Does the US use Food Safety Regulation as a Disguised Barrier to Trade? Evidence from Canadian Agri-food Commodity Exports.

Abstract

This thesis asks the question: is the US using food safety regulations illegitimately, that is as a non-tariff barrier to trade rather than to manage food safety risks, specifically in the context of agri-food imports from Canada? Data on US import refusals of three categories of fruits, vegetables and nuts, cereal products, and seafood are used as a proxy for the stringency and enforcement of US food safety regulations, with a negative binomial generalized linear model being employed to determine the significance of range of food safety risk and other less legitimate drivers of US food safety regulations. Key variables used to capture political influence on US food safety regulations are lobbying contributions changes in import prices, and the occurrence of countervailing investigations. While US border rejections for these commodities are largely explained by food safety risks, there is evidence of political influence, with qualitative and quantitative difference across the commodities.