Negotiating Nationalism: A Marketing-Based Exploration of a Baltic Collaborative Place Brand

By

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Abstract

NEGOTIATING NATIONALISM: MARKETING-BASED EXPLORATION OF NATIONALISM IN COLLABORATIVE PLACE BRANDING

Warren V. Pinto
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This paper conceptualises how nationalist sentiments influence collaborative nation branding in the context of the Baltic nations’ foreign direct investment. Enterprise Estonia, Investment and Development Agency of Latvia, and Invest Lithuania operate as three investment promotion agencies, each with a mandate to promote and brand their nations for FDI attractiveness. An interview investigation on the Baltic investment promotion agencies reviews the case of each nation’s investment brands and investment branding process to assess the option to collaborate between promotion organisations to create a collaborative Baltic investment brand alliance. The study finds that neoliberal nationalism and economic nationalism may not be oppositional forces in the collaborative branding action, but rather nationalist sentiments may be reframed within the agency newly bestowed on transition nations. The findings extend previous nation branding literature by reflecting on the polarised views of the subject and taking into account the context of transition economies.

Keywords: transition economy, Baltic, nation branding, collaboration, investment promotion
Acknowledgements

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To my housemates at 21 University: thanks for keeping me sane amid my drastic change from a layman to a layman who thinks. Your great food to great conversation reminds me how lucky I am to have access to you.

To my sister Vanessa: you know what you look like and you know what you smell like. Despite that, thanks for being my closest ally and friend during this process. You make it easier for me to be remarkable.

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CHAPTER 1 : INTRODUCTION

This thesis attempts to explore nationalism in the context of collaborative nation branding. Previous research does not explore collaboration and nation branding together in a commercial context, despite research attending to collaboration in nation branding in non-commercial contexts (e.g. NATO, European Union, continent brands). Branding has been argued to be a tool nations can use to create self-sustaining myths in building coherent commercial and political identities of the state (Aronczyk, 2008; Olins, 2001). This research study addresses nationalism in two forms as pushes and pulls of the decision for nations to take collaborative branding action. The literature review of this paper frames two forms of nationalism as oppositional (neoliberal nationalism and economic nationalism), in hopes to align these antonymic nationalist sentiments against research on the pushes and pulls to collaborative action (e.g. Fyall, Oakley, & Weiss, 2000).

The purpose of this research is to explore the concept of collaborating nation brands in the context of investment branding. Nationally instituted investment branding agencies are effective in influencing foreign bodies to invest (Morisset, 2003), and are adopting nation branding practices to increase the quality and amount of investment to their country (Jacobsen, 2009). This research of a collaborative approach to the branding of nations is based on an integration of nation-branding and collaborative-marketing concepts, in order to explore nationalist dimensions in collaborative nation brand. The premise is that the metaphor of nationalism widens the perspective of the nation branding process. This paper explores the oppositional positions of neoliberal nationalism and economic nationalism on collaborative
investment nation brands. These nationalisms, within a collaborative branding context, have been framed in a conceptual model.

Expectations of the research are to have collected interview data of three federally instituted investment promotion agencies to inform a strong relationship between nationalist sentiments and collaboration motivations framed in Fyall, Oakley, and Weiss’s (2000) conceptualisations.

This thesis has four sections. First, the literature review explores the interplay between nation branding, collaborative action, and nationalism. This section highlights the geopolitical undertones that define the nation brand, and the decision of collaboration between nation brands, where nationalism as political will arises. Secondly, the methodology proposes two nationalisms that may arise as political will in a collaborative nation branding effort. Thirdly, the findings reveal the major themes in the study. Lastly, the discussion and findings section frames the findings against the literature review in order to reveal the relevance of neoliberal nationalism and economic nationalism in the context of collaborative nation branding action. The managerial application of this research addresses the ongoing complexity of branding, using the place product as context. This study has general implications relating to branding of nationalist spaces, composed of multiple geographies that have the option to collaborate in branding initiatives to foster economic development.
1.1 Definition of Terms

The terms in this section are directly related to the research and are used throughout this paper. The researcher develops all definitions not accompanied by citations.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Term</th>
<th>Definition</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Autarky</td>
<td>Economic independence, also known as <em>economic self-sufficiency</em> (von Mises, 1990).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Baltic nations</td>
<td>The geopolitical nation-states of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania; this is not synonymous with the Baltic Sea Region, which is an 11-nation collaborative effort along the Baltic Sea.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Branding</td>
<td>A multidimensional assortment of functional, emotional, relational, and strategic elements that collectively generate a unique set of associations in the public’s mind (Aaker, 1996).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brand Alliance</td>
<td>A market-driven relationship in which two brands coexist in an effort to enhance the value of both products (Washburn, Till, &amp; Priluck, 2004).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brand Image</td>
<td>Perceptions about a brand as reflected by the brand associations held in memory (Keller, 1993).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Collaboration</td>
<td>Process of joint decision-making among autonomous, key stakeholders of an interorganisational domain to resolve problems of the domain and/or to manage issues related to the planning and development of the domain (Jamal &amp; Getz, 1995).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Co-operation</td>
<td>To work together to some end or goal (Jamal &amp; Getz, 1995).</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Country Brand</strong></td>
<td>See <em>nation brand</em>.</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Cultural Resistance</strong></td>
<td>Behaviour or sentiment of opposition to dominant political, economic, social, or other concerning circumstances in a community; oppositional force to dominant power.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Destination Marketing Organisation</strong></td>
<td>A place marketing organisation that represents a place for tourism (Hankinson, 2007; Wang &amp; Fesenmaier, 2007).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Economic Nationalism</strong></td>
<td>Ideology based on policies of free trade, interdependence, and globalisation by a state are met with inherent hostility (Shulman, 2000). This hostility is met by protectionist sentiments and economic warfare, such that it encourages autarky, or closing off the state economically (Margerum Harlen, 1999).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Foreign Direct Investment (FDI)</strong></td>
<td>Financial instrument to increase inward investment by a resident or entity in one nation acquires ownership of assets for the purpose of controlling production, distribution, operation, or other business activity of a firm in another country (Moosa, 2002).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Investment Promotion</strong></td>
<td>The practice of promoting a nation for foreign direct investment.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Investment Promotion Agency</strong></td>
<td>A government-based organisation devising promotional techniques to increase investment and better the business environment of a certain jurisdiction (Cass, 2007).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Irredentism</strong></td>
<td>Irredentism supports states opting to annex, based on commonality, whether it is ethnicity, history, culture, or politics (Hechter, 1999).</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| **Multinational Brand** or **Supranational Brand** | A multinational brand will specifically look at a ‘stretched’ conception of nation brands, examining the concept of more than one nation operating in concert for a common goal. The geopolitical concreteness of a ‘nation’ can be taken for granted, but given the growing competition amongst nations for inward investment, the viability for nations to work in collaboration for individual national goals has been increasingly realised. Literature suggests multiregional entities that exist co-operate as multinational brands, given the entities can evoke concrete and meaningful images (Pieterse & Kuschel, 2007). Marketing and tourism literature have explored multinational branding under many terms, such as region branding, interregional branding, or area branding. In doing so, a collection of few countries such as Scandinavia (Flagstad & Hope, 2001) to a large geopolitical entity as the European Union (Pieterse & Kuschel, 2007) to even continents such as Africa (Collins & Gbadamosi, 2011), have been used as multinational brands to increase inward investment (Jansen, 2008) or public diplomacy goals (Szondi, 2007). Thus, the author will operationalise the definition of interregional brand as ‘a brand developed for a collection of more than one nation brand characterised by a distinct set of traits’.

<p>| <strong>Multipolar coopetition</strong> | Cooperation and competition between two firms, not on equal terms (Bengtsson &amp; Kock, 2000); opposite of <em>reciprocal coopetition</em>. |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>Nation</strong></th>
<th>Geopolitical state that has distinct governance and identity.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Nationalism</strong></td>
<td>Political ideology involving the attachment to the idea of one’s nation (Gellner, 2006).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Nation Brand or Country Brand</strong></td>
<td>Nation brand and country brand will be used interchangeably in this paper. Brands in general may leverage the consumer-centric perspective, yet, by definition, nations are geopolitical states that have distinct governance and identities. Laws define these place boundaries, not the consumers (Konecnik Ruzzier &amp; de Chernatony, 2012). Thus, the nation brand definition must reflect this firm-oriented framework. It is a ‘managed unique multidimensional blend of elements that provide a nation or country with culturally grounded differentiation and relevance for all of its target audiences’ (Dinnie, 2004). The author cautiously defines a ‘nation brand’ as such, dependent on two assumptions. First, a nation will be defined as a nation-state, whereby it is a geographic entity with a written constitution (Wimmer &amp; Feinstein, 2010), deriving political legitimacy from serving as a sovereign entity as a sovereign territorial unit (Tishkov, 2000). Second, the nation’s brand must have been actively created and instituted by a governing body in that state itself to promote economic interests, such as export, tourism, or inward investment (Fetscherin, 2010). This definition excludes national reputation, which refers to collective judgments of a foreign</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
country’s image and character that are then used to predict or explain its future behaviour (Mercer, 1996); the image evoked from a country that has not been actively managed or communicated from the country itself.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>Neoconservatism</strong></th>
<th>See <em>parochial nationalism</em>.</th>
</tr>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Neoliberalism</strong></td>
<td>Advocates international capital mobility based on the same logic as that of market preserving federalism; to create an exit option that forces different political jurisdictions to compete for investment in a way that will discipline governments to constrain their options for pursuing market-inhibiting forms of intervention (Harmes, 2012).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Neoliberal Nationalism</strong></td>
<td>Prioritising freedom over efficiency, such that states embark on market-preserving federalism to ensure international capital mobility.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Neoliberal Consequentialism</strong></td>
<td>Post-modern position supporting free market activities of the state in global markets; supported if it is for economic and livelihood strategic goals (Tan, 2004).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Parochial Nationalism</strong></td>
<td>An ideology by which decisions are guided by a strong state, grounded in a romantic appraisal of the past and subject to traditionalist orientation (Apple, 2000). Also known as <em>neo-conservatism</em>.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Patriotism</strong></td>
<td>Individuals and organisations are socially conditioned to support stately decisions and actions (Rothi, Lyons, &amp; Chryssochoou, 2005).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Place Brand</strong></td>
<td>A brand purposely developed for any geographic entity (Keller, 2002).</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Reciprocal Coopetition</strong></td>
<td>Cooperation and competition between two firms that is based on equal terms (Bengtsson &amp; Kock, 2000); opposite of <em>multipolar coopetition</em>.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Soviet Union</strong></td>
<td>Federation of 16 republics, existing in Eurasia from 1922 – 1991; Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania were republics in this Socialist Union from 1940 -1991.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Transition Economy</strong></td>
<td>A country that has changed from a centrally-planned economic system with limited private enterprise to freer markets with greater democratic institutions (Kornai, 2000).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Triadic Net</strong></td>
<td>The focal net of a micro-net macro-net perspective that consists of three organisations (adapted from Halinen &amp; Törnroos, 1998)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
CHAPTER 2 : LITERATURE REVIEW & CONCEPTUAL MODEL

2.1 Motivation

Nations fostering branding to hone economic stability must embrace private sector tools (Aronczyk, 2007) to participate in global competition for economic gain (Kotler, Haider, & Rein, 1993). A milieu of winners and losers ascribes world histories to converge within a greater globalised biome. Nations with greater brand concepts and positive brand legacies (i.e. United States, Germany, and Italy) may garner greater attention than nations with smaller concepts due to shorter histories. Globalisation for nations with smaller brand concepts creates difficulties for success in investment markets. Yet, this very process of globalisation increases interdependence between nations for goods and services, in order to sustain strength in a global marketplace. Such interdependence becomes a growing imperative for nations transitioning from planned to free market economies (Kornai, 2000) and exercising radical efforts to increase national wealth via foreign direct investment (Fetscherin & Marmier, 2010). Linking nation branding and this interdependence between transition nations motivates a suite of research questions concerning collaborating between nation brands. Collaboration between nations occurs at a supranational level, such as the EU and the Caribbean. Evaluating countries that have the opportunity to participate in a collaborative nation brand renders imperative in geopolitical landscapes, especially for those nations with smaller brand concepts.

Evaluating collaboration between nation brands requires a literature review of two concepts: collaboration and nation branding. This is explored in sequence.
2.2 Collaboration

Collaboration is a business strategy tool that is implemented in both public and private sectors (Day & Wensley, 1983; Rao & Ruekert, 1994). Collaborative definitions first emerged in Gray's (1989) seminal research, with extensions in Jamal and Getz’s (1995) work. Their work defines collaboration as a: 'process of joint-decision making among autonomous, key stakeholders of an interorganisational domain to resolve problems of the domain and/or to manage issues related to the planning and development of the domain’ (1995:188). This is not to be confused with co-ordination¹, used often in the place branding literature (Moilanen & Rainisto, 2009; Papadopoulos, 2004). Collaboration between likeminded organisations increases market feasibility of products and corporations, by sharing resources and creating greater impact of market activities. The practice aims to minimise external threats that participating collaborators face equally, and maximise shared opportunities—it is used as a tool to mitigate impending confrontations in the future if alone (Fyall, Leask, & Garrod, 2001). Collaboration has been widely explored in the branding literature, devising and constructing strategies of collaborative branding such as brand architecture (Kapferer, 1992) and co-branding (Rao & Ruekert, 1994). Such literatures of collaborative branding present an opportunity to extend collaborative phenomena to nations within a collaborative branding instance.

¹ It is important to note the distinction of collaboration and co-operation: the latter meaning “to work together to some end or goal” as located in the tourism literature (Jamal & Getz, 1995). This distinction becomes increasingly imperative when it comes to addressing the strategies implemented between organisations that pride themselves in collaboration (Chen, 2008).
Generally, literature locates collaborative place branding within the destination management field. In this sector, collaborative efforts between tourism actors arise with the goal to create a place’s singular brand promise to be effectively communicated to potential tourists (Hankinson, 2004; Zenker & Martin, 2011). Collaboration benefits the place branding process by augmenting the symbolic capital of the place image (Aitken & Campelo, 2011; Campelo, Aitken, & Gnoth, 2011; Noya, 2006), whilst balancing the multiple, and sometimes conflicting, opinions and values of participating organisation (Fyall & Garrod, 2004). Augmenting this symbolic capital occurs when collaborative entities with individual brand concepts and brand equities merge, creating a larger brand with greater impact for potential customers. Collaborative action in the tourism sector identifies the destination-marketing organisation (DMO) to facilitate such a strategy. The DMO’s facilitation intends to foster positive collaborative working environments with economic development organisations while monitoring use of resources effectively, constrained by budgets and balancing differing goals (Gretzel, Fesenmaier, Formica, & O’Leary, 2006; Wang & Fesenmaier, 2007; Wang, Hutchinson, Okumus, & Naipaul, 2012). Because the DMO acts as an architect in the collaborative place brand process, this paper frames investment promotion agencies (IPAs; see Appendix A for more information) to be facilitators in the collaborative place branding process for foreign direct investment. Exploring this strategic tool for investment attraction requires understanding branding and collaboration, and the inharmoniousness thereof.

The evolution of collaborative action in branding literature aids in the development of the concept, but also highlights the discord that arises between the concepts of branding and collaboration. Tschirhart, Christensen, and Perry (2005) highlight this discord as a ‘paradox’
between branding and collaboration. Their argument suggests that branding articulates independent behaviour guided by competition, requiring distinctiveness, reflecting unique missions, and having the goal of attachment. Conversely, collaboration relies on interdependence guided by reciprocity, requiring collective action, reflecting shared missions, and synergising goals of service (Tschirhart, Christensen, & Perry, 2005). This paradox can also be framed as a conflict of paradigmatic process. As outlined by Perry & Thomson (2004), the branding process can be typified as one of classic liberalism, which meets the idea of collaboration with hostility. The collaborative process is conversely framed with an emphasis on the commitment to something larger than the individual organisation (Perry & Thomson, 2004). This paradox identifies the problematic stance of collaboration when paired with branding: the basic tenets of branding may be violated if not properly managed in collaborative action. A collaborative brand strategy must rely on the reputation, trust, and net benefit reciprocity of the participating brands (Tschirhart, Christensen, & Perry, 2005).

### 2.2.1 Benefits and Limitations to Collaboration

Collaborative destination management research posits that place brands hesitate to work with each other to achieve a strong unified place image. An evaluation of the presence, or absence, of nation brand collaboration would indicate whether a collaborative effort could be carried unto nation products or not. Moreover, an evaluation of a presence or absence of collaboration would address the role of power politic between branding organisations. The influence exercised between branding organisations can echo the sentiments of individual, participating place brand goals (Thomson & Perry, 2006).
Fyall, Oakley, and Weiss (2000) explore the catalytic focus of extensive collaborative decision making for place as brand in the context of Britain’s inland waterways. In their case study, benefits and limitations of collaboration in a destination-branding milieu were defined. This paper adopts the benefits and limitations Fyall, Oakley, and Weiss defined, seen in Table 1 and Table 2, respectively².

**Table 1: Benefits of Collaboration (Adapted from Fyall et al., 2000)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Benefits of Collaboration</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>- Increases effective and efficient means to develop place product</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Opportunities for stakeholders to advanced shared visions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Mutual benefits among stakeholders, derived from the exchange/pooling of resources, including time, financing, and expertise</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Reduction/avoidance of unnecessary conflict in wider place branding system</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Chances to achieve greater degree of environmental and sociocultural expertise</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Opportunities to improve communication of place brand to prospective consumers which require complex resource-intensive distribution channels</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Opportunities for stakeholders to raise their profile, embark on joint-marketing activities, benefit from joint-research and participate in forums</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The benefits in Table 1 address the goals on which collaboration intends to capitalise. These benefits address developing the economies of the participating place products, sharing costs and opportunities associated with marketing activities, and increasing likelihood of successful marketing activities (Fyall, Oakley, & Weiss, 2000). In addition, functional competencies of the participants are present in place branding initiatives, which contribute to the

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² This research aims to understand this collaborative branding process in the investment promotion context, despite much of the collaborative place branding literature being located in the tourism discipline; it is wise to understand the tourism perspective as brand process governance operates similarly in the investment context (Therkelsen & Halkier, 2008). This tourism perspective is negotiated with the investment context in Appendix A.
effectiveness of collaborative action (Bleeke & Ernst, 1991). The quality of the problem-solving network also affects the effectiveness of collaboration, whereby collaborative entities can focus on resolving complex issues that may not be adequately addressed to singular institutions (Austrom & Lad, 1989). In practice, these benefits to collaboration become increasingly attractive to places, as collaborative reforms require devolution of responsibilities among stakeholders affected by group efforts (Tschirhart, Christensen, & Perry, 2005).

Conversely, there are limitations to collaborative place branding. These limitations tend to be silent in the practitioner-oriented literature, aside from some brief attention from Papadopoulos (2004)\(^3\). Fyall et al (2000) also outlines limitations to collaboration, as seen in Table 2.

