Main content

Evolutionary Game Theory and Social Learning Can Determine How Vaccine Scares Unfold

Show simple item record

dc.contributor.author Bauch, Chris T.
dc.contributor.author Bhattacharyya, Samit
dc.date.accessioned 2018-09-05T18:35:55Z
dc.date.available 2018-09-05T18:35:55Z
dc.date.copyright 2012
dc.date.issued 2012-04-05
dc.identifier.uri http://hdl.handle.net/10214/14233
dc.description.abstract Immunization programs have often been impeded by vaccine scares, as evidenced by the measles-mumps-rubella (MMR) autism vaccine scare in Britain. A "free rider" effect may be partly responsible vaccine-generated herd immunity can reduce disease incidence to such low levels that real or imagined vaccine risks appear large in comparison, causing individuals to cease vaccinating. This implies a feedback loop between disease prevalence and strategic individual vaccinating behavior. Here, we analyze a model based on evolutionary game theory that captures this feedback in the context of vaccine scares, and that also includes social learning. Vaccine risk perception evolves over time according to an exogenously imposed curve. We test the model against vaccine coverage data and disease incidence data from two vaccine scares in England & Wales: the whole cell pertussis vaccine scare and the MMR vaccine scare. The model fits vaccine coverage data from both vaccine scares relatively well. Moreover, the model can explain the vaccine coverage data more parsimoniously than most competing models without social learning and, or feedback (hence, adding social learning and feedback to a vaccine scare model improves model fit with little or no parsimony penalty). Under some circumstances, the model can predict future vaccine coverage and disease incidence-up to 10 years in advance in the case of pertussis-including specific qualitative features of the dynamics, such as future incidence peaks and undulations in vaccine coverage due to the population's response to changing disease incidence. Vaccine scares could become more common as eradication goals are approached for more vaccine-preventable diseases. Such models could help us predict how vaccine scares might unfold and assist mitigation efforts. en_US
dc.language.iso en
dc.publisher Public Library of Science en_US
dc.rights Attribution
dc.rights.uri https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/
dc.subject evolutionary game theory en_US
dc.subject vaccination en_US
dc.subject model en_US
dc.subject social learning en_US
dc.title Evolutionary Game Theory and Social Learning Can Determine How Vaccine Scares Unfold en_US
dc.type Article
dc.rights.holder Copyright 2012 Bauch, Bhattacharyya
dc.rights.license All items in the Atrium are protected by copyright with all rights reserved unless otherwise indicated.
dcterms.relation Bauch, C. T., and Bhattacharyya, S. (2012). Evolutionary Game Theory and Social Learning Can Determine How Vaccine Scares Unfold. PLoS Computational Biology 8(4): e1002452. https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pcbi.1002452


Files in this item

Files Size Format View
BauchBhattacharyya_101371journalpcbi1002452.pdf 1.910Mb PDF View/Open

This item appears in the following Collection(s)

Show simple item record

Attribution Except where otherwise noted, this item's license is described as Attribution