Structure of Mobilization and Democratization: Youth Activism in Tunisia, Egypt, and Jordan as Case Studies

by

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ABSTRACT

STRUCTURE OF MOBILIZATION AND DEMOCRATIZATION: YOUTH ACTIVISM IN TUNISIA, EGYPT, AND JORDAN AS CASE STUDIES

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This dissertation argues for a correlation between the dynamics of the protests at their climax and the processes of democratization in case these protests succeed. Using youth activism in Tunisia and Egypt where the protests succeeded, and in Jordan where they failed as a contrasting case study, this research shows that youth activism leads to democratization if three conditions are met at the protests’ apex: domination of autonomous youth movements, an inclusive master frame (MF), and a decentralized leadership. In doing so, the research provides an atypical narrative about the role of activists during the protests in Tunisia, Egypt, and Jordan. The primary sources that informed this research are not only based on the activists themselves, but also on the analysis of the protests videos, slogans, and documents of the youth movements. Furthermore, the research contributes to the literature on social movements in four domains. First, it reveals that the state’s use of repression and the way it uses it is a necessary condition, but is insufficient to turn a reform protest cycle into a revolution; the other necessary condition is that an autonomous opposition also must be dominant when the state uses repression. Secondly, it shows that a movement’s resources are linked more closely to its framing strategy and to its choices of the locations of the protests. Thirdly, it develops tools to measure the inclusivity and exclusivity of MFs. Finally, it provides analytical tools to study the dynamics of protests in the absence of a unified leadership. The research also arrived at three main conclusions. First, the social demands in Tunisia and Egypt were at the core of protests and poor people carried the burden of the protests. Second, activists in Tunisia and Egypt maintained unity because they did not expand on the goals of the protests. Finally, the protests in Jordan failed in part because the activists did not seek to mobilize poor Jordanians.
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I would also like to thank Dr. Francesco Cavatorta, for his early important comments on the dissertation’s framework of analysis, and for helping me developing a good knowledge of the literature on civil society.

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<td>April 15th Youth Movement</td>
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<td>A6M</td>
<td>April 6 Movement</td>
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<td>ABRI</td>
<td>Indonesian military junta</td>
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<td>ACC</td>
<td>Anti-Corruption Commission</td>
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<td>AYMs</td>
<td>Autonomous youth movements</td>
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<td>CCP</td>
<td>Chinese Communist Party</td>
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<td>CFPR</td>
<td>Council for the Protection of the Revolution</td>
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<td>CFR</td>
<td>Congress for the Republic</td>
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<td>CFSE</td>
<td>Campaign for Supporting El-Barade’</td>
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<td>CoP</td>
<td>Cycle of protest</td>
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<td>CPC</td>
<td>Civilian presidential council</td>
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<td>CRG</td>
<td>Council of the Revolution Guardians</td>
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<td>CSF</td>
<td>Central Security Forces</td>
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<td>CYR</td>
<td>Coalition of the Youth of the Revolution</td>
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<td>Ennahda</td>
<td>Islamic Ennahda Movement</td>
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<td>Ettajdid</td>
<td>Ettajdid Movement</td>
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<td>FDTL</td>
<td>Democratic Forum of Work and Liberties</td>
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<td>FSM</td>
<td>Free Students Movement</td>
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<td>GFJITU</td>
<td>General Federation of Jordanian Trade Unions</td>
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<td>GIMs</td>
<td>Grassroots informal movements</td>
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<td>GMNI</td>
<td>Concentration of Indonesian Student Movement</td>
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<td>HAMAS</td>
<td>Palestinian Islamic Resistance Movement</td>
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<td>HASHD</td>
<td>Jordan's Democratic People's Party</td>
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<td>HCAORDT</td>
<td>Higher Commission for the Achievement of the Objectives of the Revolution and the Democratic Transition</td>
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<td>HCCNOP</td>
<td>Higher Committee for the Coordination of National Opposition Parties</td>
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<td>HCFRGPRDT</td>
<td>Higher Commission for the Fulfillment of Revolution Goals, Political Reform and Democratic Transition</td>
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<td>HCRMO</td>
<td>Higher Committee for Retired Military Officers</td>
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<td>HMI</td>
<td>Association of Islamic Students</td>
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<tr>
<td>Acronym</td>
<td>Full Form</td>
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<td>IAF</td>
<td>Islamic Action Front</td>
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<td>IMC</td>
<td>Interior Ministry Circle</td>
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<td>Jayeen</td>
<td>National Campaign for Change</td>
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<td>JCP</td>
<td>Jordan Communist Party</td>
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<td>Karama</td>
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<td>M24M</td>
<td>March 24th Movement</td>
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<td>MB</td>
<td>Muslim Brotherhood</td>
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<td>MF</td>
<td>Master Frame</td>
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<td>MYM</td>
<td>Maspiro Youth Movement</td>
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<td>NCC</td>
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<td>NDC</td>
<td>National Dialogue Committee</td>
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<td>National Democratic Party</td>
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<td>NPC</td>
<td>National Progressive Current</td>
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<td>O18C</td>
<td>October 18th Coalition for Rights and Freedoms</td>
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<td>OWS</td>
<td>Occupy Wall Street movement</td>
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<td>PCR</td>
<td>Protection Committees of the Revolution</td>
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<td>PCSPI</td>
<td>Popular Committee to Support the Palestinian Intifada</td>
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<td>PDP</td>
<td>Progressive Democratic Party</td>
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<tr>
<td>PLO</td>
<td>Palestine Liberation Organization</td>
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<td>POB</td>
<td>Public Order Brigades</td>
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<td>POCT</td>
<td>Workers Communist Party</td>
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<tr>
<td>RCD</td>
<td>Constitutional Democratic Rally</td>
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<td>RS</td>
<td>Revolutionary Socialists</td>
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<td>SAP</td>
<td>Structural Adjustment Policies</td>
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<td>SCAF</td>
<td>Supreme Council of the Military Forces</td>
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<td>SCCDVM</td>
<td>Committee for Citizenry and the Defense of the Victims of Marginalization</td>
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<td>SLM</td>
<td>Social Left Movement</td>
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<td>SoM</td>
<td>Structure of Mobilization</td>
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<td>SRM</td>
<td>Spontaneous Riot Movements</td>
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<td>SSIS</td>
<td>State Security Investigation Service</td>
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TI  Transparency International
TYM  Tafilah Youth Movement
UCO  Unity Consolidation Office
UDC  Union for the Unemployed Graduates
UGET  Tunisian General Student Union
UGTT  Tunisian General Labour Union
UNEF  Union Nationale des Etudiants de France
UYR  Union of the Youth of the Revolution
WAHDA  Democratic Popular Unity Party
WRAKS  We Are All Khalid Saed
WRBC  We Are Boycotting for Change
YJF  Youth for Justice and Freedom
YMs  Youth Movements
Chapter I

Literature Review and Framework of Analysis

Part I: Literature Review

The role of youth in processes of democratization in authoritarian states has been contradictory over time and space. In Indonesia (1998), South Korea (1987), and Czechoslovakia (1989) youth activism was a driving force for democratization or a voice that demanded democratization.¹ In other places and time periods, such as in Indonesia (1966), Turkey (1960, 1971, and 1980), Iran (1978) and Thailand (1970), youth activism either directly backed up authoritarianism or contributed to the continuity of authoritarianism.² Contrary to the prevailing conventional wisdom that depicts youth as anti-system, the literature on youth movements shows that youth activists strategically chose sides.³ In Kenya (1982), youth activists supported a military coup d’état that intended to replace a civilian government while youth activists in China (1989) and Iran (1999) have been key actors in the battle against repressive regimes.⁴ In this regard, the removal of an authoritarian regime by youth activism does not necessarily lead to democratization. Instead, this removal creates only the possibility for democratic transition.

¹ For the case of Indonesia, see Aspinall, “Opposing Suharto”; For South Korea, see Kim, “South Korea”; For Czechoslovakia, see Linz and Stepan, Problems of Democratic Transition, 325-327
² For the case of Indonesia, see Bachtiar, “Indonesia”; For Turkey, see Szyliowicz, “Turkey”; For Thailand, see “Thailand”; For Iran, see Afshari and Underwood, “The student movement’s struggle.”
³ In his comments on student activism, Huntington writes “Students are the universal opposition; they oppose whatever regime exists in their society.” He describes them as the extreme opposition to all regimes. See Huntington, “The Third Wave”; Edward Shils describes youths as hostile to any authority. See Shils, “Dreams of Plenitude” 4.
⁴ For the case of China, see Zhao, “The Power of Tiananmen”; For Iran, see Yaghmaian, “Social Change In Iran”; For Kenya, see Nkinyangi, “Student Protests in Sub-Saharan Africa.”
The apparent duality of youths’ relationship to democratization warrants scholarly research. More specifically, it raises the following question: under which conditions does youth activism lead to democratization as opposed to authoritarian survival or entrenchment?

This literature review will situate youth activism within the literatures on social movements and democratization and, in doing so, it will demonstrate the need for further research into answering the aforementioned question. By analyzing scholarly writings on youth politics within these two bodies of literature, I will show that the relationship between youth activism and democratization is not sufficiently understood and requires additional investigation.

This chapter consists of two parts. The first is a literature review that situates the research question in the literatures of social movements and democratic transitions. Its main goal is to demonstrate that the conditions under which youth activism lead to democratization have not been articulated in those two literatures. The second part sets down the thesis’ framework of analysis, hypotheses, methods of inquiry, and a summary of its findings.

Part one is composed of four sections. The first section is this introduction. Section two explains the debate in the sociological and social movements’ literatures about the utility of youth as a social analytical category. Its main argument is that youth can be used as a social unit of analysis if it is conceptualized as an age cohort with shared experience. Section three reviews the literature on youth movements within the broader literature on social movements. It shows that the studies of youth activism are related either to the reasons for their activism or to student movements as a proxy for youth movements. Section four explains that research on youth and democracy is of three types: youth disengagement from politics in democratic
Western countries; the relationship between youth culture and democracy; and the role of student movements in democratization. Overall, I demonstrate that the literatures on social movements and democratization poorly discuss the relationship between youth movements and democratization. In the last section of part one, I introduce the research’s question and its contribution to the literatures on social movement theory and democratization.

Youth as an Analytical Category

This thesis defines youth as a generational age-cohort with a shared historical experience. Conceptualized as such, it argues that youth can be studied as a collective body despite the fact that young people represent different social classes and backgrounds. According to Asef Bayat (2010), the concept of ‘youth’ as a unit for social science analysis is problematic in social movement theory because the biological factor that bonds young people together - that is to say, their age - is not socially significant enough to treat them as a collective body.


Young people come from different social classes and they vary in their education and socialization, which shape their political orientations in different ways. For Pierre Bourdieu, young people constitute different social categories according to their location in the structure of social class composition. In Sociology in Question, Bourdieu (1993) differentiates between the biological age and social age by comparing different categories of youth. For him, the young who stay in school and benefit from various student subsidies are different from those who drop out and work. The first group is both socially and biologically young, while the second group is young only in reference to its biological data. Bourdieu argues that talking about the young as a social unit with common interests, and “relating these interests to a biologically

Bayat, “Life as politics.”
defined age, is in itself an obvious manipulation.”⁷ He concludes that stripping youth of their biological data turns ‘youth’ into a simple word; hence he says that “youth is nothing but a word.”⁸

Recognizing this reality, scholars approach youth as a social unit for analysis from a cultural perspective. Bayat (2010) argues that the existing studies on youth movements are of two types: studies that “assumed that such conceptual tools as ideology, organization, mobilization, framing, and the like would be adequate to assess youth as a collective body” and studies that “presume a priori that youth movements are those in which young people play the central role.” These studies, he says, do not speak directly on the “meanings and modalities of youth movements.” Instead of considering age as the main distinction between youth movements and other movements, he argues that “youth movements are ultimately about claiming or reclaiming youthfulness. And “youthfulness” signifies a particular \textit{habitus} or behavioural and cognitive dispositions that are associated with the fact of being ‘young’.” As such, Bayat explains, “the political agency of youth movements, their transformative and democratizing potential, depends on the capacity of the adversaries, the moral and political authorities, to accommodate and contain youthful claims. Otherwise, youth may remain as conservative as any other social groups.”⁹

The notion of ‘youthful claims’ explicitly suggests the existence of unified culture for youth and hence the possibility to study youth as a social unit from a cultural perspective.

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⁷ Bourdieu, \textit{Sociology in question}, 95
⁸ Ibid, 94
Youth culture is tied primarily to the development of modernization and globalization.\(^{10}\) With the advent of modernization - that is to say, the rise of bourgeoisie classes and urbanization - childhood as a transient period of unfinished adulthood gained a separate cultural role as a life-stage of innocence and freedom that had to be isolated from the responsibilities and various hardships of adulthood.\(^{11}\) Freed from economic responsibilities, young people came to be seen as a lucrative market segment and the very embodiment of the emerging mass popular culture. Viewed as a distinct identity for marketing purpose, the market reinforced the idea of youth as a social group that has a special identity. This identity expresses itself in a cultural medium, called style, as manifested in the way young people chose their cloths, their taste of music, their communication with each other, their use of technology, and their going out to spend time on recreation, which differentiates them from other social groups.\(^{12}\) This youth culture is said to be globalized through Arjun Appadurai’s (1990) five scapes: “ethnoscapes” (the flow of people), “technoscapes” (the flow of technology), “finanscapes” (the flow of finance and capital), “mediascapes” (the flow of mediated images), and “ideoscapes” (the flow of ideas and ideologies).\(^{13}\) Youth according to this analysis constitutes a global homogeneous social unit with a specific cultural identity.

There are, however, two major problems in approaching youth as a category of analysis from a cultural perspective. First, the assumption that young people possess a homogeneous culture is contested. Culture is related to social class; that is to say, it is related to the position of each social class in the structure of society. Thus while it may make sense to speak about a

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\(^{10}\) Appadurai, “Disjuncture and Difference.”

\(^{11}\) Valentine, Skelton, and Chambers, “Cool Places.”

\(^{12}\) Kjeldgaard and Askegaard, “The glocalization of youth culture.”

\(^{13}\) Appadurai, “Disjuncture and Difference.”
homogenous culture for the middle class, the culture of lower or the upper middle class, is not the same. The fact that middle class people comprise the majority of youth as a category in Western countries cannot be generalized to youth everywhere. For example, in many underdeveloped countries, poor people constitute an important segment of their societies.

Second, the literature on youth as a category for analysis provides overwhelming evidence that youth tends to appropriate Western middle-class youth culture to fit their own environment. In the process of appropriation, youth culture loses some of its global homogeneity in order to be accepted by local society. For example, Henry Jenkins (2004) shows how the process of recontextualization mediated imagery across cultures often leads to unpredictable and contradictory meanings to them at the sites of consumption.

In contrast to the cultural approach of youth as a social category, this thesis treats youth as a generation, as “an age cohort with a shared historical experience.” According to Karl Mannheim (1959/1983), just as a social class position can be defined as a common location in the economic and power structure of a given society, the unity of a generation is constituted by “a similarity of location of a number of individuals within a social whole.” A generation in this sense is “a particular type of social location.” In order for a generation to share the same location, Mannheim explains, “one must be born within the same historical and cultural region” and “exposed to the social and intellectual symptoms of the process of dynamic

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14 Neyzi, “Object or subject?”; Kjeldgaard and Askegaard, “The glocalization of youth culture.”
15 Povlsen, “Global teen soaps”; Wattanasuwan, “The Buddhist self and symbolic consumption”;
16 Jenkins, “Pop Cosmopolitanism”, p. 154
17 Neyzi, “Object or subject?”
18 Mannheim, “The sociological problem of generations”, 167
19 Ibid, 168
destabilization.” This ‘nexus’ between age cohort and social change within the lifespan of the cohort is what shapes a generation’s political consciousness. Membership in a generation can be described as “participation in the common destiny of this historical and social unit (emphasis original).” In this sense, the fact that young people have a similar age “does not in itself involve similarity of location” for what creates a similar of location is that they, the young people, must be “exposed to the same phase of the collective process” and “experience the same events and data” and which “impinge upon a similarly ‘stratified’ consciousness.” This implies that each generation is inherited with “definite modes of behavior, feeling, and thought.”

Within a generation, Mannheim explains, there might be generation units. A generation unit “represents a much more concrete bond than the actual generation” for it is the product of “the great similarity in the data making up the consciousness of its members”, especially mental data because “they cause the individuals sharing them to form one group—they have a socializing effect.” A generation unit is characterized by “an identity of responses, a certain affinity in the way in which all move with and are formed by their common experiences.” Thus within any generation there can exist a “number of differentiated, antagonistic generation units.” In short, a cohort age generation is characterized by a shared memory, experience, and destiny stemming from being exposed to similar socio-historical changes that formulate their

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20 Ibid, 182-183
21 Ibid, 176
22 Ibid, 169
23 Ibid, 184
24 Ibid, 187
political consciousness and endow them with certain tendencies of thought, feeling, and behaviour.

This definition has three merits. First, it presupposes that a generation forms a particular consciousness and acquires certain tendencies when exposed to macro-social changes. In this regard, because of the neo-liberal economic policies introduced in late 70s and 80s, we can treat the youth generation that borne during this period and grew up with shared experience and consciousness about the effect of these policies on them as a social unit. Indeed, several scholars attributed the rise of youth movements that swept different countries such as Greece in 2008, the Arab MENA countries in early 2011, Spain in May 2011, and the United States and Canada in late 2011 to the neo-liberal economic policies. Second, Mannheim’s point about a generational political consciousness implies the possibility that the youth can act together to change their socio-political environment. And, finally, the concept of a generation unit recognizes the reality that although a generation has particular tendencies (e.g., hope for social justice), this fact does not guarantee that it is in favor of democratic ideals, because the generation units (the different youth groups) have their own definitions of the meaning of social justice and how to achieve it. To summarize, a generation according Mannheim ([1927]/1952), is described by the three locations: “a shared temporal location (i.e. generational site or birth cohort), shared historical location (i.e. generation as actuality-- exposure to a common period or era), and a shared socio-cultural location (i.e. generational consciousness-- or ‘entelechy’).” It is the combination of these three locations that make up a generation and that make it possible to analyze youth as a social unit.


26 Quoted in Gillear,d and Higgs, “The third age.”
Youth in Social Movement Theory

As Bayat (2010) explains, there are myriad social science studies on youth-related themes such as, exclusion, violence, religious radicalism, AIDS, and identity. The scope of scholarly inquiry on youth activism remains, however, limited and can be divided into two categories: studies related to the reasons for youth activism and research examining student movements as proxies for youth movements. However, these two bodies of literature on social movements do not touch on the conditions under which youth activism leads to democratization.

Reasons for youth activism

Following the mass protests of youth that took place in the 1960s in the United States and Europe, scholars sought to understand what motivated the rise of youth movements in democratic states. Using theories of collective behaviour and class structure, scholars in the United States and Europe linked the rise of youth movements to the activists’ psychological dispositions, generational conflict, and the struggle between the dominant class and the youth.

More recent studies on causes of youth activism are focused on its material basis. The issues of unemployment, social and political marginalization, the restructuring of the education system to fit into the neoliberal economy, and the long waiting period youth must bear before

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28 The school of psychological disposition assumes that youth movements are associated with violence. The sources of it are “obscure and subconscious going back to early childhood” and can be explained in terms of children struggling against their parents. Because of their feelings of guilt they direct their hatred at public institutions. See Zavalloni, Louis-Guerin, and BenBrika, “Students, values, and politics,” p. 7. Scholars who rooted their analysis in the conflict between two generations, the young and the old, argue that the younger generation is more radical and more hostile toward any authority than their predecessors three or four decades prior. See Shils, “Dreams of Plenitude,” 1-31. The new Marxists perceive student movements as a revolutionary force that would assume the mission of the proletariat and generate social transformation toward a more just political system. See Marcuse, “One Dimensional Man.” These theories, however, are contested on the basis that the individuals of social movements are rational actors that a generational gap cannot explain why youth movements appeared in the 60s and not before, and that students do not form a social class.
being able to establish a normal life lie at the core of youth activism. The December 2008 Greek youth movement, for example, was not made up only of high school and university students but also of youth from “vocational training centers, young workers, middleclass youths and youths facing social exclusion, Greeks and immigrants.”29 It centered on the high rate of unemployment amongst youth, the low wages offered by employers, and the difficulties of securing a job following graduation. The reform of education sector, was aimed at “increasing access to post-secondary education” but at the same time of “making sure that university degrees do not lead to guaranteed work prospects” as reforms brought “higher education closer to business interests” and intended to “disciplining the student Movement” (Sotiris, 2010).30 The youth movements that swept across many Arab countries in early 2011 were found to be in part a result of increased unemployment among youth, especially young graduates, and in broader context, the failure of neoliberal policies.31 A survey conducted by Hoffman and Jamal (2012) found that the protestors in Arab countries were mostly young, unemployed, and educated.32 Finally, Diane Singerman (2013) found that one of the important reasons for youth protests in Arab countries was what she referred to as the youth ‘waithood’: a concept that describes the long period of time the Arab youth have to wait for their education to be translated into jobs, and then their jobs to provide the economic conditions required for marriage.33 Waithood, as Zina Sawaf (2013) explains, “implies a period of protracted adolescence for Arab youth, not before which they are

29 Sotiris, “Rebels with a cause.”
30 Ibid
32 Hoffman, and Jamal, “The youth and the Arab spring.”
33 Singerman, “Youth, Gender”; on the same subject of waithood, see Force, “Reaching Out”; see also Li, Savage, and Pickles, “Social capital and social exclusion.”
able to enter adulthood.”

In a similar way, scholars who wrote on the Occupy Wall Street youth movement considered the measures of neoliberal economics to be the cause for the protests. Measures such as minimizing government authority, reducing taxes on the wealthy, restricting financial support for the poor, limiting the power of the labor unions, removing or lowering the trade tariffs, and loosening the regulations on financial and commerce. When all these measures are combined together, the result is the accumulation of wealth in the hands of one percent of the American people while the wealth of the remaining ninety-nine percent of people declines. In this sense, occupy movement was all about social justice and resentment to social inequality.

**Research on student activism**

Because a large segment of youth is students, many scholars have considered the two categories identical. Hence there was a greater focus on student activism in the 1960s in the United States, though the participants in the antiwar and civil rights movements were from the broader category of youth. Similarly, the focus on the democratic movements in Iran (1999), Indonesia (1998), South Korea (1987), and Czechoslovakia (1989) was on student movements rather than on the category of youth in general who participated in these movements. This should not be surprising due to both theoretical and methodological reasons. Theoretically, unlike with students, who constitute a distinct category of youth due to their clear social location as a group in preparation for work, the validity of youth as a social unit for analysis is debatable (see above). Methodologically, it is much easier to study students than youth because the former socialize with each other, interact under similar institutions, and form organizations which make it easier

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34 Sawaf, "Youth and the revolution."


to study them. Research on student activism, however, has focused mainly on activists’ social backgrounds, attitudes, academic specialities, and on the institutional conditions that foster their activism such as university size, and quality of education. It should be noted that these variables were not studied in terms of how student activism assisted or impeded democratization. Rather, studying the conditions conducive to student activism was an end in itself.

Research on student activists’ attitudes finds that the activists are mostly “left-oriented” students who come from relatively comfortable socioeconomic backgrounds, study in prestigious universities, and are among the most intelligent students.\(^\text{37}\) The studies also find a correlation between the size of the university and activism. In large universities, students tend to feel isolated and disconnected from faculty. When socializing with activists, they become disposed to revolt.\(^\text{38}\) Researchers also found that colleges with higher admission standards (elite universities) are more likely to witness student activism.\(^\text{39}\) Furthermore, in Western countries, scholars find that the activists tend to study social sciences and humanities.\(^\text{40}\) In contrast, in authoritarian states these findings are different. For example, Ahmed Abdalla’s (1985) study of the student movements in Egypt shows that the engineering colleges were always the source of activism. Engineering, medical and pharmaceutical colleges in ‘Third World’ countries, he explains, were always regarded by people in Third World countries as the prestigious disciplines.\(^\text{41}\) Diego Gambetta and Steffen Hertog (2009) find that engineers, medicines, and


\(^{39}\) Lipset, “Introduction: Students and Politics,” xxi.

\(^{40}\) Lipset and Altbach, “Student politics and higher education.”

\(^{41}\) Abdalla, “The student movement.”
graduates from other natural scientific studies constitute the majority of the Islamic movement cadres. In fact, they find the majority of the violent Islamic movements’ activists to be engineers.\textsuperscript{42} Finally, in his study ‘The General Union of the Tunisian Students’ Adel Althabiti (2011) finds that in the 1980,s Islamists students controlled student councils in the natural science colleges, while liberal students were dominant in the art colleges.\textsuperscript{43}

Scholars of student movements also investigate the resources available to a movement that facilitate activism. In particularly, the focus has been on student organizations, the availability of allies in other student movements, and spatial factors. Scholars find a correlation between a student organization’s size, structure, leadership and external resources on the one hand, and student activism on the other. Belden A. Fields’ (1970) study on the ‘Union nationale des étudiants de France’ (UNEF) confirms that the size of student organizations influences their leaders’ legitimacy and the resources available to them, especially finances and manpower (98). He also finds that hierarchal student organizations hinder the participation of students in activism because top-down organizations cannot address the diverse attitudes of students (106).\textsuperscript{44} Similarly, Abdalla (1985) finds that student organizations in Egypt enjoyed abundant societal resources during the period of struggle for independence.\textsuperscript{45} Scholars on student movements find also contradicting results in regards to student organizational autonomy (independence of political organization). For Shinil Kim (1989) and Edward Aspinall (2005), student organizations’ autonomy is considered a resource that facilitates activism because it allows different student organizations to form coalitions in order to sustain activism and it

\textsuperscript{42} Gambetta, and Hertog, "Why are there so many Engineers among Islamic Radicals?"

\textsuperscript{43} Althabiti, The General Union of the Tunisian Students

\textsuperscript{44} Fields, “Student Politics in France.”

\textsuperscript{45} Abdalla, “The student movement.”
encourages different social groups to join protests. In contrast, Frank Bonilla and Myron Glazer (1970), who studied the student movements in Chile and Argentina, find that student activists who were members of political parties were able to influence their parties’ decisions through their dominant youth sections and to expand activism.

Scholars on student movements also disagree on whether student activism is a result of the existence of political opportunity such as the presence of a perceived ally or due to threat of losing established benefits such as low admission fees or political freedoms, or even on whether it can arise when the political opportunity structure is closed. Harsja Bachtiar (1989) notes that student movements in Indonesia flourished in the period when there was an alliance between military leaders and student activists between 1965 and 1966. In Kenya, John A. Nkinyangi (1991) observed that students engaged in sustained activism to support the failed military coup d’état in 1982 revealing an alliance between them and the army generals. Behzad Yaghmaian (2002) argues that the student movement in Iran in late 1990s was a result of both a political opportunity and a threat. Following the election of the reformist president Mohammad Khatami in 1997, secular students, who lacked their own organizations, used the Unity Consolidation Office (UCO - the Islamic official student organization) to organize activities in support for Khatami. Once the secular students’ gains came under threat when the Parliament decided to restrict freedom of press, students launched a campaign of protests in

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46 Kim, “South Korea”; Aspinall, “Opposing Suharto.”
47 Bonilla and Glazer, “Student Politics in Chile.”
48 Bachtiar, “Indonesia.” According to Batchiar, an organisation of communist student activists and Sukarno allies killed a small number of soldiers. In response, the military under General Suharto leadership asked its allies mainly Islamists student to engage in campaign of protests against President Sukarno. During these massive protests, General Suharto asked Sukarno to resign and transfer power to him.
49 Nkinyangi, “Student Protests in Sub-Saharan Africa.”
Tehran and other cities in July 1999 to maintain them. Researchers on the 1989 Chinese Student Movement find that student activism occurred during a rift between the leaders of Chinese Communist Party (CCP) following the death of Hu Yaobang, the Secretary General of the CCP until 1986, who was perceived as the leader of the reformers within CCP.\textsuperscript{51} Other scholars, such as Charles Kurzman (1996), Timur Kuran (1989) and Mark Granovetter (1978), note that social movements appear also when political opportunities are closed. The persistence of social movements, they explain, is due to the way in which such movements open opportunities by provoking new social groups to join the protests and/or by forcing a cleavage between the state elites.\textsuperscript{52} In this regard, the sustained student activism in South Korea (1987) and Indonesia (1998) encouraged labour forces, civil society organizations, and political parties to join the protests which created divisions among the ruling elites.\textsuperscript{53}

Studies on student movements also emphasize the importance of ‘ecological’ factors in facilitating student activism.\textsuperscript{54} The presence of free places inside campuses and the territorial segregation of students, according to David A. Snow and Doug McAdam (2010), and Dingxin

\textsuperscript{50} Yaghmaian, “Social Change In Iran,” 109.

\textsuperscript{51} Zhao, “The Power of Tiananmen”; Kristof, “How the Hardliners Won”

\textsuperscript{52} See Kurzman, “Structural Opportunity and Perceived Opportunity”; Kuran, “Now out of Never”; Granovetter, “Threshold models.” These scholars base their arguments on the critical-mass approach to collective action, which argues that protestors define opportunities with reference to pattern of oppositional activities. Kurzman (1996) argues that protests in Iran in 1977 which ended by toppling the Shah in February 1979 were based on the opposition perception to its strength. The persistence of the secular protests despite the severe repression, he argues, has incited other groups to join the protests such as the Islamists who became involved in the Revolution only in late 1978. The fracturing of the state took place in the last few days of the Shah’s rule when a unit in the Air Force joined the revolution. Kuran (1989) contends that each individual has their own “revolutionary threshold” that depends on the information available for her about others. He claims some individuals, depending on their threshold, will join the protest when there are relatively few people protesting in the street, while others will wait until the protests reach thousands. Granovetter (1978) claims that “[t]he cost to an individual of joining a riot declines as riot size increases” and that “the probability of being apprehended is smaller the larger the number involved.”

\textsuperscript{53} Kim, “South Korea,” 175; Aspinall, “Opposing Suharto,” 129.

\textsuperscript{54} McAdam and Snow define the ecological factors as “special arrangement and physical places that may facilitate or impede the development and character of movement challenges to authority. See Snow and McAdam, “Readings on Social Movement,” 187.
Zhao (2010), facilitate networking, ties among students, and ease student gathering. Aldon Morris (2010) found that the black churches and colleges have provided organizational infrastructure, associational connections, and free spaces for the black Southern student movement sit-in in America to organize, strategize, and mobilize.

The literature on student movements reveals that student activists use both violent and non-violent tactics to achieve their goals. The use of nonviolent tactics such as peaceful demonstrations, silent marches, sit-ins, hunger strikes, and the refusal to attend classes in Southern Korea in 1987 and Indonesia in 1998 attracted a significant portion of those participants. By contrast, student activists’ use of armed violence in Brazil (1964) and Turkey (1960, 1971, and 1980) destroyed their political movement and provoked the military into declaring emergency powers and override the civilian government. In 1987 South Korea students enjoyed massive public support, but once they started using violence (Molotov cocktails against riot police) they began losing this support (Choi, 1991). However, scholars disagree on the sources of violence of student activists. While some of them, like Joseph S. Szyliowicz (1989), attribute the violence in Turkey to the radical ideology of student activists, Harish Chandola (1976) accuses the authoritarian regime in Thailand of using college students

55 Snow and McAdam, “Readings on Social Movement”; Zhao, “Ecologies of Social Movements,”197;
56 Morris, “Black Southern Student.”
57 According to social movement theory, when social movements act to address their constituents’ grievances, they draw from a repertoire of collection actions. This repertoire, according to Tarrow (2008), consists of “what they know how to do and what others expect them to do.” See Tarrow, Power in Movement, 31.
58 Kim, “South Korea”; Aspinall, “Opposing Suharto”; It should be noted that student movements in Indonesia in 1966 was violent. According to Hefner (2000), during the campaign against the communists following Suharto coup d’état, the student activists (allies then to Suharto) participated in the prosecution of the communist students. See Hefner, “Civil Islam.”
60 Choi, “The Societal Impact of Student Politics.”
(students who attend two years of study as opposed to four years at universities) to bomb peaceful demonstrations of university students in early 1970s.\textsuperscript{61} Kay Z. Smith (1997) considers student violence between 1991 and 1996 in Mali a result of the state failure to abide by a previous agreement signed with the Association of Students and Pupils of Mali (AEEM) following the downfall of the authoritarian regime in 1991.\textsuperscript{62}

Finally, the literature on student movements explains how student activists framed their claims in order to recruit new students to the movement, reach the broader public and justify their actions against state authorities.\textsuperscript{63} In Uruguay, Peru, South Korea, Turkey, and Thailand government and regime authorities were framed as stooges of imperialism.\textsuperscript{64} In Mali and Nigeria, students depicted themselves as victims of Structural Adjustment Policies.\textsuperscript{65} In China, student activists depicted the Communist Party leaders as “corrupt.” They used deep and emotive symbols rooted in Chinese culture to express their anger toward the government, and to attract students and public support.\textsuperscript{66} Understanding that the political parties did not want to amend the constitution, in Colombia, student activists focused between 1989 and 1990 on electing a “National Constituent Assembly” to amend the constitution. Their campaign received

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\textsuperscript{61} Chandola, “Growing Student Movement.”

\textsuperscript{62} Smith, “From Demons to Democrats.”

\textsuperscript{63} According Wiktorowicz, social movements “articulate and disseminate frameworks of understanding that resonate with potential participants and broader publics to elicit collective action.” This process of framing the problem and its solution provides a “rational to motivate support and collective action.” See Wiktorowicz, \textit{Islamic Activism}, 15-6; the process of frame as explained by Tarrow (2008) also “defines the ‘us’ and ‘them’ in a movement conflict structure.” See Tarrow, \textit{Power in Movement}, 21; and as Clark explicates, framing is a main source of forming a movement’s identity. See Clark, \textit{Islamic, Charity}, 28.

\textsuperscript{64} For Uruguay, see Van Aken, “The Radicalization”; For Peru, see McClintock, “Why Peasants Rebel”; For Sothe Korea, see Kim, “South Korea”; For Turkey, see Szyliowicz, “Turkey”; For Thailand, see Samudavanija, “Thailand.”

\textsuperscript{65} For Mali, see Smith, "From Demons to Democrats”; For Nigeria, see Shettima, “Structural Adjustment.”

\textsuperscript{66} Yang, “Achieving Emotions”; Gunn, “Tell the World About Us.”
wide public support and Colombian political parties were forced to accept it in order to maintain their constituencies.67

Thus far, I have illustrated that the literature on youth activism within the literature of social movements has been mostly concerned with the causes of youth activism rather than with the relationship between youth activism and democratization. I also showed that the literature on student activism, as a proxy for youth activism, addresses themes that lie at the heart of social movement theories including the institutional conditions that facilitate or obstruct students’ activism, the rise of student movements as a response to the political opportunity structures in authoritarian states and the effect of resources on their activism. I also addressed how student activists used several tactics to achieve their goals. However, these themes are studied from the perspective of how they ease or hinder youth activism, rather than from the perspective of the relationship between activism and democratization.

**Youth Activism and Democratization**

In this section, I examine the literature on youth activism within the literature of democratization. My objectives are twofold: illustrating that the literature on democratization does not examine the conditions under which youth activism leads to democratization, and demonstrating that youth have been found to have played an important role in democratization.

The literature on youth and youth movements in relation to democracy can be divided into three categories. The first category focuses on youth disengagement from politics, mainly in democratic Western countries. The second type addresses the relationship between youth

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67 Dugas, “The Origin, Impact and Demise.”
culture and democracy. The third and last group speaks to the role of student movements in democratization. In the following paragraphs, I review this literature within these categories.

**Youth and civic engagement**

Vibrant democracies are characterized by public participation in the processes of decision making that shape their lives.\(^6^8\) Gabriel A. Almond and Sidney Verba (1963) considered “civic culture” and “participation” essential elements for a healthy democracy.\(^6^9\) However, in considering some of the pathologies of Western democracies, such as “passive citizenship”\(^7^0\) and the “decline of social capital,”\(^7^1\) scholars have paid significant attention to the progressive decline of youth participation or engagement in conventional politics. As an electoral commission in Britain (2002) explains, this disengagement is evident in the low turnout of youth in elections, the low percentage of youth membership in political parties, and the diminishing number of youth in civic organizations.\(^7^2\) For example, the Center for Information and Research on Civic Learning and Engagement (Circle) finds the young voters’ (age between 18-29 years) share of the electorate in presidential elections has declined continuously from 24.2% in 1972 to 15.4% in 2012.\(^7^3\) Similarly, Amy K. Syvertsen et al., (2011) find a decline in adolescents’ conventional and alternative civic participation. Trends in conventional participation such as writing to public officials and working in a political campaign declined

\(^6^8\) Held, “Models of democracy.”

\(^6^9\) Almond, and Verba. "The civic culture."

\(^7^0\) Crick, “Education for Citizenship.”

\(^7^1\) Putnam, “Bowling Alone.”

\(^7^2\) Electoral Commission, "Voter engagement and young people."

\(^7^3\) Center for Information & Research on Civic Learning and Engagement, "The Youth Vote in 2012."
from 27% in 1977 to 20% in 2005, and in alternative civic activities such as community services from 28% to 20% in 2005.  

Social scientists identified three reasons for youth disengagement from politics. The first is said to be the culture of individualization. The current generation of young people, according to James Sloam (2007), “sees themselves as individuals distanced from the state and politics, increasingly viewing the provision of housing, jobs and pensions as their own responsibility.” This sense of individualism is amplified by a lack of confidence in political authorities which draws youth away from politics. The second is the set of socio-economic structural conditions that marginalize youth. Participation of young people in politics depends on social class, education, and gender and ethnicity among other things. Hard data that support these findings vary along time and space (between developed and developing countries and within them). However, there is a general agreement among scholars that young people who come from middle class families are more generally engaged in politics while young people from less privileged families are less engaged (Beck and Jennings, 1982; Plutzer 2002; McFarland and Thomas, 2006). Related to this is scholars’ finding that the more the young people are educated, the more likely they will engage in politics (Flanagan and Levine, 2010; Levinson, 2010; Verba, Burns, Lehman, 2003). Indeed, Laura Wray-Lake and Daniel Hart (2012) find that the odd of “[a] one unit increase in educational attainment” of young people is the “higher odds [that they

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74 Syvertsen et al., "Thirty-Year Trends in US Adolescents’ Civic Engagement.
75 Sloam, "Rebooting democracy."
76 Pattie, Seyd, and Whiteley, “Citizenship in Britain,” 44.
77 Sloam, “Rebooting democracy.”
will vote] in presidential elections” of the United States. Similarly, scholars find that young female individuals and young individuals from ethnic minorities are less likely to engage in most institutionalized political (Verba, Burns, Schlozman, 1997; Booth-Tobin, Han 2010; Burns, Schlozman 2001). Finally, scholars argue that the younger generation has a set of values that disengage them from conventional politics. Here the focus is on the post-materialist values such as individual autonomy, self-expression, and choice. This affects young people vis-à-vis conventional politics toward single issues policies (e.g., issues of individual interests and generational concerns) and issues related to ‘new social movements’ (e.g., issues of environment and fair trade).

**Youth culture and democracy**

Scholars who study youth culture focus on how culture may be a tool of resistance to what is perceived by young people as forms of injustice. Because such cultural resistance lies within the category of freedom of speech and is tuned toward establishing a more egalitarian society, it may be perceived as a means to end social injustice in democratic states and a means of democratization in authoritarian states.

As a means to resist social injustice in democratic states, Daniel A. Foss and Ralph W. Larkin (1976) for example, identify five sub-cultures of the white middle class youth of the 1960s that correspond to the “tentative conjunction of circumstances experienced in the social

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80 Wray-Lake, , and Hart, “Growing social inequalities in youth civic engagement?.”
81 Burns, and Schlozman, *The private roots of public action*; Verba, Schlozman, and Brady, *Voice and equality*; Booth-Tobin, and Han, “Motivated by change”; Verba, Burns, and Schlozman, “Knowing and caring about politics.”
82 Inglehart and Welzel, *Modernization, cultural change.*
83 Kimberlee, “Why don't British young.”
environment.” The hippies (1965-67) constitute one of these forms of culture, they explain, and represent a shared form of cultural revolt that revolved around drugs, sex, music and individualistic mysticism in the face of what youth perceived as “bureaucratic rationality.”

Similarly, Andreana Clay (2003) considers hip-hop music a form of cultural capital that was used to construct the young Black identity boundaries as a means to unite them to demand more inclusivity in American society. Sunaina Maira (2008) finds that Palestinian Americans’ adaptations and utilization of rap music aims to raise American awareness of the Palestinians’ struggle for “self-determination” as well as to tackle “issues of racism, inequality, and imperialism.”

Finally, the Occupy movement in Spain, Greek, and the United States expressed distrust in and rejection of established political channels operating through representative democracy by adopting a discourse and practice that emphasized participatory democracy. The youth in these countries adopted shared organizational principles that were based on ‘horizontal’ forms that emphasized consensus of decision making. In fact, the youth in Occupy Wall Street movement (OWS) refused to make direct demands out of fear that their demands could be perceived as “recognizing the legitimacy—or at least the power—of those of whom the demands are made.” This argument, however, is contested. For Alasdair Roberts (2012), “because OWS operated by consensus, agreement on a menu of reforms was unattainable.”

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84 Foss and Larkin, “From ‘The gates of Eden.’”
85 Clay, “Keepin’it Real Black Youth.”
86 Maira, “We Ain't Missing.”
87 Macpherson and Smith, “Occupy as a World Anti-Systemic Movement.”
88 Byrne, “The occupy handbook,” 144.
89 Roberts, “Why the Occupy.”
As a form of resistance in authoritarian states, young people express their dissatisfaction with political system by adopting cultural models that do not conform to the culture these regimes subscribe to and spread. For example, in her study of the Russian youth movement ‘Oborona,’ Laura Lyytikäinen (2013) shows that youth activists adopted a culture emphasizing “the importance of non-conformism and traditional dissident values” in order to “draw parallels between the contemporary government (in Russia) and the totalitarian Soviet state.” Manfred Stock (1994) explains how young people in East Germany resisted the communist regime by adopting different life-styles from the ones the ruling party encouraged, which sought to inculcate the public with socialist values. Thus, various young groups like “ punks, heavy metals, grufties, skinheads, and rappers” used subversive “apolitical symbols to dissociate themselves from the culture shaped by the State.” Andrzej W. Tymowski (1994) explains the importance of this form of resistance. He notes that because these subcultures were adopted from the West, a culture which the authorities officially branded as hostile, they were especially well-suited for resistance. Stock and Tymowski, however, do not inform us how this ‘apolitical’ passive resistance of ‘young people’ turned into the form of political activism, which eventually toppled the regime in East Germany.

There are some exceptions to the broader trends of this literature. For example, Bayat’s study of the effects of different authoritarian regimes types in Iran and Egypt on youths as they struggle to assert their own habitus. Defining habitus as “a series of dispositions, ways of being, feeling, and carrying oneself ( … ) that are associated with the sociological fact of ‘being

90 Lyytikäinen, "Gendered and classed."
91 Stock, “Youth Culture in East Germany."
92 Tymowski, “Youth Activism in the East European.”
young’,” he finds that in Iran, “where moral and political authority converged, draconian social control gave rise to a unique youth identity and collective defiance” that focus on youth’s “defense of their habitus.” In Egypt, because the regime (Mubarak’s regime) did not attempt to exert a draconian moral and social control, the Egyptian youth, “opted for the strategy of ‘accommodating innovation,’ attempting to adjust their youthful claims within existing political, economic, and moral norms.” Bayat concludes that the Iranian youth may play a democratizing role in their efforts to assert youthfulness claims while this might not be the case in Egypt.\(^{93}\)

Although authoritarian regime type is connected with youth cultural and political orientations, the claim that young people are more likely to support democracy in countries ruled by culturally conservative regimes is not supported by consistent evidence. Indeed, in the recent uprisings in Arab states, youth were the main drivers of regime change in Tunisia and Egypt, even though these regimes were culturally less conservative. Finally, Anna Biaszkiewicz (1994) writes on the role of young strikers in Poland in bringing about democracy. Initiated by the young workers at Gdansk port, in May and then again in August, 1988, a wave of strikes swept across Poland. The young strikers employed the slogan “there can be no freedom without Solidarity.” The strikes continued until the authoritarian government held roundtable negotiations with the Solidarity movement.\(^{94}\) However, Biaszkiewicz’s study is more about the role of young working class people in changing the regime in Poland than about the role of youth as a cross-cutting social category.

\(^{93}\) Bayat, \textit{Life as politics}, 120

\(^{94}\) Biaszkiewicz, “The Solidarnose Spring?”
Student activism and democratization

Even if we treat students as a proxy for the category of youth, the research question on the conditions under which youth activism leads to democratization remains valid. In the literature on democratization, the role of students appears in three forms. First, in reference to the main causes of rifts among the ruling elites, student activism is treated as an instrument for delegitimizing and destabilizing authoritarian regimes. Second, in the process leading to democratization, student activism is considered for its effects upon the resources and the strategies of reformers amongst ruling elites and the moderate leaders of oppositions. Finally, when authoritarian regimes are overthrown and the transition toward democracy begins, students are viewed the main force for democratization. Furthermore, there are cases were student activism led to the continuation and entrenchment of authoritarianism. However, in all these cases, youths are neither the subject of analysis as a social unit, nor are the conditions under which their activism led to democratization addressed.

In general, scholars who study processes of democratization use either a bottom-up or a top-down approach. The bottom-up approach focuses on the role of civil society in generating democratization through mobilization. Student activists in this context serve as delegitimizers and destabilizers, and play a key role in creating rifts amongst incumbent elites and hence drive the beginning of a liberalization process. In some cases examined according to this approach, student activism enforces democratization. In contrast, the top-down approach studies the role of

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95 Collier (1999) used this division to study the role of the working class in the processes of democratization in Western Europe and South America (Collier, Paths toward democracy). Przeworski (1991) used the same approach to argue that liberalization starts with rift among elites (Przeworski, Democracy and the market). Karl and Schmitter (1991) also used this approach to define four modes of transition in Southern Europe, Latin America, and East Europe. The modes of transition take the forms of reform (peaceful demonstration) and revolutions (violent protest) when democratization forces enforced from below, and it takes the forms of pacts and impassioning when elites enforced democratization from above. See Karl and Schmitter, Modes of transition.
incumbents alone, or of their strategic interaction (negotiation and bargaining) with moderate opposition leaders to bring about democratization. In this regard, student activism in the process between liberalization and democratization plays a functional role; it alters the resources and the strategies of the actors who negotiate the transitions.

In the bottom-up approach, scholars such as Michael Bratton and Nicolas Van de Walle (1992) attribute many of the authoritarian regimes’ moves toward liberalization in Africa between 1990 and 1991 to student activism. Students in Cote d’Ivoire, Kenya, Sierra Leon, Togo, Zaire and Zimbabwe, they claim, were the most active group in demanding democracy when compared to other social groups such as labor, civil servants and religious communities. Much of the student activism started in response to economic hardships due to high commodity prices, high university fees, and inadequate university facilities. However, students politicized their demands both in response to repression and as they moved to form coalitions with other social groups (the exceptions were Zimbabwe and Kenya where students started off their activism with political demands). These protests undermined the legitimacy of authoritarian regimes and forced them to open up their political systems.96

In Indonesia, student activism in 1998 fragmented the regime’s unity, contributing to the overthrow of Suharto, and brought about democratization after over thirty years of authoritarianism. According to Anders Uhlin (2000), “without the mass protests organized by student activists and other societal groups, Suharto would probably have been able to stay in power.”97 Despite the regime’s brutality, the continuation of student activism facilitated the

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96 Bratton and Walle, “Popular Protest."
97 Uhlin, “Towards an Integration.”
disintegration of the Indonesian military junta (ABRI). In their effort to preserve the integrity of military institutions, the ABRI chose to abandon Suharto and forced him to resign. According to Uhlin, students united Indonesia’s divided civil society around the objective of ousting Suharto. And in contrast to the position of the leaders of the opposition, the students maintained their activism so that the military was forced to keep its promise of conducting a free election in 1999 (which it did).

In South Korea, students were the force behind liberalization and the driving force leading to democratization. According to Samuel P. Huntington (1991), the movement for democracy in South Korea in 1980s became a serious threat to the military regime when “middle class professionals joined the students in demanding the end of authoritarianism.” Attributing a serious threat to the spread of protests, the military rulers of South Korea preferred to extricate themselves from the government and to reach a compromise with the leaders of opposition for a new constitution. Writing on the same subject, Adam Przeworski (1991) considers student activism the main factor that “led to a break in the regime and transformed (incumbent) liberalizers to democratizers.”

In the case of Czechoslovakia, student activism in 1989 led to the disintegration of elites within the communist party and eventually to the overthrow of the regime and to the opening of a transitory period. Huntington recounts that the ‘mass demonstrations’ opened the road for the

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98 Hefner, *Civil Islam.*
99 Uhlin, “Towards an Integration”
100 Ibid
101 Aspinall, “Opposing Suharto.”
102 Huntington, “Third Wave,” 68.
104 Przeworski, “Democracy and the market,” 60.
negotiations between the leadership of the communist party and the opposition. But Juan J. Linz and Alfred Stepan (1996) attribute the collapse of the communist regime to eight days of student protests that fractured the communist party to the extent that the party’s youth branches at the universities joined the protests. Michael McFaul (2002) agrees with Linz and Stepan: not only “were [there] never cooperative negotiations between the communists and the street leaders” in the case of Czechoslovakia, he claims, but the opposition leaders also “were not previously members of the elite; they became important actors only because of their widespread societal support.” Kuran (1991) considers the success of the general strike of November 27, 1989 in Czechoslovakia (called by students and their societal allies) the main factor that “led the Communist Party to capitulate within a matter of hours to [protestors’] major demands, including an end to its monopoly on political power.”

As explained previously, student activism also plays a functional role as it changes the resources of the main actors in the process of democratization, and as a consequence, the actors’ choices. Scholars’ assessment of the role of student activism depends on an analysis of final outcomes. In Hungary, students supported pro-democracy forces in negotiating the extrication of the communist party. Linz and Stepan recount that students were part of a loose alliance, composed in 1988 of “new social movements, greens, journalists, reform economists, and worker

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105 Huntington, “Third Wave,” 100, 166. Huntington does not mention that these protests were orchestrated by students.
107 McFaul “The Fourth Wave.”
108 Kuran, “Now Out of Never.”
organizations”, which alongside other Hungarian forces negotiated the transition to democracy with the communist party. 109

However, in the cases of Greece and China, student activism is said to have encouraged hardliners in the regimes to overthrow reformists and prevent democratization. The protests in Greece of students at the National Technical University (Polytechnic) in 1973 demanding democracy, according to Huntington and Linz and Stepan, provoked the hardliners in the military to seize power from the military moderates. 110 Though the regime collapsed after one year, this happened due to the army’s fiasco in the conflict with Turkey over Cyprus in 1974. 111 Student activism in this sense contributed negatively to the process of democratization. Przeworski provides the same assessment to students’ activism in Tiananmen, China in 1989. In China, he claims, “student demonstrations forced the liberalizers to retreat and cost them the leadership of the party.” 112 His assessment is congruent with those of Nicholas D. Kristof (1990) and Lowell Dimitter (1990), who studied the struggle within Chinese Communist Party leadership. 113

As stated, students have not always been a revolutionary force in the battle for democracy in authoritarian states and, in several cases, they supported authoritarianism. In Indonesia, the ‘Concentration of Indonesian Student Movement’ (GMNI) received significant support from Sukarno, who was the Indonesian president from 1945 to 1967. On the other hand, Suharto, the

110 Huntington, “Third Wave,” 70, 195. 35; see also Linz and Juan, “Problems of Democratic,” 131.
111 Huntington, “Third Wave,” 143; Linz and Stepan, “Problems of Democratic,” 131; Collier, “Paths to Democracy,” 159.
113 Kristof, “How the Hardliners Won”; Dittmer, “Patterns of Elite Strife.”
military leader of Indonesia who orchestrated a coup d’état against Sukarno in 1966, depended on the support of the Association of Islamic Students (HMI) to mobilize students against Sukarno. Once Suharto assumed power in 1967, he appointed a number of student leaders as members in parliament.\textsuperscript{114} Perhaps the most important example that shows how youth, and particularly students, have ended up consolidating authoritarian regimes is the case of the Iranian youth during the 1978 revolution and immediately after it. According to Ali Afshari and Graham H. Underwood (2007) the younger generation that drove the Iranian revolution can be characterized as extremely ideological and anti-Western (particularly anti-American), inclined to spread the Islamic revolution throughout the Muslim world, and was concerned more with public than with private life. The students in this period, especially from 1979 until the Cultural Revolution of 1981, were influenced “by the prevailing politics and ideology of the Islamic Revolution” which led to the “4 November 1979 takeover of the U.S. embassy in Tehran and the 444-day hostage crisis that ensued.”\textsuperscript{115}

To summarize this section, what drives research on youth as a category of analysis in the literature on the performance of democracy is their abstention from conventional politics. As such, scholarly research focuses on questions such as why youths do not participate in elections. In the literature on democratization, youth as a social unit of analysis appears in two claims. The first is that youth holds a specific culture conducive to democratization. And the second is that youth movements, especially student movements, played different roles in the processes of regime change. In some cases, youth activism either both destabilized and delegitimized authoritarian regimes, or it served as a value-added resource for the democratic forces that

\textsuperscript{114} Bachtiar, “Indonesia”, 115
\textsuperscript{115} Afshari and Underwood, “The student movement’s struggle.”
negotiated these regimes. In other cases, youth activism played decisive role in the process of
democratization. Yet, still in others, youth activism supported the persistence of
authoritarianism, even in cases of revolutions. The literature on democratization reveals that
youth activism could either lead to democratization or to the continuation of authoritarianism;
however, it does not reveal the conditions under which youth activism leads to either outcome.

**Research Questions and Significance**

The literature on the relation between youth activism and democratization describes the role of
youth in countries that have witnessed social, political and economic turmoil. In certain cases,
young people contributed to democratic transition, while in others, they acted to sustain
authoritarian regimes. The literature, however, does not provide sufficient information to support
more general statements that can be tested over time and space about the determinant conditions
under which youth activism can lead to democratization.

The significance of my work should be seen in its contribution to the theories of
democratic transitions and social movements. In respect to the literature on democratic
transitions, my research provides theoretical insights into the relationship between what I call the
structure of mobilization (SoM) of a revolutionary protest cycle and democratization. I argue that
the SoM at the cycle of protest’s (CoP) apex leads to democratization if three conditions are
available: the domination of autonomous youth movements (AYMs), an inclusive master frame
(MF), and a decentralized leadership. I support this argument by investigating the conditions that
led youth activism in Egypt and Tunisia to contribute to the processes of democratization in the
period between January 2011 and July 2013 and also by comparing these conditions to those in
the failure case: Jordan. In doing so, I provide an atypical narrative about the Arab Spring and
reveal the conditions that led to unfolding process of democratization in Tunisia and Egypt (before the military coup in Egypt on July 3, 2013).

In term of the theories of social movements, my work’s contribution is four-fold. First, it advances the argument about the relationship between state’s repression and revolutionary protest cycle. Scholars such as Goldstone (1998), McAdam (2010), and Tarrow (2008) argue that a reform protest cycle may turn into a revolution as a result the state’s use of repression and the way it uses it. My work on the Tunisian, Egyptian, and Jordanian protest cycles reveals that this condition is necessary but insufficient. In order for a reform cycle to turn into a revolution, it is not sufficient for the state to use ‘modest’ and ‘random’ repression to quell the protests; an autonomous opposition also must be dominant at the protest cycle’s apex. This is in part because autonomous and non-autonomous youth movements respond differently to repression. While the former perceive an opportunity to escalate the protests when the state uses repression, the latter considers it a constraint that might cost them their access to state’s resources. Second, it shows that movements with very scarce resources can still sustain activism against powerful and resourceful authorities if the activists adopted innovative strategies. Theorists of social movements such as McAdam (1982) and McCarthy and Zald (1977) have linked a movement ability to sustain protests with its development of formal and informal organizational capacity. The argument developed and supported with empirical data in the thesis shows that a movement’s resources are very much linked to its framing strategy and to its choices of the locations of the protest. Third, it develops tools to measure the inclusivity and exclusivity of master frames, and provides insights on the role of agency in creating inclusive or exclusive

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116 Goldstone, “Social Movements or Revolutions?”, 127-128; McAdam, Political process, 56-58; Tarrow, Power in movements, 85-86.
117 McAdam, Political process; McCarthy and Zald, “Resource mobilization and social movements.”
master frames. In this regard, the thesis conceptualizes an inclusive master frame in terms of its ideological pluralism, representation of the interests of the various groups of society, and also in its transcendence to identity cleavages. It measures these components using youth movements’ documents, the protesters’ slogans, and face-to-face interviews with activists. And finally, my research provides theoretical insights on social movement mobilization in the absence of unified leadership, which is a theme that is under-explored in current social movement literature.

Specifically, it offers an analysis of the dynamics of protests when the leadership is decentralized, or in other words when a protest movement has many leadership centers without an umbrella leadership facilitating consensus amongst various centers. In short, it shows that the dynamic of the protests in a revolutionary protest cycle under a decentralized leadership possess three important attributes that affect directly the movement’s outcome. First, unlike the mode of centralized leadership, the protests under a decentralized leadership create a zero-sum game between the regime and the protestors for that a middle ground solution is not possible because the regime has no representative interlocutors to negotiate a solution that would lead to end the protests. Second, where the consensus on the goals of the protests in case of centralized leadership takes place inside closed doors between the representatives of the protests’ organizing movements, the consensus on the protests’ goals in case of decentralized leadership takes place in the street between the different protest centers. That is to say, between that various protesting groups in the different towns and cities. In practice this means each protest center filters the demands of other centers and keeps only the demands that resonate with it. When each protest center does so, the consensus between the different protest centers is minimized to the common dominator, which explains why the protests continue in some places while they dissipate in others following the protests’ success. And finally, in a cycle of protest with a decentralized
leadership, there is always a disproportion of the flow of information about the impact of protests on the state between the protestors and the regime’s main institutions. This means that the state’s main institutions such as the upper echelons of the bureaucracy and the military are at least one step ahead of the protestors in terms of evaluating the overall impact of the protests on the state. This gives them the opportunity to seize the state’s political power, i.e., to replace the ruling elites from within, should they perceive this as the only solution to end the protests. This is mainly the result of the absence of a unified protestors’ leadership as each protest center knows only the impact of its protest on the state but not the overall impact of all the centers which deprive the protestors the opportunity to take the necessary steps to seize the political power.
Part II: Framework of Analysis, Methods, and Findings

The goal of this framework is to develop a testable model that links the structure of mobilization (SoM) of youth cycle of protests with its outcome in case the protests succeed in overthrowing the regime. I will use this model to argue that youth activism leads to democratization when three conditions are available at the cycle of protest’s (CoP) apex. These conditions are: the domination of autonomous youth movements (AYMs), an inclusive master frame (MF) adopted by the AYMs, and a decentralized leadership. If these conditions are available at the CoP’s apex, the outcome of youth activism will most likely lead to democratization. The democratization outcome in this sense is a result of the structure of the CoP at its apex; it is a consequence of path dependence as long as the AYMs are dominant, and they adopt an inclusive MF, and the leadership of the protests is decentralized at this juncture.

This framework of analysis consists of three sections. In the first section, I develop a model that links the structure of mobilization (SoM) of a cycle of protests (CoP) with its outcome and I deduct the thesis’s main hypothesis in three subsections. In section two of the framework of analysis, I elaborate on the methods used to test this model. I justify the choice of Egypt, Tunisia and Jordan as case studies. I will argue that these three countries are similar, yet the variations in the outcome of youth activism make them suitable to test the thesis’ hypothesis. In the last section, I offer a summary of the findings. Briefly stated, in Tunisia and Egypt where the outcome of the youth movements was a process of democratization (interrupted in Egypt by a coup d’état on July 3, 2013), I found that at the CoP’s apex, the AYMs were dominant, the CoP’s MF was inclusive, and the leadership of the protests was decentralized. In Jordan where the youth movements failed to impose their reform demands, I found that at the CoP’s apex, the
NYMs were dominant, the CoP’s MF was exclusive, and the leadership of the protests was centralized.

**Relationship between Structure of Mobilization and Democratization**

In this section, I develop a model that links the structure of mobilization (SoM) of a cycle of protests (CoP) at its apex with its outcome. I begin by defining the characteristics of the two types of youth movements that exist in an authoritarian state: the autonomous youth movements and non-autonomous ones. I, then explain the main components of a CoP and the significance of the CoP’s apex. Next, I deduct the thesis main hypothesis.

**Autonomous versus non-autonomous youth movements**

The main argument of this subsection is that in an authoritarian setting, state-society relations produce two types of social movements: movements that intend to change fundamentally the power structures that ensure the domination of state’s elites on society, and movements that seek to improve their position within such structure in order to have more access to state’s resources. The former does not recognize the legitimacy of the authoritarian regime and seeks revolutionary change, while the latter accepts its legitimacy and pursues incremental changes. Consequently, youth movements can be differentiated along two lines: autonomous youth movements (AYMs) aiming to alter the structure of power relations between state and society, and non-autonomous youth movements (NYMs) seeking an improvement of their position within the same power structures. Because the two types of movements differ in their end goals and tactics, they will act differently during a cycle of protests (CoP).

Michael Mann (1993) defines the state as a differentiated set of institutions and personnel embodying centrality in the sense that political relations radiate to and from a center, a
territorially demarcated area over which it exercises control, and possessing some degree of authoritative, binding rule-making, backed by some level of organized physical force. This definition allows us to distinguish between two types of states according to the level of centrality in state-society relations: democratic states and authoritarian states. A state is democratic when political power is evenly distributed between state and society. It is only when the government is committed to the rule of law, when national leaders are regularly and competitively elected by the majority of the adult population, and when social, civil, and political rights are guaranteed for all societal social groups that a state is democratic. A state is authoritarian when political power is concentrated in the hands of a few and when it “has weak political, social, or even economic pluralism and is led by rulers who are not popularly elected and who are not subject to the legal codes that they have created.”

There is also a difference between democracies and autocracies in terms of the kind of power they predominantly exercise. Mann (1993) distinguishes between despotic and infrastructural state power. Despotic power is the “power of state elites over civil society.” By contrast, infrastructural power is “power through society.” It is the “institutional capacity” of the

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118 Mann, “The Sources of Social Power,” 55. This definition differs from Weber’s who define the state as “the monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force within a given territories.” Weber’s definition focuses on the centrality of the state and its binding rule-making in the state’s political relation with the society. Mann’s definition allows interactions. Thus political relations also radiate into the center from civil society and the society have some degree over the authoritative binding rule-making. For Weber’s definition, see Nelson, “The Making of the Modern State,” 4; for the difference between the two definitions, see Hobson, “The State and International Relations,” 200.

119 Scholars use different typologies to distinguish between political regimes. See for example, Linz and Stepan, “Problems of Democratic”; Geddes, “What do we know about democratization.”

120 Dahl focuses on eight institutions in his definition to a responsive government to its citizens’ preferences. All these institutions are included in the above-mentioned definition for democracy. However, I include social rights, which Dahl excludes to describe citizens’ right for social welfare in order to minimize inequality in a society. Poor people who are busy securing the minimum conditions to secure their livings cannot participate actively in a democracy and will not engage in defending it. For Dahl’s eight institutions, see Dahl, Polyarchy, 3; For more definitions of democracy, see Held, Models of Democracy.

121 Zhao, The Power of Tiananmen, 17.
Mann characterises the democratic state as having low despotic power and high infrastructural power, and the authoritarian state as possessing high despotic power and low infrastructural power.\footnote{Mann, \textit{The Sources of Social Power}, 59-60.}

Despite the clarity of its discussion of state-society relations, which I will turn to shortly, Mann’s definition of the state does not distinguish between the state and the regime. This makes it difficult to methodologically define concepts such as regime change, change within regime, and the early stages of democratic transition, all of which are essential to this thesis. Therefore, state and regime must be clearly differentiated.

In this regard, Stephanie Lawson’s (1993) discussion of the difference between the state and regime is of great help. Lawson notes that Krasner’s (1983) concept of international regimes can also be applied to domestic politics. For Krasner, an international regimes are the “principles, norms, rules and decision-making procedures around which actors converge in a given issue area.”\footnote{Krasner, quoted in Lawson “Conceptual issues in the comparative study of regime change and democratization.”} While this definition, as Lawson explains, cannot be applied “in toto to domestic regimes,” she explains that the idea “that regimes embody — or are an embodiment of — particular norms and procedures is the key point” in Krasner’s observation that “principles and norms [are] the basic defining characteristics of a regime while the rules and procedures are derived from and are secondary to these values.”\footnote{Ibid.} As such, Krasner explains that “change within a regime involves alterations of rules and decision-making procedures, but not norms or principles; change of regime involves alteration of norms and principles.”\footnote{Ibid.} A regime can

\footnote{Mann, \textit{The Sources of Social Power}, 59-60.}
\footnote{Ibid.}
\footnote{Krasner, quoted in Lawson “Conceptual issues in the comparative study of regime change and democratization.”}
\footnote{Ibid.}
\footnote{Ibid.}
therefore be characterized “as that part of the political system which determines how and under what conditions and limitations the power of the state is exercised.” It also “determines not only the manner in which governments are formed and carry out their functions, but also the basis of their legitimacy” and “the extent to which they are permitted to exercise authority.” In other words, “regimes embody the norms and principles of the political organization of the state, which are set out in the rules and procedures within which governments operate.” Comparing the state, regime, and government, the former is a permanent construct, the second is less permanent, and the later alternates.

The abovementioned distinctions between regime and state is easily discernible in democratic states “in which there is a firm tradition of constitutional rule and provision is made for peaceful succession of government, normally by means of popular elections governed by the rules and procedures of the regime.” However, in authoritarian states it is difficult to distinguish between the state and the regime because the dominant political power penetrates all the state’s institutions, in varying degrees, in order to “structure politics in ways that serve to entrench and reproduce [its] power.” Thus it is hard to speak about institutions such as the military, judiciary, and police, to name just a few, as part of the state and not of the political power controlling the state. However, we can speak of regime change if we consider it a departure from the principles and norms of an authoritarian regime to one characterized by free, fair and competitive popular elections derived from a constitution or a constitution in the making that sets limits on government’s authority and the way in which politics and the affairs of the

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127 Ibid.
128 Ibid.
state are conducted. In that case, regime change (rather than change within a regime) is compatible with the beginning of democratization regardless of whether these processes are carried out by forces from outside the departing political power or from institutions within the political power that dominated the state under authoritarian rule.

In short, there are two defining criteria that entail moving from an authoritarian regime to a democratic one: free, fair, and competitive popular elections for the state’s national posts, and a new constitution that institutionalizes this process. Indeed, it is the institutionalization of the electoral democracy that matters more in the processes of democratization because it is a clearer sign of the change in principles and norms from authoritarianism toward democratic rule than would be elections without constitutionalization. Needless to say, the new constitution may contain prerogatives and it may constrain liberties.  

The abovementioned criteria marking the beginning of transitions are not congruent with Thomas Carothers’ (2002) “the end of transition paradigm” because the “feckless pluralism countries” he describes there are in the process of democratization, whereas the “dominant-power countries” he refers to in his article are still authoritarian. In fact some of the pathologies Carothers describes in “feckless pluralism countries” can also be found in traditional liberal democracies such as the low voter turnout in elections or the disinterest of some social groups, such as the youth demographic, in convention politics. Furthermore, these criteria exceed Guillermo O’Donnell and Philippe C. Schmitter’s (1986) democratic transition requirements. For them, democratic transition begins with liberalization, as is evident from the

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130 For example, the Chilean military was able to secure extensive institutional safeguards and financial guarantees before leaving the government. See Hunter, “Continuity or change?”

131 Carothers, “The end of the transition paradigm.”

132 Lijphart, “Unequal participation: democracy's unresolved dilemma.”
following passage: “The typical sign that transition has begun comes when authoritarian incumbents, for whatever reasons, begin to modify their own rules in the direction of providing more secure guarantees for the rights for individuals and groups.” However, a process of democratization is by definition an interval open to either democratic consolidation or return to authoritarian rule.

Having clarified the difference between the state and the regime, I turn now to the relation between state and society. Linkages between state and society are multidimensional. Beyond political and economic linkages, there are linkages that constitute sources of state legitimacy. State legitimacy is what impels people to cooperate “voluntarily” with the state. Absent legitimacy, states cannot carry out their tasks and use coercive power to preserve order. While all authoritarian regimes try to secure their survival by combining several forms of legitimation, the most important form is “performance legitimacy,” which is the citizens’ perception of the state’s achievements in economic, political and social domains. My choice to

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133 O’Donnell, and Schmitter, Transitions from authoritarian rule, p. 5
134 Weber suggests three ideal types for state legitimacy: traditional, charismatic and rational. Traditional legitimacy is based on following those people who are recognized as having the right to rule such as kings or tribal leaders. Charismatic legitimacy exists when the public follow voluntarily a leader who enjoys exceptional traits. Rational-legal legitimacy is based on the codification of rights and responsibilities. See Nelson, The Making of Modern State., 115.
135 Zhao, The Power of Tiananmen, 18.
136 Scholars such as Young (1994), Nelson (2006) and Zhao (2001) elaborated on three measurable forms of legitimacy: legal-electoral based on a commonly accepted procedure for alternation of national political posts (democratic states), performance legitimacy, and ideological legitimacy that is built upon a grand vision of future promise to which the state is committed. See Young, The African Colonial State, 37-8; Nelson, The making of the state, chapter 7 on “the Sociology of the State” (107-125); and Zhao, The Power of Tiananmen, 21-23. It can be argued that, following the collapse of the communist states in late 1980s and early 1990s, only few authoritarian states are basing their legitimacy on ideology. For example, since late 1980s, the Chinese regime, transformed its economy into free market. Thus the contradiction between the communist ideology which the ruling elites still claim to be their ruling guidance and the nature of economy they are fostering contributes to the decline of their legitimacy. Zhao argues that the Chinese people are no more evaluate the regime on its ideology; rather, they evaluate it on its performance. Zhao, The Power of Tiananmen, chapter 7.
137 Zhao, The Power of Tiananmen, 21-23. This can also be inferred from the size of protests against the economic conditions and corruptions in authoritarian states since the adoption of the Structural Adjustment Policies (SAP) in
focus on state performance in these domains as the significant linkage between state and society is based on methodological and theoretical reasons. Methodologically, I want to presume for the sake of comparison that states should enjoy (other things being equal) the same legitimacy when they are compared with each other, especially as the focus of this research is on youth activism in bringing about democratization. The level of performance legitimacy possessed by a state can be measured by the level of unemployment, number of people living under the poverty line and level of corruption in the state. Performance legitimacy can also be measured by simply asking members of the public about their perception of it. Finally, a researcher can use reports issued by international institutions to study the performance of a country.\textsuperscript{138}

Theoretically, it is helpful to consider how performance legitimacy influences the shape of relations between elites and civil society. In authoritarian states, relationships between ruling elites and societal groups are vertical, often taking the form of patronage.\textsuperscript{139} As long as these kinds of ties are strong, the prospects for protests are minimal. Tocqueville, for example, notes that “it was only with the weakening of ties between nobility and peasantry that the French Revolution became possible.” Similarly, Oberschall suggests that “protest potential is enhanced when societies are “segmented” so that lower-stratum collectives have “few links and bonds” to

\textsuperscript{138} Zhao, \textit{The Power of Tiananmen}, 21-23.

\textsuperscript{139} Scott, “Patron-client politics”; Eisenstadt and Roniger, \textit{“Patrons, clients and friends,”} 43-52.
higher-stratum groups.” Here it is reasonable to assume that these linkages become weaker when the state loses its performance legitimacy. As Frances Fox Piven and Richard A. Cloward (1977) illustrate, the emergence of a protest movement “entails a transformation both of consciousness and behaviour.” A change of consciousness is, more or less, the loss of the system’s legitimacy. When this happens, a “[larger] number of men and women who ordinarily accept the authority of their rulers and the legitimacy of institutional arrangements come to believe in some measure that these rulers and these arrangements are unjust and wrong.” The diminishing of state legitimacy is, therefore, the most important catalyst for the emergence of a protest cycle.

The constitution of society involves historical, cultural, and social structure factors. For the purpose of defining the type of youth movements that a society produces, I use the concept of civil society as a category containing relations among individual members of the public in a society and between those individuals and the state. I define civil society as the realm of formal and informal social associations that exist between the state, the market, and the individual. Given the importance of the concept of civil society for this thesis’s concepts and hypothesis, it makes sense at this stage to very briefly review the debates surrounding this concept.

Scholars do not agree on one definition of civil society. For example, Hegel considers civil society to be the realm between the state and the family, including individuals’ activities in the

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141 The other two are “people who are ordinarily fatalistic begin to assert “rights” that imply demands for change,” and “a new sense of efficacy.” See Piven and Cloward, *Poor People’s Movements*, 3-4.

142 Zhao for example argues that the nature of society is “primarily dependent on its social structure.” See Zhao, *The Power of Tiananmen*, p.24.

143 Scholars do not agree on one definition of civil society. For Putnam, civil society is merely the voluntary civic organizations. See Putnam, *Making Democracy Work*; For Diamond, civil society is “the realm of organized social
A more commonly-used definition of civil society is the “realm between the state, the market, and the individual.” This realm is made up of formal and informal associations within and between these associations which interact to produce norms that foster mutual trust, reciprocity, and engagement in public issues among individuals. In other words, these norms generate social capital that “provides civil society with some degree of collective, autonomous, organizational, and normative influence when interacting with the broader social and political system.” This civil society is believed to enhance democratic consolidation because it revives communities, trains effective citizens, reinvigorates the public sphere, and limits intrusive bureaucracies. Following the third wave of democratization, scholars considered civil society to be the key democratic force in ending many authoritarian regimes in Latin America, and Southern and Eastern Europe. Therefore, the notion of civil society gained a normative connotation that was associated with both democratic consolidation and transition to democratic rule.

However, this normative conception of civil society is debatable for at least three reasons. The first, according to Gramsci, follows from the insight that civil society is not autonomous from the state but is instead one of its two main components, the other being political society.

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144 Pelczynski, “The significance of Hegel’s separation of the state and civil society.”
145 Kingston, Reproducing sectarianism, p. 6
146 Putman, Making democracy work
147 147 Kingston, Reproducing sectarianism, p. 6
148 Ibid, p.7
149 Cavatorta, Civil society activism under authoritarian rule
The ruling elites do not need to secure their domination by relying solely on the coercive power of the state; rather, through its hegemony as expressed in civil society, the ruled are persuaded to accept the domination of the ruling class and to share its social, cultural, and moral values. In this conceptualization, civil society loses its normative connotation and becomes an area of contestation. On the one hand, the ruling elites try to secure their hegemony through concentrated work in civil society, which is aimed at establishing the cultural and ideological consent of the ruled. These activities include using the state as an educator. On the other hand, the ruling elites’ contenders use civil society to counter this domination by diffusing different values, adopting different narratives and discourses, and mobilizing disaffected social groups. In the words of Krishan Kumar (1993), civil society becomes “the space that has to be colonized - the famous ‘war of position’- by any new class seeking to usurp the old.”

The second reason is related to the first, and holds that it is more accurate to speak about the area of contestation between the ruling elite and its opponents as an area in which sub-civil societies within the same civil society generate different norms that in turn pull society into different directions. According to Migdal, developing countries are characterized by “social hierarchies, social exclusions, and sharp differences in interests and solidarities.” Rather than “transcending the social realities,” civil societies in these countries tend “to simply reflect them.” Reflecting on the role of civil society and democratization, Francesco Cavatorta (2013), and Paul Aarts and Francesco Cavatorta (2013) argue that civil society “is neither ‘good nor bad’ and it should be treated as a neutral variable.” Striping civil society from its normative

150 Kumar, “Civil society: an inquiry.”
151 Ayubi, Over-stating the Arab state, p. 6-7.
152 Kumar, “Civil society: an inquiry.” Kumar is referring to Gramsci’s understanding of civil society in this phrase.
153 Quoted in Kingston, Reproducing sectarianism, p. 12-13
attaché, says Cavatorta, ensures a better analysis of “the component parts of [it] (groups and organizations) by highlighting their ethos, their activities and their commitment, or lack of, to democratic practices”, thereby revealing its many faces.\textsuperscript{154}

Third, to this debate, one can add Nazih Aybui’s (1996) argument that in developing countries and owing to “its heavy involvement in economic accumulation” the state “is not simply a reflection of the class reality of its society but very often a creator of such realities as well.”\textsuperscript{155} This means that the associational access to the state and its resources is reflective of the regime’s interest in “[providing] enduring advantages to some segments of associational life while [disadvantaging] others.”\textsuperscript{156} Accordingly, some civil society associations in these countries have a vested interest in defending and maintaining the status quo while others do not.

The abovementioned debate informs us that civil society is not always an embodiment of universal democratic norms. However, this fact should not prevent us from making some generalizations that differentiate civil societies in democratic states from authoritarian ones. In democratic states, we can assume that civil society is autonomous in that it serves as a check on state power and nurtures those bonds and contractual relations among social groups that increase political participation in decision-making.\textsuperscript{157} In contrast, civil society in authoritarian states is not autonomous. As Amany Jamal (2007) explains, authoritarian states “severely restrict freedom of

\textsuperscript{154}Cavatorta, Civil society activism under authoritarian rule, p. 5. In Civil Society in Syria and Iran, Aarts and Cavatorta make a similar argument.
\textsuperscript{155}Ayubi, Over-stating the Arab state, p. 15
\textsuperscript{156}Kingston, Reproducing sectarianism, p.13
\textsuperscript{157}Diamond, “Toward Democratic Consolidation.” In democratic states, civil society tends to prevent national level uprisings because different social organizations tend to have distinctive interests and fosters crosscutting identities among their members. See Zhao, The Power of Tiananmen, 25. In addition to that, political channels to articulate these interests are open, and as a consequence, social movements in democratic states take a reformist nature. See McAdam, Tarrow and Tilly, “Comparative Perspectives.”
associations specifically to prevent [them] from assuming the watchdog roles." In fact, for Jamal’s argument to be valid, the word ‘autonomous’ should appear before ‘associations’; authoritarian states support associations that either depoliticize people or support the state. Certainly, this view of civil society contradicts Gramsci’s; yet we need to keep in mind that Gramsci is concerned with how the capitalist ruling elites produce and reproduce popular consent to maintain their rule, especially in Western democracies. My goal is different; I want to differentiate civil society as it appears in democratic states versus authoritarian ones.

The political institutions of a society are no exception. Ruling incumbents divide opposition into legal and illegal forms. The legalized opposition is co-opted by granting it access to state resources and institutions while the illegal one is denied political rights. Theorists on authoritarian states show that the legal opposition contributes to the persistence of authoritarian incumbents. For example, Holger Albrecht (2010) argues that the legal opposition stabilizes authoritarian regimes in four ways. First, it represents the societal interests that are not represented in the government. Second, it increases the legitimacy of the authoritarian regime. Third, it helps in co-opting societal groups that are not represented in elite circles. And finally, it deradicalizes domestic resistance toward incumbents. His argument is supported by the findings of other scholars. Jennifer Gandhi and Adam Przeworski (2007) found that dictators between 1945 and 1996 have used policy concessions or shared rents with the opposition to ensure increased cooperation. When authoritarian states had sufficient resources, they co-opted

159 According to Lust-Okar, regimes select the groups and the parties to be granted access to state institutions to expand the base of their political support. The opponents on the other hand, consider it an opportunity to legalise their interests within the framework of the regime. However, the opponents become bound by the regime political framework. See Lust-Okar, “Structuring Conflict.”
160 Albrecht, Political Opposition and Arab Authoritarianism,” 27-30.
the opposition by “direct distribution of spoils (monetary rewards, perks, and privileges),” but when resources were scarce, the co-optation took the form of “policy concessions” that entailed legalising the political opposition, but at the same time, constraining their legislative role.\textsuperscript{161} Ellen Lust-Okar (2005) shows that when traditional opposition groups in Jordan, Egypt and Morocco were granted access to state institutions, the regimes not only expanded its political support, but the opposition parties themselves found opportunities to legalise their interests within the institutional frameworks of the regimes and thus became bound by them.\textsuperscript{162}

Thus in authoritarian states non-autonomous (state-supported or recognized) associations and political parties “enjoy rights and privileges” including the right to participate in state’s national elections, while autonomous civil associations and political parties are either restricted and marginalized or forcibly disbanded. As a result, non-autonomous and autonomous civil and political societies produce two different types of youth movements (YMs) according to their goals. The first type is non-autonomous youth movements (NYMs). They strive to improve their position relative to the ruling elites to influence the latter’s decisions. The second is autonomous youth movements (AYMs). They aim at transforming the shape of state-society power arrangements, i.e., they struggle over the power to rule the state.\textsuperscript{163} In other words, NYMs are looking for more access to state’s resources without altering the fundamental structures of power relations between them and the ruling elites, while AYMs advocate for changing the political system itself, whether by seeking to topple the authoritarian regime and to install a new one, or by forcing the regime to undergo a deep political transformation that strips the ruling elites of

\textsuperscript{161} Gandhi and Przeworski, “Authoritarian Institutions.”

\textsuperscript{162} Elen Lust-Okar, “Structuring Conflict.”

\textsuperscript{163} Adapted from Albrecht, “Political Opposition and Arab Authoritarianism.”
their hegemony. This description of NYMs and AYMs does not assign to them any democratic norms; it merely states that, on the one hand, those movements which have access to the state are not willing to advance strategies that may jeopardize their interests; while, on the other, the movements that do not have such privileges are more willing to take the risks needed to change the power structure of state-society relations to one that better reflects their own interests. I should note that I use terms autonomous and non-autonomous movements instead of “norm-oriented” and “value-oriented”\textsuperscript{164} movements because the former fit better within the context of an authoritarian state as the ruling elites set boundaries for the movements that determine who may participate in the state institutions (non-autonomous) and who may not (autonomous). They thus reflect who is with the state as it is and who is interested in changing it. I also refrain from using the terms legal and illegal opposition as some illegal opposition groups participate in the authoritarian state’s elections and by doing so they legitimize the regime.

To summarize, in authoritarian states, they are two types of youth movements: autonomous and non-autonomous. The demands for changing power relations between civil society and ruling elites come mainly from the AYMs as they do not recognize the legitimacy of the ruling elites. Cavatorta (2011) has noted, for example, that the youth activists of the Arab Spring countries came from outside the more traditional movements that already had access to the state.\textsuperscript{165} Yet the prospects to achieve their goals hinge on organizing a successful

\textsuperscript{164} Snow and McAdam (2010) argue that there are two types of social movements, norm-oriented and value-oriented movements. The former does not challenge the society existing norms and legal system while the latter defies these norms and seeks to transform the system and create entirely new values. See Snow and McAdam “Reading on social movements,” 2. The terms ‘norm’ and ‘value’ fit more democratic societies for that the norm-oriented movements are not necessarily supportive to the ruling government.

\textsuperscript{165} Writing on reasons for and the prospects of Arab Youth Revolutions, Cavatorta notices that “the main agents of this revolutionary moment in the Middle East and North Africa are not to be found in the usual suspects within the political opposition or in civil society, including Islamist movements and parties. In fact, organised political and
revolutionary cycle of protest (CoP) against the ruling elites, as in the case of Eastern European countries in late 1980s.

**A cycle of protest (CoP) and its apex**

Sidney Tarrow (1995; 2008) defines a cycle of protest as a sequence of escalating collective actions that are of greater frequency and intensity, spreading through “broad sectoral and geographic extension”, and characterized by “a combination of organized and unorganized participation”, the appearance of “new movements”, the creation of a new “master frame” of meaning, the invention of “new forms of collective action”, and notes that “the [protests] almost never are under the control of a single movement.”

This definition is very helpful as it provides an analytical basis for understanding different social movements, regardless of their ideologies, as interacting with each other and together with the state. The many characteristics of a CoP as described by Tarrow, however, can obscure the fact that it is composed primarily of three elements: initiators and late-comer movements, a master frame that allows numerous movements to coalesce during the protests, and a system of leadership that organises protest activities. I call these three components the structure of mobilization (SoM) for the CoP.

I should note here that the name ‘structure of mobilization’ might cause some misunderstanding since frames are drawn from culture, discourse, and movement’s ideology, and they are not, by themselves, a structure. In addition, a structure tends to be stable and last for

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167 Polletta, “Frames and their consequences.”
long period of time, such as in the example of a class structure, while frames, as I will show, change during a CoP. Furthermore, other theorists of social movements use the expression “mobilizing structure” mainly when they discuss social movement organizations. However, I use the term ‘structure’ here to refer to relationships among a CoP’s main components (the protest movements, the cycle’s master frame, and the CoP’s leadership). As I will explain, each of these three components has two main features that influence the CoP’s outcome. For example, the MF can be either inclusive or exclusive, the youth movement may be autonomous or nonautonomous, and the leadership can be either centralized or decentralized. Collectively, the six characteristics, choosing each time three different components, produce eight configurations of the CoP (e.g., ‘AYMs, inclusive MF, Centralized Leadership’; ‘AYMs, inclusive MF, Decentralized Leadership’; etc). I refer to these different configurations as structures, and I argue in the following subsections that one particular configuration – ‘AYMs, inclusive MF, and Decentralized Leadership’ – when it exists at CoP’s apex leads to democratization regardless of the core objectives of the activists involved in case the protests succeed. I illustrate the eight possible configurations of the CoP’s three variables at its apex in Figure I-1. The corners of the cube represent the possible combination of the CoP’s variables at its apex.

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168 Rucht, “The Impact of National Contexts.”

169 For example in McAdam, McCarthy, and Zald’s book “Comparative perspectives on social movements” the terms ‘mobilizing structures’ are used to describe the form of organization espoused by social movements.
Figure I-1: possible combinations of SoM

1. (AYM, IMF, CL)  2. (AYM, EMF, CL)
3. (AYM, EMF, DL)  4. (AYM, IMF, DL)
5. (NYM, IMF, CL)  6. (NYM, EMF, CL)
7. (NYM, IMF, DL)  8. (NYM, EMF, DL)

*AYM: autonomous youth movements; NYM: non-autonomous youth movements; IMF: inclusive master frame; EMF: exclusive master frame; CL: centralized leadership; DCL: decentralized leadership.

Besides these characteristics, every CoP has the potential to become revolutionary at some point (see below). According to Jack A. Goldstone (1998), the turning point is a result of the amount of repression and the way the state employs it.\footnote{Goldstone, “Social Movements or Revolutions?”, 127-128} For McAdam, it is the inability of the state to quell the mobilization of the initiator movement that creates this turning point in a CoP, whether due to structural factors related to the state or to the strength of the initiator movement itself.\footnote{McAdam, “ ‘Initiator’ and ‘Spin-off’ Movements,” 222-5} I will call this potential turning point the CoP’s \textit{apex} and I define it as \textit{a period of time when the protests reach their utmost level in terms of public participation, activists’ use of disruptive actions, and the state’s use of repression}. It is potential rather than inevitable because, as I will explain below, the way AYMs respond to state’s repression is different from how NYMs react to it. The former sees repression as an opportunity to escalate the protests further because their original endeavor is regime change. The latter perceives it as a threat to its privileges. Additionally, AYMs may initiate the CoP, but they may lose control of it...
to NYMs throughout the course of its development, and by their nature NYMs are not revolutionaries. Hence even if there is a revolutionary situation NYMs likely will not use it to turn the CoP into a revolution for strategic reasons. However, one could argue that NYMs and AYMs might shift stances during a protest and choose to respond in unpredictable ways to a regime’s repression. This possibility is unlikely, especially in short CoP, because the orientations of the AYMs and NYMs towards the regime and their own interests are structured. Hence for these movements to act differently, there needs to be enough time for new leaders, interests, and different organizational structures to emerge.

In addition to being a potential turning point in the protests, the CoP’s apex is significant for three other related reasons. First, it is at this time that activists tend to explicitly set out their demands. This is in part because the activists perceive the strength of their movement as an opportunity to redress the injustice inflicted on them. Second, the ruling elites at this point may submit partially or entirely to these demands or they may dismiss them altogether and resist making any concessions. The course of actions the state uses is context dependent on the movement’s strength, the goals of the activists, and the tactics (institutional or no institutional) the activists employ. As McAdam (1982) explains, “the cost and risk involved in repressing a weak target are minimal when compared with those associated with a powerful opponent.”

Moreover, he illustrates that a movement whose goal is to change the political power and who resorts to non-institutional tactics unites the ruling elites and encourages the state to use repression. Despite the emphasis on repression in McAdam’s argument, the state may also tend to reconcile with the protestors especially if repression fails to end the protests. And finally,

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172 McAdam, *The political process*, 56-8.
it is at this period of time when the strategies of both AYMs and NYMs are expected to diverge clearly in response to the course of actions of the state.

So far, I have differentiated between AYMs and NYMs. I also defined a CoP and I explained its main components. I argued that a CoP is composed basically of initiators and latecomer movements, a master frame that allows numerous movements to coalesce during the protests, and a system of leadership. In addition, I argued briefly that each CoP has a turning point that may render it revolutionary. In the following subsection, I elaborate on the CoP’s main components and use that to establish the thesis main three hypotheses.

Central hypotheses on the cycle of protests

The central argument of this thesis is that youth activism most likely will lead to democratization when three conditions are gathered at a CoP’s apex: the domination of AYMs, an inclusive MF, and a decentralized leadership. In the following subsections, I justify this argument. I begin by differentiating between a reform and a revolutionary CoP. I will argue that a reform CoP has the potential to become revolutionary when the state uses repression to quell the protests if the AYMs are dominant at the CoP’s apex. Because the congruence between the state’s use of repression and the domination of AYMs at the CoP’s apex is rarely possible as the AYMs generally lack sufficient resources to sustain the protests, reform CoPs seldom turn into revolutions. But when they do, they imply that the AYMs have managed to overcome their resource problem. Conceptualizing domination as essentially a resource problem, I will argue that the AYMs can overcome this problem either by having a mass-based organization prior to the CoP or by framing successfully their grievances in a way that appeals to most aggrieved people and/or by strategically choosing the locations of the protests in a manner that increases
their resources. Next, I discuss the features of an inclusive and an exclusive MF. I use this discussion to argue that an inclusive MF is both correlated to a protest movement success and to democratization. Finally, I elaborate on a CoP’s leadership. I differentiate between two forms of leadership: centralized and decentralized. I argue that a decentralized form of leadership is most likely associated with short-term CoP in an authoritarian state because of the organizational weakness of the autonomous opposition. I then use reasoning and comparison with protests under centralized leadership to define the main dynamics of a protest movement under the form of decentralized leadership. I use this discussion to argue that the prospect that youth activism will lead to democratization is higher when the leadership of the protestors at the CoP’s apex is decentralized.

**Domination of AYMs during the CoP’s apex**

A cycle of protest in an authoritarian state is not destined to turn revolutionary. That is to say, the demands of the protestors may remain within a reform framework and never turn to call for ousting the regime. Indeed, revolutionary protest cycles are the exception and not the rule. Yet their occurrence begs a relative question that lies at the heart of this thesis: what turns a reform protest cycle into a revolution?

Following Goldstone (1996), McAdam (1982), and Tarrow (2008), I will argue that a reform protest cycle has the potential to become revolutionary when the state uses modest and random repression. Yet unlike them, I will argue that the use of modest repression constitutes only one condition; the other is that the AYMs must be dominant at the CoP’s apex.

A cycle of protest may begin as a result of a structure of political opportunities or as a perceived opportunity. According to McAdam (1996), the structure of political opportunities
constitutes four dimensions: presence of an opening in the political system, rift among the ruling elites, new allies, and decline in state’s capacity and propensity for repression.\textsuperscript{174} The presence of any of these dimensions is a necessary but not sufficient condition to trigger a movement because the aggrieved people must have indigenous organizations and arrive to a status of what McAdam (1982) calls ‘cognitive liberation’ in order to recognize the opportunity and to act upon it.\textsuperscript{175} However, even if the structure of political opportunities is closed, a CoP can be triggered. This is the case when the aggrieved people “perceived opportunities for successful protest, basing their perceptions on a shift in the opposition movement, not on a shift in the structural position of the state.”\textsuperscript{176} A movement in this sense can emerge when a significant deterioration of the state’s performance legitimacy is accompanied by a sense on the part of the aggrieved people that they can change their situation through collective action. This could happen when activists detect a dramatic change in the public’s behaviour toward the regime, as in Iran during the 1978 revolution,\textsuperscript{177} or “when [ordinary people] violate the traditions and laws to which they ordinarily acquiesce.”\textsuperscript{178} The emergence of a movement, in response to political or perceived opportunity, may set in motion a CoP if other movements join the protests and lay their own claims. Whether a CoP will remain into a reform realm or turn into a revolution is context dependence. As Goldstone (1998) explains, all the “major revolutions of European history” did not start with activists intending to overthrow the government.\textsuperscript{179} Social movements and

\textsuperscript{174} McAdam, “Conceptual origin.”\textsuperscript{27}.

\textsuperscript{175} McAdam, \textit{The political Process}, 40-51. McAdam treats the indigenous organizations as resources available for aggrieved people. He also

\textsuperscript{176} Kurzman, “Structural opportunity and perceived opportunity.”

\textsuperscript{177} Kurzman, \textit{The Unthinkable Revolution}.