**TABLE 2: LIMITATIONS TO COLLABORATION (ADAPTED FROM FYALL ET AL, 2000)**

- Fear among stakeholders of losing control over planning and development domain
- Unfamiliarity among stakeholders, which can involve switching of resources to more familiar, ‘safer’ strategies
- Mutual suspicion and ill-feeling among stakeholders if competing against each other for sources of funds
- Inertia due to inherent dynamic tension in the place branding marketplace
- Ideological and cultural conflict between stakeholders

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\(^3\) These include the lack of unity or purpose among different constituencies, reinforced by governments' lack of decision-making authority over any constituency aside from itself, and the inability to establish quantitative performance outcomes, which otherwise is analogous to marketing metrics and brand success measures (Papadopoulos, 2004)
The limitations to collaboration for place branding are based on a lack of trust between participating entities, stark differences between the entities, and general inertia that exists in the marketplace (Fyall, Oakley, & Weiss, 2000). Other limitations to the collaborative process include mistrust between collaborative partners (Fyall & Garrod, 2004), leakage of business skills and talent (Hamel, Doz, & Prahalad, 1989), reduction of direct control over the process (Palmer, 2002), and fear of increased financial and time resources detrimental to the process overall (Wang & Fesenmaier, 2007). Additionally, resistance to collaborate between entities can arise if the practice itself undermines the individual brands’ abilities to attract proper resources (Venkatesh, Mahajan, & Muller, 2000). For investment promotion, this could mean the collaborative effort may cannibalise the foreign investment opportunities that nations may have been able to attract on their own accord. Overall effectiveness of the collaborative process can be analysed through the initiatives undertaken by the style of management, organisational culture building, domain similarity, goal compatibility, and duration of collaboration (Fyall, Leask, & Garrod, 2001).

This research by Fyall, Oakley, & Weiss (2000) identifies there are pushes and pulls to collaborative action. However, their case studies look at collaboration between tourist operators within a place brand, rather than between place brands. This highlights an opportunity to extend this concept between nation brands. By extending this research, the pushes and pulls of collaborative action must be looked at deeper to ensure relevance to nation as brand.

The benefits in Table 1 identify the outcome-based aspects of collaboration, and the limitations in Table 2 identify the process-based aspects of collaboration. Attempts to address both process-based and outcome-based aspects of collaboration are exhibited frequently in
interorganisational literature (Emerson, Nabatchi, & Balogh, 2012; Marzano, 2006; Pike, 2007; Thomson & Perry, 2006; Thomson, Perry, & Miller, 2009). Such literatures address these issues through a strategic management lens, asserting that the act of collaboration is an administrative act. They thus propose that the act of collaboration can follow managerial principles in order to achieve the benefits of shared decision-making and costs. However, managerial principals do not often take into account the motivations involved in opting into collaboration. Such discourse can only be seen from a participant-focused approach to collaboration. Collaboration asserts that individual autonomous entities come together within their personal agencies to adopt collective-based action with other participating autonomous entities (Ostrom, 1990). The function of autonomy becomes salient in collaboration research, especially if achieving quality collaboration entails a willingness to work with one another and accept participants' goals, which can legitimately coalesce to become group goals within the participative system (McCaffrey, Faerman, & Hart, 1995). The participative system suggests the freedom of organisational agency; the freedom to exercise that agency is to opt-in or not to opt-in the collaborative endeavour. In an examination of organisational agency amidst collaboration, this thesis frames the motivation to exercise that organisational agency as political will.

2.2.2 Political Will

Simply put, political will is any motivation that inhibits or encourages successful collective action. It can cause the harmony or discord that arises between participants in collective action. It can also underpin the limitations in Table 2 throughout the process, or achieve the benefits of collaboration in Table 1 in its outcomes. Political will in the collaboration
literature is seldom addressed explicitly. Thomson and Perry (2006) address political will as a motivation in which to build trust between participants in a collaboration. Hall (1999) examines political will within tourism co-ordination, referring to the problem of having units relate between each other to cross-fit decision making to achieve consistent and coherent buy-in from stakeholders. Aas and Ladkin (2005) address political will within income generation in collaborative tourism promotion, arguing that it restricts the ability for greater income generation as a collective, and causes individual participating tourism operators to develop income-generating schemes for conservation and management independently.

Political will in collaborative action arises if the dimensions of collaboration are not properly managed; the work of Thomson and Perry (2006) address these dimensions as governance, administration, autonomy reconciliation, mutuality, and trust and reciprocity. The management of these dimensions by participating parties suggests collaboration can be properly achieved, such that the benefits of collaboration can be realised and the limitations are satisfactorily mitigated (Thomson & Perry, 2006). The literature here suggests that political will is a motivation that needs to be mitigated in order for collective action to succeed, and thus it tends to be framed negatively in the literature. This conceptualisation of political will can be exacerbated within the ‘paradox’ of collaboration and branding, especially if the branding concerns the nation product. This calls for exploring political will between branding participants in a collaborative action.

Political will between branding participants in a collaborative action arises to encourage or discourage the action from occurring. However, political will can manifest itself in different forms depending on the nature of the participating organisation. If that participating organisation
happens to be one that promotes a nation, the political will that arises may manifest in an alternative form. Thus, exploring the nation as brand in the literature may provide how collaborative political will may arise.

2.3 Nation as Brand

Places function beyond mere geographic spatial territories. Places provide an arena for constructing human identity, instigating political discourse, and emerging economic federations. As an economic federation, places embrace their many commercial functions. These functions can be easily shared with tourists, investors, migrants, and visitors for economic gain of the place. Place promotion via private sector marketing practice demonstrates its function as a commercial product application in a geographic marketplace (Anholt, 2002). Places as place products evoke narratives and images in a similar way to branded consumer goods for economic or administrative gain (Anderson, Challagalla, & McFarland, 1999), providing the purpose for exchange between human and place, organisation and place, and place and place.

Aaker (1996:68) defines branding as a ‘multidimensional assortment of functional, emotional, relational, and strategic elements that collectively generate a unique set of associations in the public’s mind’. Traditionally posited to address product and service brands (Kapferer, 1992), Aaker’s definition of brand manifests to multiple forms – and this thesis explores the neoliberal extension of Aaker’s branding definition to nations. The definition this paper adopts of nation branding is Fan’s 2010 conceptualisation (see 1.1 Definition of Terms).

Governments and national institutions adopt the practice of nation branding in order to alter external behaviours and attitudes to promote a palatable national identity and image for
commercial or diplomacy gains (Gudjonsson, 2005). From a branding perspective, place identities are loaded with positive associations identified, extracted, and orchestrated from the cultural, historical, economic, and societal phenomena localised in the space (Boisen, Terlouw, & van Gorp, 2011). These associations define the place’s brand personality and brand attributes when promoting itself via its marketing mix (Ashworth, 2009).

In the nation context, the most relevant objectives to implement nation branding are: to stimulate exports; to attract tourism, investments, and immigration; and to create positive foreign perceptions and attitudes (Hankinson, 2007; Jansen, 2008; Kaneva, 2011; Kotler & Gertner, 2002; Kotler, Haider, & Rein, 1993). Nation branding practice differs among these sectors as tourists, investors, and migrants interact with place brands for their respective consumer goals (Therkelsen & Halkier, 2008). In doing so, the associations that define a nation’s brand personality may change from its tourism brand identity to its investment brand identity. Albeit studies attempt to harmonise multiple brand identities under brand umbrellas (i.e. Syssner, 2010; Therkelsen & Halkier, 2004; Therkelsen & Halkier, 2008), isolating one aspect of the nation brand identity creates a more straightforward approach to understand how collaboration as political will arises. This paper elects to analyse the unique place product solely with investment promotion. The overemphasis of tourism promotion (Kasabov & Sundaram, 2013; Zenker & Martin, 2011) in nation branding may enhance a visitor economy, but creates synonymy between a tourism image and a nation image in academic literature. This can reduce stability in nation image development for long-term economic development (Jaffe & Nebenzahl, 2006). Appendix A further explores nation branding in the investment promotion context.
This study explores the nation brand within a collaborative investment promotion context. Before exploring the collaboration side of nation brands, giving attention to the complex nation product can ascertain the unique nation product and the irrelevance of some current academic exploration on the topic.

2.3.1 Nation as Unique Brand

Nations as products operate differently from other brands that exist in academic interrogations. The concept of a nation brand is both commercially- and geopolitically-tied. Nation branding is dependent on the assumption that the states derive political legitimacy from serving as a sovereign territorial unit (Tishkov, 2000). The sovereignty of the nation product echoes the collaboration literature with Jamal & Getz’s (1995) definitions, ensuring that participants in the collaborative process are autonomous bodies. The factors that affect the collaboration idea between place brands grow ever more salient when the collaborating brand itself is a nation product.

2.3.1.1 Exogenous and Endogenous Factors to Nation Brand Uniqueness

Exogenously, the nation product is subject to globalisation, competition, and modernity pressures. Globalisation acts as the intensification of worldwide relations, linking distant localities in such a way that local happenings are shaped by events occurring miles away (Giddens, 2002). Globalisation especially affects the nation as product, as nations become multidimensional spaces where globalised competition operates with human migration, capital migration, and interconnectedness of economic trade. The multidimensional aspect of this space
is exacerbated when the product is subject to history and legacy that is defined and commoditised in political and economic marketplaces (Varga, 2013). Globalisation acts as a pressure on geo-political nations to engage in collaborative activities, creating spaces for nations to collaborate for changes in human rights (Ishay, 2008), education (Bennell & Pearce, 2003), and food security (Reynolds & Borlaug, 2006). Within the framework of investment promotion, the push for nations to collaborate due to globalisation efforts is also evident (Matiza & Oni, 2014).

Competition arises in the globalised marketplace, but also enlightens the situation whereby the competing nations collaborate to be better competitors against greater powers. If the goal to brand is to increase foreign direct investment, and it is a common goal of similar brands with smaller brand concepts, there may be opportunities for similar nations to brand collaboratively to reduce having each other as competitors, increasing their chances to succeed in the marketplace. Ideally, collaborative brands combine established individual brand concepts and connect associations within the action (Lanseng & Olsen, 2010). Nation brands can benefit from such collaboration if their current individual brand concept cannot achieve the economic gain they desire. The collaborative brand that participating nations communicate may be at odds with the decision to communicate individual brands concurrently. The decision to collaborate with competitors tends to be linked to resource dependency, whereby opportunities for financial efficiency, stakeholder advancement, the spread of new technologies, and promotional expenditure are main reasons for competitive nations to collaborate (Fyall, Oakley, & Weiss, 2000; Pasquinelli, 2013; Zach & Racherla, 2011). The nation branding process involving
international brand collaboration is exposed to both cooperative and competitive influences\(^4\). Competition also enlightens the imperative to brand for target markets. Strongly influenced by its external audiences, nation brands succumb to external validation from brand interlocutors (Aronczyk, 2013). In addition, Boisen (2007) claims if policy makers perceive their places as being in competition, they will embark on policies to improve the competitive position of their places\(^5\).

The inherent modernisation processes in globalisation become relevant in the decision for nations to collaboratively brand. Nations internalise modernisation processes to transform political institutions and establish democratic institutions. Transition nations echo these processes in reconfiguring their planned economies to freer market economies. In explicating the concept of transition nation, neomodernisation becomes imperative in this study, as it galvanises the adoption of Western thought for economic development (Fukuyama, 1992); transition nations adopt nation branding as a neomodern adoption of Western thought. The choices to neomodernise are exacerbated within globalisation and its pressures onto countries. Adopting more nuanced approaches of nation branding ensure sophisticated approaches to attract and keep foreign investors (Metaxas, 2010). These nuanced marketing tools can be described as acting as

\(^4\) Literature on the portmanteau of these influences, coopetition (Bengtsson & Kock, 2000) (Dagnino & Padula, 2002), explores organisations in cooperative-competitive environments, but mostly in the context of knowledge transfer between organisations rather than as building a unified brand among organisations (van Wijk, Jansen, & Lyles, 2008).

\(^5\) The intense competition in the FDI sector sanctions place brands to develop branding agencies to further marketing goals (Boisen, Terlouw, & van Gorp, 2011). In particular, the presence of IPAs has risen in the last decades to disseminate information about investment opportunity in the nation, contribute to overall investment climate, and mitigate the prospect of market failure. (Zanatta, Costa, & Filippov, 2006).
technological tools, and national agencies adopt marketing tools, such as collaboration, in order to achieve economic development goals (such as increasing FDI) and keep the health of the nation stable (Kotler, Haider, & Rein, 1993). These approaches may include working with other nations in a joint collaboration to gain greater awareness and capitalise on shared resources. Nations would adopt such collaborative measures in an attempt to reconcile relevance in modern markets. This is exacerbated in post-industrialised nations struggling to pursue new growth strategies. This can be attributed to the inertia of negative images created and propagated throughout the de-industrialisation process (Boisen, Terlouw, & van Gorp, 2011).

Endogenously, nations that brand must articulate national identity to its audiences. This promotion of national identity is poorly framed in the academic literature – yielding an excess of critical inquiry on the matter. Expressing national identity here becomes a point of contention, marred with conflict and dissonance (Varga, 2013). Nation branding in a modern, competitive landscape exacerbates national articulation of identity, as commercial promotion of state requires more nuanced approaches to branding. Current difficulty of some national-identity articulation requires branding behaviours to circumvent mere reductionist slogans and logos that traditionally typify many destination nation brands. In the context of collaborative nation branding, the decision-makers for the national identity involved are representatives of the nation. The participants are each other’s closest competitor if each nation offers similar brand attributes to

6 More specifically, the critical marketing and communications research addresses the nation – and national identity – with a moral imperative to protect the citizen endogenous to the nation, rather than shedding light on endogenous state-level operations and benefits to the state at large (Aronczyk, 2013; Kaneva, 2012). Tasked with the development of economies, state officials articulate national imagery and suggest national identity throughout such imagery for internal and external audiences (Jaffe & Nebenzahl, 2006; Volcic & Andrejevic, 2011).
the target audiences. National identity, here framed within national rivalry of an FDI context, may thus supersede interstate cooperation in the face of economic gains.

In addressing the exogenous and endogenous factors to nation branding, it can be argued the nation operates uniquely compared to more traditional product and corporate brands (Kapferer, 1992; Fan, 2010). However, this complexity becomes a point of contention in the academic interrogation of the nation as brand. Identifying this will highlight the conflicting arguments in the literature, attending to the academic call to address the collaborative nation brand and political wills therein.

2.3.1.2 Academic Interrogation of Nation Branding

By exploring collaboration between nation brands in the investment context, the complexity of the nation brand becomes a relevant discussion point. This can be seen in the main divergence in the academic literature.

Academic interrogation of nation branding bifurcates. One dominant stream of literature addresses the practice under economic geography and critical theory lenses (Boisen, Terlouw, & van Gorp, 2011; Lucarelli & Berg, 2011, Kaneva, 2011), and the other dominant stream applies systematic marketing techniques to the nation branding practice (Dinnie, 2008; Go & Govers, 2011; Moilanen & Rainisto, 2009; Morgan, Pritchard, & Pride, 2004; Tsiotsou & Goldsmith, 2012). The critical lens suggests place branding as discomforting: criticised to be overly practitioner-oriented (Kaneva, 2011; Therkelsen & Halkier, 2008). This discomfort exists, as practitioner-oriented research does not address that nations may inherently decontextualise national identity for the sake of economic gain. Such literature innately excuses this
decontextualisation and reduces the discourse of national identity suppression for commercial identity gain. This practitioner-oriented framing lauds such nation branding literature to be a slippery concept (Warnaby & Medway, 2013), and using these commercial tools for economic gain may be ill fitting and not sustainable for national identity protection. Essentially, this discomfort in the nation branding literature creates the impetus to remind scholars of preserving the sanctity of the nation product.

Preserving the nation product addresses the protection of the complexity of the nation product itself. Marketing proliferates the use of positioning strategies, target markets, and market segmentation principles for product feasibility and sustainable profitability (Harrison-Walker, 2011). This practice inherently limits the ability for nations as products to capitalise on their smaller, less commodifiable attributes that may contribute to their overarching national narrative (Sevin, 2011). In other words, it mutes attributes of a place’s culture and history in order to ensure market feasibility, consequently encouraging reductive and monologic sentiments on the nation’s promotion (Kaneva, 2012). This becomes problematic, as it may lead to growing literature aligning nation brands to commercial product and corporate brands (Zenker & Martin, 2011), while decontextualising the number of issues nations face, different from products and corporations (Fan, 2010).

The bifurcation of the academic literature suggests the conflict that arises warrants merely two types of exploration: nation branding as a solution (i.e. traditional marketing approach to nation branding) and nation branding as problematic (i.e. common critical theory approach to nation branding). In viewing the literature in this harsh binary, the conversations about the complex nation brand halts. Collaboration between nations can ignite the conversation
between these two suites of literatures. Collaboration supports the nation-branding-as-solution argument by using collaboration as a business strategy tool itself, helping smaller nation brands to garner greater global attention for foreign direct investment by working together and increasing the potential to attain market feasibility. Collaboration supports the nation-branding-as-problematic argument by using collaboration as a means to detract nations from working together, highlighting the national imperative to control and manage commodification of national identity without the push of a larger or hegemonic force; reducing the decontextualisation of the state in its commodification practice. Understanding these two arguments in concert can arise by explicating collaborative action between nations. This tends to form as a supranational region brand.

### 2.3.2 Supranational Region Brand

Collaborative actions between nation brands form supranational region brands. The destination branding literature explores collaboration between place products as a function to collectively reach similar goals and mitigate the costs associated throughout the process. Evidenced through the preceding section, collaboration and branding may be paradoxical in practice. This paradox creates interest in the context of place brands, and this paper explores this paradox when collaborating place brands are geopolitical countries for a supra-national region brand. The logical and pragmatic incentives for place brand collaboration are subject to scrutiny when that place brand is a nation.
The discourses of supranational region brands rose firstly in Andersson’s (2007) research with the case of the Baltic Sea Region (BSR). His research addresses the lack of central decision-making authority and the multiple stakeholders and identities to which to adhere in the creation of a supranational regional brand (Andersson, 2007). This lack of central decision-making authority is addressed in practitioner literature as well. For example, the Caribbean Council posted a call for increasing control of Caribbean export products by having a central decision-making authority (namely, the Caribbean Council) to control the brand of the Caribbean via its products in a region-of-origin context (The Caribbean Council, 2014).

Other supranational collaboration efforts exist, but they tend to evidence a political collaboration rather than a commercial one. This includes continent-based supranational collaborative efforts exist for Europe and Africa. This research identifies such collaboration

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7 This paper will adopt the term supranational region brand, used primarily by Baltic branding researcher Andersson, and his works (Andersson, 2007; Andersson & Paajanen, 2012). Other literature uses terms such as macro-regional cooperation (Salines, 2010), or region branding (Paajanen, 2014).

