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Cruelty and Callousness in Virtue Ethics: Why the Virtuous Agent Acts Well Towards Animals

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Title: Cruelty and Callousness in Virtue Ethics: Why the Virtuous Agent Acts Well Towards Animals
Author: Furac, Michael
Department: Department of Philosophy
Program: Philosophy
Advisor: Hacker-Wright, John
Abstract: The purpose of this thesis is to answer the question: “Do the virtues prevent the virtuous agent from acting badly towards animals?” I conclude that an agent who is truly virtuous will not act viciously towards animals due to the agent’s virtue. In chapter one I show that a neo-Aristotelian virtue ethic does not have any aspect internal to the theory that would prevent care or concern for animals. In chapter two I defend the theory from outside critiques, each of which challenges the viability of virtue ethics as an approach to animal ethics. Finally, chapter three is a study of two vices: cruelty and callousness. I define both vices and show why each is necessary for discussing virtue and animal ethics.
URI: http://hdl.handle.net/10214/15998
Date: 2019
Rights: Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International
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Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International Except where otherwise noted, this item's license is described as Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International