\textsuperscript{178} Piven and Cloward, “Poor People’s Movements”, 4

\textsuperscript{179} Goldstone, "Social Movements or Revolutions?", 127-128
revolutions, Goldstone argues, “originate in similar processes, but evolve to different forms.” In social movements, activists remain focused on their policy goals as the state does not try to eliminate them, but once “the state adopts a repressive stance or a resolute resistance,” social movements may turn into a revolution.\footnote{Ibid} The level of repression, according to Goldstone, and the way the state uses it, are a key determinant of whether the movement will turn into a revolution or not:

“Where the government is able to focus its repressive measures squarely on the movement supporters, [repression] is likely to either end the movement or drive it underground and undermine its effectiveness. But where government responds with unfocused repression that terrorizes a wide range of civilians … or where repression is inconsistent, or limited by international or domestic pressures, the movement is likely to attract supporters while becoming more radicalized in its goals and actions.”\footnote{Ibid, 130}

Briefly stated, limited repression against a social movement turns it into a revolution and boundless repression ends it. Similarly, Tarrow (2008) argues that state’s repression “turns even moderate dissenters into opponents of the regime and forces them to pose the problem of regime overthrow as the condition for reform.”\footnote{Tarrow, \textit{Power in movement}, 85} In the same vein, Goldstone and Tilly (2001) argue that “the role of repression (and of threats of repression) contributed to mobilize the opponents of the regime by discrediting the ruling elite even further.”\footnote{Quoted in Volpi, “Explaining (and re-explaining) political change in the Middle East.”} Following the same line of argument, McAdam (1982) argues that a powerful movement “must be handled with great caution because

\footnote{Ibid}
of the potentially graver repercussion associated with unsuccessful attempt at repression.” By that he means, the possibility that repression may intensify the protests and encourage protestors to raise the ceiling of their demands.}\textsuperscript{184}

The degree of repression and how the state uses it, however, does not alone account for why, in similar situations, some movements evolve into revolutions while others do not. For example, the Tunisian, Egyptian and Jordanian regimes used mild repression against similar movements that emerged almost in the same period, December 2010-January 2011, and which called, at the beginning of their CoP, for reforms. Yet the repression against the Tunisian and Egyptian youth movements (YMs) turned them into revolutions in the sense that they altered their demands from reforms to calls for the ousting of the two regimes, while the Jordanian YMs almost dissipated after being ‘mildly’ repressed. What Goldstone, McAdam, and Tarrow’s analysis lack is an account of the nature of the social movements that dominate the protests at the time the state uses repression. The response to repression by the AYMs is different than that of NYMs as the former is likely to use the occurrence of repression against the activists and bystanders as grounds to intensify the protests, use disruptive forms of collective action, and turn a cycle that begins with reformist demands into a revolution. As such, mild repression is perceived by AYMs as an opportunity to incite people against the state by demonstrating its brutality. In contrast, NYMs are not looking for regime change and fear losing the privileges granted to them by the regime. Repression either would neutralize them, or at best, would make their struggle less intense over reforming the regime.

\textsuperscript{184} McAdam, \textit{The political process}, 56
This analysis points to the fact that there are two types of CoP: revolutionary and reform cycles. The only difference between them, according to McAdam (1995), is the “strength of the state and its ability to weather the cycle.” In both cases, McAdam stresses, there are initiator and latecomer movements. The former, in case of revolutionary cycle, leaves the state “vulnerable to challenge by all manner of ‘latecomers’,” while in the case of a reform cycle, “there is no necessary increase in system vulnerability” as the state’s institutions remains intact. Though McAdam’s main concern is to account for the rise of ‘latecomer’ movements in the absence of expanding political opportunities in case of a reform cycle, he attributes the weakness of the state in a revolutionary cycle to the actions of an ‘initiator movement.’ Revolutions, he explains, “are not born as revolutions. Rather, it is the void created by the collapse of the old regime that transforms garden-variety collective actions into revolutionary action.” Similar to Goldstone, McAdam imagines that there exists a moment where a cycle turns into a revolution, but unlike Goldstone, he attributes this moment to the activities of an initiator movement that render the state vulnerable. But on the question of which type of movement turns a reform cycle into a revolutionary one, McAdam implicitly seems to assume that this is the initiator movement, as the “cycle begins with the successful mobilization of a single group and then spreads to others.”

Yet while the initiator movement may begin the CoP, it may also lose control of it to latecomers for a variety of reasons. For example, the initiator movement might lack sufficient resources to sustain the protests, which makes it dependent on latecomers especially if they have abundant resources. Furthermore, an initiator movement may start protests with an exclusive master frame that is incapable of ‘traveling’ among different geographical and societal sectors, which erodes

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185 McAdam does not define what he means by successful mobilization. It does seem however that by successful mobilization he means the ability of the initiator movement to weakening the state’s control as latercomer movements arise out of the opportunities the initiator movement opened. McAdam, “‘Initiator’ and ‘Spin-off’ Movements,” 222-5
their chances of reaching a position of dominance over the protests (see below). In any of these scenarios, latecomers, especially if they have more resources at their disposal than the initiators, may dominate protests instead. Depending on their type, autonomous or non-autonomous, the CoP may become revolutionary or it may remain within of a reformist character should the state use mild repression.

The implication of the preceding analysis is that the character of the group that is able to dominate the protests, AYMs or NYMs, at the CoP’s apex is decisive in determining whether the cycle will have a turning revolutionary point or not. In a comparative study, assuming all other variables are equal, a difference in the type of YMs that is in domination at this juncture leads to different results. For NYMs, the CoP’s apex is a point of departure for the beginning of negotiations with ruling elites in order to build new agreements that would grant greater access to state resources without fundamentally altering the structures of the state-society relations. In the words of Matteo Fumagalli (2013), they would use it to “search for space and voice” that “should not be confused with a search for choice.”

In response to state repression, the NYMs might soften or end the protests as they are not willing to risk losing the privileges they already have. By contrast, AYMs see the CoP’s apex as an opportunity to exert more pressure on the ruling elites in order to force them to submit to protestors’ demands. Should the state use mild repression to suppress the protests, AYMs will respond by intensifying them and raising the ceiling of their demands, turning the protests’ cycle from a reformist action into one that is revolutionary. Therefore, a revolution is correlated with the domination of AYMs at the CoP’s apex.

The success of the revolution by itself is not a guaranteed path to democratization. However, removing an authoritarian regime or imposing reforms that eliminate the institutional sources of the ruling elites’ power is a necessary condition for democratization. For this reason, I advance the following hypothesis:

\[ H1: \text{The domination of AYMs during the protests cycle’s apex is more likely to lead to democratization than the domination of NYMs.} \]

In this context, domination means that protestors would adopt the demands of AYMs and would assert these demands discursively and in collective action. This assertion of the AYMs’ demands manifests itself through verbal expressions such as slogans or through disruptive actions including sit-ins, strikes, and confronting the regime’s power centers and symbols.

The AYMs’ domination on the protests at the CoP’s apex does not, however, entail the capability to lead the protestors, as ‘leading’ requires the availability of organizational capacity to diffuse the protests while maintaining leadership on them through charismatic leaders and a vast network of trained activists which are not necessarily available to AYMs. Rather, their domination consists in the consent of the protestors to the AYMs’ radical demands at the period of CoP’s apex. In this sense, AYMs are hegemonic only in their agendas and for a short period of time but they are not hegemonic in their “ideology, philosophy, ways of life, and so forth”, to invoke Gramsci’s conceptualization of the hegemony of the ruling social groups through civil society for the latter requires both time and abundant resources to manufacture the masses consent.\(^{187}\)

\(^{187}\) Green, “Gramsci cannot speak.”
The concept of domination, however, involves a resource problem for AYMs insofar as they must first be able to sustain the protests long enough to arrive at a situation where the masses adopt their radical demands. In the absence of these resources, the AYMs cannot sustain the protests. According to Bob Edwards and John D. McCarthy (2004) these resources are moral, cultural, social-organizational, human, and material.\footnote{Edwards and McCarthy, Resources and social movement mobilization, 125-8} Channeling these resources to a movement requires either creating an enduring “organizational structure to sustain insurgency” (McAdam, 1982)\footnote{McAdam, The political process, 54.} or a priori presence of mass-based organizations for AYMs. In authoritarian states, however, AYMs may lack mass-based organizations and the duration of the protest cycle may not be long enough to create an organizational structure to sustain the protests.\footnote{It is worth noting here that McAdam argument about the need to create enduring organizational structural to sustain the protests is based on his study to African American Civil Rights Movement, which lasted more than a decade.} This invokes the question of how AYMs can accumulate the required resources to maintain and dominate the protests.

The literature on social movements provides some insights to answer this question. More to the point, how activists strategically frame their grievances and where they decide to stage their protests affect their ability to overcome the resource deficit. In other words, a movement can increase its resources through two processes: (1) by framing the contended policies with the regime in a way that appeals to the most affected aggrieved social groups, and (2) by choosing the location of protests in places that increase their resources.

The concept of ‘frames’ was first introduced by Erving Goffman as “schemata of interpretation” that allow individuals to recognize and categorize events in their lives and in the
world as meaningful. David Snow et al. (1986) adopted the concept to address what they perceived as weakness in prevailing approaches of social movements such as the structure of political opportunities and resource mobilization to account for the role of ideas in a movement’s emergence and development.\footnote{Snow et al., “Frame alignment process.”} Conceptualized “as the interpretive packages that activists develop to mobilize potential adherents and constituents, appeal to authorities, and demobilize antagonists,”\footnote{Polletta and Kai Ho, “Frames and their consequences.”} frames can increase tremendously the movement’s resources. Movements create their frames through a process of meaning-making work that involves employing rhetoric, tactic, and alignment strategies in order to maximize their relevance among targeted publics.\footnote{Benford and Snow, “Frame processes and social movements.”} Such work, Snow et al. (1986) explain, constitutes processes of frame alignments. That is to say, processes in which movements link or align their goals with individual interests and with the goals of other movements. Rephrasing Snow et al. (1986) and William A. Gamson (1988), Francesca Polletta and Kai Ho (2006) argue that “much of the work of movements involved various ‘frame alignment’ processes aimed at linking individual interests, values, and beliefs to those of the movement.”

Frame alignment involves four types: frame bridging, frame amplification, frame extension, and frame transformation.\footnote{Snow et al., “Frame alignment process.”} All these types of frame alignment are relevant to overcoming the resource problem, as they involve processes that increase a movement’s recruits and supporters. However, frame amplification, defined as “the clarification and invigoration of an interpretive frame that bears on a particular issue, problem or set of events,” plays a decisive role in increasing the resource of a movement, measured by the number of participants.
amplification frequently involves employing heuristic devices such as rhetoric, slogans, and identifiable images that give specific meaning to a problem or set of problems a social movement is articulating. Drawing on McCammon (2001) findings about the American women’s suffrage mobilization, Polletta and Kai Ho (2006) argue that powerful frames may be able “to substitute for indigenous networks” and the absence of “political opportunity” in “spurring protests.”

Stated briefly, a movement can substitute for its lack of resources by focusing strategically on creating meaning to perceived injustices that resonate with public.

Social movements may also overcome the problem of sustaining protests by locating the protests strategically in places that require few resources. Recognizing that resources are not evenly distributed between social groups in a society, some scholars address the mobilization of the resource-less people. McAdam (2000), for example, criticizes frame theory for its prevailing focus on discursive strategies. He argues that the movement action strategies have to be analyzed as they play a decisive role in the “signifying work” of framing processes. In this regard, he illustrates that the leaders of the Southern Christian Leadership Conference (SCLC), made strategic decisions about where to stage protests, choosing locations in the South where police and/or politicians had a tendency to violence. The consequence of staging nonviolent protests in locations where violence was inevitable attracted the media attention, which thus depicted nonviolent protestors being subjected to violence and gave visual support for the Civil Rights Movement (CRM) and to its claims of unequal rights and inhumane treatment.

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195 Polletta and Kai Ho, “Frames and their consequences.”
196 See McCarthy and Zald, “Resource Mobilization”; McAdam, Political process; Piven and Cloward, Poor people’s movements.
197 McAdam, “Movement strategy, 120
198 Ibid, 127-8
leaders of the Civil Rights Movement based their strategy on their perception that the police would respond violently to peaceful protests. However, choosing protests’ locations may also involve the inevitable eruption of violence even if the initial intention of a movement was to maintain a nonviolent approach to achieve its goals.

Piven and Cloward (1979) argue that there is a link between the social location of the protestors and the forms of defiance they use to articulate their demands. For them, “it is the daily experience of people that shapes their grievances, establishes the measure of their demands, and points out the targets of their anger.” Moreover, they point to the fact that “institutional roles determine the strategic opportunity for defiance.” For example, while industrial workers protest by striking “because they are drawn together in the factory setting,” unemployed persons “riot in the streets” as they do not have the institutional power for disruption. As such, locating the protests in poor neighborhoods may lead unavoidably to the outbreak of violence. Bayat (2010) takes this argument further. He argues that poor people, by which he means the un-institutionalized social groups, such as the daily workers, the unemployed, and the workers of the informal economic sector as the street vendors, “may participate in street demonstrations or riots [only if] these methods enjoy a reasonable currency and legitimacy” and “when they are mobilized by outside leaders.”

If these arguments are valid, then AYMs can acquire the resources that are needed to sustaining protests if they manage to mobilize poor people who, after being engaged, can act on their own. Lacking in institutional disruptive power, as Piven and Cloward explain, the mobilization of poor people leads to riots or to the rise of what I call spontaneous riot

199 Piven and Cloward, Poor people's movements, 21-23
200 Bayat, Life as politics, 68-9
movements (SRMs). These SRMs engage temporarily in violent collective action against the state. Based on their strength, the SRMs may undermine the coercive power of the state rendering it vulnerable and decreasing the cost of joining the protests for latecomer participants. Whether the AYMs can mobilize the poor or not is context dependent. However, it is plausible to assume that AYMs activists have more chances to mobilize the poor if they have a pre-existing network and/or if they locate strategically their activities inside their neighbourhoods. Additionally, the state itself may cause the mobilization of the poor on a large scale if its reaction to the initial protests involves ‘unfocused repression’ as Goldstone argues.

To summarize, in order for a reform CoP to become revolutionary, it is not sufficient that the state use mild repression; the AYMs also must be dominant at the CoP’s apex. To be dominant, AYMs must first sustain the protests by solving the resource problem. Despite their lack of organizational capability to accumulate and channel resources for protests, AYMs can still overcome this problem if they manage to mobilize the poor, who, after being engaged, can minimize the cost of joining the protests for latecomers, if they succeed to undermine the state’s coercive apparatus.

As previously explained, the domination of AYMs at the CoP’s apex is not per se correlated with democratization as AYMs could hold nondemocratic beliefs that are conducive to reproducing an authoritarian regime. However, removing the authoritarian regime is a step forward toward democratization if two other factors happened to exist at the CoP’s: an inclusive MF and a decentralized leadership.

An inclusive Master Frame at the CoP’s apex

201 McAdam, “‘Initiator’ and ‘Spin-off’ Movements,” 222-5
In the following paragraphs, I defend the argument that in order for youth activism to lead to democratization, an inclusive Master Frame (MF) must exist at the CoP’s apex. The reason for this is that when a reform CoP turns into a revolution, there is an important change in the MF prognostic task. This change may divide a movement composed of youth groups with different ideologies and identities as it provokes the question of the type of the regime that should be installed following the departure of the authoritarian one. I will show here that for a MF to remain inclusive at this juncture either the YMs agree on the type of the regime that they plan to install or they avoid discussing this aspect. To defend this argument, I explain first the difference between inclusive and exclusive MF. Next, I explain why it is difficult to maintain an inclusive MF when a protest cycle becomes revolutionary especially in a society divided along identity lines. I, then explain the correlation between an inclusive MF and democratization. I move then to illustrate why some movements are able to deploy inclusive identity and thereby an inclusive MF while other movements cannot. This is relevant to my thesis as it explains why in similar cases of CoPs some protest movements deployed inclusive MF while other failed to do so. Finally, I conceptualize the notion of an inclusive MF in order to make it measurable. I will argue that an inclusive MF entails three attributes: ideological pluralism, a representation of the interests of a wide range of aggrieved social groups, and that it must transcend the identity divisions of a society.

A cycle of protest, as Tarrow (1992) explains, is associated with a master frame that permits several movements to cluster temporarily around some specific issues of concern.\textsuperscript{202} David A. Snow and Robert A. Benford (1992) define a master frame as “the interpretive medium

\textsuperscript{202} See for example, Porta and Tarrow, “Unwanted children”; Mooney and Hunt, “A Repertoire of Interpretations; Caroll and Ratner, “Master Faming.”
through which collective actors associated with different movements within a cycle assign blame for a problem they are attempting to ameliorate."\textsuperscript{203} A master frame permits the formation of broad coalitions that cut across movements’ boundaries, enabling them “to stage events with a very large number of participants”\textsuperscript{204} and to “exercise power” on the state by “demonstrating widespread support.”\textsuperscript{205} Whereas collective action frames link individuals at micro-level to movements’ goals and activities, master frames do the same but by macro-level linking several movements with each other in a cycle of protests.\textsuperscript{206}

Similar to collective action frames, master frames perform diagnostic, prognostic and motivational tasks. The diagnostic task involves defining one or more problems and the attribution of blame and causation. The prognostic task provides the solution to the problem. And the motivational task functions as the call for action, composed of elements such as the mottos and logos of a movement.\textsuperscript{207} In Gamson’s (1992) conceptualization, collective action frames (and as such master frames) are composed of the injustice, agency, and identity components. The injustice component of a master frame involves “a consciousness of motivated human actors who carry some of the onus for bringing about harm and sufferings.” The agency component “empowers people by defining them as potential agents of their own history.” And the identity component defines the “us” versus “them.”\textsuperscript{208} To be sure, the frame’s tasks and components are not mutually exclusive. As Stephania Vicari (2010) explains, the tasks and components of a

\textsuperscript{203} Snow and Benford, “Master Frames,”\textsuperscript{139} 139
\textsuperscript{204} Jones, Hutchinson, Van Dyke, Gates, and Companion, “Coalition Form.”
\textsuperscript{205} Koopmans, “The Dynamics of Protest.”
\textsuperscript{206} Gerhards and Rucht, “Mesomobilization.”
\textsuperscript{207} Snow and Benford, “Ideology, frame resonance.”
\textsuperscript{208} Gamson, “Talking Politics,” 78.
master frame are linked to each other. The diagnostic task implies a definition of the injustice problem and the prognostic task entails both empowering people and giving them an identity, while the motivational task involves the work of forming the movement’s identity.\footnote{Vicari, “Measuring collective action frames.”}

Based on these tasks and components, scholars of social movements differentiate between two types of master frames: inclusive and exclusive. An inclusive MF introduces broader definitions to the perceived ‘injustice’ and in doing so facilitates the processes of frame bridging by lending itself readily to numerous aggrieved groups identifying with it.\footnote{Snow and Benford, “Master Frames”; Gerhard and Rucht, “Mesomobilization”; Johnston, “Comparative Frame Analysis.”} An exclusive MF is restricted as it provides a limited number of ideas and relatively narrow definitions of the perceived ‘injustice’, and as a result, diverse groups cannot align easily with it.\footnote{Ibid} Consequently, when YMs adopt an inclusive MF, they maximize their opportunities of success. In contrast, if YMs espouse an exclusive MF, they risk alienating potential group allies and minimize their chances of success.

Scholars on social movements have, however, reached their conclusions about the features of inclusive and exclusive master frames from research pertinent to reform cycles, and not to revolutionary ones.\footnote{For example, Snow and Benford (1992) distinguish between elaborated (inclusive) and restricted (exclusive) master frames based on studies to the Civil Right Movement of the 1960s (inclusive) and the Peace Movement of the 1980s in the United State (exclusive), see Snow and Benford, “Master Frames”; Gerhard and Rucht (1992) discuss ‘The Ideology of Imperialism’ and ‘The Hegemonic Power master frames, associated respectively with the protests against the yearly meeting of the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank in Berlin in 1988, and the U.S. President Ronald Reagan’s visit to Berlin in 1987. They considered the two master frames exclusive as they only attracted groups with leftist ideologies. See Gerhards and Rucht “Mesomobilization.”} As such, they focus on the diagnostic task of a master frame in terms of how broad (or narrow) a problem is defined in order to attract (or alienate) different movements to (or from) joining protest activities. Underlying this approach is an assumption that
the prognostic task remains unchanged during a reform cycle.\textsuperscript{213} Once the problem and its solution are defined by the initiator movements – the MF’s progenitors – they remain unchanged during a reform cycle. In an authoritarian state, however, a CoP begins with reform demands, but it may turn into a revolution, which entails a change in the definition of the solution from reforming the regime to removing it. How, then, can a MF remain inclusive at the CoP’s apex when the demands of the protestors are completely changed during such revolutionary circumstances?

In the limited case studies that deal with revolutionary cycles such as in the case of the relatively recent protests in Eastern European countries in late 1980s, the movements held democratic core beliefs.\textsuperscript{214} In fact, in the case of the post-communist colour revolutions in Georgia (2003) and Ukraine (2004), the opposition’s main demand was a free and fair competitive election,\textsuperscript{215} while in Tunisia and Egypt, the demands of the protestors at the CoP’s apex centered on ousting the two regimes, and in Jordan they focused among other things on the electoral law and the king’s executive powers. Moreover, as Laura K. Landolt and Paul Kubicek (2013) observed, the opposition parties in Ukraine and Georgia had a democratic trajectory that can be traced through previous elections\textsuperscript{216} while in Tunisia, Egypt, and Jordan the autonomous opposition did not participate in elections, and the trajectory of the non-autonomous opposition such as the Islamist parties and movements that participated in ‘constrained’ elections does not

\textsuperscript{213} For example the solution offered by Civil Rights Movement revolved around implementing ‘equal rights and opportunities’ as stated in the U.S. Constitution. This solution remained unchanged during the entire cycle. Similarly, the Peace Movement offered nuclear freeze to the perceived risk of a nuclear war, Snow and Benford “Master Frames.”

\textsuperscript{214} Oberschall, “Rational choice.” Oberschall for example consider the chanted slogan “we are the people” in the demonstrations in East Germany not only a demand for reforming the communist state but a demand for a democratic state.

\textsuperscript{215} Landolt and Kubicek, ”Opportunities and constraints.”

\textsuperscript{216} Ibid
display a solid commitment to liberal democratic ideals. In fact, in democratizing countries, as Luca Ozzano and Francesco Cavatorta (2014) explain, “the illiberal stances of religiously oriented parties on a number of issues such as minority rights or women’s rights are often accompanied by demands for what can be described as limited democracy.” That is to say, they do not support “legislation believed to be contrary to God’s law.” As such, these cases do not tell us much about how different movements with diverse core beliefs and interests come to agree on what should replace the authoritarian regimes after removing them.

This observation gains further importance when applied to societies clearly divided along identity lines (be it national, regional, ideological, religious or a combination of them) as diverse groups in such contexts may only agree on solutions to their ‘injustice’ problems as long as the power structure of state-society relations remains unchanged, as the prospected change might be in favor of some groups over others and this would constitute a threat. An agreement becomes difficult to sustain if it entails altering the power structure between state and society rendering some participant groups in the protests disadvantaged. In this case, the MF that brought several diverse groups into the CoP turns into exclusive one.

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217 Ozzano and Cavatorta, *Religiously Oriented Parties and Democratization*, p. 3. For example the Islamists in Jordan voted several times in the Parliament against tightening the penalty against those who commit the so called ‘honour killing.’ Honour killing in Arab countries takes place when a member in the family kills a female member in the same family because she committed or is perceived to have committed a sexual act with someone who is not her husband. Elnajar, “Jordan is tightening.”

218 In East Germany for example, the protestors called for “Free Elections.” Oberschall, “Opportunities and Framing,” 97; On the democratic beliefs of Solidarity Movement in Poland, see Kenney, “Framing, Political Opportunities.”

219 While all societies are divided along some sort of identity lines, the cleavages within some societies, especially in developing countries where the state is still in the process of formation, are more salient. For example the division along tribal lines in Burundi between the Tutsi and Hutu, the division along religious line between the Muslims and non-Muslims in Sudan, the division along national lines between the Palestinians and Transjordanians in Jordan, the division along regional lines between the interior and coastal regions in Tunisia, the ideological division between the Islamists and liberals in most of Arab countries.
The point here is that maintaining an inclusive MF at the CoP’s apex is not a foregone conclusion simply because there may have been a consensus on the demands prior to that point. In fact, if the perceived change of the political system empowers some non-democratic groups, there are no reasons for the democratic groups to actively continue to participate in protests. The problem of maintaining inclusivity becomes even more pressing at the CoP’s apex in cases of salient ideological differences among the youth movements, as they might disagree on the type of regime that should replace the departing one due to their different core beliefs. Conclusions about MFs that are drawn from reform cycles do not touch on these issues as they do not deal with changes that take place in a MF at CoP’s apex.

We can assume that in order for the master frame to remain inclusive at the CoP’s apex, the changes that occur to it during this period should be accepted by the participant YMs. I argue that this is possible in one of two scenarios. The first scenario is based on a previous agreement among the YMs to run national elections after ousting the regime. The second scenario is when the YMs decide to leave open the question of who should govern after removing the regime. Although the second scenario is not by itself correlated to democratization, scholars of democratic institution-building have correlated ‘inclusiveness’ with democratic ideals. Ardent Lijphart (1977), for example, emphasizes “consociational” democracy, which involves greater compromises and significant minority rights as a solution for states that suffer from deep ethnic, linguistic, or religious cleavages. An inclusive MF also enhances the learning process among YMs as activists learn how to tolerate each other, communicate, and reach compromises over issues related to protest activities and to their political demands. These norms are important for

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Lijphart, “Democracy in plural societies”; Shapiro, “Power and Democracy.”
sustaining a democratic regime,\textsuperscript{221} and when they exist during a CoP, it is reasonable to assume that they will contribute to democratization. For these reasons, I hypothesize that:

\textit{H2: Youth activism is more likely to lead to democratization if the Master frame at the CoP’s apex is inclusive.}

Snow and Benford’s (1992) theoretical insights on MFs pose two challenges: one is theoretical and related to the role of agency in constructing a MF and the other is methodological and concerns measuring the inclusivity of a MF. On the theoretical level, Carol McClurg Mueller (1992) argues that the role of agency in the construction and the development of an MF is not articulated.\textsuperscript{222} He poses the question of why are some movements capable of deploying inclusive MFs while other movements are not. This is a salient question because the interests of movements stem from their own identities.\textsuperscript{223} For example, the interest of the working class of better working conditions and salaries emerge from their position in the labor-capital relations, which generate the labourers’ identity. How, then, movements with exclusive identities can deploy an inclusive MF?

The literature on social movement identity discuss three types of context that facilitate deploying an inclusive identity: when the participant movements in the protest seek to target a large audience\textsuperscript{224}, when there is a consensus on a common issue among the participant movements\textsuperscript{225}, and when previous organizational linkages exist between different movements.\textsuperscript{226}

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\textsuperscript{221} Putnam, “Making Democracy.”
\textsuperscript{222} Mueller, “Building social movement theory.”, 17.
\textsuperscript{224} Pulido, “Development of the ‘people of color’”; Lichterman, “The Search for Political Community.”
\textsuperscript{225} Bernstein, “Celebration and suppression”; Hunt, Benford, and Snow, “Identity fields”; Carroll and Ratner, “Master framing and cross-movement.”
}
In a divided society, the existence of all these conditions facilitate most the youth movements’ deployment of inclusive identity, and thereby the formation of an inclusive MF. However, previous linkages between youth activists, whether as individuals or through their organizations, play a crucial role in deploying strategically an inclusive identity. This is mainly because these linkages can mitigate interpersonal problems among activists, encourage understanding of the interests of social groups with different identities, and facilitate consensus-building.

The second problem is methodological: how do we know if an MF is inclusive or not? In a divided society, an MF can include many ideas, but it may remain exclusive because it addresses the interests of only part of the society. Hence, there is a need to reconceptualize the master frame in a way more amenable to measurement. In a divided society, I will consider an MF to be inclusive if it possesses three attributes. The first is ideological pluralism, and by that I mean, an inclusive MF should not be ideologically biased towards any particular group. The second is a representation of the interests of a diverse and wide range of aggrieved social groups.\textsuperscript{227} That is to say, the MF should reflect the interests of all groups even when divided by identity. Finally, an inclusive MF should transcend the identity divisions of a society by drawing on common culture or collective memory\textsuperscript{228} or on national unity as long as the interests of all identity groups are represented.

A comment to make here is that, as Snow and Benford (1992), and McAdam (1992) argue, the master frame established by its progenitors (initiator movements) puts constraints on

\textsuperscript{226} Ferree and Roth, “Gender, class”; Gordon and Jasper, “Overcoming the 'NIMBY' label”; Polletta and Jasper, “Collective Identity.”

\textsuperscript{227} Snow and Benford, “Master frames”; Gerhards and Rucht, “Mesomobilization”; Neidhardt and Rucht, “The analysis of social movements”; Klandermans, “The formation and mobilization of consensus.”

\textsuperscript{228} Swart for example argues that the sources of a master frames are cultural. Swart, “The League of Nations.”
the process of framing for latecomer movements. They do not, however, tell us whether this argument is valid for both inclusive MF and exclusive MF or for one of them only. The examples Snow and Benford provide for their argument are taken from the inclusive MF of the Civil Rights Movement and the exclusive MF of Peace Movement, implying that they consider their hypothesis valid for both types of master frames.

So far, I have argued that the domination of AYMs at the CoP’s apex and the maintenance of an inclusive MF throughout are necessary but not sufficient conditions for the beginning of democratization. The essential premise of my first hypothesis is that authoritarian regimes do not voluntarily change the power structures of the state without intense pressure. The second hypothesis is based on the argument that an inclusive MF is correlated with democratic ideals, but to account for ‘inclusiveness’ when a reform cycle becomes a revolution, that either a previous agreement must have been forged between the mobilized YMs to run national elections after toppling the regime, or that movements should collectively leave this question unanswered. Assuming that the second solution is adopted, the prospects for democratization depend upon the core beliefs of YMs. If the SoM is skewed in favour of YMs that do not believe in democracy, the outcome will be the formation of a new nondemocratic regime. The kind of leadership structure most conducive to democratization is the subject of the last hypothesis.

Decentralized leadership at the CoP’s apex

In general, the leadership of a CoP takes one of two forms: centralized or decentralized. The former involves either an umbrella or collective (unified) leadership, where each movement

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229 Proposition no. 4 in Snow and Benford’s article “Master Frames” states “Movements that emerge later in the cycle will typically find their framing efforts constrained by the previously elaborated master frame,” 145; See also McAdam ‘Initiator’ and ‘Spin-off’ Movements.”
in the CoP assign one or more of its leaders to coordinate political positions and activities with other movements, or a single movement leadership when only one organization assumes control. The latter takes the form of a decentralized control structure in which each movement acts independently in the CoP without a unifying coordination body. I will argue that the prospects for democratization are more likely when protests are not led by a centralized form of leadership at the CoP’s apex. That is to say, democratization is more likely to occur when the leadership at the CoP’s apex is dispersed among several movements (decentralized). The reasons are related to the dynamic of protests under this mode of leadership, which, in a successful revolutionary protest cycle, lead to a power vacuum, and thereby to a crisis of legitimacy that cannot be solved without holding national elections. In this sense, the process of democratization is the unintended consequence of the success of the protestors in creating political vacuum and of their failure to fill it, rather than of their core beliefs.

**Correlation between a short-term cycle of protest and a decentralized leadership.** The main argument in this section is that in a short revolutionary protest cycle a single movement cannot lead the protests unless it has sufficient resources at its disposal and is willing to use them to sustain the protests under its own leadership. In an authoritarian state, an AYM is willing to lead the protests but does not have sufficient resources, namely, a mass-based organization to do so. In contrast, a NYM may have a mass-based organization; thus it is in a better position to lead, yet its conservative nature, prevents it from assuming a leadership role in a revolutionary CoP. The prospect that a collective leadership will rise is higher, but this possibility is conditioned by an agreement on the end goals of the protests between the participant movements in the CoP. Additionally, the problem of forming a unified leadership between these movements amplifies if the protests take a confrontational violent nature and are accompanied with the rise of grassroots
informal movements (GIMs). Taken together, these three reasons (the possible disagreement over the protests’ goals, the confrontational nature of the protests, and the rise of GIMs) make it almost impossible for a coalition of movements to assume the role of leadership during the protests. The NYMs may have mass-based organizations but they are unwilling to lead a revolutionary CoP out of fear of losing their access to state’s resources in case the protests fail. In addition, AYMs refuse to give them the opportunity to lead out of competition and mistrust. And lastly, the emergence of GIMs also affects their ability to lead the protests alone even if they attempt to do so.

A survey of social movement history suggests that a single movement cannot assume leadership of revolutionary CoPs unless those cycles are protracted. Examples include the Russian, the Chinese, and the Iranian revolutions. The Russian Bolshevik Party (the communist party) secured its leadership of the Russian Revolution during a CoP that lasted 12 years (from 1905 until 1917). It took the Chinese Communist Party 38 years (from 1911 until 1949) to do the same. In Iran, the CoP lasted 18 months (from June 1977 until February 1979) during which time religious groups managed to secure the leadership of the protests. Similarly, the Solidarity Movement in Poland assumed leadership during a CoP that lasted nine years (from 1980 until 1989). But when a single movement leads and succeeds, it gains a revolutionary legitimacy enabling it to install a new regime that reflects its core beliefs. Thus in Russia, China, and Iran victorious movements established new authoritarian regimes, while in Poland, the Solidarity Movement agreed with the old regime to run national elections. In Russia, China, Iran,

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230 Skocpol, “States and Social Revolutions.”
231 Kurzman, “The Unthinkable Revolution.”
232 Kenney, “Framing, Political Opportunities.”
and Poland, the type of the new regime was correlated with the ideological belief of the movements that led the protests.

By contrast, during short successful CoP’s as those in South Korea (10th -29th June, 1987), Indonesia (1st – 21st May, 1998), Czechoslovakia, and Hungary multiple movements assumed unified or collective leadership of the protests. In all these cases, the outcome was a process of democratization. This observation raises two questions: why in a revolutionary CoP that lasts a short period of time is it difficult for a single movement to lead, and how does this failure to lead facilitate progress toward democratization?

The answer to the first question is that a single movement fails to lead in a CoP that last a short period of time because it does not have sufficient resources to do so. Success in part depends on the mobilizing structures the activists engage in – i.e., the organizational bases and mechanism they adopt to collect and use resources for the movement’s activities. Whether a movement takes a formal (organizational) or informal (loosely networked) form depends on the context (cultural, social, and political) under which it emerges. Formal movements create organizations with binding constitutions to gather resources, divide labor based on bureaucratic hierarchy, and maintain lists of memberships. Informal movements are based on the activists’ personal social networks which are built on ties of friendship, kinship, and workplace relational linkages; they have “no formal membership requirements and maybe dependent on bonds of empathy, obligation or sometimes even a conscious need to present a unified front against

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234 McCarthy, “Constraints and Opportunities,” 142-143.


Additionally, in these informal movements, “individual leaders can exert an important influence within such networks.”

In authoritarian states, autonomous and non-autonomous movements suffer from different kinds of problems that affect their abilities and willingness to lead protests. The illegality of AYMs impedes them in building strong and formal mass-based organizations; only activists with strong ideological commitments would risk joining them. Furthermore, authoritarian states take precautionary measures to prevent protests by repressing and co-opting known activist leaders. Faced with a lack of organizational capacity and state’s precautionary repression, when a CoP begins, an AYM can only radicalize the protestors’ demands, provoke bystanders to join, and engineer the diffusion of forms of collective actions to new societal and geographical terrains, but it cannot lead the protests despite efforts to do so. In addition, as new youth movements join the protests and the number of participants’ increases, individual AYM loses further leverage. This is especially true in short-term CoP as the time is not sufficient for AYMs to engage in adequate capacity-building (e.g., to build a mass-base organization and train new recruits) to lead a huge number of protestors.

The problem of leadership is further exacerbated because the short time of the CoP does not allow for the emergence of national-level charismatic figures that can assume leadership, as this does not depend only on the existing of crisis or personal attributes, but on the people’s perception of these leaders. As Ann Ruth Willner (1984) concludes in her study of six charismatic leaders, “it is not what the leader is but what people see the leader as that counts in

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237 Purkayastha and Subramaniam, “The Power of Women’s Informal Networks,” 2
238 Ibid, 8.
239 Adapted from Piven and Cloward, “Poor people movements.” In longer cycles the dynamics are different. Autonomous movements have enough time to recruit and gather resources to lead the protests.
generating the charismatic relationship [between her/him and followers].” Willner mentions four attributes that leaders must possess to create bonds between them and their followers: the invocation of important cultural myths, performances of activism perceived as heroic, the projection of attributes with an uncanny or a powerful aura, and outstanding rhetorical skills. However, for these attributes to make the required ‘bonds’, time is needed.

The problem of establishing a unified leadership between the AYMs alone and/or between them and the NYMs become also difficult when these groups do not agree on the end goals of the protests. In a short-term revolutionary protest’s cycle, the time is not sufficient for the AYMs to strike such an agreement due to the protests’ rapid developments. This is especially true when the AYMs suffer from ideological rifts that hinder the prospects of forging a unified leadership. Yet, even if the AYMs consent on the goals of the protests, the prospects that they can reach a same agreement with NYMs are very slim because of the conservative nature of these movements.

Furthermore, in case the CoP takes a confrontational violent form, the leadership centers of the protests multiply even more. To sustain protests in the absence of resources, the activists of AYMs focus on ‘agitation’ as a mechanism to bring more people into protest activities. Agitation invokes confrontations with the authoritarian regimes as it entails disruptive actions such as occupying public streets, squares, government buildings and violent actions directed against the state’s institutions. The confrontation with the regime disperses further the protest centers as people learn alone how to self-organize and to divide labour in the face of a brutal authority. Additionally, the violent tactics and the radical demands of the protestors raise the cost

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240 Willner, “Charismatic political leadership,” 61.
241 Shamir, “Leadership takes time.”
of forming a unified leadership between the protest movements. As McAdam (1982) illustrates, “the goals and tactics... largely define the degree of threat/opportunity posed by the movement.” Non-institutional tactics and radical demands are perceived by the ruling elites as a threat because they imply rejection of the state’s legitimacy and the power structure underpinning state-society relations. Under these circumstances, the ruling elites may show unity even if they are divided and they facilitate the use of repression which by definition raises the cost of protests and as a result the cost of forming a unified leadership.

Finally, as new people join, new protest centers arise which are not under the leadership of any known movement. These new centers take the form of grassroots informal movements (GIMs) that contribute to the success of the protests in two ways. First, because new grassroots activists join protests for the first time, they are not known to security forces. It is therefore difficult for the state to locate and detain them. Second, these activists are not part of any established organization; hence, their innovative tactics in spreading the protests and confronting the security forces are not constrained by the rules of any movement’s organization.

The GIMs are different from spontaneous riots movements (SRMs) in that the former are formed around what we can call “subaltern leaders” and have the prospects to last and form organizations after the end of the protests, while the latter emerge without any form of leadership and last only during CoP’s apex. I call the GIMs’ leaders subaltern because they ascend from lower-status social groups as a result of the AYMs’ mobilization of the poor to overcome their

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242 McAdam, Political process, 57-8
243 In his study about the cycle of protests in Italy, 1965-1975, Tarrow found that the Wildcat Strikes increased at the apex of the cycle (1968) despite the contract agreement made at the national level by their Worker Union, see Tarrow, “Cycles of Collective Actions”, 103.
resource deficit. What matters more, however, is that the rise of these GIMs disperses the power centers of a CoP’s and diminishes the ability of individual movements to lead the protests.

An important question here is why in some short-term revolutionary cycles such as that of South Korea (1987), Indonesia (1998), and Eastern European countries (1989) a centralized leadership emerged. The answer is simple: there was an agreement on the end goals of protests’ cycles. In fact, democracy was the master frame of the CoPs in all these countries and the nature of confrontation those regimes and the protestors were nonviolent. The exception was Romania, which witnessed a bloody confrontation between the regime and the protestors. But in this country, neither a unified leadership for the protestors appeared nor the immediate result of the CoP was a democratization process.244

Briefly stated, a single AYM cannot lead alone because of its weak infrastructure, and a centralized unified leadership between the AYMs is unlikely to emerge in case there is no agreement on the protest demands. Furthermore, the inability to form a central leadership to the protests exacerbates if the protests took a confrontational violent nature and in case GIMs appeared.

NYMs are in better position to lead the protests. They have access to state resources and/or external resources,245 they have mass-based organizations with offices for their leadership and members, have employees to carry out specific tasks, and own media outlets to disseminate their messages. But as I explained earlier, it is the fear of losing these resources that explains

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244 Linz and Stepan, “Problems of Democratic Transition”
245 For example, the Gulf countries became the asylum for the MB since mid 1950s after Gamal Abdulnasser campaign against them. The Gulf countries supported them financially until recently when Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates, and Bahrain designated the MB as a terror organization after the military coup against the elected president, Mohammed Morsi in Egypt in July 2013.
their behaviour during the protests. As a CoP becomes revolutionary, individual NYMs refrain from presenting themselves as the protests’ leaders for three reasons. First, the fear that the revolution could fail holds them back from attempting to take a leadership position. Second, their reformist nature (i.e., their belief in incremental change) impedes them from acting in a revolutionary way to lead the protests. Finally, the rise of SRMs raises the cost of leadership and puts further self-constraints on NYMs to claim leadership of the protests. In addition to these reasons, there are three outside factors that prevent the NYMs from assuming leadership of the protests. The first is that AYMs would not accept NYM leadership over the protests. This is in part out of competition but also due to mistrust. The second is that the GIMs have the same effect on NYMs as they have on AYMs. The many power centers formed by the GIMs make it difficult for the NYMs to assume leadership of the protests even if they wanted to. And finally, in cases where NYMs are latecomers to protests, their credibility suffers and the possibility of them assuming a leadership role becomes less likely.

To summarize, in short periods revolutionary CoPs the willingness of the AYMs to lead does not compensate for their structural inability to lead, while the structural ability of the NYMs to lead does not substitute for their unwillingness.

The failure of AYMs and NYMs to lead the protests poses the question: who leads the protests? The answer is that all movements assume some role of leadership. Sometimes this takes the form of an umbrella leadership or a unified collective leadership where each YM has representation and the members of this leadership council meet regularly during the protests to unify their political positions and to decide on activities. Examples of this include the revolutions of some Eastern European countries and the coloured revolutions in Georgia and Ukraine when there was unity on the goals of the protests. In other times, leadership takes a decentralized form
(horizontal form) where coordination between activists takes place during protest activities and at sites of protests. These two forms of leadership are context dependent. Where there is no agreement on the protests endgoals and activities take the form of daily confrontations through marches, strikes, sit-ins, and actions that are conducive for the emergence of GIMs and where the movements’ leaders have no consent on the CoP’s demands, the decentralized form of leadership is more likely to exist. Where there is an agreement on the CoP’s demands and the protests take the form of permanent sit-in, a unified leadership is likely to emerge because of the logistical needs for maintaining the sit-in (food, water, tents, communications, etc), and the need to coordinate the activities. However, what is important is that the dynamic of the protests under the two forms of leadership are different and they affect differently the process of democratization in case the protests succeed. I turn now to discuss this subject.

**Dynamic of protests under centralized leadership and democratization.** The literature on the dynamic of protests under a centralized leadership that takes a coalition form covers areas related to MFs and to the conditions under which movements coalesce, but it does not address the protest dynamics themselves. That is to say, once a coalition is in place, how does this affect the protests other than increasing their power? And how does this influence the relationship between the protestors and the regime? And more broadly, is there a clear relationship between the extant of a centralized leadership for the protestors and the process of democratization?

Keeping in mind that my goal is to hypothesize about the relationship between the type of leadership of a CoP and the likely democratization outcome in case the protests succeed, I use in most of the following paragraphs reasoning, and the literatures on social movements, organizations, and democratization where possible to deduct a reliable approach to answer the above stated questions. I begin by underlining the main dynamic of the protests under a
centralized leadership. I will argue that the extant of centralized leadership for a CoP possesses the possibilities of both cooptation and of strengthening the protests. More importantly, a central leadership sets the goals of the protests, facilitates a compromise between the regime and the protestors, and it assists its members to take informed decisions about the protests. I then explain the relationship between these dynamics and the potential process of democratization. I will argue that this form of leadership is conducive to democratization only if the powerful movements believe in democracy.

As stated earlier, a centralized type of leadership takes one of two forms: a single movement leadership and a unified or collective leadership. The dynamic of protests under these two forms vary slightly; however, their impact on the protests’ outcome, in case the protests succeed, varies significantly (see below). In terms of the protests dynamics, a centralized leadership offers the regime an opportunity to suppress the protests through cooptation and repression; it also allows for a middle ground solution between the protestors and the regime, and finally, it gives the protestors the opportunity to seize the political power in a revolutionary CoP because the leadership of the protestors has sufficient amount of information about the impact of the protests on the state.

A central leadership (especially in case of a unified leadership) sends a strong message of unity to people, encouraging them to participate in the protests, but it is like a single movement leadership and therefore it is open to co-optation and suppression as the leaders of the protests are known to the regime. Furthermore, in divided societies, if a centralized leadership is perceived as representing only part of the society, ending or deescalating the protests will be much easier for the authoritarian regime.
A centralized leadership also sets the goals of the protests. If the protests are led by a single movement organization, then the leaders of the movement define the protest goals. But if the protests are under a unified leadership from different movements, the goals of the protests are set behind closed doors between the movements’ representatives who deliberate on these goals through negotiations and compromises. This has two implications. The first is how the goals are prioritized is part of the agreement between the different movements. And the second is that once an agreement is achieved on the protest goals, they only can be modified through further negotiations between the movements’ representatives. This means, in order to maintain a unified leadership, no movement can add, omit, or change alone the protests’ goals because this may lead to the collapse of the coalition between the different movements.

Furthermore, a centralized leadership creates an address for both the protestors and the regime. Assuming the regime reaches a conclusion that a compromise is necessary to end the protests, the address of the protestors is well known, and any agreement between the regime and the representatives of the protestors would lessen the protests significantly, if not ending them completely. This is in part because such an agreement will be first deliberated between the leaders of the movements before they commit themselves to it.

Finally, in a centralized leadership, it is more likely that the leaders of the organizing of the protests will have sufficient amount of information about the impact of the protest activities on the state. This is in part because the activists of each single movement report about their activities and the information they have to their own movements’ leaders. This information is shared between the different movements during meetings of movements’ representatives (the centralized leadership). Based on the information it has, a centralized leadership takes its decisions be it escalating protests, ending them, agreeing on a compromise with the state, or
seizing the authority in case the conditions are in favor for this move. What matters here is that the decisions of the leadership are based to a large extent on a true picture of the impact of the protests on the entire state. In case the protests weakened extensively the state, a centralized leadership may see an opportunity to seize the authority even if the ruling elites attempted to reach a compromise with the protestors or tried to restructure the state. A centralized leadership could call for the continuation of the protests until it installs its own government.

The impact of the dynamic of protests, under a centralized leadership, on the prospect of democratization depends on whether the protests are led by a unified leadership of the participant movements or by only a single movement. Assuming the first scenario, a collective or unified leadership is by its nature a democratic structure especially if it represents movements with diverse ideological beliefs. It allows for direct deliberation on decision-making between different movements’ leaders, encourage compromises, and put constraints on the more resourceful movements to act alone. More importantly, it is an address for the state that can approach to negotiate a settlement. This agreement may entail a process of democratization that is based on transformation, trans-placement, or replacement depending on the strength of the CoP and the unity of a state’s ruling elites. However, no matter what form the process of democratization takes, the agreement between the elites of the regime and the opposition gains credibility and legitimacy when it is made with the protestors’ true leaders. Additionally, the existence of a unified leadership makes the process of democratization more stable because the leaders of participating movements are likely to deliberate and agree on key issues related to democratic

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246 Huntington proposes three modes of transitions: transformation initiated and leaded by the ruling elites; transplacement through interaction between elite incumbents and leaders of moderate opposition; and replacement whether through popular uprising, internal collapse for whatever reason or through foreign intervention. In transformation and transplacement, the mode takes the form of pacted transition. In transformation the pact is mostly dictated by the regime, while in transplacement is more through interaction. See Huntington, “Third Wave,” 115-163.
transition, such as the members and tasks of the interim government, the mechanism for drafting a new constitution, transitional justice, electoral law, and other crucial issues before and during the process of negotiating with the state’s elite.

A centralized leadership may also lead to authoritarianism in two cases. The first is related to the case of democratization through transformation as the ruling elites may dictate a prolonged process of democratization on the protestors’ leadership during which only liberalization measures are taken without free and competitive elections. This was the case in most of MENA Arab countries in late 1980s and the case of Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan following the fragmentation of the Soviet Union in 1991. The second is related to the scenario of replacement in case the powerful movements in a centralized leadership holding nondemocratic beliefs. While the cases here are scarce, this is a possible outcome. For example, in his study of transitions in post-communist countries, McFaul (2002) observes three modes of transitions: (1) imposition from below after democratic forces defeated the regime and installed democratic institutions (stable transitions), (2) imposition from above when the authoritarian regime “preserved and reconstituted authoritarian institutions”, and (3) protracted democratization “leading to either partial democracy or partial dictatorship” when there existed a balance of power between the opposition and the regime. In these modes, McFaul considers the core beliefs of the main actors the cause of the type the regime that results from the transition. In imposition from below the opposition actors are depicted as normatively committed to democracy and united, in some cases, behind national leaders like the cases of Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland.247

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247 McFaul, “The fourth wave”
In case of a single movement leadership, whether democratization occurs depends upon the movement’s ideology. When a CoP succeeds in overthrowing the regime (replacement) under the leadership of a single movement, it could claim a “revolutionary legitimacy” and monopolize political power. If it holds undemocratic beliefs, it reproduces an authoritarian regime.  

For example, Terry Lynn Karl and Philippe C. Schmitter (1991) noted that “where authoritarian incumbents are removed by force and replaced by new elites representing mass constituencies, the subsequent emergence of political democracy is unlikely.” In authoritarian states with no previous democratic history, there are few reasons to believe that parties and movements in these states hold democratic aspirations. Although there is abundant literature that criticises Robert Michels’ seminal work on the correlation between oligarchy and political party organizations, his argument is valid with regards to political parties and movements in authoritarian states.

According to Pamela S. Tolbert and Shon R. Haitt (2009), Michels provided four factors that impel oligarchy: the participation of members in decision making is constrained; representative delegates make decisions without general membership approval; leaders of the organization acquire in-depth, hard-to-gain knowledge of the organization which make replacing them costly; and leaders acquire vested interests in maintaining their positions within the organization and as such become tied to the survival of the organization at the expense of its goals. These factors led Michels to equate organization with oligarchy: “who says organization,

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248 The Russian Revolution of 1917, the Chinese Revolution of 1949 and the Iranian Revolution of 1979 are few examples.

249 Karl and Schmitter, “mode of transition.”

250 For example democracy was not on the agenda of any opposition party or movement in Arab MENA countries during the entire Cold War. Four types of parties existed in Arab MENA countries: leftist, Islamists, Ba'athists, and liberals. The liberals were mostly ally to authoritarian regimes while the rest sought to impose their own regimes that reflect their own ideologies.
For example, the Student Democratic Society in the United States during the sixties, understanding this oligarchic tendency in organizations, adopted a horizontal model of leadership to maximize participation and to avoid the dangers of centralization.\textsuperscript{252}

Michels’ arguments about the relationship between oligarchy and organization gain further validity in authoritarian states. The secret nature of autonomous movements and parties forces them to adopt hierarchal structures and bylaws based on what they term ‘democratic centralism’. In this system, the members at the base of the pyramid are supposed to deliberate on political issues and raise their recommendation to a higher level, but at the same time, they are expected to abide by the decisions of the upper leadership of the organization even if their recommendations are not considered.\textsuperscript{253} In short, it is against raison d’être to assume that a nondemocratic party or a movement can initiate a process of democratization if it manages to lead the protests alone and succeeds in overthrowing the regime.

\textbf{Dynamics of protest under decentralized leadership and democratization.} The core argument of the following paragraphs is that the process of democratization, in case a CoP succeeds, is the unintended consequence of the dynamics of protests under a decentralized form of leadership. These dynamics are: (1) the zero-sum game the protests create between the youth activists and the regime, (2) the disproportion of information available to protests movement leaders and to regime’s institutions about the impact of the protests on the state, and (3) the narrow consensus on the protests’ goals between the different protest centers in a CoP. Those dynamics enforce the democratization outcome, in case the protests succeeds, in three ways: they

\textsuperscript{251} Tolbert and Hiatt, "On organizations and oligarchies," 176-179.

\textsuperscript{252} Breines, “Community and Organization.”

\textsuperscript{253} The author personal experience
create political vacuum, hence a crisis of legitimacy; they lead to the replacement of the regime from within the state’s old institutions; and they generate a struggle over power, intense enough to force the de facto authority to hold a free and competitive national elections. To illustrate these arguments, I explain first the dynamics of the protests, and I then show their effect on the process of democratization.

In comparison with the dynamics of mobilization under a centralized form of leadership, there are four important dynamics that differentiate the protests of a revolutionary cycle under a decentralized form of leadership. To begin with, a decentralized model of leadership maximizes mobilization as it encourages independent initiatives and protects the activists from co-optation. According to Gerlach and Hine, this form of leadership is highly adaptive as it “[encourages] tactical experimentation, competition among subgroups, and lessened vulnerability to suppression or cooptation by authorities.”254 Additionally, each YM in this type of leadership structure can act as an “independent node” and as a “potential leader” of the CoP, making it difficult for the authorities to end the protests.255

A second dynamic is that, under decentralized leadership, the goals of the protests are set in the streets through the interaction of the protests’ leaders and the protestors themselves, and they are diffused to multiple locations through direct (subgroups’ infrastructure networks) and

255 Arquilla and Ronfeldt, “Networks and netwars,” 10. Arquilla and Ronfeldt identify three forms of organizational networks. The chain or line network is described by its end-to-end communication where the information travels through the intermediate nodes. The hub, star, or wheel network is where information moves through one central node to the members of a network. And lastly, the all-channel network or full matrix network is one in which every node is connected and communicated with every node. While the first two networks can be easily dismantled by detecting and detaining certain nodes in the network, in the full matrix network, it is difficult for the authority to dismantle it.
indirect means (such as the media). Thus the demands of the protestors vary in scale according to the intensity of, and levels of participation in different protest centers: the more intense they are and the more there are people in them, the more demands are presented and the higher the ceiling. However, because different locations may set diverse goals, as they are led by different groups, protestors in multiple locations (in the different protest centers) filter these goals and adopt the ones that resonate most. In this sense, only demands that reach a high degree of consensus among the majority of the protest centers will rise. This has two implications. The first is that the consensus on the demands of the protests between the different protest centers keeps narrowing as each center filters the demands of other centers and tailors them to fit with that of its own. This process creates two types of demands: demands that receive consent (I call them national demands), and single group demands, which have passed the filtration process but they were no agreement on them. And the second is that because there are single group demands, these groups will continue their mobilization after achieving the national demands while the groups that joined the protests only because of the national demands will cease their mobilization following achieving them. This process takes place without coordination between the participant groups as the national demands are made in the process of interaction between the diverse groups in the street and not between the leaders of the different movements. One of the reasons why it is almost impossible to create consensus beyond the specific demands that achieved consent between the protest centers is due to the vast pool of leaders that arise during the protests. These leaders vary in their education, interests, world-views, and commitment to the protests goals beyond what has been agreed on in the street.

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256 Soule, “Diffusion Processes.”
A third important dynamic is that the absence of unified leadership of the protests creates a zero-sum game between the regime and the protestors. By that I mean, in a decentralized leadership, the protests either succeed in achieving their goals or the regime succeeds in putting them down; there is no middle ground solution between the protestors and the regime. This is mainly because the regime, in case it wants to reach a compromise with the protestors, has no representative interlocutors on behalf of the protestors to negotiate with them a solution to end the protests. The regime may initiate negotiations with the leaders of some groups, but as long as the protests lack a unified leadership, any agreement with them cannot end the protests, as they do not represent all the protestors. This leaves the regime with the choice of ending the protests through repression. However, this choice depends on the willingness of the military to engage in repression. We have seen cases in the past when the military refused the orders. For example, the military in East Germany refused orders to put the protests down in 1989. 257

Fourth, this mode of decentralized leadership creates disproportion of information between the protestors and the regimes institutions concerning the impact of the protests on the state. Because the protestors do not have a unified leadership, the information about the impact of the multiple protest centers on the state does not reach a unified leadership to be evaluated and used. The protestors, for example, might be close to ousting the regime, but they cannot see it as they in each protest center have information only about their own center, but they do not have information about other centers. In contrast, the regime’s institutions, mainly, the upper echelons bureaucracy, the security forces, and the army have sufficient, if not complete, information about the impact of all protest centers on the state. In practice, this means the protestors lag, at least, one step behind the state’s institutions, which gives the state’s elites leverage over the protestors.

257 Kuran, “Now, out of never.”
For example, they might initiate a process of restructuring the state to prevent the entire collapse of the old regime’s institutions.\textsuperscript{258}

These dynamics, in case the protests succeed, lead unintentionally to a democratization process as they create a crisis of legitimacy that cannot be solved without holding national elections. First, as the protests under a decentralized leadership create a zero-sum game in the sense that they either succeed or fail with no possible middle ground solution. If they fail, the regime may initiate a process of liberalization or it may become more brutal.\textsuperscript{259} But if they succeed, they create a political vacuum when the institutions that control the political power of the state collapse. As no single movement or a coalition of movements can fill this vacuum in the absence of unified leadership, it is filled instead from within the regime’s old institutions such as the military or the bureaucracy. The new authority becomes a \textit{de facto} power by default, as the circumstances of the protests – namely, the inability of protestors to fill the political vacuum due to their lack of united leadership – forced this solution, but this \textit{de facto} power has no legitimacy to preserve authority as its ascendance to power is due to the protests rather than to the old regime own rules. The \textit{de facto} power, therefore, understands that it is an interim authority and it is forced to declare a roadmap that begins with national elections to end the protests in order to

\textsuperscript{258} I should note that the process I am describing here is very different than that of Heydemann and Leenders (2011) about authoritarian regimes’ learning. To begin with, Heydemann and Leenders goal is to explain how the regimes in Syria, Yemen, Bahrain, and Jordan learned to counter the protests in their own countries by observing how the Egyptian, Tunisian and Libyan’s regimes acted during the protests. I describe a process where segments in the regime attempt restructuring the state to avoid a complete collapse of the regime rather than saving the entire regime. Second, I do not agree with the authors’ claim that the persistence of the regimes they used as examples were due to the process of learning. In fact, the regional and international dimensions in the cases of Lybia, Yemen, Syria, and Bahrain were a decisive factor in the fate of those regime which the authors pay little attention to it in their article. See Heydemann, Steven, and Reinoud Leenders. ”Authoritarian learning and authoritarian resilience: regime responses to the ‘Arab Awakening’.”\textit{Globalizations} 8, no. 5 (2011): 647-653.

\textsuperscript{259} For example the liberalization process in Jordan, Tunisia, Algeria, and Egypt followed social protests. See Brynen and Korany, “\textit{Political liberalization}”; Cavatorta, “The failed liberalization.”
create new legitimacy. In this sense, the process of democratization begins because of the political vacuum the protestors created but failed to fill.

Second, what triggers this solution, the replacement of the elites from within the regime’s old institutions, is the fact that these institutions have sufficient information about the impact of protests on the state at time the protestors themselves lack this information because they do not have united leadership that can gather information from the different protest centers and take informed decisions at the right time. Thus, while the elites of the state see the gravity of the protests’ impact on the state and the need to take a dramatic initiative to save the remains of the old regime’s institutions, the protestors lag behind and cannot see the urgency to create a unified leadership in order to seize political power.

Lastly, whether the de facto authority will stick with its promises of holding national elections depend also on the dynamic of the protests. Recall that the consensus on the protests’ goals between different protest centers is narrowed to the common dominator demands between them (the national demands), some protest centers will dissipate immediately after achieving the national demands, for example ousting the head of the regime. While other centers will keep their protests as they have single movement demands or in case they develop new demands following the collapse of the regime such as appointing the members of the interim government or having a say during the interim period. The struggle in this case with and over the interim authority has two implications. First, it forces the de facto authority to abide with its promises to hold national elections as a means of ending the struggle over political power. And second, it may alter the extent of the process of democratization to encompass issues beyond holding free and competitive national elections such as issues related to transitional justice, to legislating during the interim period, and to the scope of interim government’s authority. Where the AYMs
are able to keep protests in the streets, they will extract more concessions from the de facto authority and the process of democratization will exceed the national elections, but where they cannot maintain the protests, the de facto authority will stop at the national elections. Either way, the AYMs will not be able to seize political power because most of the protest centers are dissipated as the consensus on the protest goals is over. Yet, at the very least, they force the de facto authority to keep its promise of holding free and competitive national elections.

If these arguments hold, then the prospects for democratization as a result of youth activism have more chances when the leadership of a CoP at its apex is decentralized. With the above discussion in mind, I present the final hypothesis:

**H3: Youth activism is more likely to lead to democratization if the protests cycle has a decentralized leadership at its apex.**

I discuss in more details the implications of a process of democratization initiated as a result of political vacuum in the findings and implications (chapter XII), but here I should note that this outcome does not conform to the cooperative model of transitions to democracy as developed by O'Donnell and Schmitter, Karl and Schmitter, Huntington, and Przeworski or to the noncooperative model as offered by McFaul. The democratization outcome discussed here is not due to a balance of power as suggested by the cooperative approach as the power is in favor for the protestors who fail to grab the authority because they do not have unified leadership. It is also dissimilar to the noncooperative mode of transitions. To say the least, the three models suggested by McFaul (imposition from above, imposition from below, and protracted democratization) are dissimilar to the case where there is clear victory of the protestors but failure on their part to seize authority. Figure I-2 summarises the framework of analysis.
Figure I-2: the framework of analysis

AYMs

NYMs

State’s Repression

Cycle of Protest’s Apex

AYMs domination at CoP’s Apex

NYMs domination at CoP’s Apex

Prospects for democratizations are unlikely

IMF at CoP’s Apex

EMF at CoP’s Apex

Prospects for democratizations are unlikely

AYMs and NYMs have previous linkages

AYMs and NYMs have not previous linkages

Single movement-type leadership

Prospects of democratizations depend on movement core beliefs

Central leadership

(type Umbrella movements)

- Consent on protest goals takes place between movements’ leaders.
- Negotiation with regime is possible.
- Central leadership is aware of impact of protests on the state.

Dynamics of protests:

- Consent on protest’s goals is narrow and takes place in street.
- No negotiation with regime (protests either succeed or fail).
- Protestors are not aware of impact of their protests on the state.

Decentralized leadership

Dynamics of protests:

- Framing protests to resonate with people.
- Locating protests in most aggrieved people areas.

AYMs solve resource problem:

State’s Repression

Prospects of democratizations are unlikely

AYMs domination at CoP’s Apex

NYMs domination at CoP’s Apex

Prospects of democratizations are unlikely

IMF at CoP’s Apex

EMF at CoP’s Apex

Prospects for democratizations are unlikely

AYMs and NYMs have previous linkages

AYMs and NYMs have not previous linkages

Single movement-type leadership

Prospects of democratizations depend on movement core beliefs

Central leadership

(type Umbrella movements)

- Consent on protest goals takes place between movements’ leaders.
- Negotiation with regime is possible.
- Central leadership is aware of impact of protests on the state.

Dynamics of protests:

- Consent on protest’s goals is narrow and takes place in street.
- No negotiation with regime (protests either succeed or fail).
- Protestors are not aware of impact of their protests on the state.

Decentralized leadership

Dynamics of protests:

- Framing protests to resonate with people.
- Locating protests in most aggrieved people areas.

AYMs solve resource problem:
Conclusion

The argument I am defending in this thesis is that youth activism leads to democratization under certain conditions related to the configuration of a CoP at its apex. It takes place as a result of the SoM rather than to the core beliefs of the youth themselves. If the SoM at the CoP’s apex involves the domination of AYMs, an inclusive master frame, and decentralized leadership, then it constitutes a structure that is conducive to the beginning of democratization. This argument is summarized in Table I-1:

Table I-1: Relationship between youth activism and democratization

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Independent Variables</th>
<th>Apex of Cycle of Protests</th>
<th>Dependent Variable</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Type of Dominant YMs</td>
<td>Autonomous</td>
<td>Democracy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Type of Master Frame</td>
<td>Inclusive</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Form of YMs Leadership</td>
<td>Decentralized</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Methodology

Choice of case studies

The choice of Tunisia, Egypt, and Jordan as cases for testing the proposed hypotheses is based on Mill’s Method of Difference which allows me to control for a variety of factors due to their similarities while studying at the same time the variance on the dependent variable. I consider Egypt and Tunisia to be successful cases of the beginning of democratization. Following the departure of the old regime on February 11, 2011, and before the coup d’état on July 3, 2013, Egypt conducted four national elections. It ran a free referendum over proposed changes to nine
articles of the constitution on 19 March 2011 to allow for free legislative and presidential elections. It conducted elections for the People and Shura Councils between 28 November 2011 and 22 February 2012. It ran presidential elections between 23 May and 17 June 2012. And, finally, it ratified a new constitution on December 2012.\footnote{Abu Hilal, “Indications”.
} The voting in these elections and referenda were described by independent monitoring centers as fair and competitive.\footnote{See for example see the Final Report of Carter Center Mission to Witness the 2011-2012 Parliamentary Elections in Egypt.” The Report summarizes its finding in the following words “In spite of concerns and in spite of visible flaws in the election process itself, it is the assessment of the Carter Center's mission that the results of the parliamentary elections appeared to broadly represent the will of Egypt's voters.” See The Carter Center, ““Final Report of the Carter Center Mission to Witness the 2011–2012 Parliamentary Elections in Egypt.” Also the Carter’s Center Report on the “Presidential Election in Egypt: May-June 2012. Tthe Center says “Egypt's historic 2012 presidential election was the first time Egypt's head of state would be directly elected by the people in a competitive election that included candidates representing diverse political platforms and where the outcome was genuinely unknown.” See The Carter Center, ““Presidential Election in Egypt.”
} The \textit{coup d’état} on July 3, 2013 does not change the fact that a process of democratization was initiated following the successful CoP, even if it was interrupted by the military. Indeed, the \textit{coup} informs us only that democratization by default is inherently unstable because stable democratization needs committed democrats. As McFaul explains when he discusses the mode of transitions in the former Soviet Union countries, “democracy emerged in countries where democrats enjoyed a decisive power advantage.”\footnote{McFaul, “The Fourth Wave.”
}

In Tunis, the transitional government established the Higher Commission for the Achievement of the Objectives of the Revolution and the Democratic Transition (HCAORDT), in which most of the Tunisian political movements that participated in the CoP were represented.\footnote{“Half a year after the revolution: the political scene is still ambiguous,” \textit{CNN Arabic}, 31 July 2011, retrieved from http://arabic.cnn.com/2011/Tunisia/7/29/tunisia.6months_later/index.html (accessed May 10, 2014)
} The HCAORDT drafted a new election law and held elections for the Constituent
Assembly on 23 October 2011. The elected Assembly appointed a new interim government along with a new president, then drafted and ratified a new constitution.\textsuperscript{264} As in Egypt, the independent monitoring centers for the Tunisian elections considered them fare and competitive. As the Carter Center noted, “the voting process was marked by peaceful and enthusiastic participation, generally transparent procedures, and popular confidence about Tunisia's democratic transition.”\textsuperscript{265}

Jordan represents the category of authoritarian Arab MENA states where youth movements emerged but failed to achieve their goals of turning the country into a constitutional monarchy.\textsuperscript{266} From the onset, the movement requested the full restoration of the 1952 constitution, which the king amended in 1956 following the election of an opposition government.\textsuperscript{267} The protests in Jordan reached their apex during the sit-in at the interior ministry circle (IMC) between March 24 and 25, 2011 but were suppressed by security forces. Though the protests re-emerged, they did not succeed in achieving their goals.

Besides the variations in CoP outcomes in Tunisia, Egypt, and Jordan, their YMs are similar on several levels. First, the involved YMs emerged in the three countries almost during the same period (Tunisia: 17 December 2010; Egypt: 25 January 2011; and Jordan: 7 January 2011). Second, unlike in Syria, Libya, Yemen, and Bahrain, where regional and international actors played a visible role in securing the protests’ outcome, in Tunisia, Egypt, and Jordan domestic factors played the key roles. Third, the very fact that in all three countries the YMs laid

\textsuperscript{264} Stepan, “Tunisia’s transition.”

\textsuperscript{265} The Carter Center. “National Constituent Assembly Elections in Tunisia.”

\textsuperscript{266} See for example, “Alhirak Alurduni: Byn AllSlah wa Altagheer (Jordan’s Movement: between Reform and Change),” Aljazeera, April, 10, 2013, retrieved from http://aljazeera.net/coverage/pages/d557463c-e2bb-477c-aadf-792b907385?GoogleStatID=1 (accessed May 10, 2014)

\textsuperscript{267} Massad, “Colonial Effects.”
out radical political demands indicates that the three regimes had lost their performance legitimacy. Briefly stated here, as I shall later expand on this issue in the introductory chapter of the three cases, in the years leading to the Arab spring, and mainly the last ten years, there has been a wedding of authoritarianism and wealth leading to a concentration of both among ruling elite families and a corresponding institutionalization of corruption. According to the Transparency International (TI) index of corruption for 2010, Jordan ranked 50 and scored 4.7. In comparison with Egypt, which ranked 98 and scored 3.1, the corruption in Jordan seems to be low. However, it is similar to that of Bahrain (ranked 48 and scored 4.9) and Tunisia (ranked 59 and scored 4.3). This form of kleptocratic governing eroded the legitimacy of the three regimes and alienated important segments of their traditional allies.

Finally, the three countries suffer a clear identity division. In Tunisia, while society is ethnically and religiously homogeneous, uneven development between the coastal and interior regions since the independence of Tunisia in 1956 contributed to the rise of two regional, and often opposing, identities. This is mainly because Bourguiba’s regime favored the coastal areas for investment, employment, and high-ranking state appointments, owing to his competition with

269 Ibid
leaders from the interior regions. In Egypt, there is a religious identity division between Muslims and Coptic Christians. The latter believe that the state is biased in favour of the former. The Copts point to the fact that there is no unified law under which the Muslims and Christians can build their own places of worship, and complain about their underemployment in the army and other security sectors. In non-sovereign ministries, the Copts believe that the state prefers to appoint Muslims to high-ranking posts. In Jordan, the national identity cleavage between Transjordanians and Jordanians of Palestinian origin dates to 1950, when Jordan officially annexed the West Bank. The cleavages became more visible following the civil war between Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) troops and the Jordanian army in 1970, and it manifests itself in the distribution of the labour force, as the Transjordanians occupy most of the public sector while Jordanian Palestinians are concentrated in the private sector. Furthermore, in all these countries, there is a clear ideological division between the Islamists and liberal groups which the regimes exploited strategically to keep their opponents divided.

Besides these considerations, it is more reliable and feasible to conduct this study immediately following the outcome of a CoP. This allows the researcher to easily locate and interview the youth activists and to validate their testimonies using other primary sources such as the movements’ own internal documents, official statements, and media reports. The research for this thesis was conducted from January to early August 2012, just one year after the successful protests in Tunisia and Egypt, and the failed protests in Jordan. I should note that these three

countries speak directly to the surprising protests in the Arab MENA countries that began in late 2010 and were dubbed the ‘Arab Spring’ or ‘Youth Revolution.’\footnote{The words “Arab Spring” initially used by international media to describe a series of events that occurred in 2005 including the Lebanese protests on 14 March 2005 to get Syria out of Lebanon, the parliamentary elections in Egypt, Iraq and Palestinian Territories. Following the protests in Tunisia in December 2010 and Egypt in January 2011, the popular media “painted these uprisings as youth revolutions.” See for example, Hoffman and Jamal, “The youth and the Arab Spring.”}

The choice of Egypt as a case study might be criticized on the basis that the period between Mubarak’s departure on February 11, 2011 and the military coup on July 3, 2013 is very short — suggesting, perhaps, that Egypt did not have time to enter a process of democratization. But is there any way to answer this line of criticism without recourse to a definition of what the beginning of the processes of democratization constitutes. Nathan Brown (2013), a recognized expert on Egypt, considers the process that followed Mubarak a case of failed democratization.\footnote{Brown, “Egypt's Failed Transition.”} Carrie Wickham (2013), another scholar on Egypt’s Islamist movements, wrote her book on the evolution of Muslim Brotherhood under the assumption that that Egypt entered the process of democratization.\footnote{Wickham, \textit{The Muslim Brotherhood}.} Marcus Mietzner (2014) compares the processes of democratization in Egypt with those in Indonesia.\footnote{Mietzner, "Successful and failed democratic transitions."} Comparing the Colour Revolutions in Ukraine, Georgia, and, Kyrgyzstan, Bert Kalandadze (2009) writes that almost all scholars in the transitology paradigm have considered these “electoral revolutions” to be successful moves toward democracy, whereupon nothing actually changed.\footnote{Kalandadze, Katya, and Mitchell A. Orenstein. “Electoral protests and democratization: Beyond the color revolutions.” \textit{Comparative Political Studies} (2009).} In his study, Kalandadze analyzes all cases of “electoral revolutions” worldwide since 1991, drawing a distinction between failed electoral revolutions and those that successfully challenged electoral results. He finds that “even
successful electoral revolutions show little democratic progress in their wake.\footnote{270} The point is that it is only in hindsight that scholars can assess processes of democratization in terms of success, failure, or stalemate. This is not because scholars are short-sighted; rather, it is because in authoritarian states there is no clear line distinguishing the state from the regime controlling it, making the process of democratization opened to all possibilities and therefore difficult to understand ahead of time or in the moment. Furthermore, because changes in power is only one problem in authoritarian regimes, it is hard to speculate about the outcome of the processes of democratization. As Kalandadze argues convincingly, “electoral revolutions,” even when they succeed, “do not resolve deeper issues of corruption, clientelism, underdeveloped political parties, and lack of transparent decision making.”\footnote{280} Yet, the entire paradigm of transition loses its meaning if scholars do not agree on minimum requirements for what constitutes the beginning of the process of democratization. In this regard, the definition I provided previously — as running free, fair, and competitive elections of national posts based on rules derived from a new constitution or, barring that, one in the making — is not only incongruent with the views of many democratization scholars, but is also more demanding than their own definitions.\footnote{281} In fact, the case of Egypt resembles those of Chile and Indonesia when they started to move toward democratization. In those countries, the military relied on a social base for its support, and its interests, especially in Chile and Egypt, were institutionalized in the state’s economy.\footnote{282} Thus rather than questioning the choice of Egypt as a case that marks the beginning of...
democratization, the question should be why the process of democratization failed in Egypt whereas it succeeded in the like-cases of Chile and Indonesia. This is certainly a different thesis, but in chapter VIII, I elaborate on possible explanations of the failed transition in Egypt as part of a comparison with the case of Tunisia.

The choice of Jordan as a case study might be criticized on the basis that monarchies are thought to be more resilient than republican regimes. This argument gains credibility in light of the fact that only presidential regimes were overthrown during the 2011 cycles of protests, while all monarchies survived. I will first briefly elaborate scholars’ arguments on this subject and then explain why they do not apply to Jordan. The arguments concerning monarchical resilience revolve around several themes: (1) kings’ extended families are ruling institutions; (2) monarchs stand above state-society relations; (3) monarchs enjoy traditional and religious legitimacy; (4) monarchies are rentier states (i.e. they sit on abundant domestic oil resources or well funded internationally); (5) kings are less violent with their subjects; and (6) monarchies are different than sultanic republican regimes.

The ruling institution in monarchies according to Michael Herb (1999) is “dynastic monarchism,” which accounts for the survival and the demise of monarchies in the Middle East, North Africa, and Afghanistan. He defines this category as a monarchy in which “the members of the ruling families monopolize the highest state offices, including the premiership and the portfolios of Interior, Foreign Affairs, and Defense.”283 The king in this sense is not a lone dictator; he is one among many in the family. Therefore, this system of governing allows for

283 Herb, All in the Family, 8.
more consultation and links with others than does a non-dynastic regime, endowing the king in dynastic monarchies with both legitimacy and flexibility needed to survive.\textsuperscript{284}

Liza Anderson (1991, 2000) poses two different arguments related to the multiple hats a king can wear in order to maintain his rule. Her early argument focuses on the relation between the creation of monarchies in the Middle East by Western imperialism and the state formation and nation building mission assigned to them. In this line of argument, monarchs gained a historical and traditional legitimacy that is not available to presidents. Unlike pan-Arabism, which fostered Arab nationalism, monarchs cultivated local nationalism.\textsuperscript{285} In her second argument, Anderson contends that Middle Eastern monarchs survive because they “thrive on multiplicity and avail themselves of considerable ambiguity and nuance in defining the members of their realm.”\textsuperscript{286} Monarchs claim a “traditional” right to rule and encourage pluralism among social groups, because “monarchies are better able to serve as the central focus in balancing, manipulating, and controlling societies characterized by such vertical cleavages.”\textsuperscript{287} Thus, the monarch stands above divisions and thereby becomes the unifying symbol of his or her nation.\textsuperscript{288}

The claims about traditional and religious monarchic legitimacy are two-fold: traditions are a source of legitimation in Gulf monarchies because kings and Amirs (princes) rule according to the norms of these societies.\textsuperscript{289} Religious legitimacy, meanwhile, provides a shield against the

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{itemize}
\item[284] Lucas, "Monarchical authoritarianism."
\item[285] Anderson, "Absolutism and the Resilience of Monarchy."
\item[286] Anderson, “Dynasts and Nationalists,” 56.
\item[287] Ibid, 60.
\item[288] Ibid, 65.
\item[289] Demmelhuber, “Political Reform in the Gulf Monarchies”; see also Kechichian, \textit{Succession in Saudi Arabia}. 
\end{itemize}
\end{footnotesize}
Islamists to monarchs in countries like Jordan, Morocco, and Saudi Arabia. In their study of the survival of monarchies in Middle East, André Bank, Thomas Richter and Anna Sunik (2013) argue that linchpin monarchies in Morocco and Jordan survive “due to their historical-religious claims to legitimacy” while dynastic monarchies such as those in the Gulf depend on “high rents and family participation in order to ensure their survival.”

The rentier-state perspective is rooted in both the abundant natural oil and gas resources available to Gulf monarchies and the Western economic support enjoyed by non-oil producing monarchies such as those of Jordan and Morocco (Luciani, 1987; Gause III, 1994; Ross, 2001; Yom and Al-Momani, 2008; Yom and Gause, 2012). Oil and gas exports and external financial support provide monarchs with sufficient financial power to be able to co-opt opposition, maintain a high quality and efficient coercive apparatus, and above all gain the acquiescence of different social groups by freeing them from paying taxes.

A further argument is related to the use of repression by monarchs and presidents. For example, Todd B. Spinks, Emile Sahliyeh, and Brian Calfano (2008) find that between 1980 and 2005, monarchies in the Middle East used less violence against their opponents than their republican counterparts in the region. This argument does not contradict the fact that rentier states (such as the Middle East monarchies) have more than sufficient resources to keep their coercive apparatus both well equipped and loyal (Bellin, 2004).

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290 Kramer, “Good Counsel to the King.”
291 Bank, Richter, and Sunik, “Long-term monarchical survival in the Middle East.”
294 Bellin, “The Robustness of Authoritarianism in the Middle East.”
Finally, Goldstone (2011) distinguishes between traditional monarchies (and states ruled by one party) on the one hand, and sultanatic states such as those in Tunisia and Egypt, on the other. He claims that sultanates are more ‘brittle’ than monarchies because sultanate leaders expand their personal powers at the expense of formal institutions, amass great wealth that they use to buy the loyalty of supporters and punish opponents, promise stability to foreign countries in exchange for aid and investment, and keep security forces divided in coup-prevention measures. Goldstone does not, however, expand on what makes monarchies more resilient; he says only that the leaders of traditional monarchies (and one-party states) manage to maintain popular support by making appeals to respect for royal tradition (or nationalism). In such conditions, “broad-based popular mobilization is difficult to achieve because it requires bridging the disparate interests” of different sectors in the society.

In general, these arguments broaden our understanding of the mechanisms of rule in Middle East monarchies. However, they have theoretical and empirical deficits. Theoretically, monarchical regimes in the Middle East are similar to authoritarian republican regimes: they have limited political pluralism with no guiding ideology; they do not enjoy intensive nor extensive political mobilization; and monarchs just like presidents exercise power within formally ill-defined limits. The confusion about monarchies, as Russel E. Lucas (2004) explains, stems from the fact that “hereditary succession” is a defining feature of these regimes. But, as he argues, “leadership [in Middle East countries] is often inherited, which may not be a remarkable fact except that many of the states are nominal republics.” Empirically, and as

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295 Goldstone, “Understanding the revolutions.”
297 Lucas, “Monarchical authoritarianism.”
Sean L. Yom and Gregory F. Gauss II (2012) remind us, “[there] is no cultural or institutional DNA that renders royal regimes in states as disparate as Morocco, Oman, and Saudi Arabia impervious to overthrow.” Monarchies were overthrown in Egypt (1952), Iraq (1958), Yemen (1962), and Iran (1962). In fact, the king of Bahrain perhaps would have been ousted in 2011 had the Gulf states of Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates, and Qatar refrained from sending troops to quell the protests in the country. In short, there is nothing unique about monarchies that make them different than republics.

As for the particular case of Jordan, the abovementioned arguments about its monarchic resilience do not hold up to close scrutiny. First, the size of the king’s family in Jordan is relatively small and most of its members do not occupy important state positions. Second, while King Abdullah, the founder of the kingdom in Jordan (and his successor to a lesser extent), claimed legitimacy based on kinship with the Prophet Muhammad, King Abdullah II focused more on governmental performance as a source of legitimacy. In fact, since the King’s ascendance to power in 1998, his religious roots are rarely mentioned. This might be related to the fact that when the king assumed power, he was barely able to speak Arabic. Third, the Jordanian regime is not ambiguous about its allegiance to Transjordanians, and claims that the regime stands above the identity division between Transjordanians and the Jordanians of Palestinian origin are untrue. For example, most civil and military service employees are

298 Yom and Gause III, “Resilient Royals.”
299 Anderson, “Absolutism and the Resilience of Monarchy.”
300 Josua and Edel, “To Repress or Not to Repress.”
301 King Abdullah, the founder of the kingdom in Jordan had two sons and three daughters. The two sons (Talal and Nayef) had in total five sons and one daughter. Nayef’s two sons have nine daughters and two sons. Talal’s three sons and daughter have twenty sons and daughters. Some of King’s Abdullah II brothers and daughters for example assume posts related sports. Prince Feisal for example is the head of Jordan’s Olympic Committee. Prince Ali is the head of Jordan’s Union for Soccer. Princess Aisha is head of Royal Jordanian Equestrian Federation. The king’s uncles and aunts do not occupy official positions that affect Jordanians daily life.
Transjordanians, and Jordan’s electoral districts are drawn to favour the regime’s social base of supporters. Nevertheless, most of the protests that have occurred in Jordan since the late 1980s came from areas dominated by the regime’s traditional base, such as the cities of Tafileh, Ma’an and Karak. During those protests the king did not show willingness to use the identity division to demobilize the protestors; he did not mobilize the Palestinian Jordanians to support his rule in order to threaten the Transjordanians. Rather, and as in all authoritarian regimes, he used strategies of repression and accommodation to diffuse the protests. Fourth, it is true that the monarchy propaganda machine reminds Jordanians that the king’s ancestors established and built the state of Jordan, but it is equally true that Transjordanians believe that they gave the king’s family a safe asylum when they fled Saudi Arabia. In fact, when Prince Hassan, the king’s uncle, reminded the Jordanians that his family built Jordan, the Transjordanian tribes condemned his statement and asked him to apologize because “his family members came to Jordan as refugees and the tribes protected them and made his grandfather a king as part of their endeavour to build one united Arab state.”

Fifth, the rentier-state’s argument is not applicable to Jordan because the monarchy has no oil-revenue income. Nevertheless, Jordan receives the third largest amount of U.S. financial support, after Israel and Egypt in the Middle East. However, let us remember that Egypt received more than USD$60 billion from the US between 1978 and 2010, but this financial

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303 Andoni and Schwedler, “‘Bread riots in Jordan.” The cycle of protests of 2011 started from Thieban, a Transjordanian southern town in Madaba. See for example, Ryan, “Political opposition.”


305 For example, from 2008 to 2012, Jordan netted almost $4 billion in military and economic assistance, with annual aid ranging from $650 to $800 million. See Yom, “Jordan: The ruse of reform.”
support did not save the regime.\textsuperscript{306} Yom and Gause (2012) claim that Western’s support of monarchies is not only financial, but also political in that it includes commitment to intervene to protect them.\textsuperscript{307} Indeed, the United States intervened in 1991 to reinstall the king of Kuwait after he was ousted by Iraq’s occupation. However, in the case of Jordan, the United States supported reforms that entailed granting Jordanians of Palestinian origin more political representation in Jordan.\textsuperscript{308} That is to say, the United States backed the demands of the traditional opposition in Jordan during its iteration of the 2011 cycle of protest.

Six, the argument that monarchies used less repression to quell the protests is not convincing. The study of Maria Josua and Mirjam Edel (2014) on the use of repression in Bahrain and Egypt post-2011 against their subjects shows that distinguishing between monarchy and republic on the basis of repression is inconclusive; the two regime-types used the same level of repression.\textsuperscript{309} Furthermore, the regime in Jordan adopted a strategy similar to those of its counterparts in Tunisia and Egypt. When the protests did not include disruptive actions, the regimes in Tunisia and Egypt did not repress the protestors. But when the activists opted for disruption, they were repressed. In Jordan, the regime used violence to end the sit-in on March 24, 2011 because it was disruptive, while it used presumably more peaceful means to end non-disruptive protests.

What is more, Goldstone’s argument can be refuted on two bases. The first is that, contra Goldstone, the Jordanian regime shares all the characteristics Goldstone has attributed to

\textsuperscript{306} According the Camp David Peace Treaty between Egypt and Israel in 1978, the United States promised to pay Egypt $2 billion every year; a billion of military worth equipment and another in the form of economic aid. Israel received $ 3 billion of military and economic aid. See for example Sharp, “Egypt: Background and US relations.”

\textsuperscript{307} Yom and Gause III, “Resilient Royals.”

\textsuperscript{308} Interview with the author with one of the American diplomat in Jordan, Amman, February 25, 2012.

\textsuperscript{309} Josua and Edel, “To Repress or Not to Repress.”
“sultanistic regimes.” The youth activists in Jordan accused the king and his family of corruption. In fact, the most famous dance against corruption in Jordan is the one that depicts the king as Ali Baba. 310 Furthermore the king in Jordan has more executive powers than any president in the republican Arab countries. The king appoints the government and the upper house, dissolves the parliament when he wishes, and is not accountable to any institutional body. And the second is related to the first: if the Jordanian regime is similar to those of Tunisia and Egypt, it is not clear why a similar broadly based uprising is not possible in Jordan.

The strongest argument against including Jordan as a contrasting case study is not articulated directly in scholars’ work on Jordan. However, one claim that national identity division is inherently stronger than other identity cleavages. While scholars who studied the protests in Jordan did not draw comparisons to other countries that suffer regional and religion divisions, they did argue that the regime used the division between Transjordanians and Jordanian Palestinians to cripple the protests. 311 This claim is valid, and the findings of my thesis confirm that of theirs. However, these scholars do not inform us why the activists in Jordan could not overcome these identity cleavages while in Tunisia and Egypt they successfully did just that during protests. A possible reason for this is that they consider national identity division in Jordan to be stronger than other forms of identity cleavages. But it is hard to compare the strength of the different type of identity cleavages as their nature is different. Donald L. Horowitz (1985), for example, argues that for comparative analysis of ethnicity, the following four dimensions should be studied and compared: the severity of division, the hierarchal nature

310 Dabkah Alfassad (The corruption dance) is invented by Tafilah Youth Movement. The dance is accompanied with a song authored by the activists. The song considers the king Ali Baba who is heading forty thieves. While the activists do not mention in the song the king by name, they clearly point to his family and cronies by their names.

of the groups (ranked versus unranked), the centralization of groups, and the groups are defined
by ascriptive differences. These dimensions cannot be applied to my cases, as the identity
cleavages of the three countries are of different types, and none of them is ethnic.

The literature on identity, however, finds that ethnicity possesses a comparable power to
“closely related forms of collective affiliation, race and religion.” The Transjordanians and the
Palestinians are Arabs. However, even if we assume that national identity division is equivalent
in its strength to ethnic rifts, we still need to explain why the activists in Jordan failed to
overcome their cleavages while their colleagues in Egypt who faced religious identity cleavages
of comparable strength to their ethnic counterparts managed to overcome this obstacle.
Moreover, the literature on identity informs us that the problem of identity appears when a social
group with specific traits is denied access to states resources or discriminated against in its daily
encounter with the state. In this sense, identity divisions in Tunisia, Egypt, and Jordan can be
perceived as similar in that the people of the interior regions in Tunisia, the Christian Copts in
Egypt, and the Palestinians in Jordan are all seeking a similar form of equality in their respective
countries. Lastly, there are abundant examples showing that regional identity holds equivalent
strength to ethnicity and religion divisions. For example, the Yemenis in the south and north
engaged in civil war in 1994 but that did not prevent youth activists from constructing a “post-
partisan identity” to unite their forces against Ali Abdullah Saleh’s regime in the CoP of 2011. The youth Shiites and Sunnis constructed a united front against the king in Bahrain but they

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312 Horowitz, “Ethnic groups in conflict,” 14
313 Young, “Explaining the conflict,” 8
314 Ibid
315 Yadav, “Antecedents of the Revolution.”
failed to topple the regime due regional military intervention.\textsuperscript{316} What needs to be explained is why the youth activists could not overcome national identity divisions in Jordan while their counterparts in Egypt and Tunisia managed to do so in their own communities. This thesis will argue that the youth activists in Jordan could not overcome their rifts due to the absence of organizational links between the AYMs and NYMs and the lack of past common activism between the two camps.

**Data and Movements’ Sample**

The analysis presented in this thesis is based on four primary sources: semi-structured interviews with 230 activists, the documents of the youth movements that participated in protests, the activists’ slogans during the protests, and the states’ official statements. It is also supplemented by other sources such as written literature on the protests, data gathered by research centers, and local and international newspapers.

The selected sample of representative youth movements in each country is based on three criteria. First, it represents both AYMs and NYMs. Second, it accounts for the initiator YMs and the latecomer movements that joined the protests. Third, it attends to the type of identity cleavages that exist in each country. In order to get further insights about the dynamics of youth activism and to validate the sample of movements and their activists’ narrative, I expanded the interviews to include activists from other movements and from civil society organizations and officials when possible. The snowballing effect upon the data gathered for this research is negligible because the interviewees belong to different movements while the different primary sources of data further reduce this effect.

In Tunisia, the protests started in Sidi Bouzid on 17 December 2010. They reached Kasserine on 25th December 2011, then reached their apex on 12 January 2011 when Sfax, a city on the coast joined in. The regime collapsed on 14 January 2011. The initiator YMs in Sidi Bouzid comprised a group of activists that belong to youth sectors of autonomous political parties such as the Workers Communist Party (POCT) and the Islamic Ennahda Movement (Ennahda), while others are members of non-autonomous political parties such as Progressive Democratic Party (PDP) and Ettajdid Movement (Ettajdid). Beyond this are members of grassroots informal movements such as the Youth Dignity Movement (Karama). In Tunisia, there were no latecomer movements; the AYMs and NYMs participated in the protests from the start. Their participation took the form of direct involvement in the protests when the YMs had activists on the ground in Sidi Bouzid, while they issued political statements in support of the protests when they did not have activists present. Table I-2 summarizes the sample of movements and Table I-3 shows the distribution of the interviewees from both the movements and civil society organizations.

Table I-2: Movements’ sample, Tunisia

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>YM Name</th>
<th>Autonomous</th>
<th>Nonautonomous</th>
<th>Initiator</th>
<th>Latecomer</th>
<th>Regional Cleavage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Karama</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td>X*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>POCT</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PDP</td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ennahda</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ettajdid</td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* The Karama YM does not consider itself a movement that belongs to the interior regions. However, the majority of its activists are from the interior regions. It therefore reflects the regional cleavages in Tunisia better than any other movement.
Table I-3: Distribution of interviewees on movements and CSOs, Tunisia

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Nº</th>
<th>Political organization</th>
<th>Activists’ names</th>
<th>Age btw (18-35) y</th>
<th>Age &gt; 35 y</th>
<th>Total Nº</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>POCT</td>
<td>Emna, Gassen, Bilel, Ahmed, Amani, Ahmed, Salem, Zuheir, Yassine, Slim, Mazen, Sondos, Zied</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Karama</td>
<td>Khalid, Hamza, Kemal, Qaies, Hisham, Khalil, Mourad, Sofein, Elamine, Abdulwahab, Samah, Bulqasem, Sabri, Abdulnaser</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>PDP</td>
<td>Issam Chebbi, Salah Hamami, karima, Nacim, Dalia, Tarek, Sofiene, Bilal, Sofia, Sarah, Hussam, Houssm</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Ennahda</td>
<td>Zied, Habib Aloz, Sahbi Atig, Chaker, Hamza, Muntaaser, Rachid, Asia Nefratı, Shukri, Shukri, Zied</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Ettajdid</td>
<td>Nizar, Amin, Youssef, Amin, Issam, Tamer, Habib, Ridha</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>WATAD*</td>
<td>Abdul Nasser Ouaini, Chaker, Adel</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>NGM**</td>
<td>Malek, Nabil</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>TLM***</td>
<td>Sonia, Fawzi</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>SDM****</td>
<td>Ahmed Khusousi</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>Salafists</td>
<td>Yahya, Hamdi</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>CSOs*****</td>
<td>Youssef AlBuheri, Imen, Nour Elddin Alouli, Aziz Amami, Mehdi Ben Abdul Jawad, Jasir, Abdulsatar Mousa, Hajar, Marwa, Hamdi, Chahine, Haamdi Bechir Haamdi, Naser AlDin AlSasi, Sameer Chaifi, Hussein Bujara</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td>64</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>84</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Nationalist Democratic Movement; **New Generation Movement (GIM); ***Free Tunisia Movement (GIM); **** Social Democratic Movement; *****This category includes activists from UGTT, Bar Association, Human Rights activists, Journalists, and bloggers.