8 In the case of the European Union, nations elect to forgive partial economic and legal sovereignty to opt into one of modern history’s largest collaborative endeavours. The impact of its economic and legal collaboration indeed has branding implications, having the mechanism to communicate a unique set of principles, ideas, and norms for 28 unified nation-states to global markets for global economic and political gain (van Ham, 2008). The European Union example of multinational branding is used as a seminal case for successful destination branding, niche marketing, and place brand image projection (Hall, 1999). The European Union set the precedent to create a collaborative multinational place brand not only to increase investment successfully, but also to regain control of its reputation to the rest of the world as interlocutors. Jansen (2008) ascribes that nation branding can alter negative reputations of a region, as in the case of Africa as a developing multinational region (Osei & Gbadamosi, 2011; Wanjiru, 2006). With a Western framing of the brand Africa, the continent is subject to a reputation attached to ideas of war, instability, and famine; impinging on the ability of the nations within this multinational grouping to attract FDI as an economic activity (Dinnie, 2008). The result of this framing causes nations within the continent to brand away from the collaboration. In this conceptualisation ‘a shared brand poses… problems in relation to what features to choose to represent the patchwork of characteristics of a whole continent without resulting in a skewed profile that centres on the interests of a few countries or a bland profile with no communicative strength’ (Therkelsen & Gram, 2010: 109). These two examples of the European Union and Africa show the dissonance between outcomes of supranational collaboration at a continental level.
exists, but will exclude further exploration on the matter as it does not render relevant in a commercial exploration of collaborating nations.

Supranational regional collaboration can also occur in multiple vectors of national integration. The case of Turkey identifies that nations that ascribe to one supranational regional collaboration (Turkey with the Turkic Council) can also collaborate with another organisation (the European Union) as long as goals do not conflict with either collaboration. Its ‘rapprochement with sister nations of the Caucasus and Central Asia’ aims to achieve the benefits of political and region branding collaboration (Daoudov, 2010). The intent is to remain connected with its Eastern and Western partners via international mechanisms and structures (Caman & Akyurt, 2011). Likewise, organisations that are not geographically proximate may adopt branding principles into its alliance, as in the case of NATO. NATO provides the example of a pre-defined supranational collaboration that spans geographies in order to achieve the goal of human and political security jointly. NATO’s promotion effort exercised in recent years is a call to address public opinion and ‘promulgate…. potential transformative effects on the alliance [between member states]’ (Wolff, 2014: 74). These opportunities show the viability for place brands to consider collaborative action. The cases demonstrate that nation branding collaborations are viable in practice.

The governance issue of influence and authority over resources can directly affect the structure of how collaborative efforts can be successful. Governance makes decisions to create a collaborative regional brand. This becomes imperative to disclose in this study of collaborative branding action, as governance for nations tend to be federal governments, driven by political
motivations despite its commercial functions. These motivations align closely with those of political will (seen in Section 2.3.2) and inform the research questions of this study.

Governance is important when explicating political will in collaborative action, as this assertion of will dictates the feasibility of the collaboration. Governance and explication of political will arises in the role of agency in collaborative nation brands\(^9\). Agency emphasises the role of branded nations in market rational choice (Gershon, 2011). Nations opt into branding and branding-related decisions. These branding measures reinforce economic liberalisation philosophies (McKinnon, 1993), dictating market rationality as a success measure most relevant in a collaborative circumstance. Likewise, an assertion of will by a nation is an assertion of economic values: collaborative circumstance forces the identities and values of participants to face an inevitable confrontation (Ringrose & Lerner, 1993).

Literature does not explore political will in collaborative marketing at length: a significant gap in the literature. Given that instances where lack of collaboration is directly related to having sufficient resources (Florek, 2005); the position an institution has to influence in a collaborative situation is at risk. Influence as politic is key to having power throughout the

\(^9\) Governance arises as either a higher power in the form of a consortium, or a supra-level governing power (Zerrillo & Thomas, 2007). In addition to consortiums and supra-level governing powers, there is also the idea of nation packages, which Goldman Sachs coined with nation groups such as BRIC or MINT nations (O'Neill, 2001). However, nation packages are externally constructed: meant to highlight nation packages as profitable investment opportunities for Western investors. These nation packages are not true collaborative nation brand alliances, but rather an externally driven characterisation of a group of nations with similar attributes. In the cases of BRIC and MINT, the characterisation was done by Goldman Sachs. The lack of agency here identifies the problematic nature of nation packaging, identifying again the autonomous characteristic of the nation as product under a collaborative lens (Pinto, McKenzie, Elliot, & Charlebois, 2014).
entire branding process (Marzano, 2006). Influence is relevant in both the nation branding (Ashworth & Kavaratzis, 2010) and strategic collaboration literatures (Naipaul, Wang, & Okumus, 2009). Influences over resources can dictate the direction of the collaborated brand itself, from nomenclature (Pedersen, 2004) to financial planning (Morgan, Pritchard, & Pride, 2004). Pacification of regional identity disrupts place branding through power imbalances among the participative organisations. The case of Denmark demonstrates that consensus of collaboration participants is a major factor in the implementation and mobilisation of a place branding initiative (Ooi, 2004). Achieved consensus dictates that collaborators are able to mitigate power imbalance seen often within and between place branding organisations (Marzano & Scott, 2009). The implications of politics in a collaborative setting have traditionally used power to incentivise or penalise collaborative behaviour of participants (Bianchi, 2004). To a lesser extent, governance exacerbates political will in collaborative branding; given governing institutions follow personal agendas to formulation and implementation of domestic policy (Fyall, Garrod, & Wang, 2012). Depending on the construction of the collaborative effort, the politics-based theories suggest the implementation of collaborative efforts requires mutual respect and recognition of all parties, democracy of each collaborator, and high levels of knowledge and interorganisational learning (Hardy, Phillips, & Lawrence, 2003). However, the geopolitical perspective does not only assert the balance of power between the collaborative
nations. It also asserts power and influence may manifest out of geopolitical identity\textsuperscript{10} (Govers & Go, 2009).

The supranational region brand culminates the idea of collaboration with nation brands as participating organisations in the collaborative action. The examples listed above show pragmatic instances of collaboration between nations. An academic interrogation of collaboration between nation brands remains silent. Fyall, Oakley, & Weiss’s (2000) benefits and setbacks to collaboration can be extended to nations here. Nations operate differently from product and corporations, and thus the benefits and setbacks may manifest differently from how it is currently presented in the destination marketing literature. This thesis will reframe this manifestation with a conceptual model, highlighting the complex nation product and its operation within a nationalist space of collaborative action.

2.4 Conceptual Model

The nation product imperative drives the continuity of this paper; brand process research is compromised if this study dismisses nation product uniqueness. (Dzenovska, 2005; Zenker & Martin, 2011). Nation as brand encourages geopolitical sentiments to arise; the investment fate of the nation-state operates because of, and in spite of, the nation branding process (Mihailovich, ________________).

\textsuperscript{10} For nation brands in particular, governance bodies of the nations may have endured violent histories and identity threats through occupation and war. Thus, nations would be weary to opt into collaboration with other nations to promote a unified brand. Such collaboration would suggest that participating in a supranational region brand would assume forgiving national sovereignty for region image (Kotler & Gertner, 2002). The unique characteristics of a nation brand as a place product creates this additional limitation for place product organisations to collaborate.
Federal governance can opt to protect the state by promoting the state as an individual entity, or promote the state in a collaborative effort with other nations. Underlying both of these decisions is the broad concept of nationalism. Nationalism in political and commercial identities suggests this research will be multidisciplinary. Nation branding is multidisciplinary\textsuperscript{17} in nature, and thus the overarching paradigm of this paper will be using constructivist thought to explore nationalism and collaborative nation branding.

There is a growing volume of research on place branding and collaboration in destination marketing literature (Fyall, Garrod, & Wang, 2012; Fyall, Leask, & Garrod, 2001; Fyall, Oakley, & Weiss, 2000; Naipaul, Wang, & Okumus, 2009; van Wijk, Jansen, & Lyles, 2008; von Friedrichs Grängsjö, 2003; Wang & Fesenmaier, 2007; Zach & Racherla, 2011). Yet, there is a dearth of research on the political will of collaborative supranational region brand processes within a context of investment promotion. This thesis aims to achieve harmonising nation branding and collaboration in the investment promotion context. Figure 1 illustrates this paper’s exploration\textsuperscript{11}.

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\textsuperscript{11} The conceptual model in Figure 1 may demonstrate a three-country model, but this proposal posits that it is general of any multiple of investment place brands; the use of three nation brands is merely for illustrative purposes.
This conceptual framework constructs the decision to nation brand, both individually and collaboratively, as motivation underpinned by neoliberal nationalism. Neoliberal nationalism in the figure illustrates the motivation to brand the nation for investment, echoing the literatures on state motivation to brand a nation (Aronczyk, 2008; Dzenovska, 2005). Participating nation brands promote themselves to respective target markets. The investment promotion context frames this target market to be the pool of potential investors\(^{12}\) of the location.

\(^{12}\) For the basis of a general conceptual framework, these investors will not be sector-specific; investors will range all sectors and all general forms of investment.
IPAs can work cooperatively to benefit from collaborative action, including brand spillover effects, joint economic gain, and sharing opportunities to mitigate impending challenging confrontations. The collaborative investment brand alliance allows each individual IPA to capitalise on the benefits of the collaboration (see Table 1). These collaborating IPAs can further achieve success outlined by their respective organisational goals. The IPAs then create an investment brand alliance; co-managed and co-implemented to increase FDI in selected target markets. The goal of the collaboration is to increase inward investment to all participating nations. The practical outcome of this brand alliance would be greater presence of the nations in the FDI marketplace, in hopes to garner greater attention of the participating nations. The role of the alliance is to create a more powerful brand; it does not act as a consortium or an organisation that would receive the investment. Rather, investments initially attracted to the investment brand alliance would be subjected to a competition amongst the participating IPAs. This would serve as a multipolar coopetition model.

Unique to the nation product is the nationalist space in which it operates. The promotion to collaborating nations commercially is a sentiment of neoliberal nationalism, and likewise the limitation to collaborate is a sentiment of economic nationalism. The model will thus evaluate the nuances of nationalism in a collaborative instance.

**2.4.1 Nationalism: Exposition in Nation Branding**

Nationalism has traditionally been equated with statist forms of governance (Harmes, 2012). Emergence of nationalism becomes salient during presence of national threat or protection. Processions of nationalism can manifest as mere individual citizen feelings (Gellner,
or in large-scale demonstrations of national pride (Zhao, 2005). Academic literature explores nationalism as a conduit for pride and power (Gellner, 2006), such that it encourages an in-group/out-group bias to protect and serve the citizens of the state (Kymlicka, 2001; Miller, 2000). Protecting the state comes in the nature of policy, as the primary role of government is to protect and serve citizenship. Nationalism can be framed to be contentious and divisive issue in political identities. Nationalism has been framed to be a violent expression of self-determination that may be framed as a last refrain before self-extermination (Ringrose & Lerner, 1993). This discussion of nationalism is born out of a discussion of dignity in national identity. This emerges strongly via economic means, whereby a need to increase wealth is an end to define national identity. Economic activity does not serve citizen-based human needs, but rather one of the economic state. The state’s desires to monopolise, create, and communicate national identity sets the position of the nation vis-à-vis to other nations (Seymour, 2004).

Nationalistic-driven policy often expresses the need for social and cultural protection. Much of this protection is valued by economically sovereign states (Gilpin & Gilpin, 1987). In other words, economically sovereign states that can provide for its citizens can economically function and are sustainable (Kotler, Haider, & Rein, 1993). Self-sustenance acts symbolically to

13 This paper will regard nationalism as one towards the geopolitical state, rather than the nationalism towards cultural or ethnic nations; this paper will explore nations such as Canada, rather than a nation as Quebec. Canada is a geopolitical territory recognised as a country, whereas Quebec is a cultural and ethnic nation (Seymour, 2000).
promote national identity, inciting pride among citizens, manifesting as self-derived nationalism (Shulman, 2000) or patriotism (Rothi, Lyons, & Chryssochoou, 2005).

Nations are composite entities of the citizens that comprise the nation-state and the overarching narratives that govern policy and procedure therein (Greenfeld, 2004), yielding multiple forms of nationalism within these two concepts. This paper explores the two nationalisms that affect the state of the nation as a whole\textsuperscript{14}:

- Neoliberal Nationalism – driving the state to brand the nation, and to take measures outside of the state to encourage future state success
- Economic Nationalism – limiting the state from furthering neoliberalism

Appendix B explores an extended analysis of neoliberal and economic nationalism.

2.4.2 Neoliberal Nationalism

Neoliberal nationalism and its counterparts have main components suitable to nation branding and collaborative branding overall. Neoliberal nationalism suggests prioritising

\textsuperscript{14} Civic nationalism does not contend as notable in this paper as it is a reflection of the members of the nation-state. Civic nationalism arises from citizens and constitutes an ethnocultural stance among citizens (Ipperciel, 2007; Smith, 2005). Despite the imperative role of citizens in the nation branding context (Harrison-Walker, 2011; Varga, 2013), citizenship monologues will not be explored because nation branding decisions are ultimately made by place branding organisations’ employees rather than those of citizens. Citizens are involved as key stakeholders in the goal orientation process of place branding (Skinner, 2005; Spencer, 2010), but have little influence beyond that unless it is as reactionary consequence to the finished brand.
freedom over efficiency, such that states embark on market-preserving federalism to ensure international capital mobility. Favouring economic globalisation over political globalisation\textsuperscript{15}, neoliberal sentiments encourage cross-border collaborative action in order to liberalise and stabilise international financing. Moreover, neoliberal nationalism as commercial nationalism creates options which otherwise would be antithetical if derived in political inquiry. Cross-border collaborations have exit options, and competing for investments can discipline nationalised organisations toward reduction of options for pursuing market-impeding forms of intervention (Harmes, 2012). Disciplining organisations in this regard can allude to stronger means to develop the state itself, especially the state as brand.

Nation branding is a neoliberal nationalistic-driven policy (Dzenovska, 2005). This link between modernity and the provision of nation branding via policy has been strongly argued as a mechanism of nationalism (Ashworth, 2009; Dinnie, 2004; Go & Govers, 2011; Gould & Skinner, 2007; Papadopoulos, 2004; Skinner & Kubacki, 2007; van Ham, 2001). Nationalism as a means for independence encourages cultural imperialism among decision makers, and thus discourages economic inequality throughout groups of nations (Milanovic, 1998; Solt, 2011). In particular, developing nations - that actively conduct place marketing - are susceptible to dire strategic outcomes should promulgation of cultural imperialism of the nation elect collaboration with other active place brands as a strategic option (Gertner, 2007; Szondi, 2007).

\textsuperscript{15} Economic globalisation is based on international cooperation to promote cross border initiatives without harmonisation of taxes and regulations. (Levy & Prakash, 2003)
It is imperative to study commercial nationalism here in a marketing context. Politics and communications literatures explore neoliberal nationalism (Brown, 2003; Giroux, 2004; Kawai, 2009; Watanabe, 2007), however does not address it in a marketing framework. Studying neoliberal nationalism in a branding context can explore the manifestation of neoliberal sentiments in brand process decisions. As brand process research encourages exploring the strategic process of political will (Bryson, 2011), neoliberal nationalism serves as a strong concept to explore for collaborative nation branding. Exploring neoliberal nationalism as political will in a marketing context can evaluate states to foster modern nation branding processes, such as collaborative action for a supranational regional brand.

This posits the first research question to this study: To what extent does neoliberal nationalism as political will affect the triadic relationship between Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania’s FDI collaborative branding initiatives?

However, nationalism can have inhibiting factors. This paper explores the role of economic nationalism as another endogenous variable to collaborative nation branding.

2.4.3 Economic Nationalism

Economic nationalism may extinguish collaborative efforts. If heavily salient, economic nationalism may lead nations to perturb their nation branding efforts. Autarky epitomises the expression of economic nationalism, an act counterintuitive to nation branding overall (Nwankwo, 2000). The pursuit of economic autonomy is counterproductive to nationalist sentiments if it costs a great deal of economic wealth (Shulman, 2000). Given collaborative nation branding increases inward investment and creates indirect ties with other states (Kotler,
Haider, & Rein, 1993), autarkic motivations turn nation-branding encouragement reticent. Moreover, states electing to introduce nation branding as an option to increase inward investments address the growing trend to globalise and liberalise markets: a concept that theoretically undermines economic nationalism (Helleiner, 2002).

This paper posits economic nationalism as an inhibiting factor to collaborative branding. Nationalism as political will has the determination to create unique circumstances for nation brands to elect against collaboration. This is the case if economic nationalism has stronger salience than neoliberal nationalism in the branding process. Consequently, this paper also aims to explore the role of economic nationalism on nations that opt to brand themselves collaboratively. Because political will can discourage the sentiments to collaborate (Endzina & Luneva, 2004), the concept of economic nationalism has important implications for furthering nation brand process research. In doing so, the initiatives to increase inward investment can be marred by anti-globalisation sentiments (van Ham, 2008). Likewise, opportunities to collaborate can be viewed with hostility if economic nationalism reigns strong within participating nations in a collaborative action. The exploration of this sentiment can provide insight on the limitations of applying neoliberal marketing practices on nations. This presents the opportunity to discuss the extent to which branding nations align with the branding organisations they are traditionally compared to, such as corporations (Ashworth & Kavaratzis, 2010; Fan, 2010; Hankinson, 2004; Iversen & Hem, 2008; Warnaby, 2009).

This posits the second research question to this study: **To what extent does economic nationalism as political will affect the triadic relationship between Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania’s FDI collaborative branding initiatives?**
2.4.4 Oppositional Forces of Neoliberal and Economic Nationalisms

The relationship between neoliberal nationalism and economic nationalism provides the antonymic discourse states face in their livelihood. Increased interdependence between nations to operate would only be ersatz in nature: a symbolic unity (Clift & Woll, 2012; Shulman, 2000). In doing so, the promotion of interdependent brand demonstrates collaboration between nations. The fear in this, however, could lead to the ideology that members of the collaboration are shared members of a single state, rather than distinct individual nations. When nationalism and statism are equal, economic nationalism is stronger. Nations are hostile and resistant to any form of collaboration such that it may violate any sense of unity through a single unassisted economic space (Clift & Woll, 2012). The limitation is supported by both the organisation that brands and the affected interlocutors of the nation brand (Aronczyk, 2013). Conversely, when nationalism is equated with globalisation, neoliberal nationalism reigns strong (Varga, 2013); nations are more willing to overcome the past in order to enjoy the benefits of working collaboratively, and in doing so achieve future success of each individual state. This is supported by neoliberalist consequentialism.

Despite these two nationalism concepts acting as antonymic, this paper posits that economic nationalism and neoliberal nationalism comprise of the political will that is present in nation brand collaboration. Economic and neoliberal nationalism are at odds with each other and differ in intensity by context. The roles of the participating countries contribute to this context. Items that also contribute include the homogeneity between the countries, the form of organisations that would collaborate, relationships organisations have with state bodies, and the
nature of historical and cultural relevancy. Likewise, this reflects the crossroads where nationalism and modernity meet.

To explore this as a third research question: **How can nationalism as political will be accounted for in the process of cross-border collaborative place branding in a transition nation context?**

This paper will provide the platform to explore how both forms of nationalism can be accounted for against each other in collaborative action of nation brands. Due to the nature of contexts and the histories unique countries possess, this paper will explore merely a single snapshot of collaboration between nation brands. Identifying the research gaps of this paper outline the reason to pose the three research questions in this section, and can provide the study plan for the rest of this thesis.

