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Vaccination and the theory of games

Show simple item record Bauch, Chris T. Earn, David J. D. 2018-09-24T15:33:40Z 2018-09-24T15:33:40Z 2004 2004-07-16
dc.identifier.citation Bauch, C. T. and Earn, D. J. D. (2004). Vaccination and the theory of games. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences. 101(36): 13391-13394. en_US
dc.description.abstract Voluntary vaccination policies for childhood diseases present parents with a subtle challenge: if a sufficient proportion of the population is already immune, either naturally or by vaccination, then even the slightest risk associated with vaccination will outweigh the risk from infection. As a result, individual self-interest might preclude complete eradication of a vaccine-preventable disease. We show that a formal game theoretical analysis of this problem leads to new insights that help to explain human decision-making with respect to vaccination. Increases in perceived vaccine risk will tend to induce larger declines in vaccine uptake for pathogens that cause more secondary infections (such as measles and pertussis). Following a vaccine scare, even if perceived vaccine risk is greatly reduced, it will be relatively difficult to restore pre-scare vaccine coverage levels. en_US
dc.language.iso en en_US
dc.publisher National Academy of Sciences en_US
dc.rights NonCommerical
dc.subject game theory en_US
dc.subject vaccination en_US
dc.subject policy en_US
dc.subject decision making en_US
dc.subject perceived risk en_US
dc.title Vaccination and the theory of games en_US
dc.type Article en_US
dc.rights.holder Copyright 2004 The Authors

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