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Cognitive Function and Beliefs in Luck in the Consumer Context

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dc.contributor.advisor Noseworthy, Theodore McManus, Justin 2014-08-29T14:02:35Z 2014-08-29T14:02:35Z 2014 2014-08-18 2014-08-29
dc.description.abstract Dual-process attribution theories suggest that attributional reasoning involves automatic judgments that are adjusted by a controlled correction process. However, this corrective process is vulnerable to failure because human cognitive capacity is of a limited pool of resources. Three experiments test whether there is a corrective process for people who hold beliefs in luck, and if so, whether cognitive constraints inhibit this process. Results suggest inhibited executive function impedes the usual correction of beliefs in luck, which facilitates future expectations of success. As such, factors within our environment that tax cognitive resources may enable people to act on beliefs in luck. This finding holds important theoretical and practical implications for gambling because these factors could range from the mindset created by financial distress or the ambient casino environment. en_US
dc.description.sponsorship Ontario Problem Gambling Research Centre en_US
dc.language.iso en en_US
dc.subject Luck en_US
dc.subject Attribution theory en_US
dc.subject Gambling en_US
dc.title Cognitive Function and Beliefs in Luck in the Consumer Context en_US
dc.type Thesis en_US Marketing and Consumer Studies en_US Master of Science en_US Department of Marketing and Consumer Studies en_US
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