### 2.5 Identification of Research Gaps

This chapter began by defining collaboration, nation brands, and supranational regional collaboration. The literature review examines collaboration – a strategic marketing tool implemented by product and corporate brands alike to gain greater awareness by sharing capital and effort costs. Collaboration is a viable option for nations, especially those that wish to brand their nation and stay competitive in the marketplace for economic gain, with the exogenous variables of globalisation, global competition, and modernisation affecting its current branding effort. Collaboration for nation brands can come in the form of a collaborative branding effort, or a supranational region brand, if the nations share geographic proximity. Strategic collaborative place branding is viable in practice. However, collaboration literature identifies political will as a
motivation that inhibits or encourages collective action. Though infrequently addressed in the literature, political will in a collaborative action creates another call for attention.

Nations as brands are then explored in the literature review. As globalisation and modernisation affect economic systems for FDI and tourism, nations may feel compelled to adopt marketing behaviours to stay competitive for economic gain. This commercialisation of nation-state frames nation branding as an adoption of neoliberal tools to promote national identities. Academic calls for action in the nation branding literature invite research to expand the breadth of theory in the field while recognising the complex nature of the nation product.

Identifying these two streams of literature (nation branding and collaboration) addresses these two gaps. Nation brands that work together in order to manage exogenous factors of the nation branding system can partake in a supranational region brand. The process in working with each other, or the decision to initially, may be marred with political will. This is exacerbated in the nation product context as this political will may inherently be framed as nationalism. This paper argues that nationalism in collaborative nation branding can be exhibited in one of two ways: economic nationalism or neoliberal nationalism. This paper posits nationalism of these two sorts to be demonstrated as part of political will.

2.5.1 Context: Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania

In order to explore the conceptual model in Figure 1, criteria are put in place to identify site selection for this study. The criteria to test this conceptual model should include the following:

1. Nations must have active place branding initiatives
2. Selected nations must have geographic proximity.

3. Selected nations must have exhibited forms of neoliberal and economic nationalism in their history

Despite the number of country clusters that can suffice these criteria\(^\text{16}\), the Baltic nations have been chosen to evaluate this conceptual model. Appendix C details this decision against the above criteria. Modernity, as is nationalism, is not a uniform phenomenon (Seymour, 2004). Therefore, it needs to be explored in a uniform context where modernity affects the participating states relatively equally.

Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania all have the criteria to participate in a multinational collaborative effort to increase visibility of their brands. All three nations are actively nation branding for FDI (Bevan & Estrin, 2004; van Ham, 2001). The Baltic nations’ plight with post-Soviet nationalism has rendered each country facing place-branding processes riddled with nationalistic discourse in their ongoing transition to modern sovereign economies (Brubaker, 2011; Jansen, 2008; Young, 2005).

Foreign direct investment as a function of transnational capitalism reorganises the system of production as well as the spheres of politics, social relations, knowledge, and cultural practice (Sussman, 2011). Transition nations, particularly those experiencing post-Soviet realities,

\(^{16}\) Country clusters that suffice these criteria include, but are not limited to: the Caucasus (Azerbaijan, Armenia, Georgia), the Caribbean, Oceania (excluding Australia & New Zealand), Central America, and the islands of the Indian Ocean (Madagascar, Maldives, Seychelles, Comoros, & Mauritius).
undergo intersectional identity politics, exacerbated by identity building and image construction within a dynamic marketplace (Kaneva, 2012). This development of transition nationhood is exacerbated by Eastern European market orientation (Akimova, 2000): a region subject to complex externalities to the nation branding process (Szondi, 2007). These externalities include the global economic crisis that affected infrastructure development (Pepinsky, 2012), and, lately, a looming threat of regional sarsens of economic power – as in the case of Russia and Ukraine over the Crimea region (Mankoff, 2014). These circumstances advocate a call for research; one that attends a marketing-based exploration of geopolitical instance, adopting a marketing paradigm to reconnoitre foreign direct investment, and considering the neoliberal view of the transitioning nation as an emerging nation brand.

The relationship explored of nationalism in post-Soviet states as in the Baltic nations can be transferable to Central Asian and the Caucasian contexts, currently exhibiting plights of nationalism as limitation in the multinational branding process (Anceschi, 2010; Malek, 2008; Marat, 2009; Pant, 2005; Sushko, 2004; Wills & Moore, 2008).
CHAPTER 3 : METHODOLOGY

3.1 Research Questions and Objectives

The general objectives of this research are the following:

- Evaluate the current position of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania as investment nation brands
- Evaluate the opportunity for Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania to develop a collaborative place brand

The research questions of this study are the following:

- To what extent does neoliberal nationalism as political will affect the triadic relationship between Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania’s FDI branding initiatives?
- To what extent does economic nationalism as political will affect the triadic relationship between Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania’s FDI branding initiatives?
- How can nationalism as political will be accounted for in the process of cross-border collaborative place branding in a transition nation context?

The objectives of the research will be addressed in the Findings section of this paper. The research questions will be addressed in the Discussions section of this paper.

3.2 Research Method

3.2.1 Research Philosophy

Constructivist thought in research ascribes individuals construct their own realities, supporting the notion that humans – in their many roles and identities – construct the realities in which they participate (Charmaz, 2006). Kaneva (2011) highlights the use of constructivist thought in place branding to counter the issues of essentialist thought currently used by marketing researchers in the domain. The ontological assumption of constructivism in marketing
says that imposed laws of research do not gather social realities but rather that societies and institutions evolve in accordance with the interactions of patterns of its members (Berthon, Nairn, & Money, 2003). In the context of place branding, constructivism approaches the discipline as a series of decisions made in the branding process, as opposed to being reactive to the brand product itself. The decisions of the branding process garner importance in this study, as this thesis explores political will: a motivation within collaborative action that can be strongly explored within process research and the construction of realities within that motivation. This context of Baltic investment promotion also highlights the imperative of transition economies and constructivism. Transition economies that brand their state inherently adopt national identity commodification (Dzenovska, 2005; Jansen, 2008; Konecnik Ruzzier & de Chernatony, 2012). In doing so, such nations consciously construct their realities such that this commodification has become imperative to perception management and to nationalist futures in geographic spatial discourse. Constructivist thought promises to transform national governance and understands the limitations of national identity (Kaneva, 2011).

Constructivist methodology assures the co-creation of realities between the researcher and the participants alike. Truth is relative and dependent on one’s perspective in this paradigm (Crabtree & Miller, 1999), and therefore the collaboration between researcher and participant enables participants communicate personal truths in a more open fashion, providing the researcher more reliability in data collected. The author will co-construct the researched reality throughout the analytical phase of the project. Some research approaches face contention as a quality form of research design due to a poorly defined data analysis process (Yin, 2003). This
project will circumvent that by using constructivist analysis processes, such that the research will exhibit reflective and transparent processes (Mills, Bonner, & Francis, 2006).

3.2.2 Data Collection Method

This study uses a primary data collection method, in the form of semi-structured interviews. This method is consistent with recognised research practice in exploratory nation branding investigations (Aronczyk, 2013; Endzina & Luneva, 2004; Zerillo & Thomas, 2007) and collaborative branding investigations (Naipaul, Wang, & Okumus, 2009; Szondi, 2007; von Friedrichs Grängsjö, 2003; Wang, Hutchinson, Okumus, & Naipaul, 2012). Interviews were conducted with key stakeholders at investment promotion agencies and adjacent organisations. The interview guide can be found in Appendix D.

The semi-structured interview methodology used for data collection allowed the researcher to explore deeply engrained social and economic matters, and in doing so increase the reliability of the gathered data. In-depth interviews in a constructivist paradigm ensure the co-construction of the branding process realities between interviewer and interviewee. The interview process enjoys the freedom of interviewee to speak freely about their perceived importance on thoughts, experiences, and opinions about the phenomenon explored (Bouma, Ling, & Wilkinson, 2004). This research explores the experiences of investment promotion among the branding decision makers in such IPAs, as well as those who facilitate investment within the region. The histories and lived experiences of the interviewees as employees can thus arise and the interviewer can investigate this in a safe environment. The iterative nature of the interview method may result in the interview question adjustment throughout the data collection
process (DiCicco-Bloom & Crabtree, 2006). The investigator can then effectively elicit necessary information by following the interviewee’s interest and knowledge (Johnson, 2002). The semi-structure format in this thesis is most fitting; the planned itinerary of the standardised interview method does not allow for digressions and thus may not be productive if greater truths can be revealed from the interviewee in a different format than previously conceptualised.

The general interview typology exercised was specific and narrow, in order to explore personal experiences, perceptions, and knowledge. The specificity of the interview allows for a greater understanding of the IPA phenomena, rather than evaluating the taxonomies of their branding processes (Guest, Namey, & Mitchell, 2013).

**FIGURE 2: THE MICRO-NET MACRO-NET PERSPECTIVE AS UNIT OF ANALYSIS**

The units of analysis here are a group of organisations, or an agglomeration of actors (Yurdusev, 1993). The relationship between Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania’s respective IPAs as a triadic net of three organisations is the unit of analysis explored in this study. These organisations were the investment promotion agencies of each nation. The decision to use
traditional marketing units of analyses can limit the study and prove to be abject. The research questions posed in this thesis explore beyond the individual, place, and organisation environments traditionally seen in place marketing studies (Ashworth & Kavaratzis, 2010; Kavaratzis & Ashworth, 2005). Rather, this paper uses a micro-net/macro-net orientation of the unit of analysis. Explored in business network research (Halinen & Törnroos, 1998), the micro-net/macro-net perspective here is most fitting to address the selected unit of analysis. A micro-net explores the numerous focal actors in this study. It is a distinct business activity involving several identifiable business actors. The macro-net in this study recognises the broader network of business and non-business actors that affect and are affected by the micro-net17 and its related activities (Holma, 2013). The micro-net/macro-net diagram in Figure 2 outlines the network embeddedness that this paper will address in the data collection, and selection of key informants.

### 3.2.3 Selection of Key Informants

Those in the micro-net and those in the macro-net will define key informants. The sample included six micro-net and eight macro-net informants. Despite the identification of many more organisations comprised in the macro-net, pragmatism dictated the final selection of informants. The micro-net informants were those who actively branded their respective nations for FDI. In

17 The result of the constructivist perspective is that it represents a dialectical response to the research question. The context of Baltic nationalism is dynamic; the phenomenon is subject to influences within each investment promotion agency, between investment promotion agencies, the environments they are branding, and the greater global biome in which the environment operates. The methodology can explore the dialogue between the parts of this system – or micro-net – in a traditional academic fashion.
In this regard, the micro-net informants included brand decision makers at Enterprise Estonia, LIAA, and Invest in Lithuania. The macro-net informants were those who work in adjacent industries and organisations directly affected by branding decisions made by the micro-net. Macro-net informants included interlocutors working directly within one of the branding organisations in the Baltic nations, and those working along the branding organisations with the nature of their work. These selected informants included legal consultants and board members of international chambers of commerce. The identified informant organisations are defined in the FDI literature (Wells & Wint, 1990; Wint & Williams, 2002), such that access for potential FDI investment into the Baltic nations depends on the legal, economic, political, and educational environments.

3.2.4 Recruitment, Interview Process, and Confidentiality

Prior to conducting the interviews, a number of books and journal articles were used to design, validate, and explore the interview process (Berg, 2009; Bouma, Ling, & Wilkinson, 2004; Crabtree & Miller, 1999; Cresswell, Hanson, Plano, & Morales, 2007; Johnson, 2002; Roberts, 1997; Wengraf, 2001).

Moreover, investment brands may not be visible to residents or local business owners, but the inherent notion of working with other countries can stimulate negative nationalist-oriented sentiments among citizens, and local business owners may see increased FDI as threat to indigenous business economies. These macro-net organisations are identified but will not be explicitly investigated due to research pragmatism and time constraints.
The data collection was carried out between May 1st and August 15th in 2014. Emails were sent to potential participants. These potential participants were identified differently at the micro-net level and macro-net level of participant. In the case of the micro-net participants, the websites of investment promotion agencies identified names of individuals in senior investment promotion positions, or contact names. If these names were not explicitly mentioned, a search on LinkedIn for each IPA was conducted (looking at employees of Enterprise Estonia, LIAA, and Invest Lithuania). Once the names were found, a contact list was made and email addresses were compiled from these LinkedIn sites. No participants were contacted via LinkedIn. Twenty-four contacts were compiled for the micro-net respondents across all three nations. This is seen in Appendix E.1. In the case of macro-net participants, companies and organisations were identified through reading investment periodicals in the Baltic region. This included Aripaev.ee, Baltic Business News, Baltic-course.com, Euractiv.com, Transitions Online (tol.org), and The Baltic Times. Contact names of articles written specifically concerning the investment promotion agencies were identified. In addition, 23 international chambers of commerce were identified as potential interviewees. These chambers of commerce were specifically chosen if their mission statement mentioned developing and facilitating investments into the Baltic region (i.e. Swedish-Lithuanian Chamber of Commerce). Forty-five respondents in the macro-net were contacted.

All contact with participants leading up to the potential interview was done via email. Obtaining access to participants was straightforward, especially as trust was maintained before, during, and after the interview (Wengraf, 2001). Reiterating confidentiality and anonymity during data collection instilled participants with confidence throughout the process. All voice-recorded material was offered to interviewees, as well as a copy of the results once data was
collected. Interviews were conducted using Skype Technologies Inc.’s Skype application, and PamConsult GmbH’s Pamela software audio recorded these interviews.

In total, 15 interviews were conducted but only 14 were transcribed and analysed. One interview was not included in the analysis. This is because the participant did not feel comfortable having their responses in the data set, and thus it was left out for the purpose and respect of this research. Appendix E.1 and 6.2 show the data collection contact and response rates for all micro-net and macro-net respondents across the three countries, as well as participants contacted who operated across all three Baltic nations. The 15 interviews created 11 hours, 16 minutes, and 55 seconds of audio-recorded data.

Confidentiality was ensured throughout the entire process. Emails to contact selected participants ensured that all data was to be kept confidential and anonymous. Participants were notified by emails that data will not be anonymous, but all identities will be kept confidential and data will be anonymous. Participants were also informed that they could opt out of the study at any time. The constructivist paradigm ensures the individuals approached had the right to give free and informed consent, and were aware of the organisational authorities outlined in a consent form they were to sign. Employees and volunteers from private organisations also had the right as institutions to refuse co-operation with researchers, which did arise from some select participation. This further ensured the researcher paid special attention to confidentiality in this project. All data was kept on a password-protected computer that remained in a locked office. No data collected can be linked to the names on consent forms. All data will be kept for a period of up to five years after the completion of research (August 15th 2014), after which electronic data will be deleted. This electronic data includes the audit trail of the research, transcripts of the
research, and audio recordings of respondents in the Skype interviews. All recordings and transcripts were collected for this study alone and only pertained to addressing this set of research questions.

3.3 Data Analysis

3.3.1 Transcription and Coding Protocols

The transcription protocol followed standardised transcription methods outlined by Guest, Namey, and Mitchell (2013). All interviews were assigned IDs, and coded against demographic data. The 14 interviews amounted to 154 pages, and 71,765 words of transcribed data. Audio recordings were transcribed verbatim in order to preserve the narrative flow of the respondent. Non-verbal sounds were typed within asterisks. Transcripts were not edited to remove foul language or slang. Indecipherable comments made by the interviewee were noted and were addressed by the transcriber as best as possible. Some words were deemed by the transcriber as unintelligible or inaudible and were noted accordingly, however the majority of transcribed material (>99%) was intelligible. A majority of the transcribed material was in English (>99%), with non-English terms as being either proper names, places, people, or colloquial phrases. All non-English terms were transcribed with due diligence, and filler words were transcribed whenever said by the participant.

A qualitative data analysis program called NVivo facilitated the coding and analysis protocol. Firstly, the coding protocol involved reading each transcribed paper thoroughly and recording notes on the main themes in each interview. Secondly, all of the questions were coded across all interviews, to ensure the same themes of questions were posed, in order to avoid the
risk of inconsistent questions in the semi-structured interview process. These questions can be found in Appendix D. Thirdly, an open coding process was implemented. The unrestricted fashion of the open coding process allows for word-by-word, line-by-line, and paragraph-by-paragraph coding (Berg, 2009), all of which was done for this research. Overall, there were 343 open codes. The entire coding process occurred a second time in order to examine the data again and thoroughly. In this second data coding process, 283 open codes were identified, categorised into 54 subthemes via an expedient coding method (Saldaña, 2009), and organised into four main categories of data. This method of coding allowed the constructivist analysis to be implemented.

3.3.2 Analysis Procedures and Dependability

Thematic analysis, as latent content analysis in qualitative research, involves prolonged contact with the collected data to look for rounded, holistic explanations. The decision to use inductive thematic analysis (Braun & Clarke, 2006) involves a classification and organisation of data in an informed approach, congruent with social science (Roberts, 1997) and ontological research (Jones, Coviello, & Tang, 2011). This paper uses inductive thematic analysis because the researcher can identify themes emerging from the collected data and can supported claims directly from the data itself (Braun & Clarke, 2006). The data collected was used solely for this research. Analysis ensured that both interviewer and interviewee co-construct the data in the research process. The researcher undertook latent thematic analyses to ensure a clear and responsible representation of the collected data and the interviewee. There is no intent to make methodological contributions to the field of marketing.
Investigator triangulation occurs in order to uphold and ensure appropriate rigor of analysis in a member-checking process (Byrne, 2001). The research advisor thus was asked to act as auditor: remarking, disagreeing, or adding information throughout the analytical and interpretive process (Decrop, 1999). Advisor as trained, academic, qualitative researcher ensured the auditing process provides the basis for logical and sound interpretations of data, which the principal investigator developed throughout the process. The researcher also advised his advisor to review investigator findings to ensure interpretations from transcripts are plausible and legitimate.

3.3.3 Reflexivity

Reflexivity here ensures the interviewer is aware of his biases throughout the interview and coding processes.

Firstly, the lack of interviewer presence can greatly affect the quality of responses from interviewees (Guest, Namey, & Mitchell, 2013; Horsburgh, 2003). The phone interview method was adopted instead of an in-person, face-to-face interview due to time, geographical, and budget constraints. The interviewer took some time to identify an appropriate interview style and thus the quality of responses was not as strong for the first few interviews. The telephone medium also made it difficult at times to understand when respondents were finding it difficult to respond to a question. This may have been due to the lack of non-verbal cues that may inform the interviewer of the interviewee’s struggle to respond (Wengraf, 2001). Over time, the interviewer learned how to navigate this through unobtrusive questioning techniques. Reflexivity here was
exercised through evaluating each interview after completion, in order to develop better interviewing tactics for the subsequent interviews.

