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Game Theoretic Scenarios of Cybersecurity Investment Models in a Sellers-Buyers Market

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dc.contributor.advisor Cojocaru, Monica Kirbyson, Spencer 2018-03-26T18:31:41Z 2018-03-26T18:31:41Z 2018-03 2018-03-07 2018-03-26
dc.description.abstract We develop three economic models that look at sellers in a marketplace. Formulated within this paper is a Nash game, a generalized Nash game and a cooperative game. The sellers compete with one another to sell a higher volume of product to the buyers in the marketplace by investing in cybersecurity. The buyers are influenced by the average cybersecurity level of all sellers. In order to solve the games we calculate the Karush-Kuhn-Tucker (KKT) conditions for each game given that each seller is trying to maximize its own expected utility function. We find that both the Nash and generalized Nash games show similar characteristics when varying parameters of the games. It is also shown that when sellers agree to cooperate in these games their expected utilities are better off than when sellers compete. en_US
dc.language.iso en en_US
dc.publisher University of Guelph en_US
dc.subject Nash Games en_US
dc.subject Cybersecurity en_US
dc.subject Generalized Nash Games en_US
dc.subject Game Theory en_US
dc.subject Optimization en_US
dc.subject Cooperative Games en_US
dc.title Game Theoretic Scenarios of Cybersecurity Investment Models in a Sellers-Buyers Market en_US
dc.type Thesis en_US Mathematics and Statistics en_US Master of Science en_US Department of Mathematics and Statistics en_US
dc.rights.license All items in the Atrium are protected by copyright with all rights reserved unless otherwise indicated. University of Guelph en_US

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