In Egypt, the protests began on 25 January 2011 in Cairo, Alexandria, and Suez. They reached their apex on 28 January 2011. The regime fell on 11 February 2011. The initiator YMs were the autonomous April 6 Movement (A6M), the Revolutionary Socialists (RS), Youth for Justice and Freedom (YJF), the Campaign for Supporting El-Barade’ (CFSE) which mostly composed of youth activists, the Karama Party, and a wide pool of independent activists.
including writers, artists, journalists, professors, and lawyers, as well as to defectors from the Muslim Brotherhood. The latecomer movements included the non-autonomous Wafd Party, the Muslim Brotherhood (MB), and the Tajamoe’ Party, as well as the Nasirist Party (a Pan-Arab group). While Maspiro, a Christian Coptic YM, was not formally established until after the revolution, in March 2011 following a confrontation with the army near Maspiro (the complex of the Egyptian Radio and TV), its activists participated in the protests from the beginning. Table I-4 shows the selected youth movement sample in Egypt and Table I-5 shows the distribution of the interviewees in the movements and CSOs.

Table I-4: Movements’ sample, Egypt

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>YM Name</th>
<th>Autonomous</th>
<th>Nonautonomous</th>
<th>Initiator</th>
<th>Latecomer</th>
<th>Religious Cleavage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A6M</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RS</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>YJF</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MB</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maspiro</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td>X*</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Maspiro reflects the religious cleavages in Egypt. Its members are only Copts. While the members of MB are only Muslims, the MB reflects an ideological cleavage with other movements as well.

Table I-5: Distribution of interviewees on movements and CSOs, Egypt

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>N°</th>
<th>Political organization</th>
<th>Activists’ names</th>
<th>Age btw (18-35) y</th>
<th>Age &gt; 35 y</th>
<th>Total N°</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>A6M</td>
<td>Mohamed, Mustafa, Ahmed, Amal Sharaf, Karim, Ahmed, saleh</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>YJF</td>
<td>Shawky Elgenawy, Mohamed, Wisam, Ahmed, Nihan</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>RS</td>
<td>Nadeem, Mohamed, Habiba, Ahmed, Basem, Mohammed, Mohamed</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>MB</td>
<td>Mustafa, Mohamed, Nidal Saker, Shady, Osama, Ahmed, Hussam, Mohammed, Amr, Abdulraheem</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Maspiro</td>
<td>Bishoy, Rami</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Organization</td>
<td>Names</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---</td>
<td>-----------------------</td>
<td>------------------------------------------</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Defected MB</td>
<td>Mohamed, Abdullah, Anas, Yahya, Ibrahim, Zeinab</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>CFSE</td>
<td>Ismael, Mohamed, Ahmed</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Karama Party</td>
<td>Ali, Jihad</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>RI*</td>
<td>Mamdouh</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>Ultras</td>
<td>Tarek Masaken</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>Lazem**</td>
<td>Karim</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>Ghad Party</td>
<td>Ahmed, Ahmed</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>YLE***</td>
<td>Ahmed, Mohamed</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>Ha’ina****</td>
<td>Hani</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>Independents</td>
<td>Ahmed, Issam, Menen, Rabi, Karim, Ahmed, Salma, Mohamed, Kholoud, Ala Abdulhafeeth, Islam, Rawda</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total</td>
<td></td>
<td>56</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>61</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Revolutionary Islamists (GIM); **A salafist movement appeared during the protests (GIM); ***Youth loves Egypt, (GIM); **** Our Rights Movement (GIM)

In Jordan, the protests started first in Thieban (a small village in Madaba Governorate) on 7 January 2011, and then extended to other cities including Amman, Irbid, Maan, Karak, and Zarqa.\(^{317}\) The protests reached their apex on 24 March 2011 when several youth groups calling themselves the March 24 Coalition (M24C) called for an open sit-in at the Interior Ministry Circle (IMC) in Amman. The first youth autonomous group appeared in Karak, a city in southern Jordan, under the name The National Campaign for Change (Jayeen).\(^{318}\) Jayeen included several groups, among them activists from Thieban, the Social Left, the Progressive Current, the Higher Committee for Retired Military Officers (HCRMO), and the Committee for the Preparation of Teachers Association. Jayeen activists are mostly Transjordanians, and though the group

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officially formed on January 21, 2011, it organized the first march in downtown Amman with the Democratic Unity Popular Party (WAHDA) and Jordan Communist Party on January 14, 2011. The Higher Committee for the Coordination of National Opposition Parties (HCCNOP) and the professional trade union organized a sit-in near the Parliament on January 16, 2011. The HCCNOP includes the Islamic Action Front (IAF), WAHDA, and several other parties. The IAF formed the youth group March 24 Movement (M24M) in early March, and the WAHDA party already had a youth group called We Are Boycotting for Change (WRBC), which it had established in 2010. The Tafilah Youth Movement (TYM) was formed after March 24, 2011 and its activities became central to the protests in Jordan after this date. I include them in the movements’ sample because they bring additional insights into the Jordanians’ grievances. Table I-6 shows the movements’ sample, and Table I-7 presents the distribution of the interviewees on the youth movements and CSOs.

Table I-6: Movements’ sample, Jordan

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>YM Name</th>
<th>Autonomous</th>
<th>Nonautonomous</th>
<th>Initiator</th>
<th>Latecomer</th>
<th>National Cleavage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Jayeen</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tafileh</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WRBC</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M24M</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*I should note that M24M and WRBC are perceived by the majority of Transjordanians as representative for the Palestinians, though, they are affiliated to national parties (IAF and WAHDA).


320 The group was formed to advocate for boycotting the Parliamentary elections.
Table I-7: Distribution of interviewees on movements and CSOs, Jordan

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Nº</th>
<th>Political organization</th>
<th>Activists’ names</th>
<th>Age btw (18-35) y</th>
<th>Age &gt; 35 y</th>
<th>Total Nº</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Jayeen</td>
<td>Ali Habashneh, Sakher Bani Salem, Mohammed Sneid, Dana, Khalid Kaladeh, Sabri, Khalil Saleh, Nahed Hattar, Amer, Salem, Ahmed, Zaid, Reema, Mustafa</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>WRBC</td>
<td>Ayham, Fadi, Fakhri, Mussa, Jihad, Hussein, Sarah, Amal, Ismael</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Tafileh YM</td>
<td>Hamza, Hana, Jihad Muheisen, Kaisar, Khalil, Majdi, Raed, Nidal</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>8</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Progressive Current</td>
<td>Khalid Ramadan</td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Ba’athist*</td>
<td>Muwafak Mahadin, Mu’ath Btush, Mustafa Rawashdeh, Rasmi</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Maan YM**</td>
<td>Akram, Mohammed, Ahmed</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>HASHD***</td>
<td>Abla Abu Ilbeh, Mustafa</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>Alawda****</td>
<td>Mohammed, Khalil, Ahmed</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>Communist Party</td>
<td>Faraj, Omar</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>ABR*****</td>
<td>Khalid, Mu’ath, Odai</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>CSOs</td>
<td>Adnan Abu Odeh, Ahmed Abu Khalil, Ahmed Awad, Ali Nobani, Bassma, Fahd Khitan, Fathi Kasab, Hadi Shobaki, Hashim Gharaibeh, Khalid Shaqran, Mohammed Almasri, Mohammed Tahboub, Mousa Barhouma, Mustafa Yaghi, Oraeb Rantawi, Rakan Wledat, Sami Hurani, Mohammed Abu Ruman, Ja’far Okeili, Mohammed Khatib, Mohammed Zawahri</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Two support Syria and two support the Iraqi Ba’athist; **GIM appeared in Maan after March 24, 2011; ***Jordan People Party, part of the traditional opposition; ****Alawda is a student group at the University of Jordan, it is affiliated with the Palestinian Fatah Movement; *****ABR (Ajlon Bloc for Reform) is GIM appeared after March 24, 2011.
I recognize that the number of activists within the sample movements from Tunisia, Egypt, and Jordan is relatively low in proportion to the total number of interviewees (in Tunisia 58 out of 84; in Egypt 31 out of 61; and in Jordan 46 out of 85). This is in part because these movements are small (except for the Islamists) and also because I wanted to validate the narratives of the movements’ activists through information from other sources. Additionally, I wanted to hear the viewpoint of activists from the grassroots informal movements (GIM). Methodologically, this should give the research more strength, as more movements’ activists are included in the interviews, and were asked the same questions.

The interviewees in the sample were asked semi-structured questions related to the thesis hypotheses. For the domination of AYMs, the interviewees were asked questions related to how the protests started and who initiated them; the kind of problems they faced to sustain protests and how they solved them; the strategies they used to provoke bystanders to join the protests; how the protests spread from one place to another; whether there were spontaneous protests, and if so, what was the role they played in uprisings; how intense the protests were; how the regime responded to the protests; why and when the protestors changed their demands from reforming the regime to ousting it; who called for ousting the regime and who did not; who negotiated the regime and who refused to do so and why; how the negotiation affected the movements that did so; did the activists disagree at any time in the protests on specific issues, and if they did, what were these issues, and how did they responded to their differences.

For the CoP’s master frame, the informants were asked to elaborate on the reasons of the protests; what solutions they offered to end the protests; whether identity cleavages affected the spread of the protests, how they managed to overcome these divisions if they did, and in case they could not, why; they were asked to elaborate on their chanted slogans and prompted to
answer some structured questions such as identifying slogans that reflected national unity, slogans that were drawn from collective memories, and divisive slogans; they were also asked to elaborate on whether movements used own symbols and slogans in the protests; Lastly, they were asked to explain how they agreed on the demand of ousting the regime (in the cases of Tunisia and Egypt); whether there were movements that did not call for ousting the regime or changing the protestors reforming demands, and in case there were, how that affected protests; whether they had a previous agreement on what type of regime that should replace the departing one, and if not, why; whether they agreed on running elections after ousting the regime, and if did not why.

For the centralized/ decentralized leadership of CoP, the interviewees were asked two sets of questions. The first set is related to the leadership during the CoP, such as whether the protests were led by a single or multiple YMs, and if multiple, whether there was a unified leadership, and if there was not then why this happened, and how the YMs agreed on ousting the regime; how the protests end and whether there was a unified decision between the YMs to end them. The second set is related to the process of democratization. The activists were asked to elaborate on how the process of democratization began in Tunisia and Egypt and what role they played in this period.

**Findings**

I summarize the thesis main findings for each country in Table I-8. The organization of the findings reflects the logic advanced in the framework of analysis. It begins by showing the findings about who were the initiator and latecomer movements. Next, it summarizes how the
AYMs and NYMs responded to state’s repression. Finally, it offers the findings of the thesis’ main hypothesis in relation to the structure of mobilization at the CoP’s apex.

Table I-8: Summary of the thesis main findings

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Tunisia</th>
<th>Egypt</th>
<th>Jordan</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AYMs</td>
<td>POCT, Ennahda, Karama</td>
<td>A6M, YJF, RS, Maspiro</td>
<td>Jayeen, Tafileh Movement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NYMS</td>
<td>PDP, Ettajdid</td>
<td>MB</td>
<td>M24M, WRBC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Initiator movements</td>
<td>AYM: (POCT, Ennahda, Karama)</td>
<td>AYM: A6M, YJF, RS</td>
<td>AYM: Jayeen</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>NYM: (PDP, Ettajdid)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latecomer movements</td>
<td></td>
<td>NYM: MB</td>
<td>NYM: M24M and WRBC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>AYM: Maspiro</td>
<td>AYM: Tafileh Movement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Response to repression</td>
<td>AYM: called for regime change.</td>
<td>AYM: called for regime change.</td>
<td>AYM: Jayeen engaged in controversy over M24M’s demands during March 24, 2011 sit-in.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>NYM: called for reforming the regime.</td>
<td>NYM: MB called for reforming the regime.</td>
<td>NYM: M24M and WRBC de-escalate the protests for three weeks after repression on March 25, 2011.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Domination during CoP’s apex</td>
<td>AYMs dominated protests (January 12-14, 2011).</td>
<td>AYMs dominated protests (January 28-February 2011).</td>
<td>NYMs dominated protests (March 24-March 26, 2011).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Prioritized social demands prior to CoP’s Apex.</td>
<td>Prioritized social demands in preparation period of protests.</td>
<td>Jayeen’s activities organized away from its social base and poor Jordanians neighbourhoods.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Used innovative tactics (appealed to university graduates, provoked Tunisians emotions, used agitation speeches and slogans).</td>
<td>AYMs planned strategically to locate protests on January 25, 2011 in the poor neighbourhoods of Cairo and Alexandria (snowball plan), and they did the same on the ‘Day of Rage’ on January 28, 2011.</td>
<td>Jayeen organized less protest activities than the MB and WRBC prior to CoP’s apex.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Organized protests in poor Tunisian’s neighbourhoods.</td>
<td>SRMs led to the collapse of CSF facilitating erecting the sit-in of Tahrir Square, and minimizing cost of joining</td>
<td>Jayeen’s protest activities lacked power of disruption.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>SRMs led to the collapse of POB minimizing cost of joining protests.</td>
<td></td>
<td>Jayeen was dependent on NYMs activities as it failed to sustain protests in big numbers.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>M24M called for the sit-in on March 24, 2011 and allocated for it more human and logistic</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MF during COP’s apex</td>
<td>Inclusive</td>
<td>Inclusive</td>
<td>Exclusive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>----------------------</td>
<td>-----------</td>
<td>-----------</td>
<td>-----------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MF’s content and abstraction reflect ideological pluralism (the focus is on employment, corruption, repression, and poverty).</td>
<td>MF’s content represents the interests of Tunisians (in interior and coastal regions).</td>
<td>MF’s content transcends identity division between the people in coastal and interior regions. No factional slogans or flags were raised; slogans focused on patriotism; and some slogans are drawn from Tunisians collective memory.</td>
<td>Jayeen and its allies advanced a MF that centered around state’s corruption, poverty, and unemployment. M24M and WRBC advanced a MF that centered on political marginalization of Palestinian Jordanians in the state’s institutions.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**MF attributions**

| MF’s content and abstraction reflect an ideological pluralism (the focus is on poverty, corruption, and repression). | MF’s content represents interest of most Egyptians except groups associated with regime. | MF’s content transcends division between Muslims and Christian Copts, and ideological divisions of youth movements. No factional slogans or flags were raised; slogans focused on patriotism; there were cross-identity slogans; and some slogans were drawn from Egyptian collective memory. | Content and abstraction are not ideologically neutral. A nationalistic chauvinism is seen in the segment of MF representing Transjordanians (e.g., there is rejection to accept an election law that represents fairly all Jordanians). Exclusionary elements are seen in MF’s segment Palestinian Jordanians (e.g., there is omission of Transjordanians’ fear of losing their national identity to Palestinians). MF does not represent the interests of all Jordanians (e.g., there are different views between AYMs and NYMs on issues of privatization, election laws, and citizenship). MF does not transcend identity division between Transjordanians and Palestinian Jordanians. NYMs raised their own flags and chanted their own movements’ slogans in protests. There was not any slogan drawn from Jordanians collective memory. |

**Reasons for deployment**

| Previous linkages between activists of AYMs and NYMs (as individuals and between their organizations) | Previous linkages between activists as individuals and between their organizations | There were no previous individual and organizational linkages between AYMs and NYMs. |
| **MF** | movement organizations) existed since 2005. Extant of strong national organizations such as UGTT, UGET, and Bar Association fostered horizontal linkages between activists. All the youth movements had a stake in the success of the protests. | existed since 2000. All youth movements had a stake in the success of the protests. | NYMs. The reasons are: The structure of mobilization prior to the 2011 COP took a national identity shape. NYMs focused on events related to Israel-Palestine conflict (except for election law). Most of the AYM stimulated during the COP with no presence outside their geographical locations. There are no national trade unions in Jordan that could facilitate the creation of horizontal linkages between the Transjordanians and Palestinian Jordanians. The GFJTU is historically weak and controlled by regime loyalists. The professional trade unions are controlled by the NYMs, and historically they did not play a role in politics in Jordan. |
| Reasons for MF inclusivity/exclusivity during COP’s apex: | Agreement on ousting regime took place in street between different protest centers. Activists did not expect Ben Ali’s departure so quickly, and therefore, they did not feel urgency to address the issue of who should replace him. Short-term period between consensus on ousting regime and Ben Ali’s departure did not allow for disagreement on the question of who should replace him. | Agreement on ousting regime took place in street between activists prior to CoP’s apex. Activists did not expect protests to succeed; they remained focus on ousting Mubarak and they did not discuss the type of regime that should be installed after him. MB did prefer to discuss regime type after Mubarak as they did not want to commit to an agreement that may hinder their strategy of negotiation with president’s deputy and army. | M24M did not abide by agreement with Jayeen on March 24, 2011 sit-in’s goals. M24 introduced demands that Jayeen did not approve such as an election law for parliament based on density of demography and resignation of head of the intelligence department. Furthermore, M24M omitted fighting corruption in its demands. Jayeen’s activists preferred election law that would enjoy consensus from all opposition groups, and at the same time, protect Jordan from becoming an alternative Palestinian state. |
| Leadership during COP’s apex | Decentralized | Decentralized | Centralized |
| Reasons explaining extant of decentralized/centralized leadership | AYM stimulated did not possess mass-based organization to lead the protests. Youth movements did not agree on protests’ goals. Many new protest centres appeared when poor people | AYM stimulated did not possess mass-based Organization to lead the protests. Disagreement on protest’s goals between AYMs and NYMs Appearance of many | AYM stimulated and NYMs met on March 17 and agreed on March 24, 2011 sit-in demands. M24M provided alone all logistic support (e.g., food, banners, and the radio) for March 24, 2011 sit-in. |
joined protests and some of them formed GIMs. Rise of SRMs raised the cost of forming united leadership.  

independent protest centers due to the confrontational violent nature of protests. Latecomer movements did not coordinate their activities on the ‘Day of Rage’ with AYMs. Difficulties to bring tens of GIMs under a central leadership.  

M24M provided most of the human resources for March 24, 2011 sit-in.  

Dynamic of protests under decentralized/centralized leadership

| Narrow consent: the regime was personified in Ben Ali. Zero-sum game: the regime tried to reach a middle ground solution with protestors but it had no interlocutors that represented the protestors. Asymmetrical information: The activists did not have enough information about the impact of their activism on the state at time the state was struggling with different issues including collapse of POB; its inability to protect Ben Ali’s extended family; and in-fight and defections among the ruling elites. | Narrow consent: the regime was personified in Mubarak. Zero-sum game: regime tried to reach a middle ground solution; it initiated dialogue with NYMs but they could not speak on the name of protestors as they did not represent them Asymmetrical information: The activists did not have enough information about the impact of their activism on the state at time the state was struggling with a number of issues including the disintegration of CSF; collapse of stock market; labour strikes, inability of Central Bank to work; and defections among elites. | Broad and vague consent: the agreement on March 24, 2011 sit-in’s demands took place between AYMs and NYMs representative. It was clear on some demands and vague on others. No zero-sum game: sit-in on March 24 had a clear leadership that the regime could approach for negotiation. Symmetrical information: the decisions NYMs undertook after the sit-in on March 24, 2011 intended to counter the regime’s propaganda that the protestors were Palestinians (e.g., moving protests to southern Jordan where the regime’s social base exist). |

Protests’ outcome

| Process of democratization The protests under decentralized leadership led to political vacuum and to crisis of legitimacy. Backed by the army, the state’s high echelon bureaucracy filled the political vacuum and formed a government that included NYMs. AYMs contested the legitimacy of de facto authority and organized two sit-ins (Qassaba I and Qassaba II) that forced the de facto authority to: dissolve the RDC; appoint a new government from outside the | Process of democratization The protests under decentralized leadership led to political vacuum and to crisis of legitimacy. The army filled the political vacuum because it was the only alternative to do so at time youth movement did not have unified leadership to seize the political authority. AYMs contested SCAF’S authority and sought to replace it with CPC. To solve the legitimacy crisis, SCAF offered a roadmap that included holding legislative and | Persistence of authoritarianism The protests in Jordan failed to achieve substantial democratic reforms. The protests, however, forced the regime to make reforms that included establishing a constitutional court; proposing a new election law that maintained the same allocation of seats for governorates but allowed for governorate and national lists; a new political parties’ law; and token constitutional changes. However, the king’s authorities in the constitution remained unchanged. |
| RDC; and to establish an inclusive HCFRGRPRDT which proposed the parties and elections laws; decided on the Constituent Assembly authorities; and determined the elections’ dates. | presidential elections. SCAF generals were forced to uphold commitment to roadmap as a result of their need to the support of MB in order to legitimize their rule and also due to their struggle with AYMs who sought to replace them with CPC. |
Chapter II

Tunisian, Egypt, and Jordan: a brief historical background

The brief historical background presented below traces the evolution of the authoritarian regimes in Tunisia, Egypt, and Jordan from their independence to the beginning of the 2011 cycle of protests. The chapter has four goals: to highlight some of the mechanisms and institutions that used by regimes in these states to rule; second, to familiarize the reader with some of the events and actors that affected the way the incumbents ruled; third, to explain the conditions that governed the relationship between these regimes and their opponents; and finally (and most importantly), to track the changes in the social and economic policies of these regimes that formulated the shared experience and consciousness of the youth groups that revolted in early 2011. The main argument of this chapter is that although the historical development and institutional arrangements governing state-society relations in these states were different, they nonetheless embarked, in the last two decades, on similar social and economic policies. These policies in turn eroded each regime’s domestic legitimacy. This is partly because their policies exacerbated unemployment and poverty; the ruling families and their allies meanwhile used this economic liberalization to secure state resources, further eroding regime legitimacy. Youths born in late 80s and early 90s, moreover, were subjected to similar political expulsion, repression, and social and economic marginalization. This historical similarity shaped youth perceptions of their regimes, and provoked them to take activism to the streets in what has become known as the ‘Arab Spring.’

I should note that I make no argument for or against the paradigm of economic liberalization; rather, my goal is to get the facts straight. Although the regimes treated here
adopted Structural Adjustment Plans (SAPs) in the early 1980s in efforts to restructure the economy of their countries, it was only in the last decade that economic liberalization policies were accelerated, accompanied by massive corruption.

**Tunisia**

Tunisia is the second oldest state among the Arab countries. Although it was part of the Ottoman Empire since the sixteenth century, it maintained relative independence from Ottoman rule. France occupied Tunisia in 1881, and kept the Husainid Dynasty in place as the state’s ruling family. However, France created military and civil administrations that directly followed its rule. Tunis received its independence in 1956 after a long struggle with the New Free Constitutional Party (NCP) that led the Tunisian national movement since early 1930s.

The rift between the two dominant groups in the NCP over the 1955 autonomy agreement with France created the roots, after independence, for both policies of repression and discrimination against the interior regions. Habib Bourguiba, the party’s and the country’s first president, maintained that the agreement with France was a step toward independence, while Saleh Ben Yousef, the party’s general secretary, rejected the agreement and called for continuation of armed resistance until the complete liberation of Tunisia. Furthermore, Ben Yousef made an alliance with the pan-Arabists in Egypt and linked Tunisian independence to the struggle to liberating Algeria and Morocco from French domination. Supported by France,

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321 Egypt is the oldest.
322 Issa, Tunisia as an Ottoman administrative in the sixteenth century
323 Teimomi, *Tunisia*, 8
324 Teimomi, *Tunisia*
325 The terms interior regions refer to the Tunisian governorates that have no borders with the Mediterranean Sea.
326 Maghreb countries include Morocco, Algeria, and Tunisia; they were all French colonies.
Bourguiba managed to get rid of Ben Youssef, who fled to Egypt and assassinated in Germany in 1961. Ben Youssef supporters, who were mainly from the interior regions and carried the burden of the armed resistance against France, became the target of Bourguiba’s policies. According to Noureddine Jebnoun (2013), almost 600 of Ben Youssef’s supporters were killed between 1961 and 1962, including the Youssefian officers who participated in the 1962 coup d’état against Bourguiba.\(^{327}\)

The confrontation with Ben Youssef affected Bourguiba’s development policies in the interior regions. Fearing that the interior regions had no loyalty to his regime, Bourguiba not only maintained the colonial policies that focused on developing the coastal cities where the French communities lived, but he also excluded the interior regions from the “prestigious posts of the state which went to his allies in the coastal regions.”\(^{328}\) According to Salah Hammami, a trade unionist and activist, Bourguiba has never visited Sidi Bouzid and Kassreine during his life. He called them *Fellaghas* (bandits, a name the French occupation used to depict the Algerian and the Tunisian fighters) “who can fight but cannot build a state, and who believed that their rusty rifles liberated Tunisia.”\(^{329}\)

Bourguiba consolidated his rule by eliminating the boundaries between the Socialist Constitutional Party (SCP) and the state, and by adopting socialist policies. He also embarked on a project of building a modern secular nation-state. In 1962, Bourguiba abolished the multiparty system, installed the governors as the party’s secretary-generals in their respective governorates, and began treating civil society organizations (including the unions of workers, women,

\(^{327}\) Jebnoun, “Ben Ali’s Tunisia”, 107; For the roots of the rift between Ben Youssef and Bourguiba, see Moor, *Tunisia Since Independence*, 61-71.

\(^{328}\) Teimomi, *Tunisia*, 83

\(^{329}\) Hammami, interview with the author, Sfax, May 10, 2012.
peasants, and students) as extensions of the party. Bourguiba offered in the 1960s a socialist policy that focused on public sector employment, free health care and education, and peasant subsidies. Bourguiba, who held liberal beliefs, also attempted to secularize and modernize the Tunisian state. Constitutionally, he separated the state from religion and adopted progressive laws to make women equal with men, including laws preventing polygamy, legalizing abortion, and making divorce legally available to both sexes, not just men. He also tried to dismantle the religious establishment. For example, Bourguiba abolished the Islamic *Waqf* (endowment) nationalized its property holdings; he also closed Al-Zaytoona University, one of the oldest religious universities in the MENA countries, which was part of the Islamic *Waqf*. Apart from his charisma as a popular speaker, Bourguiba used the SCP to defend his policies against the traditional Islamists and pan-Arabists.

Bourguiba’s social and political policies were not implemented without a cost. They created an opposition to his rule that can be characterized as dominated by leftist groups in the 1970s, and Islamists in the 1980s. In the 1970s, Bourguiba’s regime sought to counterbalance the strength of the leftist and pan-Arabist opposition by turning a blind eye on Islamist activities, which at the time were focused primarily on targeting the leftists that considered Islamism “more dangerous than the regime due to their communist ideology.” This position of the Islamists affected their relationship with the secular opposition for the next two decades. When Bourguiba’s regime turned its repression campaign against the Islamists in the eighties, accusing

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330 Teimomi, *Tunisia*, 77
331 Teimoumi, *Tunisia*
332 Bishara, *The glorious*, 81.
333 Bishara, *The glorious*, 157-165
334 Abu Zakariya, *The Islamic movement in Tunisia*, 36
them of committing terror activities, the secular opposition considered it a fight between “two fascists, one wears the earthly cloths, and the other, the sky ones.”

Bourguiba slowly introduced policies of economic liberalization in the mid 1970s, following the failure of his socialist policies. In response to increases in the price of commodities, the radical leftists in the Tunisian General Labor Union (UGTT) organized dozens of strikes that escalated to a large-scale uprising in 1978. As a result to these events, the regime declared the emergency law; the army put down the protests by killing many of activists and arresting thousands, including the leaders of the UGTT’s executive committee. In the early 1980s and in response to the economic crisis, Bourguiba’s regime froze the annual increase in public sector employees’ salaries, abandoned the policy of free medical treatment for marginalized people, and increased the prices of utilities. These policies accumulated in late December 1983 when the regime increased significantly the prices of basic commodities, provoking an uprising that began first in the interior regions on December 28, then expanded quickly to the big cities, especially the poor neighbourhoods of Tunis and Sfax by January 3, 1984. Although the army repressed the uprising, Bourguiba had to cancel the increase of the

335 Bishara, The glorious, 173. In 1987 four hotels in the coastal regions were targeted by bombs. Bourguiba’s regime accused the Islamic Direction and arrested hundreds of its activists among them Rachid Ghannouchi who was released after Ben Ali coup and supported the coup.
337 Bishara, The glorious
338 Buqara, From the history of the Tunisian left, 194; Teimomi, Tunisia, 140. According to Buqara, in 1970s the leftists and pan-Arabist opposition infiltrated and dominated the Tunisian General Labor Union (UGTT) through the unions of high school teachers and higher education professors.
prices in order to restore order. Bourguiba, however, is regarded by liberals as the founding father of the Tunisian modern state.

Zine Elabidine Ben Ali replaced Bourguiba in November 1987 after a “medical coup.” To legitimize his rule, Ben Ali reversed Bourguiba’s practice of lifetime presidency and announced his desire to foster a multiparty system and build democratic institutions that would preserve the people’s gains and fight corruption. In 1988, Ben Ali changed the name of the party to the Democratic Constitutional Rally (RCD) and called for all parties to sign Almithaq Alwatani (National Charter), a document intended by the regime to restore political pluralism (it considered the state responsible for ensuring political freedom including the formation of civil society organizations and political parties according to the law). The Progressive Democratic Party (PDP), Ettajdid Movement, and the Islamic Ennahda Movement signed the charter; however, Ennahda was denied legal status. By contrast, several radical groups such as the Workers Communist Party (POCT) refused to sign the charter on the basis that they considered the regime an extension of Bourguiba’s rule.

The Ben Ali era, however, is characterized by the creation of a police state and by the acceleration of the process of economic liberalization. To consolidate his authority, Ben Ali

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339 Teimomi, *Tunisia*, 169. According to Teimomi, the army killed 143 persons.

340 Ben Ali declared to the Tunisians that Bourguiba is medically unable to rule the state. He brought seven physicians who testified that Bourguiba was sick and unable to rule. See Hammdi, *The right for authority*.

341 In 1975 Bourguiba was elected a president for lifetime.

342 Hammdi, *The right of authority*, 9

343 Almana’i, “The Tunisian Communist Party.”

344 Bishara, *The glorious*

345 The liberalization of the Tunisian economy was introduced in early 1970s after the failure of the socialist policies of Bourguiba’s regime but these policies did not touch the major state-owned companies such as phosphate,
created an effective police apparatus housed in the interior ministry. Its enormous role is apparent from its different branches, significant budget, and in its swelled number. The Interior Ministry’s forces include the Public Order Brigades (BOP), the State Security Department (political police), the Rapid Intervention Response Brigade, the Anti-Terrorism Brigade, and the National Guard Special Unit. In 1996, the budget for the interior ministry was USD$745.6 million compared with $390 million in 1987 when Ben Ali took the power — almost three times the budget of the ministry of defense in 1996 ($281 million). This large budget reflects the increase of in the number of policemen from 20,000 in 1987 to 150,000 on the eve of Ben Ali’s departure. In 1989, the regime refused the results of the first parliamentarian election, in which the Islamic Ennahda Movement won 17 percent of the seats, and engaged in a terror campaign against the movement. Between 1990 and 2000, the regime killed 30 Ennahda activists and detained 8,000 (many of them convicted for long sentences) while 20,000 fled the country. During this period the regime also managed, through repression and cooptation, to control, ban, or hinder the work of many civil society organizations including the Tunisian General Labor Union (UGTT), the Tunisian General Student Union (UGET), The General Union for the Tunisian Students (UGTE), the Bar association, and the Tunisian League for the Defense of petroleum, telecommunication, and transportation. Moreover, the social subsidies to peasants remained in place and the government support to the basic commodities did not change. However, in 1986 the government took more measures toward liberalizing the economy following a deep crisis that was seen in the government inability to pay its internal and international debts, low development percentage, and an increased phenomenon of private companies declaring of bankruptcy. Bishara, *The glorious*, 90.

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346 Brooks, “Abandoned at the Palace”  
347 Hammdi, *The right of authority*  
348 Mdeini, *Fall of police state in Tunisia*, 138. According to Kallander (2011), the number of police under Bourguiba was 40 thousand. See Kallander. “Tunisia’s post Ben Ali challenge.”  
349 Abdelmawla, “Notes on the Tunisian experience”  
350 Bishara, *The glorious*; Mdeini, *Fall of police state in Tunisia*  
351 UGET is the secular student union, while the UGTE is the Islamist organization for students.
In 1991, the regime installed permanent security posts inside universities to prevent political activities. The regime also took control of media, censored the internet, prevented libraries from acquiring books that criticized its policies, jailed journalists, and prevented thousands of citizens from travelling by denying their right to possess passports. With its reliance on repression, the RCD lost its role of countering the opposition. Its members even served as informants to the police in order to ensure employment. Indeed, in the decade prior to the 2011 protests, the central committee of the RCD was dominated by Tunisian businessmen of whom two are Ben Ali’s sons in law.

Ben Ali also accelerated the process of economic liberalization in an effort to revive the Tunisian economy. To encourage privatization, the regime laid off 57 percent of the workers (20,000 in total) employed at the public companies proposed for privatization (in total 205 companies). By 2008, 217 companies, of which the state owned more than 50 percent of their total shares, were privatized; 87 percent of these companies became properties of foreign investors. Although the processes of economic liberalization increased the country’s GDP, provided access to foreign loans, and enlarged Tunisia’s reserve of foreign currencies, the reforms were accompanied by corruption that benefited Ben Ali’s extended family, increased the level of unemployment among graduates, and marginalized the interior regions. With the help of the state’s high bureaucrats and the security forces, Ben Ali’s extended family had access to the

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352 Mdeini, *Fall of police state in Tunisia*, 158
353 Althabiti, *The General Union of the Tunisian Students*
354 Bishara, *The glorious*
355 This information is based on my interviews with activists
356 Bishara, *The glorious*, 164
357 Hammadi, *The right of authority*, 78-9
358 Bishara, *The glorious*
state’s resources including service contracts, privatized companies, commissions to facilitate foreign investments, and lucrative loans.\textsuperscript{359} Via the resources, Ben Ali’s extended family managed — through fraud, bribery, extortion, and influence peddling — to accumulate enormous wealth.\textsuperscript{360} On the eve of the protests in late 2010, Ben Ali’s family owned almost half of the Tunisian economy, their ownership spread across a number of industries including real estate, tourism, insurance, internet services, construction, plastics, port services, car import and reassembly, and media. They also controlled tobacco and alcohol distribution, and distributed import and working licenses in order to arrange partnerships with business to their advantage.\textsuperscript{361} In fact, many Tunisian businessmen during this period refrained from investing out of fear that the ruling family would take part of their profits.\textsuperscript{362}

Furthermore, because most of the investments occurred in sectors that did not need skilled workers but instead relied on unskilled, cheap labour — such as textiles, electricomechanical, and tourism — the Ben Ali regime failed to create new jobs for university graduates. For example, while the number of the yearly graduates doubled from 40,000 in 2005 to 80,000 in 2010, the number of graduates looking for work increased from 20 percent of all graduates in 2000 to 55 percent in 2009, almost 22 percent of Tunisia’s unemployed workforce.\textsuperscript{363} According to Mongi Boughzala (2013), unemployed graduates numbered 200,000

\textsuperscript{359} Schraeder and Redissi, “Ben Ali’s Fall”
\textsuperscript{360} Ben Ali’s extended family includes his ten brothers, his wife, Leila Trabelsi and her seven brothers, and the husbands of his four daughters[0].
\textsuperscript{361} Medeini, \textit{Fall of police state in Tunisia}; Hammdi, \textit{The right of authority}; Tristam, “Wikileaks Cable”
\textsuperscript{362} Ibid
\textsuperscript{363} Medeini, \textit{Fall of police state in Tunisia}, 259-260
out of the 700,000 unemployed in total. Yet even these figures underestimate the extent of youth unemployment, as they do not include workers who entered the informal economy or left the country.

Finally, the neoliberal economic policies further marginalized the interior regions and entrenched this marginalization. This is in part because the foreign investors preferred the coastal regions, which enjoy extant infrastructure and export ports. To this end, it should be noted that 80 percent of Tunisia’s commerce prior to 2011 was with Europe, which maintained a protectionist policy against agricultural imports. As such, Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) into Tunisia avoided the agricultural sector — the sector that is the main source of living for the people in the interior. In the absence of government policies directed toward investing and developing this sector, hundreds of thousands of young men and women left the interior towns and cities for the coast in order to find jobs; they created what is called “black belts” around the main coastal cities (big poor residential quarters without proper connections to municipal services such as clean water, sewage treatment, and electricity). In Tunis alone, more than 700,000 immigrants settled in poor neighbourhoods such as Tadamon, Sijoumi, Kabareih, and Al Noor. In fact, as I will explain, the 2011 protests began in the marginalized interior regions, and were called by some scholars the revolution of the periphery against the core.

It is these policies of social marginalization and political repression, which affected the youth from all social groups that shaped the protestors’ attitudes toward Ben Ali’s regime.

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364 Boughzala, “Youth employment and economic transition in Tunisia.”
365 Honwana, "Youth and the Tunisian revolution.”
366 Mdeini, Fall of police state in Tunisia
367 Alerfawi, “A new program that gives hope to the Tunisian poor”
368 Ayeb, ““Social and political geography”; Bishara, The glorious
Unlike their parents, who were born during Bourghuiba’s regime and benefited from the expansion of the state in economy and social welfare policies, the younger generation, born in the 80s, suffered from the consequences of the reduction of state involvement in the economy, the institutionalization of corruption, and the employment of repression. Thus, while the social contract between the state and the people during Bourguiba era was controversial in that its social welfare system came at the expense of Tunisians’ political rights, in Ben Ali’s era, there was no social contract. The youth witnessed an extended family take advantage of state resources and institutions in order to enrich itself at a time when hundreds of thousands of ordinary Tunisians lived in slums and struggled everyday with the state’s apparatuses in the simple pursuit of a normal life.

Several scholars, such as Azmi Bishara (2012), Habib Ayeb (2011), Mouldi Guessoumi (2011), and Laryssa Chomiak (2014), documented the protests in the last decade of Ben Ali’s rule. They considered the CoP of 2011 an extension of past activism. In short, opposition to the regime in the last decade can be characterized as involving a reconciliation process between liberals and the Islamists of Ennahda on the one hand, and the emergence of new actors on the other. From 2003 on, the non-autonomous and autonomous oppositions engaged in dialogue with one another about the principles on which Tunisia should be ruled. This dialogue culminated in a 2005 public declaring the formation of the October 18th Coalition for Rights and Freedoms (O18C). The Coalition included the ‘non-autonomous’ Democratic Progressive Party (PDP) and Democratic Forum of Work and Liberties (FDTL), as well as the ‘autonomous’ Islamic Ennahda Movement, Congress for the Republic (CFR), and Workers Communist Party (POCT). O18C enhanced the level of coordination between the opposition parties to the extent that some of

369 Stepan, “Tunisia’s transition and the twin tolerations."
Ennahda’s activists joined the PDP. Perhaps the most important activity of O18C was a one-month long hunger strike undertaken in 2005 by eight opposition leaders. Their intention was to draw the world’s attention to the lack of freedoms in Tunisia.

Furthermore, the past decade witnessed the birth of new youth actors who confronted the regime’s policies with street protests. In 2006, the POCT established the Union for the Unemployed Graduates (UDC), which included activists from different ideological streams. The UDC organized 206 protest activities prior to the beginning of the CoP, including marches, sit-ins, and hunger strikes, all held under the slogan ‘work is an entitlement oh gang of muggers.’

Also, during this period, youth bloggers broke the regime’s media controls and provoked public discussions about freedom of expression among young Tunisians. Along with these two groups, many independent youth activists appeared whose discourses and activities aimed to transcend the ideological differences between opposition youth groups. Following the CoP, these activists formed movements such as Dignity Youth Movement (Karama), New Generation Movement (NGM), and Free Tunisia Forces’ Movement (FTM). In Sidi Bouzaid alone, those activists organized more than 200 sit-ins between 2008 and 2010 whose goals varied between demanding employment, protesting state corruption, and expressing solidarity with protests in other governorates. With the rise of the new actors, the protests took new forms: they became

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370 Angrist, “Understanding the Success.”
371 leaders Najib Chebbi and Hama Hammami, the secretary generals of the PDP and POCT, together with Samir Dilo, a member in Ennahda’s political bureau, and the presidents of five civil society organizations. See, “the strike,” Almaoukif Journal, October 21, 2005.
372 Hammdi, “The right for authority,”
373 Chomiak, “Architectures.” During the CoP, these bloggers worked as field reporters and through their network they managed to cover and convey the events to the Tunisians either directly through their websites or by allowing the international TV satellites such as France 24 and Aljazeera to broadcast their videos. See Als’edani, “The youth in Tunisia’s democratic”; See Honwana, “Youth and the Tunisian.”
374 Als’edani, “The youth in Tunisia’s democratic.”
street-based, numerous, intense, and scattered in the sense that they covered different economic and societal sectors. Perhaps the most well-known protests during this period were the uprisings by phosphate miners in the mining basin of Gafsa in 2008, the protests of peasants in Regueb in 2010, and the Ben Guerdene’s protests in the same year, aimed at reopening the Ras Jdir crossing with Libya to commercial activity.

Egypt

The history of the ‘modern state’ in Egypt is usually identified with the reign of Muhammad Ali, who came to power in 1805. Ali established a modern army, a centralized bureaucracy, and an effective tax system. He embarked on a project to create a modern industrial state but his plans were aborted in 1840 when the Ottoman Empire, with British support defeated Ali’s troops in Lebanon and Syria. In 1882, Britain occupied Egypt and in 1922 granted the state formal independence following a revolution headed by Sa’ad Zaghloul, the head of Wafd party. Britain, however, maintained control of Egypt’s politics through its military presence in Suez Canal and its relation with Egypt’s ruling Khedive family.

In 1952, the Free Officers, a secret organization in Egypt’s military headed by Gamal Abdel Nasser, carried out a coup d’état. They dismissed King Farouq, declared Egypt a republic,

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375 Chomiak, “Architectures of Resistance in Tunisia.”
376 Ayeb, “Social and political geography.” In August 2010, the Libyan authorities closed Ras Jdir crossing point with Tunisia and turned the commercial activities through the ports of Tripoli and Sfax. In practice, the decision meant the elimination of the only source of living for Ben Guerdene’s inhabitants which in part included informal trade that offered “the local population expensive products with cheaper prices than through the formal channels.” It turned out that the Trabelsi family was behind the Libyan’s resolution as the informal trade affected their revenue from some lucrative goods.
377 The Treaty of London in 1841 forced Mohammed Ali to squeeze his troops to 18,000 soldiers and to close many industrial factories. It, however, stated that the governorship in Egypt was to be hereditary office held by his family. See Cleveland and Bunton. A history of the modern Middle East, 74
378 Ibid
abrogated the 1923 constitution and replaced it with one that granted the president excessive authority, and abolished the multiparty system. To consolidate their regime, the Free Officers relied “on the public bureaucracy as a controlling apparatus, on a populist base of support that hinged on the construction of modern industry and the provision of social welfare, and on a discourse of nation liberation.” In respect to the creation of social base of support, the Free Officers adopted a series of economic policies that later greatly affected the Sadat and Mubarak regimes. First, they made a land reform that weakened the aristocracy, the social base of the monarchy, and supported a stratum of the small farmers who could provide support to their regime in the countryside. Second, they embarked on a huge nationalization project that began with the Suez Canal and expanded to include all industrial and transportation sectors. The state under this project became the sole decision-maker in economic planning. Third, the new regime expanded state-based social policies to included free health and education, subsidies for poor Egyptians, and guaranteed jobs in the public sector from graduate students beginning in 1964.

Politically, Nasser’s regime banned the multiparty system, repressed its opponents, and created a political system dominated by army officers. The multiparty system that existed prior to the coup was replaced by a single party, the Arab Social Union (ASU), which the regime claimed was an alliance of the People’s Working Forces (workers, peasants, army, and

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379 Ibid, 269
380 Waterbury, Exposed to innumerable delusions, 60.
381 Ayubi, Overstating the Arab state
382 Migdal, Strong societies and weak states, 229-30
383 Ayubi, Overstating the Arab state
bureaucrats). The ASU had the following tasks: (1) mobilizing mass sentiment to be in favour of the regime and “rendering the masses unavailable to alternative leaders”; (2) incorporating civil society organizations such as student unions and labor unions into the state’s corporatist apparatus; (3) screening and approving parliamentary candidates and potential government post-holders; and (4) managing the competition between different factions within the regime. Nasser’s regime focused its repression on two groups that were considered threatening to its stability: the Communists and the Muslim Brotherhood. The Communists’ organizations were banned immediately following the coup and their members were prosecuted; however, Nasser’s regime was able to co-opt many of them into his ASU Party under the guise of nationalization and social policies, and Nasser’s close relations with the Soviet Union. The Muslim Brotherhood initially supported the Free Officers because several of them were originally members of their organization. In 1954 Nasser escaped an assassination attempt in which the MB was implicated. As consequence, Nasser’s regime banned the MB organization and repressed its members. In 1965, the regime hanged several of its leaders, including the well-known Sayyid Qutb, whose writings are considered the foundation of the modern radical Islamism. Nasser’s most important legacy, however, was the creation of political system dominated by the military officers. According to Abdel Malek (1968), during Nasser’s era the officers received key positions in the state institutions. They compromised the great majority of

384 Ayubi, Overstating the Arab state. The ASU was that last political organization that Nasser created; it was preceded by creating two other organizations: the Liberal Rally and the National Union, respectively.
385 Binder, In a moment of enthusiasm, 41
386 Waterbury, The Egypt of Nasser and Sadat, 313
387 Fahmy, The politics of Egypt, 57
388 Cooper, The Transformation of Egypt, 55
389 Abdel-Malek, Egypt: Military Society.
390 El-Ghabashy, “The metamorphosis.”
senior diplomatic personnel, directors and board members of public agencies, ministers and vice ministers, held key posts in cultural, media, and information agencies, and ran the ASU.\textsuperscript{391}

Although Aybui (1995) believes that the Nasserist era prior to the 1967 War had two power centers — President Naser’s camp whose main domain of influence was the civil administration and the masses, and Field Marshal Abdul Hakim Amer’s camp whose chief domain of influence was the army — he concurs with Malek that the officer had occupied over one-third of the state’s political posts, and had managed high representation in the ASU and other government institutions ranging from football clubs to the Nuclear Power Organization.\textsuperscript{392}

Nasser died in 1971 and Anwar Sadat, who himself was one of the Free Officers and the Speaker of Egypt’s National Assembly, became the interim president. A conservative with right-wing ideologies, Sadat conducted what he called a ‘corrective revolution’ in 1971 in which he purged Nasser’s important allies in the ASU, the military, and the state bureaucracy.\textsuperscript{393} Sadat used the relative success of the 1973 War with Israel to consolidate his political power through means different from Nasser. First, he sought to create a new social base for his regime through what he called \textit{Inftah}, or open-door economic policy, which aimed to attracted foreign investment and encouraging joint ventures between the Egypt’s firm and foreign companies.\textsuperscript{394} This policy, according to several scholars including Osama Hamed (1981), Muhammad H. Haykal (1983) and Nazih Ayubi (1995), created a business community that thrived on profits obtained from real estate, imported goods, and commissions,\textsuperscript{395} and eventually became the social

\textsuperscript{391} Abdel Malek, \textit{Egypt: Military Society}, xxviii-xxix
\textsuperscript{392} Ayubi, \textit{Overstating the Arab State}, 269-270.
\textsuperscript{393} Haykal, \textit{Autumn of fury}.
\textsuperscript{394} Waterbury, "The" Soft State” and the Open Door”
\textsuperscript{395} Hamed, "Egypt's open door economic policy"; Haykal, \textit{Autumn of Fury}; Ayubi, \textit{Overstating the Arab State}. 
base of Sadat regime. It should be noted, however, that *Infitah* policy did not entail selling any of the state’s public companies; rather, it was meant to disentangle the developmental role of the public sector as planned during Nasser’s era from its welfare function by encouraging it to work for profit. Second, to counter the growing objection to his policies from leftists and Nasserists, Sadat released the MB members from prison and allowed a restricted multiparty system to function. The MB focused its activities away from the regime and toward the leftists and Nasserists, perceiving these groups to be more dangerous to society. For example, following the bread uprising of 1977, the MB agreed with the regime’s account of the events as merely a communist plot to destabilize the country. Like in Tunisia, the campaign of the Islamists against leftists and pan-Arabists shaped the relations between the two camps until the beginning of the new millennium. The Islamists, however, turned against Sadat following his visit to Israel in 1977. Finally, Sadat also distanced the military from politics, a process that began during Nasser’s era following the 1967 War defeat, while increasing their presence in the economy. Following the 1977 bread riots, Sadat became convinced that the army could not secure the regime from possible internal unrest. During the riots, the army insisted that Sadat should return the subsidies to the basic commodities before being deployed to restore order.

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396 Haykal, *Autumn of fury*; Waterbury, "The" Soft State" and the Open Door"; Sadowski, *Political vegetables*

397 Ayubi, *Overstating the Arab State*, 340


400 Ayubi, *Overstating the Arab State*

401 Sayigh, *Above the State*"
consequence, Sadat created a riot police in the interior ministry under the name of the Central Security Forces (CSF).402

Hosni Mubarak assumed power in 1981 following the assassination of Sadat by the Jammaa Islamiyya.403 Mubarak had been Egypt’s Air Force commander during the 1973 War and Sadat’s deputy since 1975. In his first two decades at the helm, Mubarak’s policies simply continued those of his predecessor; he kept the open-door economic policy in place and relied on business elites for support.404 Like Sadat, he was very reluctant to privatize the state-owned companies, beginning this process only in mid 1990s. Mubarak, however, relied more on a democratic façade by rigging elections, increasing repression, and integrating the military into the economy in efforts to consolidate and maintain his power. Mubarak, however, created a facade of democratic rulership while tightening the autocratic aspects of his rule. Although he held periodic elections to the people's council and legalized many new political parties, he rigged elections, further integrated the military into the economy, and created a massive repressive apparatus in the interior ministry in efforts to consolidate and maintain his power.

Mubarak began his rule during a deep economic crisis characterised by declining oil and Suez Canal revenues coupled with shrinking remittances from Egyptian migrant workers. This increased the state’s foreign and public debt and put more fiscal strains on its expenditures.405 Yet, Mubarak refrained from making drastic economic reforms that might destabilize his rule. According to Ayubi (1995), although the process of economic liberalization began during the

402 Ibid
403 Jammaa Islamiyya is an offshoot of the MB who adopted Sayyed Qutb teachings. Haykal, Autumn of Fury
404 Hinnebusch, Egyptian politics under Sadat, 295
405 Joya, “The Egyptian revolution”
Sadat era, the actual process of privatizing state-owned companies began only after 1993 and was encouraged by a package of aid from the United States, the Gulf States, and Paris club countries following Egypt’s participation in the 1991 war against Iraq. Mubarak used the process of economic liberalization to expand his social base among the business leaders by contracting out state services, creating joint ventures between the public sector and foreign private capital, and incentivizing the private sector using state resources.

Lacking the ‘revolutionary legitimacy’ of Nasser and Sadat (Mubarak was not a member of the Free Officers), Mubarak sought to legitimize his rule by holding periodic elections to the people’s council and by increasing the number of legal political parties. Mubarak remained in control of the rules of electoral riding contestation to ensure that the NDP would always possess more than two-thirds of the seats in the people council. To this end, Mubarak’s regime manipulated electoral law and supervision to directly rig the election. For example, the law governing political parties was vague, allowing the state to refuse granting license to any party if a similar party espouses the same goals. During this period, the number of legal parties increased from three to twenty-four; of these, sixteen parties were made legal by court decision. Although the MB remained an illegal organization during Mubarak’s presidency, the brotherhood participated in elections from 1984 onward through other parties, such as Wafad and

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406 Ayubi, Overstating the Arab State, 339-352.
407 Ayubi, Overstating the Arab State, 339-352.
408 Brown, Dunne, and Hamzawy, Egypt’s Controversial Constitutional Amendments.
409 Abed Rabu, “Parties pluralism in Egypt.”
410 Ibid
Labor Party, and independent candidates. In 2005, the MB held 20 percent of the parliament’s seats.\textsuperscript{411}

Furthermore, during Mubarak’s rule, the interior ministry became “a terrifying bureaucratic empire.” It housed the Central Security Forces (CSF), the State Security Investigation Service (SSIS), the General Security Service, the National Guard, and the Border Patrol. The number of police grew from 150,000 in 1974 to two million on the eve of Mubarak’s departure.\textsuperscript{412} The police tortured and killed political prisoners, invaded homes without legal warrants, monitored and arrested thousands of political activists, hired thugs to attack opposition groups, rigged elections, controlled appointments to state departments, and erected permanent security stations inside universities. Their campaign included actions taken against Islamists, the secular opposition, civil society activists, and the marginalized poor.\textsuperscript{413}

Finally, in order to ensure the loyalty of the army’s senior officers, Mubarak integrated the army into the state’s economy and civil and security services. According to Yezid Sayigh (2012), although this process was started in the Sadat era in order to depoliticize the military, it was entrenched and expanded from 1991 onward, when Mubarak’s regime “launched a major privatization of public sector economic enterprises.” The manner in which the privatization process was conducted led to a “distorted capitalist development” that enabled the “senior officer corps access to the significant part of the Egyptian economy that remain[ed] state owned.”\textsuperscript{414} The army’s incorporation into “the presidential system of privileged access and patronage” took two

\textsuperscript{411} Ibid
\textsuperscript{412} Kandil, “Soldiers, spies,” 194-199
\textsuperscript{413} On repression in Egypt see Kandil, “Soldiers, spies”; Ismail, “Political life”; Ismail, “The Egyptian revolution.”
\textsuperscript{414} Sayigh, “Above the State”
forms: the appointment of retired officers into the state’s economic enterprises and civil and security apparatuses, and the provision to the army of a large piece of Egypt’s economy.\footnote{Ibid} Thus, former officers during Mubarak’s regime held almost always the portfolios of defense, military production, and civil aviation, and also held the administrative monitoring authorities. They occupied high-rank administration posts at universities, research centers, national institutes, water regulation associations, government hospitals, and even sports stadiums. They sat on the boards of a wide range of state-owned public utilities, key infrastructure enterprises, airports, seaport authorities, electricity and water and sanitation authorities. They were heavily represented in government ministries and agencies that deal with land-related sectors such as housing, real estate management, public works, agricultural development and reclamation, and tourism. And they dominated the entire structure of local governorates, which include thousands of jobs.\footnote{Egypt has 29 governorates. At the next level down, there are 166 big cities and 200 smaller ones. Then come hundreds of city boroughs—Cairo alone had 34 by 2012. And even further down there are 4,617 villages, of which 920 are large enough to have their own local council. See Sayigh, “Above the state.”}

Moreover, the military has its own parallel economy, which generates income streams that do not go through the public treasury nor oversight by the Parliament. For example, in 2012 the army lent the government USD$1 billion from “its own money.”\footnote{Biblawi, \textit{Four Months in the Government’s Cage}} After the confrontation with activists in November 2011, the army declared a housing project for poor people that would cost $250 million from the “army’s own money.”\footnote{Sayigh, “Above the State”} In total the army claimed that it spent $2.33
billion on the Egyptian people since January 25th, 2011 from “its own money.” The size of the military economy is indeed unknown and very difficult to estimate with any confidence because the army holdings are classified as state secretes, and also because “they are too vast and disperse.” It is, however, known that the army manufactures almost everything from olive oil and shoe polish to cars and computers. Estimates by politicians and scholars of the military economy’s size range from 8 percent to 40 percent of Egypt’s total economy. The military economy behaves like a commercial sector and comprises the defense industry, a set of income generating enterprises such as military clubs, hotels and resorts on in coastal areas. The military also signs contracts with the government and local governments to build bridges, housing complexes, sport stadiums, and sanities projects. The military has its own agriculture farms, supermarkets, bakeries and gas stations. The military also uses the system of obligatory conscription as a tool to acquire free labour to its projects. Additionally, the military’s imports for its own projects are tax exempted. It is indeed a state within the state.

The last decade of Mubarak’s rule witnessed two major developments that, in hindsight, led to the demise of his regime: an intensification in the process of economic liberalization and the Mubarak’s intention to inherit the presidency to Gamal, his son. The process of economic liberalization gained momentum beginning in 2000 with the appointment of Gamal as Secretary General of the Policies’ Committee of the NDP, which reviews government policies before

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419 Nasr, “Armed Forces Supported the State with EGP 12 billion.”
421 The American Ambassador in Egypt estimated it to be 10%. The BBC estimated it to be 40%.
422 Sayigh, “Above the state”
423 The army: our economic projects pay taxes and we shall not Allow touching It, Alsharq Alawasat newspaper, 29 March 2012.
passing them to the people council for ratification. Gamal encouraged the domination of business elites in all the state’s decision-making circles. For example, the number of businessmen in the people council increased from 8 in 1995 to 150 in 2005. The Ahmed Nazif government of 2004 included six powerful businessmen holding each the portfolios of welfare, housing, health, trade, transportation, and agriculture. The new political arrangement in the NDP, the people council, and the cabinet ensured the passing of laws that would speed up the process of privatizing the public sector. In 2005, the people council passed Law 91, which decreased income tax levels on personal and private companies and increased taxes on public sector companies. It also passed laws exempting investors from state regulations and taxes. Under these new laws, public sector firms faced severe financial crises and within two years, the Ministry of Investments sold off 80 public sector companies. The outcome of these policies was a monopoly control by the NDP elites and Mubarak’s family of important sectors of the economy including the iron, steel, cement, telecommunications, and food and beverages industries. For example, during this period Ahmed Izz, Chairman of the Planning and Budget Committee of the people council and a close ally of Gamal, owned 60 percent of the iron and steel market.

Furthermore, rumours began to spread that Mubarak had intended to have his son, Gamal, inherit the presidency. Gamal attended the meetings of the ministry council and on some occasions he attended the meetings of Supreme Council of Armed Forces (SCAF).

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424 Farah, *Egypt's political economy*, 48–49
425 Momani, *IMF-Egyptian debt negotiations*, 68–71
426 Farah, *Egypt's political economy*, 49–50
427 Ibid, 81
429 Al-Baz, “Fall of divines”
rumours gained credibility when in 2005 the people council amended the constitution to allow for multiple candidates to compete for presidency. However, article 76 in the amended constitution was tailored to allow only a candidate put forth by the NDP.\textsuperscript{430} The article states in order to run for presidency, the candidate must belong to a political party that at least has one member in the people council \textit{and} receives at least the approval of 250 of the elected members in people, shura, and local councils, of which 65 must be from the people council and 25 from the shura.\textsuperscript{431} Only the NDP met these requirements.

Although Egypt’s social and economic problems cannot be entirely attributed to the policies in the last decade, these latest changes in Mubarak’s era triggered, eventually, the cycle of protests in 2011. Accelerating the process of economic liberalization was supposed to deliver new jobs; instead, the privileged network in Mubarak’s regime, including his family, used it as a mechanism to amass additional state resources. For example, Mubarak and his two sons, Gamal and Ala’, accumulated enormous wealth by forming companies that controlled Egyptian arms imports and exports. They took high commissions from local and foreign investors in return for facilitating the sales of state lands at token prices, and in some cases they directly embezzled the state’s money.\textsuperscript{432} These policies brought unemployment and poverty to unprecedented levels. In 2008, the International Labor Office found that only 19 percent of Egyptian men aged eighteen to forty-nine who had ever worked obtained ‘good jobs’, and in 2006 an Egyptian national survey found that 83 percent of all unemployed persons fell between the ages of fifteen and

\textsuperscript{430} Brown, Dunne, and Hamzawy. \textit{Egypt's Controversial Constitutional Amendments}

\textsuperscript{431} Ibid

\textsuperscript{432} From the transcripts of the interrogation of Mubarak and his sons on April 12, 2011, April 22, 2011, May 19, 2011. Al-Baz, “Fall of divines” 8-54.
The number of poor people increased from 27.8 million in 1996 to 32.7 million in 2000, and at the beginning of 2011, 40 percent of Egypt’s population lived below the poverty line — less than $2 per day — while unofficial unemployment levels reached as high as 25 percent. Poor Egyptians lived in slums with no connections to proper sewage systems, electricity, and clean water.

Like the Tunisian youth, the generation of Egyptians born in late 80s and early 90s were still children when Egypt’s neo-liberal economic policies began to be implemented. Unlike their parents, these youths “came of age during the last decade, when the consequences of privatization and economic deregulation were coming into full view.” Their collective consciousness was shaped by increased income disparity, poverty, repression, institutional dysfunction, and the diminishing middle class. Furthermore, “they also witnessed the formation of a new coalition of government officials, businessmen and politicians that emerged on the back of deregulation and privatization.” This group controlled wealth and power and used the state’s institutions to advance their domination. It was this lived experience under Mubarak’s rule that provoked youth from different social groups to take into the street on January 25, 2011.

On the level of activism, the last decade in Egypt has borne witness to two processes: reconciliation between the oppositional groups and the rise of new actors. The process of reconciliation and coordination between the main actors in the old opposition began in 2000 when a collection of twenty NGOs and independent activists from diverse backgrounds

433 Singerman, “Youth, Gender.”
434 El-Ghonemy, “Egypt in the twenty-first century.”
435 Rodenbeck, “Volcano of rage.”
436 Davis, “Planet of slums.”
437 Shahine, “Youth and the revolution in Egypt.”
established the Popular Committee to Support the Palestinian Intifada (PCSPI). The committee included members from the nonautonomous Muslim Brotherhood and the autonomous Revolutionary Socialists and Nasserites. In 2004, the Kifaya (Enough) movement campaigned against Mubarak’s rule and its policies aimed at passing the presidency to his son, Gamal. Just like the PCSPI, Kifaya included activists from autonomous political parties such as al-Karama Party (Nasserites), the Revolutionary Socialist (RS), the Islamists al-Wasat Party, and the autonomous Labor Party (Islamists) and al-Ghad Parties (liberal). Following Kifaya, several other youth movements appeared, such as the April 6 Movement (A6M), Youth for Justice and Freedom (YJF), and We Are All Khalid Saed (WRAKS). They intensified the protests against the regime by taking them to the street. In 2008, A6M sought to declare a general strike in Cairo in support for the workers of Misr Textile Factory in El-Mahalla city, who were already on strike. Although its call went largely unheard, the strike in El-Mahalla developed into a mass-protest when the police tried to prevent the workers from occupying the textile factory, as they planned to do. Following the killing of Khalid Saed, a young middle-class man in Alexandria, the online group WRAKS organized a number of peaceful protests in Cairo and Alexandria which included silent demonstrations in which protestors wore black and carried Saed’s picture while marching along a beach. These demonstrations succeeded in drawing the attention of the Egyptian youth toward police cruelty and politics more generally. Additionally, the youth

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438 Pratt, “Democracy and Authoritarianism.”
439 Shehata, “Opposition Politics.”
440 The Revolutionary Socialists is an underground radical leftist group.
441 Except for al-Ghad Party, all these political organizations were not legal political parties. See El-Mahdi, “Egypt: A decade.”
443 Ghonim, “If the people.” Khaled Said is a young man who was beaten to death in Alexandria by police. The picture of Said's severely damaged face after his death was widely circulated on the internet side by side with a
members of MB, RS, A6M, and YJF worked together in Egypt’s universities to force the Mubarak regime to change student union bylaws in order to remove the offices of security forces from university campuses. It was this cooperative spirit engendered amongst youth activists that paved the road for the January 25th CoP.

**Jordan**

Transjordan was created by British imperial fiat in 1921 as a means to satisfy at last part of its wartime promise to its Arab allies against the Ottomans. Having been put into place by the British, Prince Abdullah, son of Sharif Hussein, struggled to achieve the loyalty of various tribes that lived in the newly created state. However, by “enlisting tribal members in a national army, offering them land grants and expanding employment for them in the emerging civil service,” Prince Abdullah was eventually successful in creating “deep bonds between Transjordanians and the regime.” From the beginning, therefore, the regime’s social base has been rooted in Transjordanian tribes who rely on the state for employment and subsidies. The evolution of a Transjordanian identity, however, was aborted by the 1948 Arab-Israeli War when hundreds of thousands of Palestinians fled to or were expelled to Jordan. The West Bank itself was annexed to Jordan in 1949 and the unification of the two banks of the Jordan River was

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444 Personal communication with 12 student Egyptian activists in June and July 2012.

445 Nanes, “Choice, Loyalty”

446 Massad, *Colonial Effects*

447 Nanes, “Choice, Loyalty.”

448 Ibid.
officially declared in April 1950.\textsuperscript{449} Prince Abdullah became the king of the united two banks. Jordan Law No. 56 of 1949 considered the populations of both the West Bank and the East Bank as Jordanians. As a result, Jordan’s population increased overnight from 375,000 to 1,270,000. The seats of Jordan’s Chamber of Deputies were divided equally between the West Bank and the East Bank.\textsuperscript{450}

Both the official policies of the Jordanian regime and the rise of the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) prevented the evolution of one identity for all Jordanians. On the one hand, the Jordanian regime continued to favour the employment of Transjordanians in the army and state public sector after 1949. Concomitantly, its investments in East Jordan encouraged hundreds of thousands of Palestinian Jordanians to leave the West Bank and to settle in East Bank in order to work in the growing private sector.\textsuperscript{451} Later, this division of labor was exacerbated by the regime’s 1970’s policy of purging Palestinian Jordanians from state institutions.\textsuperscript{452} Transjordanians thus came to dominate the public sector and Palestinian Jordanians the private sector.\textsuperscript{453} At the same time, the rise of the PLO in late 1964 and its conflict with the regime for representation of the Palestinians also prevented the development of one national identity for all Jordanians. The PLO’s rejection of Jordan’s annexation of the West Bank, its struggle to create an independent Palestinian state as well as the Israeli capture of the West Bank in 1967 and the 1970-1971 conflict between the PLO militants and the Jordanian army all exacerbated the divisions between Jordanians over issues of national

\textsuperscript{449} Massad, \textit{Colonial Effects}.

\textsuperscript{450} Ibid

\textsuperscript{451} Ibid

\textsuperscript{452} Abu Odeh, \textit{Jordanians, Palestinians}

\textsuperscript{453} Nanes, “Choice, Loyalty”; Ryan, “Political Opposition”; Massad, \textit{Colonial Effects}.
Transjordanians came to believe that the state was theirs and developed a narrative of national identity revolving around the Hashemite family and their traditional tribal origins, while Palestinian Jordanians maintained a Palestinian national identity, one revolving around the conflict with Israel.

Transjordanians’ fears that Jordan may turn into an alternative homeland for the Palestinians also have helped foster a distinct Transjordanian national identity. These fears have been fuelled by successive political events beginning, most importantly, with the Israeli Likud party’s position following the Israeli occupation of the West Bank in 1967, and remaining in place today, that Jordan is the Palestinian homeland. As a pre-emptive measure (and also in response of the Palestinian first Intifada in 1987), King Hussein announced in 1988 an administrative and legal disengagement with the West Bank. Transjordanian fears, however, were exacerbated with the arrival of 300,000 Palestinians expelled from Kuwait during the 1991 Gulf War, the failure of the 1993 Oslo Accords and the second Palestinian Intifada in late 2000. These events all reinforced the fear that Palestinians fleeing or being expelled to Jordan as a result of the on-going political unrest in the West Bank, Syria, and even Lebanon would turn Jordan into a homeland for the Palestinians.

Jordan’s political liberalization and economic restructuring of the 1990s also deepened the discourse regarding national identity. The economic crises of late 1980s forced Jordan to

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454 Khalaf, A Palestinian without an Identity
455 Massad, Colonial Effects; Sirriyeh, “Jordan and the legacies”
456 Brand, “Palestinians and Jordanians”
457 Lynch, “Jordan’s Identity and Interests”
458 Brand, “Palestinians and Jordanians”
459 Braizat, The Jordanian Palestinian Relationship
conduct a structural adjustment plan (SAP) that “included monetary stabilization to fight inflation and privatization to encourage economic growth.” This was followed by a political opening in order to absorb the 1989 riots that occurred in the southern cities of Maan, Tafileh and Kerak due the rise in gasoline prices. However, the new electoral law that was implemented as part of the political reform was designed to favor the regime’s Transjordanian support base and to provide it with a mechanism to compete over access to state resources. As a result, electoral districts with Palestinian Jordanian majorities, such as Amman, Zarqa, and Irbid were and continue to be underrepresented.

This structural context, namely, the division of labor according to identity and the design of political institutions in favor of Transjordanians, has impeded the development of unified political opposition, one that cross-cuts the identity lines dividing Jordanians, and has impacted both the type of oppositional mobilization and its demographic and geographic extent. Indeed, the traditional opposition parties all lack a significant Transjordanian political base. As a result, the abovementioned 1989 protests against the removal of fuel subsidies and again against the 1996 reduction of food subsidies were concentrated in the regime’s social base in the southern cities of Maan, Kerak, Madaba and Tafileh, while the 1990-1991 protests against the American intervention in Iraq, the anti-normalization protests in 1997, the 2000-2002

460 Nanes, “Choice, Loyalty.”
461 Alissa, “Rethinking Economic Reform in Jordan”
462 Lust, “Competitive Clientelism”
463 Lust, “Elections under authoritarianism”
464 Lust, “The Decline of Jordanian Political Parties”
465 Jordan’s Democratic People Party (HASHD) and the Democratic Popular Unity Party (WIHDA) were established legally as Jordanian parties in 1992. Prior to 1992, HASHD and WIHDA activists were affiliated to the Palestinian Democratic Front and Palestinian Popular Front respectively.
466 For the 1989 riots, see Alissa, “Rethinking Economic.” The reduction of food subsidies in 1996 led to what have been dubbed as the “bread riots” and began in Kerak. See Andoni and Schwedler, “Bread Riots in Jordan”
demonstrations in support of the second Palestinian Intifada, and the 2003 protests against US intervention in Iraq were all organized by the party-based political opposition and primarily concentrated in Amman, Zarqa, and Irbid where the majority of inhabitants are Palestinian Jordanians.467

Abdullah II became the king of Jordan in 1999 following the death of his father. In 2002, he launched the Program of Social and Economic Transformation (PSET) which aimed to create sustained development projects in Jordan by directing more investments to human resources, accelerating the steps of the privatization to the public sector, and establishing partnership between the public and the private sectors.468 To implement this program the king appointed a technocrat government whose ministers believed in economic liberalization, widely known in Jordan as the ‘digital government.’ Under the direction of Bassem Awadallah, the minister of international cooperation and the finance minister in Abu Al-Ragheb government (later on the head of the Royal Court) the PSET gained momentum. However, this project failed to achieve its goals and Jordan total debts increased from $ 9 billion in 1999 to $ 17 billion in 2010.469 The process of privatizing the public sector was corrupt and most of the state’s industries, including potassium, cement, electricity, the port of Aqaba, the royal airline, and tens of other companies, were sold to investors for a fraction of the value of their real assets.470 The king’s extended family benefited directly from the privatization of the state’s companies especially in the

467 Lust, “The Decline”; Schwedler “Cop Rock: Protest, Identity”; Schwedler, “More Than a Mob”
469 Njadat, “ Jordan debts”
phosphate and telecommunications sectors. The king, himself, acquired thousands of acres of the state’s land under the guise of the need to facilitate the process of investment. The cronies of the palace accumulated enormous wealth through commissions to facilitate selling the state’s companies to private sector. The joint ventures between the private and public sectors were a facade to use the state’s resources in order to make fast profits without creating new jobs.

The PSET exacerbated poverty and unemployment in Jordan especially among youth. In 2010, the level of poverty (defined as people who live on less than $2 USD per day and near this figure) reached 14.5 percent according to the official statistical estimates, but this figure is very far less from the reality, estimated by European research centers in 2009 to be at 27 percent. The unemployment level reached 16 percent and it was largely a youth phenomenon. Young people, ages 15 to 24, accounted for about 50 percent of the unemployed which is considered by the IMF among the highest in the world and tends to be highest among the educated.

The PSET had two other important consequences on the regime in Jordan: it minimized the regime’s social base support and it created rifts among the ruling elites. Selling the state’s

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471 In June 2013, the Criminal Court of Amman accused Walid Alkurdy, the husband of the king’s aunt, of corruption and found him guilty. He was sentenced 22 years and fined him $ 365 million. Alkurdy was the director of Phosphate company. See Breiss, “Convicting the king’s of Jordan relative.”
473 The Higher Committee for Retired Officers, “the economic paper”
474 Ahid and Augustine, “The Impact of Global Financial Crisis on Jordan.”
475 European Economy, “The Impact of the Global Crisis on Neighbouring Countries.”
476 Assaad, and Farzaneh,”Youth in the Middle East and North Africa.” According to Assaad, the unemployment rate in Jordan has hovered somewhere between 13 percent and 16 percent between 1999 and 2010. See Assaad, “The structure and evolution of employment in Jordan,” 1.
477 IMF, “Jordan: selected issues”
owned companies deprived the regime the capacity of employment to Transjordanians. To substitute for this the regime created twenty-two commissions parallel to state ministries and employed in them sixty thousand employees.\textsuperscript{478} As the sons and daughters of the regime’s cronies, those employees received triple the salaries of their ministerial counterparts doing the same jobs, but this outraged the Transjordanians employees of low income.\textsuperscript{479} Furthermore, Bassem Awadallah, the head of PSET and Mohammed el-Thahabi, the director of the department of intelligence (\textit{Mukhabarat}) were not on the same page. El-Thahabi perceived selling the state’s assets as a process of empowering the role of the private sector in the state, and hence empowering the Palestinians on the expense of Transjordanians. He used his post to campaign against Awadallah accusing him of conducting policies that would turn Jordan into a Palestinian state.\textsuperscript{480} However, this struggle could be a mere struggle between two camps within the regime over power, rather than a struggle over the economic policies of Jordan.\textsuperscript{481} In fact, el-Thahabi, used his position for money laundering and for selling Jordanian citizenship to tens of Iraqi businessmen in return for millions of dollars\textsuperscript{482}, and his department, the \textit{Mukhabarat} had extra-legal authorities. It was responsible for rigging the parliamentary elections in 2007 and 2010, withdrawing or granting Jordanian citizenship, preventing political activists from travelling, and it had the final word in appointing personnel to positions in the public sector. Like their

\textsuperscript{478} Ahmed Awad, Director of the Phoenix Center for Economic and Informatics Studies, provided the data. Interview with author, February 25, 2012

\textsuperscript{479} Fahd Khitan, Columnist, Alghad Newspaper, Interview with the author, February 2, 2012

\textsuperscript{480} Interviews with Nahid Hattar, Fahd Khitan, Mohammed Masry, Oraieb Rantawi, respectively, Amman, March 5, February 2, February 5, and January 26, 2012

\textsuperscript{481} Mohammed Faraj, interview with author, Amman, February 25, 2012.

counterparts in Tunisia and Egypt, the *Mukhabrat* in Jordan, had offices in all the universities to monitor student’s activities and to interrogate the activists.\(^\text{483}\)

Jordan features similar cooperative dynamics between the opposition groups as that in Tunisia and Egypt. The old opposition which included Islamic Action Front (IAF), Jordan's Democratic People’s Party (HASHD), Democratic Popular Unity Party (WAHDA), Jordan Communist Party (JCP), and the Ba’athists, all of which are nonautonomous parties, formed in the mid-1990s the Higher Committee for the Coordination of National Opposition Parties (HCCNOP) to oppose the normalization of relations between Jordan and Israel.\(^\text{484}\) In the decade prior to the protests in Jordan, the HCCNOP remained, however, focused on two issues: parliamentary elections and the Israel-Palestine conflict; it did not engage the social and economic policies of the regime in its agenda for change.\(^\text{485}\) This is in part because most of the parties that make the HCCNOP represent the interests of Jordanian Palestinians. Indeed, in 1989 when the regime initiated a political opening, HASHD and WAHDA were dominated by Jordanian Palestinians who were officially affiliated with the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine and Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine.\(^\text{486}\) The Muslim Brotherhood (MB) was in no way immune to identity-based politics; it is widely perceived in Jordan to be a representative of Palestinian interests alone because the Palestinian Islamic Resistance

\(^{483}\) Personal communications with the tens of Jordanian’s activists

\(^{484}\) Clark, “The Conditions of Islamist Moderation.”

\(^{485}\) Most of scholars writings about the opposition in Jordan shows that the focus of the old opposition was on parliament elections, the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, and the American invasion to Iraq in 2003. The social protests that took place in 1989 and 1996 in southern Jordan were conducted by local activists.

\(^{486}\) Ryan, “Political Opposition.”
Movement (HAMAS) was part of the MB organization in Jordan. In contrast, both the Arab Socialist Baath Party and the Jordanian Communist Party were dominated by Transjordanians.487

Like Tunisia and Egypt, Jordan witnessed the rise of new autonomous opposition actors prior to the CoP. In 2004, a group of activists formed the Social Left Movement (SLM), which focused on the regime’s social policies. It was followed by the formation of the Jordan National Progressive Current (NPC) in 2008, which linked the regime’s policies of privatization to a conspiracy of turning Jordan into a Palestinian homeland.488 Besides these two groups, sixty Military Officers (HCRMO) issued a statement in May 2010 in the name of the Higher Committee for Retired Military officers (HCRMO) protesting corruption and the policies of naturalization which granted citizenship to thousands of Palestinians (‘Tajnis’).489 These groups, however, did not take their protests to the street and focused mainly on disseminating their voices through the media. Other groups, however, like schoolteachers and day-labourers, escalated their protests beginning from 2010. The Teachers organized twelve strikes, marches, and sit-ins to demand the right to establish a trade union, and the day-labourers at the Ministry of Agriculture organized seventeen protest activities demanding the same working rights as their colleagues performing similar or equivalent jobs for private businesses.490

487 See Lust, “The Decline of Jordanian Political Partie.”
488 See the social left website: https://www.facebook.com/jordan.left
489 “The Statement of the Higher Committee.”
IV: Conclusions

This briefs background about the historical evolution of the regimes in Tunisia, Egypt, and Jordan and their relationship with their people shows that although these regimes were found under different conditions, had different social-base support, and governed through different institutions and mechanism, all of them in the 80s accepted a process of political liberalization and embarked on a project of economic liberalization that was accompanied with corruption, repression, poverty, increased inequality, ditraction of the middle class, and direct involvement of ruling families using the state’s institutions to accumulate wealth. Those policies shaped the consciousness of the generation that borne during this era who, and unlike the old generation, perceived the state illegitimate. Thus, when the cycle of protests began in Tunisia following the self-immolation of Mohamed Albouazizi on December 17, 2010, Egypt and Jordan were vulnerable to the same protests. In the remaining chapters, I introduce the empirical findings of this thesis.
Chapter III

Tunisia: Domination of AYMs at the Cycle’s Apex

The protests in Tunisia began without previous planning. On December 17, 2010, Mohammad Albouazizi, a vegetable street vendor committed self-immolation before the governorate of Sidi Bouzid in protest to the confiscation of his street cart’s scale by the municipal police and of the humiliation he was subjected to when he went to complain to the office of the governor.\footnote{Bishara, \textit{The glorious}} Immediately after this event, the youth activists of the AYMs and NYMs together with members of Albouazizi family and street vendors gathered before the building of the governorate to protest the way the government officials treated Albouaziz, the unemployment, and the policies of marginalization that drive youth to put themselves on fire.\footnote{Elamine, interview with the author, Sidi Bouzid, May 8, 2012}

The camp of the NYMs that participated in the initial gathering was composed of activists from the Progressive Democratic Party (PDP) while those who participated from AYMs were activists from the Communist Workers Party (POCT), Pan-Arabists, and independents who form at a later stage Karama Youth Movement (Karama).\footnote{Oueiniah, interview with the author, Sidi Bouzid, May 8, 2012} The youth activists of Ennahda, an autonomous movement, participated individually in the protests because they did not have a working organization inside Tunisia when the protests started. However, Ennahda leaders issued several statements from outside Tunisia calling upon the people to join the protests.\footnote{The first statement Ennahda issued about the events was on December 18, 2010. See Ghannouchi, “Sidi Bouzid: Signs for a burning homeland.”} Ettajdid movement also did have activists on the ground in Sidi Bouzid when the protests began; it issued
its first statement about the events in Sidi Bouzid on December 20, 2010.\textsuperscript{495} When the protests began, none of the AYMs or NYMs possessed a mass-based organization. Because the former is composed of illegal parties and movements, only ideologically committed activists joined them. Furthermore some of these groups are Marxists and, as a general rule, these groups are small in number in all MENA countries for cultural and historical reasons.\textsuperscript{496} The latter is composed of legal parties and movements but they suffered from the constraints the regime imposed on them. For example, the regime prevented the distribution of their newspapers several times and prevented the PDP from having seats in the parliament.\textsuperscript{497} 

The protests continued in the first three days in Sidi Bouzid’s city and they spread after that gradually to all the towns of Sidi Bouzid governorate. On December 24 the protests reached other governorates in the interior regions of Tunisia such as Kasserine, and then they swap all the interior regions. The regime used the Public Order Brigades (POB) to quell the protests the following day of their beginning; they attacked the protestors using batons and tear gas canisters, and they arrested tens of them. However, the POB killed the first two protestors in Manzel

\textsuperscript{495} See Ibrahim, “Ettajdid statement about the situation in Sidi Bouzid.”

\textsuperscript{496} Historically, the foundation of many of the communist parties was linked to the Jewish communities in Arab countries. The establishment of Israel in 1948 and the communist parties acceptance to the UN Resolution number 181 of dividing mandated Palestine created a popular impression these parties are part of a wider conspiracy against the Arab. Furthermore, these parties were suppressed immediately after the Arab countries gained independence. Culturally, it was easy for the Islamists to target these parties on the ground that the Marxists deny the existence of god. See for example Lust-Okar, “The decline of Jordanian political parties.” Although she does not provide analysis to why these parties are weak in Jordan, she gives empirical data of their weakness.

\textsuperscript{497} Although the Progressive Democratic Party (PDP) and Ettajdid Movement were recognized as legal parties, the regime imposed constraints on them. For example, the regime had a quota, 20 per cent of the seats of the Parliament for the opposition parties. However, because the PDP criticized the regime’s policies against Ennahda in the 90s, the regime refused to grant it any seat in the parliament in the elections of 1994 and 1999. See Aljazeera, “The Progressive Democratic Party”, February 7, 2011. Retrieved from www.aljazeera.net/news/pages/4897a170-119e-420a-8e9e-81ff674c5aa0 (accessed June 14, 2014)
Bouzaiene on December 24, 2010. This was followed by killing 29 protestors between January 8 and 10, 2011 in Kasserine, Thala, and Regueb (hereafter, the events in Kasserine).

The CoP reached its apex on January 12, 2011 when the coastal regions joined the protests and the demand of ousting Ben Ali’s regime became dominant after this date; it continued until Ben Ali fled to Saudi Arabia on January 14, 2011. In this chapter, when I refer to the first phase of the protests, I mean the phase from the beginning of the protests until January 8, 2011. It is the phase of the protests before the killing of the 29 activists.

Following this background introduction, I begin by establishing two facts: that the AYMs and NYMs did respond differently to the regime’s repression and that the AYMs did dominate the protests at the CoP’s apex. In regard to the state’s use of repression, I will argue that the AYMs focused on spreading out, escalating, and radicalizing the protests, and eventually called for ousting the regime after the events in Kasserine, while the NYMs sought to convince the regime to accept reform from within. As for the AYMs’ domination, I will show that their domination was clear in the protestors’ adoption to the goal of ousting the regime and in their engagement in collective activities to achieve this goal. The next section of this chapter shows how the AYMs sustained the protests through frame resonance and by placing the protests in the poor Tunisians’ neighbourhoods. In the third section, I illustrate how the strategy of mobilizing the poor consolidated the domination of the AYMs during the CoP’s apex. In brief, I will show that the engagement of the poor led to the rise of Spontaneous Riot Movements (SRM) which defeated and neutralized the POB. In doing so, the SRM stripped the regime its first line of defense.

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498 One killed immediately and the other died in the hospital ten days later. See Bishara, The glorious, 235.
499 20 fell in Kasserine city and Thala (both in Kesserine governorate) and 9 killed in Regueb (a town in Sidi Bouzaid).
500 Bishara, The glorious
defense making it dependant on the army who refused to suppress the protestors. I conclude by highlighting the chapter’s main findings.

**State Repression and AYMs Domination During the CoP**

The documents of the AYMs and NYMs show that the former called for ousting the regime following the events in Kassereine, while the latter reveal a steady strategy that aimed to use the protests as a leverage to convince the regime to implement reforms. The domination of the AYMs on the CoP’s apex was clear in the activists’ chanted slogans between January 12 and 14 which demanded Ben Ali’s departure and in their collective defiance to the security forces to achieve their goal. The AYMs domination was facilitated by the NYMs acceptance to Ben Ali’s reform steps on January 13 at time the entire country was in a state of rebellion.

**State’s Repression and Responses of AYMs and NYMs**

As explained in the introduction, the regime in Tunisia started its campaign of repression on the second day of the protests. On December 24, 2010, the regime killed two activists in Manzel Bouzæine. Nevertheless, the documents of the AYMs and NYMs show different strategies but they do not reveal a strategic shift in the policies of the former due to the first event of killing. The shift in the AYMs strategy happened after the events in Kasserine. The AYMs used those events to call for ousting the regime, while the NYMs used them to improve their bargaining position with the regime. This was especially true when the NYMs accepted the proposal contained in Ben Ali’s third speech on January 13 in which he announced that he would not run in the presidential elections scheduled in 2014. By comparing the statements of the PDP and Ettajdid with that of the POCT and Ennahda, these striking differences between the two camps become clear.
Following the events in Kasserine, the POCT and Ennahda called for ousting the regime. The POCT’s statement that followed these events says: “the Workers Party is with our people (…) in their desire for change. And we cannot see this change without the departure of Ben Ali, the dissolving of the nominal current ruling institutions, and the establishment of an interim national government that should run free and decent elections.”\textsuperscript{501} The next day, Hamma Hammami, the POCT Secretary General, addressed the Tunisians via recorded message on YouTube. In addition to calling for the regime’s departure, he called for “establishing a national government that would supervise an election to Constituent Assembly that would put Tunisia on the road of democracy after ousting Ben Ali’s regime.”\textsuperscript{502} Following this statement, the regime arrested Hammami, who remained in prison until January 14, 2011. The party, however, reaffirmed its willingness “to pay the needed sacrifices until the departure of Ben Ali and the establishment of a democratic regime that prioritizes the poor people in its social policies.”\textsuperscript{503} Additionally, Almajiri, the POCT’s political bureau member, refused the calls of the PDP for the negotiation with the regime, claiming that these “initiatives” from the “moderates” reach nowhere with the “state of murderers and criminals”, adding that the party “has never and will never recognize the legitimacy of [Ben Ali’s state] and that for this reason the only demand the POCT has is the “regime’s departure.”\textsuperscript{504}

\textsuperscript{501} Hammami, “A statement from the Workers Party to the Tunisian People and its democratic forces.”

\textsuperscript{502} Hammami, “Response on Ben Ali’s speech.”


Similarly, Ennahda called upon Tunisians to escalate protests. Its statement condemned the regime which “refuses to respond to people’s call for change” and “insists on security solutions to put down the uprising.” Ennahda asked that “Tunisians and its elites engage more in the popular uprising activities” and not to let the “the heroes, the victims of injustice and oppression, especially in Sidi Bouzid and Kasserine in the confrontation be alone with the wolves [the regime’s policemen].”\(^\text{505}\)

In contrast, the PDP introduced itself as a mediator between the protestors and the regime. In a statement following the events of Kasserine, the PDP asked the regime to appoint a “national salvation government” that would order the security forces to stop shooting on the protestors, bring those who committed the killings to justice, work toward a new development program that would solve the problems of marginalization and unemployment, fight corruption, and “review the laws of media, political parties, public meeting and elections in order to prepare the country for the democratic transition by 2014.” The PDP also urged other political parties and civil society groups, and mainly the activists in the interior regions “to accept this solution.”\(^\text{506}\) Even when the protests reached Sfax and Tunis on January 12, by which point the entire country had entered into a state of a rebellion, the PDP maintained the same position. For example, in response to the Prime Minister’s decisions to dismiss the interior minister and to form a fact finding mission to investigate corruption, the PDP stated that it considered these decisions a step in the right direction but insufficient as the Tunisians want a “national salvation government.”\(^\text{507}\)

\(^{505}\) Ghannouchi, “The Tunisian regime commits a massacre in Kasserine.”

\(^{506}\) Jribi, “Toward a national salvation government.”

\(^{507}\) Jribi, “A statement.”
Ettajdid’s demands were more modest. Besides expressing its “shock” and “anger” over the scale of the killings, it appealed to “the president, as the one who is in charge for citizens and homeland safety, to take immediate steps to end the escalation.” Its statement also repeated the party’s call for a “national dialogue to solve the crisis.”508 After Ben Ali’s second speech on January 10, 2011 in which he accused masked people of attacking the police and the government’s institutions509, Ettajdid conveyed its disappointment over the speech’s “denial of the crisis”, which the party considered to be a result of “corruption, nepotism, and the illegal wealth of some people who are close to the authority”; however, the party insisted that “the solution” must occur through “national dialogue.”510

What remains to be explained, however, is why the AYMs did not change its strategy following the killing of two activists in Manzel Bouzeiene. That these events have affected the AYMs activists’ belief that the regime should go was evident in the interview with many of them who expressed similar statements like that of Aziz Amami “we became determined to oust the regime.”511 However, the AYMs strategy prior to the events of in Kasserine was based on expanding, intensifying and radicalizing the protests (see below). The events in Manzel Bouzeiene served this strategy as the protests after them spread to the governorate of Kasserine.

508 Ibrahim, “A statement of Ettajdid Movement about the development tragedy.”
509 In his second speech, Ben Ali accused masked people (Mulathameen) of terrorizing the people and of attacking the policemen and government institutions. For Ben Ali’s second speech see You Tube http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=SEQqL8BJ41o
510 Ibrahim, “A statement of Ettajdid Movement about the speech of the president of the state.”
511 Aziz Ammami, interview with the author, Tunis, April 18, 2012.
Domination of AYMs During CoP’s Apex

That the AYMs dominated the protests during the CoP’s apex was evident by the fact that in response to Ben Ali last speech on January 13, the protestors replied with the slogans *Khubz wa ma’ Ben Ali la* [bread and water but no to Ben Ali], meaning that Tunisians were willing to live under minimal conditions but could not live with Ben Ali as their president. It is also evident in the activists well-known slogan *Degage* (Depart). Furthermore, a review to the protestors’ slogans between January 8 and 14 shows that all political slogans demanded Ben Ali’s departure; one of these slogans appeared between January 8 and January 11 (Tunis is free, Tunis is free…Ben Ali get out), but the rest appeared during the CoP’s apex between January 12 and January 14. Finally, the large scale mobilization in the coastal regions happened in the last two days of the protests and the only demand the protestor raised was Ben Ali’s departure (see below table III-2).