Secondly, interviewees were given a sample list of questions before the interviews were conducted. Interviewees had some responses to questions prepared, and tended to respond strictly to the questions that were prepared, despite the interviewer probing with follow-up questions. Reflexivity here was exercised through creating open, conversational spaces for the interviewees to discuss non-interview questions. Being aware of the openness of the interviewee made it easier for the interviewer to ask or refrain from asking the interview questions, ensuring the respondent would reduce hesitation and increase trusting rapport with the interviewer (Wengraf, 2001).

Thirdly, the power dynamic between interviewer and interviewee should be noted. Interviewees are not ‘just there’ waiting to be described (Ribbens & Edwards, 1997). The roles of the selected interviewees are of power in their own domain, from decision-makers to political and organisational influencers. Thus the reflexivity on the investigator’s part is imperative in order to maintain moderate control of the in-depth interview process (DiCicco-Bloom & Crabtree, 2006), avoid conducting an oppressive research process (Ribbens & Edwards, 1997), and continue to ensure a safe environment for co-creation of the information throughout the data collection and analysis process.

Fourthly, it should be noted that the main portion of reflexivity in this study is focused on the etic nature of the study, such that the ‘operation in understandings and latent meanings of the research is uncovered from an outsider’s view’ (Berg, 2009). The outsider view in this context was adopted from the researcher not being involved in the investor promotion industry or having
prior knowledge of it before partaking in the study. The researcher acquainted himself with secondary data from Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania about the state of FDI advertisements and materials for thirty hours. The researcher became aware of the overstatement of some factors relating to foreign investment in order to make economic factors to seem more positive (Czinkota & Ronkainen, 1994). This was mitigated through discussions with the research advisor about his experiences with interviewing from a non-professional perspective. Another form of reflexivity was taken with setting up interviews with economic development agencies in Canada to learn about the overstatement of economic data for investment promotion purposes.

Finally, the researcher was not acquainted with the Baltic region aside from a trip to the area prior to the start of this study. The area was not visited by the researcher during this time. The researcher identified as Canadian, and with non-Baltic heritage. As an interpreter, the researcher was aware of the impact of trust amongst the Baltic participants. The interviewer mitigated this bias by reading vast literature about Baltic culture and history, in order to gain cultural competence. Cultural competence was also developed through conversations with Baltic students, living in Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania, who study business at universities in the region. The researcher consequently gained a better understanding of language, humor, and disposition about the state of their nation. This cultural competence created stronger trust between the interviewer and interviewee (Malhotra, Agarwal, & Peterson, 1996). Despite a majority of the interviewees identifying that they were born and raised in a Baltic nation or lineage, some interviewees identified coming from Western nations. These interviews required less reflexivity from the researcher.
CHAPTER 4 : FINDINGS

The objective of this chapter is to analyse the key findings from the primary research. First, the general position of each Baltic nation will be evaluated as investment nation brands in order to understand how each nation brand currently operates (the first research objective). Second, the idea of collaboration posited to respondents will be explored and identified. Third, regional influences in the investment nation brand process via the collaboration inquiry (the second research objective). These reflect the two objectives posited in the methodology section (see section 3.1), and will be reviewed in turn. To ensure confidentiality among respondents (see section 3.3), interview excerpts will only identify the country the respondent represents and/or their position as a micro-net or macro-net representative. More information about the coding structure of the interviewees is in Appendix E.

4.1 Current Position of Each Baltic Nation as a General Investment Brand

Evaluating the current position of each Baltic nation as a general investment brand is the first research objective of this study. Addressing this research objective requires evaluating the interview data in two ways. One evaluation is through the awareness of the nations from interlocutors, and the other evaluation is through the branding decisions and operations of the investment promotion agencies. These are evaluated through the commentary provided by the decision makers at the investment promotion agencies throughout the interviews. The intent of these evaluations is to note how the investment promotion agencies (IPAs) in Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania identify their motivations to brand. The objective of these evaluations is to identify whether goals, and the decisions thereof, addressed by the IPAs can be interpreted to represent
economic protection or modernisation for the nation – echoing economic nationalism and neoliberal nationalism respectively (see Appendix B).

4.1.1 Awareness of the Baltic Nations

Evaluating how the nations are perceived by potential and actual investors addresses the evaluation of the current position of each Baltic nation as a general investment nation brand. This was done in the interview by positing the question: “how do potential investors perceive your nation?” Ten micro-net and macro-net interviewees responded to this question with unprompted comments about their nations. Table F1 features a collection of responses from the interviewed individuals. Information of the interviewed individuals is in Appendix E.

**TABLE F1: HOW DO YOU BELIEVE POTENTIAL INVESTORS FOR FDI PERCEIVE YOUR NATION?**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Estonian Respondents</th>
<th>Latvian Respondents</th>
<th>Lithuanian Respondents</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• EST 1: “We have even cases where people in Sweden don’t even know where is, and that Estonia is an independent country and is not part of the Soviet Union, for example. So yeah, in that sense, it is still, you know, we need to promote ourselves more.”</td>
<td>• CC 1: “Nobody knows that Latvia exists in Canada. Let’s start with that <em>laughs</em> …The first thing (investors say) is 'Latvia, what?' you know, I grew up with having to explain all the time: 'No it’s not the Balkans, it’s the Baltic nations.' And, 'No it’s not Lapland'”.</td>
<td>• CC 3: “In a jokingly way, I would say 'Lithuan... what? Lithuan...where?' Where I think a number of companies, the SMEs... there’s really a small portion that would even consider Lithuania because they don’t even know if Lithuania is on the map. It applies to Latvia &amp; Estonia as well.”</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| • CC 2: “Swedes they know very little about the Baltic nations. They think Tallinn is situated in Riga *laughs*.” | • CC 7: “Unknown territory! It seems to be an unknown territory. …Western Europe in general | • LITH 2: “…the expectations are very low. We see that abroad Lithuania
Respondents from each nation identify that their nation is relatively unknown in the foreign investment market. The comments are similar across respondents in Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania. This relative unfamiliarity is supported with comments such as “Nobody knows that Latvia exists” and “Lithuan…what? Lithuan…where?” This is further identified when an Estonian respondent (EST 1) claimed that interlocutors were confused about what Estonia is in respect to other nations, citing ‘They think Tallinn is situated in Riga”. The common thread of unfamiliarity led the discussion among IPA participants, in particular, about the factors that affect their current perception in the investment market. These factors can be understood by taking a closer look at interview data from the three nations independently. The data will reveal further knowledge on the particular perceptions of branding and marketing, and its impact on the branding decisions made by the IPAs.

4.1.2 Current Position of Estonia

In total, five interviewees of the study identified as working in Estonia. Of these interviewees, two micro-net respondents were employees from the investment promotion agency called Enterprise Estonia, and three macro-net respondents were employees at chambers of commerce in the nation. More descriptive information on these participants is featured in Appendix E.
Overall, the five respondents spoke positively about the state of the Estonian nation. From the investment promotion agency, the term ‘branding’ was met as beneficial. An Enterprise Estonian respondent succinctly put it:

EST 1: “(Branding) directly supports the growth of the economy, and the well-being of Estonian people.”

Two employees from Enterprise Estonia were asked about the current strategies of the organisation for investment promotion. One interviewee (EST 1) addressed a need for “smart” investments, targeting the information and communication technology (ICT) sector. The participant continued to discuss Estonia’s electronic environment, one established by the Estonian federal government in 2000 (The Economist, 2013). Another interviewee (EST 2) addressed the aim to increase the IT sector as well, but also addressed working with other nations in order to learn from each other. The goal of the organisation’s investment promotion is to tell greater audiences “who we are and why companies are here,” in an attempt to increase awareness of the Estonian brand.

EST 1: “We have, how to say that, we are looking for smart investments. So it means we are no longer targeting, like, the low end manufacturing work. We want more R&D investments definitely, and also everything that is connected with ICT world, in the way that as Estonia is known for its eServices. ...Everything is, like, and also smart and manufacturing, smarter processes in every field. I can’t say that, yes. Because we are more targeting companies and processes rather than industries. And also nowadays the big thing that differentiates us from others in the region is in the world is our E-environment. So, all the communications with the government is via eChannels and administration part is very easy and efficient. And it’s a reality, it’s not just some promotion, it’s a reality that even private persons live in. ...Project-wise, the only goal is to attract new companies to support the Estonian brand. So maybe if we get big names, we’ll have a better chance to tell the bigger audience who we are and why does companies are here.”

EST 2: “The next 10 years, the aim is to increase the IT sector, not like the IT but IT between horizontally between the other sectors, how IT could help production or education or farming. It’s the main idea today, and of
course, the start up technology sites they call Estonia but of course, the idea is not only Estonia and not only Finland and not only Stockholm or St Petersburg in the region. It is, we are all small but quite for the VCs as well, the start-up entirely is very strong today so it’s the... and we learn from Finns. Finns learn from us. So that’s the main idea, and that’s why it’s one of the slogan is we’re talking about it’s not Tallinn, it’s not Helsinki, it’s Tal-sinki!

Beyond the IPA perspective, the macro-net respondents in Estonia were asked about their perceptions of the growth of the Estonian economy. Referring to the development of the nation in the 1990s and 2000s, one member from a Chamber of Commerce in Estonia encapsulated its nature in the following excerpt:

CC 4: "When you consider where they’ve come from and what they’ve achieved. It’s absolutely astonishing. I mean without a word of a lie, I mean, to go from Soviet background to actually really beginning to look and be pretty Scandinavian is pretty impressive. I mean they were the first of the Balts to get the Euro, but actually if there hadn’t been some changes along the way, they certainly could have gotten into the EU before the other two. So, I think when (an Estonian economist) he can talk, he does still go on how the only economics book he ever read because he was a historian was 'Free to Choose', and he said that sounded pretty mainstream. He had no idea how radical he was being by radical uberlibertarian way of doing things. I think it’s what he said, it’s worked.”

This respondent salutes the "astonishing" achievement of the Estonian nation, going from a Soviet background to "actually really beginning to look and be pretty Scandinavian.” CC 4 continues to identify the many firsts of the Estonian nation, including getting the Euro and joining the European Union. The respondent continues to identify the "impressive" development of the nation by identifying positive brand attributes of the Estonian nation product, including its clean air and well-educated populace. The respondent attributed this to the nation’s "powerful" composure it carried throughout its development.

CC 4: “You know, there are several things that are quite powerful about the way that they run themselves. I mean, in 2012, I think the World Health Organisation said Estonia had the cleanest air on anyone on the
planet. Certainly, for a capital city; it’s mainly because Tallinn is pretty tidgy... You know, I think clean nature, well educated. Estonia, again, tends to score more highly on all of those. They have cleaner nature, they have better educated people, they have more advanced colleges. They basically are a global leader in technology.”

The respondent (CC 4) expressed that the environment in Estonia is transforming well for investment and business, in its "get-up and go environment.” CC 4 identified the growth of Estonia applies a "consistent" and "disciplined approach" in the nation’s economic development.

CC 4: “When you look at other countries in Central and Eastern Europe that have not been successful, or not as successful, it’s because they’ve not consistently applied reform until it is too late. And so the result is that they’ve kinda zig-zagged. The consistency in application of reform is what has made Estonia more successful than the others. They told a radical road and they stuck with it, irrespective which government happened to be in charge. So that’s consistency of economic approach has been quite strong. ...It’s a very get-up and go kind of environment ... To be honest, though, I think it’s part of the reason of the success of the country, because, if you got a very disciplined approach, you should stick to it. And they do, even though sometimes that could be quite painful.”

Two Estonian respondents voluntarily identified limitations to the current Estonian brand. Of those who responded, the macro-net Estonian respondents in particular identified these limitations, including immigration and failed costly promotion attempts in the past. One response (CC 6) claimed that the nation might not be exploiting all of its "potential" for investment.

CC 7: “I hope that Estonia will consider immigration *laughs* Because this is one of the problems. There are not too many people here, and no one is being born. People are very afraid of immigration. Last year Estonia accepted 700 refugees. I think that’s the limit of refugees. Because, well, I’m not saying Estonia should open its borders to let everyone just enter, but we need more of a balanced view on it, because... most businesses actually need people. But I think Estonia will be good as well.”

CC 6: “The biggest one that everyone knows is that promotions with Robbie Williams, and they spent loads of money on that. I’m still not sure whether that money was well spent. Maybe, you know, they could have done it differently. ...I think it wasn’t, you know, it wasn’t a bad idea, but the costing were a bit high. I think they should help companies go to market, and they should turn their attention more to that and see how we
develop these relations, how can we get these companies who want to do export how we can assist and to do that. With regards to market a company, or rather the country: I’m not sure that they are using all their potential in that.”

Comments thus far have inferred that Estonian interviewees perceive the nation is progressing economically. However, there has been little evidence of these macro-net respondents identifying the role of the investment promotion agency, Enterprise Estonia, in the discussion. In particular, one interviewee (CC 4) emphasised the lack of strategy the IPA has and, in doing so, classified the organisation as "thoroughly dysfunctional". Another interviewee (CC 6) identified that they may not be communicating well with one another as an organisation, and that co-ordination can help carry out governmental direction, citing "hopefully things will be more co-ordinated".

CC 4: “The reality is Enterprise Estonia is a thoroughly dysfunctional organisation. I would say that, it has not been helped by the pan-European entities. ...the economy ministry kinda tries to neglect the organisation but has kinda been compelled by the finance minister to take the money. It’s a complete fondugo. There’s no value... They resource and expand, and the job expands to fill the resources until completion. So, unfortunately, Enterprise Estonia is a classic example of a civil service, Parkinson’s Law in full flight. You see repeatedly decisions taken which are for internal reasons only. There is no real clear strategy. I find it personally very frustrating... they don’t have the strategic vision. So they constantly turning over at the top. I mean, the average boss of Enterprise Estonia lasts less than two years. So, strategic vision: there ain’t any. Consistent application of policy? No, because they come under repeated and conflicting gnashes from both ministries and now indeed two ministers inside the MKM can make life exciting because they from two different parties... (Enterprise Estonia) lack(s) strategic leadership. It lacks vision. It does not lack budget, but, you know, the reality is that the budget is inefficient and inefficiently delivered. So, it’s a political organisation charged to achieve an economic result, but with a conflicting mandate. On one hand, the reform really does not believe that any significant government money should be used, even in investment promotion, never mind trade promotion. They tend to get their way.”

CC 6: “I know with Enterprise Estonia, they have been criticised and have been in scandals as well. They’ve changed their managers very often and in a way, it’s a bit like political game there as well. But, I wouldn’t say
that all do is bad. I think they are trying to do good valid things as well. As I’ve mentioned, we’re doing the trade missions to the UK and this is the main project that we work closely with Enterprise Estonia because our interests lie in there. And, they’ve been along with us, country member, I’m not sure if the fact is right, but a few years before that, last year, they didn’t support us on this matter because they thought it’s, for whatever reasons, it’s not feasible for them. Again, this year, they think that they were wrong last year and they still want to be in the same... involved in this project. It’s difficult to say with EAS. Obviously, they’ve been through the mud in their newspapers with all different kinds of scandals and sometimes you’d think like 'oof!', but I’m not sure whether all of it is true. I know that they sometimes maybe they don’t have common aim, everything is like... everyone is trying to do their or go their own way. Maybe they don’t communicate with each other as they should do. They’ve got, as of a month or as of July, they’ve got a new manager now as well who has quite strongly said that he will take the programme that’s been given by the government and he will follow now that. Hopefully things will be more coordinated.”

These excerpts from respondents CC 4 & CC 6 highlight that Enterprise Estonia could be perceived as a detriment to the Estonian brand in general. Interestingly, the interviewee (CC 4) who identified Estonia as a nation that applied consistent reform to its development also identified that Enterprise Estonia as not applying consistent marketing efforts. He attributes this to "repeated and conflicting gnashes [clashes] from both ministries" involved in the governance of Enterprise Estonia. Isolating this inconsistency to the Enterprise Estonia institution provides a place for discussion for political will in nation branding in the Estonian context.

4.1.3 Current Position of Latvia

There were four Latvian respondents interviewed in this study. The Latvian micro-net respondents comprised of two governmental employees: one from the IPA (Latvijas Investīciju un attīstības aģentūra, LIAA for short) and one from the Latvian Institute, a government agency founded to create positive awareness of Latvia abroad across all of its nation-branding sectors (tourism, investment, & public diplomacy). An additional two macro-net respondents from
Latvian Chambers of Commerce were included into this analysis as well. These are outlined in Appendix E.

The branding decisions of LIAA arose strongly in interviewing its senior management. The interviews with employees at LIAA echoed many of the strategies of their investment promotion found on the LIAA website (Investment and Development Agency of Latvia, 2013). However, one employee (LAT 1) focussed the discussion on analysing sectors and geographic sources of investment.

LAT 1: “And... this is... a two tier strategy. The first is to concentrate our activities and resources on a limited number of these countries, so the five that I had mentioned. And also to look at specific sectors. And they - the specific sectors, there are three. ...And then for each sector, we identify high priority country, medium or simply priority country, and secondary country. Three levels under each sector. And then we’ve targeted, you know, for let’s say there’s this one sector: high priority countries, there will be a sector of... five or six high priority, roughly. Medium priority, it can be anything from four to up to eight... And secondary countries... to give you an idea of how we’re working for investment attraction. So yeah, we’re sticking to... we are following the guidelines that have been set out for our organisation and so we have a clear path to follow. I think it’s also makes sense to target specific countries and specific sectors.”

The LIAA employee underpinned the success to the organisation’s marketing activities, giving the example of an integrated stakeholder engagement process involving multiple organisations across public and private sectors for economic development and, consequently, investment promotion for the area. This is called the Polaris process (Investment and Development Agency of Latvia & Bloom Consulting, 2013). The LIAA respondent regarded this stakeholder engagement strategy as imperative to the branding of the nation overall.

LAT 1: “It’s sort of at the government level, but I would say the Polaris Process is an important component of Latvia’s branding strategy. This Polaris Process directly affects foreign direct investment attraction ...it’s the government, yes, probably playing the key role. And then you have the supporting agencies and institutions...”
Another Latvian micro-net employee echoed this sentiment, supporting the claim that Latvia evidences intranational cooperation with public, private, and academic sectors to "improve the nation’s business environment."

LAT 2: “That falls under the section of government and governmental cooperation. And, it’s a national strategy which is designed to promote the economic growth of Latvia, development. It’s essentially ...an alliance between the public/private/academic sectors to improve the business environment and to specifically also help progress investment projects. There’s also a coordination council for large and strategic investment projects, which is led by the Prime Minister of Latvia, which meets regularly every year, and it follows the progress of investment projects and helps resolve any issues. This is something that is, I think, unique in comparison to our Baltic neighbours.”

These comments evidence LIAA’s attempts to co-ordinate within the nation for Latvian economic development. Although neither Latvian micro-net respondent identified these coordination efforts were to brand the nation for investment purposes, one respondent in particular did identify the imperative nature to brand for investment.

LAT 1: “What I can say is that the Latvian government certainly has been paying attention to the importance of branding... in order to be competitive (for investment), you need to have a successful branding strategy.”

