Main content

A platform upgrade will be performed on the Atrium Institutional Repository from Monday, July 13 to Wenesday, July 15, 2020 (inclusive). During this time, users will not be able to submit new items to the Atrium. Users will still be able to browse, view, and download items that are already available in the Atrium. We apologize for any inconvenience this may cause.

Resolving a Kantian Problem: Beyond Reconciliation to Formal Unity

Show simple item record

dc.contributor.advisor Houle, Karen
dc.contributor.advisor Mitscherling, Jeff
dc.contributor.advisor Novak, Joseph
dc.contributor.author Jordan-Stevens, Christopher
dc.date.accessioned 2018-08-27T14:39:34Z
dc.date.available 2018-08-27T14:39:34Z
dc.date.copyright 2018-08-09
dc.date.created 2018-08-09
dc.date.issued 2018-08-27
dc.identifier.uri http://hdl.handle.net/10214/14109
dc.description.abstract Kant grounds the possibility of a priori knowledge by reversing the traditional model of cognition. For him, synthetic a priori knowledge is possible only if objects conform to cognition; he “does not see how we can know anything a priori [about objects]” except if “objects conform to cognition”. Kant’s idealism (at least ‘in a nutshell’) consists in this tracing of objectivity back to functions that are, in fact, subjective. This idealism comes at a cost, however. For if we assume that objects conform to our cognition, then we are faced with the ‘thing in itself’, which is the unknowable, wahres Korrelatum (true correlate) of what appears. All kinds of metaphysically heavy problems follow from the introduction of this elusive, utterly transcendent entity. In my thesis, I hope to offer an alternative model to Kant’s own, one that is able to ground the possibility of a priori knowledge without having to resort to an idealism that results in the ‘thing in itself’. Instead of arguing that objects conform to cognition, I will claim that, at the formal level, cognition and its object are the same. They are not in need of reconciliation at all. In one way, I agree with Kant: we know this form of nature a priori because it resides in the mind. Contra Kant, however, I maintain that the objectivity of these forms – i.e. their validity with respect the empirical world – does not result from ‘subjectification’, or the constitution of objects by mind. I argue that his line of thinking develops not into rationalism or into an absolute idealism, but into a different conception of nature altogether. en_US
dc.description.sponsorship SSHRC en_US
dc.language.iso en en_US
dc.subject Kant en_US
dc.subject Metaphysics en_US
dc.subject History of Philosophy en_US
dc.title Resolving a Kantian Problem: Beyond Reconciliation to Formal Unity en_US
dc.type Thesis en_US
dc.degree.programme Philosophy en_US
dc.degree.name Doctor of Philosophy en_US
dc.degree.department Department of Philosophy en_US
dc.rights.license All items in the Atrium are protected by copyright with all rights reserved unless otherwise indicated.


Files in this item

Files Size Format View
Jordan-Stevens_Christopher_201808_PhD.pdf 1.365Mb PDF View/Open

This item appears in the following Collection(s)

Show simple item record