The AYMs domination on CoP’s apex was mediated by the NYMs’ acceptance to Ben Ali’s promises in his third speech on January 13, 2011 at time the Tunisians were calling for ousting the regime. In his speech, Ben Ali spoke to the Tunisians in their dialect; he claimed that he understood the demands of the protestors and promised not to run for a sixth presidential term in 2014. He ordered his Prime Minister to decrease the prices of basic materials and he removed the censorship on internet and promised free media. He also asked POB to stop shooting on protestors and promised establishing an independent fact-finding mission to introduce those who killed the activists to justice, and he also pledged to fight corruption. Finally, he promised to

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512 Sghiri, Issam, interviews with the author, Tunis, respectively, April 29, 2012, April 13, 2012
establish an independent national committee to review the press, election, and civil society organization laws to pave the way for a pluralistic and democratic society.\footnote{See his speech on the YouTube http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=2AQm45CGcHo}

Chebbi and Ibrahim, the leaders of the PDP and Ettajdid respectively, welcomed the speech, considering it sufficient to end the protests. Chebbi said the speech was “unexpected” and “in harmony with the opposition’s demands” and “praised the president who touched on the fundamental issue of the crisis which is reforming the political system.” In his part, Ibrahim considered the speech “in agreement with the demands of the street and the opposition.”\footnote{“Tunis after Ben Ali speech: welcoming marches and thousands ask his departure,” Almasryalyoum, January 15, 2011, http://today.almasryalyoum.com/article2.aspx?ArticleID=284698 (accessed April 12, 2014)} In contrast, Rachid Ghannounchi, the president of Ennahda, told the press that “this Mafia regime [the Ben Ali regime] is over and the people want to get rid from it” and added that “this mafia is not viable for reform.”\footnote{“Tunis after Ben Ali speech.”} Indeed, the AYM\textsuperscript{s} believe that Ben Ali’s third speech was coordinated with the PDP because it came after a meeting between the leaders of the two parties and the Prime Minister on the same day of the speech.\footnote{Amani Thweib, Ahmed Mouli, Malek Sghiri, Tunis, interview with author, April 13, 2012} Chebbi almost admitted as much, as he did not deny the meeting, saying “it was held to discuss the available options to end the crisis.”\footnote{“Interview with Ahmed Chebbi,” Ettounisiya TV, January 30, 2012, http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=GWQgJah3kMk (accessed April 11, 2014)}

\textbf{AYMs and the Resource Problem}

In the framework of analysis, I argued that in order for the AYM\textsuperscript{s} to dominate the protests, they first have to be able to solve the resource problem. McAdam (1982) argues that the indigenous organizational structure, that is to say, the initial networks of informal and formal movements, is the basis on which a movement emerge, but to be sustained, there is need to “create an enduring
organizational structure” to “assume the centralized direction of the movement” which entails providing the resources necessary resources to sustain and to diffuse the protests.\textsuperscript{518} McAdam had in mind the mass-based social movement organizations that sustained and led the protests of the Civil Rights Movement in the 1960s. These organizations, however, were established over a long time period.\textsuperscript{519} In Tunisia, the initial networks of the AYMs and NYMs were the basis from which the protest movement emerged, but the short time period of the CoP, less than a month, was not sufficient for the AYMs to construct mass-based organizations. How then did the AYMs in Tunisia overcome their resource deficit?

I will argue that the AYMs were able to sustain the protests because they relied on two strategies: frame resonance and locating the protests in poor Tunisian neighbourhoods. The former included prioritizing the social over political demands in the early phase of the protests, and a motivational strategy to incite the Tunisians to join the protests. The latter included locating the protests in the areas of the urban poor in the coastal regions. In the last part of this section, I show that the evidences do not support the claims that the social media and the Tunisian General Labour Union (UGTT) the main resources on which the activists were able to sustain the protests.

Frame Resonance

The frame resonance strategy included prioritizing the social over political demands prior to the events of Kasserine which began on January 8, 2011. This can be seen in the AYMs statements especially when they are contrasted with those of the NYMs. Furthermore, during this period, the

\textsuperscript{518} McAdam, \textit{Political process}, 54.

\textsuperscript{519} For example, National Association for the Advanced of Colored People (NAACP) was founded in 1907, and Congress for Racial Equality (CORE) and March On Washington Movement (MOWM) both were established in 1940s. See Morris, \textit{Origins of the civil rights movements}, xi.
activists of AYMs adopted a motivational strategy that focused on convincing the Tunisians to join the protests. This strategy included calling the graduate unemployed to take part in the protests, appealing to Tunisian emotions, incitement speeches against the regime, and confrontational slogans.

**Prioritizing social demands prior to January 8, 2011**

A review of the statements made by the AYMs during the first stage of the CoP shows a continuous effort to expand and radicalize the protests. In their statements the AYMs held the regime responsible for the unfolding events, focused on the social character of the protests, accused the regime of adopting policies that intentionally marginalize sectors of society, sought to delegitimize the regime by undermining its initiatives to end the protests, and called upon members of the public to take to the street. For example, the first statement of POCT called for people to “join the struggle against the policies of social marginalization and oppression.” In it they condemned “police arrogance” and expressed “solidarity with the legitimate demands of the protestors for employment” and for their endeavors to end the policies of “marginalization.” The party continued: “the use of force by the dictatorship of November (Ben Ali’s regime) is intended to preserve the status quo which the regime exploits to accumulate fortune on the expense of the citizens’ dignity and the pride of Tunisians’ homeland.” Thus from the beginning, the POCT claimed that the policies of marginalization are not a simple mistake by the regime, but are deliberately planned, and the use of repression against the protestors was intended to maintain these policies.

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520 Hammami, “Let us Struggle Against Social Marginalization and Oppression.”
When the government proposed to solve the crisis by promising to create new jobs through investments in Sidi Bouzid, the POCT dismissed this solution, considering the promises of the regime to be lies. Hamma Hammami, the POCT’s secretary general, accused the regime of sending police to Sidi Bouzid “to suppress the people as it had done in the Mine Basin of Qafsa and Ben Gardane,” arguing that the proposal for creating new jobs is “déjà vu propaganda.” Hammami challenged the regime to offer “a monthly financial grant and social subsidies for the unemployed”; “decreasing the retirement age” in order to create working places for youth; and “building new schools” to create new jobs. He also proposed increasing “the taxes on the wealthy people”; decreasing the “budget of the interior ministry which do nothing except torturing people”; and of using the ‘Fund 26-26’ which the “government collects from people under the name of saving for the future generation but which no one knows anything about” to finance his proposal. Hammami warned the regime that the protests “shall expand because the problems are not limited to Sidi Bouzid but all Tunisians suffer from them.” Ennahda took the same line as that of the POCT. Its first statement claimed that the cause of the uprising was the “widening of the scope of unemployment”, the “uneven development between governorates”, and the “corruption of influential families and their partners in the ruling party, the Constitutional Democratic Rally (RCD).”

521 On December 23, 2010, Nuri Al-Jawani, minister for international cooperation visited Sidi Bouzid and declared a plan to establish industrial and agriculture projects, training graduates, and improving Sidi Bouzid infrastructure to create suitable environment for investment. He also declared the intention of the government to invest JDT 15 million ($ 10 million) immediately and funding 306 small projects to create immediate jobs. See “Tunis protests enter its seven days,” Aljazeera, December 23, 2010, http://aljazeera.net/news/pages/2bdfe7a6-5480-47c1-b3e6-1bc009d709b9 (accessed April 15, 2014)

522 Fund 26-26 is the nick name for the National Solidarity Fund. Established in 1992 to alleviate poverty through voluntary donations but the regime used it to force businessmen to pay for the Fund and in several occasions it force public employees to pay a one day of their salaries to the Fund. See Almideini, “The Fall,” 206

523 Hammami, “The position of the Worker Party from the protests in Sidid Bouzid.”

524 Ghannouchi, “Sidi Bouzid: Signs for a burning homeland.”
The strategy of the AYMs becomes clearer when contrasted with that of the NYMs. For example, the common line in the PDP and Ettajdid statements during the entire CoP was their commitment to the regime’s legitimacy. This was evident in how they proposed political reform solutions that did not challenge the regime’s existence, and referred to protests simply as ‘a crisis.’ As the conditions for ending the protests, the PDP and Ettajdid issued statements calling for political reforms and dialogue with the protestors. Both parties also refrained from calling for protest escalation as a mechanism to force the regime to accept their proposal.

The first statement of PDP called upon the government to “review its economic and social choices in order to redistribute the country’s wealth in a just way” and “to grant the Tunisians their freedom of expression.”525 As protests continued, the PDP issued another statement that referred the root of discontent as the “repression of security apparatus, the youth’s feeling of injustice and inequity, corruption, influence peddling, and unemployment.” To end the protests, the statement called for “releasing the detainees, dialogue with the representatives of unemployed youth, and a new development plan that takes into account the balance and justice between regions.” The PDP, however, put political reforms first: as the statement says, “these measures would not be effective unless political life is liberalized, and the media and public sphere are freed.”526 When the protests became more intense and spread out to cover all of the Sidi Bouzid governorate by December 24, Maya Jribi, the PDP Secretary General, reiterated the same solution proposed in earlier statements, but added the additional demand for a “dialogue

with the political parties and civil society organizations to discuss the means for democratic transition following the end of Ben Ali presidency term in 2014."  

The Ettajdid movement followed a similar path to that of the PDP, though its language was far more modest and reconciliatory with regime. It issued three statements between the start of protests and January 10, 2011. In its first statement it expressed sympathy with the Alouazi family and called for the government to “review its social and political choices in order to solve peacefully the problems of unemployment and unbalance development.” The second statement was a call for national dialogue between protestors and the regime in order to find “a collective solution to the current situation.” The third statement was an appeal to “the higher authorities in the country to end the repressive policies with the social movements and to open dialogue with them on the issues of employment, education, development and social justice.”

Not only did these statements sustain a commitment to the regime’s legitimacy by calling for dialogue and for political reform under Ben Ali’s leadership, but they also refrained from calling upon the public to join the protests. The statements’ titles of the PDP, for example, show disengagement with the protests. They carried neutral titles such as “a statement by the PDP,” “a second statement by PDP,” “a statement about the events in Sidi Bouzid.” In contrast, the AYM’s were far clearer in calling the Tunisians to join the protests. For example, the title of the POCT’s first statement of the POCT was “Let us Struggle Against Social Marginalization and Oppression.” This is not to suggest that the activists of the PDP and Ettajdid were not engaged in

528 Ibrahim, “Statement about the situation in Sidi Bouzid,”
529 Ibrahim, “After the painful incident in Sidi Bouzid: from the misery of unemployment to the media misery.”
530 Ibrahim, “A letter from Ahmed Ibrahim to the activists for social justice in Redeyef city”
the protests from the beginning; indeed, they were by the testimony of the AYMs. However, as Ali Abuazizi, an activist from the PDP, explains, the leaders of his party were always more cautious in managing their relationship with the regime than were the party’s activists. Ali recalls that on the first day of the protests, the party’s leadership called him from Tunis to advise him against escalat­ing the protests – advice which he and his colleagues dismissed.\footnote{Bishara, “The glorious,” 209.}

AYMs motivational strategy

There is no doubt that Albouazizi’s self-immolation was a spontaneous act, and it cannot by itself explain how the protests spread to all the towns of Sidi Bouzid’s governorate and then to the entire country. This is especially true because other incidents of self-immolation took place just few months before the uprising in Sidi Bouzid, in other regions, but were not followed by protests.\footnote{In March 2010, Abdulsalam Treimish, a street food vendor from Monastir, sat himself on fire when municipality denied him a license to open a shop for regular work. See “Abdulasalam Treimish, the first Tunisian that put himself on fire for freedom and justice,” Tunisian People are burning themselves Mr. President, January 19, 2011 https://www.facebook.com/note.php?note_id=158180324231259 (accessed April 10, 2014).} What was unique in the case of Albouazizi was the existence of a group of activists who were ready to turn the incident into a public issue by organizing and maintaining the protests in Sidi Bouzid, and by working to spread them to other regions. The process by which the protests were expanded was accompanied by a sustained campaign of incitement against the regime. This incitement strategy included focusing on the high rate of unemployment among graduates, appealing to the public’s emotions, and using fiery speeches and provocative slogans.
Albouazizi as university graduates. At the midnight of December 17, 2011, Elamine Albouazizi, the founder of Karama movement and the uncle of the victim, made the following post on his Facebook:

> Labor is an entitlement: gang of muggers. This is what thousands of protestors chanted this evening in Sidi Bouzid – people who were shocked when an unemployed graduate (emphasize added) put himself on fire in a protest act against the insult he received from the police who denied him his right of selling few kilograms of vegetables on the road side."

The post is merely descriptive; it does not mention the demands of the protestors and it portrays the victim as unemployed graduate even though he did not finish his high school education. Elamine provided four reasons for his having done this. The first was related to what had happened in the uprising of Redeyef in 2008. The protests in Redeyef, he explains, lasted six months but the Tunisians did not join them because the demands of the activists were of a regional nature. By informing the public that Albouazizi is a graduate, this might convince tens of thousands of unemployed graduates to join the protests. The second is related to the nature of the illegal opposition, which at the time considered the problem of unemployed graduates to be one of its top priorities in its struggle against the regime. The third is that unemployed graduates were one of the groups most affected by Ben Ali’s social policies, and as a category included most opposition activists. The final reason is coincidental, as on the same day

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533 I use his first name in the rest of chapter to distinguish him from Mohamed Albouazizi
535 According to Salem Ayari, president of Unemployed Graduate Union (UDC) in Tunisia, out of the 800 thousand unemployed, there are 250 thousand graduates, interview with author, Tunis, April 16, 2012.
Albouazizi set himself on fire, the government was conducting a national competition at Sidi Bouzid to hire new teachers, and there were thousands of graduates from all neighbouring governorates in the city. By spreading the idea that Albouazizi was a graduate, Elamine sought to provoke those thousands into anger, which would in turn inspire them to spread the protests to their various home regions. Depicting Albouazizi as a graduate, though he did not finish his high school, was indeed an effective strategy for inciting Tunisians to join the protests, as demonstrated by the fact that all participating movements and parties in the protests capitalized on it in their statements, including the PDP, Ennahda, the Congress for the Republic, the Party of Green Tunisia, the Progressive National Current, the Green Party, the Socialist Democratic Movement, and the UGTT, and the regional media including Aljazeera and France 24 TV. Actually, even eighteen-months into the uprising, some observers still believed that the main cause of the protests was unemployment among graduates.

**Appealing to Tunisians emotions.** The focus on incitement also included appealing to public emotion. I expand later on this dimension in the paragraphs related to the activists’ slogans (see below) but here I refer to two related subjects: an alleged picture of Albouazizi as he is consumed by flames, and a letter he supposedly had written to his mother before his death. The alleged picture was shared among the activists via their social media accounts (primarily on Facebook). The picture appeared first on a website entitled *Sha’eb Tunis Yihriq fi rouho ya*

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538 Tamer Idrees, a member of the political bureau of Ettajdid Party, Sfax, interview with author, May 10, 2012. Idrees was still convinced that Albouazizi was a university graduate when I asked him about the reasons of the uprising.
539 None of the activists whom I interviewed knew who published it first.
siadat alra’es (Tunisian People are burning themselves Mr. President, hereafter, Sha’ebTunis), on December 19, 2010.\textsuperscript{540} Although it is hard to measure the effect of this picture on the rate of protest spread, it is well known in the academic literature on communication that visual messages tend to have more power upon the recipient than auditory ones.\textsuperscript{541} Additionally, activists dramatized the incident of Albouazizi by publishing a letter supposedly written by him to his mother before he sat himself on fire. The letter, which appeared on some of the activists’ Facebook accounts, reads “I am travelling, mother; forgive me. There is no use for complaining. I am lost in a road that I did not choose to walk through. Forgive me if I did not listen to you. Blame the time, and do not blame me. I am going and I will not come back.”\textsuperscript{542} Like the picture, the precise effects of the letter are hard to measure, but its content certainly increased public anger toward the regime. According to one of the activists, people did not only feel sympathy with the victim and his family but also with themselves; they did not want to feel as helpless as Albouazizi and they wanted to “walk down a path of their choice.”\textsuperscript{543} Furthermore, the activists claimed that the POB had been raping women in Kasserine. Radio Kalima, for example, interviewed a witness in Kasserine who, crying, said that he received phone calls from friends informing him that the members of the POB had sexually assaulted his sisters, and added “the French did not do that to us.”\textsuperscript{544} In my interviews with activists in Kasserine, they denied that


\textsuperscript{541} McLuhan, “Understanding media.”; Kozma, “Learning with media.” ; Nelson, Clawson, and Oxley, “Media framing of a civil liberties.”

\textsuperscript{542} Hilmi Alasmar, “the vegetable peddler who ignited the revolution,” Alddustour newspaper, January 16, 2011.

\textsuperscript{543} Elamine, “interview.”

any rapes had occurred, although they mentioned that policemen had entered a ‘Turkish bath for women’, which had infuriated many members of the public.545

**Incitement speeches.** The speeches of AYMs’ activists also focused on inciting the public to sustain the protests. The activists focused on the regimes’ corruption, on widespread unemployment, and on the marginalization of the poor, and they avoided proposing solutions that may have seen an end to the protests while also undermining any of the regime’s own proposals. Some of their speeches illustrate this particularly well. Khaild Oueiniah, a pan-Arabist activist with Karama movement, addressed the crowd on the second day of the protests in Sidi Bouzid. He considered the RCD committee that the local governor (the *Wali*) had formed to discuss protestors’ demands to be illegitimate, and insisted that the only way to end protests was by providing Sidi Bouzid’s people with the minimum conditions of a “decent life.” He did not, however, specify these conditions.546 Another activist addressed a crowd of people in Foussana, Kasserine saying:

> “The gang of the ruling party do not care of you; they care only for their interests. Look to our town’s infrastructure: when it rains we become isolated from the world. Did this authority listen to us when we wrote to it? It did not. This authority humiliates you and it forces young men to seek money from their mothers in order to sit in cafes. Demand your rights because you born free and do not believe this authority’s promises. We saw its lies in Redeyef.”547

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This fiery speech was accompanied by slogans such as “uprising, uprising until we put an end to this gang.”\textsuperscript{548} In fact, tens of speeches can be located on the activists’ Facebook profiles, on YouTube accounts, and on websites linked to the uprising, with similar ideas: provoking the people to sustain their protests and attacking the regime’s initiatives to end them.

**Confrontational slogans.** Finally, a review of the activists’ slogans during the CoP shows that the main focus was on incitement and on expressing grievances related to social issues during the entire period of protests. However, we see more focus on incitement and on political issues during the period of the CoP’s apex (January 12-14, 2011). This is because the activists of the AYMs saw an opportunity to oust the regime and capitalized on it. While it is difficult to track the evolution of all the protests’ slogans during the protest cycle, the findings of a representative sample of videos posted to the internet supports this argument. According to Tunisian activists, the website of Sha’eb Tunis and the Wkalat Anba’ Alshare’ Altunisi (News agency of the Tunisian street, henceforth, Wkalat Anba’) were two important sources for their information. Sha’eb Tunis posted videos of the protests from December 17 until 31, 2010, and also from January 11 until 13, 2011. The regime managed to shut the website down between January 1 and 10, 2011. I substituted this period using sample videos that appeared on Wkalat Anba.’ Additionally, I increased the number of videos using You Tube’s search engine to locate videos related to the protests in Tunisa, Soussa, Sfax, Kasserine, and Sidi Bouzid on January 14, the day of Ben Ali departure because Sha’eb Tunis and Wkalat Anba’ have no videos of them.\textsuperscript{549} After deleting the videos that were related to incitement songs, interviews, reports, and pictures of confrontations, I had fifty remaining videos. The videos cover almost all governorates of Tunisia.

\textsuperscript{548} Ibid
\textsuperscript{549} This increases the number of slogans by 28.
and they contain 183 slogans, many of which are repetitions of identical words but show up on different dates of protests – for example, ‘work is entitlement… o gang of muggers’ is repeated in 22 demonstrations, and ‘work, freedom, national dignity’ is repeated 18 times (See Appendix I for the complete list of the videos, cities and towns, and dates).

I coded the slogans as relating to one of three topics: social demands, political demands, and incitement.550 Certainly, there are slogans that refer to all three topics, such as “work, freedom, national dignity.” In such cases, I coded the slogan according to its main focus as prioritized by the protestors. In the previous example, the main focus is on the work, and thus I included it in the social category. Table III-1 illustrates how these slogans are distributed on the three categories, and table III-2 shows how they are distributed during three periods of the CoP.

Table III-1: Incitement, social, and political slogans during the entire CoP

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of slogan</th>
<th>N of Slogans</th>
<th>Examples of the slogans</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Incitement</td>
<td>105</td>
<td>With blood and soul we redeem you martyr</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>The national anthem</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Hey citizen, hey victim…feel our cause</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Hey martyr…on your path we will not deviate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>No, no to the Trabesia… who loot the budget</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>Work, freedom, national dignity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Work is entitlement o gang of muggers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Lands are sold and people hungry</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Hey government, the prices are so high</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

550 For coding, I defined political demands as every slogan that seeks changes in the state’s political institution such as the departure of the president, parliament, new press law, and the like. Social slogans are defined as any slogan that seeks social change including employment, reduction of prices, changing laws that affect the daily living of people. Incitement slogans are defined as any slogan that condemn corruption, call the people to join the protests, and praise national unity.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Period</th>
<th>Type of slogan</th>
<th>N of slogans</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>December 17, 2011- January 7, 2011</td>
<td>Incitement</td>
<td>53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Social</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Political</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>January 8-11, 2011</td>
<td>Incitement</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Social</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Political</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>January 12-14, 2011 (the CoP’s apex)</td>
<td>Incitement</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Social</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Political</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>183</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

As Table III-2 shows, during the period from December 17, 2010 up until January 7, 2011, the activists focused on incitement and social demands. In fact, of the 22 political slogans used during this period, only seven slogans requested reforms, while all of the remaining called for ousting the regime. Examples of this include “Down, down, to the constitutional party, down, down to the torturer of people” and “Tunis is free, Tunis is free, Ben Ali gets out.” This trend
changed from between January 8 and 14 in that the focus of the slogans shifted from social to political demands, though nevertheless the incitement slogans remained dominant. By this point all political slogans demanded Ben Ali’s departure. One of these new slogans appeared between January 8 and January 11 (Tunis is free, Tunis is free…Ben Ali gets out), but the rest appeared at the CoP’s apex between January 12 and 14. The domination of incitement slogans during the entire protest cycle is clear in considering their proportion of the all total slogans (57 percent), and the reason should be obvious: activists of AYMs sought to mobilize the public in order to sustain the protests in the face of organized authoritarian state. The incitement slogans focused on appealing to public emotion, stimulating Tunisian patriotism, and condemning corruption. The emotional slogans called the public to adhere to a martyrs’ path in order not to let the sacrifices of previous victims be in vain. They also called upon poor people, who constituted many of the most grievous victims of Ben Ali’s policies, to join the protests for their own interests. Slogans such as “hey martyr, hey martyr…on your path we will not deviate” and “hey poor citizen, hey victim…come and join us in defending your cause” exemplify this category. The second category of slogans appeals to Tunisians’ patriotism, calling upon them to remain united against the regime out of love for the country. Here we find activists singing the national anthem, calling for unity between workers and students, and promising to protect Tunis with their blood and souls. The third slogans’ category condemns regime’s corruption and especially that of Trabelsi family. There were also regional slogans but they were intended mainly to instill enthusiasm in citizens. Slogans such as “hey Ben Ali, hey coward…Foussana’s people shall not be humiliated” and “hey Ben Ali, hey coward, in Kasserine, we will dig your grave” were meant to recall public memories in these regions of their struggle against French colonialism.
Additionally, there were a few slogans that intended to dissuade police from attacking the protests.

Table III-3: Distribution of incitement slogans according to their type with examples

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of incitement slogans</th>
<th>N of slogans</th>
<th>Examples</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Emotional</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>Hey Sidi Bouzid…today we support you…tomorrow you support us.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Hey citizen walk with us…your silence is treason.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Albouazizi left a message…there is no return back on the cause</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Martyrs, martyrs we are loyal to you</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>Land, freedom, national dignity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Unity, unity against repression and exploitation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>The same line in struggle…school students, university students, and workers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>There is fear…there is no fear…after Tunis there is no fear</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>If the people want to live… the fate will respond</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Hey governorate…shame on you…the trade union is besieged.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regional</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>The sons of Meknis are here…are here</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Ben Ali …hey coward… the men of Kef will not be humiliated.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Against corruption</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>No, no, to Trabelsia who looted the state’s budget</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Hey Trabelsi …hey vile…what did you left for the poor.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Uprising, uprising, until we put down the gang.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Calls to the policemen</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>Hey policeman…hey victim…feel with your brother</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>103</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The success of the incitement campaign spread, intensified, and sustained the protests mainly in poor neighbourhoods. According to activists in Kasserine and Sidi Bouzid, the interior region became liberated from the Public Order Brigades (POB) conscripts by January 12 and the army which replaced them did not intervene in their activities against the regime. However, this cannot be attributed only to the result of framing strategy the AYMs adopted during the first phase of the protests but also to locating the protests in the poor neighbourhoods especially when the protests reached their apex.

Locating Protests in Poor Neighbourhoods

The second strategy the AYMs adopted to solve the resource problem was locating the protests in poor Tunisian neighbourhoods. In the first stage of the CoP, this strategy seems to have been an outcome of the activist indigenous mobilization network rather than of being deliberately planned. During this phase the activists learned how to divide labour among themselves, and the importance of involving the poor Tunisians in the protests. In the second phase, i.e., when the protests reached the coastal regions, this strategy was intentionally planned by the activists.

From the first day of the protests in Sidi Bouzid, activists sought to exploit their social networks in order to mobilize people first inside Sidi Bouzid and then outside it. In Sidi Bouzid, Bilal, a high school student who happened to know Elamine (the founder of ‘Karama’ movement) since the protests of Regueb’s farmers in 2010, decided with seven of his friends to take the protests to his own quarter, Al Noor Algharbi, which is one of the two poorest areas in Sidi Bouzid. In order to avoid being videotaped or photographed by the POB informers, Bilal and his friends decided to confront police at night. This tactic led unintentionally to a division of

551 Rahmouni, “interview”; Elamine, “interview.”
labour amongst activists which communicated later on to all protest centers in other governorates. The activists of the middle class engaged in peaceful demonstration during the day, while by night those of the poor threw stones and Molotov cocktails at police formations and stations, RCD offices, and the governorate buildings. Unable to know who those activists were in order to arrest them, the police conducted a massive campaign of collective repression against the poor including shooting tear gas in very populated areas, invading homes of citizens at night, and conducting random campaign of arrests which infuriated the poor even more and led to the intensification of the protests.\footnote{552}{Bilal, Sidi Bouzid, interview with author, May 8, 2012.}

Besides using their direct network with the poor, activists organized demonstrations in poor neighbourhoods, and in particular in the coastal regions. This is mainly because these neighbourhoods are inhabited by immigrants from the interior regions who would be easily mobilized out of solidarity with their families back in the interior. And also out of an historical hatred for the police, who has long engaged in repressive actions as a mechanism to keep them under control.\footnote{553}{Twelve activists expressed this opinion during interviews with author, April-May, 2012} The Al-Muhamadieh quarter in Ben Arous, for example, is inhabited by immigrants from North-West of Tunisia. On January 10, 2011 a group of student activists from April 9 University who happened to live in Al-Muhamadieh organized a demonstration; they started to incite the people to protest but when they did not receive a positive response, they blocked the main street. When the POB started to disperse them using the tear gas, local people then joined the activists against the POB. The activists belong to the POCT but the initiative to mobilize the poor was solely the latter’s.\footnote{554}{Ghassan and Bilal, interview with author, Tunis, April 23, 2012} Other activists behaved in a similar way. Malek
Sghiri, the founder of New Generation movement, went with his colleagues to square number 106 in the Tadamon quarter, the largest impoverished neighbourhood in Ariana. The small skirmishes with the police which activists initiated transformed into huge protests when police shot cans of tear gas on the roof of the buildings and between them. Chaker, a student at the commerce institute in Sousse, and his fellow student friends decided to demonstrate on January 9 in solidarity with Sidi Bouzid and Kasserine. Their demonstration was planned to coincided with a football match between the two famous teams of Sousse: Ataraji and Alnajam. According to Chaker and his colleagues, those demonstrating numbered close to fifty when the POB confronted them near the Hidaya mosque. But when the match was over, the Ultras of the two teams, who were mainly from Alriyad quarter, the poorest area in Sousse, joined the protests. From that day, Sousse became involved in the protests until Ben Ali’s departure. Not only were these poor neighbourhoods a target for the activists who lived in or close to them, but so too were activists in the interior regions, who started to call their friends and relatives in these areas demanding of them to join the protests in order to ease ongoing police repression.

To summarize this section, the AYMs did not have mass-based organization to sustain the protests. However, they were able to solve this problem by using a frame resonance strategy that reverberated with the aggrieved Tunisians enhancing them to join the protests and by

555 Also called Hay Al-Intilaka
556 Tunis, Tunisia’s capital, is composed of four governorates which are called the Greater Tunis and consists of Tunis, Ariana, Ben Arous, and Manouba governorates.
557 Malek Sghiri, interview with author, Tunis, April 29, 2012
558 Chaker, Hamza, and Muntaser, interview with author, Sousse, May 16, 2012
559 Ten activists in Tunis and Sousse said they received phone calls from their colleagues or they knew about phones from interior regions to their relatives requesting mobilization against the regime, interview with author, April-May 2012.
locating the protests in the poor neighbourhoods in the coastal regions who became involved when the regime used indiscriminate repression to put the protests down.

**Resource Problem and Role of Social Media and UGTT**

Scholarly writings on the Tunisian protest cycle tend to attribute the success of the protest movement in solving the resource problem to either the activist use of social media or to the role of the Tunisian General Labour Union (UGTT) in the protests. In this section, I argue that the role of social media has been exaggerated and the claim that the UGTT played decisive role in spreading and maintaining the protests conflates between the role of the UGTT branches which are dominated in many cities and towns by the AYMs activists and between the role of UGTT Executive Committee which refrained from taking the side of the protestors during the entire protest cycle.

The claim that social media solved the resource problem goes like this: the protests in Sidi Bouzid were spontaneous; however, they spread because of the activists’ intensive use of social media which connected the activists together and served as an organization tool to the protests. In fact, almost all scholars who have written about the Tunisian protest cycle considered the social media the value-added that substituted for the weak opposition organizations. Chomiak (2014) interviewed several bloggers and her study on the Tunisian uprising gives evidence to how the social media prior to the uprising facilitated the creation of network of activists who debated the political situation in Tunisia and became committed to changing it especially in urban Tunisians where the middle class is concentrated. She also argues that social media provides the activists with a means to escape repression due to the possibility of using

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560 Lotan et al., “The revolutions were tweeted”; Howard et al., “Opening closed regimes”; Ghannam, “Social Media in the Arab World”; Honwana, “Youth and the Tunisian Revolution.”
anonymous names. Additionally, Howard and Hussain (2011) find that “Tunisians experienced what the sociologist Doug McAdam calls “cognitive liberation” through the work of bloggers and youtubes, and text messages which motivated them to participate and spread the uprising. These studies are short of empirical data that attribute the spread of the protests to the use of social media. As Angrist (2013) notes, social media are insufficient to explain the persistence and the wide spread of the uprising for that it “cannot create actors’ basic political preferences and instincts.” Moreover, in their longitudinal research, Wolfsfeld et al., (2013) claim that the increase in the use of social media followed the protest activities and did not precede them. Finally, I looked into the Facebook pages of fifty activists focusing on their posts during the time period between December 17, 2010 and January 14, 2011. I found few posts related to events that had happened in some cities and towns but I did not find any post related to organizing a protest event or even a call to join the ongoing protests.

There is no doubt that social media played a role in the uprising; yet without specifying the mechanisms by which online activism turned into street protests and especially in the poorest areas where the Tunisians lack access to internet, it is hard to justify these claims. The findings of this thesis support the claim of disseminating the information about the events of the uprising which in turn created motivations for participating especially in the urban regions. However, the thesis found very weak evidence that back an organizational role of social media in the uprising events.

561 Chomiak, “Architecture of Resistance in Tunisia.”
562 Howard and Muzammil, “The role of digital media.”
563 Wolfsfeld, Segev, and Sheafer, “Social Media and the Arab Spring.”
The second claim attributes sustaining and spreading the uprising to the decisive role of the UGTT. Citing El-Ghobashy, Angrist (2013) argues that the “[T]he stability of regimes, particularly authoritarian regimes, is threatened when multiple sections of society protest simultaneously across large swaths of territory.” To explain how this happened in Tunisia, he provides three reasons: that the secular political opposition came to see Ben Ali as a threat to its interests, the secular-Islamist rapprochement, and the decisive role of UGTT. His argument is important because of its focus on the role of the UGTT as an organizer for the protests. Angrist, however, mixes between the role of the UGTT at the regional level and the role of the UGTT Executive Committee. The leaders of the UGTT at the regional level are composed mainly of activists from AYMs especially in the basic education association, medical professional syndicate, and railway worker union. The activists used the regional branches as the beginning point of their marches in solidarity with the protests in Sidi Bouzid. However, these marches were peaceful and they were not organized on daily basis. In fact, as I will show below, they cannot explain the intensity of the protests and the collapse of the POB. Furthermore, in some regions including Sidi Bouzid, the leaders of the UGTT branch were from the RCD party and they did not engage in organizing any activity against the regime. In its turn, the UGTT Executive Committee did not back the activists during the entire CoP and at some point it exerted pressure on the activists to stop their protests. For example, on December 19, 2010, the regime sent a delegation to Sidi Bouzid which included among others, Mohammed Sa’ad, a member in the UGTT’s Executive Committee who is originally from Sidi Bouzid to convince the

564 Angrist, “Understanding the Success.”
565 Elamine, “interview”; Oueiniah, “interview.”
activists to end the protests. Furthermore, when the UGTT chose to take a position from the protests, in the last two days, it left the decision to the regional branches and kept distant from them.

In short, the arguments that the social media and the UGTT solved the resource problem to sustain the protests are not supported by empirical evidence, and the findings of this thesis do not back them. Having explained how the activists of AYMs solved the resource problem, I now illustrate how the engagement of the poor Tunisians created the conditions for the AYMs domination.

**Poor Tunisians and Domination of AYMs**

In this section, I argue that the protests were sustained and succeeded in ousting Ben Ali’s authority due to the participation of the poor Tunisians. The participation of poor Tunisians consolidated the domination of AYMs in two ways. First, they adopted the demand of ousting Ben Ali, and second their participation resulted in the emergence of Spontaneous Riot Movements (SRM) which exhausted the POB and led eventually to its collapse. To illustrate these arguments, I first demonstrate that poor Tunisians carried the burden of the protests. Then, I show how the poor sustained the protests. Next, I explain the role of the SRM in defeating the POB which led the regime to deploy the army who refused to repress the protestors. Finally, I falsify the claim that the POB did not collapse.

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566 Bishara, *The glorious*, 216.

567 According to Cheifi, a member in the UGTT Executive Committee, this approach to the protests intended to protect the UGTT from the regime. Samir Cheifi, interview with the author, Tunis, May 23, 2014.
Poor Tunisians as Main Carrier of Protests

An investigation into social class of the victims of the protests’ cycle shows that poor people carried the greatest burden. According to the Bouderbala Fact Finding Commission (May, 2012), which was established by the Tunisian interim government to investigate the events of the revolution and its aftermath, there were 125 victims of state violence from the beginning of the protests up to and including the day of January 14th. Day labourers, unemployed, and blue collar workers comprise 95 victims, or 76% of the total number of the victims. In fact, except for the six victims of the violence who can be considered middle class (two teachers, one university professor, one journalists, one state employee, and a shop owner), everyone else killed by state security forces might fall into the category of the poor; these are fifteen school students, one university student, two technicians, four taxi drivers, and two hair dressers.\(^{568}\) Additionally, a look into the places where the victims were killed shows that a significant number of them died while protesting in the poorer neighbourhoods of Tunisia. Table III-3 shows the distribution of 43 victims in the governorate of Great Tunis (Ariana, Ben Arous, Tunis, and Manouba governorates) according to their work and the location of their death. Except for two victims (an unemployed person and a student who sat themselves on fire in Arian on January 2 and 5, 2011 respectively), all victims were killed between January 12 and 14, 2011.

Table III-4: Distribution of victims in Greater Tunis according to their work and place of death

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\(^{568}\) Bouderbala report.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name of governorate - Poor quarter</th>
<th>N. of victims</th>
<th>Daily workers</th>
<th>School students</th>
<th>Unemployed</th>
<th>Blue collars</th>
<th>Others</th>
<th>N. of victims in poor areas</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ariana - Tadamon</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ben Arous - Al Muhamadia</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tunis - Sejomi - Alkaram</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>6</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manouba - Duwar Hechir</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>10*</td>
<td>1**</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Three among them are taxi drivers and the rest are factory workers; ** A journalist; For the victims of Ariana, Ben Arous, Tunis, and Manouba see Bouderbala report pages 656-6, 666-7, 673-8, and 691 respectively.

The table shows that 65% of the victims are of working or poor class backgrounds, even if we only include within that category day labourers and the unemployed. The percentage increases to 88% if we include the blue collar workers’ victims. The Bouderbala report does not provide information on where these victims lived; rather it informs us about the place of where they were shot. Although there is no reason to assume that those who were killed lived outside
the poverty belt of Tunis, the percentage of the victims shot within it constitutes 44% of all of those killed. This representative sample should be combined with the fact that most of the victims killed in the interior regions lived in the poorest neighbourhoods of those areas (see below). Having established that the poor Tunisians carried the burden of the protests, I explain how they sustained the protests and led to their success in ousting the regime.

**Poor Tunisians as Sustainer of Protests**

The poor Tunisians played two important roles in the protests that led to their success. First, through their self-initiatives, they sustained and expand the protests, especially in the first stage. And second, they intensified the protests and led to the POB’s disintegration. This was a result of a surge of SRM that attacked the premises of the regime such as the POB’s stations, the governorate buildings, and the RDC offices.

**Sustaining and expanding protests**

Sustaining the protests was based on the poor Tunisians self initiatives. According to Khalid Alouaini, the protests were almost over in Sidi Bouzid on December 22. The POB, he said, “surrounded us before the UGTT regional office and we felt that we had done all that we could.” Suddenly, however, Hussain Naji, an unemployed young man from Rfala quarter, climbed an electrical pile and came into contact with a high voltage electrical line. He fell immediately on the ground and died. This event galvanized the poor of Rfala quarter to join the protests, reigniting them.569 The same happened in Kasserine. According to Sebri Rahmouni, a public servant employee and an activist, until January 6, 2011 the police did not repress peaceful protests in Kasserine, but when a young man from Alzohour quarter set himself on fire, the

“night confrontation” began in both Alzohour and Alnoor neighbourhoods, the poorest areas in the city. He recalls, “I found myself behind those young men who knew how to confront the police and deal with its repression techniques.” Of the twenty persons killed between January 8 and 10, fourteen of them from the two poor quarters\(^570\), they (the poor people) managed to burn the police stations, and to drive the police out of the city. In fact he says “many of the police cars left behind” which they used to organize a “convoy that went to support the people in Thala.”\(^571\) Similarly Amer Fattah and Mus’ab Jawahri, two unemployed from Qafsa governorate, Ayoub Alhamidi, a school student and Muntaser Alayadi, unemployed from Ariana governorate put themselves on fire between January 2, and 5, 2011.\(^572\) Not only did these acts sustained and expanded the protests but they also created a sense of solidarity among the poor in their ongoing defiance of the state which led to the rise of SRM that exhausted and defeated the POB.

**SRM and defeat of POB**

The engagement of poor Tunisians was accompanied with their formation of SRM. Though only these movements appeared for a short period of time, they proved decisive for the protests’ success as they exhaust the police forces and consequently led to their collapse. In the following paragraphs I provide evidences to support this argument from the activists’ narrative and from official documents.

In almost all the interior regions, but mainly in Sidi Bouzaid, Kasserine, and Gafsa, the SRM attacked the state’s symbols of sovereignty, such as police stations, Constitutional

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\(^570\) According to Bouderbala Report the police killed twenty in Kasserine, 14 of them from the quarters of Alnoor and Alzohoor, and the remaining six from Thala.

\(^571\) Rahmouni, “interview.”

\(^572\) “Bouderbala Report”
Democratic Rally (RCD) offices, and governorate buildings, with Molotov cocktails, and many of them were burned completely. The same happened in Sfax when its regional UGTT declared a strike on January 12, 2011. According to Chahine, the UGTT wanted to solely organize a solidarity speech and a march to express their support with the people in Sidi Bouzid and Kasserine, but the participation of the poor residents of Hafarah and Wadi Al Ramal quarters (the poverty belt around Sfax) turned the strike into a confrontation with the POB in which the protestors burned the RCD main building completely, along with police stations, and commercial stores for the Trabelsi family.\(^\text{573}\) The same occurred in Tunis between January 12 and 14 in Tadamon, Sijoumi, Kabareih, Rahrouni, Halq Alwad, Al-Muhamadiah, and Karm, or what is called ‘the black belt’.\(^\text{574}\) Issam, an activist who lives in Tadamon, reported that on January 12 the people in this area “burned eight banks, considering them a symbol of the state’s exploitation of them.”\(^\text{575}\) In Al Muhamadiah, the activists of POCT tried to lead the massed protestors to Bourguiba Street, but when the march reached Foushana, the POB confronted them with live bullets killing four of them. Provoked by the killings, the poor burned the police station and the RCD offices.\(^\text{576}\) These people did not target the police satiations and the RCD offices out of feelings of grievance over their poverty rather out of hatred for the POB conscripts, who had humiliated and abused them. Additionally, they considered the RCD offices to be *Marakiz Qawada* (pimps’ centers) that ran informants for the POB.\(^\text{577}\)

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\(^{573}\) Chahine Sefi, Sfax, interview with author, May 10, 2012.

\(^{574}\) According to Alerfawi, there are more than 750 thousand immigrants living in the black belt around Tunis. See Alerfawi, “A new program that gives hope to the Tunisian poor quarters.”

\(^{575}\) Issam Sebri, interview with author, Tunis, April 13, 2012.

\(^{576}\) Gassan Shili, interview with author, Tunis, June 7, 2013.

\(^{577}\) Interviews with Ahmed Mouli, Abdulnasser Glassi, Zuheir, and Rachid Kahlani, Tunis, between 5 and 10 June, 2013.
What is important to note, however, is that the participation of the poor Tunisians especially in the coastal regions happened at time the slogan for Ben Ali’s departure was paramount. In this sense, the engagement of the poor Tunisians fostered the domination of the AYMs on the protests. This should not be interpreted as if the SRM were controlled by the organised AYMs’ activists; they were not. According to Ahmed Mouli, a POCT political bureau member, the only time the leadership of his party asked its youth activists to attack what might be considered a sovereign symbol of the state was on January 14 when it asked some of the party’s activists “to dismantle the banner of the RCD main office in Tunis to confirm the demand of ousting the regime.”

Kahlani, an activist from Ennahda who was in Al-Intilaka, Tadamon quarter on January 13, witnessed the poor invade an office of one ministry: “they destroyed the office and brought down the Tunisian flag from the top of the building and burned it.” When I asked why he did not try to stop them, he replied, “[if] I tried to do that, they would have considered me an informer for the ruling party and probably would have hit me.” Some activists said that they did not participate in violent activities against the state’s institutions as they were not sure the regime would collapse, and thus they feared that attacking the state’s institutions might backfire.

Some activists in the NYMs believe that the POB did not collapse in the face of sustained rioting but rather that the regime asked POB’s conscripts to disappear, in order to create a state of chaos and insecurity that might lead the Tunisians to ask the regime to restore order. One of the activists argued that on January 14, the POB dispersed the demonstration in Bourguiba.

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579 Rachid Kahlani, interview with author, Tunis, June 8, 2013.
580 Shili, “interview”; Sebri, “interview”; Kahlani, “interview.”
Street. They also argue that the regime deliberately opened its prisons to permit thousands of criminals to flee in order spread chaos. A consideration of the available evidence, however, does not support these claims. First, the state of insecurity started after the departure of Ben Ali, and in particularly during the period from January 15th to 17. According to Bouderbala report, the army was deployed in Tunis on January 14 at 3:00 PM when the POB failed to restore order. If the intention of Ben Ali had been to create a state of insecurity, he would not have deployed the army to assume the police’s task of preserving order. In fact, the army showed its unwillingness to confront the protestors when it was first deployed in the interior regions on January 10, which was a clear message to the regime that it could not rely on the army’s support. Second, according to Bouderbala’s report, what led to the state of anarchy in Tunisia was the disappearance of the police, who were “under attack and [their] stations were looted and burned.” The report says that police “felt threatened of their lives and families” to the extent that it “prevented them from even showing up at their working locations” (372-3). The report affirms that in many towns and cities it was difficult to convince police to return back to their work even after Ben Ali’s departure. For example, on January 15, the central operation of the Monastir called 220 police personnel in Al-Wardanin city to return to work, “threatening that if they did not show up at the police center, they would be considered traitors to the homeland”, but despite the gravity of the threat only 30 conscripts showed up (345-6). Third, following Ben Ali’s departure, the people formed popular committees to protect their neighbourhoods in almost all cities, which indicates that the police were unable to provide security. Even in the cities where

\[\text{581} \text{ Nizar Ben Saleh, interview with author, Tunis, April 11, 2012. See also “Bouderbala Report”, 12-21.}\]

\[\text{582} \text{ Ben Saleh, “interview”; Youssef Tlili, interview with author, Tunis, April 15, 2012.}\]

\[\text{583} \text{ “Bouderbala Report”, 12-21}\]

\[\text{584} \text{ According to the activists in Thala, they coordinated with army since its deployment to manage the affairs of the people in the absence of working governmental bodies.}\]
the people did not form protection committees, the army, according to Bouderbala report, asked them to do so (346). Finally, on the matter of escaped criminals, Bouderbala’s report found two types of evidence. The first supports the claim that the regime purposely did not issue clear orders to prison warders on what to do when if prisoners rebelled, which implies that the regime wanted the prisoners to escape, particularly given that some of the administrations of the prisons were known for corruption and loyalty to Ben Ali and his family (466). The second type supports a different view: that as many prisons are located in the centers of cities, the prisoners were not isolated from the events that were taking place close to them and were thus inspired to exploit the events in order to flee by destroying and burning their prisons (468). Whatever the truth is, the fact remains that the police lost control of the country due to the breadth and intensity of the protests, which were, as I have demonstrated, a result of the activities of the SRM.

To summarize this section, poor Tunisians carried the burden of the protests as evident by their high percentage among the casualties. Their self-initiatives in the protest movement activities sustained and strengthened the protests, and their engagement in violent confrontation with the POB led to the collapse of the latter. Furthermore, poor Tunisian requested the departure of Ben Ali which consolidated domination the protests.

Conclusion

The evidence shows that the AYMs sought from the beginning to undermine the regime’s initiatives to end the protests. They sought to expand and intensify the protests, and when the regime engaged in repression against those protesting, the AYMs called for its departure. In contrast, the NYMs tried to use the protests to rewrite the rules that govern relations between the opposition and the regime without challenging the fundamental legitimacy of the latter. Both the
PDP and Ettajdid movements advocated for reforming the regime from within and accepted its legitimacy until the next election in 2014. Even when the protests turned into a revolution, between January 12 and 14, the position of NYMs remained unchanged.

The domination of the AYMs at the CoP’s apex was a necessary condition for turning it into a revolution. This was achieved by means of mobilizing poor Tunisians through frame resonance and by locating the protests in poor Tunisians neighbourhoods. The activism of the poor sustained the protests, ensured the domination of AYMs, and led to the collapse of police forces. As a result of this collapse, the regime was forced to deploy the army, which had to choose between confronting the protestors and abandoning the regime. For whatever reasons, the army made the second choice.

The domination of the AYMs of the CoP’s apex was a necessary condition to secure the collapse of the regime, but it was not sufficient for the process of democratization to be started. In the next two chapters, I elaborate on the two remaining conditions: An inclusive master frame and a decentralized leadership during the CoP’s apex.
Chapter IV

Tunisia: Protest Cycle Injustice Master Frame

In this chapter, I show how in Tunisia the activists maintained an inclusive master frame throughout the CoP and especially at its apex. I begin by reconstructing and graphing the Tunisian master frame (MF) based on the participant movements’ documents, the activists’ narratives, and the CoP’s slogans. Then, I show that the MF was inclusive during the CoP because it maintained political pluralism, represented the interests of the majority of the social groups that constitute Tunisian society, and because it transcended the identity divisions between the interior and coastal regions. Next, I explain why the activists in Tunisia were able to deploy an inclusive identity, and as a consequence, an inclusive MF, despite the identity division between the interior and coastal regions. After that, I discuss how the MF remained inclusive at the CoP’s apex when its prognostic task changed from reform to ousting the regime. I will argue that the MF remained inclusive because the activists of the AYMs focused on ousting the regime without elaborating on the type of government that should replace it. This is in part because avoiding this type of discussion, though it was not intentional, prevented an ideological rift from forming in the camp of the AYMs and maintained the MF’s inclusivity. In section five, I test the hypothesis of MF inclusivity through the case of the Tunisian uprising in Redeyef in 2008. If the MF of the uprising in Redeyef was inclusive, then the hypothesis of inclusivity bears little explanatory power for that the uprising failed. Finally, I conclude by summarising the chapter’s main arguments.
Work, Freedom, National dignity

This section aims to describe and reconstruct the MF through an examination of the AYMs’ and NYMs’ documents and the activists’ narratives and chanted slogans. As explained earlier, this strategy is congruent with Johnston’s methodology on how to reconstruct a MF. In fact, because I use three sources, the precision of the description of the MF is higher than if I were to use only one source. I will call the Tunisian CoP’s MF “work, freedom, national dignity” because this cry was repeated in almost every demonstration during the entire CoP and it aptly summarizes the demands of the protestors. I should note at this stage that reconstructing the MF may give the impression that the activists implemented a pre-planned scheme; this was not the case. However, the guiding logic for the activists was to spread the protests as much as they can.

The Tunisian CoP was unplanned; it began when Mohamed Albouazizi sat himself on fire. Beginning in Sidi Bouzid, the protests moved from one governorate to another first in the interior regions and eventually reached the coastal governorates, starting with Sfax on January 12, 2011 when the reformist demands of the protestors transformed into a call for toppling the regime. The unplanned start of the protests and their relatively slow expansion had important consequences for the MF. To begin with, there was no agreed-upon statement issued by the participant youth movements that could sum up the MF as was the case in Egypt (see Egypt, chapter VII). Additionally, because the protests first began in the interior regions, it is logical to assume a strong possibility that activists would define their grievances and the solutions to them from their regional perspectives, which may lead to an exclusive MF. This, however, was not the case; the activists of the AYMs were aware of this potential problem from their previous

585 According to Hank, one could use the main documents of the participant movements, the narratives of the activists, or the narrative of one principal activist to reconstruct the MF. See Hank. “Comparative frame analysis.”
experience in the Redeyef uprising in 2008 where they failed to expand the protests due to excessive focus on regional demands.\textsuperscript{586} Furthermore, the documents of the participant movements in the protests reveal that the MF developed through a collective project in which each individual movement added new issues to the MF, and by doing so, created their own bridging frames linking up to the CoP’s MF. For these reasons, I use the participant movements’ documents, the activists’ narratives, and the protests’ slogans to reconstruct and analyse the MF.

In the first three days of the protests, the PDP, Ennahda, the Tunisian General Labour Union (UGTT) in Sidi Bouzid, and the POCT all issued independent statements in which they attributed the cause of the protests to variety of reasons related to poverty, corruption, and repression. The PDP statements referred the protests to government economic decisions that widened the scope of unemployment especially among graduates;\textsuperscript{587} political repression carried out security apparatus and the detention of activists, perceptions by the country’s youth of injustice and inequality, corruption, influence peddling, and unemployment.\textsuperscript{588} The PDP maintained that all Tunisian regions suffer from these problems and that they are especially acute in the poverty belts around large cities including Tunis.\textsuperscript{589} Ennahda’s statement talked about the scope of unemployment, the uneven development between governorates, and the corruption of influential families and their partners in the RCD.\textsuperscript{590} The regional branch of the UGTT in Sidi Bouzid blamed the protests on injustice and inequality, increased unemployment especially among graduates, the lack of manufacturing plants in the governorate, the use of force to quell

\textsuperscript{586} Elamine, “interview.”
\textsuperscript{587} Jribi, “A statement.”
\textsuperscript{588} Jribi, “A second statement.”
\textsuperscript{589} Ibid
\textsuperscript{590} Ghannouchi, “Sidi Bouzid: Signs.”
protests, and the high price of commodities. The POCT considered the protests a result of police aggression, unemployment, and uneven development. Similarly, Ettajdid’s statement talked about unemployment and uneven development as reasons for protests. At a later stage, Maya Jribi, the PDP secretary general, told a press conference that “focusing on developing the coastal areas divided the country into two parts, where the interior regions suffer the highest rate of internal immigration, unemployment, illiteracy, school interruption, a lower level of development, and the worst health services.”

That the MF developed mainly around unemployment, especially among university graduates, and also cited corruption, uneven development and economic marginalization, perceived inequality, state repression, and the marginalization of interior regions as other causes of the protests cannot explain why the protests took almost twenty-six days before they reached the coastal regions. To understand this chronology, one should look at the interior region’s activists’ writings and narratives. On December 20, 2010, Elamine Albouazizi posted on his Facebook an article that describes this regional dimension well. Entitled, “For these reasons Sidi Bouzid rebelled”, it begins by linking the sympathy felt by the people in Sidi Bouzid with Mohamed Albouazizi to their sympathy for themselves as victims of marginalization. By staging an uprising, Elamine explains, the people were empathizing with “their own feeling of being disdained and marginalized by the state.”

591 AlHani, “The Revolution in Tunisia 17 December,” 91. See also the UGTT executive committee statement on December 21, 2010, ibid., 96.
592 Hammami, “Let us Struggle.”
593 Ibrahim, “Ettajdid statement.”
594 Jribi, “Press conference.”
Elamine provides five direct claims about the cause of these feelings. First, the municipality in Sidi Bouzid has double-standards when it comes to peddlers. Its rules apply only to those who do not have *wasta* (connections with the authority). Second, the state provides poor administrative and health services to people in the interior, and the people cannot obtain those services without paying bribes. The only hospital in Sidi Bouzid, Elamine says, is under-equipped, mismanaged, and turned into “ogre that kills people and especially women during their delivery.” Third, the regional representatives who are supposed to address Sidi Bouzid’s problems are only busy with pursuing their own narrow interests, and spend most of their time fighting with and launching accusations at their opposition. Fourth, unemployment in Sidi Bouzid increased as a result of the Minister of Tourism’s refusal to establish a tourism company for the region and he is unwilling to allocate lands for this purpose. Furthermore, the state did not build factories in Sidi Bouzid that are related to the region’s essential products, and that investors “exploit the resources of the region but they do not use the capital surplus for further investment.” Finally, the government abandoned the region’s once-thriving agricultural sector, which was in the eighties and nineties the main provider of milk, red meat, fruits, and vegetables for Tunisians. Elamine attributes the anger of Sidi Bouzid’s peasants to several factors, among them:

- Owners of the tomato manufacturing plants do not pay the farmers often for two years and sometimes they pay them in goods instead of in cash, which increases the farmer’s debts to banks;

- Owners of dairies typically refuse to pay farmers for their milk, justifying their behaviour by claiming that they receive the milk rotten;
• Owners of chicken farms are not allowed to sell their chickens live, and are forced to sell them cheaply to owners of slaughterhouses;

• State subsidies of animal fodder and gas do not go to farmers as the officials of local authorities appropriate the funds.595

These problems, however, are not limited to Sidi Bouzid. Sebri, an activist from Kasserine, gave two reasons for the protests in other regions: solidarity with people in Sidi Bouzid and being subjected to same living conditions. So while solidarity with Sidi Bouzid was one reason for the protests in Kasserine, of equal importance was, according to Sebri, was that “we also part of the same belt of poverty that extends from Gafsa in the south-west to Jendouba in the north-west” he said.596 Bulqasem, another activist I interviewed, echoed Sebri, explaining that Kasserine was similar to Sidi Bouzid in that there were no factories in the two governorates.597 Hamza from Thala, reiterated the same ideas: “the only working places for us are the quarries and lime plant [yet] how many people they can employ?” In addition, he said, these quarries export stones as raw material to Italy instead of remaking them in Thala to create more jobs for the people. In fact, he claimed, “we even had to fight the government in 1981 to keep the lime plant in Thala when it decided to move it to Sfax.”598

For the activists of the interior regions, the state’s discrimination in development was not an accident, but was purposefully planned to keep certain regions marginalized due to their


596 Rahmouni, “interview”;

597 Bulqassem Ghadbani, interview with author, Kasserine, May 9, 2012. The only factory that exists in Kasserine is the factory for cellulose which is used to produce papers.

598 Hamza, interview with author, Thala, May 9, 2012.
historical support for Bourguiba’s opponents and that this scheme continued during the Ben Ali era.\textsuperscript{599} Just like in Jordan (see chapter X), in Tunisia the activists believed that the state’s major resources, such as phosphate, agricultural land, cement, marble, iron, copper, and even the most important monuments dwelt in the interior regions, but that inhabitants of those are historically denied their wealth for political reasons, leading to a bitter mixture of pride and betrayal. Their pride is related to the role of these regions in armed resistance against the French during colonial times, while the feeling of betrayal comes from the fact they did not benefit from the independence the same way as did the coastal regions. Elamine captured this feeling using the concept of “wounded memory” to describe mass participation in the protests in these regions.\textsuperscript{600} This unhealed wound in the collective memory of the people in the interior regions, he claimed, is what motivated them to rebel against the regime. I will explain later in this chapter why these popular sentiments did not produce an exclusive MF.

The MF evolved in the first few days but after that it remained relatively fixed until January 12, 2011 when the CoP changed from demanding social justice into seeking to oust the regime. I asked seventy-six activists to elaborate on the causes of the uprising. All of them mentioned at least three reasons and some of them focused more on one category of reason than the other two. But in general, their answers (see Table IV-1) fall within the same three categories that were introduced earlier by the participant movements’ statements: poverty, corruption, and repression. I should note that these categories are not mutually exclusive. There is certainly a correlation between poverty and corruption\textsuperscript{601}, and one could argue that repression is a category

\textsuperscript{599} Salah Hammami, interview with author, Sfax, May 10, 2012; Elamine, “interview”; Rahmouni, “interview.”

\textsuperscript{600} Elamine referred this analysis to the Tunisian historian, Ra’ouf Hamaza.

\textsuperscript{601} Gupta, Davoodi, and Alonso-Terme, “Does corruption affect income inequality.”
of state corruption as it violates the authoritarian regime’s own written laws. However, because the acts that are related to these categories are distinct, they can be sorted into independent groupings.

Table IV-1: Reasons for the uprising as described by seventy-six activists

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>№</th>
<th>The main theme</th>
<th>How it is stated by the activists</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Poverty</td>
<td>1. Unemployment in general.</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
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<td>2. Unemployment of graduates.</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>3. Marginalization of interior regions.</td>
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<td>4. The miserable situation in popular quarters.</td>
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<td>5. The economic crisis and the high prices.</td>
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<td></td>
<td>7. The concentration of wealth in the hands of few.</td>
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<td>8. Corruption at universities.</td>
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<td></td>
<td>9. The Corruption of RCD whose members had the priority of employment.</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>10. The greedy attitude of the Trabulsi family who used the state for rapid enrichment.</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>11. Bribery and nepotism</td>
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<td>12. Everyone who gets a licence to open a business, the Trabulsi family force a partnership.</td>
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<td>13. The country’s wealth was directed to small villages (Monastir and Sousse) in order to make them into big cities.</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>14. The most important thing was to develop the coastal regions because the leaders of RCD from there.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Repression</td>
<td>15. The repression of the police and security apparatus.</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>16. The killing and detention of people during the uprising.</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>17. The security role of the RCD members.</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>19. Lack of freedom</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>20. Solidarity with our families in the interior regions who were subjected to a massive security campaign to silence them by force.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>21. The regime made the people to feel as if they were a commodity that can be sold and bought.</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

* All the seventy-six activists mentioned at least three reasons for the protests.
Additionally, the slogans chanted during the CoP confirm that the Tunisians’ grievances stem from poverty, corruption, and repression. 129 slogans appeared in the period from December 17, 2010 up and including January 11, 2011. After removing slogans which are related to calls for national unity, calls for ousting Ben Ali, and region-specific incitements, I coded the remaining 108 slogans according to their meaning (see Table IV-2). I found 48 slogans speaking about poverty, 49 about repression, and 11 addressing the state’s and Ben Ali’s family’s corruption. The relatively low number of slogans that address corruption is related to coding rather than to the significance of corruption in driving the protests. For example, I considered the slogan ‘Work is entitlement… O gang of muggers’ as a poverty type because of its focus on unemployment in its first segment, but the second segment of the slogan directly accuses the regime and its corruption for Tunsians’ poverty. This slogan was repeated in every demonstration. I should also note that many of these slogans are repeated in all demonstrations.

### Table IV-2: Distribution of slogans between December 17, 2010 and January 11, 2011

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of slogan</th>
<th>Examples</th>
<th>Nº of slogans</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Corruption</td>
<td>Where is the budget gone…the Trabelsi family ran away with it.</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Hey workers wake up …wake up… where are the money of fund 26-26.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>No, no to Trabelsi (family) …who looted the budget</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poverty</td>
<td>The lands are sold and the people are starving</td>
<td>48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Work is entitlement…O gang of muggers</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Shame on you regime…the prices became so high</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Repression</td>
<td>No, no to tyranny…hey government of corruption</td>
<td>49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>O citizen…watch what they are doing…repression is so visible</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>We will continue until the detainees are released</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Having described the Tunisian Injustice MF, I now present it graphically and discuss its inclusivity.
Figure IV-1: Tunisia CoP’s Injustice MF

- **Work, Freedom, National Dignity**
  - **Corruption**
    - Nepotism, Bribery, Influence Peddling
    - RCD members are prioritized in employment
    - The President’s family (Trabelsi) abuses the state
    - Impose partnership on businessmen
    - Wealth in the hands of few
    - Prices skyrocketing
    - Deterioration of social services
    - Representatives focus only on their interests
    - Higher rates of poverty, illiteracy, unemployment, worst poor services... in interior regions
  - **Poverty**
    - Wealth directed to where RCD leaders live
    - Uneven Development
    - Divide the country and interior regions marginalized
    - No manufacturing plants
    - Government abandoned the Agriculture sector
    - Peasants are in debt to banks
    - Owners of milk complexes and chicken slaughters are exploiting farmers
    - Subsidies are selectively distributed by RCD
    - Government took the farmers’ lands
    - Investors do not use surplus for more investments
  - **Repression**
    - Suppression of freedom
    - Police tortures and kills people
    - Detention of political opposition
    - Deputies fabricate accusations to their opponents
    - RCD members spy on people
    - People are forced to do things that they do not do in normal conditions
    - People are forced to show loyalty to RCD in order to work
    - The regime made people feel as if they were a commodity that can be sold and bought

Living conditions unbearable → feeling of injustice, inequity, and self-disdain → youth burn themselves
Inclusive MF

In this section, I first show that the MF is ideologically pluralistic in terms of its content and abstraction. I then explain how the MF represents the majority of Tunisian social groups. And finally, I use the activists’ slogans to show that the MF transcends the regional identity division between the interior and the coast. Finally, I show how the activists of the AYMs overcame the excessive focus on uneven development that initially defined the Tunisian MF, which had threatened to keep the protests contained within the interior regions.

The graphic presentation of the MF revolves around the themes of corruption, poverty, and repression, none of which implies bias toward a specific ideology. Some might argue that the focus on the concentration of wealth in the hands of few reflects a leftist slant. This is a reasonable argument, but in the Tunisian context, the accumulation of wealth by a specific group is presented in terms of abusing the state’s institutions rather than exploiting the working class as per the Marxist point of view. The same can be said about the reasons of uneven development; the reasons are not introduced in terms of a center that exploits the peripheries, but rather as a regime that gave preference in its economic choices to the regions of RCD leaders (at least per the narrative of the activists). In the Tunisian context, these regions are the governorates of Monastir and Sousse. The level of abstraction of the MF – that is to say, the way the problems are connected to each other and the language used to address them – do show a leftist bias. For example, only leftist groups advocate for a greater role of the state in the economy. This, however, appears only in reference to the theme of poverty; taken all together, the MF’s level of abstraction is ideologically pluralistic.

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603 Esping-Andersen, “The three worlds of welfare capitalism.”
The multiple subthemes of the MF show how a wide range of social groups are affected by injustice. There is, however, a special focus on the poverty of the interior regions and less attention paid to issues that would attract the people in coastal regions to the protests. Nevertheless, themes like corruption and repression concern the entire population, except those who are part of the regime. Addressing the role of the Trabelsi family in the MF appeals to the many business-owners who have witnessed their abuse of the state to force them to share their companies with the family’s members. In this sense, the MF not only addresses the interests of the poor and middle class but also of the upper middle class. Additionally, the fact that each activist movement built a part of the MF explains how the various movements incorporated their own bridging frames within it. The MF developed through the contribution of the individual movement’s statements, and by building it in this way they ensured their own frames aligned with the MF.

Finally, I have argued the MF is inclusive if parts of it are drawn from common culture or the collective memories of the people in order to transcend identity cleavages in society. The graphic presentation of the MF does not capture this dimension. To shed light on it, I asked 76 activists to identify slogans during the CoP that were chanted to praise national unity, slogans that might be perceived as divisive, and slogans that are drawn from the Tunisians’ collective memory. The national unity slogans can be of two types: patriotism that extols the homeland and the will of people to make sacrifices for it, and cross-identity slogans that admit a division of identity but celebrate diversity as a source of power.

604 Beau Graciet, “La régente de carthage.”
For the first question, each activist identified at least one of fourteen slogans that praise national unity (see Table IV-3). All the slogans, however, fall in the category of patriotism and none of them could be considered a cross-identity slogan. Considering that the protests remained in the interior regions for almost the entire period of the CoP and as such most of the chanted slogans appeared first in these areas, we might expect cross-identity slogans to spread the protests. This, however, was not the case. I will elaborate on this subject in section three of this chapter, but here I want to draw attention mainly to how the repertoire of collective actions of the interior regions activists is related to their struggle against French colonialism, and especially the Thala Rebellion in 1906 and armed resistance against the French occupation in the 1950s, hence their focus on patriotism.

Table IV-3: Slogans that called for national unity

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>№</th>
<th>Patriotism Slogans</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>The Tunisian National Anthem (Protector of Homeland)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>O martyr do not care… liberty is sacrificed by blood</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>With soul and blood we redeem you martyr</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Loyal...loyal to the blood of martyrs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>O martyr does not be upset… liberty is sacrificed by blood</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Work…liberty…national dignity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>O martyr…o martyr.. on your path we will not deviate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Our martyrs are … our will is strong… we do not knee for … we do not fear detention.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>Either we live a good life…or we all die.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>Hey coward regime… the people of Tunisia will not be humiliated.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>The martyr left a well…there is no abandonment of the cause.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>Ben Ali hey coward… the Tunisian people will not be humiliated.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>O people rebel rebel…on the mafia and constitution party</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Hey vile Tajamoe’… the people said their word in your future.

* The table is based on slogans the activists offered during the interviews when asked to identify national unity slogans.

For the question of whether there were divisive slogans, the activists did not identify any and they maintained that all movements raised only the Tunisian’s flag, and not the flags of any particular parties or groups. The sample of the videos of the protests posted online that I reviewed, however, show several regional slogans of a sort that I identified in the preceding chapter of this dissertation as incitement slogans; they are calls for people in these specific towns and cities to join the protests. They also reveal a limited number of slogans that refer to parties’ own identities, such as “land, freedom, national dignity” (a slogan that is used only by the Nationalist Democratic, a Maoist radical group) or “bread, freedom, national dignity” (a slogan used mainly by POCT). However, these slogans must not have been offensive to any of the activists as no one mentioned them.

On the question about slogans drawn from common culture and collective memory, the activist identified six slogans, and each one of them mentioned at least one slogan. Table IV-4 shows these slogans and the historical events in which they first appeared.

Table IV-4: Slogans drawn from the Tunisian collective memory

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No</th>
<th>Slogan</th>
<th>Historical Event</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Work is entitlement …o gang of muggers</td>
<td>2006, during the demonstrations of unemployed graduates.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Down, down to the Constitution Party…down down to the Tunisians torturer</td>
<td>Student demonstrations since the 1990s</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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605 A’del Bu’laq, interview with author, Tunis, May 22, 2012. Bu’laq is the one that draws my attention to the historic roots of those two slogans. The Maoists believe that Tunis is still under occupation by capitalist countries; hence the priority ! liberating the land to gain a true independence. The Marxists believe that the national independence period is over and the workers are subjected to the exploitation of national bourgeoisies, hence the focus on bread in the slogan. Other activists such Elamine, Sghiri, and Tlili confirmed Bu’laq observation.
3  O Hashad…the oppression is so visible  1978, during the UGTT uprising to maintain its independence.
4  O Hashad …the treason is so visible  1978, during the UGTT uprising to maintain its independence.
5  Work, freedom, national dignity  2006, during the demonstration of the unemployed graduates and Redeyef uprising in 2008
6  Lands are sold and the people are starving  2010, during the peasant demonstrations in Regueb, Sidi Bouzid

* The table is based on slogans the activists offered during the interviews.

The answers given by the activists on the three questions confirm that part of the MF is rooted in Tunisians’ collective memory and in particularly in their memory of a common struggle against the regime. As such, the MF transcends the identity division between the coastal and interior regions. The MF, therefore, is inclusive, because it is ideologically pluralistic, represents the interests of all social groups except the regime’s allies, and it rises above the identity cleavages in the Tunisian society.

The last point in this section is related to whether MF’s inclusivity has drawn more people to the protests. Following Snow and Benford (1992), I argued the theoretical framework that the potency of a MF is a function of its inclusivity. As such the spread of the protests over a wide geographical area is an indicator of MF inclusivity. The protests that began in the city of Sidi Bouzid spread over eight days to all towns within the governorate. They then moved to all governorates in the interior regions and on January 12 they reached Sfax and Tunis, the economic and political capitals of Tunisia, respectively. There were protests in these governorates before January 12, but they were of symbolic importance and small in size. The only governorate that did not participate in the protests before the departure of Ben Ali on January 14 was Monastir, which is considered the home of the RCD leaders, and thus enjoyed

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606 For description of every day protests during the CoP see Bishara, “the Glorious.”
preferential treatment since Tunisia’s independence in terms of development – no wonder then why its residents did not join the protests.

However, as most of the time of the CoP took place in the interior regions, one may still have their doubts as to just how inclusive was really was the MF. Indeed, the MF as presented in Figure IV-1 shows greater focus on the uneven development and marginalization of the interior regions, which delayed the spread of the protests to coastal regions. However, just because the towns and cities of the Tunisian’s coast do not share the interior regions’ particular grievance of poverty, it does not mean the MF is not inclusive. It only informs us that an inclusive MF is a necessary condition but insufficient condition for expanded protests. In other words, the MF may not possess sufficient mobilization potential and “its appeal may be only superficial or skin-deep.” Yet the focus on marginalization and the bitter feeling of discrimination in the interior regions did not produce an exclusive MF; the activists of the interior regions were able to deploy an inclusive identity despite the feeling of the people in their regions, and that of their own, of being discriminated against since the independence. By contrast, and as I shall discuss in chapter X, in the case of Jordanvthe activists failed to show an inclusive identity, and as a consequence, they presented an exclusive MF that led among other reasons to the failure of their protests. In the following section, I explain the reasons for the Tunisian success.

**Deployment of Inclusive Identity**

In the previous chapter, I discussed the AYMs’ strategy for spreading protests through innovative tactics such as by locating the protests inside poor neighbourhoods. This strategy explains how the activists compensated for their MF’s weakness in terms of its mobilization.

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607 Snow and Benford, “Master frames,” 140
potential, but it does not inform us why the activists of the interior regions were able to develop an inclusive identity. In my theoretical framework, I explained that the literature on social movements points to three cases in which the participant movements in the protests build, as a matter of strategy, an inclusive identity: when they want to target a large audience, when there is consensus on a common issue, and when there are previous organizational linkages between the participant movements. In the Tunisian context, although all these three cases existed, the narratives of the activists give more weight to past collaboration between them through the existing trade unions, as well as to the previous linkages between their movements’ organizations.

The fact that the movements participating in the protests issued public statements about the events in Sidi Bouzid that held the regime responsible for the outbreak of demonstrations and made social and political demands for the benefit of all Tunisians inform us that they were trying to target a broad audience. In addition, these movements, as their statements inform us, believed that poverty, corruption, and repression were the main causes of the protests. The fact that the issues of uneven development and high unemployment were mentioned in every statement of the participant movements demonstrates a high level of consensus among them about the reasons for the protests. Yet, in terms of what might be considered a solution to Tunisian grievances, there had not been agreement among them. The PDP called for reforms to the political system including opening it to participation from the opposition.\footnote{Jribi, “Press conference.”} Ettajdid called for dialogue between the opposition and the regime to find a cooperative solution to the crisis.\footnote{Ibrahim, “Ettajdid statement.”} POCT demanded permanent social subsidies to the unemployed but maintained its position that the regime’s
policies of marginalization were a deliberate plot.\textsuperscript{610} \textit{Ennahda} called for dialogue between the opposition groups in order to discuss the social and political repercussions of the protests.\textsuperscript{611} These differences about what constituted a solution to the protests were, however, mitigated by the regime’s refusal to respond positively to the NYMs’ initiatives (the first time the regime accepts the NYMs initiatives was on January 13, one day before its fall). As a result, the disagreements between activists were not salient and did not hinder the spread of protests during the entire CoP. The regime’s unbending attitude and reliance on repression to end the protests generated unity among the activists who needed desperately to remain cohesive to maximize the chances of the protests’ success. Indeed, fear of the protests failing strengthened unity among the activists in the street because the consequences of failure were very grave.

But the desire of youth movements to appeal to wide audience and the consensus among them on the reasons of the protests were not, however, the main factors that encouraged the activists to develop an inclusive identity, and thereby an inclusive MF. The narratives of the activists and the available historical evidence points more to past relations between the activists, in national trade unions, mainly the Tunisian General Labour Union (UGTT), Tunisian General Student Union (UGET), and the Bar Association, and to the organizational linkages between their movements. These linkages, both on the individual and organizational levels, mitigated the identity cleavages among the activists and encouraged them to deploy an inclusive identity in the sense that the “us” versus “them” reflected the “Tunisians” versus the “regime” as opposed to the “interior regions” against the “coastal regions.”

\textsuperscript{610} Hammami, “The position of the Worker Party
\textsuperscript{611} Ghannouchi, “Sidi Bouzid.”
Relations between the activists of the interior and coastal regions were established long ago through the national trade unions of the UGTT, UGET, and the Bar Association. Through these organizations, activists carried out tens of social and political activities against the regime prior to the revolution. In fact, cross-identity cooperation between activists in these organizations has been ongoing since their inception. The UGTT, for example, was established in 1946, and it gained its legitimacy by defending workers’ social rights and participating in the resistance against the French occupation. 612 Tunisians consider Farhat Hashad, the UGTT’s founder, to be a national leader who devoted his life to defend workers’ rights. His assassination in France in 1952 made him a Tunisian icon, whose name many activists chanted in protests against the regime. 613 In the 1970s, the UGTT conducted thousands of strikes to improve the wages and the social benefits of workers. 614 In 1978 it declared a general strike to defend its independence from the government, which turned into huge demonstrations against Bourguiba’s regime. The army crushed the demonstrations using a considerable force, leading to the killings and woundings of hundreds and the imprisonment of three thousand activists. 615 Although Bourguiba’s and Ben Ali’s regimes managed most of the time to co-opt the Executive Committee of the UGTT, the activists of the opposition maintained a permanent presence in the UGTT and used it for their political activism against the regime. 616 The strong relations among the activists in the interior and coastal regions can be seen at play in the revolution when UGTT regional branches initiated

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613 One of the slogans the activists chanted in almost all protests: O Hashad..the oppression is so visible (Ya Hashad Shouf shouf...alqam’ bilmakshouf)
615 Ibid, 143
616 The rail road, health services, transportation, and school teachers associations were controlled most of the time by leftist and radical groups. Chahine Seif, “interview”; Yassine Nabli, interview with author, Tunis, June 7, 2013; Rahmoui.
solidarity movements with Sidi Bouzid. In almost every town the regional leadership of the UGTT was the first to call for marches or sit-ins in support of the protests in Sidi Bouzid. Even in the governorates where the regional leadership of UGTT were co-opted, there were always activists who were able to exert pressure on those leaders to show solidarity with Sidi Bouzid. For example, prior to the regional general strike in Sfax on January 12, 2011 the unions of railroad, transportation, and health services employees declared strikes in solidarity with Sidi Bouzid. The sit-ins in Sidi Bouzid were initiated by union activists who were not members of the UGTT regional leadership, which forced the latter to issue solidarity statements.

The same can be said about the UGET and the Bar Association. Since its foundation in the mid-1950s, the UGET was dominated by leftists and built a history of activism against the regime that cut across the identity division between the interior and coastal regions. During the revolution, the student activists of the UGET from both the interior and coastal regions organized solidarity movements with Sidi Bouzid in Almanar complex, Ben Sharaf institute, and 9 April university, and the colleges of art in Sousse and Sfax; all these universities are located in the coastal regions. The students’ protest actions included demonstrations, sit-ins, and marches. The Bar Association played a similar role to the UGTT and UGET. It initiated several solidarity marches and sit-ins with Sidi Bouzid in Tunis, Sousse and Sfax. To illustrate further, the strong bonds that existed between the activists of the interior and coastal regions can be captured

617 Chahine, “interview.”
618 Elamine, “interview.”

by the following example: Khalid Ouainiah, a lawyer and a main organizer of the activities in Sidi Bouzid, did not go to Tunis to explain the cause of the protests to the Bar Association board when they asked him to do so, but rather called his friend in Tunis, Abdunasser Alouainy, to address this subject on behalf of Sidi Bouzid’s lawyers. In the previous chapter, I discussed organizational linkages between the opposition groups. To recall that discussion, the formation of the Coalition of 18 October 2005, which comprised five opposition groups, facilitated coordination between the activists on the ground when the protests started and moderated the feeling of identity cleavages.

These linkages between activists, through the national trade unions and between opposition organizations, created a sense among the activists in the interior regions that they were not alone and their colleagues in the coastal regions share their same convictions in the need to resolve the problems of social marginalization of the interior regions. Additionally, these national unions fostered horizontal cleavages in the society, e.g., (workers against employers) and by doing so, they softened vertical identity divisions (the interior against coastal regions) in Tunisia. In sum, it is true that the participant movements in the protests sought to reach a wide audience and there was agreement among them on the causes of the protests (though there was not a consensus on a solution to them), but the best explanation of why the activists were able to develop an inclusive identity was the prior relations between them that existed as a result of their involvement in the national trade unions.

In the previous sections, I demonstrated that the MF was inclusive until the protests reached their apex on January 12, 2011. The disagreement among the participant movement on

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620 Ouainiah, “interview.”
what constitute a solution to the protests did not matter at the time because the regime did not accept any of them. What remained to be illustrated is how the MF remained inclusive during the CoP’s apex despite the ideological divisions between the AYMs themselves and their disagreement with those NYMs who accepted Ben Ali’s reform program in his third speech.

**MF Inclusivity During CoP’s Apex**

In my theoretical framework, I argued that the prognostic task of the MF changed at the CoP’s apex because the protestors’ demands turned from reforming the regime into ousting it. I also argued that in order for the MF to remain inclusive during this period, there existed two options: either the participant movements agree on the type of the regime that would replace the departing one, or they ignore this subject altogether and focus only on overthrowing the regime. The evidence from the Tunisian revolution shows that the participant movements did not confer about the type of the regime that would be installed after Ben Ali’s departure and for this reason the MF frame remained inclusive. To explain why this had was the case, I first use the narratives and chanted slogans of the activists to show the convergence of multiple demands into a single one – i.e., the call for ousting the regime, which first appeared in the interior regions after the killings in Kasserine, Thala, and Regueb. It became the only demand of the AYMs when this call was adopted by the people of Sfax and Tunis on January 12, 2011. I then use the activists’ narratives and AYMs’ statements to demonstrate that the agreement on toppling the regime took place in the street and was neither previously coordinated nor elaborated by the activists in the sense that the question of what type of government should be installed after Ben Ali’s departure was not discussed. Finally, I show that the rapid departure of Ben Ali preserved the inclusivity of the MF when the NYMs and AYMs disagreed about toppling the regime.
In order to understand how the MF remained inclusive during CoP’s apex, it is important to know when the call for ousting the regime began, as if the AYMs had called for ousting the regime before the protests had reached their apex, we should expect a division among the participant movements as the NYMs were in favour for reforming the regime. But if the call for regime’s departure became dominant during the CoP’s apex, the deviation from it by the NYMs would not affect the MF’s inclusivity as the majority of people at this stage would be in support for this demand. To show that the demand for ousting the regime was dominant only in the period of the CoP’s apex, I asked Seventy-six activists to elaborate on three questions that are related to the MF inclusivity during Cycle’s Apex. These questions are:

When did the call for ousting the regime appeared?

What slogans were raised that reflected the demand for regime departure?

And finally, did the activists agree on the type of government that should follow Ben Ali’s departure, and in case they did not, why?

The answers of the activists (see Table IV-5) show that the call for ousting Ben Ali entered their slogans gradually starting from the killings perpetrated by security forces in Kasserine, Thala, and Regueb between January 8 and 10, but it became their one and only slogan once the protests reached Sfax and Tunis – that is to say, when the CoP turned into a revolution on January 12.
Table IV-5: Distribution of activists’ answers to when slogans calling for Ben Ali’s departure appeared

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Governorate</th>
<th>Answer</th>
<th>N° of each answer</th>
<th>The slogan</th>
<th>Tot. N° of activists</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sidi Bouzid</td>
<td>After the killing in Regueb, Thala and Kasserine on January 9, 2011 (^{621})</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>- Down to the Constitution Party … down down to the people’s torturer</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kesserine</td>
<td>On January 9, after the killing in Thala and Kasserine. (^{622})</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>- Down to the Constitution Party … down down to the people’s torturer - Zine patience, patience… tomorrow Thala will dig your grave - Zine patience, patience… tomorrow Kasserine will dig your grave</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sousse</td>
<td>On January 6, 2011 when the police entered the Art College of Sousse to repress the demonstration.</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>- Down to the Constitution Party … down down to the people’s torturer - Down to the regime of the seven (seven November)… collaborator and subordinator regime</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>On January 12, after the massacres of Thala and Kasserine</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>- Water and bread but Bin Ali No</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sfax</td>
<td>On January 12, during the UGTT march</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>- Tunis, Tunis, is free… and Ben Ali go out - 2011 2011 Ben Ali is no useful for us - Down to the Constitution Party… Down to the people’s torturer</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tunis</td>
<td>On January 12 during the demonstrations in Tadamon and Melasin quarters</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>- Down Down to the Constitution Party… Down to the people torturer</td>
<td>43</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\(^{621}\) On January 9, the police forces killed five people in Regueb. The Fact-Finding Commission on Abuses Committed from 17 December 2010 until the End of its Mandate (known as the Bouderbala Commission) issued its report in May 2012, p. 682.

\(^{622}\) On January 8 and 9, the police killed five in Thala and none in Kasserine. On January 12, the police killed seven more. Bouderbala Commission, pp. 657-8.
On January 13 during the demonstrations in Tadamon, Melasin, Bakriah

- Water and bread but Bin Ali No
- Down Down to the Constitution Party… Down to the people torturer

On January 14 during the demonstration in Habib Bougheaba Boulevard

- Water and bread but Ben Ali No
- Down Down to the Constitution Party… Down to the people torturer
- The People want to oust Ben Ali
- Degage

Total 76

* Seven out of eighty-three were not asked these questions - two because they did not participate in the uprising (Salafists), and five because of the limited time of the interview.

The activists’ answers also show that the call for the regime’s departure appeared first in Sousse, and then in Sidi Bouzid, and Kasserine. In fact the videos of the protests as posted on the webpages of Sha’eb Tunis and Wkalat Anba’ (as discussed in the previous chapter) show that similar slogans that called for regime to fall appeared even earlier in the protests. For example, the slogan “uprising, uprising until we end the gang” appeared in Foussana and Kasserine on December 28, 2010; “Down, down to Constitution Party, and down to the torturer” appeared in Sousse on December 28, 2010 and in Tunis on December 31, 2010 during a protest of lawyers; “Liberties, liberties and no life-time presidency,” “Republic, republic, and not a kingdom,” “Water and bread but no for Trabelsia” all appeared in Kef on December 31, 2010.

Raising these slogans at these early times suggest that the AYMs were trying from the very


beginning to push for toppling the regime but that these slogans were not adopted by most people protesting, and they were not as dominant in as other slogans such as “Work is entitlement” or “work, freedom, national dignity.” The focus on ousting the regime, as the table shows, grew only after the killings of protestors in the interior regions. It was then that the activists of the AYMs perceived a moment to concentrate on “ousting Ben Ali” and that was when this slogan began to gain in popularity. This slogan became dominant in the sense that it became the only demand for the activists staring from January 12, 2011, which is evident in both the answers that interviewed activists gave me and in videos of protests posted online.

For the question of whether the activists agreed on the type of the regime that should follow Ben Ali’s departure, the activists’ answers were all in the negative, which explains how the MF remained inclusive during the CoP’s apex despite the ideological rifts among the AYMs and NYMs. For the activists, the time between calling for Ben Ali’s departure on January 12 and his actual departure on January 14 was too short to think about the future. Neither the activists of the NYMs nor those of the AYMs foresaw the regime departing so quickly; therefore, they did not see any urgent need to discuss the future. The narrative of the activists about the last day of the revolution illustrates that Ben Ali’s departure was a surprise for all of them. Issam Chebbi, the Secretary General of the PDP from 2012 until now, explained the situation at Habib Bourguiba Boulevard on January 14:

“The victory of the revolution was a surprise for the people and for us. We were in front of the interior ministry and the police begged us to leave. The interior minister called Najib Chebbi (the historic leader of the PDP) and asked him to calm down the street but Chebbi told him that it was too late. At 3:00 pm, the police managed to disperse us. I and some of my colleagues left to our office. At 4:45 pm we left the office but the police
stopped us in front of the interior ministry and attacked us. We left homes with the intention to return back the next day to continue the demonstrations, but then we heard that Ben Ali fled.” 627

Nizar Ben Saleh from Ettajdid movement confirmed the story. As he said, “On January 14, the police sent us away from the interior ministry. We were sure it was not over yet, but then we were told that Ben Ali ran away.” 628 The POCT also was unsure of the success of revolution on January 14. Amani Thoueib told me that after Ben Ali’s speech, she had left her home early wearing her pajamas to see if the people were still protesting to oust the regime. “I received a call while in the street,” she said, “from a girl friend in Habib Bourguiba Boulevard, I was able to hear the people’s cry against the regime. I felt that Ben Ali failed to convince the people to leave the streets.” 629 Nasser Elddine Sessi, director of the center for studies at UGTT, confirmed these narratives. He said “on January 14 we had in Tunis a two hour general strike. The people were at the square of Mohamed Ali in front of the UGTT offices but suddenly they decided to leave to Bourguiba Boulevard chanting ‘disengage’. When the police dispersed us, we decided to come the next day.” When I asked what form of government they had in mind in place of Ben Ali regime, he said “Ben Ali’s sudden departure prevented us from thinking of this. We had fears all the time that Libya would interfere to save Ben Ali, but thanks to the Libyan uprising; it saved us.” 630 As such, refraining from addressing the type of the regime that would replace Ben Ali maintained the MF’s inclusivity, although this had not been planned by the AYMs.

627 Issam Chebbi, Interview with author, Tunis, May 4, 2012.
628 Nizar Ben Saleh, Interview with author, Tunis, April 4, 2012.
629 Amani Thoueib, Interview with author, Tunis, April 13, 2012.
There are two other reasons that why the MF remained inclusive at CoP’s apex. One can be inferred from the regime’s behaviour during the CoP and the other from the revolutionary situation that appeared after the killings in the interior regions. The first is that the disagreement between the AYMs and NYMs on the ultimate goals of the protests were ignored by both camps because the regime did not show a willingness to accept the NYMs’ initiatives for reform before January 13. Thus, when the AYMs started to focus on ousting the regime, the NYMs did not see a reason to oppose them publicly. In fact, for the NYMs, the AYMs’ demand for ousting the regime was leverage for their reform strategy as it sent a message to the regime that it had no alternative. Additionally, the killings in the interior regions created a sense among the participant movements that they should maintain unity to counter the state’s brutality. For this reason, eleven of the participant movements and civil society organizations issued on January 10th a common statement that condemned “the massacre” and held the government responsible for the deaths. Their statement called for the immediate cessation of all shooting, the return of the police and the army to their barracks, the prosecution of those responsible for issuing the orders to fire on protestors and of those who executed them, the release of detainees including those who were still in prisons since the events of the Basin Mine in 2008, freedom of expression in the media, the right to gather and organize, and the right to choose who governs and represents them.631

This statement reflects the minimum agreement between the participant movements in the protests at the time. However, this statement was issued before the development of the protests on January 12, and as I explained in the previous chapter, each individual movement issued their own statements expressing their own solutions to the crisis. The only statement that called for

discussing the future of the country after Ben Ali’s ouster was the one that issued by the Congress for the Republic (CFR), but this call did not materialize due to the rapid development of the events.

The second reason that can explain why the MF remained inclusive during the CoP’s apex is related the AYM’s perception that a change has happened in the mood of people after the killings in the interior regions which could lead to ousting Ben Ali. Thus the AYMs sought to capitalize on this moment by escalating the protests and they did not pay attention to the period that would follow Ben Ali’s departure. The interior regions were already in rebellion but Tunis and Sfax were still undecided, and the priority for the activists was to bring mobilize people against the regime in those two governorates. During this period, the activists of the AYMs in the UGTT exerted enormous pressure on the Executive Committee of the UGTT to declare a general strike. The committee did not want to take a position against the regime directly because it had been co-opted, but at the same time, it did not want to be perceived as if it was standing against the general mood of the UGTT members. As a result, it decided to let each regional branch of the UGTT choose the appropriate means to express solidarity with the people in Kasserine and Sidi Bouzid. The UGTT’s branch in Sfax decided to declare a general strike on January 12, the branch in Tunis declared a general strike for two hours on January 14, and in Sidi Bouzid, the UGTT announced a general strike on January 14. This focus on turning the CoP into a revolution prevented the AYMs from discussing the future of the Tunisian political system after Ben Ali, which unintentionally led to the preservation of the MF’s inclusivity. This does not mean that had the AYMs addressed this issue, they would have failed to reach an agreement


633 AlHani, The Revolution in Tunisia."
about the future of the political system; rather it just reveals the fact that these movements did not address this subject because they were busy in escalating the protests.

Indeed, the rapid departure of Ben Ali created all kind of rumours and speculations. El Amine told me that “the regime decided to sacrifice its head in order to preserve itself.”\textsuperscript{634} The activists of the POCT said that the “Army committed a coup d’état.”\textsuperscript{635} Sahbi Atig, head of Ennahda bloc at National Constitutional Assembly, said “the army chose to be with the people.”\textsuperscript{636} Abdulsattar Ben Musa, the president of the Tunisian Human Rights League, told me that “we would never know what exactly has happened on January 14th”, adding “it might be that the head of republican guards created an atmosphere of fear that led Ben Ali to flee.”\textsuperscript{637} I will address this topic in more detail in the next chapter, and it will suffice to say at here that the lack of a central leadership for the protestors prevented the activists from seeing the entire picture in Tunisia – i.e., the collapse of the police forces in the entire country, except for a small group that was guarding the interior ministry. The collapse of the police forces rendered Ben Ali impotent and dependent on the army, which chose not to fire on protestors.

**Testing MF Inclusivity Hypothesis**

In the following paragraphs, I will try to falsify the hypothesis of MF inclusivity. In order to do so, I will discuss the MF of the 2008 Redeyef, Gafsa uprising, which failed to spread to other governorates. If the protests’ MF was inclusive, it follows that the hypothesis of MF inclusivity holds little explanatory powers and it is therefore not decisive for the success of the protests. In

\textsuperscript{634} Elamine, “interview.”
\textsuperscript{635} Mouli, “interview.”
\textsuperscript{636} Sahbi Atig, interview with author, Tunis, April 30, 2012.
\textsuperscript{637} Abdulsattar Ben Musa, interview with author, Tunis, April 30, 2012.
order to do so, I first present a brief historical background of the protest movement in Redeyef, highlighting the reasons of its emergence, development, and limited expansion. Then, I use accounts of the events to explain the exclusive nature of the protests’ MF. Next, I discuss and refute three possible reasons for the protests’ decline: low levels of media coverage, a lack of support for the protests from the UGTT executive committee, and organizational weaknesses in the opposition. Finally, I use this discussion to support the argument that the exclusive nature of the protests’ MF in Redeyef was one of the main reasons for their decline.