Similar to the Estonian interviews, Latvian macro-net respondents were asked about their perceptions of LIAA. Macro-net commentary on LIAA evidenced to be quite thin: the only commentary regarding this came from a Chamber of Commerce CEO in the nation (CC 1), addressing that the advertisements put out by the IPAs are "not very good.” This is the extent of the commentary about the Latvian IPA.
CC 1: “Well, yeah – my wife was just showing me: there’s a Latvian Institute that just put out some ads. Not very good, in my mind. They’re trying to say that there’s a lot of open space here. Unfortunately, those particular ads… I think a little bit off the mark”

4.1.4 Current Position of Lithuania

The five Lithuanian respondents comprised of two micro-net employees of Invest Lithuania and three macro-net members of the Lithuanian investment community. More information of these respondents can be found in Appendix E.

Similar to the Enterprise Estonia and the LIAA employees, the two employees of Invest Lithuania were asked about the organisation’s current strategies in investment promotion. Main responses identified clarification of definitions and targets for the organisation, as seen in the following quotes.

LITH 1: “It’s also what has helped us a great deal is, and it’s not been in place before… we have put in place clear cut rules in terms of what we call a result and what is not. And, also how do we engage our clients and how we deal with our clients. For the first part, it’s important for us that we don’t count the result that looks like an investment project but it is not an investment project as how we defined it. It’s fairly more complicated.”

LITH 2: “We have established clear rules on the type of investment project that generates at least 20 new jobs in a three-year period. It also has to be export-led activities. So, more than 50% of being generated there are projects out of Lithuania. There are some other indicators. So that brought quite a bit of clarity in the work we do. Before you would see people doing some sort of investment help but, you know, that would not even contribute to the final result. Now we’re able to get rid of it. We direct that type of request to other partners that can help us with and we focus on our, kind of, core business.”

These comments suggest that Invest Lithuania is setting goals and clarifying objectives in what it believes is its investment promotion strategy. The successes identified by respondents – respondents both within Invest Lithuania and outside – include attracting Western Union and
Barclay’s to the nation. These two companies are Western companies that sought expansion in Eastern Europe in the first decade of the 20th Century, and set up operations in Lithuania recently (Lithuania Tribune, 2011). This has had great impact on the nation of Lithuania for FDI (The London Economic, 2014). This sentiment is echoed in the comment of one Invest Lithuanian employee (LITH 1):

LITH 1: “We have noticed that. I think it comes hand-in-hand with the results. Something like five years ago is a time when some major developments started in Lithuania in terms of new companies coming in. I guess Barclay’s IT centre was one of the first… it was one of the first shared service centres to choose Vilnius with a very good name. So, that gave us both confidence for the agency but also gave us, you know, a good recognition that is something defined in this country.”

Invest Lithuania employees were asked about these investment promotion tactics and its relation to the Lithuanian investment brand. The excerpts of LITH 2 and LITH 1 describe how investment promotion allows the nation to benefit and highlight its position in the global market, both as a nation and as a brand. Additionally, excerpts identify the adjustment Lithuania makes to its investors and the needs of the marketplace, such as being "nimble and alert" as a nation.

LITH 2: "This attitude and this culture is making Lithuania more open to what is happening in the world, it is becoming more responsive. Therefore, you know, capable to help Lithuania takes its place. Up until now, it would be fair to say that Lithuania was still only searching for its image and for its place in Europe and also in a global economy. Now it’s starting to be as if we are going into the right direction of identifying what we should be and starting to take action to really become what we would like to become."

LITH 1: “What we are promoting ourselves as very dynamic and nimble and alert country. Where things are made to happen, or we make things happen. So that’s very applicable to any market, really, because most of them they want to make things quick and easy and simple as possible. So, we didn’t find any yet to redefine this message or sort of branding approach.”

As shown earlier, respondents of each nation identified that there is the issue of awareness to potential foreign direct investors. However, two respondents from Lithuania (LITH 2 and CC 5) made comments positing this may not be a large limitation, remarking that the
"undiscovered" nature of Lithuania to Western investors might help them achieve the saturation of FDI, which Poland and Czech Republic currently face.

LITH 2: "(Branding) gives us good marketing, so on and so forth. I think the outcome of that in the next years will be really very positive because will start compensating more and more an awareness issue. So, more and more companies will hear about Lithuania and they will hear about their peers. They will hear about it in industry meetings. They will hear about it in the conferences, read in the media. For many business men, we have noticed it’s undiscovered land and they find it intriguing. They want to learn more, and they want to double check what their initial decision to go for Poland was right or not. Perhaps there’s more to be found in Lithuania. I think generally it’s very positive. We will have the economy very saturated with foreign investment, just like it currently is in Czech Republic, for example, or Western Poland."

CC 5: “People are making for promotion of a country and organising how things are happening in the country. It’s getting more and more positive by the day. It’s always the thinking and old habits are for remembering how it used to be and remembering our success stories from 20 or 30 years ago, but from a business perspective, identifying and locating: what can we do in the future? Where is the biggest, most potential that we have? Since going after that, using all of the technologies, which are available to anyone, irrespective of developed or developing economy, and what I also like is that the perspectives of quite a lot of people are basically becoming more and more global. For them, it doesn’t matter if it is locally or if it is in China, or if it’s a project in Indonesia or any other dangerous or unsure countries. So, this attitude and this culture is making Lithuania more open to what is happening in the world, it is becoming more responsive. Therefore, you know, capable to help Lithuania takes its place.”

Macro-net respondents provided varied responses to the strength of the organisation. Two macro-net respondents were asked about the interactions and perceptions of the organisation, which garnered the two conflicting responses. One respondent (INV 1) identified an imperative to cooperate with Invest Lithuania in order to meet their organisation’s mandate: to "bring into Lithuania more investors.” The other respondent (CC 3) identified that the marketing practices exercised by Invest Lithuania do not seem to be marketing practices. The example CC 3 gave
identified that some FDI may not be facilitated by Invest Lithuania at all, and yet the organisation claims it as one of its success stories.

CC 3: “So when you look at (Invest Lithuania’s marketing practice), what they’re doing is: they have service hunters in their call centres, their global call centres. That’s something that Lithuania, I don’t think really... that wasn’t part of the strategy, it just kinda happened that they became a very good place for call centres. There are some companies with great success stories. And that’s it.”

INV 1: “[The respondent’s organisation and Invest Lithuania] are cooperating a lot. We are representing investors who are already in Lithuania, and they are trying to bring into Lithuania more investors. We also want to have more members, so we want more investors. Investors are very much about investment climate improvement and business environment improvement, so are cooperating with that as well: contacting politicians, going to see them, telling them why we need it, etc. ...So we are cooperating and in my action plan, that is one item has risen, is that we need more meetings with investors. So we are meeting more often *laughs*”

4.1.5 Summary of Current Position of Baltic Nations for Branding

The evaluation of the current position of the three Baltic nations partly illustrates how they brand themselves for investment promotion. Respondents identified the nonentity status each nation faces in its awareness abroad, shared by all three nations. Efforts toward enhancing positive image building are identified across the three nations as similar impetuses to brand. Respondents identified they perceive their nation’s attempts at economic development for investment as progressive, but suggesting that there is continual imperative to improve on image-building activities and overall investment promotion. Satisfying the first research objective, respondents believe the current position of the Baltic countries could use more tools to enhance the image and attract more investment into their respective nations.

4.2 Opportunity to Develop A Collaborative Place Brand
The second research objective in the study (as in Section 3.1) poses to evaluate the opportunity for Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania to develop a collaborative place brand. This opportunity to brand needs to be addressed from an organisational standpoint, in order to evaluate nationalism as political will in a collaborative milieu appropriately. Nationalism may be difficult to identify in organisational decision-making (Egeberg, 1999). Nation branding itself can be posited to be a nationalist sentiment (Dzenovska, 2005); it must be verified that the decisions made by the IPA are indeed reflective of federal governmental decisions and its electorate. If such a case can be reasonably made, IPA decisions can be construed to be nationalist in nature (Birch, 1989; Scully, 1988). This is explored further in the following section.

4.2.1 Assumption of Federal Government Act of Will

A verifying question was asked to all interviewees who were employees of Enterprise Estonia, LIAA, and Invest Lithuania concerning the relationship the federal government had with their organisations. This is imperative in order to identify whether the investment promotion agency is indeed acting on the political will of the electorate. If this is not clearly identified, the arguments – which suggest the organisational decisions being made – may not be reflective of country or nationalist practice. The IPA's decisions, strategies, and behaviours must be in the name of the country and its wellbeing, because the country is directing the organisation.

The responses to the question “what is the role of the federal government with your organisation?” are featured in the Table F2.
**TABLE F2:** QUESTION: WHAT IS THE ROLE OF (YOUR) FEDERAL GOVERNMENT WITH YOUR ORGANISATION?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Enterprise Estonia</th>
<th>LIAA</th>
<th>Invest Lithuania</th>
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<tr>
<td>• EST 1: “Well, we belong under the Ministry of Economic Affairs and Education, so, the Enterprise Estonia is one subunit of that ministry. And also, of course, they have a role in our decision making process. But, it only affects the longer-term plans, and so they don’t, they are not involved in everyday management, or everyday work.”</td>
<td>• LAT 1: “Yeah, we are essentially under the umbrella, or the supervision. We act as an agency under the, yeah. Let’s say the supervision of the Ministry of Economics. So we are, in fact, the government institution. In a sense that we are working, we work with them in a definition of our activities. ...And, they are, as regard to promotion of Foreign Direct Investments for example, and export promotion: they are, in fact, guidelines - which have been prepared by the Economics Ministry with input from the, from LIAA and other relevant institutions. ...They are set for 2013 to 2019. These guidelines were prepared by the Ministry of Economics of Latvia.”</td>
<td>• LITH 1: “We do work a lot, but then we are quite autonomous as well. ...because of that successful approach we’ve made about Lithuania’s government, they’ve started working with us more and more.”</td>
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The comments from Enterprise Estonia and LIAA support the assumption made that these organisations act in the interest of the government. A representative from Invest Lithuania, however, claims the agency acts autonomous to electorate powers. However, it can be reasonably argued that Enterprise Estonia and LIAA act in the direct interests of the federal government, and thus the insights derived from interviews regarding decision-making can be regarded as in the interest of the nation-state: decisions that are made for nationalist purposes.
4.2.2 Exploration of Collaboration

Decisions made by Estonia and Latvia—and arguably Lithuania—can be reflective of federal will, and these IPA branding decisions are in the interest of the state; therefore, the analysis of the findings can proceed. This section addresses how the investment promotion agencies would react to collaborative efforts between the three Baltic nations. Variations of the question “should the nations collaborate?” were posited to all fourteen respondents. Table F3 collates these comments across all respondents, split between the micro-net and macro-net respondents.

**Table F3: Question: Should the three nations collaborate?**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Micronet Responses</th>
<th>Macronet Responses</th>
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<tr>
<td>• LITH 1: “Yes, but we haven’t done it before”</td>
<td>• CC 7: “Economically: Yes. Politically: No”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• EST 2: “Yes, with the Baltic Sea Region... But the Tallinn-Helsinki area is a better collaboration”</td>
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<tr>
<td>• LAT 1: “Yes, I believe in numbers, there is strength”</td>
<td>• CC 2: “No, the nations are too different”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• LAT 2: “Yes, we do with the Baltic Sea Region... but it is very competitive”</td>
<td>• CC 3: “May not be feasible for investment promotion... but perhaps for tourism promotion”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• EST 1: “Yes, but it doesn’t need to be necessarily Baltic”</td>
<td>• INV 1: “It’s a possibility, but it would be very difficult to implement”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• LITH 2: “We have no choice but to do it, but no we haven’t done it yet”</td>
<td>• CC 4: “It would have helped at some point, but the nations are too different now”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• CC 6: “Yes, and it’s feasible”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• CC 1: “Politically: Yes. But no citizen would want it”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• CC 5: “Difficult to say, but it would work in a greater region”</td>
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The variation in responses in Table F3 stresses conflicting dialogue when discussing collaboration. The inconsistent responses are found across all nations. As a group, the micro-net
responses tend to answer favourably the idea of collaboration, with some respondents saying it has already happened (i.e. “yes, and we do collaborate” and “yes, we do with the Baltic Sea Region”). Comments among the macro-net respondents address collaboration with both positive and negative sentiments. Exploring these discourses further requires a look at how respondents commented: in favour of collaboration, against it, and the alternatives to a three-nation collaborative effort.

4.2.3 In Favour Of Collaboration

4.2.3.1 Internal Collaboration as Favourable

All interviewees identified that there were benefits to Baltic nations collaborating for investment promotion. Such responses arose when questions that were asked concerned the benefits to collaboration. Three respondents commented on collaboration evident within the nation for investment promotion, and that it was beneficial. Such commentary arising for collaboration within the nation often stemmed from the idea of development and business environment improvement. Among these examples, the natural state of collaboration speaks to the nature of developing each Baltic nation. Interviewees here suggest that internal collaboration can help these nations encourage “economic development,” give “power,” and “improve business environments.”

LAT 1: “There are quite a few stakeholders involved in this branding process. You have the municipalities, also, that actually cooperation of municipalities... We work very closely with them to help their economic development. So, it’s a team effort. Both for FDI attraction and branding of FDI as a country.”

CC 5: “I would say it is very much depends on... the skills of the cooperation of the partners and the situation (the organisation) has the advantage of having long-standing experience and while establishing
contacts and obviously being connected with [foreign] embassy gives us power as an association."

INV 1: "Yes, we are cooperating a lot [within the nation]. We are representing investors who are already in Lithuania, and they are trying to bring into Lithuania more investors. Investors are very much about investment climate improvement and business environment improvement, so are cooperating with that as well: contacting politicians, going to see them, telling them why we need it, etc. Secondly, foreign investors are newcomers, they are asking Lithuanians: 'Can we talk to someone who lives here? You know, to get some knowledge directly.' We are meeting also them, and I’m not telling that not everyone wants to meet someone, but sometimes they seek what the current investors are started to think, etc. What they think about the environment, the politics, and so on. So we are cooperating and in my action plan, that is one item has risen, is that we need more meetings with investors. So we are meeting more often *laughs*." 

4.2.3.2 Collaboration Between Baltic Nations as Favourable

Looking towards collaboration between the Baltic nations, the question "are there positive aspects of collaboration between the three Baltic nations?" was posited to all interviewees. Three themes of responses arose: increasing visibility, saving costs, and reducing competition in the region.

First, increasing visibility featured in comments made in this study. A member of LIAA said "in order to stay competitive…. We do have to work together.” This quote suggests attracting investment may be more difficult amidst other nations with "econom[ies] skyrocketing and taking over". Likewise, an Estonian Chamber of Commerce member addressed collaboration can "make bigger noise,” despite their stance that there may be "no burning reason" to do so. The LAT 2 respondent also cited the Visegrad 4 region of Poland, Hungary, Slovakia, and Czech Republic as an example of interregional collaboration for investment (Cieślik, Michalek, & Michalek, 2014), suggesting that regional collaboration has evidence of success for increasing investment in a region.
LAT 2: “But, the Baltic Sea Region, in order to stay competitive in the modern world, I mean, with China’s economy skyrocketing and taking over: I would say that staying competitive we do have to work together. We do have to attract investment and we have to invest in our research & development…Another interesting thing is that we see in the European Union that there are specific regions. So for example, the Visegrad Region, you might have heard of it… It’s in the centre of Europe, and they’re relatively well off in the amount that they’re cooperating.”

CC 4: “They will, I think, make a few feints of collaboration. In some ways it might work, the reality is that it’s complicated for them to do! There’s no burning reason except to make a bigger noise.”

Second, the pragmatic stance of cost saving arose. Such comments came solely from the Lithuanian participants of the study. LITH 2 identified the difficulty to promote Lithuania as a small nation to large nations such as China and India (in the context of export promotion). INV 1 identified that the act of cooperation helps attract more investment to the region by "sharing costs of (trade) missions."

LITH 2: “The same are with Baltic countries. To cooperate more, we could do more, for example, in saving from costs to present the region to bigger countries like, China or India for investments and also for exporting to that region for those countries. That cooperation could be very good, because to find the market like China for small countries like Lithuania is very very tough. It’s very difficult job. But if we do it together, I think it could be good results achieved.”

INV 1: “I think in 10 years (Lithuania) could be more than average of European Union GDP. I’m thinking about all the countries. And I still believe in cooperation. I think together, we can attract more investment into the region, sharing some costs of missions, roadshows, and so on… presenting as a region.”

Third, interviewees discussed reducing competitiveness between nations. One Estonian respondent claimed collaboration is necessary to "get out of [Estonia’s] head the idea of competition they’ve had.” CC 4 continued to strengthen this point with the external threat of Ukraine in 2014 should push the nations to try to "portray [themselves] efficiently.”
CC 4: “It’s not impossible. Arguably, it’s necessary. You’ve got to get out of your head the idea of the competition they’ve had up until this point… I think to be fair, I think what’s just happened in Ukraine has made everyone think very carefully, indeed. It’s very clear there are things that need to be done. Not, at least, I think the most important thing is that they need to rid of media outlets of Russian language. It also means, thinking about how the images of the countries are portrayed efficiently.”

4.2.3.3 Evidence of Collaboration

The follow up question “does the region already exhibit collaborative efforts with the [other two Baltic] nations?” was posited to the six micro-net interviewees. A collection of ten comments made by these interviewees responding to this question can be found in Table F4.

**TABLE F4: QUESTION: DOES THE REGION ALREADY EXHIBIT COLLABORATIVE EFFORTS WITH THE (OTHER TWO) BALTIC NATIONS?**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Estonia</th>
<th>Latvia</th>
<th>Lithuania</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• EST 1: “We have not done this cooperation much in the past. But now, yes, it’s more and more like on the table, because there is an organisation called, I don’t know if you’ve heard, agencies around the Baltic Sea that do more cooperation lately, and branding is definitely one issue that is on the table … We actually promote this region together, so we don’t focus on different region. We have felt the need to speak more about</td>
<td>• LAT 1: “We are part of the agency part of WAIPA, the association of investment promotion agencies. Secondly, we are also part of the Baltic Development Forum. I’m sure you’ve must have heard of that.” • LAT 1: “We are working with other Baltic IPAs. There (is) the Baltic Sea Region plan, as you probably know. This is also with the support – it’s basically within the framework of the EU strategy for the Baltic Sea Region. ...There is the Baltic Sea Region IPA forum, for example, which takes place… I</td>
<td>• LITH 1: “We sometimes talk with them, there’s a Baltic Development Forum, I think, part of one of the European Union projects or so. So, we’ve met once and we talked about the possibilities of promoting Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia as one brand or one country. So, they have the same sort of problems and even the value propositions of what we have to offer is very similar between Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia.” • LITH 2: &quot;If you look beyond that,&quot;</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
that region, because it is not that well known either."

• EST 2: “Yes, like a concrete example that our joint material trade promotion visits. That’s one way, and of course trade promotion is more to develop tourist because there is a clear direct benefit. For example: if tourists coming from Japan and China that are going to Helsinki and of course it make sense that they come two hour trip to Helsinki to Tallinn. But it is still, at least, a good start, it’s still on the first steps because we don’t have the joint strategy today, for example, how promote the region.”