The uprising in the Mining Basin of Gafsa, located in the southwestern region of Tunisia, began on January 5, 2008. The uprising arose to protest the Phosphate Company of Gafsa’s (CPG) recruitment procedures. Initially, the young men of Redeyef protested the rigged process of hiring new workers in CPG, which resulted in their exclusion. They accused the head of the CPG of rigging the hiring exam in order to recruit workers from outside their region, namely, from Sidi Bouzid. When the protestors failed to convince the CPG to release the results of the hiring exam, the unemployed young, with their families, took their case to the street. Beginning with a hunger strike by 19 unemployed workers in the office of the UGTT in Redeyef, the protests soon developed to include strikes in the Mine Basin, sit-ins in the streets (including the building of tenants on railroads in an effort to prevent the transport of phosphate to Sfax), an occupations of the main power stations in an effort to cut the electricity powering Gafsa’s phosphate plants. The protests including protracted confrontations with Tunisia Public Order Brigades (POBs), which covered many towns in the governorate of Gafsa including Umm Alar’ais, Midhilla, Metlaoui, Melares, and Gafsa city for five months. \(^{638}\) The protests did not

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spread outside Gafsa, however — although authors write that it reached Firiana in Kasserine.\textsuperscript{639} The regime put down the protests on June 5, 2008 when thousands of policemen were sent to the region. Police killed two protestors, wounded dozens, and arrested hundreds, out of whom 33 were sentenced to long prison terms, sometimes up to ten years.\textsuperscript{640} At the same time, the regime promised to hire hundreds of the region’s unemployed workers.\textsuperscript{641}

During the protests, the unemployed and local activists of the Tunisian General Labour Union (UGTT) requested employment and called for an end to corruption, nepotism, and government policies that impoverished and marginalized the region. In this sense, the protests’ MF seems to be similar to the CoP that overthrew Ben Ali on January 14, 2011. However, this similarity does not hold up under scrutiny. The written accounts of the protests of Gafsa reveal the exclusive nature of its MF, which obstructed the protests from expanding to other governorates. According to Bishara (2012), the protests in Redeyef began when the unemployed accused the head of the CPG, who happened to be from Sidi Bouzid, of nepotism. The protestors claimed that he excluded the unemployed of Gafsa in order to hire ‘\textit{Ghuraba}’ (strangers), i.e., workers from outside the region of Gafsa. Therefore, the activists in Gafsa did not pose the question of unemployment to the national level; rather they posed it in the context that some “strangers” as opposed to “Gafsa dwellers” were appointed by the CPG.\textsuperscript{642} This attitude deprived the protestors of the sympathies of people in other regions, such as Sidi Bouzid

\textsuperscript{639} Almajiri, \textit{Tunisian Revolution}, 42
\textsuperscript{640} Ibid; Hammidi, \textit{The right for authority}
\textsuperscript{641} During the cycle of protests of 2010-2011, the activists referred to these promises calling upon the Tunisians not to believe the regime because it did not fulfill its promises during Redeyef uprising. See note 44 in Chapter III.
\textsuperscript{642} Bishara, \textit{The Glorious Tunisian}, 197.
and Kasserine, who felt they were one of the targets of Gafsa protests. The regional nature of the uprising can be seen in Ammar Amrousiah’s news report. “There is no doubt”, Amrousiah says that “there are objective reasons that prevented the protests from spreading beyond Gafsa. These reasons are related to the demands of the protestors which are local and have to do with the Phosphate of Gafsa rather than with national reasons such as the increase of price commodities.” Amrousiah explains his argument by pointing to the protests of peasants in Redeyef and Midhilla; the peasants joined the uprising in order to press the government to dig desired artesian wells, settle the problem of agricultural land ownership, and pave the roads of their towns. Furthermore, while unemployed graduates were at the heart of the uprising in Redeyef, these activists did not give the uprising a national dimension, instead keeping their focus on employment in Gafsa. This was one of the reasons why activists in Sidi Bouzid claimed that Mohammed Albouazizi was a university graduate, even though he had not finished high school. According to Elamine, the activists claimed that Albouazizi held a university degree because they wanted to avoid the mistake made in Redeyef and successfully encourage tens of thousands of unemployed graduates to join the protests. The exclusive nature of the MF, here appearing in the fact the problem was framed in local terms rather than national ones, prohibited the protest movement from spreading beyond the borders of Gafsa.

Those who wrote about the events in Redeyef offer three other explanatory variables for its containment, however: low media coverage of the event, a lack of help from the UGTT, and the weakness of opposition. But these arguments do not possess sufficient explanatory power

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643 Elamine, “interview”
644 An activists who reported extensively on the Redeyef uprising and a member in the Workers Communist Party
645 Amrousiah, “The uprising of mine basin”
646 Elamine, “interview.”
when compared to the MF exclusivity. For example, Almajiri (2011) and Hammidi (2011) claim that the regime’s repression of the uprising was conducted in the absence of media coverage. According to this view, the regime managed to prevent Tunisians elsewhere from knowing what was happening in Gafsa and therefore repressed the protests before Tunisians were fully aware of them. Uninformed of the protests, Tunisians could not joined or enabled the spread of the uprising. Amrousiah (2008) refutes this argument by claiming that the events were covered by several news outlets: the Tunisian Dialogue TV channel, the electronic Albadil newspaper (Alternative), and the newspapers of Almaoukef (Perspective), Alttariq Aljadid (New Road), Muwatinoun (Citizens), and Sawt Alsha’b (The voice of People). It was also covered through the activities of the “National Committee for the Support of the Basin Mine.” In fact, one could find many reports on Aljazeera’s TV satellite channel about the uprising. Therefore, the low media coverage account cannot explain why the protests did not expand outside Gafsa.

Hammidi (2011), Bishara (2012), and Amrousiah (2008) contend that one of the major reasons the uprising was repressed stemmed from the position taken by the UGTT executive committee during the protests. According to this account, the UGTT executive sided with the regime against the protestors by refraining from organizing activities that would support the people in Gafsa and stripping the local UGTT members who became activists of their trade union membership. However, by comparing the position of the UGTT bureaucracy (to use the Tunisian activists’ term) in 2008 with that of the time of the protests (2010-2011), the UGTT bureaucracy seems to have acted in the same way in both time periods. To a large extent, in

647 Almajiri, Tunisian Revolution, 43; Hammidi, The right for authority, 81
648 Amrousiah, “The uprising”
649 Hammidi, the right for authority, 82; Bishara, The glorious, 122; Amrousiah, “The uprising”
2010, the local activists of the UGTT took the side of the people while the bureaucracy supported the regime. During the 2010-2011 events, the bureaucracy did not initiate any activity to support the uprising in the interior regions. Furthermore, and as explained in the previous chapter, it was the local branch of the UGTT of Sfax that declared a strike on January 12, 2011 in support of the interior regions’ protests. However, one should observe that the call for the strike happened only when all the interior regions joined the protests. This implies that if there was a change in the position of the UGTT bureaucracy, it happened under the intense pressure of the local UGTT activists in the interior regions. As Medeini notes, the local branches of the UGTT became incubator for the Tunisian opposition despite the position of the UGTT’s president, who worked closely with Ben Ali. Finally, the UGTT president met Ben Ali on January 13 and declared that “the UGTT supports the reforms measures of the president.” In other words, nothing had changed sufficiently to warrant the claim that the position of the UGTT bureaucracy in 2010 was any different from its position in 2008.

Finally, Amrousiah (2008) considers the organizational weakness of the opposition and the passivity of Tunisian intellectuals as two main reasons the protests in Gafsa remained confined. However, he maintains that these amount to only one factor; the other is that the protestors raised local, as opposed to national, demands. Needless to say, that the weakness of the opposition in 2010 was a major problem for both sustaining and leading the protests in the 2010 revolution, as I explained earlier and as I will further explain in the next chapter. Thus, this argument does not bear an explanatory power.

650 Medeini, *The fall of the police state*, 271
651 Yahmad, “Sectors in Tunisian society toppled Ben Ali”
To summarize, the major difference between the uprising of Redeyef in 2008 and that of 2010 lies in the MF. In the protests of 2008, the MF was exclusive. It began this way when the unemployed protested the appointment of Sidi Bouzid residents. Whether the CPG’s recruitment process was based on nepotism or was in actuality a fair one does not matter because the protests in Redeyef were perceived by other interior regions as against them. Even when the protests expanded to include several towns in Gafsa, protestors’ demands remained local, inhibiting the possibility of expanding them. In 2010, the case was different. The protests’ MF was inclusive; it represented the different societal sectors in Tunisia, thus making it easier for activists to spread the protests throughout the interior regions first, and then to all of Tunisia.

Conclusion

This chapter demonstrated that MF of CoP was inclusive; its level of abstraction displayed ideological pluralism, it represents the interests of the majority of the Tunisian social groups, and it transcended the identity divisions between the people in interior and coastal regions. It also showed that the MF was inclusive because the participant movements in the CoP all contributed to its construction and it explained how the activists past experiences and linkages through the national trade unions prevented the rise of an exclusive MF. Finally, it illustrated that the MF remained inclusive at the CoP’s apex because the AYMs did not discuss the kind of the political regime that should replace Ben Ali.
Chapter V

Tunisia: Decentralized Leadership at the CoP’s Apex

The main argument of this chapter is that the process of democratization that ensued in Tunisia following the departure of Ben Ali, the president, was a result of the dynamic of protests under a decentralized leadership at the CoP’s apex. These dynamics created a power vacuum and, as a consequence, a crisis of legitimacy that could not be solved without running elections for the national posts. On the one hand, in the absence of a unified leadership that would elaborate on the protests end game, the protestors narrowed the consensus to a single goal: ousting the head of the regime. That is to say, the consent between the protestors formed around the departure of Ben Ali. Furthermore, because the protestors had no central leadership, the regime had no chance to reach a settlement that could end the protests. This meant that Ben Ali was doomed to depart in case he failed to repress the protestors. Additionally, as the protestors did not have a unified leadership, they could not see the impact of their activism on the state and this deprived them the opportunity to seize the authority once Ben Ali departed. On the other hand, the state high echelon bureaucracy and the military were in a position to fill the political vacuum once it happened. In part, because they were at least one step ahead the protestors in terms of organization and of the information they had about the size, the intensity, and the total impact of the protests on the state, and also because the protestors had no unified leadership to present themselves as the successor of the departing president. The consequence of those two processes: the political vacuum and the filling of it from within the regime through declaring, Fouad Mebazaa, the speaker of the parliament, as the interim president put in motion a crisis of legitimacy. Mebazaa and his government, the “de facto” authority, sought legitimacy from the Tunisians by declaring their intention to hold presidential elections among other steps that
included broadening the political and social base of the defeated regime. For their part, believing that they possess a revolutionary legitimacy, the AYMs strived to install their own government. This post-revolution struggle over authority altered the roadmap for democratization initially crafted by the “de facto” government into a more reliable one and enforced running the national elections.

To validate these arguments, I first establish the fact the leadership of the protests during the CoP’s apex was decentralized and I explain the reasons for this. Then, I discuss the dynamics of the protests under a decentralized leadership. Next, I explain how these dynamics led to the beginning of the process of democratization following Ben Ali’s departure. I conclude by summing up the chapter.

**Decentralized Leadership Prior and During the CoP’s Apex**

In the following paragraphs, I argue that the decentralized form of leadership that appeared at the CoP’s apex was not a free choice of the youth activists; rather, it was imposed on them by the confrontational nature of the protests, their weak organizational infrastructure, and their disagreement on the protests’ goals. An account to how the protests began and spread should be sufficient to explain how the protest centers were multiplied without being linked to a centralized leadership. This decentralized leadership remained at the CoP’s apex as the AYMs and NYMs did not agree on a solution to end the protests especially after the killing in Kassereine, Thala, and Regueb between January 8 and 10. The AYMs called for regime change while the NYMs maintained their call for reforming the regime. However, the quick departure of Ben Ali on January 14 did not give the two groups sufficient time to bridge their differences in order to build a unified leadership.
The protests in Sidi Bouzid began when activists from different youth movements and independent demonstrators gathered with the victims’ family before the local governorate building to protest conditions that led Mohammed Albouazizi to self-immolate. However, the protests could have waned after this gathering because the Public Order Brigades (POB) did not confront the protestors but instead allowed them to publicly express their anger. The activists, who knew each other from past activism and were mainly from PDP, POCT, and Pan-Arabist groups, planned to continue their protests the next day and agreed to make Sidi Bouzid’s main market the location of their actions. This form of centralized leadership was impossible to be maintained when the protests turned into a violent confrontation.

The next day, the POB received more troops and disbanded the protests violently, arresting 50 activists. In response, protestors attacked the police station and government building, and in order to avoid being identified, they confronted the police at night. To maintain the peaceful nature of the protests and in order to keep them organized under a single leadership, the organized activists established what they called the “Sidi Bouzid Committee for Citizenry and the Defense of the Victims of Marginalization” (SCCDVM). However, two developments made this committee irrelevant. The first is related to the government’s response to the protests, which refused to speak with representatives of the activists and tried to bypass

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652 Elamine; Oueiniah; “interview”

653 According to Elamine this happened for two reasons: the first is due to the POB’s conscripts low numbers and the second is related to what he believed as a sort of sympathy the police wanted to show to the victim’s family, especially that most of them were from Sidi Bouzid. Elamine, “interview.”

654 Elamine; Oueiniah; “interview.”

655 Haamdi, “The right of authority,” 95.

656 Bilal, “interview.”

657 Haamdi, “Sidi Bouzid rebels.”
them by talking only with the UGTT branch in Sidi Bouzid. The second was the spillover of the protests to other towns in Sidi Bouzid governorates such as Meknes, Manzel Bouzaiene, and Jilma. The latter development created new protest centers that were connected loosely with the activists in Sidi Bouzid but not under their control. By that I mean, the activists who initiated the protests in these towns knew the core activists in Sidi Bouzid and coordinated with them, but they did not consider them their leadership. So while Ayman and Jasser, two unemployed graduates-cum-activists in Manzel Bouzaiene, knew Ali Albouazizi, Elamine, and Oueiniah, some of the core activists in Sidi Bouzid, they did not receive directions from them; they organized their activities alone.

According to Jasser, on December 21 he and his colleagues were in Sidi Bouzid to participate in an annual national contest to hire teachers for public schools. They witnessed the brutality of the police and they decided to organize a march in their town to show solidarity with the people of Sidi Bouzid. The protests that formed around the leadership of Jasser and his colleagues remained independent from that which formed around the core activists in Sidi Bouzid. Similar to what occurred in Sidi Bouzid, the violent response to the peaceful march in Manzel Bouzaiene incited local youth to attack the police station. And as in Sidi Bouzid, the peaceful marches during the day and the confrontations between activists and the police at night multiplied the leadership centers of the protests even in the same town.

The centers of leadership increased further in number with the formation of solidarity movements throughout the regional branches of the Tunisian General Labor Union (UGTT), the

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659 Jasser, interview with the author, Manzel Bouzayenn, May 9, 2012.
Bar Association, the Tunisian General Student Union (UGET), and the General Union of Unemployed Graduates (UDC). In Kasserine, for example, protests started on December 26 when activists of the Basic Educational Association (part of UGTT) and lawyers from the Bar Association called for peaceful march in solidarity with Sidi Bouzid. Sebri and his colleagues remained in charge of the protests until they turned into a street confrontation between the activists and PBO conscripts, on January 6, 2011. These processes – the creation of centers of gravity for the protests and of activists losing their leadership of them as they became confrontational – was repeated in almost every city and town in Tunisia, giving the false impression that these protests were spontaneous.

In addition to the confrontational nature of the protests, the weak infrastructure of the youth movements involved also inhibited the formation of a central leadership for the protests. I explained earlier that the lack of resources of the AYMs led them to focus on inciting the poor Tunisians to take to the streets in order to sustain the protests. But with the participation of poor people a set of new community leaders took the control of the protests in their localities. Some of these subaltern leaders had a history of political activism since they were university students and had their own ideologies. Once they had gotten involved in the protests, they formed their own movements such as Karama, the New Generation Youth Movement, and the Forces of Free Tunisia. Others groups appeared as a response to the state of anarchy that prevailed between January 15th and 17th, seeking to protect their neighbourhoods. They called themselves the

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660 Sebri, “interview.”

Protection Committees of the Revolution (PCR) and appeared in most of Tunisian towns and cities, confiscating the offices of the RCD party and using them for their own activities. Although, these Committees disappeared gradually, and were no longer prevalent by the time of the election of the Constituent Assembly in October 2011.662

The rise of these Grassroots Informal Movements (GIMs) created additional leadership centers and further obstructed the rise of a unified command structure for the protests. Indeed, because these subaltern leaders disdained totalitarian ideologies and hierarchal organizations, they focused more on networking to spread the protests rather than on creating a central leadership. For example, Malek Sghiri, the founder of New Generation Movement, created with his colleagues the Tunisian Street News Agency to document and disseminate information on the events of the protests.663 Elamine Albouzizi, the founder of Karama, used his personal relationships with different bloggers, such as Tarek Kahlwai in the United States, Ghassan Khalifa in Canada, Iyad Dahman in France, and Kawthar Abbas in South Africa, to disseminate news on the protests outside Sidi Bouzid through those bloggers’ own websites.664 Because these subaltern leaders carried the burden of the protests in their localities, they did not have much respect for the organized youth movements. According to Elamine, “it was not sufficient [to topple the regime] to hold ‘seminars’ in the presence of the Ambassadors of the countries that

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662 Salah Eldin Barhoumi, In the midst of the Tunisian revolution: the north-west as a model, Tunis, Dar Sahar for Publication, 2012, 137-141. I should note the PCR are different from the Leagues for the Protections of the Revolution. The former was established by the citizens directly while Ennahda established the latter. The leagues remained until 2014 and were perceived by the secular opposition as Ennahda violence forces. Ahmed Mouli, interview with the author, June 8, 2013.

663 Malek Sgiri, “interview.”

664 Elamine, “interview.”
supported authoritarianism, as many of the organized parties did [but] was necessary to mobilize the marginalized people” which the GIMs have done.\textsuperscript{665}

Finally, disagreement amongst youth organizations on what constituted a solution to the Tunisians’ grievances curtailed the possibility of the emergence of unified leadership for the protests. Thus while the AYMs and NYMs agreed in their diagnosis of the problems driving the protests – namely, economic marginalization, unemployment, corruption, and absence of political freedom – they disagreed on how to fix these problems. As explained previously, the NYMs sought to convince the regime to conduct reforms while the AYMs refused to propose a feasible solution to end the protests, focusing instead on spreading them to delegitimize the regime. The gulf between the two groups became bigger following the killings the POB conscripts committed in Kassereine, Thala, and Regueb between January 8 and 10. While the AYMs called for the regime departure, the NYMs continued advocating for reforming the regime. Thus when the CoP reached its apex with the expansion of the protests to the coastal regions beginning in Sfax on January 12, the leadership of the protests was already decentralized. Furthermore, the time period of the CoP’s apex was too short; it lasted only two days during which the disagreement between the AYMs and NYMs amplified. The NYMs accepted Ben Ali’s plan of reform on January 13 while AYMs refused it and insisted on his departure.\textsuperscript{666} The rapid departure of Ben Ali on January 14 preserved the decentralized form of leadership.

This account should not be interpreted as if the camps of AYMs and NYMs had each a centralized leadership and a unified strategy. In fact, there was not a single meeting between the various AYMs to discuss their goals and tactics. The reasons for that are different from one

\textsuperscript{665} The quote is cited in Als’edani, “The youth in Tunisia’s democratic transition,” 22.

\textsuperscript{666} See chapter III for further discussion on the different positions of the AYMs and NYMs during the CoP’s apex
organization to another. Ennahda activists, for example, claimed that their leadership was in exile and that they did not have a functioning hierarchal organization on the ground. POCT activists said that their leaders did not seek to create a central command over the protests because to do so might undermine the popular uprising. For Karama’s activists, all coordination took place in the field because the youth activists were more radical than their leaders, who were not willing to pay the cost of changing the regime.

As for the camp of the NYMs, the reasons that prevented them from forming a central leadership are different. On the one hand, as Ali Albouazizi testimony shows, they did not want to send a signal to the regime as if they were advocating escalating the protests. On the other hand, the groups that formed this camp were not united on the protest goals. The PDP proposed an elaborated plan to reform the regime while Ettajdid called for dialogue between the opposition and the regime without offering any plan.

However, what matters more is the fact that the CoP was not led by any single movement or a coalition of movements during its apex. The absence of unified leadership at the CoP’s apex contributed to the protests success, removing the political authority, and impacted to a large extent the process of democratization. In the following two sections, I elaborated on those two subjects.

Dynamic of Protests Under Decentralized Leadership

In order to understand how youth activism led to the post-revolution political vacuum, and therefore, to crisis of legitimacy that opened the door for the beginning of the process of

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668 Ahmed Mouli, interview with the author, Tunis, April 21, 2012.
669 Mourad Ben Jeddou, interview with author, Sousse, April 15, 2012
670 See chapter III
democratization, it is essential to grasp the dynamics of protests absent a unified leadership. I will argue that the absence of unified leadership during the CoP’s apex had three consequences that are directly related to the process of democratization. First, in the absence of centralized leadership, the protests could only lead to complete success or complete failure, because the Ben Ali’s regime had no interlocutor with which to negotiate a middle ground solution. Second, the consent on ousting the regime happened in the street. As such, the agreement was narrowed to the extent that the regime was personified in Ben Ali as the head of the state. This had two important implications: (1) this encourages defection with the regime as several institutions and personalities tried to distant themselves from Ben Ali, and (2) it deprived the AYMs from the capacity of sustaining the protests after the departure of Ben Ali. This is in part because the coastal regions joined the protests at time the slogan of ousting Ben Ali was dominant. Thus protests in these regions faded as soon as Ben Ali departed, though in the interior regions, however, protests did remain active for longer as their original demands were for employment and development. Finally, the absence of a unified leadership created disparity of information between them and the state’s important institutions such as the high echelon bureaucracy and the military. The implication of this is that while the youth movements could not see the scope of their activism and understand its impact on the state, the state’s high institutions were aware of it and used it to seize control on the authority once Ben Ali left. By doing so, they deprived the youth movements from the opportunity to seize the authority, but at the same time, they created a crisis of legitimacy. In the following paragraphs, I explain these points.

**Zero-Sum Game**

Data gathered from the activists show that the protests in Tunisia expanded through a loose network that included activists from the AYMs and NYMs. This network was composed of two
lyres: the direct network of the AYMs and NYMs’ organizations, and the network of the UGTT, the Bar Association, UGET, UDC, and Tunisian bloggers of which members of AYMs and NYMs were active. Each node in the network planned and initiated its protest activities alone and without coordinating with the other nodes in the network. This deprived the regime from the possibility to end the protests through negotiation as it had no representative interlocutor that could speak on behalf of the protestors. Indeed, each protest center acted alone with very loose connection with other centers as the following two examples illustrate.

According to Jasser, the unemployed graduates organized the first protest in Manzel Bouzaiane, on December 21, and POB conscripts dispersed the protesters. On the next day, they contacted activists in the UGTT in their town and held a joint march, which also brutally dispersed. As a result, on the night of December 22, the activists burned the governor’s office, Almutamadiya. In response, the POB stormed the houses of local citizens to arrest the suspected activists. On December 24, the activists organized a march from the UGTT’s regional office to the police station to protest the home-invasions. This march was joined by demonstration held exclusively by women from Alzakzouk quarter, organized independently by two schoolteachers. The gathering turned into a violent confrontation with the police, who killed two activists.671 During those four days, the activists of the region acted independently and with no instructions from any sources beyond the one they themselves created in their town despite the fact that many of the youth activists involved were affiliated with organized parties and movements. Nevertheless, their activism was not isolated from the events that were taking place elsewhere in the country, and their activities diffused to other places. Aziz Ammami, an independent anarchist

blogger who resides in Tunis but whose family lives in Manzel Bouzaiene, went to his hometown during these four days to report on the protests. With the help of his blogger colleagues Sofian Shorabi and Najib Obeid, he informed Tunisians throughout the country about the events taking place Manzel Bouzaiene through personal webpages and TV channels with which the three had connections, such as France 24 and Aljazeera.  

The same thing occurred in other Tunisian cities and towns. In Thala, Kasserine, the activists of the UGTT, who were schoolteachers, organized marches to show solidarity with Sidi Bouzid as early as December 20. According to Hamza, a local high-school student, these marches were flanked by police in a bid to prevent other people from joining them. The turning point in the protests, according to his testimony, happened on January 3, 2011 when students returned to their schools from the fall vacation. The high-school students at the Ben Sharaf Institute organized a large march, which was attacked by the police. To avoid being arrested, the activists decided to sleep in the mountains, where many of them met each-other for the first time. Hamza, whom I interviewed in the presence of three other activists who confirmed his narrative, said that they used their gathering in the mountains to divide tasks among themselves: one group would attack the office of the Constitutional Democratic Rally (RCD), another would reach out to some quarters in Thala which were not engaged yet in the demonstrations, a third would confront the police, and so on. On January 6 the police informed Thala’s citizens that high-ranking officials would come to listen to their demands. As a result, the activists decided to freeze their activism, but no officials came, and the activists discovered that the police had deceived them in order to gain time to get more ammunition and troops. In response, the activists

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672 Aziz Ammami, interview with the author, Tunis, April 18, 2012.

673 According to Hamza it was burned three times. Interview with Hamza, Talah, May 9, 2012.
attacked the police, who responded with live bullets, killing five activists.\textsuperscript{674} As in the case of Manzel Bouzaïene, the activists in Thala initiated their activities, froze them temporarily, and re-engaged in activism without any instructions or coordination with any center in the activists’ network. However, their activism was not completely isolated from the other centers in the network. Malek Sghiri, whose family lives in Thala, returned from Tunis to his town on January 9 to report about the events in his town. Through his Tunisian News Street Agency, Malek reported on the events of Thala and appeared on Aljazeera TV by satellite, the same day, to talk about them.\textsuperscript{675}

The existence of many centers in the protests and the absence of any unified leadership of them deprived the regime of the possibility of arriving at a middle ground solution with the activists. That does not mean the regime would otherwise have negotiated; indeed, the regime showed no inclination to do so until the protests reached their apex. In the first stage of the protests the regime adopted a ‘carrot and stick’ policy. On the one hand, it insisted that “a minority of extremists and hired agitators”\textsuperscript{676} and “masked gangs”\textsuperscript{677} were behind the tumultuous events in the interior regions and that it would enforce the law. This was accompanied by mass detentions of protestors coupled with violent repression to quell the protests, which led to the killing of tens of activists. On the other hand, the regime informed the regional council of Sidi Bouzid that the government intended to establish industrial and agricultural projects, improve

\textsuperscript{674} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{675} Malek, “interview.”
roads, and offer job training to the unemployed.\textsuperscript{678} The regime also promised to create tens of thousands of new jobs within a short period of time, it increased the governmental budget allocated for investment to Sidi Bouzid\textsuperscript{679}, encouraged business-owners to invest in the interior regions lifting taxes on their profits for ten years\textsuperscript{680}, distributed food subsidies to the poor in Sidi Bouzid\textsuperscript{681}, dismissed the governor of Sidi Bouzid and reshuffled the government, and decreased the prices of basic commodities.\textsuperscript{682}

However, the regime changed this strategy completely when the protests moved to the coastal regions on January 12. Desperate to end the protests, the regime sought a middle ground solution with the protestors. On January 13 Ben Ali ordered its security forces to stop firing live bullets unless their lives were threatened, freed the media, promised not to run in the 2014 presidential elections out of respect for the age restriction defined in the constitution, and established a committee to review a set of laws that would lead to the transfer of power in 2014.\textsuperscript{683} To this end, Ben Ali ordered Mohamed Ghannouchi, the premier, to contact opposition parties to discuss his plan, and he met with Abulsalam Jarad, the head of the UGTT Executive Committee to support his plan and to convince him to cancel the strike in Tunis, which was planned for two hours on January 14. The media reported that Jarad welcomed Ben Ali’s speech,


\textsuperscript{679} Ben Ali’s first speech

\textsuperscript{680} Ben Ali’s second speech

\textsuperscript{681} For example on December 21, the government distributed food subsidies on the families of the unemployed. Elamine, “interview.”


\textsuperscript{683} “Ben Ali’s third speech”
and stressed “the need to get out of these difficult circumstances and to restore normal life in order to implement the measures approved by the head of state, especially those that are related to creating new jobs.” Similarly, the PDP, Ettajdid, and UGTT leaders embraced Ben Ali’s third speech and appeared in the Tunisian media to promote it. Nevertheless, because the protests had no unified leadership, Ben Ali’s middle ground solution had no chance to materialize and therefore, his political survival as a president at this stage of the protests hinged on conducting a successful campaign of repression. However, because the POB collapsed after almost a month-long confrontation with the protestors, the fate of the president became dependant more on the army’s loyalty, but the army chose to abandon the president forcing him to flee the country.

**Narrow Consent on Protests’ Goals**

The process that led the army to abandon the president had to do to a large extent with the formation of the consent among the different protest centers on protest goals. In other words, what facilitated the army’s position is the fact that the protestors personified the regime in Ben Ali as a person. By narrowing their goals to ousting Ben Ali, the protestors unintentionally created motivations for the army and the state’s high bureaucrats to abandon Ben Ali as a mechanism to end the protests. The question then becomes: in the absence of centralized

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685 The Tunisian military position from the protests in Tunisia has been investigated by several scholars. For example, Bellin argues that the Tunisian army did not repress the protestors to maintain its institutional interests especially that the number of protestors was very high, and the means of protests were nonviolent. See, Bellin, “Reconsidering the robustness”; Brooks advance a different argument. She says the military was excluded from governing, its number is very small (28,000 compared to 120,000-150,000 police), and poorly equipped. As such it had no interest in defending the regime. See Brooks, “Abandoned at the Palace.” My own research supports Brooks’ argument. Several activists confirmed the existent of state of enmity between the army and the police. Furthermore, Bouderbala’s report states that the army asked the Tunisians report about police cars that approach their neighbourhoods following Ben Ali departure.
leadership to direct the protests; how did the consensus on ousting Ben Ali form among the different protest centers of the CoP?

The answer to the abovementioned question can be found partly in an analysis of protests’ slogans. The analysis I offered of the protests’ slogans, in chapter III, shows that the only dominant mottos until the CoP reached its apex were ‘work is entitlement, oh gang of muggers’ and ‘work, freedom, national dignity.’ Beside these slogans each protest center raised other demands. Some of them were of a regional nature and others were national in scope, but these demands did not receive consent from the protestors. For example, in Manzel Bouzaiene, the activists demanded to decrease the age of retirement to create new jobs for graduates. In Banzart and Kef, the activists raised the slogan of ‘freedoms, freedoms, no life-long presidency.’ In Gafsa the activists called for subsidies for unemployed graduates. Meanwhile, according to Aziz Ammami, Elamine Albouazizi, and other activists, the AYMs were pushing from the beginning of the protests for ousting the regime. We can find slogans that support their claims; as early as December 20 in Sidi Bouzid such as “down, down to the torturer of people… down, down to the dustour party.” We can also find the same slogans in the sit-in in front of the UGTT headquarters in Tunis on December 25. On December 27, the activists

686 Jasser, “interview.”
688 Ali, an activist from Gafsa and founder of Nsitni, a civil society organization that cares of the revolutions wounded, interview with author, Tunis, April 25, 2012.
689 Bishara, “The Glorious,” 219
chanted at protests in the town of Meknes ‘down to the regime of November 7th.’ But these demands did not receive popular support despite being diffused nationally through the activists’ network, as some of these slogans were part of the social and political programs of POCT and PDP parties, which mean that diffusing them nationally were a task for the activists of those two parties. This informs us that these demands passed through different protest centers and were ultimately filtered and discarded. Malek, for example, considered the POCT’s demand for subsidies for unemployed graduates to be inappropriate as it provided the regime with a mechanism to calm the protests, and felt that the marginalization in the interior regions could not be solved through some grants. Similarly, Amani, an activist with the POCT party, said that her party could not accept the PDP’s demand to run free elections because it did not trust the regime.

The protest centers in the interior regions remained united on the general demands of “work, freedom, and dignity” until the CoP reached its apex on January 12, 2011. By this time, there were two important developments that led to the consensus on ousting the regime. The first, according to the response of all the activists whom I interviewed, was the killing of twenty nine activists in Kasserine, Thala, and Regueb between January 8th and 10th. The second was the expansion of the protests from the interior to the coastal regions on January 12. The killings of the activists united the conviction of protestors in the interior regions that the regime must go. As Malek put it, “the killing of the activists evoked nationalist feelings of the people during the

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693 Malek, “interview.”
694 Amani Thweib, interview with author, Tunis, April 13, 2012
period of resisting the French occupation.” In this sense, the regime was perceived to be a foreign occupier. Mothers started to participate with their children in fighting the police and calls for revenge became prevalent. During this period, radical activists put enormous pressure on the UGTT’s Executive Committee to declare a national strike. Finding itself between the hammer of the government and the anvil of the UGTT members, the Committee decided to take a middle route. It allowed each regional branch to make its own decisions on solidarity activities with the interior regions. This decision was a turning point in the CoP. The UGTT branch in Sfax declared a strike on January 12 and in doing so marked the spread of protests to the coastal region. I explained in Chapter III how poor residents of Sfaxi turned the UGTT’s peaceful march into violent confrontation with POB and how the protests moved to Tunis on the same day. What matters here is that as protests moved to the coastal regions, so too did the call for ousting the regime. However, in the absence of unified leadership to put the goals of the protests, mainly at this juncture, the protestors personified the regime in Ben Ali focusing on his departure. It is important to keep in mind that the consent in the interior region initially was on the issues related to create new jobs and ending marginalization as can be interpreted from the their dominant slogans “work is entitlement; and work, freedom, national dignity” but as the protests reached the coastal regions following the events of Kasserine, the consent among the protest centers in the coastal and interior regions became on ousting Ben Ali.

I should note also that the Executive Committee of the UGTT and the regional leaders of the UGTT in Sfax had nothing to do with creating this consensus. According to Samir Cheifi, a

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695 Malek, “interview.”
696 Hamza, “interview.”
697 According to Naser Eldin Alsasi, the director of studies at the UGTT, the regional branches cannot declare general strikes in their regions without the approval of the UGTT Executive Committee. Interview with author, May 13, 2012.
member in UGTT Executive Committee, the UGTT wanted to keep an arm’s length from the protests in order not to give the regime an excuse to repress the union as it had in 1978. He said, however, that the “the excessive use of live bullets against the protestors forced the UGTT to take a clear position against the regime and to declare the regional strikes.” In Sfax, the UGTT wanted to end its participation after a march that ended with an oratory rally, but the activists of the AYMs insisted on continuing and they began to chant slogans that called for the regime’s departure, in which they were joined by the other protestors. The killing of activists in Sfax and Tunis on January 12 and 13 solidified the consensus on ousting Ben Ali. That does not mean that every protest center in the CoP accepted this demand – for example, the NYMs did not adopt it – but the majority of them considered it their only task.

The way the consensus on ousting the regime was forged between protest centers had an important effect on how the protests declined. Because the coastal regions joined the protests to end Ben Ali’s rule, once this goal was achieved the protests in these regions faded. By contrast, the protests in the interior regions remained for a period of time after January 14 because the main demands of the protestors in these regions were originally revolved around employment and development. These demands remained unfulfilled after the Ben Ali’s departure, and as I will explain in the next section, this made the interior regions play an important role in the process of democratization.

**Asymmetrical Information Between YMs and Regime’s Institutions**

The last important dynamic of the protests under a decentralized form of leadership was the disproportionate of information the activist and the state’s high officials had about the impact of

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the protests on the state. In the absence of information transmission from protest centers to a
unified leadership, the activists were lagging one step behind the institutions of the old regime,
which had more information about the size and the effect of the protests upon the entire state.
Thus while the activists I interviewed said they did not give the issue of who should rule after
Ben Ali’s departure any thought because they did not expect his departure very quickly, the
state’s high bureaucrats and the army top generals were fully aware of the grave situation in the
country and that the regime was falling apart. This gave them the opportunity to fill the political
vacuum once Ben Ali fled the country.

According to the Bouderbala Report, on January 14 the picture in Tunisia was as follows:
there were 70 thousand protestors in front of the interior ministry, the interior ministry was
guarded by anti-terrorism forces, and protestors were trying to invade the interior ministry,
having climbed its walls to reach the window of the interior minister. What prevented a massacre
at the ministry was not the ability of the security forces to quell the protests, as some activists
stated in their testimony, but a funeral for one of the previous day’s victims which many
protestors joined. The clash between the activists in the funeral, which was held away from the
ministry, and some of the security forces dispersed the protestors. Meanwhile, the defense
minister informed the president that the security forces were surrendering their arms to military
units and returning to their homes. At this time there were massive parallel protests in Tunis in
the following areas: Alwardiah, Bab Al Khadra, Almarsa, Bab Sa’don, Sejomi, Sidi Hassan,
Kaser Sa’ed, Ariana, Mneihleh, Tadamon, and Halq Alwad. Furthermore, protestors had burned
several homes belonging to the Trabelsi family, which forced many of them to leave the country
in the same day, with those who could not do seeking asylum in the presidential palace while waiting for a means to leave the country.  

The Bouderbala Report also mentioned three developments that led to Ben Ali’s sudden decision to leave Tunisia. The first was credible information that the protestors in the neighbourhood of al-Karam were planning to storm his palace. The second was information about a defected unit of the anti-terrorism forces, headed by Lieutenant-Colonel Samir Tarhouni that had detained some members of the Trabelsi family at Carthage airport while they were trying to flee the country. And finally, a helicopter had flown close to the presidential palace and the presidential guards did not know about its intentions. Ali Siriati, the head of the presidential guards, interpreted the second and the third developments as a conspiracy against the president by unknown institutions in the state, and he convinced the president to join his family on a flight to Saudi Arabia for his safety. Bouderbala admits in his report that his findings are incomplete, but his investigations clearly point to defections inside the regime and to the total effect of the protests on the state that were not apparent to the activists. Issam Chebbi, a PDP political bureau member, confirmed this information. He said that “the only time we felt the regime was weak was a few hours prior to the departure of Ben Ali, when Kemal Murnjan, the foreign minister, stated that he supported our demand of appointing a national salvation government. But before that we were convinced that the regime was very strong.” For the purpose of my research, it does not matter if Ben Ali departed because he was afraid for his life due to the

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700 “Bouderbala Report”, 229

701 As for Tarhouni, the report finds that he stopped members in the Trabelsi family based either a self-initiative or on orders by Ali Siriati. Concerning the helicopter, the report says it was observing the north part of the capital and the defense minister knew about it, though he denied his knowledge about the plane when the president asked him about it. Furthermore, after the departure of Ben Ali, the defense minister ordered the army to arrest Ali Siriati while he was still in the airport. “Bouderbala Report”, 218-272.

702 Issam Chebbi, “interview.”
strength of the protests, or out of fear that a military coup was about to remove him. What matters is that the state’s high bureaucrats and the army’s officers were in a better position to fill the political vacuum that Ben Ali left behind.

To summarize, the dynamics of the protests under decentralized leadership created a situation where Ben Ali faced a zero-sum game; his fate hinged on either putting down the protests or leaving his position as a middle ground solution with the protestors was not possible due to the absence of unified leadership that could speak on behalf of the protestors. Furthermore, because the consent on the protests’ goal was set in the street, the agreement between the protest centers was narrow and revolved around ousting Ben Ali. This encouraged defection in the regime, but at the same time, this solution did not ensure that the initial demands of the protestors were to be met. Finally, as there was disproportional of information between the activists and the state’s high rank officials about the impact of the protests on the state, the latter was able to seize the political authority once Ben Ali departed.

**The Process of Democratization**

The process of democratization in Tunisia was the unintended consequence of the dynamic of the protests under a decentralized leadership. As explained in the preceding section, the protests led to the departure of Ben Ali and in doing so, they created a vacuum in the political authority. This vacuum was filled by the elites of the old regime. But by filling the political vacuum from within the regime, the state’s elites triggered two processes at the same time that were related to the process of democratization. The first was that because the old regime’s elites seized the political authority due to the success of the protests in forcing Ben Ali departure, they knew that they had to legitimize their authority by calling for general elections. And the second was that by filling
the political vacuum, they put in motion a struggle over the authority with the AYMs who believed that they had a revolutionary legitimacy to rule during the interim period. Although this struggle was over who had the right to rule following the departure of Ben Ali, it led to a more credible path toward democratization and of establishing an inclusive mechanism to ensure its implementation.

In this section, I flesh out these arguments. I first explain how seizing the political power by old regime’s elites created a crisis of legitimacy. Then, I illustrate the steps the interim authority undertook to legitimize its rule. Next, I shed light on the struggle between the regime’s elites and the AYMs which led a more genuine process of democratization. In short, I will argue that the struggle over power led to the establishment of the Higher Commission for the Fulfilment of Revolution Goals, Political Reform, and Democratic Transition (HCFRGPRDT) created an inclusive mechanism that enforced the national elections.

The Crisis of Legitimacy

Ben Ali’s departure created a crisis of legitimacy. The political vacuum he left behind was filled by Mohamed Ghannouchi, the premier. Legally, this process was in contradiction with the constitution. At the same time, the AYMs contested immediately the Ghannouchi’s de facto authority considering it a continuation of the old regime demanding its replacement with a revolutionary government. This crisis of legitimacy paved the road for the beginning of democratization. In the following paragraphs, I will describe how this crisis was unfolded.

Almost at the same time of Ben Ali’s departure, Colonel Sami Seik Salem, the chairman of the sub-department for the escort and protection of official figures, called the premier, the parliament’s speaker, and the president of the consultants’ council, to come to Carthage Palace to
take over Ben Ali’s roles in government. Based on the Article 56 in the 1959 constitution, Mohamed Ghannouchi, the premier, claimed that Ben Ali temporarily delegated to him his authority, which both the speaker of the parliament and the president of consultants’ council endorsed. According to Article 56, the president can delegate his authority to the premier in case he is temporarily unable to perform his duties.\textsuperscript{703} Ghannouchi addressed Tunisians the same night of Ben Ali’s departure, promising to “respect the constitution and to implement the political, economic, and social reforms” as declared by the departing president.\textsuperscript{704}

The same night, two events took place that affected the legality of the interim authority. The first was that protests in the governorates of Kasserine and Gabes which called for Ghannouchi to resign his office, considering him part of the old regime. And several jurists contested the transfer of authority to the premier on the basis of Article 56; they argued that Ben Ali was not temporarily unable to assume his authority, but that he fled the country, leaving his post vacant.\textsuperscript{705} As a result, they said, Article 57 in the constitution should be activated.\textsuperscript{706} This article states that the speaker of the parliament becomes president for a maximum of 60 days during which time the state’s institutions hold a new presidential election. Article 57 also prevents the interim president from dismissing the government, dissolving parliament, and running for election. The following day, the constitutional council declared the presidency vacant.

\textsuperscript{703} Article 56 from the 1959 constitution states that in case the president could not perform his duty temporarily he can delegate his authorities, temporarily, to the first premier, and he should inform the speaker of the parliament and the president of consultants’ council of this. A PDF copy of the 1959 can be retrieved from e-justice, \url{http://www.e-justice.tn/fileadmin/fichiers_site_arabe/org_juridictionnelle/constitutionde_la_republique.pdf}

\textsuperscript{704} “Bouderbala Report,” 272-279.

\textsuperscript{705} Bishara, “the Glorious,” 296.

\textsuperscript{706} Article 57 in the 1959 constitution states that in case the presidential post becomes vacant due to death, resignation, or complete inability to perform his duties, the Constitutional Council meets and declare the vacant of the president post and the speaker of the Parliament becomes a president. A PDF copy can be retrieved from \url{http://www.e-justice.tn/fileadmin/fichiers_site_arabe/org_juridictionnelle/constitutionde_la_republique.pdf}
and Fouad Mebazaa, the speaker of the parliament, became the interim president. In this sense, the elections, the beginning of democratization, that was supposed to take place after sixty days, was a direct result of Ben Ali departure.

For the AYMs this solution meant that the old regime was still in place as the government, the parliament, and the interim president were all from the RCD and the interim period will be managed based on the old regime’s constitution. Believing they have a revolutionary legitimacy, the AYMs called for dismissing the interim government, dissolving the parliament, writing a new constitution and appointing an interim government from outside the RCD with the following tasks: convicting the seniors who issued ordered to kill the activists during the protests, holding account officials who embezzled the state during Ben Ali era, dissolving the RCD and the parliament, and preparing for a national elections. The AYMs called for and organized protests (see below) to achieve their goals. In practice this meant that the filling the political vacuum from within the regime did not solve the question of who should rule after Ben Ali and that the struggle over authority has just begun.

**Ghannouchi’s Government Limited Steps Toward Democratization**

To legitimize the interim government, Mebazaa, the interim president, sought to broaden the social base of old regime and to create a rift within the youth groups. He ordered Ghannouchi to reshuffle his cabinet to represent a unity government, and he did so by adding to it one minister from the PDP and another from Ettajdid Movement, three ministers from the UGTT, and one

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707 Bishara, *The glorious*

708 Despite their differences, the AYMs were united on these demands as has been proved in the sit-in of Qassaba I and II which they organized before the government building.
The ‘national government,’ as Ghannouchi called it, promised to put Tunisia on the road of democracy by “changing the laws governing public life and running free and decent national elections under the supervision of an independent election commission and in the presence of international monitors.”

Amending and Enforcing the Roadmap Toward Democratization

The struggle between the AYMs and the interim government in the two months that followed Ben Ali’s departure was not about the process of democratization per se, but on who should rule the country during the interim period. The interim government insisted that the constitution was clear on this issue, while the AYMs believed that they had the right to rule because it was their ‘revolution’ that ousted the regime. The result of this struggle, however, was the creation of a more reliable road toward democratization with a mechanism that enforced it. I will explain this argument by first describing the struggle between the interim government and the AYMs. Then, I will map the main important actors and camps during this period. Next, I will illustrate why the AYMs failed to install their own government. Finally, I will show how this failure resulted in a compromise that created a credible path toward democratization.

Struggle between AYMs and interim government

Mebazaa efforts to legitimize the interim government deepened instead its crisis of legitimacy. On the one hand, by reshuffling the government, he violated the old regime own constitution

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709 Haamdi, “The right of authority,” 161. The UGTT refused to join the government because one of its demands was to exclude the ministers from the previous governments in the formation of the new one. See “A statement of the UGTT on the flee of Ben Ali,” January 15, 2011. Altuhami, “The revolution of 17 December.”

which prevented the president from changing the government before the presidential election.\footnote{Mebazzaa called for abiding with the soul of the constitution not with its exact articles. See the speech of Fouad Mebazza on January 15, 2011. Retrieved from \url{http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=nTL_xZBAf4o} (accessed June 22, 2014).} And it also accelerated the struggle over authority with the AYMs. Under the pressure of the radical activists of the AYMs, the UGTT refused to join the new government and maintained that it was illegitimate because it was formed mostly from the RCD. It also withdrew its members from parliament, the consultants’ council, and other state institutions.\footnote{“Three ministers resigned and the Central Committee of the UGTT refuses to recognize the government,” Elaph, January 18, 2011. Retrieved from \url{http://www.elaph.com/Web/news/2011/1/625787.html} (accessed May 30, 2014).} Meanwhile, the AYMs’ activists in the interior regions organized demonstrations in order to topple the government and appoint a new one from outside the old regime, and to dissolve the old regime’s institutions, including the parliament, the consultants’ council, the political police, and the RCD.\footnote{Haamdi, \textit{The right of authority}, 164-5} On January 22, the activists of the AYMs in the interior regions responded positively to an initiative that came from their colleagues in Manzel Bouzaïene, to hold a sit-in in front of the government building in Tunis until their demands were achieved.\footnote{Elamine, Mouli, and Jasser, “interviews”; Bachir Haamdi, interview with author, Tunis, May 24, 2012; Chaker Saiari, interview with author, Sousse, May 16, 201.} This sit-in, known as “Qasaba I”, was started by almost 2500 activists from the interior regions and was joined by hundreds of others from the other regions. It received support from the UGTT and remained in place until January 28 when the government dispersed it by force.\footnote{Ibid} The sit-in, however, forced a reshuffle in the government. Before quelling the sit-in, Ghannouchi dismissed most of the RCD ministers from his cabinet, keeping only two, and replaced them with independents. The new government also

\footnotesize{\begin{itemize}
\item \footnote{Mebazzaa called for abiding with the soul of the constitution not with its exact articles. See the speech of Fouad Mebazza on January 15, 2011. Retrieved from \url{http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=nTL_xZBAf4o} (accessed June 22, 2014).}
\item \footnote{Haamdi, \textit{The right of authority}, 164-5}
\item \footnote{Elamine, Mouli, and Jasser, “interviews”; Bachir Haamdi, interview with author, Tunis, May 24, 2012; Chaker Saiari, interview with author, Sousse, May 16, 201.}
\item \footnote{Ibid}
\end{itemize}}
included members close to the UGTT, which justified joining the government based on the latter’s agreement to form a council of all parties that would protect the revolution’s goals.  

Dismissing the majority of the RCD members from the government and the inclusion of the UGTT in it, did not end the struggle over power for that this period witnessed the rise of many actors that competed for power. In the following paragraphs, I map these actors and their goals.

**Reasons for AYM’s failure to install their own government**

There were three reasons that prevented the AYMs from installing a government of their choice. These were: the camp of the AYMs was fragmented physically and it did not have a united strategy, they did not struggle with the old regime institutions but also with NYMs who joined the interim government, and their failure to maintain the protests beyond the interior regions.

Ben Ali’s departure to the authority did not result on the formation of a united leadership to the AYMs in order to organize their struggle against the interim authority. Indeed, the leadership of this camp remained decentralized as it was during the protests. However, three coalitions emerged within this camp after the success of the protests in removing Ben Ali. Although the three coalitions competed for authority, they had different goals.

The first coalition was composed of Ennahda, the Congress for the Republic and Ettaktol Party. Though there were differences inside among them, they had a political program based on rejecting Ghannouchi’s government and replacing it with a national unity government drawn from outside the old regime. However, this coalition was willing to make compromises in order

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716 Haamdi, *The right of authority*, 168

717 For example, Ennahda advocated for a parliamentarian system while the Congress for the Republic wanted a presidential system.
to reach the national elections as soon as possible in order to create a new legitimacy. Following the departure of Ben Ali, Ennahda called for the establishment of a Constituent Assembly from all the groups that participated in the revolution in order to write a new constitution for a parliamentarian system, abolish the 1959 constitution, dissolve parliament, the consultants’ council and the constitutional council, and run a general election within six months of forming a national unity government.\(^718\) The development of events, however, shows that Ennahda’s main goal was to force the interim government to hold national elections as soon as possible. In response to my question on why Ennahda accepted a limited number of representatives in the Higher Commission for the Fulfilment of Revolution Goals, Political Reform and Democratic Transition (HCFRGRPD), which limited their party’s role in the decisions of the Commission, Sahabi Atig, then the head of Ennahda bloc in the Constituent Assembly, explained that what was important for party was to have a roadmap that would lead to national elections in order to create a new legitimate government that would replace the interim authority. Atig also claimed that his party was confident that it was going to win the elections because its activists were able to rebuild their party in a short period of time.\(^719\)

The second camp was the Front of 14 January. Formed on January 21, 2011, the Front included the POCT and seven additional radical leftist and pan-Arabist groups. Its platform included the following goals: depose Ghannouchi’s government and any government that includes members from the RCD party; form an interim government that would be accepted by the Tunisian people, its progressive political forces, and civil society organizations; dissolve the institutions of the old regime including the parliament, the consultants council, the security police, and the RCD party;

\(^{718}\) Ghannouchi, “Ennahda state’s its position.”

\(^{719}\) Sahabi Atig, interview with author, Tunis, April 30, 2011.
hold Constituent Council elections within a year in order to write a new constitution; and finally, solve the country’s social and economic crisis by nationalizing the companies that the old regime privatized and by abandoning the policies of economic liberalization.\textsuperscript{720} This camp was the closest to the interior region activists because it integrated into its program their social demands. The last camp within the AYMs was the GIMs, which remained focused on the revolution main social goals. Some of them, like Karama and the New Youth Generation advocated for the constitutional formalization of the revolution’s demands before any election took place. According to Elamine, the social and economic rights of the poor must be “constitutionalized first before running any election because “[those] who have not (the poor people) lack sufficient resources to compete in the elections with those who have everything and embrace free-market policies.” In other words, the constitution should be written first to guarantee the interests of the poor Tunisians because they did not have a chance to achieve their demands through the elections. In the absence of this condition, he claimed, elections were merely a mechanism for “changing the guardians of the same polices of liberal economics,”\textsuperscript{721} or as Aljelassi put it, “equality through elections is a big lie due to economic subjugation.” What would lead to social justice, according to Karama, is not an election, but “the continuation of the revolutionary track until the demands of the marginalized are achieved.”\textsuperscript{722} Others, such as the Free Tunisian Forces,

\textsuperscript{721} Elamine, “interview.”
\textsuperscript{722} Abdulnaser Al-s’edani, interview with the author, Tunis, June 7, 2013.
called for the continuation of the revolution until the installation of a revolutionary government that would implement the revolution’s demands.\footnote{Fawzi Daas, interview with author, Tunis, June 8, 2013; Sonia Chorabi, interview with author, Tunis, May 24, 2012.}

The second reason that prevented the AYMs from installing a government of their choice was that they had to struggle with the NYMs which chose to make an alliance with the old regime. The PDP and Ettajdid maintained that the revolution achieved its goal by ousting Ben Ali and that the country was trapped, according to Issam Chebbi, between military rule and the collapse of the state. To avoid either possibility, Chebbi said, his party agreed to join the government to keep the state functioning. In addition to these claims, Chebbi said the Ghannouchi’s political roadmap suited them because it included running the presidential election before the parliamentary one. As he illustrated “since the struggle after the departure of Ben Ali was over authority, and the main two forces were the PDP and Ennahda, running the presidential election would most likely lead to the election of the PDP candidate\footnote{The Ahmed Chebbi, the party’s historic leader was the party’s candidate.} because Ennahda, then, had no national leaders, and this in turn would affect the results of the parliamentarian elections for the benefit of the PDP candidates.”\footnote{Issam Chebbi, “interview.”} For Ettajdid, as Youssif Tlili argued, removing Ben Ali and his family from authority opened the door to ending corruption, democratizing public life, and solving the uneven development problem between the regions. If, he said, the radical left or right took power, the process of democratization would not be guaranteed.\footnote{Youssif Tlili, then, member in the Central Committee of Ettajdid movement, interview with author, Tunis, April 10, 2012.}

The final reason of why the AYMs could not install a government of their own was their lack of organizational capacity to sustain the protests in the coastal regions. Unlike in the interior
regions, which were committed to the protests because the reasons of their mobilization were unemployment and marginalization, the coastal regions joined the protests in order to oust the regime. With the departure of Ben Ali, the reason for protests in these areas disappeared. The inability of the AYMs to maintain the protests in these regions made them reliant on the support of the UGTT to achieve their goals. But as a civil society organization, the UGTT included activists from all the movements, and all of them struggled to ensure that the official position of the union was congruent with theirs. As such, the official position of the UGTT was oscillating between supporting the AYMs and backing the interim government.

A new path toward democratization

The power-struggle between the different actors over authority prompted the UGTT to propose an organizational body that would unite all factions during the interim period. In response to this proposal, the ‘Front of 14 January’ suggested forming ‘The National Congress for the Protection of the Revolution’ and proposed its own political program to be the platform of the Congress. It also proposed turning the Congress into a legislative and decision-making body until the election of a Constituent Assembly, which would be then tasked with missions of writing new constitution and governing during the interim period. This proposal was discussed by thirty parties and civil society organizations and on February 11 the groups declared the formation of the Council for the Protection of the Revolution (CFPR). The most important goals the groups agreed on were to make the CFPR the legislative and decision making body on all issues related

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to the interim period and to give it the authority to monitor the interim government’s work.\textsuperscript{728}

The PDP and Ettajdid withdrew from the agreement because they were part of the government and they did not want to grant the CFPR decision-making and legislative powers. For their part, Ennahda, Ettakatol, the Congress for the Republic, and the Bar Association all signed the agreement, but they expressed the same reservations as the PDP and Ettajdid.\textsuperscript{729}

Thus the CFPR was stillborn, because its authority as a legislative and decision-making body, according to the agreement between the different groups, hinged on the approval of the interim president, who refused to ratify the agreement.\textsuperscript{730} This incited the AYMs’ activists in the interior regions to hold a second sit-in in front of the government building (known as the sit-in of Qasaba II). The sit-in, lasting February 23- March 4, raised the same demands as that of Qasaba I and included an additional one: an immediate election to establish a Constituent Assembly to write new constitution and to lead the interim period.\textsuperscript{731} This demand was endorsed by all AYMs and the sit-in was fully adopted and backed by the UGTT and Bar Association.\textsuperscript{732} The mass demonstration on February 26 forced the Ghannouchi government to resign.\textsuperscript{733} On March 3, the interim president declared, officially, the resignation of the government and the formation of a new one headed by Beji Caid Sebsi. The interim president defined the goal of the new government as to prepare for the elections of the Constituent Assembly by July 24. He also


\textsuperscript{729} Als’edani, “The youth in Tunisia’s democratic transition,” 44

\textsuperscript{730} Mouli, “interview.”

\textsuperscript{731} Hussam Farati, interview with author, Sfax, May 11, 2012

\textsuperscript{732} Mouli, “interview.”

\textsuperscript{733} His supporters, according to Yousif Tlili and Amin Chanfouli, then activist within Ettajdid movement, organized a counter sit-in in Al-Qubeh, to back him up. Ghannouchi addressed them, saying that if he was going to continue, the silent majority should speak. Interview with author, Tunis, April 22, 2012.
reaffirmed the formation of the HCFRGPRDT as an equivalent body to the CFRP.\textsuperscript{734} Sebsi, who was part of Bourguiba regime but not of Ben Ali’s, declared in his first speech that the 1959 constitution was no longer valid, and that “all the institutions that were established according to it would be frozen except for the administrative court and the department of accountability.” This meant the dissolution of parliament, of the consultants’ council, and of the security police, which were part of the Qasaba I and II demands.\textsuperscript{735} With these achievements, the sit-in ended, though the new government was appointed without consultation with the revolutionary groups.

The formation of the HCARGPRDT put Tunisia on track for a more credible process of democratization, as it included most of the important political powers that formed the CFPR.\textsuperscript{736} According to Samir Cheifi, the UGTT left the CFPR and joined the HCARGPRDT because it wanted to protect the democratic transition from the “radical left who may install a Stalinist regime and from the radical right who could embrace a Khomeinist regime.”\textsuperscript{737} Creating the HCFRGPRDT would, he hoped, put Tunisia on the track of democracy and limit the perceived danger posed by the far left and far right. Ennahda, the Congress for the Republic party, and Ettakatol left the CFPR because they were more concerned with the election of the Constituent Assembly, which the HCFRGPRDT was supposed to set up. Finally, three groups of the ‘Front

\textsuperscript{734} The HCFRGPRDT originally established by a presidential decree on February 18th, 2011. According to this decree, the HCFRGPRDT had two major goals: make proposals to keep state institutions running and to achieve the revolution’s goals; and approve written laws by experts before introducing them to the president to approve them. See “Decree No 6 for the year 2011, date February 18, 2011 concerning the establishing of HCFRGPRDT.” Retrieved from Jurispedia, http://ar.jurispedia.org (accessed May 31, 2014)


\textsuperscript{736} The only groups that refused to join were the GIMs and the POCT. The GIMs

\textsuperscript{737} Cheifi, “interview.”
of January 14 left the CFPR and joined the new Commission. These withdrawals from the CFPR and from the ‘Front of January 14 made them irrelevant and empowered the HCFRGPRDT.

However, the POCT and GIMs such as Karama refused to join the HCFRGPRDT. The POCT rejected the Commission on the grounds that “its composition, tasks, and goals were not discussed with the revolutionary groups”, because the Commission included “representatives of groups that did not participate in the revolution, some of which were against it”, and because it “did not include representatives for the regions.” As a result, the HCFRGPRDT dismissed those members who had appealed to Ben Ali to run for a sixth presidential term and expanded its membership to give the political parties more representations, and to include representatives from all regions and from the families of protestors killed by regime forces. The GIMs, as explained earlier, refused the entire track of democratic transition because they felt it was not going to lead to the achievement of the revolution’s social goals. According to Ayman, from Karama, the development of democratic transition track proved that Karam position was right because the Commission and the elections of the Constituent Assembly that followed “turned the struggle over the revolution’s social demands into a fight over Tunisians’ identity, [waged] between the religious and secular groups.”

Despite the refusal of the POCT and the GIMs to join the HCARGPRDT, its formation created the mechanism that led to the October 2011 Constitutional Assembly. The members of HCARGPRDT agreed on electoral and parliamentary laws, defined the scope of responsibility for the High Election Commission and the authorities of

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740 Ayman, “interview.”
Constituent Assembly\textsuperscript{741}, and blacklisted senior members of the RCD and those who had appealed to Ben Ali to run for a six term of presidency.\textsuperscript{742}

**Conclusion**

In this chapter, I argued that the emergence of multiple leadership centers for the protests was a result of the confrontational nature of the protests, the weak infrastructure of the youth movements’ organizations, their disagreement over the protests’ goals, and due to the rise of grassroots informal movements. This decentralized form of leadership had several implications on the process of democratization. First, because the protests had no unified leadership, the outcome of the protests was limited to either complete success or failure. Second, the success of the activists in ousting the regime created a political vacuum that the youth movements could not fill because they did not have a unified leadership. However, their success created a legitimacy crisis that could not be solved without running national elections. Third, the interim government initially formed out of the old regime’s institutions, the Ghannouchi government, was forced to declare national elections because of the foundation on which it assumed the authority – namely, Article 57 in the 1959 constitution. Finally, the struggle between the AYMs and the interim government and amongst one-another led to the creation of the HCARGPRDT, which put Tunisia on a more credible track of democratization by running free and competitive elections in October 2011.

\textsuperscript{741} Abdulmawla, “The Tunisian experience in democratic transition.”

Chapter VI

Egypt: Domination of AYMs at the Cycle’s Apex

In Egypt, the call to protests the police repression to Egyptians and to demands better living conditions on January 25, 2011 appeared on the website of We Are Khalid Saed (WRAKS) on January 14, on the day the protests in Tunisia succeeded in overthrowing Ben Ali. The call for the protests was immediately embraced by April 6 Movement (A6M), Youth for Justice and Freedom (YJF), the Campaign for the Support of El-Baradei’ (CFSE), the Revolutionary Socialists (RS) and several independents. All those youth movements are autonomous; they were neither legal nor had ever participated in the election. In fact, except for the RS whose roots refers to the Egyptian Communist Party and were active since early 2000, the other youth groups are relatively new. A6M appeared in 2008 when a group of youth activists called for a general strike in Cairo in support for the workers of textile factories in El-Mahalah who were planning to declare a strike on April 6, 2008. The YJF is a leftist group that was formed in middle 2010 from activists in the RS group who defected because they believed the social issues should be prioritized in order to convince the Egyptians to change the regime. The CFSE was established in March 2010 following the return of Mohamed El-Baradei’, the former Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) former abroad. The group of youth who supported El-Baradei’ to be Egypt’s new president called for ending the emergency law, decent and fair election elections under the judicial supervision, and limiting the right to run for the presidency to two terms.

Though, the abovementioned groups did not possess mass-based organizations as the Muslim Brotherhood (MB), and there numbers were very small, they were the ones that planned
for the January 25, 2011 demonstrations along with independents and defected youth from the MB. The success of the protests on January 25 and the killing of two activists in Suez governorate encouraged those groups to call for the ‘Day of Rage’ or the ‘Friday of Furry’ on January 28, 2011 in order to oust the regime.

The MB, a nonautonomous movement who was not recognized legally by the regime but who participated in the People Council elections since 1984 declared intention to participate in the demonstrations on the night of January 27. However, their participation in the protests was on the platform of reforming the regime from within as reflected in their statements between January 28 and 30. The cycle of protests’ apex began on January 28; on this day the Egyptians called for ousting the regime, the Central Security Forces (CSF) collapsed after bloody confrontation with poor Egyptians, and the army was deployed in the streets. Encouraged by the defeat of CSF and the seemingly neutral position of the army, the protestors occupied Tahrir Square on January 29 and declared a sit-in until the departure of Mubarak on February 11, 2011.

Following this background introduction, I first establish the facts that the AYMs and NYMs responded differently to the regime’s repression, and that the AYMs did dominate the protests at the CoP’s apex as the protestors’ adopted their call of ousting the regime and supported it by maintain the sit-in in Tahrir Square and by refusing the negotiation with the regime. Then, I explain how the AYMs initiated and sustained the protests. In other words how they solved the problem of resources at time they did not have mass-based organizations. Next, I illustrate how the engagement of poor people consolidated the domination of the AYMs at CoP’s apex. Finally, I summarize the chapter’s main arguments and findings.
State Repression and AYM’s Domination During the CoP

The evidence drawn from the narrative of activists and the documents of the AYMs and the NYMs during the entire CoP shows that the former responded to state repression by calling upon the Egyptians to intensify their protests until ousting the regime, while the latter sought to improve its negotiating power with the regime. The evidence also shows domination of the AYMs on the protests before and during the CoP’s apex in the sense that the protestors adopted and backed up the AYMs call of ousting the regime as evident by their demonstrations, the sit-in in Tahrir Square, and their refusal of the negotiation with Mubarak’s regime. The domination of AYMs, despite their lack of mass-based organization, during the entire CoP was facilitated by the absence of NYMs from the protests in their early stages and by the engagement of the latter in negotiating the regime during the CoP’s apex.

State’s Repression and Responses of AYMs and NYMs

The state responded to the protests on January 25 by intensifying its repression. In Cairo and Alexandria it dispersed the protests using batons and tear gas canisters, and in Suez it killed two protestors. On January 26 and 27, the regime killed 10 protestors in Sinai governorate.\(^743\) In response, the AYMs issued several statements calling for Egyptians to participate in the demonstrations of the ‘Friday of Rage’ on January 28 in order to oust the regime while the NYMs reiterated its prior demands for reform. This is clear in the statements issued by both sides between January 25 and 28.

The Revolutionary Socialists’ (RS) statement on January 25 which seems to be issued after the protests reached Tahrir Square as it mentions the protestors attempt to remain in the

Square called for the continuation of the demonstrations until Mubarak stepped down, the resignation of Nazif’s government, the dissolution of the People Council, and the formation of a national unity government.\(^{744}\) Similarly, April 6 Movement (A6M) called upon Egyptians to demonstrate and march after Friday prayer throughout the country on January 28, 2011, the ‘Friday of Rage and Freedom’, in order to topple the regime.\(^{745}\) In comparison, the MB focused on calling the regime to conduct immediate reforms that included dissolving the People Council and holding new elections for it under judiciary observation. It also called upon the regime to “abandon its stubbornness” and to make reforms on all levels. When it came to participation in the protests of the ‘Friday of Rage’, the MB’s statement ignored the subject and appealed to all Egyptians to be united against “oppression and corruption” without further clarification.\(^{746}\)

The AYMs and NYMs camps also responded differently to the state’s repression on January 28 and 29, when millions of Egyptians in all governorates took to the street to demand the regime’s departure. During those two days, the state killed 763, yet even during this period, the MB refrained from joining protestors’ calls for the regime’s departure and instead maintained their commitment to its legitimacy.\(^{747}\) The MB’s official statement on January 29 called for abolishing the emergency law, new elections for the people council, releasing all detained protestors and political prisoners, and forming an interim national government from outside the National Democratic Party (NDP) that would organize the legal process of transferring

\(^{744}\) RS, “Revolution, Revolution until Victory,” 267


authority.\textsuperscript{748} In fact the first instance on which the MB called for overthrowing the regime came only on January 31 when it asked the people to continue their protests in all Egypt “until the regime, all the regime with its president, party, cabinet, and People Council, leave their positions of authority.”\textsuperscript{749} In contrast, April 6 Movement (A6M) statement on January 29 called the Egyptians to remain in the streets and to form neighbourhood committees to protect their properties because “[they] are on the road of the revolution success.”\textsuperscript{750}

To summarize, in congruence with the thesis argument, the AYMs responded to the state’s repression by call to Egyptians to oust the regime, while the NYMs remained loyal to its reform program in order to maintain its interests with the state.

**Domination of AYMs During CoP’s Apex**

In the following paragraphs I establish the fact that AYMs did dominate the protests prior and during the CoP’s apex. Prior the CoP, the domination was evident because the AYMs were not subjected to competition with NYMs as the latter did not participate in initiating the protests. During the CoP’s apex, this domination can be seen on three levels: the protestors’ demand of ousting the regime in accordance with AYMs statements at time the NYMs were calling for reforming the regime; it was demonstrated in establishing the sit-in in Tahrir Square until Mubarak’s departure; and in the protestors refusal to negotiation with the regime in agreement with AYMs rejection to the regime’s invitation for national dialogue.

The absence of the MB, rhetorically and physically, during the preparation for the protests on January 25, allowed the AYMs to dominate the protests prior to their apex; they had

\textsuperscript{748} MB, “A statement from the Muslim Brotherhood about the Egyptian people blessed Intifada,” 179.

\textsuperscript{749} MB, “A statement from the Muslim Brotherhood about the Egyptian people continuous blessed Intifada,” 180.

\textsuperscript{750} A6M, “In our way for the revolution success,” Rabe’, 242.
no competition. Rhetorically, the AYMs prepared the Egyptians for the protests and determined their goals. Encouraged by the successful Tunisian Revolution, the group of ‘We Are All Khalid Saed’ (WRAKS) on January 14 posted a call on their website for Egyptians to take into the streets on January 25 in order to get higher minimum wages, to abolish the emergency law, to dismiss Habib Al Adli, the interior minister, and to prosecute the police officers who had allegedly committed crimes against Egyptian citizens. This call was followed with five statements issued by A6M seeking to incite Egyptians against the regime and to call them to participate in protests. The first statement of A6M called for Egyptians to follow the example of Tunisians. A6M claimed in it that,

‘if Alouazizi motivated the Tunisians to make an uprising, we [the Egyptians] have Sayed Bilal, Khalid Sa’ed, tens of victims of police torture, the martyrs of ferry, the martyrs of carcinogenic pesticides, and the martyrs of Duaika and trains. We have martyrs in the queue of bread, martyrs due to medical ignorance at hospitals and thousands of martyrs whom the authoritarian Mubarak’s regime assassinated.’

Their second statement dubbed the policemen Baltija (thugs) whose main goal was not to protect the people, “as they did on January 25, 1952 when they fought the British occupation in Al Ismaeliya”, but rather to protect “Mubarak’s regime.” A6M thus “calls upon youth to express their refusal to the policies of torture conducted by the Baltija of the Interior Ministry on

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751 Ghonim, “If the People One,” 215.
752 A6M, “Tunisia Flies toward Freedom,” 236. The statement refers to the incidents of the sink of Peace Ferry in the Red Sea in 2006; the rockslide in Dwaika region, Cairo in 2008 were hundreds of Egyptians killed due to state carelessness.
January 25.”753 A6M’s third statement outlined the same demands as appeared on the website of WRAKS.754 The other three statements were directed at organizational management.755

In contrast, the MB’s statements during this period ignored the call for protests and continuously sought to convince the regime to accept political reforms. The MB first statement was a comment on the Tunisian revolution and the lessons it offers to states and to corrupt regional governments. Their statement, however, implicitly informed the regime that it was not planning to take part in the protests of January 25 because it preferred “the stability and civil peace in all cases and circumstances” and that it “believes in constitutional struggle for reform” and for those two reasons, it expected the “regime to initiate the required reforms.” The statement contains ten demands framed as necessary for the state to maintain stability. The first four demands in the statement are: abolishing the emergency law, dissolving the People Council, widely viewed as ‘fraudulent’, and running a new and fair election to replace it, amending the constitution to ensure competitive presidential elections, and providing the Egyptian people with their basic needs of food and medicine. Their other demands are related to political freedoms such as freeing political prisoners and freedom of expression.756 The MB’s second statement seems to be a response to a police warning against joining the 25 January protests, as it says “we were surprised by calls to our activists in the governorates to warn them against taking to the street to inform the people of our demands [as mentioned in the previous statement].” The

753 A6M, “About the organization,” 237.
755 The first called upon participating movements and parties in the protests not to raise factional flags and banners and to display only the Egyptian flag and to put up posters that reflect the demands of the entire people. The second was a warning to policemen not to use force against peaceful protestors, and in the last statement A6M listed phone numbers to be used by demonstrators in case of emergency. See Rabe’, the documents, 237-41.
statement calls for a national dialogue to solve Egypt’s crisis, and reminds the government’s elites to deal “wisely” with popular tension by “responding positively” to the “nation’s demands.”

Not only was the MB rhetorically absent in the preparation for the protests on January 25, but it did not physically participate as well. According to Osama, an MB activist at the University of Cairo who participated in the protests on January 25, he and other colleagues from the university went to Dr. Mohamed Morsi, then a member of the MB Guidance Council and later on the elected president of Egypt, to ask him about the official position of the MB on the protests on January 25th. Morsi’s answer, according to Osama, was vague: on the one hand, he did not ask them to participate, and on the other hand, he said “we are always with our people,” a phrase that they interpreted to mean “participation is an individual choice.” Osama said what encouraged him to join the protests was his good relationship with the revolutionary groups at the University of Cairo that had been active the last few years.

In Alexandria the MB’s position was a clear rejection to joining the protests. According to three former MB activists who eventually defected to the AYMs, when they asked their leadership about the protests, they were informed in clear words that the MB was not part of it. Like Osama, they said they joined the protests because they had strong relations with the activists of A6M, RS, and Youth for Justice and Freedom (YJF) and they could not simply ignore them. Mohammed Abo Elgheit, an activist and a columnist at Shorouk newspaper, also asked two leaders of the MB whether they were going to participate in the protests and they clearly told him ‘no’, arguing that the protestors...

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757 MB, “About the popular tension,” 177-8.
758 Osama Salem, interview with author, Cairo, June 7, 2012.
“would not succeed” and that the MB activists “would be targeted alone by the state investigation security.” Similar to Ghonim (2012) says in his book that he asked Omar Gazaz, one of the founders of RASD website- an electronic news agency for the MB-, if the MB were going to participate in the demonstrations and the latter told him in “clear-cut” words that they were not. Furthermore, in her research on the Islamists and the Revolution, Abdulatif (2012) also confirms that the MB did not participate in the protests as an organization. However, she says, the MB sent three of their leaders to Tahrir Square in order to evaluate the protests and this facilitated the decision of their participation on January 28. The MB is a hierarchal organization and its participation in the protests is subject to a decision from its top leadership, the Guidance Council. Only on the night of January 27 did the MB inform its members and other movements that it was going to take part in the ‘Friday of Rage’, which was already declared by the AYMs. This physical and rhetorical absence of the MB ensured the domination of the AYMs prior to the beginning of the CoP’s apex and it also helped in maintain their domination during it.

During the CoP’s apex the AYMs dominated the protests as evident by the people adoption to their call for ousting the regime, the protestors support to the sit-in in Tahrir Square, and the rejection of the protestors of the negotiations with the regime which reflected the AYMs position from the dialogue with the regime. I explained in the previous section that the AYMs called in its statements between January 25 and 30 for ousting the regime while the MB

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760 Abo Elgheit, “About the ugly revolution.”
761 Ghonim, If people wants life, 226-7
762 Abdulatif, “The Islamists and the Revolution”, 224-225. It is important to note that the protests began in the morning and reached Tahrir Square around 5 PM. Atta, Nagi, Mustafa, Elbahrawi, “interviews.”
763 Mustafa Ben Hassanein, MB activist, interview with author, Cairo, June 27, 2011
maintained their call of reforming it from within. The demonstrations on January 28 which followed the Friday prayer began with one word ‘Irhal’, which means ‘depart.’ It was directed to Mubarak as the head of the state and it reflected the protestors’ interpretation to the AYMs call of changing the regime. According to several activists, once the prayer ends, the activists of the AYMs who were distributed on several mosques in Cairo chanted Irhal and the protestors repeated after them the same demand.\footnote{Nagy, Atta, Mustafa, Osama, interview with the author, Cairo, respectively June 25, July 4, July 22, June 7, 2012} In their way to Tahrir Square the protestors expressed their instance on this demand by breaking the CSF cordons in fierce and bloody confrontation (see the section in this chapter on spontaneous riot movements). Furthermore, the protestors backed up the call for ousting the regime by maintaining presence in Tahrir Square, which the AYMs erected on January 29, until Mubarak departed.\footnote{On January 25 the AYMs tried to remain in Tharir Square but the CSF dispersed them around midnight. Following the collapse of CSF, the AYMs occupied the Square on January 29. I elaborate on the sit-in in Tahrir Square in chapter VIII.}

In addition, the domination of the AYMs during the CoP’s apex can be read in the defense position of the MB following their acceptance to negotiate the regime on February 2, 2011.\footnote{Curiously, the first and the second statement of the MB on February 2 bluntly call for refusing dialogue with the regime. The first stament says “this regime lost its legitimacy”…[it] refuses the people’s demands”… [and] we refuse to run a dialogue with it.” See, MB, “A statement from the Muslim Brotherhood about the Egyptian people continuous blessed Intifada,” 181. The second says “we refuse to conduct dialogue with the regime that lost its legitimacy including its president, party, parliament, and government.” See MB, “A statement from the Muslim Brotherhood to the Egyptian people,” 182} This defense reflected the protestors refusal to the negotiation with regime for that as a mass-based organization, the MB would not defend themselves against the position of the camp of AYMs which constitutes only several hundreds of activists unless the position of this camp is dominant among the Egyptian youth and mainly the protestors. For example, the statement of the MB on February 2 says “we do not have special agenda and we have no aspiration to the
presidency or to rule” and that all what they want is “incremental peaceful reform.”\textsuperscript{767} Similarly, their statement on February 5 promises that they “will not nominate any one of them for presidency.”\textsuperscript{768} And on February 6, the MB claimed that they “entered the dialogue in order to convey the demands of the protestors directly to the state’s seniors.”\textsuperscript{769} Perhaps the clearest statement that shows their defense position during this period is the one they issued on February 7. It begins by admitting that their dialogue with the regime undermined their position among the protestors. The statement reads “The MB would like to clarify more and to eliminate suspicions about their position” and it reaffirmed commitment to Mubarak’s departure because “it ends the crisis and absorbs the people anger.”\textsuperscript{770} These statements were in part a response to the AYMs statements which sought to delegitimize the movements and the parties that pursued negotiation with the regime. For example, A6M repudiated any negotiation with the regime until Mubarak stepped down,\textsuperscript{771} and accused the regime of conducting “dialogue” with “decorative parties of its creation” in order to deceive the Egyptian people.\textsuperscript{772} Similarly, the RS captured the irony of dialogue between the MB and the regime: “how it is possible to make a dialogue with the regime for toppling the regime”, they asked. The RS was direct in accusing those who negotiate with the regime of wanting to legitimize it by accepting limited and nominal reforms.\textsuperscript{773}

This overview shows only the domination of the AYMs during the CoP’s apex but it does not explain how social movement organizations without mass-based organizations can dominate

\textsuperscript{767} MB, “A statement about Thursday events”, in Rabe’, The documents, 183.
\textsuperscript{768} MB, “About the events of great Friday”, in Rabe’, The documents, 184.
\textsuperscript{769} MB, “About the meeting with Vice President”, in Rabe’, The documents, 186
\textsuperscript{770} MB, “Statement press release”, in Rabe’, The documents, 187
\textsuperscript{771} A6M, “About the youth demands and a rejection,” “The documents,” 243.
\textsuperscript{772} A6M, “In response to Amr Suleiman threats to sit-inners,” 245.
\textsuperscript{773} RS, “No negotiation until the regime’s departure,” 271.
the protests in order to turn a reform CoP into a ‘revolution.’ It is to this subject that I turn in the following section.

AYMs and the Resource Problem

The lack of AYMs of mass-based organizations was evident by the fact that the protests on January 25, 2011 were not organized by the same AYMs groups in all governorates (see below). Furthermore, the past experiences of these groups were that all their demonstrations ended up with the police encircling and imprisoning them – an outcome largely due to low numbers of participants. Indeed, because the AYMs did not have sufficient human resources, the most that they had hoped to achieve on January 25, was a one-day mobilization like that of April 6, 2008, when thousands of people challenged the regime in El Mahla Alkubra. Additionally, the only movement that could contribute significantly to the protests was the MB, but as mentioned earlier, the MB refused to commit to participate in the protests. Thus these groups struggled from the beginning with the question of how to initiate and sustain the protests. To illustrate how the AYMs solved the resource problem, I first will argue that they overcame this problem by mobilizing poor Egyptians. They did so in two ways: they prioritized the social demands over the political ones in the preparation period for the protests on January 25, 2011 and in the early stages of them, and by strategically planned to locate the protests in poor Egyptians neighbourhoods. Then, I falsify two arguments related to how the activists solved the problem of resources. The first is the claim that the activists overcame their resource deficit through their

774 Author’s interview with Shawky Elgenawy (YJC), Amal Sharaf (A6M), Ahmed Elbahrawy (RS), Cairo, respectively, June 15, June 17, June 6, 2012; Anas Hassan, interview with author, Alexandria, July 13, 2012.
775 Mustafa Maher (A6M), interview with author, Cairo, July 22, 2012.
extensive use of social media. And the second one is that the participation of the MB on January 28, 2011 solved the resource problem due to their possession of a mass-based movement.

**Prioritizing Social Demands in the Preparation Period of Protests**

A frame analysis to the statements of A6M and the MB as a representative to the AYMs and NYMs, respectively, during the preparation period to the January 25, 2011 protests show that former focused on the Egyptians social demands in order to convince them to join the protests while the latter prioritized the political demands. The diagnostic component in the A6M’s statements between January 15 and 25 attributed the Egyptians daily grievances in terms of poverty, unemployment, and poor health conditions to the regime’s disregard and disrespect to the Egyptians. In term of the prognostic component in the statements, A6M considered increasing the minimal wage of the white and blue collars, and increasing wages as the prices of commodities go up its first two top priorities.\(^{776}\) In contrast, the first statement of the MB focused on the movement’s political demands such as dissolving the people the council and amending the constitution to allow for competitive presidential election while fixing the problems of poverty and mal health treatment appears in its statement at a later stage.\(^{777}\) This, however, should not be surprising because the AYMs sought to incite Egyptians to take into the streets on January 25, while the NYMs were after convincing the regime to accept political reforms. Furthermore, the document ‘All what you need to know about the demonstrations of January 25 Revolution’ which reflects the master frame of the protests focuses mainly on the issues of social justice, mainly the Egyptians’ poverty and the state’s corruption and repression (see the next chapter). This document was prepared by the AYMs and disseminated through the webpage of WRAKS.

\(^{776}\) A6M, “The places of demonstrations”, 238-9

\(^{777}\) MB, “About the Tunisian Intifada,” 175-7
In addition, the activists were cautious to raise political demands at the beginning of the protests in order not to scare the people. According to Nagi, “our goal was to convince the people to join the protests by addressing their social demands.” Indeed, he said, “when I saw the people joining us at Nahia in hundreds, I wanted to chant down to Mubarak regime, but my colleagues asked me to stop because they did not want to scare the people.”

However, because the protests reached their apex in a very short period, only three days after their beginning and due to the demonstration effect of the Tunisian successful CoP, it is difficult to track the effect of prioritizing the social demands over the political ones as in the case of Tunisia. Yet, several scholars including Hoffman and Jamal (2012) and Assad (2011) show that the social demands such as employment and improving the living economic conditions were at the core of protests in the Arab countries. This argument will further gain credibility when I discuss the second track the AYMs adopted to solve the resource problem. I turn now to this subject.

**Locating Protests in Poor Neighbourhoods (The Snowball Plan)**

The second strategy the AYMs used to overcome the resource problem was that they deliberately and secretly planned to locate the protests in the most aggrieved Egyptians zones.

In Cairo, although the youth groups that expressed readiness to take part in the protests on January 25 were numerous, the actual groups that were involved in planning the protests on

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778 Nagi, interview with author, Cairo, June 25, 2012

779 Hoffman and Jamal, “The youth and the Arab Spring”; Assad, “Demographics of Arab Protests.”

780 The groups that expressed willing to join the protests were Youth for Justice and Freedom (YJF), the Campaign for the Support of El-Barade‘ (CFSE), the Youth Movement of the Democratic Party, Youth Movement for Change, Solidarity Movement, the Youth Movement of Karama Party. See Hamada, “25 January Revolution”; Zahran, “The regional trends”; El-Mahdi, “Egypt: A Decade.”
the ground were only A6M, Youth for Justice and Freedom (YJF), and the Campaign for the Support of El-Baradei’ (CFSE). The solution to the AYMs resource dilemma came from Mahmoud Sami, an activist in A6M and then a student at the University of Ain Shams, who proposed what he called the “the snowball plan” in a meeting at the YJF’s office on January 15, 2011. His plan was to locate the demonstration in one of the poorest regions of Cairo and to begin the protests by chanting social justice slogans in order to convince poor people to join the protests. According to Sami, the failure of previous demonstrations owed to two factors: the first was the use of political rhetoric which did not resonate with the people, and the second was that locating the protests away from the most aggrieved sectors of the public made it easier for police to keep protestors within a cordon. If, he said, we “begin a march in one of the poor areas and chant slogans that resound with them, they may join us”, and if they did, then a march featuring large numbers of protestors would “prevent the police from encircling us as it used to happen.” Moreover, the march, he explained, “would turn into a snowball as it would attract more people while we are heading to Tahrir Square.” The choice of Nahia in Boulaq El Dakrour as the main location for the protests was based on two factors. The first is the high density of poor households in this area, while the second is that Nahia lies in close proximity to Tahrir Square. The other choices that the activists discussed but discarded were Al Hitiah region in El Agouza,

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781 Abo Elgiatan, “The map of snowball plan”; author’s interview with Wisam Atta (YJF), Mustafa Maher (A6M), Ahmed Ismael (CFSE), Cairo, respectively July 5, July 22, and July 2, 2012

782 Shawky Elgenawy, interview with author, Cairo, June 15, 2012; see Abo Elgiatan, “The map of snowball plan.”Elgenawy, an activist in YJF was one of the few who attended the meeting on January 15, 2011.

783 Abo Elgiatan, “The snowball plan.”
which they rejected for its low population density, and Ard Al-Liwa, Giza, which they rejected due to its distance from Tahrir Square.  

This plan was confirmed in the last meeting of the protests’ organizing groups, on January 24 at the office of Ziad Aleleimi’s, who was an activist in the CFSE. In this last meeting, organizers decided on three social justice slogans to be chanted at Nahia at the beginning of the gathering. They chose the Alsuniah mosque at Nahia to be their departure point, and distributed protest roles amongst their group – who would hold banners and who would start chanting. Additionally, they agreed to hold a sit-in close to the Mustafa Mahmoud mosque in case the original plan to reach the Tahrir Square failed. Two other important issues were also discussed: the first was to incite the poor to take part in the protests the next day by distributing leaflets in their areas at night and the second was to keep the location of the protest a secret in order to prevent the police from aborting it before it gained momentum. For this particular reason, the name of Nahia as the main location of the protests was never publicized. In fact, other than the ten people who attended the January 24 meeting and the head of the groups that were supposed to meet in Nahia (fifteen groups each composed of ten activists), opposition

784 Elgenawy, “interview”; Maher, “interview.” In fact, Sami measured the distance and the time it took on feet to arrive to Tahrir Square from Nahia and drew a map of the roads the march of the demonstrators would pass through.

785 Ahmed Ismael, interview with author, Cairo, July 2, 2012.

786 These slogans are: They raised the prices of sugar, they raised the prices of food oil, tomorrow we will sell the home’s furniture; they raised the prices of diesel, they raised the prices of gas, our life became like mud; they eat birds and chickens, and the fava beans, which we eat, made us unconscious.

787 Ismael, “interview”; Wisam Atta, interview with author, Cairo, July 5, 2012. Atta was the one who prepared the banners for Nahia demonstration.

788 Elgenawy, “interview”; Maher, “interview.”
activists were told only that Nahia’s street was simply a place to hide from the police en route to the protests in the Mustafa Mahmoud mosque.\footnote{Mohammed Nagy, “interview.”}

On January 25, this plan was implemented. Almost 200 activists gathered at Alsuniah Mosque and marched along Nahia’s main street while chanting the slogans they had previously agreed upon. Surprised by the location of the protests, the few police officers that were stationed at Nahia could not stop the protestors, and the march immediately gained momentum when joined by the local residents of poor neighbourhoods. When the march left Nahia’s main street, it had grown to include more than 5,000 protestors, and this number increased to 30,000 during the march to Tahrir Square.\footnote{I interviewed thirty-five activist in Cairo of whom twenty-six participated in the protest of January 25, 2011 (the other nine participated in the protests beginning from January 28). The twenty six activists said the number of the protestors in Tahrir Square was between thirty to fifty thousands.}

In Alexandria, the groups that planned for the protests included A6M, YJF, and CFSE, the defected youth of MB, the Revolutionary Socialists, and the Revolutionary Islamists.\footnote{Author’s interviews with Mohammed Samir (CFSE), Ahmed Fahmi (A6M), Mohammed Elnimir (defected MB), Mohammed Mamdouh (Revolutionary Islamists), Alexandria, July 13 and 15, 2012. Revolutionary Islamists is a small Islamic group that believes in prioritizing the social justice in the Islamic discourse as opposed to the religious educational approach of the MB.} They chose Al-Attarin, Bakous, Al-Manshiah quarters, and Alasafirah and Sidi Bishr, the poorest areas in Alexandria, as the sites for their protests and they distributed themselves throughout these locations. According to Elnimr, a defector from the MB, and Samir, a CFSE member, the activists of the YJF went to Bakous, A6M to Al-Manshiah, RS to Al Attarin, and CFSE to Alasafirah.\footnote{Mohamed Elnimir, interview with author, Alexandria, June 30, 2012.} The plans made by these organizations were to start the protests at 12:30 PM to surprise the police as the declared start time on WRAKS website was 2:00 PM. Like in Cairo,
once the activists started to chant “bread, freedom, social justice”, nearby residents of poor
neighbourhoods joined the protests in such numbers that the police could not confront them.

In Suez, the A6M, YJF, and CFSE had no mobilizing structure and those who planned for
the protests there were activists from the Popular Current and Alghad Party. However, the
protests started accidentally, when a few activists from the popular current (a group headed by
Hamdeen Sabahi who ran for the presidential election in June 2012) went to Maydan Al-
Arba’een to convince locals to join them the protests. While they were chanting against the
regime, few other people joined them, but a large protest quickly formed after a microbus driver
tried to set himself on fire to protest the police having taken his driving license. People gathered
to prevent the police from arresting him and threw stones at them. In response, the police tried to
disperse the crowd using tear gas. The end result was that much of the neighbourhood became
involved in the protests and by midnight two had been killed, all of them from Al Malaha, one of
Suez’s poorest areas.

On January 26 and 27, most of the AYMs’ activists were preparing for the ‘Friday of
Rage’ protests held on January 28, but people in the poorest quarters in Cairo, Alexandria, and
Suez were already clashing with police. In the dominant narrative about Egypt’s revolution,
those two days are rarely mentioned, yet they were very important as the street confrontations
that took place during them exhausted the police and encouraged more groups to join the
protests. In addition to that, ten protestors were killed on those two days, and their deaths

793 Author’s interview with Ali Osama, Ahmed Khuzeim, Mohammed Elaithy, Jihad Elaithy, Karim Anwar, Suez,
July 8, 2012.
795 Sharaf, Maher, Elgenawy, Nagy, Elnimir, Elbahrawy, “interviews.”
incited many others to go in huge numbers on the ‘Day of Rage.’ Therefore, when January 28 came, it was only the second most important day in the Egyptian revolution, for while protestors occupied Tahrir Square and declared a sit-in, the urban poor were already at the heart of protests and demanding the regime’s departure.

**Other Explanations to How Activists Solved the Resource Problem**

As the foregoing may suggest, the narrative that the protests were organized through the social media is factually not true because it goes against the activists’ narrative of the events. Similarly, the account that the participation of the MB solved the resource problem of initiating and sustaining the protests goes against the chronology of the events as the MB participated in the events when the resource problem was solved.

The argument that social media solved the activists’ resource problem is unsound because anonymous activists may commit themselves online to take part in certain events, but this does not necessarily lead to offline commitment, simply because they cannot trust each other. It is biased as it focuses only on middle-class activists able to afford the cost of the internet connections, while ignoring the majority poor who had no access to internet, and who carried the burden of the protests. Moreover, the regime cut the internet on the night of January 27 and returned it back on January 29. Lastly, and more importantly, this narrative is factually untrue because, as I will show, even the administrator of the webpage “We Are All Khalid Saed”

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796 Wiki Thawra, “A statistic about the distribution of victims according to the days of the revolution,” https://wikithawra.files.wordpress.com/2013/10/d8a7d8acd985d8a7d984d989-d985d8add8a7d981d8b8d8a9-d988d98ad988d985.png (accessed February 28, 2014).


798 Angrist, "Understanding the Success.”

799 Elmahdi, “Egypt: A Decade of Ruptures”
(WRAKS), which called for the protests in Egypt on January 25, did not know the actual location of the main gathering for the protest. In this regard, the main function of Facebook on January 25 was to distract police attention from the real location of the protests. It did not secure any critical mass for the protests that would aid in overcoming the police and sustaining the protests.

In fact, Wael Ghonim, founder and administrator of WRAKS, did not himself know the true location of the main protest and thus few actual protestors showed up to the four locations that appeared on the website of WRAKS (these were Mustafa Mahmoud, Dar Elhikma, Shubra, and the University of Cairo). Unsurprisingly, all four locations were encircled by huge numbers of CSF. Ghonim (2012) explained that at the beginning he had wanted to go to the Mustafa Mahmoud mosque but that one of his friends had warned him that there would not be many people there and that it was better to go to Dar Elhikma.\(^{800}\) At Dar Elhikma, he recalls that there were fewer than 200 people, all surrounded by police, and he was so disappointed by this showing that he tweeted “demonstrations are like a melon: you do not know its taste until you have opened it.”\(^ {801}\) He also recalled that the CSF kept them encircled and hit everyone that tried to break through the circle until they voluntarily left. Similarly, Rabe’, an independent activist, who knew about the protests from WRAKS, went to the University of Cairo to participate in them only to find hundreds of policemen there, but no other protestors.\(^ {802}\) At Mustafa Mahmoud, the protestors were also very few in number and also cordoned by the police. The march that came from Nahia, where the AYMs locate their main protest, broke through the cordon, allowing

\(^{800}\) Ghonim, “If the people,” 253-289.

\(^{801}\) Ibid, 277.

\(^{802}\) Rabe’ Fahmy, interview with author, Cairo, June 28, 2012.
marchers to join in with standing protests.\textsuperscript{803} The activists who went to Shubra were the last to arrive to Tahrir Square, able to come only after the CSF let them go.\textsuperscript{804} None of this is to say that social media played no role whatsoever in the revolution, but rather that this role has exaggerated and amplified, especially in its role in bringing the masses to the streets.