• think the next one is in Helsinki in June. Yes, these kinds of activities. Also, there is this Baltic Shared Services community, and this is specifically for Baltic nations countries. I mean, Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania.”

• LAT 1: “There is a very good relationship with the other two investment promotion agencies. That is a clear and the representatives often meet within, as I had also mention the Baltic Development Forum and the community. But there are also other events, you know, invited to various conferences as well. The messages has to exchange and use new points and I know our director is also knows very well the directors of the two agencies, so. That’s not an issue.”

• LAT 2: “Tourism attraction, business, politics altogether, international relations: so, on the shore of the Baltic Sea, there’s another subregion is forming called the Baltic Sea Region. What this region is put together is for environmental protection, because we are united by the Baltic Sea. In order to maintain a level of pollution that’s below any harmful norms, we had to figure out historically & politically: when we had a common goal, basically freedom out of the Soviet Union, which as we imagined gave each of the countries the same good results, I think this is where we’ve been closest in our co-operation.”
logistics with ships going around all the time, because all of these states have very important ports, very competitive ports with each other, but we also have to understand that the sea is one. We can’t tamper with it. That was the start, probably of the region. Now it has come to more of a cultural and political integration.”

- LAT 2: “The Baltic Sea Region is one of the most competitive out of all the European Union’s regions, because we have attracted already most amount of talent, the most amount of science in the sheer number of how much money we invest in science, and research & development is outstanding. It’s a very good indicator, which means that even if we’re not attracting as many investors now, we will attract those in the future.”

Micro-net interviewees in Table F4 addressed that there are some collaborative efforts currently in place between the three Baltic nations. The examples given by Latvian employees in Table F4 relate directly to regional development instituted by the European Union (European Union, 2007), such as the Baltic Sea Region and the Baltic Development Forum. The Baltic Sea Region (BSR) is a cooperative effort amongst three Baltic nations, supported with BSR reports that branding is one of the main topics of discussion for the programme (European Union, 2007). However, the programme was designed for the 11 regions that surround the Baltic Sea (including
Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania) to foster innovation and increase accessibility to the area. Despite this, interviewees in Table F4 claim the BSR was indeed the collaboration of the three Baltic nations in particular. One LIAA interviewee compared the BSR initiative to other European areas: highlighting that the BSR attracts the most amount of talent and science innovation. This programme has since ended in 2013 (European Union, 2007).

In addition to the BSR, IPA respondents identified coordination between the nations through conferences and regional engagements. These include the Baltic Development Forum (Baltic Development Forum, 2014), the Baltic Shared Services Community conference, and WAIPA (World Association of Investment Promotion Agencies, 2014). Interviewees did not mention the extent of the collaboration via these memberships, aside from sharing information and keeping positive relationships between regional investment promotion agencies.

Interestingly, an Invest Lithuania employee (LITH 2) identified that there was once a common goal that brought these Baltic nations together: the goal of leaving the Soviet Union in the early 1990s. The respondent claims "this is where we’ve [Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania] been closest in our cooperation".

The same question, “does the region already exhibit collaborative efforts?” was posited to the macro-net respondents as well. Two responses (CC 2 & CC 7) are given.

CC 2: “I know that there’s this Rail Baltica Project to railroad from Tallinn to actually to Warsaw or Berlin. I’m unsure what the end point will be. It’s to go through the Baltic nations. The thing they’ve negotiated, I don’t know for how many years, but all of a sudden, Lithuania wants the rail to go through Vilnius. I don’t know if you’ve looked at a map, but anyway everyone has agreed – we can do a side track to Vilnius. So they can start building, it may take forever.”

CC 7: “There are plans for a railway Transbaltica: from Helsinki, Tallinn, Riga, Vilnius, into Poland and to Western Europe. They are arguing since a couple of years now because Vilnius Lithuania wants part going to Vilnius
and they’re fighting amongst themselves just for the railroad. ...I went to the meeting of the Latvian and Estonian chambers of commerce. They published this brochure. I think about 40 – 45% of all of the companies learned to say 'no, we never want to go, and not even sell in Estonia or in Latvia or we will definitely more than 50%, we will definitely never open a subsidiary there'. This is part of a 2.5 hour drive to Tallinn and same you’re in Vilnius. It’s not really necessary to open a representation office or even a country there ...It needs a lot of improvement in the infrastructure. The roads are in very bad condition. There is hardly any motorway and a big problem is that the track, the train track, the size, the width of the track is different. It’s the Russian width which is different from the Western European. In Lithuania, there is a big train station where they take the container from the tracks of Russia to the track of Western Europe. That’s a big hurdle. That’s why this Transbaltica railroad will be very good.”

As seen in the quotes above, the main example that emerged from these responses was one of the Baltic Rail Project, or Rail Baltica. It acts as a trans-Baltic railroad system to increase access and logistics in the region, and a stronger port system between Estonia and Finland (Ministry of Transport and Communication of the Republic of Latvia, 2014). CC 2 highlighted that there were negotiations made between the nations in order to implement this system. CC 7 discussed the need for this logistics system in order to address the infrastructure: "the roads are in very bad condition. There is hardly any motorway…. It’s a big hurdle (for investment)". Despite the positive impacts of these railroad systems to investment, both respondents identified this project as a case outlining the difficulty Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania have had in getting along with one another. CC 7 made comments about how the organisers between the nations were "fighting amongst themselves just for the railroad.”

Collectively, the quotes can be interpreted to support a cross-Baltic railroad. The quotes also identify that this may be met with some contention when in collaborative practice. The respondents, however, tend to be meet the idea of a Baltic collaborative brand with positivity.
Yet, there are operational and legacy issues, which were identified by respondents who addressed the lack of collaboration, and why a collaborative brand may not occur.

**4.2.4 Absence of Effective Collaboration**

Resistance was identified directly in an interview with a chairperson in a Chamber of Commerce in Lithuania. She commented that much of the collaboration between the nations for foreign direct investment did not happen "because of mostly cultural resistance.”

CC 5: “Any collaboration as such to a certain extent, since it didn’t happen because of mostly cultural resistance, I don’t know now if it is of much value to make any hypotheses of how much damage or how much lost potential that it has brought to all three of the countries. It's simply that it didn’t happen.”

Resistance manifested itself in two main forms in the interviews: resisting the legacy of the Soviet Union, and resisting the idea of Baltic.

A salient theme, which emerged across all fourteen transcribed interviews, concerned the legacy and impact of the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union, a large Eurasian power that occupied the three Baltic nations for a lengthy portion of the 20th Century, (Eglitis & Arda, 2012; Lane, Pabriks, Purs, & Smith, 2013), became a point of discussion when the question arose concerning the need to brand the country. The discussion of resistance arose in the contexts of collaboration. The following will outline the manifestations of resistance in the data.

**4.2.4.1 Estonia and Finland Relations**

One manifestation of resistance arose primarily in Estonian respondents, concerning their relationship with Finland. An Invest Lithuania employee identified the Estonian–Finnish relation
to be due to maritime proximity, identifying the influence of Finnish media on the Estonian populace during the times of the Estonian SSR.

LITH 2: “Estonia, for example, benefitted a lot from the proximity to Finland. They have something like 30 minutes ferry connection from Finland. Simply because they were watching Finnish television for years, there are many Estonians who are able to communicate in the Finnish language. We saw how immediately in the 1990s, Finland built really strong ties with Estonia in terms of moving business, setting up new facilities, etc.”

As LITH 2 mentioned, Estonia’s "really strong ties" with Finland leveraged Estonia to develop after re-independence "in terms of moving business, setting up new facilities, etc.” Since then, the Estonian-Finnish relationship can be interpreted to be an act of cultural resistance to the Soviet legacy. Supported by the comment from CC 3 below, Soviet legacy persists in the nation via corruption. The respondent identified Finland as Estonia’s mentor, helping the nation navigate its independence through this relationship. Another respondent (CC 4) addresses the Estonian-Finnish relationship as one that is exclusive: arguing that collaboration with the Baltic nations may not happen because Estonia adopts a "Nordic singularity,” whereby the nation does not “‘have too many friends”.

CC 3: “Estonia, from what I understand, fired half of their police force due to fight corruption. And today, they’re… when you look at the transparency international numbers, there are big differences between Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania. Estonia had Finland as its mentor.”

CC 4: “That speaks to, you know, ennui. Estonia, if it feels good to anyone, it’s Finland. It doesn’t necessarily feel close to Latvia. And Latvia is pretty much the only place it would feel close to. I do think it’s in a sense of Nordic singularity not to have too many friends *laughs*.”

To address the Estonian–Finnish relation as resistance to Sovietness, an excerpt exemplifies Estonia’s nature in relation to Finland. The participant (CC 2) referred to the nature
of the Estonian economy before its multiple occupations in the early 1900s. He continued to address "they will get past this old Soviet years and again, be at the same level at Finland,” ascribing a relationship with Finland as Estonia's mentor, but eventually to be back in a place that may appear rightful to the nation.

CC 2: “The dream of Estonia is to be equal again with Finland. Actually even better, back in the 1930s, Estonia as an economy was larger income was higher than to the Finns. This is the dream of the Estonians. They will get past this old Soviet years and again, be at the same level of Finland... But I think Estonia will be good (for investment. Maybe not reach the Finnish level as it did once *giggles*, but Estonians are quite smart and practical people... the only goal is to attract new companies to support the Estonian brand. So maybe if we get big names, we’ll have a better chance to tell the bigger audience who we are and why does companies are here.”

4.2.4.2 Identity Seeking Behaviours

A second manifestation of resistance comes in the form of identity-seeking behaviours. After the fall of the Soviet empire, re-independence of the nations was met with varying behaviours by these newly free-market Eastern European nations (Acaravci & Ozturk, 2012). Understanding this identity-seeking behaviour requires identifying how the participants believed their nation was being perceived. To the question, "How do you [the participant] perceive your nation?" Table F5 outlines a word map of common phrases that arose in interviewee responses relating to the word ‘Soviet’.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Estonia</th>
<th>Latvia</th>
<th>Lithuania</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Western</td>
<td>Outskirt of Europe</td>
<td>Falling Behind</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Resourceless</td>
<td>Untrustworthy</td>
<td>Central European</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Smart</td>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>Interventionist State</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Good Tax System</td>
<td>In the Middle</td>
<td>Socialist</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Winning</td>
<td></td>
<td>Slavic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In the Middle</td>
<td></td>
<td>Unknown</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The words from Latvian and Lithuanian respondents in Table F5 appear to be more negative than the Estonian comments. These emergent words identify the underlying negative tones that respondents use to describe the current state of their nation in its branding efforts. The resistance from a negative brand perception of Soviet arose, which is ascribed to many Eastern-European nations by Western interlocutors (Lamoreaux & Galbreath, 2008). In exploring one subtheme that arose from an Invest Lithuania employee (i.e. "falling behind"), the quotes below ascribe feelings from participants that Lithuania may have not had a desirable "starting position" after the Soviet days.

LITH 2: “[Lithuania is a country] Which is one of the smallest I think in the EU, as an accumulated capital. There are many reasons for that. The accumulated FDI includes basically all the transactions, including foreign people buying real estate. It includes things on how many foreign entities privatised local companies who are countries that became independent. For example: Estonians were really good in that and they privatised a lot of Soviet-built lands to Finnish investors. While in Lithuania and mostly in the case the privatisation was directed towards local businessmen, not foreign [businessmen].”

LITH 2: “We have some, I think our starting positions were somewhat different. One is that Baltic nations were part of Soviet Union while, you know countries like Czech Republic or Poland or Bulgaria were not part of the Soviet Union but were republics. They still had somewhat more autonomy and were kind of better known in that respect. Other things that had an effect I think initially when all of the Soviet bloc had opened at the end of the Cold War, some countries had a good starting position that helped them.”

The end of the Cold War led to disparities in "starting positions" for investment. These disparities may have lead other transition nations that did not have good "starting positions" to attract foreign investors and investment (Sokol, 2001). In supporting this notion, macro-net respondents were asked about changes in the nation over the past ten years. The collection of quotes, from macro-net participants across nations, examines this below, addressing the Baltic nations' joining Western organisations and benefits thereof, including the European Union and
the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation. This form of cultural resistance against the Soviet legacy is one of joining supranational Western powers.

LAT 1: “With renewal of independence in the early 90s, this [Sovietness] was provided the impetus for the country to brand itself, yeah, as an independent country. *laughs* and the second important event, as mentioned earlier, was also Latvia joining the European Union and NATO in 2004… which resulted in an increase in specifically in FDI and also in brand recognition of Latvia as a European nation. Thirdly, it would think important event is that as of January 1st of this year, Latvia joined the Eurozone. I think that economically speaking, this will increase Latvia more attractive for investors at the same time, it also serves as a kind of increasing the brand recognition of Latvia, if you like, as a Eurozone member. It becomes more recognisable. I think that Latvia joined the EU had a more direct, I think, will have more… if we look in the future, let’s say, 10 years’ time, we’ll probably see Latvia’s joining the EU had a more direct impact on FDI increase than during the Eurozone.”

EST 2: “First Estonia joined NATO and EU, and the EU was the biggest change in the economical field so that means less bureaucracy for the companies, more possibilities for the dealers [investors].”

LITH 1: “I think European Union was the most important thing (for our Lithuanian brand). Because when we talk about companies, we do a lot of research with them, it’s very rarely that people didn’t know, or we would approach the company that has no interest at all Europe. So, obviously, we align ourselves with the European Union is a big advantage for us.”

4.2.4.3 Renewal of Independence

Another form of resistance against the Soviet powers comes in the form of framing an independent identity within the context of a renewed independence. One example of this can be addressed through claiming investment nation branding as a form of cultural resistance. This is identified by an employee from a Lithuanian chamber of commerce, suggesting that Lithuania searches for an image within a European context, independent of its history of Russian occupation:
CC 5: “Well, I think that current trends that we are seeing, it will be further because the country obviously are going through a process of really selecting and understanding its areas of potential strength as well as its limitations. So, in that term, communication and positioning of a country both inside and outside of a country is becoming more precise and more better targeted... Up until now, it would be fair to say that Lithuania was still only searching for its image and for its place in Europe and also in a global economy [since occupation]. Now it’s starting to be as if we are going into the right direction of identifying what we should be and starting to take action to really become what we would like to become.”

Another example from the Latvian accord also credits this idea. An independent business owner in Latvia (CC 1) noted Latvia’s unbridled nationalism since re-independence “by wrapping itself in its flag.” CC1’s comment addresses that such flag-wrapped nationalism has led to difficulties to Latvia’s current export market and Latvian imagery among some Scandinavian countries.

CC 1: “Latvians want to wrap themselves in their flag. So for example: I was just looking at a company that was developing a line of baby food. Well they’ve actually put the Latvian flag on the baby food jar. Well, if you’re being told by customers from outside of Eastern Europe that if anything, it’s a negative that it’s from Latvia... well, don’t put it in people’s face. Don’t hide it, but you know... ”

CC 1 gave other examples of Latvia and its interactions with hired place-branding consultants. The findings from the place-branding consultation highlights that the intensity of Latvian national pride had marred its potential to create an effective nation brand.

CC 1: “One of the interesting things is... there was... an international marketing guru that came to Latvia. And, his comment about Latvia was: that Latvians are so proud of their country. And you have to realise that after 50 years of Soviet Occupation to regain your independence is a very special thing... His comment was: 'the branding of Latvia is not possible because Latvians are so overly proud of being Latvian, that it doesn’t leave any room for promoting it.' And it was very interesting observation, I thought. And, you know, at the end of the day: Latvia is a relatively flat non... non-spectacular scenery. But at the same time, when you live here, you start to understand small is beautiful. You start to understand a wide expansive field or a forest... it can be, you know, truly beautiful... But, that is the fact that those small things are quite, uh... perceived quite special, which to the outsider which seems quite odd. Which is why I
thought the Marketing guy hit the nail on the head. Latvians are so proud of their country, and there really is no room to promote it as such."

This creates a smaller dialogue in the data: the Lithuanian respondent identified nation branding as a tool for an identity-forming behaviour, conflicting with the Latvian respondent citing the superciliousness of the nation to be dire ("Latvians are so proud of their country, there really is no room to promote it as such").

4.2.4.4 Resistance via Competition

In the following quote, a Latvian Chamber of Commerce volunteer (CC 1) comments on competition within the region, via a sense of pride of the nation’s nature and wonder. This competition is another sub-theme that arises in the data. It also relates to resistance.

CC 1: “You start to understand a wide expansive field or a forest... it can be, you know, truly beautiful. But it’s not, you know, it’s not the Rocky Mountains. The biggest hill in Latvia is 500 metres high. Ok? So, you know, it’s 500 metres above sea level. It’s nothing significant. But, everybody knows, the Latvian geyser is 520 metres above sea level. And everybody needs to know about it. And damn it, Estonia’s 10 metres higher!”

The theme of competition arose throughout many interviews. Much of the more pointed responses about competition came directly from conversations about collaboration. Discussion of competition was prompted via non-descript follow up comments from the interviewer. These included “so there is a sense of competition?” or “so you believe [the nations] are competitors in the market?” Because the data was abundant with such comments, the responses will be addressed from macro-net respondents (see Table F6) first, then followed by responses from micro-net respondents (see Table F7).
Macro-net respondents referred to competition as a hindrance to the collaborative branding effort. A collection of these comments is in Table F6.

**TABLE F6: THEME: COMPETITION BETWEEN BALTIC NEIGHBOURS AS HINDRANCE TO COLLABORATIVE BRANDIN**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Estonia Macro-net Participants</th>
<th>Latvia Macro-net</th>
<th>Lithuania Macro-net</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CC 4: “Well I think the interesting thing about the Baltic nations is that they tend to compete with each other. They tend not to be allied. They see themselves as having very similar assets in a way to sell. They have to compete most obviously in the ports, where Ventspils, Liepaja, Riga, Klaipeda for Lithuania, and Tallinn for Estonia are going after many of the same customers. And that includes even the new Silk Road Chinese customers.”</td>
<td>CC 1: “The real Latvian businessman is the one that’s looking West, and then I think I’m being very Western... But, at the end of the day, I have to have the balls and the wherewithal and the determination of a Russian businessman. Supposedly, the veneer of being very Western... a lot of business in Latvia is really driven by a Russian business mentality. Which... doesn’t allow for a win-win situation. If he’s winning, that mean I’m automatically losing. And that’s often where you sit there and go: 'Can’t you compromise?' Well if I compromise, it means I give in. If I give in, it means you win. If you win, that means I automatically lose... That would be my gut feeling would be that the Latvian Investment Agency would see that, you know - 'I gotta win this, I gotta win, I gotta make sure the company opens in Latvia. If it opens in Estonia, I have lost'.”</td>
<td>CC 3: “Latvia &amp; Lithuania have always been competitors to a certain point with everything. Latvia is smaller. Lithuania is always the largest of the Baltic nations... There’s still this competitiveness feeling. The jokes that you hear every day. In Lithuania you hear Latvian jokes. In Latvia, you hear Lithuanian jokes. It’s more of a cultural thing.”</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In Table F6, a Lithuanian macro-net respondent (CC 3) claimed competition between the nations as a commonplace concept, encapsulated by cultural "jokes" among citizens. An
Estonian macro-net respondent (CC 4) attributed this competition towards a sense of similarity between the nations, such that the nation brands are so similar, with "very similar assets," that competition would arise. A Latvian macro-net respondent (CC 1) attributed this competition to a "Russian business mentality," such that the typical Latvian businessperson "doesn’t allow for a win-win situation.” The respondent (CC 1) commented that the LIAA would be expected to operate in a similar format. The competition between the nations in investment branding exists, but respondent data identifies a conflict on the matter in Table F7.