Similarly, the MB activists made the argument that their official participation in the protests of January 28 solved the lack of resources of the organizing AYMs, but this claim is in fact false. The MB informed the organizing groups of their decision to participate on the night of January 27, by which time the locations of the protests in Cairo were already decided and large numbers of Egyptians were already involved in them.\textsuperscript{805} In Alexandria, the MB and the Alghad Party’s youth activists (NYMs) met with the AYMs’ activists to decide on the locations of the protests. The two groups disagreed on how to describe the events. The MB and Alghad insisted that Egypt is witnessing “revolutionary momentum” which should be used to secure incremental gains from the government, while A6M, RS, CFSE, YJF, Revolutionary Islamists, and the defected MB activists described what was happening as a full revolution. The NYMs wanted the protests to be in open locations away from poorest areas in Alexandria, like Samouha, Sidi Bishr, Al-Sa’a, and Al-Qa’ed Ibrahim mosque areas, in order for them to control the protests, while the AYMs insisted that the protests begin in the poorest areas as they had on January 25.\textsuperscript{806} In addition, the MB in Alexandria refused to call for a general strike as a means to escalate the protests by claiming that “this would hurt Egypt’s economy.” The AYMs, however, went to the

\textsuperscript{803} Elgenawy, “interview”; Maher, “interview.”

\textsuperscript{804} Nagy, “interview.” In fact most of the activist whom I interviewed mentioned Shubra and Dar Elhikma very rarely, and no one of them mentioned the University of Cairo.

\textsuperscript{805} Elgenawy, Salem, Maher, “interviews.”

\textsuperscript{806} Elnimir, “interview.”
iron plants, gas refineries, and to the port and convinced workers to declare a general strike to support the protests, which they did between January 31 and February 5. In Suez, the participation of the MB on January 28 added nothing to the protests because of the prior involvement of residents from the poorest neighbourhoods of Al-Malaha, Al Knour, and Al-Manshieh, who had been intensely engaging with police, and thus the CFS in this city had collapsed by January 27.

The participation of the MB did, however, increase the protest movement’s resources after the collapse of CSF on January 28. It did so in three ways. First, the MB maintained a presence at Tahrir Square until February 11. This is mainly because thousands of their activists came from Upper Egypt to participate in the protests in Cairo. Second, the MB activists, together with the Ultras – who are mostly from poor neighbourhoods – contributed significantly in confronting the regime-sponsored Baltajia, who had attacked the sit-in on February 2 in what is known in Egypt as the “Camel Battle.” Finally, it makes sense to assume that the engagement of the MB in secret negotiations with the army minimized the possibilities of the army’s intervention against the protestors. According to one of the MB leaders, they met secretly with members from Supreme Council of Armed Forces (SCAF) three times during the protests and they promised that the MB would not compete for more than one-third of People Council seats, and that they would not run any candidate in the presidential elections, in return for the

808 There is two poor areas with the same name of ‘Manshieh’, the well know one is in Alexandria; the other in Suez.
810 Hassanein, “interview.”
811 Tarek Masaken, Ultras White Nights, interview with author, June 14, 2012; Elbahrawy, “interview”; Atta “interview”. See also, Ahmed Hamdi, “Elabarade’: MB responsible on the mistakes of article 28,” Alwafd website, June 9, 2012. In the article the journalist mentions El-Barade’ statement that the MB defended the revolution during the Camel Battle.
army removing Mubarak. However, the resources the MB brought with their participation were not vital to sustain the protests for two reasons. First, the aforementioned contributions of the MB happened after the collapse of the CSF on January 28, which had made it safer to organize demonstrations and to maintain a presence in the sit-in in Tahrir Square. Second, the army and despite the curfew it imposed following the ‘Friday of Rage’ on January 28 did not prevent Egyptians from demonstrations or reaching the Square and was asking Egyptians to form popular committees to confront the thugs in the streets.

To summarize, although the AYMs did not have mass-based organizations, they were able to accumulate the human resources needed to initiate and sustain the protests by mobilizing poor Egyptians. This section, however, does not illustrate how the poor engagement contributed to the AYMs domination. This is the subject of the next section.

**Poor Egyptians and Domination of AYMs**

Directing all attention at the sit-in in Tahrir Square as the main site of confrontation between the masses and the regime elides the truth of how it was possible to actually sustain the sit-in in the Square in the first place. I argue that the rise of spontaneous riot movements (SRM) which accompanied the involvement of the poor in the protests was the main reason for making the Square a safe place for the protestors to gather and to maintain the sit-in. The main claim I make here is that SRM that had appeared on January 28 (in Suez on January 25) defeated the regime’s Central Security Forces (CSF) and in doing so deprived the regime of its coercive power, leaving it no choice but to deploy the army in the streets in order to restore order. The refusal of the army

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812 Nidal Sakr, Muslim Brother Activist and Political Consultant for the MB Guidance Office, interview with author, June 28, 2012

813 Ibrahim, “Days.”
to quell the protests turned the Square into a safe place to regime’s opponents. To defend this argument, I first establish the fact that the poor Egyptians bore the burden of the protests, a significant indication of their decisive role in the protests. I then explain how the SRM emerged as a result of locating the protests in the poor neighbourhoods. And finally, I illustrate how these SRM led to the collapse of the CSF and as a consequence of sustaining the sit-in in Tahrir Square.

**Poor Egyptians as the Main Carrier of Protests**

As in Tunisia, studying the social class of those protestors who were killed reveals that the poor bore most of the cost of the CoP. The Egyptian Center for Economic and Social Rights (ECESR) registered the names of 1075 victims of the violence during the 18 days of the revolution; out of them 837 were killed during protests, 183 were convicted prisoners killed in ‘violence’ in the places of their detention, 49 were police officers, and 6 were soldiers. The list of the victims, however, does not show the profession of most of the victims. Only 290 victims can be identified from their work whether they belong to the middle class or to the poor: 121 can be assumed to be part of the middle class, as they either hold bachelor degree or are corporate employees, engineers, lawyers, or university students. The remaining 169 are workers, day-laborers, taxi drivers, hair dressers, or unemployed. In the Egyptian context, it is logical to assume that the majority of the remaining victims (487) are poor people as the middle class has adequate access to media and civil society organizations to inform them about their losses.814

A clearer indication, however, that the poor Egyptians carried the burden of the protests can be inferred from the locations of where the protests killed. As I will explain below most of

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814 Wiki Thawra, “The victims of Egypt’s Revolution during the first 18 days,” https://docs.google.com/spreadsheet/ccc?key=0ApHkfHF83JYxdDV6eXhqOTloV1JpZUEykjMGVjY1E&usp=drive_web#gid=0 (accessed February 28, 2014). This is a google document uploaded by Wiki Thawa, a website initiated by Egyptian Center for the Economic and Social Rights.
these confrontations happened around the police stations in the poor quarters when the CSF attempted to disperse the protestors. In this regard, the document of ECESR shows that 67 percent of the 562 victims which the center documented the place of their death, were killed around the police stations. In Cairo, 143 were killed around Tahrir Square, 13 in the Square during the Camel Battle, and 240 around police stations. In Alexandria, 27 were killed around Al-Manshiah Square, one of poorest area and 50 around police stations, 17 out of them around the police station in the poor Al Ramal neighbourhood. The remaining 89 were killed around police stations in twelve other governorates.\(^{815}\) Table VI-1 illustrates the names of the neighbourhoods of which the police stations were put on fire and the number of victims that were killed during these events. In fact except for Al Ma’di, Ain Shams, Awal Madina Nasr, and Al Haram, and Hilwan, which are considered inhabited by people from the middle class, the remaining areas are occupied by poor Egyptians.

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<th>Name of Police Station</th>
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<td>Imbaba</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>Old Egypt</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Awal Al Salam</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>Al Zaytoon</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>Boulaq Al Dakrour</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>Al Sharabiah</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\(^{815}\) Wiki Thawra, “Distribution of cases of killing during political events in the first 18 days of the revolution,” https://wikithawra.files.wordpress.com/2013/10/d8b3d98ad8a7d8b3d98ad8a9-d8aad988d8b2d98ad8b91.png (accessed April 12, 2014)
Furthermore, several Egyptian columnists recounted how the poor in these
neighbourhoods burned the police stations (see below). Salwa Ismail (2011), who wrote
extensively on the brutality of Egypt’s police and the poor’s daily resistance, also confirmed in
her fieldwork that these police stations were subject to attacks by Egypt’s poor. Indeed, the
percentage of poor Egyptians who were killed in the protests is much higher as we can assume
that many of those who were killed in places away from the police stations include also many of
the poor. Having established that the poor people were the main carrier of the protests, I illustrate
now how the spontaneous riot movements (SRM) emerged and I elaborate on its role on
neutralizing the Central Security Forces (CSF).

SRM and the Collapse of CSF

The masses were certainly the most important asset in the CoP, but to understand how it became
easy for the activists to maintain the sit-in in Tahrir Square we need first to understand how the
CSF broke down. One of the unintended consequences of the protests of the ‘Friday of Rage’

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816 Ismail, "The Egyptian revolution against the police"; See also the Vetogate link which reveal how poor Egyptians
was that the protest marches, which departed from mosques located in densely populated poor neighborhoods, put the urban poor face-to-face with the CSF. The result was a surge of SRM that engaged in bloody confrontations with the CSF and led eventually to the collapse of the latter. For example, in Almatariah, one of the poorest areas in Cairo, the demonstration began with a few activists from Alnoor Almohamadi mosque and was soon joined by large numbers of people. But once the march arrived at the local police station a true battle began. According to Mohammed Yahya, a blogger from Almatariah, everyone in the crowd seemed to bear a grudge against the police and wanted revenge – particularly the microbus drivers and street vendors who were forced in the past to pay bribes to police and who were subject to abuse. In fact, he says, mothers were shouting encouragement as they watched their sons looting police stations and setting them on fire, as those same stations were the places where their children had been tortured in the past. The police forces deployed on the roofs of nearby buildings responded with live bullets but that did not prevent protestors from reducing the stations to ruins with Molotov cocktails. By the end of the day, the two police stations in Almatariah and twenty-five police cars were completely burned and the CSF had fled, after having killed thirty-three protestors.  

Ahmed Samir, a columnist at Amasry Alyoum, recounts a similar series of events he witnessed at Al-Sayed Zainab, when protestors from poor neighbourhoods burned the local police station. Indeed, this scene was repeated almost everywhere in Egypt but especially in Cairo, Alexandria, Suez, and Sinai. In Suez, for example, the poor threatened to burn a police station with its officers inside if police did not hand over a police informer who had taken refuge there.

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817 Yahya, “Why Almataria Square.”
818 Samir, “How the blood started.”
The army, Osama says, could not convince the protestors to lift the siege and eventually decided to give up the informer, who was then beaten to death.\textsuperscript{819}

That these events led to the significant collapse of the CSF can be seen by their losses, in the testimony of the state’s officials, and the activists’ narratives. On January 28, thirty-two police officers were killed and 1079 injured, 4000 police cars were burned, some of which were armoured, and 99 police stations were set on fire, including thirty stations in Cairo\textsuperscript{820} and fifteen more in Alexandria.\textsuperscript{821} The attacks by the SRMs also included burning offices for NDP, as well the destruction of some courts and governorate buildings. In the words of Abo Elgheit, it was a “campaign by the poor against everything that belong to the official state.”\textsuperscript{822} The collapse of the police was also confirmed by the testimony of Mahmoud Wajdi, the appointed interior minister on January 31, who informed the court that “all the officers of the State Security Investigations Service (SSIS) fled to their homes fearing for their lives”.\textsuperscript{823} In his testimony in the court, Omar Suleiman, the president’s deputy, also said that “the mass protests on January 28 confronted and broke up police forces, and policemen could do nothing except to flee in order to save their lives.”\textsuperscript{824} Ibrahim (2011) also recounts in his memoire Days in Tahrir Square that he saw a numerous CSF officers sitting on the ground in Alsheikh Rihan Street close to the gardens of the Abdin palace. They were surrounding by a large number of young men holding clubs in their hands. Some of the police officers were crying while others were trying to hide their faces.

\textsuperscript{819} Ali Osama, interview with author, Suez, July 12, 2012.
\textsuperscript{820} Abo Elgheit, “About the ugly revolution.”
\textsuperscript{821} Mansour, “The security of Alexandria.”
\textsuperscript{822} Abo Elgheit, “About the ugly revolution.”
According to Ibriham, older residents in the area convinced the young men to let the policemen go, which they did but only after forcing them to take off their boots and clothes.\textsuperscript{825} Osama recounts that on January 28 the SRMs stormed Maydan Al-Arba’een police station and freed all detained activists and criminals before setting the station on fire. He also recalled that the fire station department, the government center for food security, and several private commercial centers that belong to members of the NDP were burned. In addition to this, he said the activists of the SRMs forced the police to leave their cars, to take off their uniforms, and to hand over their weapons.\textsuperscript{826}

The narrative so far offered by scholars who have written on the revolution portrays the Tahrir Square protest as if it had been filled by hundreds of thousands of people during the 14 days of the sit-in, suggesting to some that this protest action was the main reason for the protests’ success. This suggestion is true but it conceals the main reason that made sustain the sit-in in the Square possible. The success of the protests was due to the collapse of interior ministry police forces (the police, CSF, and the State Investigation Security Service) which led to the deployment of army on January 28. The refusal by the army to confront the protestors allowed for the sit-in in Tahrir Square to be sustained. In fact, on February 2, 2011, during the Camel Battle, there were fewer than 15,000 protestors in Square when pro-regime thugs attacked them.\textsuperscript{827} Osama, a MB activist, recalls that he and his colleagues demanded support from their leadership, who sent hundreds of activists from Shubra to defend the Square.\textsuperscript{828}

\textsuperscript{825} Ibrahim, “Days”, 66
\textsuperscript{826} Ali Osama, “interview.”
\textsuperscript{827} Salem, “interview”; Shadi Ibrahim, interview with author, Cairo, July 8, 2012. In fact the video tubes of the events on February 2, 2011 reveal few thousands in the Square.
\textsuperscript{828} Salem, “interview.”
existed on February 2 the regime would have sent them to re-take the Square instead of sending poorly organised thugs to do the job, or at least would have backed up the thugs with some police presence. In short, the defeat of the forces of the interior ministry on the ‘Day of Rage’ stripped the regime of its ability to repress the protestors and made it completely reliant on the army. The refusal of latter to attack the demonstrators made it possible for the activists to sustain the sit-in in Tahrir Square regardless of their numbers.

**Conclusion**

In this chapter, I argued that the domination of the AYMs during the CoP’s apex was clear in the protestors adoption to the call of ousting the regime at time the NYMs was calling for reforming it. I also considered the problem of AYMs’ domination a resource dilemma and I illustrated how they solved it through mobilizing poor Egyptians. I also explained that the success of the AYMs strategy was facilitated by the physical absence of the NYMs during the first period of the protests and by their negotiation with the regime during the CoP’s apex. I also falsified the arguments that the activists’ extensive use of social media solved their lack of resources to initiate the protests, and that the MB sustained the protests as they possess mass-based organization. Additionally, I showed how the participation of poor Egyptians led to the emergence of SRMs which in turn led to the disintegration of the CSF making it feasible to initiate and sustain the sit-in in Tahrir Square.
Chapter VII

**Egypt: Protest Cycle Injustice Master Frame**

This chapter provides empirical evidence to demonstrate that Egyptian CoP’s master frame (MF) was inclusive. The chapter begins by reconstructing and graphing the Egyptian *Injustice* MF. Then, it discusses the MF’s inclusivity. Next, it explains how previous linkages between the activists helped them to deploy an inclusive MF. Finally, it illustrates how the MF remained inclusive at the CoP’s apex despite moving from focusing on political reform into ousting the regime. The main argument in this section is that the AYMs were focusing on ousting the regime rather than on the type of the government that would replace it. I conclude by summarizing the chapter findings.

**Bread, Freedom, Human Dignity**

I reconstruct the CoP’s MF using the statement written by Wael Ghonim, the administrative of *We Are All Khalid Saed* (WRAKS) webpage (see Appendix II for complete translation). He published it both online and in his book, *Revolution 2: If the People One Day wanted Life*. There are three reasons that make the document titled “All what you need to know about the demonstrations of the January 25 Revolution” representative. First, it includes all the names of the parties and movements that promised to participate in the demonstrations. According to Ghonim, protest demands and the sites of demonstrations were coordinated with Ahmed Maher,

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829 Ghonim, “All What You Need to Know About the Demonstrations of the 25th January Revolution.”

830 Ghonim, *Revolution 2: If People*”, 258-266.

831 Ghonism writes that on January 20, 2011, he asked Omar Qazaz, one of the founder of Rasd agency, an electronic news agency affiliated to MB, if the MB intends to participate in the protests and Qazaz told him clearly it would not but some individual MB activists might participate. Despite this information, he left the name of the MB in the document. See “*If the People*”, 266-7.
the head of April 6th Youth Movement (A6M), who was coordinating with the other participant movements. Second, the statements of A6M that appeared before the protests are in agreement with the positions expressed this document (see chapter VI). Third, the document is in accord with the narrative offered by activists both in terms of how they defined problems and what they demand to fix them (see below).

‘All what you need to know about the demonstrations of January 25 Revolution’ is composed of ten sections: who are we; why we demonstrate; why January 25; what are our demands; the time and the places of demonstrations; demonstration’s directions; chanted slogans; important phone numbers; important links; and who is going to participate. I describe here only the themes that are related to MF; i.e., the reasons for demonstrations and the protestors’ demands as they appear in the statement.

The section ‘Why we Demonstrate’ in the document focuses on three themes: corruption, poverty, and violations to human dignity. The document begins by informing the public that their government is lying about the social and economic situation in Egypt and that the reality is bleak, but that the demonstrations of January 25 are meant to change this situation. The document then identifies the forms of social and political injustice suffered by Egyptians as the participant movements see them and backs those views up with statistics. According to the document, 30 million Egyptians suffer from clinical depression and in 2009 alone; 100,000 attempted suicides resulted in 5,000 deaths. It claims also that 48 million Egyptians live in poverty; 2.5 million of whom live in complete destitution. It claims that 12 million Egyptians are

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832 Ibid, 238. Ghonim was also in coordination with other activists including Mostafa Najar, Mahmoud Sami, Ibrahim el Masri, Isra’ AbdulFatah, Amro el Qazaz, and others, 231-266

833 A Full translation of “All What You Need to Know about the Demonstrations of the January 25 Revolution” sections: why we demonstrate; our demands, united slogans, and the participant movements appear in Appendix II.
homeless and 1.5 million live in cemeteries. It then alleges entrenched corruption in state institutions, discusses the high level of unemployment, and the malfunctioning health care sector, in terms of high birth mortality, low number of ambulances available for citizens, and the high number of people who suffer cancer. The document holds the government responsible for the poor state of affairs as outlined due to corruption, abuse of emergency law to suppress political activities, the torture of suspected dissidents, and by rigging the People’s Council elections. The solutions it proposes to these problems are to establish a minimum wage for employees, provide subsidies for unemployed youth, terminate emergency law, subject police forces to the jurisdiction of the general prosecutor, dismiss the interior minister, and limit presidents to two terms of office.

The document also explains why the activists chose the January 25, the police day, as a date for demonstration. It says that the demonstrations are intended to remind the police of their ancestors when on January 25, 1952 they resisted British occupation with their rifles in order to protect the people, but that after 50 years, the people suffer from humiliation and torture at the hands of the police. Furthermore, the document calls upon protestors to chant slogans articulating the causes of their protests, such as “bread, freedom, and human dignity,” which succinctly captures the Egyptians’ definition of their problems and demands. Finally, the document calls upon demonstrators to avoid factionalism and to raise only the Egyptian flag and not flags representing any particular movement.

The structure of the Egyptians’ Injustice MF (‘bread, freedom, and human dignity’) is graphically presented in Figure VII-1.
Figure VII-1: Egypt CoP’s Injustice MF

Bread, Freedom, Social Justice

Repression

- Emergency Law
  - State’s security monitor and abort politicians’ activities

- Rigged People Council Election

- Police torture and humiliate people.

- Tens of death and thousands of arrest.

Poverty

- Poor Health conditions
  - Highest rate of birth mortality in the world (50 out of 1000)

- Half Egyptian children suffer anemia

- 100 thousands patient of cancer yearly

- One ambulance for every 35 thousand

- 48 million live in poverty

- $6.5 billion of loss in cases of corruption

- 2.5 million live in destitution

- The position of 115 out of 139 countries in IT

- 12 million homeless

- 3 million youth unemployed (30% of the unemployed)

- No employment’s transparency

- 1.5 million live in cemeteries

Corruption

- 30 million depressed

- 100 thousands attempted suicide in 2009

- 5000 death

Degradation of human dignity
**Inclusive MF**

Using Figure IV-1 and considering the public statements of participant movements, activists’ chanted manifestos, and various other expressed narratives related to the Egyptian protests, I measure the Egyptian Injustice MF’s inclusivity according its ideological pluralism, representation of the interests of the majority of the Egyptian’s social groups, and in term of its capacity to transcend major identity cleavages in society by drawing part of its frames from common culture or collective memory or by focusing on national unity.

The graphic presentation of the CoP’s MF shows it to state a wide range of problems relating to poverty, corruption, and repression, and thus displays notable ideological pluralism. The major components of the MF are not presented in terms specific to any one ideological framework, such as with reference a capitalist system that abusing the working class, or a comprador class working in the service of hegemonic international powers, but as a result of a political system that does not care about its constituents due to its corruption.

The interests of the majority of Egyptians are also represented in the MF. Each of the MF’s major themes is broken into subthemes that speak of problems that Egyptians endure in their daily lives. The types of problems do not address a particular segment of the society but rather span the concerns of the poor and of the middle class. For the poor, it refers to poverty, slums and homelessness, the malfunctioning health sector, and police torture. For the middle class, it refers to the abuse of emergency law through which the regime suppresses the political opposition, rigs elections, and detains suspected dissidents without due process. Additionally and as seen in the third horizontal level in the figure, there are many leverage points where different social groups and people affected by injustice can easily identify themselves with the MF.
Because of these many leverage points, it was easy for the AYMs’ and even for the MB to use them as bridges between their own movements’ frames and the MF. For example, in the previous chapter, I showed that A6M focused on social justice issues while the MB concentrated on political issues, but as shown, the frames of both movements’ are integrated in the MF.

The Revolutionary Socialists (RS) and the Youth for Justice and Freedom (YJF) movements did not issue statements in the two weeks leading up to January 25, while the Maspiro Youth Movement (MYM) was not formed at that time. However, I asked six activists from RS and YJF (three from each group) to elaborate on the reasons for their participation in the protests. Elbahrawy from RS believes that poverty and violations of human rights are a result of a capitalist system that concentrates the power and wealth in the hands of elites. As for the protestors’ demands, he explained that the RS have long advocated for changing the regime and did not believe it was possible to reform it from within. When I asked him how he could explain the RS’s approval of the demands of January 25 as they were in the realm of reform, he replied that the demands were revolutionary in their nature. Elbahrawy was referring to the demands to abolish emergency law and to set the period of the presidency to two terms. The YJF activists hold similar views to those of the RS due to their Marxist origins. According to Elgenawy, the YJF had discussed the demands and prepared for the protests in cooperation with April A6M and CFSE. He believes that the main reasons for the protests were poverty, corruption, and repression, and that Ghonim document reflected the opinion of all the organized movements. If this shows anything, it is that RS and YJF found their bridging frames in the MF.

834 Elbahrawy, interview with the author, Cairo, June 15, 2012
835 See also RS. “With the Muslim Brotherhood Against the State.” The statement unambiguously calls for toppling the regime as the only road for freedom, justice, and democracy.
836 Elgenawy, interview with the author, Cairo, June 6, 2012
even if their views on the situation did not entirely accord with the MF’s structural presentation of the problem, i.e., how it was presented to the people.

The Maspiro Youth Movement did not exist before or on January 25; it was formed in March 2011 following an attack on a church in Isfeh village, southern Cairo. Yet those who would eventually become its activists participated in the protests from the beginning. The movement’s importance comes from the fact that all of its activists are Copts. The participation of Coptic activists (or lack off) in the uprising is a good litmus test for whether or not the MF is inclusive, especially given that the graphic presentation of the MF does not reveal any particular leverage point where the specific grievances of Copts are addressed. However, an important segment of the Coptic community participated in the protests despite the Coptic Church’s position, which, like Al Azhar, supported the regime. The reason for their participation, according to one activist whom I asked, Shanouda, was that the Coptic youth believed they would not receive their civil rights unless they acted as citizens. As he explained, the discrimination against the Copts forced many of them to choose life in isolation from the rest of society, and this encouraged discrimination against them. By becoming involved in the process of changing their country, he said, they might achieve their rights and end their marginalisation. Shanouda added another important reason for the Copts’ participation: after the bombing of Al-qiddissin (Saints) Church in Alexandria in early January 2011, Coptic youth came to believe that the regime wanted to divert the Egyptians’ attention away from poor economic and social conditions by fomenting sectarian conflict. As he phrased it, “the regime sought to create sectarian problems between the Muslims and the Copts and for this reason the security apparatus

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837 Bishoy Shanouda, a founder of Maspiro, interview with author, July 7, 2012, Cairo. According to Shanouda, most of Maspiro members are from the Copts Youth Movement, a movement that existed before the Revolution.

838 See, Guirguis, “The Copts and the Egyptian Revolution.”
bombed the church.”\textsuperscript{839} This view is reiterated by Madgy, a Copt from Alexandria, who believed that “a crime on this scale could have never happened without the security apparatus’s knowledge.”\textsuperscript{840} True or false, the bombing of \textit{Al-qiddissin} Church became one of the causes that provoked Coptic youth to participate in the protests.\textsuperscript{841} However, the fact remains that the MF addresses problems that all Egyptians encounter in their daily life, regardless of religion, and thus articulates sufficient reasons for the Copts to have engaged in the protests.

I also argued that for a MF to be inclusive it should transcend identity divisions within a society. The figure showing the Egyptian MF illustrates its ideological pluralism and its representation of the interests of the Egyptian public, but it does not, however, reveal whether aspects of the MF are drawn from common culture, collective memory, or whether it focuses on national unity. Therefore, to determine this, I asked fifty-eight youth activists to list their slogans used during the eighteen days of uprising that may have been received by them as divisive, and slogans that were drawn from Egyptians’ common culture and history. I did not provide any definition for national unity to allow for the activists to express their own views of what count as “unity” and “divisive” slogans. I did define the slogans that were drawn from common culture and history as those that were used in previous demonstrations and are generally part of the Egyptians’ collective memory, at least amongst dissidents.

For the first question, the activists identified twenty-seven slogans that praise national unity. I have divided them into two categories: ones that signify Egyptian patriotism (nineteen slogans) and ones that acknowledge a division between Muslims and Christians but celebrate

\textsuperscript{839} Shanouda, “interview.”
\textsuperscript{840} Ramy Magdy, Mapiro Movement, interview with author, Alexandria, July 10, 2012.
\textsuperscript{841} See Khalil, “The Three Christian Churches Refused.” Mapiro activists, Bishoy Shanouda and Ramy Magdy confirmed also this information.
their unity. I call the latter *cross-identity slogans* (eight slogans). By praising patriotism, the MF signals that all Egyptians are equal in loving their country and are willing, despite their identity differences, to defend it. This implies a desire and a willingness to put identities aside for the sake of the bigger cause – namely, alleviating injustice. The cross-identity slogans are an even stronger indicator of inclusivity, as with them activists do not hide their different religious identities but instead they acknowledge and celebrate them. All of the activists I interviewed reported one or more slogans in the both categories. Table VII-1 shows the distribution of these slogans.

Table VII-1: Distribution of Slogans that Called for National Unity (the translation is followed by the slogan in Arabic)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No</th>
<th>Patriotism Slogans</th>
<th>Cross-identity Slogans</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Revolution, revolution until victory..revolution in all Egypt's streets. (Thawara thawara hata alnasr...thawara thawar fi kul share' misr).</td>
<td>The Crescent and the Cross against killing and torture. (Alhilal wa alsalib did Alqatal wa alta’thib).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Wake up people and shake the universe.. Egypt is our country and will not be dishonored. (Sahi alkgaq wa hiz alkon...Misr baladna wa mish hathoun.)</td>
<td>The Crescent and the Cross say no to Habib (The Interior Minister). (Alhilal wa alsalib biqoulo la ya Habib).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Say and respond you and her..Egypt will remain precious for us. (Qoulo wa rudo inta wa hiyya...Misr hatifdal ghalia a’laya).</td>
<td>The Crescent with the Cross..tomorrow hey Hosni will replace you. (Alhilal ma’ alsalib...bukra ya Hussni gherak njeeb).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Egypt will remain precious for me ..despite the traitors and blunders. (Misr hatifdal ghalia alaya...raghm alkhawana wa alharamiyya).</td>
<td>Hey Mubarak hey Pharaoh.. you are damned in all holy books. (Ya Mubarak ya far’oun...inta fi kul kitab mal'oun).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Buzz off, buzz off, buzz off... let our country see the light. (Irhal, irhal, irhal ghour...khali baladna tshouf alnour).</td>
<td>No to sectarianism and factionalism.. we are all national unity. (La ta’fiyya wa la hizbiyya...kulna wiha dataniyya).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Raise, Raise, the chants...our people is free and will not get afraid. (Irfa’, irfa’ alhitaf...sha’bina hur wa mish haykhaf).</td>
<td>The Crescent and the Cross .. buzz off president of torture. (Alhilal wa alsalib...irhal ya wazeer ala’theeb).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Wake up Egypt, wake up from sleeping...they looted your sons day after day. (Ishi ya Misr wa foo’I min alnoum...nahabou wladek youm wara youm).</td>
<td>Hey Mohammad, hey Boulus.. tomorrow Egypt follows Tunis.(Ya Mohammed ya Bulis... bukra Misr thasal Tunis).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Revolution, revolution, hey Egyptians...in order to get rid from traitors. (Thawara, thawara ya misriyeen...la’jl nkhalas min alkhayeen).</td>
<td>Hey mother of Mohammad.. hey mother of Mina.. Egypt will become for you and me. (Ya um Mohammed..ya Um Mina.. Misr hatib’a leeki wa leena).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Slogan</td>
<td></td>
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<td>---</td>
<td>------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>Hey Mubarak hey stupid... Egyptian people are not slaves. (Husni Mubarak ya baleed...sha’eb Misr mish abeed).</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>All the people say and call... Hosni Mubarak out of my country. (Kul alsha’eb beqoul wa binadi... Hussni Mubarak bara biladi).</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>Dignity and freedom...the demand of all Egyptians.(Alkarama wa alhuriyya ... matlab kul almisriyya).</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>Egypt is our country and not a farm... for looters and thieves. (Misr baladna mish takiyya...lelaheeba wa alharamia).</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>Open your heart for freedom... Egypt will remain precious for us.(Ifthah sadrak lehuriyya... Misr hatifdal ghaliya a’laya).</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>I swear with its sky and soil... Mubarak is the one who ruined it. (Ahlef bisamaha wa biturabba... Mubarak huwa eli kharabba).</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>We do not fear the Interior Ministry...Egypt is our country and precious for us. (Mish binkhaf min aldakhiliyya...Misr baladna wa ghalyya a’laiyya).</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16</td>
<td>Hey Mubarak hey villainous...Egyptian blood is not cheap. (Ya Mubarak ya khasis... dum almisri mish abbeeh).</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17</td>
<td>Not faction not Muslim Brothers...all people in Tahir Square. (Mish ahzab wa la ikhwan...kul alsha’eb fi almaydan).</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18</td>
<td>Egypt is free...and you (Mubarak) out. (Misr hura wa inta bara).</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19</td>
<td>Buzz off, Buzz off hey Pharaoh... this is the wish of 80 million. (Irhal, irhal ya farou’n...di raghbet tamanee n million).</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* The table is based on slogans the activists offered during the interviews when asked to identify national unity slogans.

Meanwhile, one of the fifty-eight activists whom I interviewed reported about divisive ideological and factional slogans. According to Shanouda, from Maspiro Movement, some MB activists chanted their own factional slogans one time during the eighteen days of the uprising but then other demonstrators asked them to stop, which they did. To confirm the activists’ answers, I reviewed several studies of Egyptian slogans during the uprising: one by Adel Abdul Sadeq and the rest were biographies of some activists involved in the fifteen day sit-in in

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842 Sadeq, “25th January Manifestos.”
Tahrir Square. These sources also claim that there were no conflict-ridden slogans during the uprising.

For the third question, in which I asked activists to identify slogans that are drawn from Egyptians’ collective memory, the activists named one or more out of a total of eight slogans. Table VII-2 shows these slogans.

Table VII-2: Slogans drawn from Egyptians collective memory (the translation is followed by the slogans in Arabic language).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>N°</th>
<th>Slogan</th>
<th>Historical Event</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Leave, leave, like Farouq (King Farouq)…our people from you became smothered. (Irhal, Irhal, zay farouq…sha’buna b’a makhnouq).</td>
<td>1952, the departure of King Farouq from Egypt following the coup.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Soldiers, soldiers, soldiers why…are we in prison or what. (Askar…askar…askar leih…ihna fi sijn w ail ieh).</td>
<td>1968 uprising against Naser following 1967 War defeat.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>They wear last fashion…and every ten of us live in one room. (Huma biyebiso akher modah…wa ihna a’sheen ashra fi ouda).</td>
<td>1977 bread protests</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>They eat kabab and chickens…and our lives in bleak. (Huma biyaklo hamam wa firakh wa ihna alfoul dawakhna wa dakh).</td>
<td>1977 bread protests</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>They raise the prices of sugar and oil…tomorrow we will sell the furniture of our homes. (Ghalo alsukar, ghalo alzeit…bukra nie’ a’fsh albeit).</td>
<td>1977 bread protests</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>They eat pigeons and ducks…and the people suffer from blood pressure. (Huma biyaklo hamam wa bat…wa kul alsha’b galo aldaght).</td>
<td>1977 bread protests</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* The table is based on slogans the activists offered during the interviews when asked to identify slogans that are drawn from Egyptians collective memory.

I should note again that these slogans are just a representative sample. Adel Abdul Sadeq mentions more slogans in his study, though his focus is more on written slogans rather than on chanted ones. The problem with focusing on written slogans, however, is that they could

represent only the individuals who carried them on their signs and banners. The chanted slogans are more representative as they were heard and repeated by many people.

My last point in this section on high level of inclusivity of the Egyptian Injustice MF pertains to the geographical spread of the protests. Although the protests between January 25 and 28 were in few main governorates, primarily in Lower Egypt in cities such as Cairo, Alexandria, Suez, and in the Sinai, by the eighteenth day all governorates had become involved. On the surface, this may contradict the argument that poor people played the decisive role in overthrowing Mubarak’s regime, considering that poverty in Upper Egypt is higher than that of Lower Egypt – 32.5% and 14.5% of the population, respectively. These figures may imply that governorates in Upper Egypt should have protested first if poverty is the driving force behind demonstrations. However, It is important to note that the percentage of poverty in Upper Egypt is just a territorial average; it does not reflect the percentage of poverty in the poor neighbourhoods where the demonstrations began. As such there is no contradiction between the argument that poor Egyptians carried the burden of the protests and the fact that poor governorates demonstrated at a later stage.

But my investigation of the apparent contradiction nevertheless pointed to another reason: the fear felt by greater numbers of people in Upper Egypt of the state security apparatus. According to Abdu Razeq, head of AlBardae campaign in Assiut, local activists followed the lead of their colleagues in Cairo and Alexandria in that they planned for demonstrations, decided where to meet to begin them (in Maydan Um Al Batal, in this case), prepared banners, and distributed organizational and operational tasks among themselves. However, unlike as occurred

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844 UNDP, “Report prepared by Egypt Ministry of Economic Development.”
in Cairo and Alexandria, local people did not join the protests, and the police arrested many of the activists. According to Abdu Razeq, the people in Assiut, as with all the people in Upper Egypt, remember well the state’s campaign on terror in the eighties and nineties, and thus fear provoking any further crackdowns. The state during that period committed severe atrocities that remained alive in people’s memories. Alaa Abdelgawad expressed the same viewpoint. Assiut, he explained, had since early 80s been where every Interior Minister served first as its governor before being promoted. This means every interior minister must had been engaged in repressive activities in Upper Egypt as a governor before being promoted. However, Assiut transcended its fear when it became clear that the security forces had been broken and that the army would not confront the demonstrations.

Deployment of an Inclusive Identity

Unlike in Tunisia, in Egypt the CoP began with demonstrations in the political and economic centers of the country, and these demonstrations were engineered after the successful protests in Tunisia had taken place. The level of inclusivity of the Egyptian MF is higher than that of Tunisia (for example it does not have a leftist slant and it also includes cross-identity frames), which may explain why the protests spread faster in entire Egypt. But like Tunisia, the activists of the different participant movements in Egypt were able to deploy an inclusive identity because of previous linkages that had existed amongst each other since the second Palestinian Intifada.

846 Alaa Abdelgawad, Dean of Political Science Department, Asiut University, interview with author, July 19, 2012.
847 Saleh AlBakry, Freedom Movement, interview with Yaghi, July 19, 2012; Also Abdulrazeq and Abdelgawad confirmed this, “interviews.”
318

had began in 2000.848 I explained the structure of mobilization in Egypt prior to the revolution in chapter two and I illustrated through a literature review that these activists had long-standing working relationships with one-another. The fact that many MB activists joined the protests against their organizational official position demonstrates the importance of these linkages in deploying an inclusive MF. These previous linkages strengthened further after El-Barade’s return to Egypt in early 2010 and after the formation of a broad coalition against the regime under the name of the National Campaign for Change (NCC). Established by El-Barade, the NCC is a aimed to establish a political system in Egypt based around ideals of democracy and social justice. The first step to doing so, according to the NCC, was to ensure fair legislative and presidential elections after an end to formal the state of emergency.849 The NCC included the MB, A6M, RS, CFSE and other parties and personalities including influential Copt figures such as Naguib Sawiris, an Egyptian billionaire and the owner of Orascom Telecom Holding and several media outlets, and George Isaac, the coordinator of Kefaya movement since 2004. On March 2 2010, the NCC began a campaign to collect one million signatures in support for its demands and by October 2010 it reached this number.850 During this period, activists from different political backgrounds worked hand in hand on this campaign: they knocked on doors to explain their demands and to ask citizens for their signatures and they organized media campaigns to support their demands. This period prior to the revolution strengthened the linkages


849 The NCC considered the supervision of the judiciary on the elections, the observation of the elections by domestic and international civil society organizations, giving equal time for the candidates in the media, allowing the expatriate Egyptians to vote, and limiting the period of presidency for terms are pre-requisite for faire and decent elections. See Mohammed Hkayal, Riham Soud, and Duha Aljundi, “National Campaign for Change,” Shorouk Newspaper, April 8, 2010, http://archive.today/JS4O (accessed April 10, 2014)

850 See El-Mahdi, “Egypt: A Decade of Ruptures.”
among activists and facilitated the deployment of inclusive identity Notably, and as I shall expand upon later, these linkages did not exist in Jordan.

So far, I have argued that the Egyptian MF was inclusive during the reformist period of CoP. In the next section, I will explain how the MF remained inclusive when the CoP transformed into a call for revolution, on January 28.

**MF Inclusivity During CoP’s Apex**

In developing my theoretical framework, I observed that Snow and Benford (1992), McAdam (1995), and Gerhards and Rucht (1995) have deduced their hypotheses about MFs from reformist as opposed to revolutionary cycles of protest. For this reason, they assumed continuity to the characteristics of a MF until it loses its appeal to the public or until it is replaced by another MF. By making this assumption, their analyses miss a fundamental point; namely, the way in which a MF remains inclusive when the prognostic task of the MF changes during the CoP from advocating reform to advocating revolution. Put it differently, we are left with a question: how did the participant youth movements in the CoP come to agree on toppling the regime as a solution to their grievance when the initial solution was to reform it?

I found that their agreement on the new solution – that of overthrowing the regime – took place in the street and was not coordinated among the participant youth movements ahead of time. For this reason, the MF remained inclusive when the CoP turned into a revolution. This finding implies that the participant movements in the protests did not discuss the type of the regime that would replace the outgoing one. To support this finding, I use the narratives offered by activists to show first that they did not initially plan to oust the regime but decided to change

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851 Snow and Benford, “Master Frames”; Gerhards and Rucht, “Mesomobilization”; McAdam, “‘Initiator’ and ‘Spin-off’ Movements.”
their objectives once people joined them in large numbers, at which point the call for overthrowing the regime appeared and was adopted immediately by the AYMs. I also use the activists’ chanted slogans, documents and the chronology of events of the eighteen days of the uprising to show that there was no agreement between the youth participant movements on the type of the regime that should follow Mubarak.

Fifty-eight activists were asked to elaborate on four questions that reveal how the MF remained inclusive during Cop’s apex. These questions are:

- Did they plan to oust the regime when they originally call for the demonstrations? And in case they did not, what were the reasons?
- When the call for ousting the regime appeared?
- Who raised the slogan “the people want to oust the regime?”
- Did the activists agree on the type of the regime that should follow Mubarak’s and in case they did not, why?

For the first question, none of the activists claimed that there was a plan to oust the regime on January 25; they offered, however, different explanations as to why that were the case. Table VII-3 shows the explanations and their distributions.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No</th>
<th>Answer</th>
<th>No of activists</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>No one expected the protests to turn into a revolution; we thought there were going to be small demonstrations and they would be encircled by the police as in the past.</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>We wanted to encourage the people to join the protests by offering realistic demands.</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Neither we neither the regime expected this huge number of people.</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>The most we expected is the resignation of Habib Eladli, the Interior Minister.</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Our hope was to do something like what had happened on April 6, 2008.  
We thought the regime was strong and that it was not possible to overthrow it.  
We did not participate in the first day of the revolution; we did not expect the event to be important.

| Total number of answers | 58 |

These answers lead to one conclusion: fifty-eight activists did not expect the demonstrations to turn into a revolution, simply because they expected the protests to be small based on their previous experiences.

For the question when the call for ousting the regime appeared the first time. The answer varies according to governorates (see Table VII-4).

Table VII-4: Distribution of activists’ answers of when the slogan ‘the people want to topple Mubarak’ appeared on January 25, 2011

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Governorate</th>
<th>Answer</th>
<th>No of activists for each answer</th>
<th>Tot. No of activists</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Cairo</td>
<td>When the protestors arrived Tahrir Square at 4 PM</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>At 7 PM</td>
<td>5</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>At 10 PM</td>
<td>4</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Midnight</td>
<td>17</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Do not recall the time</td>
<td>4</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alexandria</td>
<td>We did not raise this slogan on January 25th.</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>We chanted “the people want to topple the government” at 8 PM</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>when we arrived at Sidi Bishir.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>We chanted the people want to topple Mubarak when we arrived Victoria area.</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Suez</td>
<td>In the afternoon following the killing of the first protester.</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assiut</td>
<td>We did not raise this slogan. The people did not join us.</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td></td>
<td>54</td>
<td>54</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Four activists did not participate on January 25.

That this slogan appeared at different times in Cairo, appeared in some demonstrations in Alexandria but not in others, and began to be chanted only after the killing of a demonstrator in Suez all suggest that the MF was changing without prior agreement among the activists. That
said, it could be argued that several other elements contributed to the discrepancies in timing in Cairo, such as that the activists arrived to Tahrir Square at different times due to confrontations with the police, and also that because the Square is a big area, some activists might have chanted this slogan in some places but not in others. Nevertheless, though, it still strongly appears that the call for ousting the regime was not coordinated among the activists. This can be seen in the activists’ answer to the question of who raised this slogan. All the fifty-four activists denied being the first to chant it; their answers took a passive form: it was raised. Two of the RS activists said they had chanted it at the beginning of the demonstration in Nahia, Cairo, but the people did not follow them.852 One from the YJF said that he had chanted it when he saw thousands of people joining the protests until his colleague asked him to stop so as not to scare off the bystanders who were joining the protests, but when they arrived at Tahrir Square, the demonstrators began to chant it.853 Mohammed Abo Elgheit said that one of his subjects, Mahmoud Sami, an activist with A6M and the master mind for the snowball plan, informed him in the interview that the organizing activists had agreed that in case the plan of mobilizing the poor in Nahia succeeded, they would raise the slogan *Irhal* (depart), similar to *degage*, the word the Tunisians used in Habib Bourguiba street when asked Ben Ali to leave.854 Though the activists I interviewed did not confirm this piece of information, nothing they said suggested it couldn not be true. However, even if the activists had agreed in advance on this slogan, they were not sure that the protestors would accept it, and they did not agree on what to do if Mubarak actually was ousted.

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853 Nagy, “interview.”
854 Abo Elgheit, “The map of snowball.”
Regardless of preplanning, in any case, the fact that this slogan appeared, and that protesters had begun to call for the regime to fall, changed the situation significantly. It did so in two ways. First, it signified a turning point in the CoP from reformist to revolutionary demands. Second, it sent a message to the AYMs that the time was ripe to oust the regime if they capitalized on the people willingness to go beyond reformist demands. As I explained in the previous chapter, the RS movement issued a statement by the end of the day calling for the continuation of the protests until “Mubarak steps down from his position authority immediately” and A6M called upon Egyptians to demonstrate “in order to topple the regime” on January 28th. According to Mohamed Nagy, the movements participating in the protests at Tahrir Square met at midnight on January 25 and declared the continuation of the sit-in at Tahrir Square until ousting the regime, but at fifteen minutes after midnight, Egyptian security forces attacked the protestors and dispersed them.

Of particular importance here is the position of the MB following the protests of January 25. On the one hand, the MB did not call for ousting the regime and reiterated its demands for reform. This implies that the prognostic component of the MF was not inclusive at the period of CoP’s apex. On the other hand, the MB participated in the demonstration of January 28, which called for the regime’s departure, and this seems to be an indication of MF inclusivity. How then can we understand this contradiction? Suffice here to say that the MB had a big interest in ousting the regime but it did not want to be seen advocating for this out of fear over the reprisals should the demonstrations not succeed. However, the MB’s practical interest in ousting the regime maintained the MF’s inclusivity during the apex of the CoP nonetheless.

856 Nagy, “interview.”
I asked the activists whom I interviewed whether they had all agreed on the type of the regime that should follow Mubarak’s ouster, and in case they had not, why that might be. All fifty-eight activists reported that they had reached no agreement. They offered four reasons for this lack of planning. First, the activists did not expect Mubarak’s regime to fall quickly and were taken by surprise when he departed. Alnemir, a defected MB activist and one of the main activists who organized the demonstrations in Alexandria, describes the days from January 28 to February 11 as full of events that passed quickly and gave the activists no time to think about the period after Mubarak’s fall as they were focused intently on engineering his departure and expected him to resist. In Alnemir’s words, the activists “had no calculation for this moment, not even one clear political alternative.” Ata from the YJF confirms Alnemir’s description of this period, explaining that “the Sit-in at Tahrir Square was only for two weeks…and we were busy in confronting the police attacks on us and fighting for Mubarak’s departure”, adding that “we had no time to discuss the future.”

Second, the dominant public hope at the time, from which the activists took their cues, was that the military would oust Mubarak and seize authority. Maher, an activist from A6M who was involved in the preparations for the demonstrations in Cairo, explained how few people were against transferring authority from Mubarak to the military. The people, he said, had great trust in the military and it was very difficult to speak against the military during those days. Nagy agreed with Maher, saying that “when my group began to chant against the military some activists confronted us saying this would upset the people who joined us and might encourage

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858 Atta, “Interview.”
859 Maher, “interview.”
them to leave.”

This was clearer in Suez than in any other governorate. As Osama, an activist of the popular current, explained, “we did not have a plan for what to do after the departure of Mubarak. On January 25 when the police killed three of us, we chanted ‘Wahed, Ihnein, Al Jeish Al Masri fein’ (One, Two, Where is the Egypt’s Army).” Osama added, “we wanted Mubarak to go, we did not care then who would replace him.”

The same viewpoint is found amongst the activists from Alexandria: “even if the military brought anyone at that time instead of Mubarak, the people would have accepted him to rule,” Abdulfatah, an MB activist, said. Third, the activists had in mind a form of a civilian government that would replace Mubarak, according to Elbahrawy, but they neither discussed nor elaborated upon what it would look like. For example, Maher, an activist with A6M, reported that his group had wanted the interim period to be managed by a civil authority responsible for organising the first presidential and legislative elections, but that there had been more than one vision about what did this entailed and how this authority should be composed. By contrast, Samir, a member of CFSE and one of the core activists in Alexandria, said that after January 28th, “we who coordinated the demonstrations agreed on ten demands, among them the formation of a civil council of five persons (a politician, judge, university professor, economist, and a military officer) to manage the interim period”.

Ata and Elgenawy, both from the YJF and core organizers of the protests, told a differing stories. Elgenawy said, “at Tahrir Square, we proposed a civilian presidential council to manage

860 Nagy, “Interview.”
863 Elbahrawy, “Interview.”
864 Maher, “Interview.”
the interim period.” But Ata denied this, saying “we had no vision of what we should do after the departure of Mubarak.” Both of them are correct in important ways; the idea of replacing Mubarak with a form of a civilian government was not communicated between the participant movements nor discussed among the activists of each movement because it was not urgent. They did not expect Mubarak to leave as quickly as he did and they were focused on maintaining the sit-in in Tahrir Square.

Finally, the MB leaders had no interest in forging an agreement about the period that would follow Mubarak’s departure because they were not sure that Mubarak was leaving and they did not want to cross a line with the regime by boycotting negotiations with it. Sakr, one of the main activists of the MB at Tahrir Square, explained the MB position: “Mubarak’s departure was not expected but god’s will made this possible.” He further noted that the MB had not wanted to commit itself to an agreement with the AYMs because it was seeking an agreement with the army. According to Sakr, once the MB called for regime’s departure (January 31), it became a point of no return and if Mubarak were to have remained, the regime would have taken revenge upon the MB for opposing it. Sakr added that the true authority lay with the military and convincing it to abandon Mubarak was the only way to oust him. Taken together, all these reasons lead the MB to focus on the regime’s departure rather than on the period that would follow Mubarak, and thus the MB maintained an inclusive MF during the period of the CoP’s apex.

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866 Elgenawy, “Interview.”
867 Atta, “Interview.”
868 Nidal Sakr, “Interview.”
869 Ibid.
Studying the chanted slogans that appeared during the fifteen-day sit-in at Tahrir Square offers another illustration of the activists’ singular focus on the regime’s departure rather than on the type of the regime that should replace it – an area that may have cause rifts between the protestors due to their ideological differences. I examine here the most famous one hundred chanted slogans as gathered by Mohamed Fathi, an Egyptian writer and an activist who participated in the sit-in. Several things stand out about them. First, that the activists’ vision for the future of government involves justice, freedom, and dignity. Second, the slogans pointedly condemn corruption and oppression. Third, they are concentrated mainly on ousting the regime as personified in Mubarak’s continued role as president. And finally, they called for national unity. Table VII-5 shows how these slogans are distributed on the four themes with examples for each theme.

Table VII-5: Distribution of the Egyptian’s Revolution slogans

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No</th>
<th>Theme</th>
<th>Sample (translation followed by original slogan in Arabic)</th>
<th>No</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Call for justice, freedom, and dignity</td>
<td>Dignity and Freedom…the demand for all Egyptians (Al karamah wil huriyya matlab kul almisriyyah). Hey freedom where are you… Mubarak between me and you (Ya huriyya weinik weinik…Mubarak beni wa benic)</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Denunciation of corruption and oppression.</td>
<td>Raise your voice like all people… it is enough, we hate oppression (Irfa’ sotak zai elnas… ihna krihna alzulm khalas). The cancer everywhere…and the gas is sold for free ( Alsaratn fi kul makan wa algas bitba’ bilmagan).</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Calls for Mubarak departure</td>
<td>Hey Gamal Hey owl…Take your father and go the Zine (Zine El Abidine Bin Ali). (Ya Gamal ya ghurab albein…khus abouk wi rouh la zein. Leave, Leave, Suleiman… we do not want you also (Irhal, irhal ya Suleiman…mish a’wzeenak inta Kaman).</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>National unity</td>
<td>The army and the military are hand in hand…Egypt is entering a new era (Al gesh wa asha’b eid WAHDA).</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* I should note that out of the 42 slogans that call for Mubarak’s departure, only 4 slogans call for the departure of the regime, and 5 slogans associate the departure of Mubarak with that of other persons such as Habib AlAdli, Omar Suleiman, and Gamal Mubarak.

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In short, the MF remained inclusive because the activists focused on ousting Mubarak and as they did not discuss the type of the regime that should follow his departure. That the MB negotiated the regime does not change the fact that on the ground they did not deviate from demanding the regime’s departure after getting involved in the protests.

**Conclusion**

In this chapter I reconstructed and analysed the Egyptian CoP’s MF from the documents of one of the CoP’s main activists, Wael Ghonim. His statement “All what you need to know about the demonstration on January 25” is in agreement with the participant youth movements’ own documents and with the narratives offered by the activists whom I interviewed. The MF revolved around poverty, state corruption, and repression, and it was inclusive because it displayed political pluralism, represented the interests of the majority of people despite their different identities, and it transcended the cleavages between Muslims and Copts, as well as the ideological rifts between the participant movements. This is in part because there were organizational linkages between the participant movements dating back to the protests of 2000 and strengthened prior to the revolution by the formation of the National Campaign for Change following the return of Mohammed El-Barade’ in 2010.

I also explained that the MF remained inclusive during the CoP’s apex because (1) the activists focused on Mubarak’s departure, (2) did not discuss the type of the regime that should be installed, and (3) that the MB had interest in the regime’s departure despite its engagement in the negotiations with regime. These reasons were a result of the activists’ lack of confidence that Mubarak would indeed be deposed, and the short time of the CoP which did not give the YMs sufficient time to focus on the interim government that would replace Mubarak. Furthermore, the
two faces of the MB helped in maintaining the MF inclusivity. The MB wanted to maintain a link with the departing regime in order to avoid being held responsible for the protests in case the revolution failed, and at the same time, they wanted to guarantee the fall of the regime so as to escape possible reprisals and to maximize their organizational and political gains, and hence in their secret talks with the military they pushed for the regime departure after January 31.
Chapter VIII

Egypt: Decentralized Leadership at the CoP’s Apex

As was the case in Tunisia, the beginning of a process of democratization in Egypt was the result of a political vacuum created by the protests and of the failure of the youth movements to fill this vacuum due to the absence of unified leadership. The vacuum created a crisis of legitimacy that led to the national elections of the legislative and executive authorities in late 2011 and June 2012, respectively. The Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF), which became the de facto authority after Mubarak’s ouster, did not have adequate popular legitimacy to rule Egypt. This was in part because the protests forced the departure of Mubarak, and also because their authority was in contradiction with old regime’s own constitution. This forced SCAF to declare a plan that included running new elections for the legislative and executive institutions. At the same time, the absence of unified leadership among the YMs provoked a power struggle between the main actors. The AYMs sought to replace the SCAF with a civilian presidential council (CPC) while the MB backed the SCAF and defended its roadmap to the elections. Unlike in Tunisia, the struggle over authority between the main actors in Egypt altered slightly the roadmap of democratization as drafted by SCAF. This is because the AYMs had to compete with two powerful rivals: the SCAF and the Muslim Brotherhood (MB).

To explain these arguments, I first show that the decentralized form of leadership appeared before the CoP’s apex. Next, I argue that the decentralized form of leadership remained

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871 “The constitution of 1971 and the amendments of 2007,” State Information Service. Retrieved from http://www.sis.gov.eg/Ar/Templates/Articles/tmpArticles.aspx?CatID=73#.U6ENT_ldVZk (accessed June 1, 2014). Article 84 states also that “The President of the Republic shall be chosen within a maximum period of sixty days form the date of the vacancy of the Presidential office.” Article 76 states that the Egyptians elect their president through secret ballots.

872 SCAF, “the first constitutional declaration,” 98.
during the CoP’s apex even when the conditions, that is to say, the sit-in in Tahrir Square, were in favour for establishing a centralized leadership. Then, I illustrate the dynamic of protests under a decentralized leadership. After that, I show how these dynamics led to the process of democratization. Finally, I sum the chapter’s main arguments.

Emergence of Decentralized Form of Leadership

The protests in Egypt that took place on January 25 were organized by several AYMs that coordinated closely with each other. Yet these movements could not maintain their leadership of the protests because of their weak organizational infrastructure, the confrontational nature of the protests, and the late participation of the NYMs, which preferred to keep their distance from the AYMs. Unlike in Tunisia, the protests in Egypt began with clear leadership; that is to say, the movements that called for the protests were known to the public and to the Egyptian regime. What was not known at that time were the details of the core activists’ plans for the protests. So while the public and the regime knew about the intention of the AYMs to organize protests, and the locations of those protests, which were declared on the webpage of We Are All Khalid Saed (RAKS), they did not know that the core activists in the AYMs had decided secretly to begin their protests from the poor neighbourhoods of Cairo and Alexandria, which prevented the Central Security Forces (CSF) from cordoning of the protests as they had done in the past. The plan of the core activists to mobilize poor Egyptians was a result of their conviction that they would be unable to sustain the protests otherwise due to organizational weaknesses.  

However, by joining the protests in the tens of thousands, the involvement of large numbers of poor people had two consequences on the AYMs’ ability to lead them. The first is

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873 See chapter VI
that because the AYMs did not have mass-based organizations, they could not muster big
numbers of their supporters, and therefore became a minority of protest participants. As Elnimir,
one of the protests organizers in Alexandria explained:

“Once the demonstrators reached thousands of people we became confused as we did not
have experience on how to lead huge demonstrations and how to coordinate between big
protests in different places. [Our experience] was with small demonstrations in which we
knew each other by name […] we did not know where to take these numbers and how to
connect the different demonstrations with each other….new independent activists
appeared and began to direct the protests through their chanting.”

The second is related to the violent nature of the protests as the confrontation with the CSF
created multiples of independent protest centers. In Cairo, the protests reached Tahrir Square
without confrontation with the CSF, but once the activists planned to remain in place for an
extended period of time, the CSFs attacked them with tear gas. The protestors, who were
dispersed into many groups in the inner streets of Cairo confronted, the CSF by throwing stones
until the dawn of January 26. The same happened in Alexandria, where the CSF dispersed the
protestors violently at Abu Alkheir Street, after which the protestors regrouped and began
throwing stones. On January 26 and 27, the core activists of the AYMs were planning for
demonstrations on January 28, or “the Day of Rage,” as it would be called, but confrontations
with the CSF continued in Cairo, Alexandria, Suez, and Sinai, which point to the fact that new

874 Elnimir, “interview.”
875 Nagy, “interview.”
876 Samir, “interview.”
protest centers in these regions emerged that were not led by the initiator movements. In his testimony, Mohammed Shama’ recounts the confrontations in Cairo between the CSF and the protestors in Tahrir Square, the professional associations of lawyers and journalists associations, and in Tal’at Harb Square. In Suez, for example, the small group of activists from the Popular Current who began the protests almost lost their control of them instantaneously when the CFS confronted the protestors. According to Osama, when the violence erupted the protestors formed groups to confront the CSF and “all that we could do was to join these groups.” In Assiut, although the protests failed on January 25, a group of the AYMs’ activists went the next day to Suweris Square to hold protests and the police arrested fifteen of them.

Finally, when the MB decided to join the protests in the night of January 27, they did not coordinate their activities with the AYMs. The exception to this was in Alexandria, but, and as mentioned in Chapter VI, they disagreed with the AYMs on the locations of the protests. What is evident in this chronology is that with the participation of the MB in the protests, another leadership center emerged that was managing its own affairs and decisions independently. Thus with the start of the CoP’s apex, the leadership of the protest movement was already fragmented.

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877 Not all the core activists of the AYMs supported the idea of waiting until January 28th. In Cairo, for example, Mahmoud Sami from A6M argued that poor Egyptians were already involved in the protests and that there was no need to wait until the Friday of Rage. He joined the protests on January 26th and the CFS arrested him. Shawky, “interview.” Similarly, Yousef Sha’ban, from the RS did the same in Alexandria and he also was arrested. Samir, “interview.”


879 Ali Osama, “interview.”


881 Mustafa Maher, “interview.”

882 Elnimir, “interview.”
To summarize, the organizational weakness of the AYMs, the violence the accompanied the protests in their early stages, and late participation of the MB in the protests led to the disintegration of protest movement leadership.

**Decentralized Leadership During the Sit-in in Tahrir Square**

The main objective of this section is to illustrate that even when the circumstances were in favor for the rise of a centralized leadership, the protest movement at the CoP’s apex remained under a decentralized leadership. In order to do so, I will focus on the sit-in in Tahrir Square between January 29 and February 11, 2011. I first explained the importance of the sit-in. Next, I use the way the logistics of the sit-in gathered, channeled, and used to illustrate that the leadership of the protestors was not centralized. I, then, map the leadership centers that appeared in Tahrir Square, and finally I explain why the youth movements failed to create a unified leadership. I will argue that these reasons are related to the disagreement between the AYMs and NYMs on the protests’ goals and due to the rise of numerous grassroots informal movements (GIMs).

**The Importance of the Sit-in in Tahrir Square**

The ‘Day of Rage’ or the ‘Friday of Rage’ on January 28 was a turning point in the CoP because it was accompanied by five crucial developments: the joining in the protests of the MB and other NYMs, the appearance of the demand for ousting the regime, the collapse of the Center Security Forces (CSF), the deployment of the armed forces, and most importantly, the establishment of a permanent sit-in in Tahrir Square.883 The sit-in in the Square began on the night of January 29 following the collapse of CSF. The original plan of the ‘Day of Rage,’ according Shawky from

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883 See chapter VI
YJF, did not include a sit-in, but the collapse of the CSF and the seemingly neutral position of the army encouraged some activists of the AYMs to remain in the Square on the night of January 29. The AYMs’ and NYMs’ activists adopted the sit-in on the morning of January 30 and turned it into the center of their showdown with the regime.  

The focus on the sit-in at Tahrir Square to show that the leadership of the protests remained decentralized during the CoP’s apex is due to four reasons. The first is related to the important role of the Square in the revolution. The sit-in not only creates a visible center that repeated the demand of ousting the regime, but it also put enduring pressure on the regime to leave the authority because of its disruptive nature in downtown Cairo and the continuous coverage of it by the international media. The second reason follows simply from the structure of the sit-in: if the leadership of the sit-in, where all movements were gathering, was decentralized, then leadership for the protests elsewhere was also decentralized. The logic is that any permanent sit-in requires supporting logistics to maintain it and it forces coordination between the activists to respond to the demands of those participating in the sit-in, which allows for the rise of unified leadership. If this unified leadership did not materialize under such circumstances, it will be unlikely to appear in streets protests where the conditions encourage a decentralized form of leadership. Third, there is a symbolic importance to the Square. The youth movements and the regime, at the time, believed that the success or failure of the revolution hinged on the continuation of the sit-in. As Nadim, an activist from the Revolutionary Socialist, put it: “the sit-in in the Square turned the Square from a place to go into a place to go through toward freedom and social justice,”  

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884 Shawky, “interview”; Maher, “interview”

885 Nadim, interview with author, Cairo, June 20, 2012
their goals were achieved. Indeed, many activists left their governorates and went to Cairo to participate in the sit-in because they believed that the successful of the revolution depend on its continuation.\footnote{For example, Mohammed Samir from Alexandria and Ahmed Abdul Razeq from Assiut left the protests in the governorates and went to the sit-in in the Square after the ‘Battle of Camel.’ According to them, many activists went with them. Samir, “interview”; Abdulrazeq, “interview.”} Meanwhile, the regime was under the conviction that ending the sit-in in the Square would end the protests elsewhere, and thus the regime tried to evacuate the Square by using hired thugs following the collapse of CSF, in the so called the ‘Battle of Camel.’\footnote{“Alshorouk republishes the report of the Fact Finding Mission on the Battle of Camel,” Alshorouk news, October 12, 2012. Retrieved from http://www.shorouknews.com/news/view.aspx?cdate=12102012&id=f11ce139-b6ae-4fad-b59d-bf24af7bee59 (accessed June 10, 2014)} In addition, the concessions the regime offered during its negotiations with the NYMs aimed to end the sit-in. For example, Omar Suleiman called upon Egyptian youths to return back to their “governorates and businesses in order to build Egypt” after reaching “understandings with the opposition on the required reforms”, all of which he promised to implement.\footnote{Suleiman, “The text of major-general Omar Suleiman to the Egyptian’s people,” 46.} Finally, during the period of the sit-in, the calls for what the activists dubbed ‘a milioniah demonstration,’ – i.e., a call for millions of Egyptians to come to the Square to express their support to the demand of ousting the regime came from the sit-in.\footnote{There were three calls for millioniah demonstrations during the sit-in: on January 31st, February 4th, and February 9th. These calls emerged from the Square through coordination between the AYMs and NYMs. Shawky, “interview”; Osama, “interview”; Maher, “interview.”}

**Logistic Sources for the Sit-in**

A significant indication that the sit-in in the Square was not under a unified leadership, and that no single movement or coalition of movements had the capacity to end it alone, is that the logistics needed to sustain it (such as tents and blankets for sleeping at night, the food and water for the protestors, radios to address the participants, and the equipment and medicines for field
hospitals that were erected in the Square) were not organized or channeled through a unified leadership. According to different sources, including my own interviews with a sample of activists, the testimonies of several activists who attended the sit-in and documented their observations in published books, and Aljazeera interviews with different personalities who were involved in the sit-in, there were three independent sources for the logistics. Firstly, the blankets, the food and water, and the first sit-in radio to address the sit-inners were mostly provided by Mamdouh Hamaza, a wealthy engineer, who had close relations with activists from A6M. According to Hamza, he used his own money and funds fathered through a network of wealthy friends that included Safwan Thabit Juhaina (owner of Juhaina Company), Sami Saad (owner of Corana Company) and others to provide the sit-inners with their needs. Hamaza also used his engineering office to print the AYM’s statements and to provide them with the banners they asked for. The second source was the Muslim Brotherhood, who established two living tents (out of eight) to distribute food and who also focused on providing the field hospitals with physicians and medicines. By the end of sit-in, there were eight field hospitals in the Square and more than 300 physicians working in them. The third source was direct donations from the Egyptian people, who provided participants mainly with foods, drinks, and blankets. According to Ziad Eleimi, a member in the Coalition of the Youth of the Revolution (CYR), his neighbors

890 This include the microphones, the loudspeakers, the stand, and a generator

891 Mamdouh Hamza was one of the victims of the old regime. He had an engineering office in London and when he extended his work to Egypt, Mohammed I. Suleiman, the former housing minister, accused him of planning to kill him and Fathi Srour, the People Council speaker. He was arrested for months in London and then he was released when the accusations turned to be part of a plot to prevent Hamza from competing with engineering offices owned by the housing minister. See Abdulmajeed, “Days of liberation,” 116

892 Mansour, “Mamdouh Hamza: a witness on the revolution, part 3”; also the author’s interviews with Maher, Shawky, and Nagy; Also see Abdulmajeed, “Days of liberation.”

893 Osama, “interview”; Mustafa, “interview”; Hani Mustafa, interview with author, Cairo, July 23, 2012. Osama, Mustafa, and Hani were medicine students at the time and served in the field hospitals.
collected money and gave it to him to spend on the sit-in. Similar stories were also repeated by other activists. For example, the activists who lived in Cairo brought supplies from their homes.

Having explained the importance of the sit-in in Tahrir Square and how the logistics gathered, channeled, and used in a way that confirm the extant of multiple leadership centers in the sit-in, I now map these centers.

**Map of Leadership Centers During the Sit-in**

The leadership centers in the sit-in in Tahrir Square included at least four coalitions, the MB, and tens of grassroots informal movements (GIMs). To begin with, the two sit-in radios in the Square indicate the present of two important leadership centers: the Coalition of the Youth of the Revolution (CYR) and the MB. The CYR was composed of fourteen activists; two for each of the five movements that coordinated the events of January 25 including April 6 Movement (A6M), Youth for Justice and Freedom (YJF), Campaign for the Support of El-Baradei’ (CFSE), the youth of the Front Democratic Party, and defectors from the MB. The other four were independents and bloggers. According to the activists of A6M, YJF, CFSE, and the MB, these two centers coordinated closely with each other on issues related to the sit-in’s security and the practicalities of living in the Square. For example, the two radios that existed in the Square were

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896 The CYR erected their radio, the one that Hamza Mamdouh brought to them, close to Tahrir Compound, and the MB placed its radio close to Harden’s restaurant. See Sha’ban, “Youth Movements media in the republic of the Square”; also Nagy, “interview”; Elgenawy, “interview”, Maher, “interview”, Hani, “interviews” and others; Also see Shama’, “Days of liberation,” 50; Ibrahim, “Days.”

open for use by the two camps, as well as for independents; however, each radio was managed by the activists of each camp.\textsuperscript{898}

These two leadership centers, the CYR and the MB, were not alone in the Square; they competed with tens of other independent centers. Some of them can be identified, but others cannot. Among the known centers is the Union of the Youth of the Revolution (UYR), which included activists from the NYMs, such as Al-Wafd, Etajame’, and the Arab Nasri Party.\textsuperscript{899} Another center included public personalities who sought to influence the sit-in demands and strategists such as Mustafa Abdul Jalil, Yahya Abdul Hadi, Mohamed Beltaji, Ala’ Elswani, Mohamed Abu Elghar and other figures who used to all meet at Dr. Abduljalil office near the Square.\textsuperscript{900} A third carried the name “the committee of wise men,” and included figures such Amr Hamzawy, Ahmed Zewail, Najuib Sawiris, and others.\textsuperscript{901}

In parallel to these known centers, there were tens of grassroots informal movements (GIMs) that are difficult to be identified for two reasons. The first is that a high number of GIMs appeared during this period. To give an indication of this number, the meeting that SCAF called for with the youth movements on June, 1, 2011 to discuss their demands was attended by one thousand activists who represented one hundred youth movements – ten activists for each movement. Nor did this reflect the true number of GIMs because SCAF limited the attendance to

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{898} Nagy, Elgenawy, Maher, Elenany, Salem, and Ben Hassaniem, “interviews.”
\item \textsuperscript{899} Shama’, “Freedom Days,” 88.
\item \textsuperscript{900} Ezbawi, “Role of youths and new protest movements in January 25th revolution.”
\item \textsuperscript{901} The committee called for a smooth democratic transition guaranteed by the army in return for ending the sit-in. See for example, “Committee of Wise Men calls army to ensure a safe transition to democracy,” Almasry Alyoum, February 5, 2012. Retrieved from http://today.almasryalyoum.com/article2.aspx?ArticleID=286586 (accessed June 6, 2014). This position was rejected by the groups of the CYR. For example, A6M announced that it had no “coordination with what is known as the wise men committee which proposed ending the sit-in and started the negotiation while Mubarak is still in the authority.” A6M, “About the youths’ demands,” 243-4.
\end{itemize}
ten activists for each movement and arranged the meeting on the principle “first come, first serves.”

This means that tens of other movements did not have the chance to attend the meeting. In fact, the Coalition of the Revolutionary Powers, which included fifty-eight youth movements, refused to attend the meeting. The number of the youth movements, according to Alahram Center for Political and Strategic Studies, exceeded 180, and according to Fahmy Howeidy, an Egyptian Islamist writer, exceeded 193.

The second reason is that it is difficult to know which of these movements were really GIMs and established originally in the Square and which of them were fakes established after Mubarak’s departure. According to Abu Al’ula Madi, the secretary general of Wasat Party, President Morsi informed him that state security forces controlled 300 thousand thugs, 80 thousand of which were in Cairo. Furthermore, after ousting Mubarak the SCAF tried hard discredit the AYMs by claiming that the Egyptian youths had no true coalition to represent them and thereby the demands of CYR did not reflect the actual opinions of the youth. Indeed, during my research I conducted interviews with two activists from a movement that called itself ‘Youths love Egypt’ but when I asked activists from A6M, YJF, and CFSE about it, they denied that they had even heard of it.

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902 See CYR, “A statement to SCAF.”
904 Albuheiry, “Coalition of the youth of the revolutionary.”
905 Howeidy, “The coalition is a necessity and not a luxury.”
908 Ahmed Fathi and Nihan Nizar, Youths love Egypt, interview with author, Cairo, May 27, 2012.
Reasons for YMs’ Failure to Form Unified Leadership

The narrative of the activists and the documents of youth movements show three reasons that explain why the activists failed to establish a centralized leadership during the sit-in in Tahrir Square. The first is related to the fact that the NYMs, including the MB, and the aforementioned coalitions joined the protests officially on January 28 while the Coalition of the Youth of the Revolution (CYR) was already in place, though it officially announced its existence on February 16 after the end of the sit-in in the Square. The second is related to the disagreement between the CYR and the MB and the other coalitions on the end goals of the protests. For example, the MB guidance bureau preferred to preserve its independence because it did not want to commit itself to decisions that might not be congruent with its broader political program or strategy. This became clear when the CYR refused to negotiate with the regime and raised the slogan “no negotiation before the regime’s departure” while the MB and other coalitions accepted the offer of negotiation. And finally, as can be inferred from the preceding discussion, the huge number of GIMs that existed in the Square, made it almost impossible to unite all these groups under a central command.

Dynamic of Protests Under Decentralized Leadership

In the framework of analysis, I argued that the protests under a decentralized leadership have three dynamics that are conducive to the beginning of democratization in case the protests lead to

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909 According to Ziad Uleimi, a member of CYR, they announced officially the coalition because many activists who had little to no contribution in the revolution started to talk in the name of the youth groups. See Uleimi, “why the revolution.”

910 On February 6, 2011, the CYR issued a statement in the name of “the Coalition of the Youth of the Revolution of Rage” (CYRR) in which it refused the dialogue with the regime before the departure of Mubarak. See for example, the statement of CYR, Masrawy, February 7, 2011. Retrieved from http://www.masrawy.com/News/Egypt/Politics/2011/february/7/mub_youth.aspx (accessed June 5, 2014)

911 MB, “A statement from the MB about the events of Thursday,” 183.
overthrow the regime. In this section, I explain these dynamics in the context of Egypt’s CoP. I will show first how the consent between the different protest centers established around ousting Mubarak. In this sense the regime was personify in Mubarak as a person. Next, I illustrate how the protests were doomed either to succeed or to fail under this decentralized mode of leadership. And finally, I explain the impact of the protests on the state and the inability of the YMs to see it which made the army at least one step ahead the YMs in term of seizing the political power.

**Narrow Consent on Protests’ Goals**

The multiple leadership centers in Egypt’s CoP raise the question of how the agreement on ousting the regime was reached and sustained during the entire period of the sit-in in Tahrir Square. I will argue that the consent on overthrowing the regime achieved before the CoP reached its apex; however, during the CoP’s apex, this consent grew narrower as the regime personified in Mubarak’s personality in order to maintain the sit-in.

Unlike in Tunisia where the consensus on ousting Ben Ali was caused by the interaction between the different protest centers in the streets, in Egypt the call for the ‘Day of Rage’ on January 28 was from the start a demand to oust the regime. Hence, the people who took to the street in that day did so for that purpose and the sit-in was established to achieve this goal. However, due to the absence of unified leadership for the protestors, the word ‘regime’ has never been articulated and elaborated between the different centers of the protests. Did the regime include all the ruling elites? For example, the president, his deputy, the government, the top leaders of the security forces, the leaders of the National Democratic Party, and the state’s top bureaucrats.

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912 See chapter VI for the AYM’s statements which defined the goals of the protests on January 28th.
The evidences from the movements’ documents, the activists’ slogans, and movements’ behavior during the CoP’s apex show a clear tendency to personify the regime in Mubarak’s personality to maintain consensus between the different protest centers on the protests’ goals. This in return created an implicit understanding among the protestors that after his departure they would leave the Square. This can be seen in the protestors’ slogans, such as “we will not leave, he should leave”, or in the comic banners that were raised in the Square, such as “please leave, my feet are hurting.”  

This also can be seen in the AYM’s slogan “no negotiations before Mubarak’s departure” and in the huge demonstrations in Cairo and Alexandria following Mubarak’s last speech, in which demonstrators chanted one word: depart. The movements’ statements also reveal this tendency to narrow the protests’ goals. For example, while April 6 Movement (A6M) early statement of January 27 focused on “toppling the regime”, its statement on February 4 says “we declare our refusal to Omar Suleiman, the president deputy, call for negotiation until Mubarak’s departure.” Implicitly here one can understand that the president deputy was singled out from the call for toppling the regime. The acceptance to negotiate Suleiman by the NYMs reveals also how the regime was personified in Mubarak’s, as the statement of the MB on January 31 called for the “departure of the entire regime with its president, party, ministers, and parliament.”

The consensus on ousting Mubarak remained solid during the fifteen days of the sit-in except on February 1st. Following Mubarak’s second speech, in which he appealed to the

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913 Abdul Sadeq, “25th January Manifestos.”
914 According to Abulmajeed, in Alexandria alone three millions gathered in the street against the beach on their way to Atin Palace chanting one word ‘leave.” Abulmajeed, “Days,” 240.
915 A6M, “About the youth demands.”
916 MB, “A statement from the Muslim Brotherhood about the Egyptian people continuous blessed Intifada.”
Egyptians’ emotions by stating “this is my homeland as it is the homeland of every Egyptian. I grew up in it, and I fought for it, and I defended its land, sovereignty, and interests, and on its soil, I will die,”⁹¹⁷ the protestors in the Square became divided and thousands of the ordinary people who joined the protests left the sit-in; they were influenced by Mubarak’s nationalism.⁹¹⁸ Indeed, according to my interviews, the number who withdrew from the Square was so large that only fifteen thousand activists remained in the Square⁹¹⁹, though other sources put the number between 30-40 thousand.⁹²⁰ Nevertheless, Mubarak lost the Egyptians’ sympathy following the ‘Battle of the Camel,’ one day after his speech, and the consensus on ousting him regained its momentum. The images of horses and camels carrying thugs wielding knives and sticks and attacking the sit-in convinced the people that Mubarak must go. Following this event, the call came out for holding a milioniah in the Square under the name of the “Friday of Departure”, and it was attended by hundreds of thousands of Egyptians.⁹²¹

What should be observed, however, is that while the AYMs focused on ousting Mubarak in order to keep a state of consent with different protest centers to sustain the sit-in, their demands were far from ousting Mubarak. As their statements explicate during that period, they called for dismantling the National Democratic Party (NDP), abolishing the state security investigations service (SSIS), reconstructing the CSF, and replacing Mubarak with a Civilian

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⁹¹⁷ “The text of Mubarak’s Speech, Tuesday, February 1, 2011,” in Rabe’, “the documents,” 33. In this speech, Mubarak promised not to run in the presidential election of October 2011, to amend the constitution, and to fight corruption.


⁹¹⁹ Salem, Nagy, Maher, Ismael, and Alenany, “interviews.”

⁹²⁰ Mansour, “Mamdouh Hamza.”

Presidential Council (CPC) among other demands. I will elaborate in the next section on these issues, but here I want to emphasize that narrowing the consensus on Mubarak’s departure meant that the AYMs were left with many pending demands. As I will show below, the moment Mubarak departed, the protestors in the Square returned home, and the AYMs return to square one struggling to solve its organizational weakness in order to pursue its pending demands.

To summarize, in order to maintain the sit-in, the consent on the protests’ demands became very slim to the extent that they revolved around ousting Mubarak from office. This left the AYMs with abeyance demands that required remobilizing the Egyptians to achieve them.

**Zero-Sum Game**

The failure of the regime to end the sit-in by force left it with the choice of reaching a compromise with the protestors. But the absence of unified leadership to the sit-in made this solution impossible. Unable to end the protests by force or to reach a middle ground solution with the protestors through negotiations, Mubarak was doomed to depart. I support this argument by first showing that a middle ground solution was not possible due to the fragmentation of the protestors’ leadership. Next, I use the narrative of the AYMs and NYMs activists to illustrate that neither side was able to end the protests. Finally, I explain how Mubarak arrived to the conclusion that he should leave to end the protests.

Between February 2 and 10, Mubarak’s deputy conducted negotiations with the MB, the Union of the Youth of the Revolution (UYR), and with independents. He agreed to amend the constitution to allow for free presidential elections, to lift the emergency law, free the media, and accept the courts’ decisions on electoral appeals regarding the 2010 people council’s elections,
among other issues, but that did not end the sit-in because his interlocutors did not represent the Square. The AYMs, as I explained elsewhere, maintained that the parties and movements that were involved in the dialogue with regime represented themselves, and not all of those in the Square. For its part, the MB claimed in its statements that it engaged in dialogue only to convey the demands of the protestors to the regime and that it was committed to a revolutionary outcome; though its statement on February 6 reveals an agreement between the president’s deputy and the MB. The negotiations with the regime also created rifts between some NYMs and their youth groups. For example, the leadership of Etajmoe’ party called for reforms and participated in the meetings with Omar Suleiman. However, its youth organization, the Union of the Progressive Youth, remained committed to the consensus in the Square on ousting the regime, issuing a statement on February 1, 2011 calling for the “departure of Mubarak’s regime with all its institutions.”

If the NYMs had no capacity to end the sit-in, did the AYMs have this capability and simply not use it? I posed this question to activists from A6M, RS, YJF, and CFSE, who denied being able to do so. According to Mustafa, from A6M, “even if A6M called for ending the sit-in the protestors would not have listened to us because they were not under the command of any movement.” For Shawky, from the YJF, the strength of the movements that called for the protests on January 28 came from their call to topple the regime. “If these movements called the sit-inners to go home after all the bloodshed, they would only lose the respect of the protestors

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922 Sulieman, “The content of the agreement,” 43.
923 See chapter VI
924 UPY, “the fall of the president.”
925 Mustafa Maher, “interview.”
and the sit-in would continue,”\textsuperscript{926} Shawky explained. The role of the YMs that called for the protests, according to Mohammed Samir, from CFSE, was not to lead the protests, but to maintain their popular nature. “If they attempted to lead, they would have created rifts inside the popular movement,”\textsuperscript{927} he said. I explained elsewhere, the limited organizational capacity of the AYMs allowed them only to radicalize the protests. In this sense, they gained support, as Shawky explained, because of their political position. Nidal Sakr from the MB eloquently described the dilemma of leadership in the Square: “the sit-in had its own soul that no single movement could contend.”\textsuperscript{928}

The failure of Mubarak’s regime to find interlocutors that represented the sit-inners left it with only two options: using the army to quell the sit-in or to step down. There is, however, no evidence to support the claim that Mubarak ordered the army to end the protests. In fact, Omar Suleiman, the president’s deputy, and field marshal Mohamed Tantawi, the president of the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF) both denied that Mubarak issued orders to repress the protestors. What is clear, however, is that the military sought from the beginning to avoid engaging directly in repression. This does not mean that SCAF wanted Mubarak to leave. Indeed the evidences accumulated on this period shows that the SCAF eventual realization that it was impossible to end the protests without Mubarak’s departure passed through two stages.

In the first stage, the SCAF gave Mubarak the opportunity to end the sit-in through repression with implicit complicity. This involved sending armored cars from the presidential guards on January 28 to provide the CSF at Tahrir Square with ammunition, but the protestors

\textsuperscript{926} Shawky, “interview.”
\textsuperscript{927} Samir, “interview.”
\textsuperscript{928} Sakr, “interview.”
burned them. The army also flew jets and helicopter gunships over the Square to intimidate the protestors, and it also witnessed the ‘Battle of the Camel.’ According to Mohamed Biltaji, one of the MB leaders, on February 2, Major General Abdulfatah Sisi, then the chief of the military intelligence and currently Egypt’s president, came to the Square around 2:00 PM and asked him to end the sit-in to “prevent the bloodshed” that might ensue as “Mubarak’s supporters are in their way to the Square.” When Biltaji asked him to protect the Square, el-Sisi told him, “Mubarak’s proponents have the same right in the Square as his opponents.” But when Biltaji told him that Mubarak supporters might attack them in the streets if they left, Sisi replied that “the army will ensure their security in case they leave the Square.” The contradiction in Sisi’s position (“we cannot protect you in the Square but we will protect you in case you leave it”) shows that the SCAF was until the ‘Battle of Camel’ behind Mubarak. During the attack of the thugs on the sit-in, the army remained neutral; it did not back up the attackers but it also did not protect the sit-in. The only exception was at the entrance of Tal’at Harab’s street when Major Majed Boulus fired into the air to scare the thugs who were coming from his direction to attack the sit-inners. However, in the remaining entrances of the Square, the army did nothing. In fact, according to one of the witnesses, the army at the entrance of Abdulmen’em Riad

929 Abdalmajeed, “Days,” 73
930 Shama’, “Days of Freedom,” 36-7
931 The Battle of the Camel lasted from afternoon of February 2nd until the dawn the second day.
933 After this event, Major Majed Boulus became one of the icons of Egypt’s revolution and his position on that day was recounted from many activists.
disappeared when the thugs initiated their attack.\footnote{May Anani et. al., “Witness Tarek Zidan: the protestors discovered that that the burnt cars contains gaz and they used it,” Alyoum Alsabe’ newspaper, July 10, 2012. Zidan testimony provided to the court which was investigating the events of the ‘Battle of Camel.’ Retrieved from http://www1.youm7.com/News.asp?NewsID=728381#.U6Zv1fdVqU (accessed June 7, 2012).} Even when the protestors came under fire at night from snipers who had occupied the roofs of the buildings around the Square, the army did nothing.\footnote{Osama, Shadi, Hani, Nagy, and Maher, “interviews”; Mohammed Ghazal, interview with author, Cairo, June 21, 2012} The army claimed that its role until February 3 was to protect the state’s vital institutions and not the protestors but it expanded its mission to include the sit-in after the events of February 2.\footnote{Hassan Ruweiny, major general, member in SCAF and the Commander of the Central Security Forces, “testimony on the battle of camel”, ONA news agency, July 2, 2011. Retrieved from http://onaeg.com/?p=195418 (accessed June 1, 2014)}

In the second stage, the SCAF gave Mubarak the opportunity to end the protests through negotiating a compromise with the protestors, but as I mentioned above, he failed because the sit-in had no unified leadership. The failure to end the protests through repression and negotiation left Mubarak with one alternative: to depart the political authority.

**Asymmetrical Information Between YMs and Regime’s Institutions**

Like in Tunisia, the absence of a unified leadership for the protests created an asymmetry in the amount of information available to the protestors and to the institutions of the old regime. The activists did not see the impact of their protests upon the state because the information about what was happening in all governorates did not arrive to a central leadership for analysis. Therefore, their decisions during the CoP’s apex were not based on the true powers they possessed. At the same time, the army was several steps ahead because it had complete information about the grave situation in Egypt. This disproportion of information in favor for
SCAF facilitated its tenure to the political authority when Mubarak’s abandoned his post. To support this argument, I show first the impact of the protests on the state which the protestors did not observe due to their lack of unified leadership. Next, I show how SCAF perceived the gravity of the protests, the steps it undertook to encourage Mubarak departure, and how it became the de facto authority.

Unfortunately, there is no official report that describes the situation in Egypt during CoP’s apex as there is in for Tunisia, but the information I gathered during my interviews with activists in Cairo, Alexandria, Assiut, and Suez, from the testimony of the old regime officials, and stories in newspapers suggests that the state during this period was close to collapsing, in the sense that the only functioning institution was the army.

Firstly, and as mentioned in chapter VI, the testimonies of security officials state that the CSF collapsed and the state security investigations service (SSIS) fled their offices. Second, twenty-three thousand criminals fled their prisons either because they were freed by outside allies who broke them out or because Mubarak’s regime released them in order to intimidate the protestors. This incited the people to form popular committee to protect their homes and neighbourhoods. 937 During this time the thugs also attacked malls and banks, and erected checkpoints on the roads to force people to pay them money. 938 Third, the schools and universities were closed. 939 Fourth, workers in vital sectors such as the transportation and

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937 Abdulrahman, “thirteen thousand prisoners.”
938 Almost all the activists I interviewed in mentioned cases of theft and checkpoints erected by thugs to force the people to pay them money. Also Abdulmajeed and Shama mentioned this in their memories, “Days of liberation,” and “Days of Freedom.”
939 The universities remained closed until early March.
petrochemicals were on strike, and they occupied cement and steel factories in Suez.\footnote{Basiuny. “Workers movement and the revolution.”} The workers in the steel factories and the port in Alexandria also declared partial strikes.\footnote{Elnimir, Mohammed Samir, “interviews.”} Fifth, Egypt’s stock market and the Central Bank were not functioning.\footnote{Shalaby, “Closing the stock market because of demonstration.” The stock market and the central bank remained closed until February 12, 2011.} Six, the informal movements during this period replaced the state in providing services to the people, especially bread, and they monitored food prices.\footnote{All the activists in Alexandria and Suez mentioned this. In Cairo, Shama’ wrote about the role of protection committees in decreasing the prices during this period in his “Days of freedom” though without sufficient details.} Finally, and perhaps most importantly, the protests during this period expanded to include almost all societal and geographic sectors.\footnote{By February 11, all Egypt’s governorates were involved in protest movement, and the protests reached the state’s institutions itself including strikes in the official radios and TV and the official newspapers.}

The lack of information about the entire picture in Egypt kept the activists focused on removing Mubarak and deprived them of the knowledge needed to seize the government. By contrast, SCAF was fully aware of the grave situation in Egypt. Abdulfatah Sisi summed up how SCAF saw Egypt during these days in few words: “the state’s institutions received a big smack that almost led to its fall.”\footnote{Aljazeera, “A new leak for Sisi about the state’s institutions of Mubarak,” November 29, 2013. The video retrived from https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=HUpiADX4ryc (accessed June 5, 2014).} With this in mind, the SCAF took the strategic decision of abandoning Mubarak. The details of what had happened between the SCAF and Mubarak and between the SCAF’s generals are still unknown to the public and only disconnected snapshots tell us anything about them. At best guess, SCAF chose to abandon Mubarak because it wanted to end the protests without engaging in repression that might not lead to end them and could
affect the army’s unity and its good reputation among Egyptians, and also because it wanted to preserve its economic and political interests.  

To exert pressure on Mubarak to leave his post, the SCAF met on February 10 without him and decided “to remain in permanent session to study the developments in the country and to take the necessarily measures in order to protect Egypt and its people.” At the same time, the SCAF sent Major General Hassan Ruweiny to inform those at the sit-in that their demand would be achieved. Ruweiny told them, “all that you want will be achieved” and that “what is important is to preserve Egypt’s security”, asking them to chant the national anthem. The same day, Mubarak addressed the Egyptian people but insisted on maintaining his position until the next election in September. Believing that the army is in their side, the AYMs and NYMs decided to organize marches the next day, in what they called the ‘Friday of Defiance’, or the ‘Friday of Crawling’, to all the presidential palaces, and millions Egyptians marched to the palaces as planned. Deserted by the army and threatened by the gravity of remaining in power, Mubarak abandoned his post and delegated his authorities to SCAF February 11.

To sum this section, the dynamic of the protests under a decentralized leadership led to personify the regime in Mubarak personality. As a result, once Mubarak departed, most of the protestors left the sit-in in Tahrir Square, though his departure was only one of several demands

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946 The army during the revolution enjoyed great support from the Egyptian people because it did not open fire on the protestors. All the activists whom I interviewed informed me that ordinary Egyptians felt secure when the army deployed and were encouraged to join the protests when the army refrained from implementing the curfew.


950 A6M. “A6M refused Mubarak’s speech,” 247-8; see also Abdulmajeed, “Days of liberation.”
the AYMs had raised during the sit-in. Mubarak departure was a result of the protests dynamics as he could not reach a negotiated solution with the protests due to their lack to central leadership. And finally, the political vacuum was filled by the army because the youth groups lacked a unified leadership and this deprived them from seeing the enormous impact of their activism on the state at time the army was fully aware that the state was on the edge of collapsing.

The Process of Democratization

The dynamic of protests forced a power vacuum that the YMs failed to fill. This ignited a legitimacy crisis that could not be solved without national elections. The SCAF, which became the de facto authority, had no legitimacy because it came to power as a result of the successful mobilization of YMs and also as its rule contradicted the old regime’s own constitution. Having a revolutionary legitimacy, the AYMs sought to dissolve the old regime’s institutions, and to appoint a civilian presidential council (CPC) in the place of SCAF to lead the interim period but as the consent between the protestors revolved around Mubarak’s departure, they could not sustain the protests to achieve their goals when SCAF grabbed the authority. Their struggle over authority with SCAF and between them and NYMs limited their achievement; it however, created sufficient tension to force SCAF to stick to its promises of holding fair and free national elections.

To defend these arguments, I first illustrate how the dynamic of protests under decentralized leadership created a crisis of legitimacy. Next, I explain the steps the SCAF undertook to legitimize its interim authority. I then explicate the reasons that forced SCAF to abide with its roadmap. I will argue that the SCAF’s genererals were forced to stick with the road
map because they relied on the MB’s support to rule during the interim period and their authority remained under the pressure of the AYMs activism. Finally, I construe why the AYMs’ struggle over authority did not affect much the roadmap as proposed by SCAF. This explanation seems to be important as the activism of the AYMs in Tunisia affected profoundly the process of democratization. I will argue that there were three reasons that limited the effect of the AYMs on the democratization outcome in Egypt: the rifts within the AYMs, the strength of Egypt’s army, and the strength of the MB.

The Crisis of Legitimacy

The successful mobilization of youth movements led to Mubarak’s departure but as the YMs did not have a unified leadership, they failed to fill the power vacuum which was filled by the SCAF. In so doing, SCAF created a crisis of legitimacy. On the one hand, when Mubarak left power, he delegated his authorities to SCAF to manage the country’s affairs. By accepting to hold the presidential powers, SCAF violated the rules of the old regime institutions as Article 84 in the 1971 constitution states “[in] case of the vacancy of the Presidential office or the permanent disability of the President of the Republic, the Speaker of the People’s Assembly shall temporarily assume the Presidency.” As such SCAF could not claim legitimacy based on the state’s old institutions. Nor could SCAF claim a revolutionary legitimacy because Mubarak’s

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951 The statement of Mubarak’s departure which was read by Omar Suleiman, his deputy, says “In these difficult circumstances that our country is experiencing, President Mohamed Hosni Mubarak decided to abandon the post of presidency and assigned the task of managing the country’s affair to the Supreme Military Council.” “Mubarak’s decision to leave his post,” February 11, 2011. Retrieved from https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Bz5Eydw3vnw&feature=kp (accessed June 1, 2014); See also “Decision of Mubarak to quit the authority which read by major general Omar Suleiman,” Friday, February 11, 2011, in Rabe’, “The documents,” 37.

952 “The constitution of 1971 and the amendments of 2007,” “State Information Service.” Retrieved from http://www.sis.gov.eg/Ar/Templates/Articles/tmpArticles.aspx?CatID=73#.U6ENT_ldVZk (accessed June 1, 2014). Article 84 states also that “The President of the Republic shall be chosen within a maximum period of sixty days form the date of the vacancy of the Presidential office.” Article 76 states that the Egyptians elect their president through secret ballots.
departure was a direct result of the protests which SCAF claimed to support the protestors’ demands just one day before Mubarak’s departure.

On the other hand, the AYMs refused delegating the presidential power to SCAF. The AYMs – mainly, A6M, YJF, RS, and CFSE – believed that the SCAF had no right to assume control of the state. Following Mubarak’s departure, the activists of these movements remained in the Square and called for the dissolution of the People and Shura councils, the abolition of emergency law, and the release of all political detainees. However, on February 14, according to Atta and Maher, the thugs evacuated them by force with the support of the military police. During the evacuation they destroyed the sit-in radio and pulled down the tents. As a result, the AYMs focused on removing SCAF from power. April 6 Movement (A6M), for example, defined the goal of the revolution as the establishment of a parliamentarian democracy. It called for the formation of a civilian presidential council (CPC) chosen by the youth groups to direct the government during the interim period, the writing of a new constitution that would empower the People Council, the formation of a national salvation government, the dissolution of the People and Shura councils, an end to emergency law, the release of political prisoners, and convicting the corrupt officials in the old regime. A6M’s list of demands expanded in successive statements to include dissolving the NDP, the SSIS, local governing councils, and dismissing all governors.

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953 Suleiman, “The army accepts.”
954 Atta and Maher, “interviews.”
955 A6M, “February 11th is a new era,” 248.
In its part, the RS considered the army part of the old regime and called upon people to continue the protests until they could install their own government. Political authority, the RS’s statement says, “is in the street; either it is kidnapped by a hawk from the hawks of the old regime, its army or political parties, or it is grabbed by the people through their revolutionary committees.”

Furthermore, the Council of the Youth of the Revolution (CYR) which represent the AYMs at the time defined the role of the SCAF as being to “supervise, monitor, and follow up the implementation of the revolution’s demands”, which according to them include “abolishing the old constitution and writing a new one after the election of the people council.”

Having no constitutional and revolutionary legitimacy, and their authority is contested in the street by the AYMs, the SCAF declared a roadmap to transfer executive and legislative authorities to elected bodies. In this sense SCAF’s commitment to hold elections for the national posts was a direct result of the dynamic of the protests under a decentralized leadership which created the power vacuum, and thereby the crisis of legitimacy.

**SCAF Limited Steps Toward Democratization**

The roadmap of SCAF included dissolving the People and Shura councils, forming a committee to amend some constitutional articles and running referendum to approve them, and running legislative and presidential election. The roadmap, which was titled “the first constitutional declaration,” granted the SCAF the executive and legislative powers to manage the “country’s affairs temporarily for six months or until the elections of the People and Shura councils.”

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957 RS, “Egyptian’s revolution ongoing,” 275.
958 CYR, “a political paper,” 294-5
959 SCAF, “The first constitutional declaration,” 98
Two days later, and as promised, the SCAF formed a committee to amend the articles in the constitution that were related to the elections of president and the People Council, and to the president’s authorities. The SCAF also asked the committee to finish its work within ten days. On February 26, 2011 the SCAF published proposed amendments to eleven articles as suggested by the committee, and followed by declaring March 19 as the referendum’s day, to be held under judicial supervision. In this sense, SCAF was committed to their roadmap, and the process toward democratization appeared to be moving along following Mubarak’s departure.

The SCAF’s roadmap, however, did not include writing a new constitution, and it did not touch on the demands that prompted the protests, such as abolishing the emergency law, releasing political detainees, prosecuting corrupt officials, and dismantling the state security investigation services (SSIS). This implies that the SCAF was trying to limit the achievements of the revolution and it casts doubt on its true intentions to hold free and fair presidential and parliamentary elections. How then SCAF’s commitment to hold these elections was enforced? It is to answer this question that I turn now.

Enforcing the Path Toward Democratization

Understanding that they have insecure legitimacy, SCAF relied on the MB to gain legitimacy to rule during the interim period. Whether the road map SCAF’s generals drafted was part of their plan to abort the AYMs endeavor to restructure the state after Mubarak’s departure or the price they had to pay to gain the MB’s support, divide the youth movements, and limit the protests’ outcome, do not matter. What matters is that beneath this road map is a crisis of legitimacy. Two

960 SCAF. “SCAF’s decision to form the constitutional amendment committee,” 99-100
961 SCAF. “SCAF’S decision to include the amendments in the constitution,” 101-2
962 SCAF. “SCAF’s decision to hold the referendum on the constitutional amendments,” 10
forces came into play at the time that obliged SCAF to maintain its commitment to the road map. The first is that, the MB’s support to SCAF was conditioned of implementing the road map. The second is that the AYMs escalated their activism to replace SCAF with a Civilian Presidential Council (CPC).

The evidence that show that the SCAF’s general sought and relied on the MB’s support to rule during the interim period are coherent. First, SCAF appointment of three members (out of nine) whose worldviews were close to those of the MB to the judiciary committee tasked with mission of proposing the constitutional amendments.\(^{963}\) Second, the MB supported the constitutional amendments without any reservation. In its statement concerning the SCAF’s roadmap, the MB approved amending “all the articles in the constitution that concentrate the powers in the hands of an individual” and called for “maintaining all the great remaining chapters of the constitution.” Their statement also expressed trust that army would keep its promises as made in the constitutional declaration.\(^{964}\) Third, the MB activists contended that they supported the SCAF’s roadmap because it contained mechanisms and a timeline for the transfer of political authority to elected civilians.\(^{965}\) Fourth, the activists of the MB argued that it was impossible to replace the SCAF with another authority because of the absence of an alternative to the SCAF at the time of Mubarak’s departure. Mohammed Abdulfatah, a MB activist, claimed that “if anyone replaced Mubarak, the people would have accepted it because the youths did not present any alternative.”\(^{966}\) As for the AYM’s proposal for appointing a Civilian Presidential

\(^{963}\) See chapter VI
\(^{964}\) MB, “About the constitutional declaration,” 191.
\(^{966}\) Abdulfatah, “interview.”
Council (CPC) instead of SCAF, the MB activists claimed that the CPC was only one idea among many, including appointing the speaker or the head of the constitutional court as interim president. Furthermore, they claimed that the youth groups which made this proposal were not serious about it. They also argued that the idea was impractical. They asked how tens of youth movements could agree on the names on the CPC members. Fifth, the MB activists believed that the SCAF had a kind of revolutionary legitimacy because it had abandoned Mubarak and refused to repress the protestors. Sixth, in many occasions, the MB defended SCAF’s repression of the activists of the AYMs, claiming that the old regime’s supporters and thugs, Alfoloul, were trying to create a rift between the army and the Egyptian people. Seventh, it was the MB who approved the constitutional amendments and in doing so, they legitimized SCAF’s road map. The MB made an alliance with the Salafists and mobilized Egyptians to vote ‘yes’ for the constitutional amendments, claiming that saying a ‘no’ vote would lead to a liberal constitution that would abolish Article 2 (Article 2 states that “Islam is the principle source of legislation”). The referendum on March 19 was a turning point in the process of democratization that followed as the proposed amendments received overwhelming support (77% voted ‘yes’ of 18 million Egyptians who participated in the referendum), which created both legitimacy for the SCAF’s roadmap and raised at the same time the public expectation that SCAF would abide with its road map.

967 Sakr, “interview.”
968 Sakr, Adulfatah, and Hassanein, “interviews.”
969 For example they described the demonstrations against SCAF on May 27, 2011, as a plot that intended to drive a wedge between the army and the people. See Alwaziri, “MB website describes May 27th”; The Salafists according to Wisma Atta, called the demonstrators ‘atheists.’ Atta, “interview.”
970 See Brown, “Egypt's Failed Transition”; see also Brown, “Contention in Religion and State.”.
The second factor that forced SCAF to stick to its promises as articulated in its roadmap was its struggle with the AYMs over power. I stated earlier that AYMs contested SCAF authority following Mubarak’s departure and called for transferring the presidential powers to a Civilian Presidential Council (CPC). This proposition gained support from the secular NYMs as the committee that SCAF formed to amend the constitution was perceived biased to the MB. According to Mohammed Samir, an activist from the CFSE, the SCAF neutralized the MB by offering them the constitutional amendments that would trigger an early election for the People Council. He claimed that since the NDP activists were hiding after the revolution, as the youth groups were not ready for the elections, and as the leftists and liberal parties were weak, the MB thought that the amendments provided an opportunity to seize the People Council. This, he conjectured, was how the SCAF managed to gain the MB to its side.  

Samir’s views were shared not only by almost all of the AYMs’ activists whom I interviewed, but also with the secular NYMs who came to believe that SCAF made an alliance with the MB. As such, four secular coalitions – namely, the Supporting Front of the Revolution, the Union of Youth Revolution (UYR), the Union of Egypt’s Revolutionaries, and the Coalition of Free Egypt – joined the Council of the Youth of the Revolution (CYR) in its demands for replacing SCAF with Civilian Presidential Council (CPC), abolishing the old constitution, and writing a new one. Furthermore, the CYR emphasized the importance of “extending the interim period under the leadership of presidential council and postponing the dates of the elections which the SCAF had declared.” The CYR demands were supported by twenty-five

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971 Samir, “interview.”
parties which argued that it was impossible to run elections before having electoral laws, abolishing the committee of parties’ affairs, and transitioning to a free the media.  

Following March 19 referendum, ousting SCAF’s authority became a top priority for the AYMs who took into the street in several occasions, only to be violently dispersed by the military police. Indeed, between February 11, 2011 and June 30, 2012 when SCAF transferred its authority to the elected president, 235 Egyptians killed in confrontations with the army. These confrontations delegitimized SCAF’s rule and forced the presidential elections which the generals were trying to postpone.

Stated briefly, SCAF sought the MB support to facilitate its rule during the interim period in order to preserve the state’s institutions which the AYMs were calling for restructuring. The MB lent support to SCAF in return for the latter commitment to the roadmap. Meanwhile, the AYMs remained focus on ousting SCAF. Those two factors forced SCAF to uphold to its commitment as declared in the roadmap.

**Explaining the Dissimilarities with Tunisia**

The struggle between the AYMs and the SCAF forced the latter to abolish the emergency laws, dissolve the NDP, send Mubarak and his sons to prison, begin corruption trials of many officials,

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974 Gharib, “Political parties’ leaders ask SCAF.”
975 Between the departure of Mubarak on February 11, 2011 and the beginning of the presidential elections on May 23, 2012, there had been many protests against SCAF such as Maspri demonstrations (October 2011), Mohammed Mahmoud Street demonstrations (November 2011), the Ministry Council events (December 2011), Al-Abasiah events (May 2011), and many others.
run parliamentarian elections, ease the formation of new political parties, free the media, agree on the constituent assembly that wrote the 2012 constitution, and forced the SCAF to conduct presidential elections earlier than it had originally planned. Nevertheless, the power struggle between the main actors did not fundamentally alter the process of democratization as planned by the SCAF — unlike the experience in Tunisia. Worse, the July 3, 2013 military coup casts doubts on the nature of the entire political process that followed Mubarak’s departure. This invites two questions: the first is how to explain variation in the depth of the processes of democratization between Egypt and Tunisia; the second is whether the military coup in Egypt was inevitable.

**AYMs and their Rivalries in Tunisia and Egypt**

Variation in the depth of the process of democratization between Tunisia and Egypt was context dependent and related to the power possessed and the strategies employed by the main actors: AYM, NYM, and the de facto authority in the two countries.

In Egypt, the AYMs were very weak in comparison to Tunisia. Instead of building coalitions to substitute for their weakness as in the case of Tunisia, they became more fragmented after the revolution. For example, although the AYMs pushed for establishing a Civilian Presidential Council (CPC), there had never been a coherent vision about it in terms of its number and who should be in it. In its early statement on February 4, A6M called for establishing “a national salvation group that includes all the political personalities, public figures (…) in order to establish a national salvation government to manage the country during the interim period and to form a Civilian presidential Council until electing new president.”

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978 A6M, “About the youth demands.”
February 10, A6M appealed to SCAF to form the CPC from personalities “chosen by the youth groups that participated in the events of January 25 and 28.” And on March 3, A6M’s statement explained that the CPC should include representatives from civil society, the judiciary, and military. The Council for the Youth of the Revolution (CYR), which was supposed to be the representative of the AYMs, called the SCAF to transfer authority to a CPC “formed of three persons; two civilians and one military.”

Furthermore, youth groups that supported transferring the power from SCAF to a CPC could not build a united coalition due to their ideological rifts and personal rivalries. For example, the CYR perceived the Union of Youth Revolution (UYR) to be part of the old regime’s ‘decorative opposition,’ and that they had neither a popular base nor legitimacy. Additionally, after Mubarak’s ouster, the youth groups witnessed what can be called the rise of egoism among the youth leaders, which made them more concerned about what divided them instead of what united them. Some of the activists whom I interviewed pointed to the effects of media coverage on the rise of this feeling; they said the media played the game of pick and choose among the youth leaders and that those who were not picked focused on divisive issues to attract the media’s attention. At the same time, the youth leaders who did receive attention from media ceased to feel obliged to deliberate with their colleagues on issues related to the revolution because they had become public figures and could disseminate their messages through the media.

979 A6M, “Thanks and an appeal to the Army.”
980 AP6, “A6M: the revolution is still continued,” 259-60
981 CYR, “Statement by CYR about the constitutional amendments,” 303
982 A6M expressed this position in its statements during the negotiation between the URC and the MB on one hand, and the regime. See A6M, “About the youths demands.”
or discuss them directly with the SCAF. Indeed this egoism led many of AYM’s leaders who appeared during the sit-in and were part of CYR to form their own independent parties. For example, Mustafa Najar formed the Justice party, Shadi Ghazali Harab formed the Alwa’i party (Conscious party), and Islam Lutfi formed the Egyptian Current party.

The army power is second variable that account for the lack of substance in the democratization outcome in Egypt compared to Tunisia. Whereas the AYMs struggled in Tunisia with the remnant of the old regime, which had no popularity, in Egypt, the AYMs struggled directly against the army, which possessed popular support among most Egyptians especially after its refusal to repress the protestors. In fact, one of the factors that led the army to run presidential elections before writing a new constitution as it had planned originally to do was its belief that its public support began to wane. Furthermore, while in Tunisia, the struggle was directly against the elites who controlled the economy, and thereby, their defeat opened the road for restructuring the state. In Egypt, the Army which controls a big share of the economy remained intact during the protests. As a consequence, when the protests waned following Mubarak’s departure the army was in a strong position to defend its economic interests and the old regime institutions.

Finally, unlike the PDP and Etajdid’s nonautonomous parties in Tunisia, which lacked popular support, the MB had a mass-based organization that could deploy hundreds of thousands of people in the street. In fact, those demonstrations which had the greatest impact upon the

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983 Nagy, Elbahrawy, Ghazal, Samir, Ismael, Maher, and Hani, “interviews.”
984 This conclusion is based on the perception of both AYMs and NYMs activists who argued that SCAF popularity has weakened during its rule.
985 For example all the activists whom I interviewed said the army’s popularity was very high during the sit-in in Tahrir Square.
SCAF between February 12 and March 4 and which forced it to change some of the old regime’s institutions were the ones that the MB supported. The demonstrations and the sit-ins which the AYMs organised alone were repressed by SCAF. For example, following the demonstration on February 25, 300 activists from A6M, YJF, and RS held a sit-in in the Square and demanded that the SCAF change the government and put Mubarak in prison, but the army cleared them away by force and humiliated women who had participated in the sit-in by subjecting them to ‘virginity inspection.’ The results of the referendum and its alliance with the Salafists created the impression amongst MB leaders that they did not need to do compromises with the AYMs. Fragmented on the other hand, and facing an alliance between two strong organizations, the army and the MB, it was almost impossible for the AYMs to alter the SCAF’s roadmap.

**The Military Coup**

The answer to the question of whether the military coup on July 3, 213 was inevitable is plainly that it was not. The military guaranteed its economic and political interests in three articles of the 2012 constitutions: Article 195 prevents the president from choosing the minister of defense from outside the military; it says “The Minister of Defense is the Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces, appointed from among its officers.” Article 197 deprives the people’s council from discussing the military budget and prevents the president from declaring a war or sending troops outside Egypt without the approval of the National Defense Council, where generals are a majority. Paragraph three of the article states that “The Council [National Defense] is responsible for matters pertaining to the methods of ensuring the safety and security of the country and to the

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986 The AYMs and NYMs organized together three big demonstrations: the first on February 18, 2011 to celebrate the success of the revolution, and the next two on February 25, and March 4, 2011 to oust the government, to abolish the emergency law, the NDP, the state security investigation services, and to free the political detainees.

987 Suleiman, “The witness on virginity inspection confirms to the court the violation of her chastity”; Suleiman, “SCAF regrets to Egyptians on the events of Friday of Purification.”
budget of the Armed Forces.” Finally, article 198 gives the military the right to try civilians before its own courts. The article states that “[civilians] shall not stand trial before military courts except for crimes that harm the Armed Forces.”

Considering the vast property holdings of the army in Egypt, a fight in a gas-station or a market owned by the army could be perceived as “harmful to the military.” But if these articles preserved the army’s interests, what motivated it to oust the elected president?

Here we need to return to the period that followed Mubarak’s departure. The army, then, had two preferences. The first and best preference was for it to retain political power — but this was almost impossible because SCAF’s generals received support from the MB on the condition that it holds national elections, and at the same time, SCAF was under pressure from the AYMs who maintained mobilization to replace it with civilians. However, strife between the Islamists and the AYMs, and the decline of popularity and credibility of the former, motivated the army to seize power amidst popular protests and support. Some background here will help illuminate this argument.

The Islamists who dominated the People and Shura Councils formed a constituent assembly composed of 100 members to write the new constitutions; fifty came from the two councils and the other fifty came from the independents. However, the Islamists maintained a majority in the assembly and they decided that a simple majority would be needed to ratify each article of the constitution. The liberals in the assembly refused and withdrew. At the same, the administration’s court ruled on April 10, 2012 that the formation of the assembly was illegal and

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should be dissolved. Furthermore, the Supreme Constitutional Court ruled on June 14, 2012 that the election law on which the People Council’s elections took place was unconstitutional and therefore the council should be dissolved. The court’s decision was based on the premise that one-third of the People Council’s seats should have been reserved for independents in accordance to the SCAF’s constitutional declaration, but the political parties competed for them.

As it clear, the liberals and the Islamists reached the presidential election of June 2012 very divided. This increased the chances for the army to rule through legal means — that is to say, by supporting one of the candidates of the old regime. Five groups competed in the elections. The old regime had two candidates: Ahmed Shafik, the last prime minister during Mubarak’s era, and Amr Mussa, Secretary-General of the Arab League. The AYMs had two candidates: Hamdeen Sabahi, the leader of the popular current, and Abdel-Moneim Abolfotoh. The NAYs had Mohamed Morsi, the candidate of the MB. The results of the first round of the elections proved that without the support of the AYMs, the MB candidate would lose the elections to Ahmed Shafik in the second round. In order to win the AYMs’ support, the MB leaders accepted their conditions and reaffirmed them in writing on June 23, 2012 in what is

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989 Brown, "Egypt: A Constitutional Court in an Unconstitutional Setting."

990 According to article 38 of the constitutional declaration of March 2011, “the law shall organize the elections of the people and shura councils according to party closed lists for 2/3 of the seats and the remaining 1/3 for individuals.” The constitutional court interpreted the word individuals as independents on the bases of the principle of equal opportunities for the organized parties and non-organized citizens in order to create balance in the legislative body. See The political section, “Alwatan publishes the constitutional court decision of dissolving the people council,” Alwatan newspaper, June 14, 2012. Retrieved from http://www.elwatannews.com/news/details/15636 (accessed June 28, 2014)

991 I am describing Amr Musa as a candidate of the old regime based on the YMs’ activists’ perspective.

992 The distribution of votes in the first round: Morsi: 5.7 million; Shafik: 5.5 million; Sabahi: 4.8 million; Abolfotoh:4 million; Mussa: 2.5 million
known in Egypt as the Fairrmont Agreement.\(^{993}\) This accord includes six points: partnership; the representation of Egypt’s national forces in the presidential team and the government, and the appointment of an independent as the prime minister; the establishment of a crisis team, drawn from all national forces, to deal with the process of transferring authority from the army to the elected president; the refusal of the army’s national security council and complementary constitutional declaration which strips the president its authorities; the amendment of the constituent assembly to ensure an inclusive constitution is written; and the establishment of a transparent presidency.\(^{994}\) The AYM’s support of Morsi gave him sufficient votes to win the elections.\(^{995}\)

In order to avoid facing the united camp of the MB and AYMs, the military opted for its best second preference: delivering authority to the elected president and constitutionalizing its interests. In fact, six weeks after the Fairrmont agreement, on August 12, 2012, Morsi abolished the army’s constitutional declarations and sent many of SCAF’s generals into retirement. These included Marshal Tantawi, the head of SCAF, who was replaced by general Abdul Fatah Sisi; Sisi also became defense minister. The question, then, is that: why did the army return to the presidential palace after being sent to the barracks?

The answer is simple: it was the MB’s mistakes. The MB did not live up to its promises as articulated in Fairmont agreement. It refused to form a presidential team from the powers that helped Morsi to win the elections. It appointed a prime minister from the Islamist ranks, and

\(^{993}\) Fermont is the name of the Hotel where the MB and liberal leaders opposing the old regime held their meetings.


\(^{995}\) Morsi received 51.7% and Shafiq got 49.3%. 
most importantly, refused to amend the second constituent assembly in which the the Islamists enjoyed a majority. In fact, on November 22, 2012 Morsi announced a constitutional declaration that made the constituent assembly immune to being dissolved through legal procedures and extended its work for two more months. The declaration also granted extra-legal authority to the president that cannot be challenged through legal means.\footnote{\textit{“A sudden constitutional declaration immunes the constituent assembly and retrial Mubarak’s seniors,”} \textit{BBC}, November 22, 2012. Retrieved from \url{http://www.bbc.co.uk/arabic/middleeast/2012/11/121122_egypt_morsi.shtml} (accessed June 25, 2014)} The AYMs and the liberal camp considered the declaration an effort on the part of the president to install a new dictatorship. In the words of El-Baradei’, Morsi “destroyed the concepts of the state and legitimacy, and declared himself the ruler of god’s orders.”\footnote{Ibid} The remaining leaders of the opposition, including Sabahi, Abolfotoh, and Mussa, took the same position. These groups formed the national salvation front (NSF) and promised to topple Morsi’s constitutional declaration.

The events between January 2013 and July 3, 2013 were intense and spiralled out of control very quickly. Suffice it to say that MB came under assault from two forces: the NSF, and the high echelon bureaucrats of the old regime who controlled the state’s institutions. Using sound bites from the Islamists’ TV channels (which flourished in Egypt after January 25’s revolution),\footnote{For example the Muslim Brotherhood had five satellite channels which the army closed immediately following the coup. These are Egypt 25, Alhafeth, Alnas, Alrahmah, and Alshabab. Retrieved from \textit{BBC}, July 9, 2013 \url{http://www.bbc.co.uk/arabic/interactivity/2013/07/130709_commnets_religinus_tv_closer} (accessed June 28, 2014).} the liberal media dubbed the Islamists fascists who promote sectarianism and violence. In fact, Morsi himself contributed to this image when he attended “The Islamic Forces Conference for the Support of Syrian Revolution.” In his conference speech, he attacked Iran and Hezbollah for their interference in Syria but said nothing about the intervention of Saudi Arabia
and Qatar. Following the conference, thousands of the Salfists attacked a meeting of Egyptian Shi’a community leaders in south Cairo and killed four of them with batons. The media also focused on the economic crisis, especially the long queues in gas stations and electricity disruptions. It also accused the Islamists of planning to take control of the state by occupying the most prestigious posts in its institutions.

Instead of perceiving the counterrevolutionary camp as dangerous and approaching the AYMs to solve the problems with them, the MB did its best to confront the AYMs. For example, when the army killed scores of people in Suez in January 2013, Morsi defended the army, declared a 30-day curfew in all Suez Canal cities, and praised the police forces that responded “quickly to his orders.” Meanwhile, the armed forces were very careful in publicly taking the MB’s side. Indeed, when the AYMs demonstrated in February 2013, demanding Morsi abolish his constitutional declaration, the police refused to protect the presidential palace, claiming that they did not want to take sides in a civil strife.

Certainly, the old regime benefited from the strife between the AYMs and the MB, and it backed the former to oust the latter from power. This was evident in the old regime’s support, at

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1001 For example, on the eve of the military coup there were 13 governors from the Islamists (8 from the Muslim brotherhood) out of 27 governors. See “Morsi and the brothers are accused of Akhwanat the state (making it belong to MB),” BBC, June 30, 2013. Retrieved from http://www.bbc.co.uk/arabic/multimedia/2013/06/130630_egypt_brotherhood (accessed June 28, 2014).


least through the media, of Tamarod’s (rebellion) movement, a youth group that called for (along with the NSF) June 30, 2013 demonstrations aimed at forcing Morsi to accept running early presidential elections. Indeed, hundreds of thousands (if not millions) took to the street on that day, as can be seen in verified YouTube videos, with this very aim. It was the army’s moment to both restore its popularity by ousting Morsi and seize political power. Following the demonstration, the army gave Morsi an ultimatum of 72 hours to diffuse the crisis, but rather than accepting to hold early elections, the MB, along with the Salafists, responded by organizing demonstrations supporting Morsi and denying the gravity of the situation. On July 3, 2013, under the guise of preventing a ‘civil war’ between the Islamists and their opponents, the army arrested Morsi and seized political power.

Had the MB accepted an inclusive approach to writing the new constitution, and had they also sought partnership with the AYMs, it could have been possible, as the sequence of events show, to avoid the army’s coup and to minimize its role in the state’s institutions over time. Had the AYMs accepted the results of the referendum on the constitution and focused on building parties that could compete with the MB, the results would have been different. Instead, the AYMs resorted to the streets and demanded the army to overthrow the elected president. Egypt’s experience with failed democratic transition confirms our knowledge that establishing unity among opposition groups and building inclusive institutions are important conditions for a successful transition.

\[1004\) See for example, the life broadcasting of Sawt Almaydan, an Egyptian TV satellite, June 30, 2013. Retrieved from https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Z2pKR7bU9jA (accessed June 25, 3014)
Conclusion

The process of democratization in Egypt following the departure of Mubarak was a result of the dynamics of the protests at the CoP’s apex in the absence of unified leadership. These dynamics created a crisis of legitimacy. The AYMs sought to replace the SCAF with a civilian presidential council (CPC) and to write a new constitution while the MB backed the SCAF leadership during the interim period and supported amending the existing constitution. The March 19 referendum on the constitutional amendments legitimized the SCAF’s road map and was the foundation on which the SCAF ran the legislative and the presidential elections. The failure of the AYMs to replace the SCAF with the proposed CPC was due to their failure to sustain the protests after Mubarak’s departure. Furthermore, the AYMs failed to establish a grand coalition of YMs that shared them the same vision.

Finally, and unlike in Tunisia, the struggle over authority did not lead to any substantial changes to the road map for democratization because the Egyptian AYMs faced two strong enemies who allied against them: the MB and the SCAF. The MB had a mass-based based organization and amplified its power by an alliance with the Salafists. The SCAF enjoyed public support because it refused to repress the protestors during the sit-in. And the alliance between the SCAF and the MB, especially after the referendum of March 19th, made it difficult for revolutionary groups to influence the interim government further.
Chapter IV

Jordan: Domination of NYMs at the Cycle of Protests’ Apex

The protests in Jordan began in Theiban, a town in the governorate of Madaba in the southern of Jordan. Started by daily labourers as a protest against the rise of commodity prices and unemployment, the protests spread to other Jordanian cities and soon evolved into demands for political reforms that aimed at social justice, fighting corruption, an electoral law that offers better representation to Jordanians in the parliament, and constitutional reforms that intended to limit the King’s executive authorities, namely, his prerogatives to appoint and dismiss the government, dissolve Parliament, and appoint deputies to the Upper House of Parliament.\footnote{These are articles 34, 35, and 36 in Jordan Constitution.}

The cycle of protest (CoP) reached its apex on 24 March 2011, when several youth groups associated with the NYMs and AYM were attacked by the Jordanian riot police (the darak) at a sit-in in Amman at the Interior Ministry Circle (IMC) leading to the killing of one activists and the wounded of tens.\footnote{For more information on the Sit-in at Jamal Abdulnaser Circle (also known as Duwar Al Dakhiliya Circle), see “Jadaliyya,” www.jadaliyya.com/pages/index/1012/jordans-march-24-youth-sit-in-violently-dispersed-.} After this event, the protests almost died for three weeks before regaining momentum. However, the level of the protests remained modest and did not exceed the one that existed prior to the sit-in. Although the AYM initiated the protests in Jordan, they lost domination on them to the NYMs prior to the CoP’s apex. The reason for this was the failure of the AYMs to sustain the protests without being reliant on the NYMs activities. In other words, it was the failure of the AYMs to solve the resource problem that gave the NYMs the opportunity to maintain control on the protests prior and during the CoP’s apex. This domination hindered the protest movement from achieving its goals. As the evidence show, the NYMs refrained from
taking the protests into a higher level when the regime used repression to quell the protests; instead, they preferred to calm them down. Furthermore, their domination contributed to the division of the youth movements as they called for changing the election law in accordance with the demographic density of the population in governorates. Such demand was perceived by the AYMs unacceptable as it could lead to turning Jordan into a Palestinian state. Their domination also facilitated the regime’s propaganda that the protestors in the sit-in were affiliated with the Muslim Brotherhood, and thus Palestinians who sought to take the political authority from the Transjordanians. In all, the domination of the NYMs on the CoP’s apex was an obstacle for the protest’s movement development and obstructed it from achieving its goals. Before defending these arguments, I want first to explain the map of the main actors in Jordan’s CoP.

The camp of the AYMs included new social and political actors whose past activism was relatively recent such as the daily labourers, the teachers association (it was under formation), the Social Left Movement (SLM), and the Progressive National Current (PNC).\textsuperscript{1007} The activists of these groups were mostly Transjordanians; they formed after two weeks of the beginning of the protests in Theiban what they called the National Campaign for Change (\textit{Jayeen}), an Arabic word that means ‘We Are Coming.’ Except for the teachers association, none of these groups could be considered a mass-based organization. For example, the SLM did not have activists in the main universities in Jordan.\textsuperscript{1008} Similarly, the PNC had few activists who relied mostly on

\textsuperscript{1007} The Social left Movement (SLP) was found in 2007 from defected members of Jordan Communist Party (JCP). For more information about the movement see its website http://joleft.org/#; The National Progressive Current (NPC) was founded in early 2010. It advocates for a constitutional monarchy based on the 1952 constitution before being amended, social democracy, and constitutionalizing the decision of disengagement with the West Bank of 1988. Like the SLP, the NPC formed from defected members in JCP. See its program on \textit{Kul Al-Uron}, December 30, 2010. Retrieved from http://www.allofjo.net/index.php?page=article&id=7331 (accessed June 15, 2014)

\textsuperscript{1008} I met two activists with the social left from the German University in Amman who told me that they had no members at Jordan and Al-Yarmouk universities. Dana and Ayman, interview with the author, Amman, March 12, 2012
their media work whether through the print or the electronic press to spread their ideas and to gather support. The exception was the teachers association, but this organization was seeking recognition from the government and its activists were careful to call teachers to join protests that were not related directly to teaching sector.\textsuperscript{1009} Jayeen also received support from other two social groups that are located outside the youth category: the Higher Committee for Retired Military officers (HCRMO) and the ‘36 current group.’ The former was established in May 2010, months before the beginning of the protests in Jordan; the retired officers focused mainly on the corruption that accompanied the process of privatization in Jordan since the Abduallah II, became the king of Jordan in 1999. The HCRMO also concentrated on what they called the existing of power centers around the King that was involved in facilitating the process of \textit{Tajnis} to Palestinians. By that they meant, granting Palestinians the Jordanian nationality. In order to ensure that the ‘process of \textit{Tajnis}’ would not lead to turning Jordan into a Palestinian state, they called for constitutionalizing Jordan’s decision of disengagement with the West Bank in 1988.\textsuperscript{1010} The latter, the 36 Current, refers to 36 leaders of Transjordanians tribes who met in middle February 2011 and took the same position as that of HCRMO from question of \textit{Tajnis} and add to it criticism for registering state’s land in the name of the king.\textsuperscript{1011} The coalition of Jayeen started to disintegration after the sit-in at the IMC, but new autonomous youth groups

\textsuperscript{1009} For example when I asked Mustafa Rawashdeh, then the head of the preparation committee for teachers association about the teachers’ involvement on the protests in Jordan, he said “the committee does not ask the teachers to participate in protests; it is not a political body. Those who participate do as individuals. Our goal is to establish a trade union for the teachers to protect their social rights.” Rawashdeh, interview with author, Karak, February 4, 2012.


appeared as the protests moved from Amman and Irbid to the southern Jordan governorates in early May 2011 such as Tafilah Youth Movement (TYM).

The camp of NYMs is basically representing the traditional Jordanian opposition. It is composed of the Islamic Action Front (IAF), the party of Muslim Brotherhood; the leftist groups, mainly the Popular Unity Party (WAHDA), Jordan Communist Party (JCP), and the People Democratic Party (HASHD); and the pan-Arabists parties. These groups participated in the parliament elections since its re-inauguration in 1989.\footnote{Rashwani, “Political parties in Jordan”} In mid 1990s, these groups formed a committee for coordination that carried the name the Coordination of National Opposition Parties (HCCNOP). Except for the Muslim Brotherhood which possesses a mass-based organization and well resourced, the other groups have only few hundreds of activists.\footnote{For example, I could not find a representative for HASHD at the universities of Jordan and Al-Yarmouk, the two biggest universities in Jordan. The WHADA party seemed to be the only leftist group that had activists at the universities as they were engaged in several activities during my research.}

Furthermore, the camp of the NYMs is widely perceived in Jordan, as representing the Palestinian Jordanians with the exception of JCP.\footnote{The perception that these parties are representing the Palestinians is related to two facts. First, WAHDA and HASHD parties were originally part of the Popular Palestinian Front and the Palestinian Democratic Front until 1989 when they forced to form Jordanian political parties as a mean to participate in the parliament election and to legalise their position in accordance with Jordan’s political party law. The Muslim Brotherhood is perceived as Palestinians because Hamas, the Palestinian Islamic Resistance was organizationally affiliated with the MB until late 1990s.}

This camp engaged in the protests after two weeks of their beginning. The Muslim Brotherhood formed several youth groups during the protests including March 24 Movement (M24M) and April 15 Movement (A15M).\footnote{March 24 Movement (M24M) was formed in the middle of February 2011 and its name refers to the date of sit-in at the Interior Ministry Circle that it was preparing to do. The name of April 15 Movement (A15M) refers to protests in Jordan in 1989; they began on April 15. Oddly enough is that the Muslim Brotherhood did not participate in the protests of 1989. Fahd Khitan, interview with the author, Amman, February 2, 2012. Also, the author also confirms this observation as he witnessed those events during his study in Jordan.} The youth activists of the leftist parties engaged in the protests through their youth branches, though
WAHDA party had already a youth group under the name We Are Boycotting for Change (WRBC) which was formed in 2010 to advocate for boycotting the parliament elections.\footnote{Fakhri Da’as, head of Thabahtouna, interview with author, March 12, 2012.}

Following this introduction, this chapter will use the activists’ narratives, documents, chanted slogans, and the archive of Addustour, a Jordanian newspaper, to argue first that NYMs did dominate the CoP prior to its apex. Then, I explain the reasons for their domination. Next, I illustrate how the NYMs dominated the CoP at its apex. After that, I construe the significant and the implication of the NYMs domination on the CoP. Next, I discuss competing arguments that aim at explaining the failure of the protests in Jordan. I conclude by summarizing the chapter’s main arguments.

**Domination of NYMs Prior to CoP’s Apex**

The domination of the NYMs on the CoP’s apex can be seen as an extension to their control of the protests in the period that preceded it. For this reason, I show first that NYMs dominated the protests prior to their apex. This can be seen in the number of activities they organized in comparison with that of the AYMs and also in the domination of the political slogans during this period. The latter indication has to do with the two camps priorities as the NYMs focused on political demands during this period while the AYMs prioritized the social ones. The archive of the newspaper “Addustour” and the video tubes of the protests during the period from January 7 up and until March 23, 2011 reveal this domination.

The archive of “Addustor” shows 57 marches, sit-ins, and oratory speeches organized by both the NYMs and AYMs during the period of investigation. Of the 57 activities there were 35
staged by the NYMs, 18 organized by the AYMs, and 4 made by the Salafists.\footnote{The Salafists demanded the release of their prisoners who were arrested for reasons that had nothing to do with the CoP.} Table VIV-1 shows the location and the distribution of the NYMs protests on the organizations that called for them, while Table VIV-2 shows the number and locations of the AYMs activities.

**Table VIV-1: Locations of protests of NYMs from January 7 until March 23, 2011**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Nº</th>
<th>Main organizer</th>
<th>Nº of protests</th>
<th>Location of protests</th>
<th>Nº of protest per location</th>
<th>Date</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>HCCNOP</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>Amman</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>16, 21, 28 Jan; 18 March</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Irbid</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>21, 28 Jan, 11 March</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Tafilah</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>21 Jan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>IAF</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>Amman</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>4, 18, 22, 25 Feb; 4, 12, 15 March</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Irbid</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>14 Jan; 4, 25 Feb, 4 March</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Tafilah</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>14 Jan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Zarqa</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>14, 21 Jan; 4 Feb; 11 March</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Ramtha</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>18 March</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Ajlon</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>28 Jan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Karak</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4 Feb</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Maan</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>28 Jan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>WAHDA</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>Amman</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4, 18 Feb; 8 March</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Irbid</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>18 March</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Salafists</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>Maan</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>25 Feb; 11; 18 March</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Amman</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>6 March</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Trade Unions</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Amman</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>8, 12 Feb</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Ramtha</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>11 March</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>39</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>39</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Table VIV-2: Locations of protests of AYMs from January 7 until March 23, 2011**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Nº</th>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Activity</th>
<th>Nº of activities</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>7 Jan, 14 Jan, 21 Jan, 18 Feb</td>
<td>Thieban</td>
<td>March</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>14 Jan</td>
<td>Salt</td>
<td>March</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>14 Jan, 21 Jan, 28 Jan, 18 Feb, 25 Feb, 11 March, 18 March</td>
<td>Karak</td>
<td>March</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>14-Jan, 11 March,</td>
<td>Amman- Alhusseini Mosque</td>
<td>March</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Not only is the domination of NYMs very clear in the number of protests each group organized, but also can be seen in the domination of political demands throughout the CoP. The NYMs focused in this period on political reforms while the AYMs, like their counterparts in Tunisia and Egypt, prioritized the social demands during the first stage of the protests.

The focus on the political reforms in the NYMs agenda is expressed in the statement of the Higher Committee for the Coordination of National Opposition Parties (HCCNOP) made on January 16, 2011. It attributes the social problems faced by Jordanians – poverty, unemployment, prices increase, erosion of wages, and a diminishing middle class – to the Wadi Araba Peace Agreement with Israel, the privatization of the public sector in accordance with World Bank conditions, the exclusion of Jordan political forces from decision making, the lack of any process of political reforms in which changing “the election law is considered it is entrance and leverage,” and rampant corruption and state tyranny. The HCCNOP then offers an “alternative national program” to overcome the crisis. The first four points of that program are political: a democratic election law based on proportional representation, a new election for parliament, the right of parties holding a parliamentarian majority to form the government, and government acceptance of opposition and civil society forces as partners in the process of decision making.
The next five points are similar to the demands made by the AYMs, and the last three are related to Jordan’s foreign policies.\textsuperscript{1018}

In contrast the AYMs focused on the social demands of the Jordanians as reflected in the founding statement of the National Campaign for Change (Jayeen). It called for dismissal of Samir Rifa’i, at the time the prime minister, and the formation of a national salvation government that would take the following decisions: establish a special court to convict corrupt officials, restore the public sector, create a ministry of provision with the mandate of controlling the prices of basic commodities, incrementally eliminate the value added tax (VAT) and facilitate the adoption of a progressive income tax, and permit the formation of teachers associations (see Appendix III for the complete statement).\textsuperscript{1019} A few days later, Jayeen called for the restoration of the 1952 constitution before it had been subjected to amendments that concentrated authority in the hands of the king.\textsuperscript{1020} Addressing the constitution was not a departure from focusing on social demands, according to Jayeen’s activists; rather it was intended to reach a common ground with NYMs that joined the protests and focused mainly on political reforms.\textsuperscript{1021}

A sample of videos posted online and depicting the protests in Amman, Thieban, and Karak during the period from January 7 to March 23, 2011 shows that political demands were


\textsuperscript{1021} Mohammed Sneid, interview with the author, Marj Alhamam, February 3, 2012; Jehad Almheisen, interview with the author, Amman, January 28, 2012.
more frequent than the social ones. Out of 128 slogans identified in the sample, there were 52 that focused on incitement against the regime, 22 on social demands, 37 on political demands, 11 factional slogans, and 6 on Israel-Palestine conflict.¹⁰²²

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Slogan type</th>
<th>N° of slogans</th>
<th>Examples (the translation is followed by the original slogan)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Incitement</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>Who took the decision ...the robbers of dollars. (Meen ili itakhath alqarar...haramiet aldular).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>111 cowards gave confidence for granted. (Miyeh wiha’shar jaban a’tou althiqah bilmijan).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>They closed the doors on us and they bought even the deputies (Sakarou a’lena alabwab wa ishtarou hata alnuwab).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>We want rights not grants... this is a citizen not a beggar. (Bidna Hoqouk mish ihsan...hatha muqaten mish shahath)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Our demands are just... we want bread, freedom, and social justice. (Matalibna Shari’eh... bidna khubz, huriyeh, wa adalah ijtima’eh)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>The price of kilogram of tomato is one JD and yet it is increasing (Kilo albandourah bi dinar wa lisa alhabel a’la aljarar)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>The people want an elected government (Alsha’b yoreed hukouma muntakhaba)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Not 20 or 50 we want the 1952 constitution (Al sha’b yoreed hal albarlaman)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

¹⁰²² For coding, I defined political demands as every slogan that seeks changes in the state’s political institution, such as the departure of the government and parliament. Social slogans are defined as any slogan that seek social change including employment, reduction of prices, changing laws that affect the daily living of people. Incitement slogans are defined as any slogan that condemn corruption, call the people to join the protests, and praise national unity. I used the You Tube search engine to locate video tubes related to the dates of the protests in Amman, Thieban, Karak, and Irbid as mentioned in table I and II. I used the same Arabic words as mentioned in Addustour newspaper in combination with the date and location. For example: massera (March), Aljami’ alhusseini, march 18, 2011; I’tisam (sit-in), majles alwuzara (prime ministry council), January 29, 2011 and so on. I was able to locate 32 unrepeated videos. I watched them and logged off the chanted slogan. I deleted the repeated chanted slogans in each video (for example if a call for dismissing the government is repeated more than once in one video, I considered it only one slogan) but I kept the repeated slogans when they appeared in different videos. I then coded the slogans according to their meaning. If a slogan for example is calling for elected parliamentary government, I considered it political. If it speaks about the high prices, I considered it social. There were, of course, gray areas such as when a slogan is calling for dismissing the government because they are corrupt. In this case, I considered the slogan political because of its focus, although it condemns corruption. See Appendix IV for the complete video list.
This breakdown is unsurprising simply because the slogans are drawn from a sample of videos that better represent the NYMs as they conducted more protests. It nevertheless shows the domination of the NYMs.

Reasons for NYMs Domination

The domination of the NYMs on the CoP was a byproduct of AYMs failure to overcome their resource problem in order to sustain the protests. In particularly, they failed to mobilize poor Jordanians of whom they attempted to represent in the protests. This failure is due to three reasons: they organized the protests away from the poor neighbourhood of the Jordanians, their activities were few in numbers, and they maintained an alliance with two controversial groups, the military veterans and the 36 current. The consequence of this failure made the protest less intense, frequent, and reliant on the activities of the NYMs.

First, the AYMs did not choose to locate the protests in the poor neighbourhoods of Jordan’s governorates. Similar to the case of Sidi Bouzid in Tunisia, the protests began in the marginalized town of Thieban. However, the AYMs’ activists failed to spread the protests to the marginalized governorates of Madaba, Tafilah, Maan, Jarash, Ramtha, Mafraq, where they enjoyed a social base, and they did not seek to expand the protests to the Palestinian refugee camps in Amman, Irbid, and Zarqa. As Table VIV-2 shows, the AYMs organized 18 protest activities between January 7 and March 23, 2011, and these activities were mainly in Thieban, Karak, and Amman. Table VIV-2 illustrates that the Karak governorate was host to more protest activities than the other places and Salt hosted only one protest. This is mainly because the leaders of the schoolteachers’ movements are from Karak and they had an interest in escalating
the protests to force the government to approve the formation of a teachers union. In Salat, Jayeen’s activists came mainly from Social Left, a small organization which depended on schoolteachers and military veterans for their march on January 14. After the protest in Theiban on February 18, Jayeen’s activists started to focus their protests on Amman as they could not organize protests in several places at once due to their small numbers.

Second, as table VIV-1 and VIV-2 illustrate, not only the AYMs organized fewer activities than the NYMs, but also most of the activities were held away from AYMs social base. There were 35 activities in Amman, Irbid, and Zarqa where the NYMs traditionally enjoy political domination. The AYMs’ activists, however, participated in the protests that were called by HCCNOP, but their voices were not heard by Jordanians as only the leaders of the IAF, WAHDA, and Trade Unions were permitted to address the protestors. This was primarily because the HCCNOP was the body who called for the protests and who prepared the list of speakers to ensure that they were going to be affiliated with them.

Finally, the alliance between the AYMs and the Higher Committee for Retired Military officers (HCRMO) and the ‘36 current group’ alienated poor Jordanians of Palestinian origin, discouraging them from joining the protests. The HCRMO issued its first statement several months before the beginning of the protests in which it warned against the possibility of Jordan becoming a Palestinian state due to the government policy of Tajnis, which grants Palestinians

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1023 For example two of the main leaders of the school teacher’s movement were Mustafa Rawashdeh and Mu’ath Qteishat live in Karak.

1024 Sabri Akrush, interview with the author, Rusaifa, January 26, 2011

1025 According to Abala Abu Elbeh, the secretary general of Hashad and a member in HCCPOP, the marches of the HCCPOP are normally planned in advance in terms of the banners that should be raised in them, their paths, the statements that should be distributed in them, and who were going to speak in them. Interview with the author, Amman, January 24, 2011.
Jordan citizenship. As a preemptive measure, the HCRMO called for constitutionalizing the disengagement decision of 1988, in which Jordan renounced its claims to the West Bank – which would lead to the withdrawing of Jordanian citizenship from the Palestinians who could return to the West Bank – and a fair parliamentary election based on Jordan’s geography and not its demographics.\textsuperscript{1026} The ‘36 current’ linked the issues of Tajnis and corruption to Queen Rania, who is of Palestinian origin, and to her family, the Alyaseens.\textsuperscript{1027} I address these issues in more detail in the next chapter. It will suffice to say here that the Alliance with HCRMO and the 36 Current made it difficult for Jayeen to appeal to Jordanians of Palestinian origin, who perceived a threat to their interests in the statements of Jayeen’s allies.\textsuperscript{1028}

Jayeen’s lack of adequate human resources for sustaining the protests had an impact on the protests in three ways: the protests became less intense, less frequent, and heavily reliant on the NYMs’ activists participation. Unable to stage daily protests, Jayeen decided to organize a protest every Friday.\textsuperscript{1029} This decision was adopted by the NYMs because it suited their strategy of exerting pressure on the regime through controlled protests. In Tunisia and Egypt, the AYM\textsuperscript{1026} “A statement by Higher Committee for Retired Military officers,’’ \textit{Ammon News}, May 1, 2010. Retrieved from http://www.ammonnews.net/article.aspx?articleNO=59696 (accessed March 22, 2014). The statement which holds the name of 30 military veterans claimed that there were 850,000 Palestinians who were granted the Jordanians nationality since the decision of disengagement with the West Bank in 1988, though they can return back as they hold valid Palestinian identity cards. The statement also made a link between privatizing the public sector and corruption with the conspiracy to turn Jordan into a Palestinian state claiming that some central powers in Jordan are facilitating this plot. According to Fahd Khitan, a columnist in Alghad newspaper, the statement reflected then a struggle of power between two different factions in the regime, the head of the intelligence department, Mohammed Althahabi and the Transjordanian bureaucracy on the one hand, and Bassem Awadallah, the head of the royal diwan, and the neo-liberals on the other hand. Awadallah, a Jordanian of Palestinian origin who had close relations with the palace, was responsible on accelerating the privatization of some public companies. By adding the charge of Tajnis to him, Althahabi camp hoped to weaken his influence in the state. Interview with the author, Amman, February 2, 2011.


\textsuperscript{1028} Oraeb Rantwai, interview with the author, Amman, January 26, 2012.

\textsuperscript{1029} “Jordan Campaign for Change.” The first statement of Jayeen on January 22, 2011 called for organizing a march every Friday.
did not have sufficient human resources but were able to mobilize the poor, which sustained daily protests and disrupted government functions while exhausting the riot police. In Jordan, the weekly and controlled protests did not prevent the government from continuing its services especially given that over 90% of the protests occurred on a Friday, which is a day off in Jordan. In Egypt, where Friday protests involved all the major mosques in Cairo, Suez, and Alexandria, large numbers of people in different places joined the demonstrations, and thus exhausted Central Security Forces. However, in Jordan the NYMs kept the protests limited to very few mosques (Al-Husseini in Amman; Al-Omari in Zarqa; and Masjed Irbid Al-Kabir, and Alhashimi mosque in Irbid) in order to maintain their control over them. The implications of this were twofold: the majority of the population remained away from the protests and the regime was able to concentrate its riot police in the places of the protests.

Furthermore, because the AYMs were unable to sustain the protests, they became reliant on the initiatives of the NYMs. In practice this reinforced the domination of NYMs on the protests in their early stages, consequently ensuring that social demands were replaced early on with political ones. This hindered the participation of a larger segment of the population in the protests whose major concerns were social and at the same time deepened cleavages between the activists of the NYMs and those of the AYMs, whose agenda for the CoP was different. This is especially true when the AYMs and NYMs agreed to hold a sit-in at the Interior Ministry Circle (IMC) on March 24, 2011 (see below). By comparison, in Tunisia and Egypt political demands became dominant only after the engagement of large numbers of the poor in the protests. Poor people under the guidance of the AYMs discovered that the solution to their grievances was only possible if the two regimes changed.
CoP’s Apex and NYMs Domination

In this section I begin by explaining why I consider the sit-in on March 24, 2011 Jordan CoP’s apex. This especially important because the sit-in in scholarly writings is treated like all other activities conducted by youth groups. Hence its importance in the development of the protest movement in Jordan is not explored. I will argue that the sit-in was the only disruptive activity that the NYMs and AYMs had undertaken since the beginning of the protests. Furthermore, the regime used direct repression to quell the protestors, which it had not previously done. And finally, because it prompted a shift toward de-escalating the protests as a result of AYMs and NYMs clear disagreement over the demands of the sit-in and mainly the election law. I then explain why the NYMs chose to hold the sit-in and how they dominated it. Here I argue that NYMs sought to change the conditions of dialogue with the regime by exerting pressure on it through a disruptive activity, the sit-in. And, that they dominated the sit-in because they deployed the resources, material and human, to ensure its success.

The Sit-in of March 24 as the CoP’s Apex

Though the CoP in was not over when I conducted my research in Jordan in the months of January, February, and March 2012, there was only one juncture where the protest cycle could had turned from a reformist one into a ‘revolutionary’ one. This period was during the sit-in of March 24, 2011, which lasted 36 hours. There are three reasons for this. First, the sit-in was the only disruptive action the youth activists had attempted to stage since the beginning of the protests. It was disruptive because the choice of the Interior Ministry Circle (IMC) as a place for permanent sit-in intended to interfere with government functioning, to instill a sense of political crisis amongst the general public in order to entice them to participate in the protests, and to
place additional pressure on the regime by focusing the media spotlight on it. The IMC is to 
some extent similar to Tahrir Square in its importance. It is located at the heart of Amman, and 
connects several important areas in the city, including Jabal Alhussein, Alabdali, Alistiqlal street, 
Almadina Alriyadiah, Shmeisani, and Jabal Amman. Located around the IMC are a number of 
important buildings including the interior ministry, the Amman governorate building, the Petra 
news agency, a number of the most important hotels, and four private hospitals. Additionally, the 
IMC is the location of several public transportation hubs. As such, closing the IMC would 
literally disrupt the functioning of the city’s government and commercial sectors. This did not 
happen, however, because the sit-in lasted less than 36 hours; it started Thursday noon, March 24 
and by Friday afternoon, the darak, Jordan riot police, dismantled it.1030

    The sit-in on March 24 was the only disruptive activity that the AYMs and NYMs agreed 
to organize together during the CoP. Jayeen activists tried to organize an earlier permanent sit-in 
on January 25 in the yard of Amman municipality, but the police prevented them from erecting 
tents to protect themselves from the rain. After a cold night, the activists abandoned the idea and 
left unnoticed.1031 There was also another sit-in in Tafilah on March 7, 2012; its goal was to exert 
pressure on the government to release some of the activists the Mukhabrat had arrested, from the 
Tafilah Youth Movement.1032 After ten days of the sit-in, the police burned the protestors’ 
tents.1033 The sit-in in Tafilah attracted some media attention and the protestors’ tent received

1030 Arab, “A reading of the truth of March 24 movement.”
1031 “Jayeen: decisions from higher ranks in government prevented the erection of the sit-in tents”. Khaberni, 
daily solidarity delegations from opposition political parties and youth movements. However, the
two sit-ins of Jayeen and Tafilah Youth Movements did not have the chance to disrupt the
government’s functioning. The first was away from the main street of downtown Amman and the
second was in a marginal governorate.

The second reason is that because the disruptive nature the sit-in, the regime was forced
to decide whether to deal with it as it used to do with the weekly marches in Amman –i.e., to
‘protect’ the protestors by sending the public security forces to keep them under its supervision –
or to prevent it by force. The decision was to use the darak in combination with the zu’ran
(thugs) to end the sit-in. The zu’ran mounted the bridge over the IMC and climbed the roofs of
nearby buildings and threw stones at those participating in the sit-in, and then the darak
interfered under the pretext of preventing the regime’s supporters and the protestors from
harming each other.\textsuperscript{1034} The darak attacked the activists, killing one and injuring tens of
them.\textsuperscript{1035} The regime’s deployment of the darak to end the sit-in reflects its perception of the
gravity of the situation, since the darak, a highly trained force, receives its orders directly from
the king, the chief of the armed forces or the interior minister.\textsuperscript{1036}

Third and finally, March 24 was the CoP’s apex, as it revealed the true intentions of the
participant movements. On March 24, the Muslim Brotherhood (MB), through their youth group,
March 24 Movement (M24M), asked for an election law based on Jordan’s governorate

\textsuperscript{1034} Alma’ani and Ineizat, “Dismantling the IMC sit-in.”
\textsuperscript{1035} Abdulsalam Mansour, Amman, January 29, 2012; Ghaith Alqudah, Amman, March 3, 2012; Sabri Akrush,
Rusaifa, January 26, 2012; and Hashem Gharaibeh, Irbid, March 15, 2012, interviews with the author with the
author. These activists participated in the sit-in.
\textsuperscript{1036} King Abdullah II established the darak in 2008 and separated it from Public Security Forces. The darak’s main
goals are to confront internal riots, to protect foreign embassies and government buildings in Jordan, and to
participate in peace keeping missions. See Abu Shattal and Rawashdeh, “The Jordanian Gendarmerie.”
demographic density.\textsuperscript{1037} Prior to this date, the MB advocated for an election law based on proportional representation without addressing the number of seats allocated for each governorate. On January 18, 2011, Hamza Mansour, the secretary general of the Islamic Action Front (IAF), the MB party, called for a “new election law in agreement with the democratic principles that expresses the Jordanians will.”\textsuperscript{1038} The same month the Shura Council of the MB called for a national dialogue to agree on a new election law.\textsuperscript{1039} In early March, the IAF leaders called for adopting a ‘developed’ election law without specifying what the word ‘develop’ entails.\textsuperscript{1040} In fact, the clearest position on election laws was expressed by Saed Thiab, the speaker of HCCNOP, who called the government to agree with the official opposition on an election law based on proportional representation through lists. He did not, however, explain whether the list would be drafted at the national or governorate level.\textsuperscript{1041} This vagueness about election laws allowed for a level of unity between the activists of AYMs and NYMs as the former did not feel threatened by a proportional representation based on governorate lists. But when the March 24 movement (M24M) demanded an election law that reflected governorate demographic density, the AYMs did begin to feel threatened, as this demand entails changing the number of seats for each governorate, which means giving more seats in parliament to Jordanians of Palestinian origin. As a consequence, part of Jayeen’s activists left the sit-in and criticized M24M’s position on election laws.\textsuperscript{1042} I discuss this topic in greater detail later in this

\textsuperscript{1037} Alnajar, “An open sit-in for change in Amman.”

\textsuperscript{1038} “IAF calls for adjusting and decreasing prices, and fixing the economic problems”, Addustour newspaper, January 18, 2011, p.1 and p.18.

\textsuperscript{1039} “ MB Shura Council calls for dialogue to agree on a new election law”, Addustour newspaper, January 29, 2011, p. 6

\textsuperscript{1040} Sayafeen, “Saed and Bani Rsheid call.”

\textsuperscript{1041} Alm’ani, “ Peaceful demonstration in middle Amman.”

\textsuperscript{1042} Mohammed Sneid, speaker of Jayeen, interview with the author, Marjalhamam, February 3, 2012.
chapter and in the next, but I still want to emphasize here that the sit-in marked a clear division between the AYM and NYMs, since Jayeen and M24M did not join together in any new activities following this date. Those reasons made the sit-in a turning point in the protest cycle, marking the point at which it began to decline.

**Domination of NYMs on the CoP’s Apex**

Besides that AYM failed to provide the necessary resources to sustain the protests as clarified in section II, the narrative offered by the activists of M24M, Jayeen, and WAHDA, reveal another reason for NYMs domination on the CoP’s apex: the sit-in was the choice of the MB who provided the most material and human resources into it.

The idea to escalate protests by holding a permanent sit-in at IMC came as a result of the formation of the National Dialogue Committee (NDC). Formed by the Prime Minister’s Council on March 2, 2011, the NDC was assigned the task of discussing laws related to political reforms including the establishment of new political parties and changes to election laws. The IAF refused to participate in the NDC because the government appointed its 52 members, limited the scope of its mandate to discussing legislations and laws that do not touch upon the distribution of authority set forth in the constitution, and did not make any of decisions of the committee binding to the government. Additionally, the IAF demanded guarantees that the period for national dialogue will not exceed two months and that the king would guarantee the

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1043 “Almasri appointed a president of National Dialogue Committee for political reform laws”, Addustour, March 3, 2011, p. 1. The prime ministry council defined the mandate of the committee as “conducting national dialogue about all legislations that are related to political work in order to achieve the goals of the Jordanians. These goals are creating are aspiring to. These goals are creating partisan and democratic life, forming parliamentary government based on political parties, and proposing consensual laws for the general elections and parties.” See Almasri “National Dialogue Committee.”

1044 Karasneh, “Islamic movement reaffirm.”
implementation of the decisions of the NDC. In total the opposition had 19 representatives in the committee: six for NYMs, four for AYMs, and nine independents who historically support the traditional opposition.

Unsatisfied by the composition of the NDC and its mandate, the IAF created and mobilized several youth movements including the M24M, the April 15th youth movement (A15M), and the Free Students Movement (FSM) to escalate the protests. The M24M had the appearance of an independent coalition youth movement, especially given the identities of its two speakers, Muath Khawaldeh, an Islamist, and Firas Mahadeen, a Marxist. The M24M called for a sit-in at IMC on March 24, 2011 and the Jayeen coalition accepted the idea as it put more pressure on the government to accelerate reforms. Nevertheless, because the sit-in was the MB activists’ initiative, they invested more resources in it to ensure its success. First, according to Jayeen, the M24M, and other sources, the majority of the protestors at IMC were affiliated with the MB. Furthermore, to give the impression that the majority of the activists

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1045 Shteiiwi, “Jordan: Islamic movement refuses.”

1046 The list of NDC members can be retrieved from Ammon news link http://www.ammonnews.net/article.aspx?articleNO=82666; http://ar.ammannet.net/news/100254 (accessed April 10, 2014). I considered the share of the opposition in the NDC as 19 members based on the assumption that three members from the IAF refused to join the NDF but their places remained reserve for them, fifteen withdrew from the NDC following the attack on March 24th sit-in, and I added Ali Alhabashneh, the head of HCRMO to them. The list of names of the opposition shows how they represent the factions of AYMs and NYMs. The AYMs was represented through Khalid Kalaldeh, head of Social Left, Khalid Ramadan, head of National Progressive Current, Mustafa Rawashdieh, head of teachers committee, and Habashneh. The NYMs was represented through Saed Thiab, secretary general of WAHDA party, Ishaq Farhan, Abdulmajid Thneibat, Abdulatif Arabiat represent the IAF. Abdulhadit Fleihat on professional trade union and Abdulsalam Mansour on students (both affiliated with IAF). For the list of withdrawals from NDC following the attack on the sit-in, see “Fifteen personalities withdraw from NDC and accused the security forces of attacking the protestors”, Amman.net, March 25, 2011. Retrieved from http://ainnews.net/?p=93987 (accessed April 10, 2014).


1049 Mohammed Sneid, Jayeen speaker and Hashem Gharabeh, independent, confirmed this information. Also in an interview with 9 activists in Irbid from different NYMs groups, they argued that the Islamists had the right to control the sit-in because the majority of the protestors were from them, interview with the author, Irbid, February 6, 2012.
in the sit-in were liberals, many activists of the MB had shaved their beards.\footnote{This act, according Ghaith Al-Qudah, the head of the youth sector in the IAF, was perceived by the king as an act of deception by the Islamists’ leaders, who had met him before the sit-in and informed him about their intention to participate, but who had not told him that the sit-in was their own movement’s action. The Islamists’ strategy also included holding a march from Al-Kalouti mosque in Amman toward the Israeli embassy, were their leaders could show up in order to confirm their claim that they had nothing to do with IMC sit-in.} Second, the material resources that were brought to the sit-in were from the M24M. According to Jayeen and WAHDA activists, it was the M24M that brought the loudspeakers, erected the tenets, and distributed water, juice, and food to the participants. An activists in the WAHDA party claimed that the IAF spent JD 11, 000 ($15,700) on the 36 hours sit-in.\footnote{One of the 9 activists of whom I interviewed in Irbid from WAHDA party provided this information. Another activist from the Jordan communist party confirmed it. I, however, could not confirm it from other sources. However, the material resources including the loud speakers are confirmed to be brought by M24M from different sources.}

Having explained how and why the NYMs dominated the protests prior and during their apex, I discuss in the following section, the significance of their domination.

\textbf{Significance of NYMs Domination on the CoP’s Apex}

I will argue in this section that the domination of NYMs on CoP’s apex was the main reason for the protest movement failure for three reasons. First, it prevented the escalation of the protests
when the state used repression to end the sit-in. Second, it divided the youth groups by proposing demands related to the election laws and the Jordan Department of Intelligence (Mukhabrat) that the AYMs rejected. And, finally, the domination of NYMs eased the regime’s plan to end the protests through dividing the Jordanians along identity lines.

NYMs Response to State’s Repression

The use of repression to end the sit-in led to the death of one activist and to the injury of 77 others. Based on the precedents of Tunisia and Egypt, this should have turned the CoP ‘revolutionary’, or at least have increased the intensity of the protests. Yet in Jordan this did not occur, in part because of the domination of NYMs on the protest cycle at this juncture. This can be seen in the reaction of the NYMs that followed the end of the sit-in. Instead of taking the protests to the streets, the IAF, together with the M24M and the professional unions under its control, held a press conference on March 26 in which the IAF called for the resignation of the government, the dissolution of the darak, and the restructuring of all security forces, with all senior officers responsible for the decision to attack the sit-in held to account, the resignation of the head of NDC and its members, and release of those activists who were detained during the operation to end the sit-in. When it was their turn to speak, the professional unions’ leaders called upon those government ministers affiliated with the unions to resign and threatened to freeze their memberships in case they refused. The Bar Association called upon its members to hold sit-ins in the courts and to defend the detainees. The M24M declared intention to continue

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1054 According to the activists the number of injures exceeds 200.
the open sit-in but did not mention when and where it would take place. And 16 members of the NDC resigned.  

One might expect, given these statements and the reaction of part of NDC members, to have seen more protests in the street. However, over the next two weeks the number of the protests in all Jordan’s governorates was limited. In fact, between March 27 and April 9, 2011 (which includes two Fridays), there were only three activities: on April 1, there was a sit-in for the M24M in the yard of greater Amman Municipality (away from the street) for a several hours, a march organized by the IAF in Tafilah, and on March 31, there was a speech at the professional associations’ complex.  

On April 8, the M24M issued a statement claiming that their activists decided “[to make] this Friday a day off for the policemen because they are [their] brothers.”  

Not only did the weekly marches in Amman, Zarqa, and Irbid disappear for two weeks but the language of the NYMs also became more conciliatory. For example, except for those IAF members who refused to join the NDC from the beginning, the opposition members who had earlier withdrawn from the committee returned back to it, including the secretary general of the WAHDA party.  

1055 Addustour, March 27, 2011, see pp, 1, 6, 7, and 8

1056 A march for the Islamic movement in Tafilah calls for reform and fighting corruption,” “Youths of March 24 make a sit-in in greater Amman municipality square in the Friday of unity and reform.”, Addoustour newspaper, April 2, 2011, p 4; “Professional association and the coordination committee of the opposition: reform does not contradict loyalty,” Addustour, April 1, 2011, p. 5.

1057 “Youth of March 24 consider the cadre of public security their brothers”, Addustour newspaper, April 9, 2011, p.4

1058 “Popular Wahda returns to national dialogue and insists on constitutional reforms,” Addustour, April 5, 2011, p
The protests did eventually return back to the streets starting from April 15, 2011 but at the same level of intensity as before March 24 sit-in.\textsuperscript{1059} The MB justified the almost complete absence of demonstrations during the two weeks following the sit-in by pointing to the atmosphere of incitement against Islamists, which according to Zaki Bani Rsheid, an MB leader, was driven by propaganda intended to divide the Jordanians according to their origins. For this reason, Rsheid said, the MB had altered their strategy and were focusing on mobilizing people in the southern and northern governorates instead of in Amman and Zarqa.\textsuperscript{1060} In other words, the intent was apparently to mobilize the Transjordanians in order to overcome the regime’s propaganda efforts against them. This strategy proved to be useful as it contributed to the rise of several AYMs in Tafilah, Maan, Karak, and Ajlon due to competition with the MB’s activists. But even so, the protests remained at the same level as they were before the CoP’s apex.\textsuperscript{1061} In sum, and unlike in Tunisia and Egypt, the domination of NYMs of the CoP’s apex hindered the prospects for intensifying the protests when the regime used repression to end the sit-in.

**NYMs and the Division of YM s**

The domination of the NYMs on the CoP’s apex also led to divisions among the youth groups. Originally, the goals of the sit-in were reached through a compromise between the *Jayeen* and M24M. The former accepted to make the constitutional reforms a priority while the latter agreed on approaching the demand concerning the election law in terms of “proportional representation

\textsuperscript{1059} Peaceful marches in Amman and governorates request reform”, Addustour, April 16, 2011, p. 1, 4. The activities included Amman, Irbid, Karak and Maan.

\textsuperscript{1060} Zaki Bani Rsheid, interview with the author, Amman, February 28, 2012.

\textsuperscript{1061} Because I consider March 24, 2011 the CoP’s apex, I do not discuss the period that followed this date in details. Suffice to mention that other variables contributed the protests weakness among them the division between the youth movements in general over the protests in Syria. The youth of Islamic movement supported the protests in Syria while the youth of leftists, Ba’athists, and Jayeen stood against them.
according to national pact.” Furthermore, the two sides did not agree on how to approach the question of the role of Mukhabrat in Jordan. I elaborate on this compromise in the next two chapters, but here I just want to show how the violation of M24M to this agreement divided the youth groups. During the sit-in, the M24M called for an election law according to the demographic density of the governorates and they asked for the dissolution of the Mukhabarat. Jayeen activists were surprised because these demands were not part of their agreement with the M24M. Unable to convince M24M to abide with the initial agreement, some of Jayeen activists withdrew from the protests before the sit-in came under attack by darak and Zu’ran (thugs). The rest of Jayeen’s activists issued a statement expressing their refusal to endorse or agree to the M24M demands. Therefore, when the regime dispersed the protests by force, the youth groups were already divided and their rifts turned the focus away from the regime’s repression to the issues of their disagreement. Following the sit-in, Jayeen stopped its coordination with the M24M and both Jayeen and the Islamists engaged in mutual accusations of fault. Responding to Rsheid’s claim that Jayeen had been infiltrated by Mukhabarat, for example, Jayeen accused the IAF of being penetrated by Mukhabarat and groups from ‘outside Jordan.’ These accusations facilitated the regime’s plan to divide the Jordanians according to their original identity as will be discussed in the next subsection.

**NYMs Domination as Facilitator to Regime’s Repression and Propaganda**

1062 “Jayeen turns against M24M”; See also Jayeen, “Two governments in the country.”
1063 Sneid, “interview.”
1065 Ibid
The domination of NYMs on the CoP’s apex also made it easier for the regime to use repression to end the sit-in and it also facilitated its propaganda to divide the Jordanians according to their original national identity. By easier, I do not mean that the regime would not have engaged in repression had the AYMs dominated the protests, but rather that the control of NYMs facilitated convincing the darak that the MB activists, and thereby Jordanians of Palestinian origin, intended to impose reforms that would lead to their takeover of the state. Although the majority of the protestors were Transjordanians, according to many activists of whom I interviewed, the regime informed the darak that the protestors at IMC were Palestinians and planning to destabilize Jordan. One Transjordanian activist said that while the darak troops were beating him, they recognized from his accent that he was a Transjordanian, and one of the darak asked him why he was among the Palestinians who wanted to stage a coup. Another said the darak beat him badly, but once they knew he was Transjordanian, they carried him immediately to the hospital.

Furthermore, the domination of the M24M on the sit-in of March 24 gave credibility to government propaganda that the sit-in was directed by the MB. After the sit-in, the government accused the MB of refusing to end the sit-in peacefully and alleged that they received orders from abroad. Furthermore, the government’s agents engaged in a campaign on social media and radio to portray the protestors as MB and as Palestinians who had abused Jordan’s reputation.

1067 Akrush, “interview.”
1068 Gharaibeh, “interview.”
1069 “AlBakhiet: MB wants fitna and there is no societal consensus on their demands and receives orders from Syria and Egypt”, Addustour newspaper, March 26, 2011, p.2.
1070 See for example the song against M24M which portray them as Islamists who seeks to damage Jordan’s reputation. “Dedicated for M24M: You humiliated the country.” Retrieved from http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Ld_V7_WiK-U
hospitality. For example, Mohammed El-Wakil, a famous anchor on Rotana radio, called upon those who did not like Jordan’s laws to ‘cross the bridge’ (in the Palestinian context, this means to return back to West Bank). This campaign was so effective that several columnists warned against its consequences upon the overall national unity of Jordan.

To summarize, the domination of NYMs on the CoP’s apex contributed to a large extent to the protests failure. Their domination inhibited the escalation of the protests following the regime’s use of repression to end the sit-in at IMC, their demands concerning an election law based on reallocating the number of seats for the governorates according to the density of their population divided the youth groups, and finally, and related to the previous point, their domination eased the regime’s propaganda campaign that depicted the activists as Islamists from the MB and representing Palestinians who sought to take over the state.

**Other Explanatory Variables**

The question of why the protests in Jordan did not escalate as protests did in Tunisia and Egypt has received some attention from scholars on authoritarian states. Most of their answers, however, are related to the monarchical type of the Jordanian regime, which supposedly enables it to alter state institutions and to use societal cleavages for its survival. This kind of explanation rests on four assumptions. First, the national identity cleavages in Jordan are more entrenched and more powerful than regional identity divisions in Tunisia and the sectarian rift in Egypt, and thus Jordanian activists could not achieve adequate unity. Second, the regime in Jordan used

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1071 Dana Jibreel, Radio Baladna, interview with the author, Amman, March 21, 2012

1072 See the articles of Oraeb Rantwai and Bassem Sakajha on incitement against Palestinians. Addustour newspaper, March 27, 2011, p. 16.

less repression than its counterparts in Tunisia and Egypt.\footnote{Horres, “How Durable is “Durable Authoritarianism”.’’} Third, that unlike the Mubarak and Ben Ali regimes, which offered ‘too little, very late’ concessions to the protestors, King Abdullah II offered ‘generous, and timely’ concessions.\footnote{Gallala-Arndt, “Constitutional Reforms in Tunisia.”} And fourth, that the king of Jordan displays a charismatic leadership that both Mubarak and Ben Ali lacked. These assumptions merit discussion for their apparent logic and more importantly as they reinforce the idea that the monarchical type of the regime is more resilient than the republics of Tunisia and Egypt. I should note that my objective here is not to claim that these arguments are totally invalid; rather, my purpose is to show that the domination of the NYMs on the protests on the CoP’s apex holds more explanatory power in understanding why the protests did not escalate than these other factors.

**Identity Cleavages**

It is legitimate to ask whether the nature of national identity division in Jordan really is stronger than the regional and religious divisions extant in Tunisia and Egypt, respectively. In other words, was the reason for the weak protests after the sit-in on March 24 related to national identity divisions between Transjordanians and Jordanians of Palestinian origins rather than due to the domination of the M24M on the sit-in? As I have already noted, I answer this question in the negative.

In outlining my framework of analysis, I argued that the problem of identity cleavages in a society becomes salient when an authoritarian regime gives preference in distributing state resources to certain groups and deprives other groups from accessing those resources. I also showed that the literature on identity cleavages gives religion and ethnicity equal power in
explaining intra-state conflicts. Additionally, I presented the cases of Libya and Yemen to illustrate how regional identity differences can look much like ethnic and religious divisions when their main cause is uneven distribution of resources. In this regard, Jordan is not different than Egypt or Tunisia. Just like the Copts in Egypt, the Shi’its in Bahrain, Tunisians from the interior regions, Libyans in the east of their country, and Yemenis from the south, the Jordanians of Palestinian origin felt excluded from the state resources. However, what caused the protests in Tunisia and Egypt to turn into revolutions was the domination of AYMs on the CoP’s apex, as they intensified when the regime used violent repression against the protestors. In Jordan, the NYMs not only chose not to escalate the protests as I explained earlier, but their domination weakened the entire protest movement.

This was for two reasons. First, the domination of the M24M on the sit-in of March 24 gave credibility to government propaganda that the sit-in was directed by the Islamists. After the sit-in, the government accused the Islamists of refusing to end the sit-in peacefully and alleged that they received orders from abroad. Furthermore, the government’s agents engaged in a campaign on social media and FM radios to portray the protestors as Islamists. Second, the domination of the M24M on the sit-in exacerbated the rifts between the AYMs and NYMs at time when the youth groups needed to appear united to effectively counter the regime’s propaganda.

Another glimpse at how the domination of the M24M hindered the protest movement is to use a counterfactual analysis of March 24th sit-in. In so considering the events of March 24

1076 “AlBakhiet: MB wants *fitna* and there is no societal consensus on their demands and receives orders from Syria and Egypt”, Addustour newspaper, March 26, 2011, p.2.

1077 This approach explains the meaning of causal claims in terms of the form “If A had not occurred, C would not have occurred.” Menzies, Peter, ”Counterfactual Theories of Causation”, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy
sit-in we see strong indications that the main reason why the protests in Jordan became less
intense when the regime resorted to violence was in part due to the M24M’s behaviour at the sit-
in. Let us assume that the M24M abided by the agreement with Jayeen. The M24M would not
have talked about election laws in the sit-in and Jayeen activists would have remained at the
protests. The regime would still have quelled the protests and used the same propaganda
campaign against the protestors, depicting them as Islamists. Jayeen activists would defend the
protestors as the sit-in was theirs as much as it was the M24M’s. They would have countered the
government’s propaganda, created stronger bonds with the M24M, and probably, as in Tunisia
and Egypt, they would have sought to intensify the protests against the regime. In other words,
the regime’s success in dividing Jordanians was not a foregone conclusion due to the power of
national identity divisions between Transjordanians and Palestinians Jordanians; rather it was the
activists’ mistakes, which started when the M24M violated its agreement with Jayeen that
enabled the success of the regime’s propaganda.

Less Repression

Another claim is that unlike the regimes in Tunisia and Egypt, the regime in Jordan did not use
much repression to end the protests, and as a result the protests did not intensify. In comparing
the behaviour of the three regimes during the protests it is evident that Jordan’s regime operated
to some extent in a similar way to that of Tunisia and of Egypt: it acted peacefully towards the
protests when they did not include any form of disruptive actions but violently when they did.
The protests as illustrated in Table VIV-1 and VIV-2 include three kinds of action: marches, sit-
ins, and speeches. The protests in Amman were weekly, occurring after Friday prayers, and they

(Spring 2014 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.) Retrieved from
included a march from Al-Husseini mosque to the greater Amman municipality, 500 meters away from the mosque. Because it was on Friday, a day off in Jordan, and far from the government buildings, the protest did not disrupt the government’s functioning or hinder any commercial activities in downtown Amman. Indeed, according to many activists, the marches were a good thing for local merchants as protestors bought food, drinks, and did their shopping after the end of their activities.1078 The speeches held either in a closed location like the professional associations’ complex or in open fields and sit-ins took place before the prayers at the mosques and thus for only a short period of time. Because these protests did not include any disruptive action, and as they were repeated in the same way every week, the regime in Jordan had no excuse to use repression against them.

Jordan did not act in differently from Tunisia and Egypt in this respect. In Tunisia, the regime did not repress the middle class activists during their sit-ins in front of the UGTT regional offices or bar associations; it used violence against the poor people who were confrontational with riot police and whose actions were not predictable and potentially disruptive. In Egypt, the middle class protests on January 25 were encircled by the police and prevented from turning into marches in order to prevent ordinary people from joining them, but the Central Security Forces did violence against the march of the poor that came from Nahia. The Jordanian regime, meanwhile, did indeed violently repress the protestors once they decided to conduct an activity that entailed disruption: the sit-in on the IMC. Moreover, the regime in Jordan used two other ways to intimidate the protestors that the regimes in Tunisia and Egypt did not. First, on many occasions, the regime sent thugs to attack the activists as in the case of February 18, 2011 when

1078 Ahmed Abu Khalil, an anthropologist, confirmed the activists claim. Interview with the author, Amman, March 20, 2012.
almost one hundred thugs, wielding wooden and metal clubs, attacked the march of Alhusseini mosque. Second, regime-sponsored thugs targeted well-known opposition figures like Laith Shbeilat and Ahmed Obeidat. Thus the regime in Jordan used repressive violence even against peaceful protests that did not entail any disruptive activity.

**Timely and Generous Concessions**

One of the most important claims purporting to explain why the protests in Jordan did not intensify into a revolution is that regime was more responsive to the demands of the protestors; it made generous and timely concessions that prevented further escalation. Scholars on Jordan points here to three conciliatory measures: dismissing Samir Rifa’i government, increasing the salaries of public sector employees, and forming the Anti-Corruption Commission and the National Dialogue Committee (NDC). But these measures cannot explain why the protests did not intensify for several reasons. Firstly, dismissing Rifa’i government was only one of the protestors’ demands and it was conditioned upon replacing him with a national salvation government, which the regime did not do. Furthermore, the regime dismissed the government at a time when protestors’ demands had become more focused on constitutional reforms. Thus the regime’s concession was too little, too late. Secondly, it is true that the regime increased the salaries of some public employees but this increase was too little (JD 20 almost $ 28 per

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1079 For example, on February 18, 2011, the regime’s thugs attacked Muwafak Mahdeen and his son Firas in the middle of the peaceful march in downtown Amman. Mahadeen, a writer, is well known for his opposition to the regime. Similar events occurred in Amman and Irbid, and in the months that followed the regime’s thugs continued their attacks on well known opposition figures including the attack on Laith Shbeilat on October 1, 2011 and Ahmed Obeidat on December 27, 2012.

1080 As mentioned earlier, the AYMs demanded a return to the 1952 constitution and the NYMs called for parliamentary government before dismissing Alrifa’i government.
and it incited many other employees in both the public and private sectors to protest in order to have their salaries increased as well. In other words, the increase in salaries for some prompted those who benefited little or at all from the raise to join in protest actions. The following table shows the numbers of social protests in the month of March, 2011 and the distribution of professions of the participants.

Table IV-4: Workers protests in March for salary increase

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>N°</th>
<th>Sector</th>
<th>Type of protest</th>
<th>N° of protests</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Drivers</td>
<td>Strike</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Journalists (Public Radio and TV, and Alra’ newspaper)</td>
<td>Sit-in</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Workers of port of Aqaba, phosphate, customs, water authority, electricity company, Amman municipality</td>
<td>Sit-in, strike, march</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>School teachers, university teachers and employees</td>
<td>Strike, march, sit-in</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Shopper renters</td>
<td>Strike</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Medicines, engineers, and pharmacists</td>
<td>Strike</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Total</td>
<td></td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

These protests do not include five sit-ins organized by university students in March 2011 to demand a decrease in university fees.

Thirdly and finally, the protestors did not take the formation of the Anti-Corruption Commission (ACC) seriously. This is in part because the committee was just a name for the first few months and had no personnel assigned to it to actually investigate corruption. According to Binu, the president of the ACC, the human resources and the budget allocated for the ACC were

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1082 This table is based on reviewing the archive of Addustour newspaper for the month of March 2011 for the actual strikes, sit-ins, and marches that in favor for salary increase or decreasing the university fees in case of university students.
insufficient to investigate many corruption cases. Binu wondered, for example, how eight employees could follow even a single file when it consists of 15,000 pages written in English, when few of them can read English and the ACC had no money to pay to translate them. Additionally, most of the important files detailing corruption which the activists focused on in their protests, such as those that are related to Phosphate Company, Mawared, and Omniah, were not addressed by the ACC during the first few months because these files were related to the king’s family and to Bassem Awadallah, a former head of the royal diwan and a former minister of international cooperation who was in charge on accelerating the privatization of the public sector. Furthermore, during the month of February the government allowed Khalid Shahin, a businessman convicted of corruption-related offences, to leave prison and travel to London under the pretext that he needed special medical treatment that did not exist in Jordan, which casted doubts about the regime’s seriousness in fighting corruption. Finally, the formation of the NDC in early March 2011 actually intensified the protests. As explained earlier, the Islamists considered the mandate of the committee and the choice of its members to indicate the absence, on the part of the regime, of a true desire for reform. Furthermore, the Islamists and the WAHADA party, the remaining parties comprising the traditional opposition, were not represented on the council, which motivated them to join the protests despite being willing.

1084 In my interview with the activists, the name of Bassem Awadallah bopped always when they talked about corruption that accompanied the process of privatization.
1085 Khalid Shaheen was convicted for three years in 2010 for taking a bribe in what is known in Jordan as the refinery case. In February 2011 he was allowed to leave to the United State for treatment but he was seen in London in a restaurant having lunch with his family. See “Eye witnesses saw Shaheen in London”, Khaberni, April 6, 2011. Retrieved from http://www.khaberni.com/more.php?newsid=52648&catid=1 (accessed April 2, 2011).
initially to abandon them when the government declared its intention to form the committee. And more importantly, the sit-in of March 24 was held after the formation of the committee, is a clear indication that NDC was perceived by both the AYMs and NYMs as insufficient and that activists had hoped that more pressure might lead the regime to offer substantial concessions. In short the evidences do not support the argument that forming the NDC lessened the protests.

**Charismatic King**

There is a claim made by some scholars, as mentioned earlier, that the king of Jordan did not try to alienate opposition groups and maintained channels of dialogue with them. This argument gains currency because the king met with representatives of different societal sectors during the first three months of the protests, made visits to some marginalized towns and to a Palestinian refugee camp, and initiated dialogue with the Islamists. However, this did not prevent the AYMs and NYMs from demanding constitutional reforms to restrain the king’s authority to appoint the government, dissolve parliament, and appoint the Upper House Deputy. Furthermore, the AYMs targeted the king directly on issues related to corruption, including the registering of state lands in his name and the role of queen’s family in both the economy and in the granting to Palestinians of Jordanians citizenship. Finally, the presence of channels of dialogue between the king and IAF leaders did not affect their position on reforming the regime. In fact, the Islamists maintained the same old policy of targeting the government and sparing the king, and indeed in many instances targeted the government in the name of the king. As such, the relationship between the king and the Islamists did not contribute to weakening the protests.

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1086 “Opposition parties decide not to participate in Friday marches,” Addustour, March 3, 2011, p. 1. These parties were the Communist party, HASHD, and the Ba’athists. They said the priority was for dialogue after forming the NDC.

1087 “Jordanian tribes cross redline.” In fact in many protests in Jordan the activists chanted “Hey abduallah Ben Hussein… where the lands of Jordan have gone” (Ya Abduallah ya ibin Hussein… Aradi Alurdun rahat wein).
In short, claims focusing on significant identity cleavages, lower levels of repression, offers of generous concessions, and the king’s supposed charisma do not provide a good explanation of why the protests did not escalate, compared to the argument that this was due to the domination of NYMs on the CoP’s apex. Their domination impeded the protests from becoming revolutionary because of their non-confrontational position, which in turn stems from their calculations of what they might lose were they to have lost control over the protests.

Conclusion

Unlike in Tunisia and Egypt, in Jordan the NYMs dominated the cycle of protests before and during its apex. This domination was a result of the AYMs’ failure to overcome the problem of finding adequate human resources to sustain the protests. The AYMs did not adopt a strategy to mobilize poor Jordanians whom they contended representation. At the CoP’s apex, the NYMs dominated because the MB activists put more human and material resources into protest actions. The control of M24M activists over the sit-in prevented the escalation of the protests when the darak attacked the sit-in, divided the YMs, and facilitated the regime’s campaign to portray the sit-inners as Palestinians.
Chapter X

Jordan: Protest Cycle Injustice Master Frame

Similar to those that took place in Tunisia, the protests in Jordan were not planned. On January 22, 2011, AYMs, which include representatives of day labourers, the committee for the preparation of school teachers’ association, the Higher Committee for Retired Military Officers (HCRMO), the Social Left Movement and the National Progressive Current (NPC) formed a coalition under the name of Jayeen (We are coming).\textsuperscript{1088} Jayeen’s goals were mainly social. The NYMs, including the youth sectors of the Islamic Action Front (IAF), Democratic Party (HASD), Democratic Popular Unity Party (WAHDA), and the Jordanian Communist Party, organized their first protest on January 16, 2011, demonstrating outside parliament in cooperation with the professional trade unions. Their demands, as expressed in the statement released by the Higher Committee for the Coordination of National Opposition Parties (HCCNOP) were political (see the previous chapter). As discussed in the chapters on Tunisia and Egypt, the different goals and priorities of AYMs versus NYMs in the first stage of the protests should not negatively affect the cohesion of the CoP’s master frame (MF), as both kinds of movements form bridging frames that enable them join the protests together. In Jordan, disagreement between the AYMs and NYMs over election laws, the granting to Palestinians of Jordan citizenship, the constitutional ratification of 1988 the disengagement from the West Bank, and the position of NYMs on privatization, prevented the aggregation of grievances of both sides into one MF that reflected the interests of all Jordanians.

\textsuperscript{1088} Khitan, “Jayeen: the new rising changing force.”
In this chapter, I present and discuss empirical evidence showing that the Jordanian CoP’s MF, in contrast to that of Tunisia’s and Egypt’s, was unambiguously exclusive, which rendered the Jordanian protests impotent. I first begin by reconstructing and graphing the MF based on the participant movements’ documents, the activists’ narratives, and the CoP’s slogans. Next, I show that the MF was exclusive. Then, I explain why the AYMs and NYMs failed to develop an inclusive identity. After that, I demonstrate that exclusiveness of the Jordanian CoP’s MF generated a significant rupture amongst the movements participating in the protests during the sit-in of March 24-25, 2011 at the Interior Ministry Circle (IMC). I conclude by summarizing the chapter’s findings.

Two Injustice MFs

The narrative offered by the activists of the AYMs and NYMs, their slogans, and the documents of their organizations reveal the existence of two parallel injustice MFs: one that focuses on the state’s corruption, and another that focuses on political rights. The failure of the activists to integrate the two made the CoP’s MF exclusive and prevented protests from appealing to major segments of the population. In this section I will begin by discussing the narratives and documents of the emerging opposition of the AYMs, which in my sample of movements include Jayeen and the Tafilah Youth Movement (TYM), most members of which are of Transjordanian origin. Next, I will discuss the narrative of the NYMs, and primarily of the M24M, which is affiliated with the Islamic Action Front (IAF), and of Muqati’oun Min Ajl Altagheer (We Are Boycotting for Change [WRBC]), a youth movement affiliated with the Jordanian Popular Unity Party (WAHDA), both mostly of Palestinian origin. I will support the two narratives by citing the opinions of independent activists from both camps.
The narrative of Jayeen’s and TYMs’ activists revolves around economic and political corruption, which allegedly has impoverished Jordanians and might lead to the state becoming an alternative homeland for the Palestinians. Almuheisen, an activist in TYM, considers the sources of grievance in southern Jordanian governorates (Tafilah, Karak, Maan, and Madaba) to be the privatization of state companies and corruption, both of which, he says, increased unemployment and poverty. According to Almuheisen, there were 1600 employees from Tafileh working in the cement company, but after privatization, only 400 workers remained, and that a similar outcome followed the privatization of Phosphate, a company in Ma’an. These companies, she said, were not losing money as the ruling elites had claimed, but were turning a profit. Jordanian political elites had sold them in order to loot the state’s public assets. For her, the marginalized southern governorates are rich with natural resources such potassium, phosphate, oil, uranium, and freshwater, but the beneficiaries of these resources are not the local population but economic elites in Amman. Moreover, she said, the people have become fed up with being treated as beggars living on the king’s donations. As she phrased it, the people “want their rights and not grants.”

The same narrative is offered by the activists of Ma’an and Rusaifa. Abu Tawileh, an activist with Jayeen, considers the limited sources of work the main driver of protests in Ma’an. There are no new jobs, he claims, because the employment capacity of the commerce sector is limited, the state-owned companies are privatized, and there are no investments in the city from private and government sectors. Today, he said, there are only 750 employees working for the railway and 200 truck drivers for the phosphate company. He attributes the poverty and lack of jobs in part to the state’s corruption and ignorance. Investment, he said, needs infrastructure and

1089 Hana Muheisen, Tafileh Youth Movement, Interview with author, Amman, 22 January 2011
security, but Ma’an lacks both. According to him, corruption was typical among the state’s high-
level bureaucrats, who exploited the state resources without creating new jobs. According to Abu
Tawileh, three factories were planned for construction in Ma’an since 2007 but in all cases the
plans never came to fruition. The owner of these projects benefited from the state’s law of
investment; they purchased the land at a cheap price, received municipal services, and then sold
the land at much higher prices.\footnote{Saleh Abu Tawileh, Jayeen, Interview with the author, Maan, February 10, 2012. For more about the story of the three projects, see Asabagh, “‘the voice of south’ breaks the silence.”} Sabri Akroush, an activist with Jayeen from Rusaifa, Balqa
governorate, reiterated the same claims. In my interview with him, he focused on how the
privatization of state companies involved both corruption and job cuts. The assets of the state
were sold very cheaply in order to benefit a few elites in the regime, he said. One of the
examples he mentioned was the telecommunication company, the infrastructure of which is
alone estimated to be worth JD 2.5 billion and made JD 150 million in yearly profit. It was sold
for JD 350 million. Akroush claimed that there had been 2400 workers in the state’s cement
company but that after the privatization less than 1000 workers remained.\footnote{Sabri Akroush, teacher, Jayeen, Interview with author, Rusaifa, January 26, 2012.}

The focus on corruption that accompanied the process of privatization is detailed in a
document issued by the HCRMO in early February, 2011. In it, they are claim the state-owned
companies were sold for much less than their market value, some to such an extent that in a
single year their profits exceeded the price for which they were purchased by three times. In one
example, the HCRMO says the state sold the telecommunication license of OMNIA, a mobile
phone company, for JD 4 million, and that the private individuals who bought it then re-sold it
for JD 415 million. The document notes that while the state supposedly sold its assets to repay its
debts, the Jordanian debt nevertheless increased to $ 17 billion dollars, which they allegedly
proves the high level of corruption in the state.\textsuperscript{1092} Whether the figures presented by the activists of HCRMO are true or false is not relevant here, but rather that these figures show that the activists believe that state to be corrupt and that this corruption is the source of their grievances.

The privatization created another problem that impelled a sense of grievance among many Jordanians. According to Fahd Khitan, a columnist at Alghad newspaper, to compensate for the regime’s inability to reward its supporters after selling off state-owned companies, the regime created twenty-two commissions parallel to state ministries and employed in them sixty thousand employees, and paid these employees triple the salaries of their ministerial counterparts doing the same jobs, which outraged the employees of low income.\textsuperscript{1093} There are also complaints directed at the king for registering the state land in his name,\textsuperscript{1094} and for choosing to fill the ministerial posts, including that of prime minister, with individuals from certain families. According to Shakran, for the Jordanians it is normal that the King’s son become a king but it is not normal that sons of ministers becoming ministers. Sahkran noted the example of the Alrifa’i family, observing that three generations of men from it all became prime ministers.\textsuperscript{1095}

\textit{Jayeen} activists argue that the main beneficiaries of state corruption are a few elites who happen to be Jordanians of Palestinian origins and are close to the palace. They note the names Majdi Alyassen (the Queen’s brother), Basem Awadallah (Chief of the Royal Hashemite Court between 2007 and 2008), and Khalid Shaheen (a businessman) as examples of a link between

\textsuperscript{1092} HCRMO, “Retired Military Officers: the revenue of selling state assets.”
\textsuperscript{1093} Fahd Khitan, Columnist, Alghad Newspaper, Interview with the author, February 2, 2012
\textsuperscript{1095} Samir Alrifa’i was prime minister in 1944, 1947, 1950, 1956, 1958, 1963; his son Zaid Alrifa’ was a prime minister in 1973, 1985; and the son of Zaidd, Samir, was a prime minister in 2009. Khalid Shaqran, interview with the author, Amman, January 22, 2012.
state corruption and a bigger plot that aimed to turn Jordan into an alternative homeland for the Palestinians.\textsuperscript{1096} For example, Ali Habashneh, the head of HCRMO, said that there were high-ranking officials who were involved in a political and economic process that would lead to turn Jordan into a Palestinian state. Those officials, he explained, through their close relations with the Queen were exerting pressure on the King to give more political representation to the Palestinians in line with their demographic proportion of the overall population.\textsuperscript{1097} This claim had been made earlier as well, in the statement of HCRMO in May 2010, which calls, among other things, for a halt to the policy of Tajnis and to constitutionalize the disengagement resolution of 1988 in order to define who the Jordanians are.\textsuperscript{1098} These positions are shared by all AYMs in the Jayeen coalition and TYM.

The privatization of state assets is in this context not only a matter of corruption but considered a problem in that it empowers Jordanians of Palestinian’s origins who already dominate the private sector. Hattar, one of Jayeen’s intellectuals, explained this concern. He said the public sector was not only the main employer of Transjordanians, but it was also a social ladder for military officers who have traditionally received employment in the state’s companies once they retire from service. But now that the public sector privatized, their retirement not only becomes a step down in status, but also it became a source of shame as the only jobs retired officers are finding in the private sector is that of mutatabe’ wathaeq (documents’ tracker). In Hatter’s words, “the private companies employ retired military offices to track their documents

\footnote{1096 According to the activists, Majdi Alyassen is accused of getting the license of OMNIA cheap and selling it for a much higher price. Bassem Awadallah is accused of wasting almost 2 billion dollars while responsible for managing the files of economic change and Mawared.}

\footnote{1097 Ali Habashneh, head of the retired military committee, interview with Yaghi, Marj Al-Hamam, Amman, January 25, 2012.}

\footnote{1098 HCRMO, “The Statement of the Higher Committee.”}
in the government and to facilitate their projects as the officers know government procedures,” but that this “comes at the expense of the officers’ dignity.”

Additionally, the Jayeen activists argue that the Jordanian economy became worse with recent trends in the market for land sales. The Palestinians who settled in Jordan after being expelled from Kuwait, in 1991 and the Iraqi refugees that came as a result of the 2003 Gulf War, increased the price of land considerably. Thus selling land became more profitable for its owners than cultivating it, and as a consequence thousands of peasant farmers lost their jobs while the prices of commodities increased. Finally, Jayeen and TYM activists complained about the increased role of the Mukhabarat in Jordanian public life, whom, they allege, rigged the 2010 parliamentary election despite the absence of IAF candidates.

The narratives offered by the activists of Palestinian origin I interviewed reveals a feeling of exclusion from state institutions. Jamal, an independent activist, claimed that his family had lived in Jordan before the establishment of the kingdom but that members could not find employment in the Mukhabarat because the family is of Palestinian origin. Majdi, another independent activist, claimed that he was denied employment in the fire department because of his Palestinian roots. Oraeb Rantawi, head of Alquds Center for Political Studies, noticed that in 1989, Palestinians comprised twenty percent of representatives in parliament but that this number has fallen to twelve percent, despite Palestinians constituting roughly half of the

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1099 Nahed Hattar, interview with the author, Amman, March 5, 2012.
1099 Ibid
101 One of the activists from Maan claimed that Mukhabarat blackmailed deputies and forced them to vote for issues that they would vote against in a free environment, interview with the author, Amman, March 10, 2011.
102 Jamal, interview with the author, Amman, January 25, 2012. Jamal reached this conclusion because in the job interview with his brother there was much focus on the root of his family.
He claimed that the Palestinians are never employed in the state’s sovereign state ministries and even in the less prestigious ministries such as the ministries of health and education they do not occupy important administrative positions. Furthermore, he complained, the state imposes and collects high taxes from half of the population (the Palestinians in private sector) but denies that half their political rights.\footnote{Oraib Alrantawi, Director of Al-Quds Center for Political Studies, Interview with Yaghi, Amman, January 26, 2012.}

By comparison, the activists of M24M and WRBC do not speak so bluntly on issues related to Palestinians political representation and prefer instead to express their desire as being for a more democratic election laws, through proportional representation via party lists, at the national level. For example, when I asked Hamza Mansour, the secretary general of the IAF, about Palestinian representation in parliament, he answered that “in this country we are all Jordanians” but that election laws as they are right now do not represent Jordanians. When I asked him what election laws the IAF preferred, he said that the HCCNOP had decided that it would not accept any election law that does not elect fifty percent of parliamentary seats on the basis of proportional representation on the national and the governorate levels.\footnote{Hamza Mansour, interview with the author, February 2, 2012.} The insistence on proportional representation at the national level is away to avoid speaking explicitly about the under-representation in the national legislature of governorates with majority Palestinian populations. This position, however, came after the sit-in at the IMC on March 24 when the position of M24M on election laws (demanding representation through demographic density) led to clear divisions among the activists.
Palestinians Jordanians face a number of other social problems that exacerbate their grievances with the regime. Families struggle to get admission to state universities for their children, who compete for only thirty percent of university seats as the remaining seats go to Transjordanians through a different system of governmental grants. This situation forces Palestinian students to attend parallel university programs where they study the same subjects but pay double the normal fees.\footnote{Interview with nine student activists (five from M24M, three from WRBC, an independent), Al-Yarmouk University, interview with author, Irbid, February 6, 2012. Also confirmed by Thabahtouna Campaign (You slaughtered us) that more than seventy percent of university seats are reserved for different governmental grants. Fakhri Da’as, head of Thabahtouna, interview with author, March 12, 2012.} Additionally, there are a half million Palestinians from Gaza who are trapped in Jordan because they are denied travelling documents and other rights.\footnote{Ali Alnobi and Fathi Kassab, independent writers, interview with author, Jarash, February 20, 2012; Also Khalid Kaladeh, the head of Social Left, interview with author, Amman, January 19, 2012; Khalid Ramadan, leaders of Progressive Current, interview with author, Amman, January 31, 2012.} Furthermore, many Palestinians complain that anti-corruption groups only complain about corruption committed by Palestinians and ignore the corruption of Transjordanians. According to Al-Khatib, \textit{Jayeen} activists protested when Khaled Shaheen was allowed to leave the prison for treatment in abroad but remained silent when two Transjordanians convicted in the same case that Shaheen was were also freed from prison.\footnote{Mohammed Khatib, journalist, interview with author, March 10, 2012.} Additionally, the NYMs speak about the poor services and poverty in Palestinians refugees’ communities, which receive very little support from the state despite their members holding Jordanian citizenship.\footnote{Three student activists from Albaqa’ camp, interview with author, February 29, 2012.}

From the very beginning, in other words, the focus of the AYMs was on social issues while the NYMs focused only on political ones. Considering the example set by opposition Tunisia and Egypt, this should have created more leverage points in the MF that would encourage more social groups to join the protests, but that was not what took place. As can be
inferred from the narratives and the statements of the IAF and Jayeen’s activists, the two camps disagree on four subjects that lay at the heart of their differing grievances: election laws, the Tajnis question, the 1988 disengagement resolution, and privatization of state assets. The Islamists considered changing election laws to be their top priority. During the January 28, 2011 march in downtown Amman, Ali Abu Alsukar, then the head of the IAF shura council, identified the protestors’ goals as the formation of “an interim government that would run parliamentary elections based on a new election law that would lead to a truly representative parliament”\textsuperscript{1110} which in turn “will end corruption by supervising the government’s work.”\textsuperscript{1111} Zaki Bani Irsheid, the president of the IAF political bureau, believes the current election law creates an imbalance as it gives more seats to some areas despite their small populations. Though he did not name these areas, he said “we are looking for an election law that somehow come close to justice.”\textsuperscript{1112} Additionally, while the IAF prioritized political demands over social ones, they also considered changes in election laws to be a gateway to economic reforms. Jayeen dismissed this aspiration, however. In their sit-in before Raghadan Palace on February 16, Jayeen augmented its demands from social to political, calling for “the head of the country [the King] to end the absolute monarchy by returning the constitution to its 1952 version.” At the same time, Jayeen considered changing election laws to be “a source of controversy that would divide Jordanians.”\textsuperscript{1113}

\textsuperscript{1110} LBC TV, You Tube, “Demonstrations in Jordan”, January 28, 2011. Cited at: www.youtube.com/watch?v=3IdWAl6z5bM


\textsuperscript{1112} Zaki Ben Irsheid, interview with author, Amman, February 29, 2012.

On the issues of *Tajnis*, and constitutional recognition of the 1988 disengagement from the West Bank, the *Jayeen* coalition is united, though some groups consider these issues top priorities while others see them as less urgent.\(^\text{1114}\) By contrast, M24M and WRBC argue that the government is withdrawing Jordanian citizenship from Palestinians\(^\text{1115}\) and that the subject of disengagement can only be reopened after the end of the West Bank’s occupation, as the West Bank was part of Jordan when Israel first occupied it.\(^\text{1116}\) Furthermore, because the unity between the West Bank and East Jordan was based on the approval of the representatives of both, in 1951, to end the unity between them representatives of both must again meet first to ratify the disengagement decision, which can only happen after the removal of occupation.\(^\text{1117}\)

Finally, although the NYMs are not united on the issue of privatization, the Islamic Action Front (IAF), the major group within this camp, does not see the privatization of state-owned companies as a major cause of poverty amongst Transjordanians as the AYM\(\text{s}\) do; rather, they see the corruption that accompanied the process of privatization as what led to poverty. So while the AYM\(\text{s}\) want the state to re-nationalize the privatized companies, the IAF denies that “there is one school in development” and argues that the “whole discourse about privatization should be left to the experts.”\(^\text{1118}\)

In short, the AYM\(\text{s}\) believe that poverty and unemployment are due to privatization and corruption, and that giving Palestinians Jordanian citizenship not only increases the

\(^{1114}\) For example, the social left and the progressive current, though, they are against *Tajnis*, they consider the 850 thousand Palestinians that the HCRMO claimed received Jordanian citizenship to be a lie.


\(^{1116}\) Abdulsalam Mansour, “interview”; Da’as, “interview.”

\(^{1117}\) Saleh Armouti, senior in the IAF, interview with author, January 20, 2012.

\(^{1118}\) Hamza Mansour, secretary general of IAF, Interview with Yaghi, February 2, 2012.
Transjordanians’ hardships but also makes it possible to lose what they believe is theirs: the state. The Jordanians of Palestinian origin consider themselves to be excluded from the state and this issue lies at the core of their grievances. I should note, however, that the disagreement between the two camps on these four subjects did not prevent them from organizing common protest activities in the first three months of the protests. There are two reasons for this. First, the NYMs did not propose solutions to the issues of election laws and privatization in obvious disagreement with the AYMs. On privatization, the IAF focused on condemning state corruption and it has never argued in public for privatization. As for election laws, the IAF and the WAHDA party kept their position vague. They talked favourably about new election laws based around proportional representation according to lists, claiming that such laws would be more modern, more representative, and more democratic, but they did not specify what they meant by proportional representation. Their vague language made it possible for the two camps to organize activities with each other. On Talnis and the disengagement with the West Bank, the emergence of the protests indeed helped in removing them from the public discussion. This is in part because the HCRMO discussed these topics several months before the protest cycle. Thus, when the protests began, the AYMs largely kept these two topics aside from their main focus on social issues. Secondly, and as explained in the previous chapter, the AYMs needed the NYMs in order to sustain the protests due to the former’s inability to sustain them alone. What brought these conflicting topics to the forefront again was M24M’s demand for proportional representation according to demographic density (see below).

Having described the MF from the perspectives of the AYMs and the NYMs, I now graph it and analyse its inclusivity in the following section. Figure X-1 shows the MF as having two segments: one representing the Transjordanians’ grievances, which focus on state
corruption, and the other representing the grievances of Jordanians of Palestinian origin, which centre on their lack of representation in state institutions.
Figure X-1: Jordan CoP’s Injustice MF

**Transjordanians**

- A corrupt state

**Economic**

- King theft the state’s land
- State’s resources are wasted by creating independent commissions.
- Beneficiaries of privatization are king’s family and its cronies
- Southern governorates lack infrastructure for investment
- Southern Jordan resources are exploited by Amman
- Profitable state’s companies sold cheap
- Privatized companies dismissed employees.
- State is no more able to employ in state’s companies.

**Political**

- Cost of living is unaffordable
- High rate of unemployment
- Mukhabarat interferes in state’s departments.
- Rights are introduced as grants
- State refuses to constitutionalize disengagement decision of 1988
- Palestinians are granted Jordanian Nationality.
- Threat to Jordanian identity
- Endanger Jordan as alternative Palestinian state.
- Land prices increased

**Impoverishment of Jordanians**

- Few families inherit ministerial positions

**Palestinians Jordanians**

- Unfair state

**Unfair state**

- Unjust election law
- Unfair representation in Parliament
- No entry to sovereign ministries
- Weak existence in the administration of non sovereign ministries.
- High taxes on the private sector
- Only Palestinian corruption is targeted.
- Admission rules at universities in favor for Transjordanians.
- Palestinian students compete on 30% of university seats.
- Palestinian students study in parallel programs and pay double the regular fees.
- Nationality is withdrawn from Palestinians.
- Half million Palestinians from Gaza have no rights.
- They do not have travelling documents.
- Have no rights to benefit from social services.
- Transjordanians are silent about poverty in Palestinian camps.

**Feeling of alienation**
Exclusive MF

The graph of the MF depicts a wide range of grievances that revolve around two subjects: state corruption and exclusion from the state institutions. The Transjordanian segment of the MF focuses more on how state corruption increases poverty, unemployment, and concentrates wealth and power in the hands of few elites that are close to the palace. The Palestinian Jordanians’ part of MF concentrates on the low level of Palestinian political representation in the state institutions and the consequences of this upon their daily life. Combining the two segments of the MF should create more leverage points that would attract more Jordanians to join the protests; yet, as I will discuss below, the MF lacks the features that qualify it to be considered inclusive, and for this reason, it failed to provoke more Jordanians to take part in the protests.

There are several reasons why the Jordanian MF is not inclusive. First, the MF’s level of abstraction is not ideologically neutral. A nationalistic chauvinism can be seen in the subthemes related to granting Palestinians Jordanian citizenship, the focus on making the 1988 disengagement decision part of the constitution, and the claim that Amman exploits the resources of southern Jordan. These ideas, when coupled with the activists’ refusal to modify the election laws to reflect the true proportion of Palestinians living in the governorates, signal a conviction on the part of Transjordanian activists that the state is “theirs” rather than to its entire “citizens.” The same exclusionary elements be seen in the part of the graph that depicts the claims of the Palestinian Jordanians. The omission of the Transjordanians’ grievance of losing their national identity to Palestinians with Jordanian citizenship indicates a state of denial of that Jordan may turn into a Palestinian state should more Palestinian refugees settle in the country. It also reflects a belief that Jordanian identity is artificial and not authentic – i.e., Palestinians do not see an evolution of identity away from the Hashemite family in how Jordanians define themselves. In
fact, the approach of the M24M and the WRBC reflects this conviction as they did not bother at any time in the protests to agree with Jayeen on electoral laws.

Second, the MF does not represent the interests of all Jordanians. Unlike in Tunisia, where different youth movements developed their MF by adding their own particular frames to it, and unlike in Egypt, where the MF was born alongside the protests themselves and was not contested, in Jordan the MF was controversial from the very beginning, and thereby, its two segments cannot be added together to make one MF that expresses the grievances of all Jordanians. This is because the positions of the M24M, the WRBC, Jayeen, and TYM all differ from one-another on the issues of privatization, election laws, Tajnis, and the disengagement with the West Bank. It is true that these issues were not salient before the CoP’s apex, but during and after it (see below), they became central. In addition to that, the Palestinian Jordanians could not identify with the MF as reflected in the Transjordanians activists’ narrative for three reasons. Firstly, the focus on state corruption is seen by them as a purely Transjordanian issue. For them, the public sector is fully occupied by Transjordanians and they are not part of it. Secondly, the Palestinian Jordanians believe that they have the right of Jordanian citizenship as the West Bank was part of Jordan prior to the occupation in 1967. And finally, the Transjordanian MF does not describe any form of injustice endured by Palestinians in Jordan. In Tunisia, part of the population in coastal regions did not see the injustice in the interior region as theirs, but they were able to sympathize with the cause of its people and finally they joined the protests. In the

1119 Mohammed Abu Ruman, Center of Strategic Studies, Jordan University, interview with author, Feb 5, 2012; Mousa Bahouma, Professor, Philadelphia University, interview with author, March 15, 2012; Mohammed Jaber, student activist, Jordan University, interview with author, March 5, 2012.

1120 This is the position of the NYMs as expressed through my interviews with them and the leaders of their parties.

case of Jordan, Palestinian Jordanians felt that they were considered a threat to Transjordanian interests, and this prevented them from showing sympathy with the Transjordanian cause.  

Similarly, the segment of the MF that concerns the Palestinians does not refer to the Transjordanians’ complaints and the discourse of the IAF and WAHDA that begins by focusing on election laws, exacerbates the Transjordanians’ fear of losing the state to the Palestinians. In Tunisia and Egypt, disagreements over political demands in the early stages of the protests were mitigated by the domination of social demands until the protest cycles reached their apex, by which point Tunisians and Egyptians widely supported the AYM’s call to out the regimes as a mechanism for solving the social and political crisis. In Jordan, the domination of NYMs on the CoP enabled them to prioritize political demands over social ones and this generated rifts between the activists earlier in the CoP than in the cases of Tunisia and Egypt. This is not a result of disagreement over making parliament the source of all authority, as the two camps were in agreement over this goal, but due to their disaccord over election laws that may alter the domination of the Transjordanians over the state. Additionally, for the IAF, corruption is a political problem that could be solved by an accountable government. For the Transjordanian activists, however, privatization itself is the problem because it minimizes the state’s capacity to employ key demographic sectors. Logically, the two understandings of privatization need not lead to controversy between the two camps because the youth of the IAF did not campaign for privatization, rather, but simply condemned the corruption that accompanied it. However, when

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1122 For example Ahmed Awad, Director of the Phoenix Center for Economic and Informatics Studies, considers the Transjordanian “movement” exclusionary because it perceives the Palestinians a threat to the Transjordanian nature of the state. Interview with author, February 25, 2012. Oraib Rantwi expresses the same views, “Interview.”

1123 Hamza Mansour, “interview”.

1124 “Statement of Higher Military”; “Jordanian tribes cross redline”; interviews with Jayeens’ activists.
the rift between the M24M and *Jayeen* appeared over election laws, all other controversial issues became important.

Third, the MF does not transcend the identity division between the Transjordanians and the Palestinian Jordanians. This conclusion is based on the answers provided by sixty-two activists who were asked to identify slogans that were chanted to praise national unity, slogans that might be perceived as divisive, and slogans that are drawn from Jordanians’ collective memories. For the first question, at least every activist identified two of nine patriotic slogans. For the question on divisive slogans, *Jayeen*’s activists claimed that the IAF used its party’s slogans and flag in the protests. And for the third question, the activists could not identify any slogan that is retrieved from the Jordanians’ collective memory.

To confirm the activists’ claims, I reviewed the slogans that I retrieved from the sample of videos that I used in the previous chapter. I found three national unity and three factional slogans out of 41 in the protests organized by *Jayeen*. I also found eleven national unity and eight factional slogans out of 88 in the protests organized at Alhuseini mosque by the IAF. Table X-1 and show these slogans (see Appendix IV for the list of videos).

Table X-1: National unity and factional slogans in protests organized by *Jayeen* between January 7 and March 23, 2011

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No</th>
<th>National unity slogans (Translation followed the actual slogan in Arabic)</th>
<th>Factional slogans (Translation followed the actual slogan in Arabic)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Jordan free men…youth do not care of fire (Sha’ab Alrdun ya ahrar…shabab bitihjim ‘la alnar)</td>
<td>You can rest now Abdunasser…the Egyptian people are revolting.* (Irtah ya Abdunasser…alsh’ab almisry tha’er)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Jordan is for free men…youth do not care of fire (Hatha Alurdun lil ahrar… shabab bthijim ‘la alnar.</td>
<td>You can rest now Abdunasser…Egypt after you in revolution.* (Irtah ya Abdulansser…Misr min ba’dak tha’er)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>With our souls and blood … we redeem you Jordan (Weinak Weinak Wasfi Atal… tisjin kul alharamieh).**</td>
<td>Where are you Wasfi Atal to imprison all thieves. (Weinak weinak Wasfi Atal… tisjin kul alharamieh).**</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* I designated these slogans factional because the MB activists considered Gamal Abdulnasser one of their bitter enemies. ** Wasfi Atal for the Palestinians Jordanians is not a national symbol because he was Jordan’s prime minister during the black September 1970 (the war between Jordan’s army and PLO troops).
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>№</th>
<th>National unity slogans (Translation followed the actual slogan in Arabic)</th>
<th>Factional slogans (Translation followed the actual slogan in Arabic)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>From Ramtha to Ma’an… the Jordanian people will not be humiliated (Min Alramtha hata Ma’an…Sha’b Alrudun ma binhan)</td>
<td>The MB slogan: God is our end… the prophet is our example…and Qura’an is our constitution. (Alah ghayatuna…wa alrasoul qudwatuna…wa alqura’an dustouruna) Repeated five times in five different demonstrations.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Jordan…Jordan my country …we redeem you with our blood and kids. (Aurdun…Aurdun ya bilady…fidaki dami wi wladi)</td>
<td>The Jordan political parties…lead the popular movement.* (Alahzab Alurdunieh tuqoud alharaka alsha’bieh)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>With our soulsa and bloods we redeem you Jordan. (Bilrouh wa aldam nifdeek ya Ardun) (repeated three times in three different demonstrations)</td>
<td>Hey Malki …hey villainous… Aldouri is the president.** (Ya Malki ya khasis…Aldouri huwa al’ra’is)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>This Jordan is ours and traitors should go out. (Hatha Alrdun Aurduna wa alkhain yita’’ bara) (repeated twice in two different demonstrations)</td>
<td>The will of Sadam Hussein to dignified people…Palestine will not be libereted with Arab unity.** (Wasiet Sadam Hussein to Alsho’oub al’biah…ma bi titharar falastine…bdoun alwihda al’arabieh)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>From Irbid to Thieban… the Jordanian people will not be humiliated (Min Irbid hata Thieban…Sha’b Alrudun ma binhan)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>From Irbid to Thieban… one united people will not be humiliated (Min Iribd ila Thieban…Sha’b wahd la yuhan)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Ala Jordan Ala…we accept death but not humiliation. (’la ya Aurdun ‘al… almout wa la almathala)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Raise the voice of people in order for Sameer to listen…Jordan is free and will not be grieved. (Irfa’ fi sout aljamaheer hata yisma’ sameer… Alrdun hur wa ma biyndam)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* This slogan is divisive because it ignores the new youth actors who started the protests. ** The slogans on Iraq are divisive because even in the camp of NYMs there is no agreement on them.

I should note that I found six slogans related to the Israel-Palestine conflict in the demonstrations related to Alhusseini mosques such as “The people want to liberate Palestine”, “no to a Zionist embassy on Jordan soil”, “people want to cancel Wadi Araba agreement”, and “the people want to free Daghamshe” (the last two slogans repeated twice in two different
demonstrations). Although these slogans might be considered factional, I did not consider them so because the activists of Jayeen and TYM did not consider them so.\footnote{Sneid, “interview”; Akrush, “interview”; Mahadeen, “interview.”}

That there are more national unity slogans in the protests of the NYMs (12.5\%) compared to those organized by the AYMs (7\%) is not coincidental. The activists of the NYMs are perceived as Palestinian, and as a consequence, they wanted to emphasize their loyalty to Jordan in order to lend credibility their political demands. In one demonstration, one the activists asked the protestors, “do you love Jordan?” And the protestors replied, “yes…let them hear: with our souls and blood we redeem you Jordan.”\footnote{“March of Alhusseini”, \textit{Ammon}, March 18, 2011. Retrieved from http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=K6ajDiLGYyU&playnext (accessed April 1, 2013)} In contrast, activists of Jayeen and TYMs did not need to prove their loyalty because no one questions their allegiances.

The absence of cross-identity slogans in the protests is in part related to the fact that Islamist activists did not engage in popular protests before the 2011 uprising, and hence there are no slogans that can be retrieved from the collective memories all activists. Besides the divisive slogans I found in the protests organized by the two camps, I found that in the protests that were conducted by the Islamists and the HCCNOP in Amman, participating parties raised their own flags, and as illustrated in Table X-2, the Islamists chanted their own slogans, such as “We do not work for current life but for god… we only came for god, not for position or prestige… God is our aim… the prophet is our example… Quran is our constitution…and jihad is our means.”

Finally, I argued in my theoretical framework that the potency of a MF is in part a function of its inclusivity. Therefore, if the MF is inclusive, one should see a geographic and demographic expansion of the protests. In Jordan, in terms of geography, the protests started in
southern Jordan and spilled over to Amman and Irbid but never reached the Palestinian refugee camps, they remained sporadic, and they were concentrated in downtown Amman. As records show, it is fair to say that majority of Transjordanians and Palestinians did not participate in the protests. I should note however, that the AYMs brought new actors to the protests (Transjordanian day-labourers, teachers, and military veterans), but the NYMs failed to convince new Palestinian social groups to join in. Finally, the time it took for the protests to spread from one place to another was relatively long; for example, Tafilah joined the protests actively in May 2011\textsuperscript{1127} and only a few protests were organized in Jarash, Ramtha, Mafraq, and Zarqa governorates as can be seen in table VIV-2 in the previous chapter.

To conclude this section, the Jordanian MF is exclusive: ideologically it is not neutral, it does not address the interests of all Jordanians, and it does not transcend the country’s national identity divisions. The main question that remains to be answered is why the activists in Jordan failed to deploy an inclusive identity like the activists in Tunisia and Egypt. In the following section, I attempt to answer this question.

\textbf{Deployment of Exclusive Identity}

In my framework of analysis, I mentioned that the literature on social movements identifies three cases that facilitate the strategic deployment of inclusive identity by social movements: when they seek to target a large audience, when there is a consensus on a common issue, and when previous organizational linkages exist between different movements. The narratives of \textit{Jayeen} and TYMs activists reflect an absence of aims to target all Jordanians and a lack of consensus

\textsuperscript{1127} Until March 25, 2011, Tafilah Youth Movement was still under construction and working under the name of the preparation committee for popular movement focusing only on issues related to Tafilah. See “th preparation committee for the popular movement to achieve Tafilah demands calls for a meeting today,” Addustour, March 25, 2011, p. 4.
with the activists of M24M and WRBC on several issues. Jayeen and TYMs in Jordan focused, like their counterparts in Tunisia and Egypt, on social issues in the early stages of protests. However, the activists of AYMs did not try to reach all Jordanians by addressing poverty in the Palestinians camps and Palestinian Jordanians’ lack of representation in state institutions.

The activists of the AYMs denied that they were deliberately neglecting these things. According to Al Muheisen, there are no citizens and subjects in Jordan; all the Jordanians are subjects. Addressing the Palestinians absence in the state’s institutions suggests that the Transjordanians have control on the state which is not true. Both Palestinians and Transjordanians are struggling for employment in the state, he said.  

Sneid argued against the claim that the Jayeen targeted only the corruption of Jordanians of Palestinian origin. He said it was not the fault of his camp that in most of the important corruption cases, Palestinians were involved in them, and he emphasised his movement’s commitment to targeting all corruption, including that of Transjordanians. On the issue of why poor Palestinians in the refugee camps did not participate in the protests, Jayeen and TYMs activists believe that IAF represents the Palestinians in Jordan and that “Palestinians will not join the protests unless the IAF asks them to participate.” These claims suggest that AYMs’ activists did not deliberately try to limit their message to a Transjordanian audience, but they do show that they did not do much to overcome this problem, unlike their counterparts in Tunisia and Egypt.

The lack of consensus between the AYMs and NYMs on what constituted a solution to the Jordanians’ grievances could be the reason for the exclusivity of the MF. However, in

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1128 Jehad Almuheisen, “interview.”
1129 Sneid, “interview.”
1130 Kamal Abu Khalil, Writer and Journalist, Interview with author, March 14, 2012; Almuheisen and Khitan expressed the same views, interviews.”
Tunisia and Egypt, this consensus did not exist for during the entirety of the protest cycles and this did not matter for two reasons. First, in the early stages of the protests, Ben Ali’s and Mubarak’s regimes ignored the differences between the AYMs and NYMs and refused the demands of both camps, which maintained unity in the street. Second, when the two regimes tried to play on the differences between the AYMs and NYMs as the protests escalated, it was too late. The discourse of the AYMs was dominant, in that the Tunisians and Egyptians were convinced that the two regimes must be toppled. In Jordan, however, the king ignored the demands of both the AYMs and NYMs during first period of the protests, which helped in maintaining a kind of unity among the activists in the street, but in the second period, mainly after CoP’s apex on March 24, 2011, the regime exploited the rift between Jayeen and the M24M and used it against both sides (see the following section). This suggests that it was the lack of consensus between the two sides that prevented them from deploying an inclusive MF.

In fact, the failure to target a large audience and the absence of consensus between the YMs’ activists could be understood as a result of the absence of previous organizational linkages between the two camps. There are three reasons why these linkages did not exist. First, as stated in chapter II of this dissertation, the structure of mobilization prior to the 2011 protests took a national identity shape. Despite its claim of being a cross-identity organization, the IAF has historically focused on events that were related to the Israel-Palestine conflict and the American invasion of Iraq, and it avoided social and political issues (other the election laws) that mattered to the Jordanians. According to activists in Jayeen and TYMs, the MB did not participate in the protests of southern Jordan in 1989 and 1996, and their focus on Palestinian issues distanced
them from Transjordanians’ grievances. This claim is accepted by many of the MB activists, who believe that part of regime’s success in exacerbating the rifts between Transjordanians and the Palestinians after March 24th sit-in is due to the mistake of prioritizing the Palestinian issue at the expense of issues related to other Jordanians’ grievances. In practice, this means that when the protest cycle began, there were no strong relations between the activists of the AYMs and NYMs. In Tunisia and Egypt these relations were assets in securing the spread of protests and for mitigating the differences between the two camps. In Jordan, their absence limited the extent of the protests and aggravated tensions between the AYMs and NYMs.

Second, most of the AYMs emerged during the protest cycle with no past experience in activism and no presence outside their geographical locations. That is why many of these movements carried the names of their regions (TYM, Ma’an Youth Movement, and so on). This limited their outreach and made them less sensitive to the demands of Jordanians of Palestinian origin. However, some movements in the coalition of Jayeen, like the Social Left and HCRMO, did appear before the protest cycle. The former was always skeptical about the intentions of IAF to the extent that it tried to convince Jayeen not to participate with the M24M in the sit-in of March 24, and the latter emerged few months before the CoP as a result of veterans’ perception that a conspiracy existed to turn Jordan into a Palestinian state. As such, the HCRMO increased the rifts among the AYMs and NYMs.

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1131 Saled Abu Tawileh, “interview”; Qaisar Almuhesien, interview with author, Tafilah, February 6, 2011; Amer Sabalieh, interview with author, Amman, March 5, 2011.


1133 Khalid Kaladeh, “interview”.
Third, unlike in Tunisia where the General Labour Union (UGTT) fostered linkages between the AYMs and NYMs, in Jordan, the General Federation of Jordanian Trade Unions (GFJTU) is historically weak and controlled by regime loyalists. Only the employees of the private sector are legally allowed to join unions. The employees of the public sector are prohibited by law from joining the federation or forming organizations to defend their rights. Furthermore, only 50 thousand employees out of 750 thousand are members in the 17 unions that make the GFJYU. This is in part because labour laws in Jordan allows for business owners to dismiss workers without giving them reasons. Additionally, the GFJTU is financially dependent on the government support. Finally, to ensure regime’s control on the GFJTU, labour laws give the minister of labour the authority to merge labour associations into one and to disintegrate associations into many. The other professional trade unions, such as those of the civil engineers, agricultural engineers, medical practitioners, pharmacists, dentists, and bar associations, are controlled by the NYMs, but other than supporting the Palestinian cause, historically, they did not play a role in politics in Jordan.

In short, the past structure of mobilization in Jordan, the birth of the AYMs only during the protests cycle, and the lack of focus on internal politics by the trade unions, did not foster a tradition of cross-identity activism that would facilitate the deployment of inclusive identity by the AYMs. In the following section, I show that the MF remained exclusive during the CoP’s apex, which further impeded the escalation of the protests.

1134 Awad, “Jordan’s labor associations.”
1135 Ibid
1136 Salameh, “The weakness of Labour movement.”
MF Exclusivity During CoP’s Apex

I will argue that the schism between the M24M and Jayeen over election laws became the focal point of the CoP’s apex, hindering attempts to escalate the protests. Here, the chronology of events shows that the failure of the M24M activists to abide by an agreement they forged with Jayeen prior to the sit-in on March 24, 2011 led to a chain of events that reinforced the MF’s exclusivity.

According to the activists of both the M24M and Jayeen, the preparation for the sit-in began on March 17, 2011 when representatives of a number of youth movements met at the Social Left office in Alwaibda, Amman and declared a coalition under the name of March 24.1138 The coalition agreed at the meeting to hold an open sit-in at the IMC until the following demands were achieved: a constitution that defines clearly the authorities of the government branches and which ensures the formation of a parliamentarian government and the establishment of a constitutional court; the conviction of corrupt officials other than the king; the restoration of the state’s privatized land; a decrease in the prices of basic goods and a review of the salaries of the state employees; a progressive income tax and decreased sales tax; a review of the status of the companies that manage the national wealth; and support for the teachers’ demand of establishing a national union.1139 In the sit-in, the activists of the M24M distributed and read almost a completely different statement of eight demands (see the complete statement in Appendix V), the most divisive among them being an elected parliament based on “demographic density” and the


reduction of social demands to “taking direct and urgent measures to easing the economic burden on people”, which came as the last point in the statement. In addition, the M24M dropped any mention of convicting corrupt officials and added instead a demand for the cessation of the intervention of the Mukhabrat in political life.\textsuperscript{1140} The statement was read alongside chanted slogans that requested the dismissal Mohammed Raqad, the head of the Mukhabarat.\textsuperscript{1141} These new demands provoked some of Jayeen’s activists to leave the sit-in.\textsuperscript{1142} In Tunisia and Egypt the MF remained inclusive because of its vagueness regarding the future; in Jordan, the contrary happened. The agreement between Jayeen and the M24M, on vesting all authority in an elected parliament, was only possible because it did not entail how the members of parliament would be elected in the first place. The clarity of the M24M on election laws provoked Jayeen fears about the true intentions of their colleagues – mainly, the fear of losing the state to Palestinian Jordanians.

Although the majority of Jayeen’s activists remained in the sit-in until the darak dismantled it on the evening of March 25, the experience of Jayeen’s activists with the M24M during the sit-in widened the rifts between the two camps. In its statement of March 30, 2011, Jayeen explained the points of its disagreement with the M24M: they disagreed on “the fateful call of election law based on the demographic density,” on the M24M’s insistence on targeting certain figures in the Mukhabrat and for calling to dismantle the agency entirely, for eliminating their main social demands from the sit-in to the extent that convicting corrupt officials was not

\textsuperscript{1140} The complete statement of M24M can be retrieved from http://www.4shbab.net/vb/archive/index.php/t-130879.html; http://www.aljazeera.net/news/pages/d4e39ac9-d553-46c5-b1de-7de6455cb06f;

\textsuperscript{1141} “Jordan also in a state of fury”, Egyptian talks, March 25, 2011. Retrieved from http://www.egyptiantalks.org/invb/index.php?showtopic=118685 (accessed April 18, 2014); Sneid, “interview.” Among the slogans M24M activists chanted “The people want Alraqad departure (Alsha’b yureed raheel Alraqad); Listen...listen...hey Raqad we got bored from tyranny (Isma’...isma’ ya Raqad Maleina min alistibdad.”

\textsuperscript{1142} Sneid, “interview”; Abu Taweleh, “interview”; Kalaldeh, “interview”.
mentioned at all in the M24M’s first statement, and finally, on the how the leaders of the Islamic movement – namely, Hamza Mansour and Zaki Bani Irsheid – became the spokesmen of the sit-in for the media and the government. Jayeen concluded that what happened during the sit-in was not coincidence but the result of the domination of certain groups within the Islamists on the M24M, and for this reason decided to “freeze their coordination” with them.” As for election laws, Jayeen explicitly called for a law that is based on proportional representation and party lists, and that does not imply *shubhet altawteen* (the resettlement of Palestinians in Jordan).1144 To amend its mistake, the M24M re-issued the same statement on March 29, 2011 with two important modifications: instead of calling for election laws based on “demographic density”, it called for a “modern election law that represents the Jordanians”, and added a demand to bring officials accused of corruption to justice.1145 Though these changes appeal to Jayeen’s activists, they came after the damage had been done.

**Conclusions**

The failure of Jordanian activists to achieve their goals is in part due to the exclusive nature of the CoP’s MF. During the first stage of the protests, Jayeen focused on social issues and state corruption while youth groups of Islamists and the WAHDA party concentrated on the lack of representation of Palestinian Jordanians in state institutions. The grievances of the two camps were not combined together to create an inclusive MF because the two camps disagreed on

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1143 Although Jayeen does not mention what does this mean, two of its activists said M24M activists were receiving their orders from groups within the IAF who were affiliated with the Palestinian Hamas movement.


1145 “A statement by M24M”, *M24M FB*, March 29, 2011. Retrieved from https://www.facebook.com/notes/%D8%B4%D8%A8%D8%A7%D8%A8-24-%D8%A2%D8%B0%D8%A7%D8%B1/%D8%A8%D9%8A%D8%A7%D9%86-%D8%B5%D8%A7%D8%AF%D8%B1-%D8%B9%D9%86-%D8%B4%D8%A8%D8%A7%D8%A8-24-%D8%A2%D8%B0%D8%A7%D8%B1/121208817956112
fundamental subjects – namely, election laws, *Tajnis*, constitutional recognition of the
disengagement with the West Bank, and the government’s privatization policies. However,
*Jayeen* and the M24M put aside their differences and held a permanent sit-in at IMC on March
24, but this only exacerbated the MF’s exclusionary nature as the M24M did not abide by the
agreement with *Jayeen* and proposed election laws according to demographic density. The
inability of the activists to forge an inclusive MF is related to the lack of previous organizational
linkages between the AYMs and NYMs.
Chapter XI

**Jordan: Centralized Leadership at the CoP’s Apex**

On March 17, 2011 eight youth movements that represent the AYMs and NYMs met in the main office of the Social Left Movement in Amman to plan for the sit-in at the at the Interior Ministry Circle (IMC) on March 24. The movements included the National Campaign for Change (Jayeen), a coalition of several autonomous youth groups of Transjordanian origin, and March 24 Movement (M24M), a movement that was created by the Muslim Brotherhood for the purpose of holding the sit-in. The representatives of the youth groups negotiated an agreement of their demands and they were supposed to act as the sit-in unified leadership. However, this had not been the case. During the sit-in on March 24, the M24M assumed alone the leadership and raised demands in the name of the protestors that represented its own interests. This act of M24M led to the fragmentation of the youth movements which the regime used to limit the scope of reforms it undertook unilaterally to maintain the power structure of the state-society relations as they were before the beginning of the protests. In this regard, the failure of the protest movement is directly related to the centralized unified form of leadership that appeared few days prior to the sit-in and continued during it under a single movement leadership. Because the agreement on the sit-in demands intended to achieve the consent between many youth movement organizations, it ended up being a conglomeration of several issues written in a vague language in order to account for the different movements’ priorities. This made the agreement binding to the movements that negotiated it and as a consequently fragile in case one of the movements violates it. Therefore, when M24M assumed alone leadership on the sit-in offering additional demands and interpreting some of the agreement’s articles such as the elections law in a way that serves its own interests, it evoked a rift in the protest movement that led to its failure.
In comparison with the cases of Tunisia and Egypt, the consensus on the protest demands occurred between different protest centers in the street and therefore it did not matter if one or more youth movements violated it because the protestors themselves maintained consensus through excluding demands that did not resonate with them. In Jordan, the consensus happened between the representatives of the youth movements who were supposed to be the central command of the protest movement during the sit-in. Therefore, maintain this consensus required at minimum commitment with the agreement the youth movements made prior to the sit-in.

I explain these conclusions in four sections. Section one shows that the leadership of the protest movement during the sit-in was centralized and that M24M was the leading movement of the sit-in. Section two explains how this centralized leadership led to the failure of the protests. Section three illustrates the failure of the protest movement by presenting the nominal reforms the regime undertook which did not respond to the major demands of the AYMs and NYMs. The last section sums up the main arguments of this chapter.

Centralized Leadership at CoP’s Apex

In my framework of analysis I argued that a central leadership for the protests could take the form of either a unified leadership, when each movement has a representative that meets regularly in a council to discuss and plan activities, or a single movement leadership, when one movement assumed the leadership on the protests. In Jordan, the proposal for the sit-in on March 24 came from M24M; however, eight youth groups adopted it and met on March 17 at the Social Left headquarters in Amman to agree on their objectives. The representatives of these groups were supposed to be the leaders of the sit-in. This, however, did not materialized during the sit-in.

1146 Kaladeh, “interview”; Sneid “interview”
and a single movement, namely M24M emerged as the central movement that led the sit-in. The evidence that confirms the leadership of M24M to the sit-in is four-fold:

First, according to the activists of Jayeen movement, and WAHDA and the Jordanian Communist Parties, although the MB’s symbols did not appear in the sit-in, most of the people who addressed the sit-in belong to or are politically close to the MB. To confirm this information, I reviewed the video tubes that M24M posted on its website and related to the events on March 24 and 25. The video tubes clearly show that the activists who controlled the only sit-in radio to chant slogans were from M24M and part of their slogans are only chanted in the MB marches. Second, the statement that was distributed to announce the collective demands of the sit-in was written by M24M and reflected their own interests rather than the interests of all participant movements. I will discuss this point in details in the next section, but here I want to emphasize, that this act reflected the leadership role of M24M in the sit-in because Jayeen could not persuade M24M to abide with their previous agreement and could not at the same time engage in power struggle with M24M on this issue as the majority of youth activists who attended the sit-in were from M24M. Indeed, Jayeen withdrawal from the sit-in after M24M’s statement and their failure to influence the sit-in reflects the central role of M24M in the sit-in. As Sneid explained, Jayeen appealed to the Jordanians to join the sit-in and its activists were among the first to arrive to the IMC. Therefore, if they were able to influence the sit-in, they would have remained in the sit-in.

1147 Akroush, Gharibeh, and Sneid, “interviews.”
1149 Alnajar, “ An open sit-in in Jordan.”
1150 Sneid, “interview”
Third, M24M leadership of the sit-in was clear in the aftermath of it, when the leaders of the MB started to speak in the name of all protestors. As explained in chapter VIV, the leaders of the Islamic Action Front Party (IAF), together with the M24M held a press conference on March 26 in which the IAF called for the resignation of the government and the dissolution of the darak (Jordan riot police). Similarly, the professional unions’ leaders affiliated with the IAF called upon those government ministers affiliated with the unions to resign and the Bar Association called upon its members to hold sit-ins in the courts and to defend the detainees whom the darak arrested during dispersing the protestors in the sit-in.\footnote{Addustour, March 27, 2011, see pp. 1, 6, 7, and 8} As Gaith Alqudah explained, the more resourceful and well organized group, by which he means the MB, was the group that defended the sit-in and crafted the strategy of taking the protests from Amman to the southern governorates to overcome the regime’s propaganda against them.\footnote{Alqudah, “interview”; also Ben Irsheid, “interview”; see also Jayeen’s accusation to Ben Irsheid of speaking on behalf of M24M in “A statement of Jayeen attacks the IAF.”}

Finally, the fact that Jayeen refrained from defending the sit-in and its accusation to M24M of dividing the Jordanians by proposing an election law based the demographic density reflects the leadership that M24M had assumed during the sit-in. According to Jayeen statement on March 30, 2011 “[in] the light of M24M procrastination and under the pressure of stone throwers, which did not stop since Thursday, we could not hold any meeting (between the youth groups) but we as Jayeen and Youth for Change Movement issued statements in which we refused some of M24M’s demands. Unfortunately, these statements did not receive much attention from the media and also because of the situation in the Square.”\footnote{“Jayeen turns against M24M,” Khaberni news website, March 30, 2011. Retrieved from http://www.khaberni.com/more.php?newsid=52349&catid= (accessed June 17, 2014). In its statement Jayeen accused M24M of taking over the sit-in by using their own radio.}
That March 24 Movement (M24M) became the central leadership at the CoP’s apex should not be surprising because the AYMs failed to solve the resource problem to sustain the protests prior to the sit-in and, therefore, they lost the chance to dominate the protests. Furthermore, it was M24M that called for the sit-in and for this reason it allocated most of the human and the material resources for the sit-in. Unlike in the case of Tunisia and Egypt where the AYMs dominated the protests because they mobilized the poor people, in Jordan, the AYMs lacked an appropriate plan to sustain the protests. They did not locate their protests where they have a supporting social base in Southern Jordan and they did not try to mobilize the poor Jordanians in Amman, Zarqa, and Irbid. As shown in table VIV-I, between January 7 and March 23, 2011, the AYMs organized 18 activities: 6 in Amman, 7 in Karak, 4 in Theiban, and one in Salt. There were no activities in Maan, Tafileh, Jarash or Ajlon where the activists of Jayeen had chances to mobilize supporters. There were two reasons for this. The first seems to be, at least from the activities conducted in Theiban and Karak, that Jayeen focused on the areas where it had activists. The second is that Jayeen did not have ‘indigenous organizational’ network, to use McAdam words, with poor Jordanians in Amman, Zarqa, and Irbid; the poor in these three cities are mostly of Palestinian Jordanians. In fact, one activist from Tafilah Youth Movement (TYM) who lives in Amman claimed that the poor Jordanians in these cities would not participate in the demonstrations unless the Islamic Action Front (IAF) asked them to do so. This very failure of AYMs to spread and sustain the protests encouraged the NYMs especially those affiliated with the MB to take the lead during the sit-in of March 24.

The other reason that encouraged M24M to lead the sit-in was that the logistical support for the protests, such as food, tenets, and the sit-in’s radio came only from M24M. This is

\[1154\] Jihad
different from the case of Tahrir Square were the supplies came from different sources and took different channels to reach the protestors. For example, in its statement on March 30, Jayeen accused M24M of taking over the sit-in through its control on the sit-in Radio.\textsuperscript{1155} Several activists from Jayeen, the Communist Party, and WAHDA also claimed that M24M provided alone the material resources to the sit-in.\textsuperscript{1156} Furthermore, the majority of the activists who participated in the sit-in were also affiliated with M24M. In fact one nine activists of whom I interviewed together in Irbid argued that M24M had the right to lead the sit-in because those who were in the sit-in are mostly from the Islamists. What gives his comment some credibility is that no one from those who were listening and who were affiliated to different NYMs youth groups, contested his observation.\textsuperscript{1157} I also mentioned in Chapter VIV, that many of M24M activists had shaved their beards to give the impression that the sit-in included more liberals.\textsuperscript{1158}

I should note at this point, that the centralized leadership of M24M at the CoP’s apex should not be interpreted as if the protests in Jordan were centralized since their inception. As Mohammed Faraj, an activist in the Communist Party explains, when the protests started in Jordan there were already three leadership centers that reflected to some extent the variant position from the struggle between two camps in the regime: the high-ranking state bureaucracy and the private sector. The former was represented at the time by Mohammed al-Thahabi, the head of the department of intelligence (\textit{Mukhabarat}), and the latter by Bassem Awadallah, the

\textsuperscript{1155} Ibid
\textsuperscript{1156} Omar Emile Awad, interview with the author, Amman, February 2, 2012; Sneid, “interview”
\textsuperscript{1157} Interview with the author, 9 activists from different NYMs groups, Irbid, February 6, 2012.
\textsuperscript{1158} Ghaith Alqudah, head of youth sector in IAF, “interview.”
president of the royal diwan in 2007. The bureaucracy accused Awadallah of accelerating the policies of privatization through his management of the “program of economic and social transformation 2002-2005.” His policies, they argued, affected the capacity of the state to employ Transjordanians in the public sector, increased Jordan’s foreign debt due to corruption, and decreased the state’s ability to reward military officers when they retired by appointing them to positions in the state’s companies. Because of Awadallah’s Palestinian roots, his plans to privatize the public sector were perceived or claimed to be perceived as part of a conspiracy to empower the Palestinian community, which dominated the private sector. Thus, when the protests started in Theiban in early January 2011, the youth groups were already divided according to their position from this internal rift within the regime. The first camp is represents the groups that formed later on Jayeen, mainly, the Social Left, the day labourers, and the National Progressive Current. This camp was influenced by the state bureaucracy’s narrative about the role of Awadallah in privatizing the public sector. The second camp contains the MB and and some civil society figures of Palestinian origins. This camp took the side of Awadallah, but it did not defend it directly. However, it perceived the accusation against him as part of a campaign to abort any effort to give Palestinians more political rights in Jordan. For example, in my interviews with leaders of the MB, they claimed that the Mukhabarat was behind those


1160 This analysis is based on interviews with Mohammed Faraj, an activists within the communist party, interview with author, Amman, January 27, 2012; Hatter, “interview”; Khitan, “interview”; Habashneh, “interview”; Rasmi Badawi, interview with author, Amman, February 3, 2012.

1161 Hatter, “interview.”

1162 Oraib, “interview.”
among the Transjordanians who were calling for constitutionally recognizing the disengagement from the West Bank in order to abort the process of reform.\textsuperscript{1163} The last camp, constituted the Jordanian Communist and WAHAD parties, in additional to the Pan-Arabists. It argued that the poor Jordanians had no interest in the struggle between al-Thahabi and Awadallah, whose advocates fight for their own interests and divide Jordanians along identity lines. The poor Jordanians, they said, were suffering from both the state bureaucracy and the private sector and only a class alliance between all subordinated groups could overcome the identity divisions facing the country.\textsuperscript{1164} These three centers remained in place for the entire CoP. However, during the CoP’s apex on March 24 and 25, M24M emerged as the leader of the sit-in for the reasons I illustrated above.

To summarize this section, the leadership at the CoP’s apex was centralized. M24M took the leading role because it provided the sit-in at the IMC with its human and material resources at time the AYMs failed to solve their resource problem to have a say during the sit-in.

\textbf{Dynamic of Protests Under Centralized Leadership During CoP’s Apex}

A centralized leadership has three attributes that affect directly the dynamic of a protest movement and therefore its outcome. A centralized leadership sets the goals of protests, takes informed decisions related to the protests, and serves as an address for the protestors and the government. In this section, I argue that the protest movement in Jordan failed as a result of having centralized leadership at the CoP’s apex. In order to do so, I begin by explaining the agreement between the AYMs and NYMs on the sit-in demands, and I use it to show how the leadership of M24M to the sit-in contributed to the protests’ failure. Then, I try to answer why

\textsuperscript{1163} Saleh Armouti, interview with the author, Amman, January 24, 2011; Ben Irsheid, “interview.”

\textsuperscript{1164} Faraj, “interview”; Fakhri Daas, interview with the author, Amman, February 8, 2012; Badawi, “interview.”
M24M took unilateral decision during the sit-in when it knew previously that the regime would exploit the rift between the youth movements to weaken the protests. Finally, I illustrate why this centralized mode of leadership did lead to a settlement between M24M and the regime as implied in the framework of analysis.

One of the most important tasks of a centralized leadership, as illustrated in the thesis’ framework, is to set the goals of the protest movement. In order to reach consent between the movement’s organizations about the goals of the protest activity, their representatives engage in a process of negotiation that leads, in case they agreed, to an agreement with three features: first, it prioritizes the most important demands of the movements. Second, it addresses the controversial issues in vague terms to prevent them from inhibiting a possible agreement. And three, it excludes issues the representatives fail to reach on them a compromise solution. In this sense, the agreement is binding because it is the outcome of negotiations and fragile as the failure to abide with it leads to rift in the protest movement. With this in mind, the agreement between Jayeen and M24M on the sit-in’s demands on March 17, 2011 represented a compromise between the two movements that was designed to avoid conflict, mainly on the issues of election law and the role on *Mukhabarat* in public life. It also aimed to arrange the priorities of the two groups to satisfy the both parties. As can be inferred from Jayeen’s own statement calling for the sit-in, their priorities were mostly related to social conditions; changes to the election law and limiting the *Mukhabarat’s* interference in public life were not part of its agenda. Its statement calls for holding a sit-in to achieve the following goals: a constitution that defines the limits of the executive and legislative authorities, the formation of parliamentarian governments and a constitutional court, the conviction of corrupt officials, re-nationalizing privatized state lands and registering that land in the name of the state, decreasing the price of
commodities, imposing progressive income tax, increasing public employee’s salaries, abolishing the VAT, restoring the public sector; and supporting the schoolteachers’ demand to establish a trade union.\footnote{Jayeen, “An open sit-in.”}

In contrast, the priorities of M24M were mainly to change the election law, to amend the constitution, and to end the interference of Mukhabarat in public affairs. Its second statement, issued on March 22, 2011 prior to the sit-in, calls for a parliament that represents all Jordanians, which it claimed cannot be achieved without an election law based on proportional representation, free and fair elections supervised by an independent commission, constitutional amendments to immunize parliament from being dissolved and vesting true authorities to it, the adoption of a parliamentarian government, a constitutional court, abolition of the laws that restrict freedoms, an independent judiciary, the re-nationalization of state companies that were successful before being privatized, and the conviction of corrupt officials.\footnote{M24M, “statement No 2.”} Its original statement in which they called for the sit-in, however, included three other demands: fixing the taxation system, lifting the “security fist on the public life,” and achieving national unity.\footnote{M24M, “A movement that is preparing for an open sit-in.”} The centrality of changing the election law and limiting the role of Mukhabarat within the framework of defending Jordan’s national interests are also clear in the posts of M24M on social media prior to the sit-in, which they included calls to protest such as “our date on March 24 to end the security’s fist on public life,” and “together on March 24 to change the one-vote law.”\footnote{For example one post on March 18th says “our demands are true constitutional reforms. The law of the one-vote is reactionary; it means the results of the elections are known before the running them. Be with us to demand our rights. Another on March 20th says: we refuse the interference of the security in our youth, the conviction of civilians before military courts, the exceptional courts, and the security offices in our universities. We will open this file in our sit-in on March 24th. See M24M website https://www.facebook.com/shhab.march.24}
The gap between the two movements was bridged by a compromise that focused on (1) prioritizing constitutional reforms, changes to election law, and social demands, (2) referring to changing election law in only vague terms; the agreement called for a change to proportional representation, but it did not specify whether party lists were to be related to each governorate or to the national level, and it also subjected the new election law to a national accord, and (3) the issue of the *Mukhabarat* was removed from the agreement. According to Jayeen, this compromise was between eight movements and it included the following demands: constitutional reforms that lead to checks and balances between the executive, legislative, and judicial branches of the government, establishing the Jordanian people as the source of authority, convicting corrupt officials, endorsing an election law that is based on proportional representation according to national pact, and taking immediate measures to improve the Jordanians’ living conditions. In addition to that, they agreed to maintain the popular character of the sit-in by raising unified slogans only, and abandoning factional symbols.¹¹⁶⁹

Thus, when M24M, the leading movement of the sit-in issued its first statement in which it called upon the regime to change election law to take into account the demographic density of Jordanians in governorates and to end the *Mukhabarat’s* interference in public life, and when it omitted from its statement the demand of prosecuting corrupt officials, it created rifts between the participating movements. For Jayeen, M24M’s statement violated the agreement on the sit-in’s demands. It reflected M24M own understanding to the demand of changing the election law. Furthermore, M24M added the demand concerning the *Mukhabarat* which Jayeen refused to include in the agreement during the negotiation between the two movements. And finally, it omitted calling for convicting corrupt officials.

¹¹⁶⁹ “Jayeen turns against M24M”; See also Jayeen, “Two governments in the country.”
In Tunisia and Egypt, it did not matter if any movement raised its own demands during the CoP’ s apex because the leadership of the protest movements in the two countries was decentralized. As such, the demands of each movement passed through the filter of the protest centers, which kept only the demand of ousting the regime. In Jordan, M24M violation to the agreement incited part of Jayeen’s coalition to leave the sit-in, divided the participating youth groups, and facilitated the regime’s propaganda, which was intended to end the protests by dividing Jordanians along identity lines.

Following the sit-in, Jayeen accused M24M of taking the lead in order to implement the agenda of specific groups within the MB (implying that such groups received their orders from Hamas). Jayeen explained that it was surprised by the raising of “ominous slogans” such as “an election law based on demographic density” and “the insistence on attacking the intelligence department” through calls for “dismantling it.”

Similarly, Nahed Hattar, the coordinator of National Progressive Current (NPC), declared that his movement decided to “freeze all its activities” after the events of the sit-in because democratic forces had fallen between the “hammer of the Islamists, who are motivated by the agenda of settling the Palestinians in Jordan, and the anvil of the government, which managed to rally the poor and unemployed Transjordanians against reform.”

The Social Left also terminated its relationship with M24M, accusing them of raising three slogans during the sit-in that had been vetoed ahead of time, demanding an election law based on demographic density, an attack on the Mukhabarat and a

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1170 Jayeen, “Two governments in the country.”

call to dissolve it, and raising a flag that carried the slogan “God, homeland, people.” Even the movements that remained in the protests, from the leftist groups of the NYMs, expressed their discomfort about the way M24M led the protests, but they refrained from leaving the sit-in because they wanted to keep the focus, according Omar Emile Awad, a member in the communist party’s central committee, on the regime’s repression rather than on the disagreement between the youth groups.

The rift between the youth movements was in keeping with the picture painted of the protests in regime propaganda that depicted the sit-in as representing a segment of the Jordanian population of Palestinian origin who intended to seize power. April 15 Movement (A15M), a youth group affiliated with MB, has noted this tendency in the media and accused the government of “playing on the national unity accord by feeding racist and tribalist tendencies to prevent the march of reform [by] dictating what should be and should not be diffused in local media [and by] using the mosques to incite the people against M24M.”

I explained in Chapter VIV how the government portrayed the protestors in the sit-in as Palestinians who wanted to change the regime and install their one of their owns. Here, I want to stress only on the importance of the rift of the youth movements in assisting the regime to achieve its goal of dividing the Jordanians. Jayeen is essentially an autonomous movement that brought to the protest movement important segments of the Transjordanians society such as the

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1172 Kalaldeh to Arai’ “We stopped coordination with M24M and we recognize the vagueness vision of MB,” Jordan Politics, N.D. Retrieved from http://jordanpolitics.org/index.php/local/865--------24----- (accessed June 15, 2014). In Jordan, the slogan “God, homeland, people” contradicts the regime’s slogan that one can see in most Amman’s streets (God, homeland, king).
1173 Emile Awad, “interview.”
day labourers, the military veterans, and school teachers. Its participation in the sit-in along with M24M, and with the MB in general, who are seen by the majority of the Transjordanians as representing the Palestinians in Jordan, was a threatening step to the regime as it reflected a unity between the two people from below. Assuming there were no rifts between Jayeen and M24M, this unity would have reinforced through the linkages the activists created during the sit-in and this probably would have led to more Transjordanians and Palestinian Jordanians to participate in the protests. However, because Jayeen withdrew from the sit-in, and engaged in confrontation through the media with M24M, the process of unity from below between the two people was aborted. This discourages the social base of the camps of AYMs and NYMs (the Transjordanians and the Palestinian Jordanians) to join the protests; something the regime sought to achieve by depicting the protestors in the sit-in as Palestinians.

A legitimate question here is why M24M issued a statement in the sit-in that it should have known would divide the protest movement. Here the activists of M24M contend that the first statement was not originally planned and a few activists issued it on their own. They contend that M24M corrected this mistake by issuing a second statement.\footnote{Alqudah, “interview”} This explanation is not convincing because the first statement was read by Muath Khawaldeh, an M24M speaker. A possible explanation is that, M24M probably did not expect the regime’s propaganda to succeed because most of the protestors in the sit-in were Transjordanians. Moreover, the fact that most of the activists in the sit-in were Transjordanians might explain why there were calls to change the elections law to better accord with the demographic density of governorates, and why Mukhabarat was attacked: the demands would be portrayed as coming from Transjordanians rather than Palestinians. There is no evidence to support these claims; they are introduced here
only because the answers of M24M activists regarding why they acted the way they did during the sit-in are not convincing.

However, the way that M24M acted after the sit-in implies that a central leadership takes informed decisions. For example, in response to the regime’s propaganda accusing the protestors of being affiliated with the MB, of taking their instructions from the MB’s of Egypt and Syria,\(^{1176}\) and of seeking to turn Jordan into a Palestinian state\(^{1177}\), the MB changed their strategy by moving the protests to the southern governorates where the social base of the regime was strongest and refrained from protesting in Amman, Irbid, and Zarqa until the southern protests gained momentum.\(^{1178}\) The strategy also included looking for an alliance with influential Transjordanian elites and adopting a deliberately vague concept of proposed election laws that focuses on justice and proportionality.\(^{1179}\) This strategy revitalized the protests, yet the division between the AYMs and NYMs continued with the latter constant domination on the protests.

Another legitimate question here is that since the protest movement in Jordan had centralized leadership why it did not lead to a settlement between the regime and the protestors. Recall that in the framework of analysis, I argued that a centralized leadership serve as an address to the government for repression, cooptation, or for negotiating a compromise to end the

\(^{1176}\) “Bakhit warns the Islamists.”

\(^{1177}\) See for examples the posts on Jayeen’s Facebook page from between March 25th and April 15th. One of the posts on March 30 says, “they are trying (they refers to the regime’s supporters) to accuse the reformists of wanting to turn Jordan into an alternative homeland, but who granted tens of thousands of the Palestinian’s authority men and their families the Jordanian nationality in the last five years? And who is the responsible on the incitement in the street? Is not it those who who refuse reform.” Retrieved from https://www.facebook.com/jayeen.jordan?fref=nf (accessed June 18, 2014).

\(^{1178}\) Rsheid and Alqudah, “interviews.”

\(^{1179}\) On May 9, 2011, for example, the MB formed the National Front for Reform headed by Ahmed Obeidat, a former prime minister and a former director of Mukhabarat. The Front produced the Document for Comprehensive Reform which linked the regime’s legitimacy by conducting major reforms. See the “Document for Comprehensive Reform,” Addustour newspaper, May 23, 2011.
protests. In the case of Jordan, the regime’s interest was to end the sit-in peacefully without using repression and therefore it sought a compromise with the MB, who had dominated the protests prior to the sit-in, as well as during and after it. Prior to the sit-in, Bakhit’s government gave the MB five representatives in the NDC to convince them to participate in dialogue; three members directly affiliated to the MB because they have leadership positions in the movement, and two indirectly affiliated to the movement; they represent at the time trade unions. Furthermore, according to Hamza Mansour, Bakhit’s government tried to reach an agreement with them by offering them to change the election law in accordance with the law of 1989. During the sit-in, Ma’rouf Bakhit, Jordan prime minister claimed that his government tried to convince the MB to end the sit-in and begin dialogue, but they denied being responsible on or they can end the sit-in. After the sit-in, Al-khasawneh government tried to build a partnership with the MB but the latter refused.

The fact that the government failed to reach an agreement with the MB is related to the latter refusal to reach a compromise. According to Hamaza Mansour, IAF secretary general, Bakhit and Al-Khasawneh’s governments tried to reach agreements with the IAF, but his party refused because it “is guided by fixed principles” and is “committed to its allies in the HCCNOP.” Mansour’s claims are not necessarily true, however; many activists and political analysts believed that MB refused to compromise with the regime based on the strategic

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1180 In addition to Ishaq Farhan, Abdulmajid Thneibat, Abdulatif Arabiat who officially represented the MB, the government appointed Abdulsalam Mansour, the president of Jordan’s University Student’s Union, Abdulhadi Flahat, the president of the Engineering Agriculture Association in the NDC who are members of the MB.

1181 Mansour, “interview.”


1183 Mansour, “interview.”

1184 Ibid
calculation that the regional environment was changing in its favor, especially after the ousters of the regimes in Tunisia and Egypt, and the beginning of the protests in Syria. According to Khalid Shaqran, the head of Alrai Center for Studies, the MB in Jordan was waiting for the success of protests in Syria before throwing its full might into the protests as the fall of the regime in Syria would weaken the regime in Jordan.\footnote{Shaqran, “interview.”} Similarly, Mousa Barhoumeh believed that the MB leaders chose to hold demonstrations every Friday rather than daily demonstrations because they were hoping that the “Syrian revolution would succeed before investing their entire resources in the protests.”\footnote{Barhoumeh, “interview.”} Their viewpoint was shared by activists from Jayeen, the Communist Party, WAHAD party, and the Pan-Arabists. Although their reading to the MB position might be true, there was also the problem of guarantees. The MB leaders argued that if parliament should lack immunity from being dissolved by a decree, then even if the regime changed election laws in line with the their demands it would not be sufficient because the regime can change the laws again at any time, as it did in the past, by dissolving parliament or changing the laws again.\footnote{Rhiel Gharaibeh, interview with author, March 10, 2011; Mansour, “interview.”} In this sense, the MB refused to compromise with the regime because it had no assurance that the regime would deliver on its promises once the political environment changed. However, what matters here is not the failure of the regime to reach an agreement with the MB but the fact that in a centralized mode of leadership, the protestors have an address that the regime can reach them at to open dialogue in case it deems negotiation necessary for its own interests.

The failure of the protest movement became evident when the camp of NYMs witnessed a sever schism in the month that followed the sit-in between the MB on the one hand and the
leftist and Pan-Arabist groups on the other. Starting from early May 2011, the MB activists put supporting the ‘revolution’ in Syria on their agenda: they chanted slogans against the Syrian regime in their protests and they held sit-ins in front of the Syrian embassy in Amman. The leftists and Pan-Arabists considered the uprising in Syria to be a Western plot against the regime because of its support from the Lebanese and the Palestinian ‘resistance’; they organized visits to Syria to support the regime and accused the MB of supporting what they called “American creative anarchy in the Middle East.” In its turn, the MB accused the leftists of supporting a repression regime because it grants them financial support. As a consequence, the two camps of the HCCNOP agreed to leave the subject of Syria out of those protests that were carried out under the name of HCCNOP. In practice, this agreement led to fewer unified protests that called for reforming the regime in Jordan.

In sum, the centralized leadership of M24M during the CoP’s apex contributed to the failure of the protest movement by evoking the original divisions between the AYMs and NYMs about the issues of elections law and the fear that Jordan might turn into a Palestinian state.

**Titular Reforms**

The failure of the AYMs and NYMs to achieve their goals is evident by the fact that the reforms the regime undertook did not address the demands they asked for. The regime allowed for nominal reforms that included establishing a constitutional court, a new election law, and token constitutional changes that did not touch on the king’s authorities. However, the reforms were designed to allow the regime to claim that it responded to the demands of both the AYMs and

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1188 Muwafak Haddadin, interview with the author, Amman, January 24, 2012
1189 Saleh Armouti, interview with the author, Amman, January 20, 2012
NYMs. In the following paragraphs, I outline these reforms to demonstrate the failure of the protests movement in Jordan to achieve its goals.

It was in the environment of internecine struggle among the youth movements that the regime in Jordan passed its package of reforms in the National Dialogue Committee (NDC). On June 4, 2011, the NDC issued its final recommendations to the government, which included nominal reforms of election laws and some constitutional amendments, but also included general recommendations concerning granting Palestinians Jordanian citizenship among other issues. On the issue of election law, the NDC tried to please the NYMs; it proposed 20 seats be selected via proportional representation from a national-level list and 110 from governorate-level lists. The law added six seats to the original number, for Amman, Zarqa and Irbid where there are a majority of Palestinian Jordanians, and also added four seats to the governorates inhabited by a Transjordanian majority. It proposed establishing an independent election commission to run and supervise the elections to ensure their fairness. In practice the law ended the principles of the ‘one-vote’ and the ‘illusion departments’ that stamped the parliamentarian elections since 1993 and limited the Mukhabarat’s interference in them, but it did not touch on the main problem identified by the NYMs, namely, the lack of representation of the Palestinians in parliament due to the small percentage of seats allocated for national list, as well the distribution of the parliament seats allotted to the various governorates.

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1192 The word ‘open’ in the proposed law means that the voters should pick the list and they should also mark the names of their candidate in the same list. This gives the voters the right to chose all the names in the list or only few of the, Additionally, this means the hierarchy of the names in the lists is not important when the results are calculated because the winners are those candidates who get the higher votes.
As for the constitutional reforms, the NDC did not dispute the king’s authorities of choosing and dismissing the government, dissolving parliament, and appointing the Upper House members. It did, however, propose changes to some articles in the constitution in order to make parliament more effective, limit the prime ministry council’s authority to issue temporary laws when parliament is not convening, and abolish the outdated articles in the constitution that were related to the unity between the West Bank and Jordan. For example, it proposed depriving the parliament of the right to decide the legality of its members (article 71) and called for considering the judiciary the reference for such problems. It also proposed limiting the government’s right to issue temporary laws when parliament is not convened, such as in cases related to national disasters, emergency and state of war, and urgent expenditures that cannot be postponed (article 94). The NDC also proposed several other reforms including establishing a constitutional court, urged to enact the law of grafting, change the law of publication and media, and called for establishing an independent commission for parties’ registrations.

In addition, the proposed reforms tried to satisfy the AYMs endeavor to constitutionalize the decision of the disengagement with the West Bank and to lessen their fears of the issue of granting Palestinians Jordan’s nationality. In this regard, the NDC proposed abolishing outdated constitutional articles related to unity with the West Bank, such as paragraphs 4, 5, and 6 in article 73 which give the king authorities to postpone or run the elections in half of Jordan’s departments. It also proposed granting the prime ministry council only the right to give or withdraw the Jordanian nationality according to the constitution.

Originally, article 71 in the constitution gives two-third of the parliament members the right to consider any of the parliament’s members illegally elected in case the voters in the department challenge her/his election.
In sum, the reforms the regime undertook were in line with the recommendations of the NDC, and neglected the main social and political demands of AYMs and NYMs. The CoP in Jordan is not over, but within the period of its beginning and immediately following its apex, the protests failed to achieve their demands.

Conclusion

This chapter shows that the protests’ failure in Jordan to achieve their reform goals was in part a result of the centralized leadership of M24M at the CoP’s apex which was an extension to the domination of NAMs prior to the sit-in at the IMC.

The M24M assumed leadership at the CoP’s apex because it was the main provider for the sit-in human and material resources. The centralized leadership to the sit-in contributed to the protest movement failure because M24M did not abide with priori agreement between the YMs’ representatives on the sit-in goals. The agreement was detailed on some articles and vague on others in order to maintain a consensus. When M24M, during the sit-in, added to it new demands, omitted others, and proposed its particular interpretation to some of its articles, a rift between the YMs which facilitated the regime’s endeavor to divide the Jordanians along identity lines and as a result to the protests decline.
Chapter XII

Conclusions and Implications

In this chapter, I summarize the main thesis’ arguments and discuss some areas that require further research. The thesis approaches youth as a cohort generation that has been exposed to meta-socio-economic changes since the late 80s and early 90s. As a generation with shared experience, young women and men in Tunisia, Egypt, and Jordan formed a particular consciousness in opposition to the regimes under which they were ruled. However, because youth groups belong to different social classes and are subjected to different processes of socialization, they form distinct convictions and identities. As such, their engagement in activism against authoritarian regimes does not necessarily lead to democratization. For this reason, I looked into the conditions under which the structure of mobilization of youth protests is conducive to democratization, rather than looking into youth attitudes towards democracy.

This thesis argues that youth activism in authoritarian states leads to democratization under three conditions related to the CoP’s apex: (1) when AYMs are dominant, (2) when the MF is inclusive, and (3) when the protestors’ leadership is decentralized. The thesis’ hypotheses are driven by the findings of the literatures on opposition groups in authoritarian states, social movements, and democratization. The literature on opposition groups states that autonomous movements are more radical in their demands and tend to use extra-institutional means to achieve their goals. The literature on social movements correlates a movement’s success in sustaining protests with its ability to solve the resource problem. And, finally, the literature on democratization considers inclusiveness and decentralization to be correlated with the notion of democracy.
The findings of this thesis support its hypotheses. In Tunisia and Egypt, the CoPs resulted in a process toward democratization. In both countries, at the CoP apex, AYMs were dominant, the MFs were inclusive, and the leaderships were decentralized. In Jordan, the CoP failed to achieve its declared goals. At the CoP’s apex, the NYMs were dominant, the MF was exclusive, and the leadership was centralized. Both Tunisia and Egypt embarked on processes of democratization, though in Egypt’s case this process was aborted by a military coup. Apart from these findings about the thesis’ main hypotheses, there are other important ones, enumerated below.

First, the claim that mild repression turns a reform CoP into a revolution is true in cases where AYMs’ dominate the CoP at its apex: these autonomous groups will use the regime’s repression to escalate the protests, as seen in the cases of Tunisia and Egypt. Meanwhile, the domination of NYMs will lead to the end of the protests or at least will cool them down when the regime uses repression, as seen in the case of Jordan.

Second, unlike Snow and Benford’s and McAdam’s claims that initiator movements determine the MF for the CoP, the cases of Tunisia, Egypt, and Jordan inform us that (1) the MF is subject to change during the protests, and (2) if the MF does not represent the interests of the late-comer movements, those movements will not abide by it. In Tunisia and Egypt, the MF changed from reforming the regime to toppling it. In Jordan, the latecomer NYMs created an MF parallel to the existing one — created by AYMs — because the initial one did not represent their interests.

Third, weak movements that lack mass-based organizations can overcome their resource deficit through frame resonance and innovation tactics. As the Tunisian and Egyptian CoPs
inform us, resourceless activists sustained their protests in different ways, including prioritizing demands that resonate with people, appealing to people’s emotions, and locating protests in the neighbourhoods of most aggrieved people.

Fourth, one of the most important findings of this thesis is related to the dynamics of protests in absence of unified leadership. As the cases of Tunisia and Egypt show, these dynamics create a zero-sum game between the regime and the protestors, they narrow the consent of the protests’ goals, and they are subject to asymmetrical information between the protestors and the old regime’s institutions, to the benefit of the latter. These characteristics create a crisis of legitimacy when the CoP succeeds in overthrowing the regime. This is because those characteristics on the one hand deprive the AYMs from filling the political vacuum their activism creates, and on the other hand, they permit the old regime’s institutions to fill the vacuum. It is this crisis of legitimacy that triggers the process of democratization, as the cases of Tunisia and Egypt testify. The centralized leadership in Jordan deprived the CoP from having these characteristics; hence its prospects were limited.

Five, the thesis finds that the role of agency is decisive in creating an inclusive MF. Although the societies of Tunisia and Egypt, like their opposition groups, are divided along regional, religious, and ideological lines, the activists overcame these barriers and offered an inclusive MF. In Jordan, the activists failed to do so and proposed an exclusive MF. By contrasting the previous activism in Tunisia, Egypt, and Jordan, and by looking into the civil society organizations that foster horizontal linkages between people, the thesis finds that the activists in Tunisia and Egypt were able to offer inclusive MF because of past organizational and individual linkages between activists. In Tunisia, these linkages were stronger due to the historical role of the trade unions such as the UGTT and Bar Association. In Jordan, the activists
failed to offer an inclusive MF because they lacked past organizational and individual linkages. This is partly because the AYMs in the Jordanian case are new actors and do not have past activist experience, and also partly because the NYMs did not focus in the past on social issues that were of significant importance to Transjordanians. Furthermore, historically, Jordan lacks trade unions that foster horizontal linkages among Jordanians. In particular, the labor union in Jordan is co-opted by the regime and only private sector employees can join it.

Sixth, the finding of this thesis in regards to the behaviour of NYMs is in congruent with the literature on opposition in authoritarian states. It was the AYMs in Tunisia and Egypt that called for regime change. The NYMs tried to use the protests to improve their bargaining position with the two regimes in an effort to gain further access to either state’s resources. In Jordan, the NYMs focused on changing the election law so that the number of seats they held in parliament would be increased.

In addition to these findings, there are two implications that need further research:

First, the thesis offers a path dependence argument in regard to the beginning of the process of democratization. In that is says youth activism leads to democratization if certain conditions emerge at the CoP’s apex and the protests succeed in overthrowing the regime. This implies that, the beginning of democratization hinges on the availability of these conditions (domination of AYMs, inclusive MF, and decentralized leadership). In other words, the process of democratization is the unintended consequence of the protests; it is not the primary goal of the protests. This type of democratization can be called ‘democratization by default’; it has nothing to do with YMs believe in democracy. The concept of democratization by default is different than democracy by default. The latter is a well known concept in democratic theory. It is similar
to the terms *low-intensity democracy, poor democracy, empty democracy, hybrid regimes* and to O’Donnell concept of *delegative democracy* as it describes the weak institutions that carry the processes of democratic consolidation.\(^{1194}\)

This form of Democratization needs further research because it does not conform to the cooperative model of transitions to democracy as developed by O'Donnell and Schmitter, Karl, Huntington, and Przeworski or to the noncooperative model as offered by McFaul. First, in cooperative transitions the process of democratization begins because of a stalemate, occurring when a balance of power between “supporters and opponents of the authoritarian regime” yields to power sharing through negotiation because neither side can achieve its “first preferences through the use of force.” The outcome ‘pacts’ of these negotiations are then institutionalized in transitions.\(^{1195}\)

In democratization by default, the starting point is different. There is no balance of power; the power is in favour of the opposition challengers who created the political vacuum through their ‘revolution’ but failed to fill it as they do not have a unified leadership. Second, in the cooperative model, the regime is understood to be divided between soft- and hard-liners, and the opposition between moderates and radicals. The ‘pact’ takes place between the regime’s soft-liners and the moderate opposition in order to: "(1) limit the agenda of policy choice, (2) share proportionately in the distribution of benefits, and (3) restrict the participation of outsiders in decision-making."\(^{1196}\) In democratization by default, the regime is defeated and there are no soft- and hard-liners but instead a *de facto* authority that seeks to exploit the fragmentation of the opposition to save the old regime. This implies that the *de facto* authority does not necessarily

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\(^{1194}\) Diamond, “*Developing democracy,*” 34; Whitehead, “The alternative to liberal democracy.”.

\(^{1195}\) McFaul, “Fourth Wave”; see also Przeworski, “*Democracy and the market*”; Huntington, “*Third Wave.*”

\(^{1196}\) O'Donnell and Schmitter, “*Transitions from Authoritarian Rule,*” 413
negotiate with the moderates; rather, it seeks to maintain the divisions among the opposition in order to limit the agenda of policy choice. When the opposition shows unity after major protests end, the *de facto* authority submits to the opposition even if this implies that the opposition would enjoy all the benefits and the outsiders – that is to say, the radicals – would participate in decision-making. But when the opposition shows disarray, the *de facto* authority seeks to limit the agenda of policy choices, to maximize its share in the authority, and to target opposition radicals.

Finally, theorists of the cooperative transitions consider pacted transitions to be the most stable mode of democratization. In this model the radicals and hard-liners are sidelined and the outcome of negotiation constitutes a positive sum game for the major players.\(^ \text{1197}\) The mode of democratization by default is unstable because it is the outcome of balance of power between the opposition movements themselves rather than between them and the ruling elites. In cases where the YMs lack democrats, the process of democratization means little to these movements and the public could be mobilized again for variety of reasons.

Democratization by default is notably dissimilar to the noncooperative mode of transitions. In his study of transitions in post-communist countries, McFaul observed three modes of transitions: (1) imposition from below after democratic forces defeated the regime and installed democratic institutions (stable transitions), (2) imposition from above when the authoritarian regime “preserved and reconstituted authoritarian institutions”, and (3) protracted democratization “leading to either partial democracy or partial dictatorship” when there existed a balance of power between the opposition and the regime. In these modes, McFaul considers the

\(^ {1197}\) McFaul, “Fourth Wave.”
core beliefs of the main actors the cause of the type the regime that results from the transition.\footnote{McFaul, “Fourth Wave.”}

In imposition from below the opposition actors are depicted as normatively committed to democracy and united, in some cases, behind national leaders. In democracy by default, the main actors of the opposition are fragmented, they have different core beliefs, and they do not have recognized national leaders. In imposition from above, the ruling elites dictate their institutions according to their core beliefs, which in the case of post-communist countries were nondemocratic. In democracy by default, the ancient regime is defeated; it cannot impose its institutions. The mode of protracted democratization is context-dependent on the balance of power between the opposition and the ruling elite. In the proposed mode here, and unlike these other modes, there is no balance of power; the transition is a result of power vacuum.

In short, democratization by default is a result of the political vacuum generated by the CoP and of the inability of political opposition to fill that vacuum because of their lack of a united leadership. It is an inherently fragile process, intrinsically unstable, and may be easily derailed. As the CoP ends, the conditions under which youth activism led to democratization disappear. The AYMs are no longer dominant because poor people who led to its control of the CoP’s apex are no longer protesting in the streets. As a consequence, the AYMs once again face the problem of overcoming the resource problem. The inclusive MF which appeared during the protests is replaced by the main actors’ core beliefs as they strive to assert their own ideologies. The decentralized horizontal leadership that created the legitimacy crisis over who should rule, leading to the national elections, becomes an obstacle to the process of democratization as the leaders of individual movements become more worried about their own gains than about
attaining a democracy. And in the absence of unified leadership, the *de facto* authority plays on the YMs’ differences to preserve some if not all of the old institutions.

Second, I claim that the findings of this thesis can be generalized to other countries that are ruled by authoritarian regimes. Yet, the analysis provided in this thesis does not account for the possibility the AYMs may use armed violence to achieve its goals. I suspect that if the AYMs used armed violence they can no more offer inclusive MF and thereby the outcome of their protests in case they succeed will not be a process of democratization. Furthermore, the analysis which I offer in this thesis does not account for cases when international forces interfere in local contentious. I suspect that in case of outside interference, the variable leading to democratizations are different. The cases of Libya and Yemen can be contrasted with that of Tunisia and Egypt to account for both the armed violence and the international dimension.
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## Appendix I: Video Tubes of the Tunisian Protest Cycle

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Website</th>
<th>Place</th>
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Appendix II: All What You Need to Know About the Demonstrations of January 25:

Why We Demonstrate?

Egypt is passing one of its worst historical periods on several levels. Despite the government reports to make the picture look pretty, the reality is regrettably different. Our demonstrations on the 25\textsuperscript{th} is the beginning of the end; the end of silence, dissatisfaction, and subservience before what is going on in our country, and a beginning for a new page of positivity and demands for our rights. The 25\textsuperscript{th} of January is not a revolution in sense of a coup but a revolution against the government in order to inform it that we began to care about each other, we will get our rights, and we will not keep silence from now on.

There are 30 million Egyptians suffer from depression; 1.5 million of them are in deep depression. In 2009, there were 100 thousand attempts to suicide resulted in the death of 5 thousands. We have 48 million persons living in poverty, 2.5 million of them living in destitute poverty. We have 12 million homeless, out of them, there are 1.5 million living in cemeteries.

There is systematic corruption that led to cases of corruption with values exceeding EL 39 billion (roughly $ 6.5 billion) in only one year. Egypt occupies the position of 115 out of the 139 countries in the Transparency International in terms of corruption. There are 3 million youths unemployed and the percentage of unemployment among youth exceeds 30\% of total unemployed, and Egypt occupies the last position among 139 countries in the employment transparency.

We have the highest rate birth mortality in the world, 50 out of 1000. Half of Egypt’s children have anemia and 8 million persons have Hepatitis C. We have yearly more than 100 thousand cancer patients due to water pollution, and we have one ambulance for every 35 thousand Egyptian.

In Egypt, the emergency law caused the death of tens of people, and the arrest of thousands without any legal basis. And because the security forces monitor the politicians and abort their activities, that resulted in a rigged election for the People Council, and the winning of the ruling party of more than 90\% of the People Council seats.

\textbf{Why the 25\textsuperscript{th} January?}

In 1952, our grandfathers in the police forces resisted with their rifles the British army with its heavy tanks, and 50 of them killed and more than 100 were captured. Our grandfathers made a great example in sacrifice for our homeland. We, after 50 years, suffer now from the police forces’ practices, which became a tool to torture and humiliate Egyptians. We chose this because it symbolizes the solidarity between the police and the people, and we hope on the day of demonstration that good and respected officers will support us as our case is one (Call for the police to support the protestors demands). The day of the 25\textsuperscript{th} is a day-off for all Egyptians which give them the opportunity to participate without leaving their jobs (why the 25\textsuperscript{th} was chosen?).

\textbf{Our Goals}

First: Encountering the problem of poverty before it explodes by respecting the adjudication of the Egyptian judiciary, which demands a just increase of the minimum wage, especially for employees in the health and education sectors in order to improve the services provided to the
people. In addition, subsidies of EL 500 for each undergraduate that does not find a job for a period of time.

Second: Abolishing the emergency law, which resulted in the domination of the security apparatus in Egypt and the jailing without reason of politicians opposing the government’s policies. We also demand that the police centers be moved to the jurisdiction of the judicial department in order to stop the systematic torture of Egyptians these centers. And the implementation and respect by the government of the courts’ adjudications.

Third: The dismissal of Habib Al Adli, the interior minister, because of the security chaos that Egyptians face, which can be seen in the acts of terrorism and the spread of crimes committed by police officers or elements in the interior ministry without facing a strong deterrent.

Fourth: Limiting the presidential period to two successive terms, because absolute power corrupts absolutely, and because there are no advanced countries that allow their president to stay in power for tens of years. We have the right to choose our president and it is our right not to let anyone to respressively govern us until his death.

(Other demands) Certainly there are many demands for Egyptians in all sectors as health and education, but the beginning is to start moving together and to achieve them demand by demand through pressuring the government, and this is our role as people to guide the government and hold it accountable on its performance and to determine its priorities not the other way around (the agency role).

**United Slogans**

Long Live Egypt

Bread, freedom, human dignity

Freedom, freedom, freedom, freedom

Hey freedom, where are you… the emergency law between me and you

We will not fear, we will not bow… we hate the low voice (being intimidation)

Our loved Tunisians… the sun of revolution will not set down

We sacrifice our homeland with our souls and bloods

Raise your voice… tell the people… we hate injustice

One …two… we are Egyptians

Awake up the people…shake the universe…Egypt is our country

When the Tunisians people stood up, the burglar and his madam ran away

Minimum wages before all the people rebel

I have the right to find a job and live… the cents are not enough

Oh Egyptian awaken your soul… the door for freedom is open

Oh people overcome fears… let the world wake up and see

The people of civilization and of years of glories… will not bow until the day of judgement
Participants

It should be note that the majority of the participants in this demonstration is from the people who do not care about politics in general but got involved because the invitation for demonstration reached them and touched on their problems and grievances. The invitation for demonstration in essence is not politicized, and came from the page “we are all Khalid Saed” which is not affiliated with any political parties or political movements that have political goals. The call, however, was received positively from all the political parties because their goals are the same, and because these political powers were established basically to defend the rights of Egyptians.

1. 6th April Movement
2. The National Campaign for Change
3. AlGhad Party
4. Youths for Justice and Change
5. The Muslim Brotherhood
6. Al Wafd Party
7. Hashd Movement
8. The Party of Democratic Front
9. Al Baradei Campaign for Change
10. Karama Party
11. The Campaign for Supporting Hamdeen Sabahi
12. The Socialists Revolutionaries

Dr. Mohammed Biltaji
Dr. Ala Aswani
Mother of Khalid Saed
Sarcastic writer: Bilal Fadl
Consultant Mahmoud Mecki
Artist Omro Wakid
Director Mohammed Diab
Artist Khalid Abu Naja
Appendix III: Statement for the Press (Foundational Statement of Jayeen)

The activists of the Jordanian popular movement met in Karak on January 22, 2011. These activists represent different social groups (such as teachers, students, retired veterans, employees, and workers) and the diverse political currents (national, leftist, and pan-Arabist) that have interest in change and which have participated in launching the protests in Theiban and organized protest demonstrations every Friday. The activists declare the formation of the Jordanian Campaign for Change (Jayeen). The campaign is opened for all activists who believe in the campaign’s goals which are derived from the Jordanians reality and their slogans during the protests. The campaign will continue to organize popular events to achieve the following objectives:

Sacking the government of Samir Rifai as it constitutes the culmination of the successive policies that have brought us to where we are, and on the basis of changing the policy and not the policy of rotating chairs.

The formation of a national salvation government that promises in its first ministerial statement to implement the following points:

The establishment of a special court for the major corruption files including the privatization of state’s companies and the selling of the public sector assets, restoring the people's money to the Treasury and the reformation of the public sector.

The establishment of ministry of provision with extensive and intrusive powers- regardless of any other laws- whose mission would be to impose government control on the market, mainly the basic goods and services that form the basis of living Jordanian family.

Ratifying a tax law that is based on the reduction of general sales and services’ taxes, until they are cancelled completely, and imposing a progressive tax, in accordance with the constitution, on the incomes and profits of all kinds, as a prerequisite to solve radically the crisis of budget, and in order to enable Treasury to spend on the social programs, and to reduce the social inequality.

Taking the political decision to the establishment of the school teachers association, as this decision is necessary to advance the public education and a step to improve teacher’s social and living conditions.

The activists also agreed that Mohammed Sneid will be the spokeman of Jayeen.

The campaign also announce organizing a protest sit-in before the prime ministry council building on Saturday January 29, 2011 at 2:00 PM, which is going to be a step among several steps that Jayeen is going to announce successively. In addition we will continue to participate in organizing protest marches every Friday in various governorates.

The campaign emphasizes its commitment of peaceful marches and sit-ins, of not raising any flags except Jordan’s flag, and of making organizational committees for every activity.

Long live struggle of the Jordan’s people.

January 22, 2011

Source: All of Jordan

Appendix IV: Video Tubes from the Protests of Jordan (January 7- March 23, 2011)

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Appendix V: Statement by the Sit-in of the Youth of the 24 March

After years of compound and repetitive sloth of successive governments to implement the programs of reform in all fields, and as a result of the entrench of corruption in all state institutions and premises, and the predominance of the general intelligence department in all aspects of civil life, including forging the will of people and dominating the legislative authority, as such, the youths of great Jordan and its people calling his Excellency King Abdullah II to interfere immediately in order to implement comprehensive reforms and save our homeland.

We call for:

1. Making the nation the source of all authorities and the nation gives legitimacy to executive authority.
2. The King is the army’s higher commander, and the head of authorities within specific constitutional provisions.
3. An elected Parliament according to the density of population in governorates.
4. An evenly elected upper council between governorates.
5. The establishment of a higher constitutional court.
6. A government that is formed from the Parliamentarian majority, of which, the two elected councils and in a common session, can grant confidence, approve budget, dismiss, and accept government’s resignation.
7. Lifting the security grip on public life.
8. Taking direct and immediate measures to ease the economic burden on citizens.

The Sit-in of the Youth of 24 March
March 24, 2011

Source: Sada Alhajjaj