**TABLE F7: THEME: COMPETITION BETWEEN BALTIC NEIGHBOURS AS HINDRANCE TO COLLABORATIVE BRANDING EFFORT**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Estonia Micro-net Participants</th>
<th>Latvia Micro-net</th>
<th>Lithuania Micro-net</th>
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<tr>
<td>• EST 1: “To some extent they definitely are (competitors), but all these countries have different challenges and different opportunities. So, we have projects where we have told companies that we have told them Estonia isn’t the best place, and to try Latvia or Lithuania. we know what our limitations and it is important to get the projects in the region. So perhaps in the future, this company will have a project in Estonia, it’s not, there’s always an opportunity.”</td>
<td>• LAT 2: “Of course, we are always competing with our neighbour country, Estonia, for the light under the sun because throughout both of these countries are rapidly expanding, they’re growing, they’re trying to catch up to the other countries which haven’t endured not that glorious past of the Soviet Union, but the previous decade. We’re trying to catch up and we are catching up fast… Latvia and Estonia have always been competitive between themselves. For instance, well Estonia was first to introduce the Euro,</td>
<td>• LITH 2: “I guess it comes back to what your political views and whether you are conservative or are you liberal. I would probably think about myself, and I am more on the conservative right wing side, and believe that the natural state of being is chaos <em>laughs</em> and countries tend to be more competitive than collaborative.”</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
even though both countries were competing for that and they did it in 2011. We did it only this year, in 2014. So they came ahead on that... From the other side, Lithuania, is competing with Latvia, mainly in a more traditional sphere of production, like agriculture, food products, or wood products. From both sides, we have these countries that are relatively the same with the same history, the same opportunities, and we’re competing very harshly with each other in order to get ahead. Who knows – probably that’s one of the reasons why we have been so successful because we are always competing with each other... Each of these countries is highly, I would say, egotistic. Each of them try to focus on their own personal gain, which is of course, normal and we have to understand that’s just the way it is. We are no different. But, it also means that we have to make sure that we offer something more.”

| Table F7 discloses the data conflict. LITH 2 asserted that countries in their very nature are competitive; “countries tend to be competitive more than collaborative.” The Latvian micro- |

| even though both countries were competing for that and they did it in 2011. We did it only this year, in 2014. So they came ahead on that... From the other side, Lithuania, is competing with Latvia, mainly in a more traditional sphere of production, like agriculture, food products, or wood products. From both sides, we have these countries that are relatively the same with the same history, the same opportunities, and we’re competing very harshly with each other in order to get ahead. Who knows – probably that’s one of the reasons why we have been so successful because we are always competing with each other... Each of these countries is highly, I would say, egotistic. Each of them try to focus on their own personal gain, which is of course, normal and we have to understand that’s just the way it is. We are no different. But, it also means that we have to make sure that we offer something more.” |

Table F7 discloses the data conflict. LITH 2 asserted that countries in their very nature are competitive; “countries tend to be competitive more than collaborative.” The Latvian micro-
net participant (LAT 2) typified each nation as "egotistic," focusing on the "personal gain" of the nation, which may incite competition. Interestingly, an Enterprise Estonia employee (EST 1) said the nations are very different, insofar as the nations could indeed help each other, and Estonia in particular has already started it to support the region. This is an anomaly compared to the Latvian and Lithuanian commentary.

Exploring the conflicting data further requires isolating the Estonian respondents' data. The researcher asked Estonian respondents "what does it mean to be Baltic?" The question was originally posited to ask about a possible nomenclature of a Baltic collaborative branding effort. Instead, it uncovered another manifestation of cultural resistance between the nations. This can be seen in Table F8.

**Table F8: Question: What Does It Mean to Be Baltic?**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Estonian Micro-net and Macro-net Responses</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• CC 2: “Companies are looking for, like, cheap production. Then maybe it’s maybe it’s better to market itself as Baltic. People will think it’s cheap and not good quality.”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• EST 1: “The ‘Baltic’ word doesn’t actually exist. It was just developed to call the region somehow. Those three countries that were starting to be independent from the Soviet Union. But culturally there hasn’t been anything as Baltic. Historically, I mean, because we (Estonia) were more, have always been more, united with Nordic countries than with Baltic countries. And just because we are here are three small countries in one place we are called the Baltic countries. But we don’t have anything historically or culturally that unites us. We think differently, and the languages are totally different.”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• CC 4: “The idea of a common Baltic identity isn’t really accepted even if Latvia and Lithuania, who are the original Balts, after all. They speak the Baltic languages. They live on the Baltic Sea. I mean ‘Balts’ is white in Latvian.”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• CC 2: “I’d say the discussion going between Estonia/Latvia/Lithuania won’t consider themselves being a Balt or say that they are from the Baltic nations. This is more something that people who are not from here would say.”</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
CC 4: “I mean they are all small linguistic communities under siege of their larger neighbours. There are superficial similarities, but they are not built on any kind of historical, cultural foundation. It’s really only the accident of 20th Century history that brought all of these countries together, in a sense. You know, it could easily have been, as we talk about four or five Baltic countries, if Finland had not managed to escape in 1944 from their destiny as a Soviet Socialist Republic.”

The commentary from the Estonian respondents highlights an interesting view on the word Baltic, as seen in Table F8. One respondent (CC 2) alluded to the word Baltic as three nations merely grouped together. Another respondent (EST 1) echoed this sentiment, stating "Baltic… is something that people who are not from here would say". A third respondent (CC 4) went further, saying that this grouping of nations is an “accident of 20th Century history.” This, again, supports claims that Baltic, as a means to typify Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania, may not be embraced. It can be interpreted that these Estonian respondents believe the Estonian decision-makers for investment had minimal agency over the idea of Balticness. The perception of the word Baltic, as cited by one respondent (CC 2) in Table F8, may be met by interlocutors as "cheap and not good quality.” In this conceptualisation, the idea of a Baltic brand may deter may deter formidable investment. This will be explored further in the discussion section.

4.2.4.5 Regional Alternatives to the Baltic Investment Place Brand

The majority of respondents say that there are benefits to a collaborative branding effort. Yet, this collaboration is not occurring among the three nations. In this interrogation regarding a Baltic collaboration, some respondents offered alternatives to a Baltic brand. Respondents from Estonia provided the most commentary about this branding effort, as seen in the Table F9.
TABLE F9: THEME: WHY NOT THE BALTIC BRAND? - ESTONIA

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Micro-net Responses</th>
<th>Macro-net Responses</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• EST 1: “We are historically, culturally closer to Nordic countries than other Baltic countries. Latvia and Lithuania are both historically and language-wise and culture-wise are more connected to other Slavic countries. Estonian language and Finnish language are related, so, this is. And also the business culture works is also much closer to Scandinavian countries than other countries.”</td>
<td>• CC 1: “You know, Estonians are the overly logical, more aspiring to be Nordic than anything else. Lithuanians tend to be more, not to insult Lithuanians, but they tend to be more Slavic and Polish driven.”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• EST 1: “Historically, I mean, because we were more, have always been more, united with Nordic countries than with Baltic countries. And just because we are here are three small countries in one place we are called the Baltic countries.”</td>
<td>• CC 4: “They don’t aspire to be a Baltic country, they aspire to be a Nordic country, as you know. And so for them, Baltic doesn’t really mean very much.”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• EST 2: “No. Actually, if you promote to Germany or UK, sometimes use like the word ‘Estonia, you’re Nordic, you’re not sub-par’. We are trying to put, if there’s the possibility to choose between Nordic and Baltic, then of course we choose Nordic. Because we see that we are in the Northern part of Europe. So it’s the more... and of course, about 10 years ago, it was quite a big mess because between the people like the mixed Baltic and Balkans. Whereas the war in Sarajevo and Serbia, and people said ’Oh ok, you are the same area. It is not safe'... But I think we use more Nordic than Baltic.”</td>
<td>• CC 2: “People have a Nordic mindset. We’ll get corruption. Look at... people who do business. They will also say that Estonians are very similar to Finland. Of course, there are some differences, but the differences between Finland and Estonian, compared to an Estonian and a Latvian... that is something completely different. We have... people are not that Christian... That defines a big part of the culture, that Estonians are Lutherans or Protestants as Swedes and Finns. So, we have the same holidays. We celebrate more or less the same way. Yeah. An Estonian would most definitely be more Nordic than Baltic.”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• CC 4: “But, arguably, there are three Baltic countries. The other one is Finland, but it doesn’t feel like that because the Finns have been accepted into the Nordic ‘Club’ in a way Estonians and Latvians have not. Estonians very clearly see themselves as, we would like to be seen as a Nordic society with all that it implies. But the Nordics do not see them as such because they are so radically liberal and non-social democrats. They’re seen as not...”</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The overarching theme arising from comments in Table F9 addresses that Estonia is not Baltic, but is rather Nordic. These respondents identified this distinction because of history and culture; the idea of Balticness does not relate to them (i.e. "we are historically, culturally closer to Nordic"; "people have a Nordic mindset"; "Estonians are aspiring to be Nordic"). One Estonian IPA respondent (EST 2) went insofar as to infer that the term Baltic would deem the nation as “sub-par”. Estonian macro-net respondents identified that the nation yearns to be Nordic, such as suggesting that there was an attempt to change the cultural symbol of the Estonian flag to look more Nordic. This idea is further exacerbated when an Estonian macro-net respondent (CC 4) claimed Lithuania to be more Slavic, in a sense of ostracising Lithuania. This theme from the Estonian respondents suggests there are other opportunities, aside from the three Baltic nations, to create a collaborative nation branding effort.

Estonian respondents were not the only ones to suggest an alternative collaborative branding effort. An Invest Lithuania employee (LITH 1) also suggested an alternative branding, based on sector-preference rather than geography.

LITH 1: “It definitely would help to have a common brand and think it might be really worth having one, and not necessarily even related to the Baltic region as a name or a brand. It might be more related to the industry as such. I just had a really good example from Lule City in North Sweden... established actually a brand called North Pole, which encompasses, like, three municipalities. And they brand themselves, they market themselves as best location for data centres. This common brand of these municipalities, they work really well at attracting big names and companies. I think in a
similar way, having a common brand with Latvia and Estonia – there would be very specific for one or the other industry than it would help.”

This classifies an interesting role of othership in an identity context from Estonian respondents, while asserting regional togetherness from Lithuanian respondents. These comments, despite offering substitute solutions to a Baltic collaborative brand, highlight a theme of in pursuit of self-interest. This self-interest-based mechanism was lastly pointed by an employee at a Latvian branding agency (LAT 1).

LAT 1: “Yes, you have to find your rightful place among those countries, and you have to find your real competitors. And then you have to find whatever it takes to attract this investment, to, like I said, the Baltic nations can work jointly on specific things like that but ultimately it still goes down to each country’s interests. Of course, if Estonians will see any benefits for them, they will definitely try to attract the investor specifically to Estonia. This will, of course, leave Latvia and Lithuania in a situation where they’re stuck with basically nothing. Yes, we do cooperate to some level, probably more than other countries with more historic ties and just being united and has felt in recent past, we’re trying to maintain that for now... each country has its own interest at mind at any given time. It’s a very good indicator, which means that even if we’re not attracting as many investors now, we will attract those in the future. And, of course, we have to work towards that, because the richer your region is, the more benefits a specific country can get. Ultimately, I would say it would still remain on the map where each country fights for their own interests.”

4.2.5 Summary of Opportunity for Baltic nations to Collaborate for Branding Initiative

These findings explore the opportunity for the Baltic nations to collaborate. The data show the idea of collaboration can be seen as both a positive and negative for the region. Themes that emerge from the positive commentary on collaboration include generating greater economic development, ending competition, and improving business environments. Themes that emerge
from the negative commentary on collaboration include navigating Soviet legacies, branding away from occupational past, perceiving other Baltic nations as rather competitive to collaborate, and – in the case of some Estonians – addressing that a Baltic grouping of the three nations would not help them in particular. These alternative addenda to collaboration points out a theme of pursuit of self-interest, one that suggests that Estonia may find greater utility in a regional brand of being associated with its more Nordic neighbours, and Lithuania one of technical and sector-based expertise. In sum, the idea of collaboration between the three nations may be a less attractive option for FDI, if there were choices of other, more culturally germane, regions. This, in part, makes salient that self-interest and resistance may be key in the nation-branding process.
CHAPTER 5 : DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS

5.1 Opportunity for Collaboration and Nationalism

The second research objective of this thesis is to evaluate the opportunity for these Baltic nations to develop a collaborative place brand (see Section 3.1). This objective yields the first two research questions of the study: to what extent does neoliberal nationalism as political will affect the Baltic FDI initiatives, and to what extent does economic nationalism as political will affect Baltic FDI initiatives? These research questions can be discussed by reflecting on the findings of this study.

The opportunity to collaborate provides the space to analyse and discuss the major themes of the findings. Briefly, the overview of these findings can be seen in the Table D1.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>For Collaboration</th>
<th>Against Collaboration</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Internal collaboration</td>
<td>1. Resistance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>a. Encourage economic development</td>
<td>a. Estonia and Finnish relations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b. Improve business environments</td>
<td>b. Identity-seeking behaviours</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Collaboration between Baltic nations</td>
<td>c. Renewal of independence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>a. Increasing visibility</td>
<td>d. Competition</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b. Cost saving</td>
<td>2. Regional alternatives to Baltic brand</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c. Reducing competitiveness in the region</td>
<td>a. Culturally-based</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Evidence of Collaboration</td>
<td>b. Sector-based</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>a. Common goals to benefit nations</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The findings of this thesis covered five main themes that can be seen as either in support of the idea of collaborative action, or against it. The themes of the findings of this research can be weakly ascribed to neoliberal nationalism and economic nationalism.
5.1.1 Neoliberal Nationalism as Political Will

In the investment promotion context, neoliberal nationalism drives the investment promotion agency to brand the nation, and encourages the nation to take measures outside of the state to encourage future national success. As outlined in Appendix B, neoliberal nationalism acts to cultivate parochial nationalism, decontextualising nationality in an attempt to increase investment viability. This paper suggests that this neoliberal form of nationalism would arise amid liberalising financing opportunities, to beget a state more inward investment. This includes reducing market-impeding forms of intervention and encouraging cross-border initiatives to help the state reach its individual investment goals (Harmes, 2012).

In an overview of collaboration and neoliberal nationalism (see Table A1), there are parallels drawn between the two concepts. Table D2 is an augmented version of Table A1, which aligns the findings summarised in Table D1 and germane to the predominant themes of neoliberal nationalism and collaborative branding (Fyall, Oakley, & Weiss, 2000). Adding the themes of these findings will address the first research question of this study: To what extent does neoliberal nationalism as political will affect the triadic relationship between Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania’s FDI branding initiatives.
**TABLE D2: FINDINGS ALIGNING NEOLIBERAL NATIONALISM AND COLLABORATIVE BRANDING**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Collaborative Branding Reference</th>
<th>Neoliberal Nationalism Reference</th>
<th>Reference in the Findings of this Study</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>More effective and efficient means to develop place product</td>
<td>Disciplining states to reduce market-inhibiting actions (Harmes, 2012)</td>
<td>(1a) Encouraging economic development (1b) Improving business environments</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Opportunity for stakeholders to advance shared visions More effective representation of stakeholders</td>
<td>Postnational values of shared state gain (Carnegie, 2002)</td>
<td>(3a) Common goals to benefit nation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mutual benefit among stakeholders to be derived from the exchange/pooling of resources, including time, financing, and expertise</td>
<td>Postnational capitalisation of shared resources for state enhancement (Castells, 2003; Glassman, 2004)</td>
<td>(2a) Increasing visibility (2b) Cost saving</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Opportunity to improve communication of place brand to prospective consumers that require complex resource-intensive distribution channels</td>
<td>Dissolution of archaic cultural conflict (Volcic &amp; Andrejevic, 2011)</td>
<td>(2c) Reducing competitiveness in the region</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chance to achieve greater degree of environmental and sociocultural expertise</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Opportunities for stakeholders to raise their profile, embark on joint-marketing activities, benefit from joint-research and participate in forums</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reduction/avoidance of unnecessary conflict in wider place branding system</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table D2 outlines six themes that arose from the data and how it aligns with the major themes of beneficial aspects of collaborative branding and neoliberal nationalism sentiments. All six themes that posit collaboration as a beneficial act amongst the data are relevant to these
collaborative branding and neoliberal nationalism in the study. To evaluate the research question in depth, the following will look at each finding individually against the neoliberal nationalist and collaborative action literatures.

5.1.1.1 Encouraging Economic Development and Business Environments

The need to encourage economic development and business environments were evident in the findings of this study. The data evidences intranational collaboration, arising from two interviewees: a LIAA employee and a Lithuanian investment developer. This indicates how the organisations in each nation perceive the concept of collaborative action. Nation branding literature argues that economic development is the main driver to participate in the state branding endeavour (Fan, 2010; Kotler, Haider, & Rein, 1993). The imperative for transition nations to brand collectively within the nation is common in order to ensure a positive message can be constructed to international audiences with ease (Szondi, 2007). Collaboration literature states that the collaborative action within a state helps individual organisations’ goals to converge while competitive goals diverge (Fyall, Leask, & Garrod, 2001). The aligned goals within Latvia and Lithuania in this study ensure the very practice of collaboration can create impetuses for these nations to collaborate outside of the nation for a supranational region brand. This can be further exacerbated by LAT 1’s comment that the national IPAs of each nation are communicating between each other at regional conferences, such as the Baltic Development Forum and WAIPA. Therefore, collaboration is not met with contention in Latvia and Lithuania.

Neoliberal nationalism literature identifies that discipline in governance is required for states to develop (Harmes, 2012). Harmes’s (2012) argument includes embracing economic
inter-jurisdictional competition, which may appear to undermine inter-jurisdictional cooperation on the surface. However, intranational discipline for global competition asserts a neoliberalist notion that constrained options would limit the state from pure market dominance. The evidence in the data supporting development of business environments suggests that Latvia and Lithuania in particular have not constrained their options; the nations seek market enhancing tools (such as involving multiple stakeholders) to effectively develop their nation product. The Latvian data in particular hired a place-branding consultant to aid in the nation’s branding process, eventually resulting in the Polaris Process. Overall, the very act of nation branding encourages the neoliberal disposition that nations must adopt this commercial promotion of state (Aronczyk, 2008), and developing business environments for economic development seen in this finding is a manifestation of that.

5.1.1.2 Common Goals to Benefit the Nation

A second theme reflecting on the neoliberal–nationalist conceptualisation was one of common goals that benefited the nation. This came out in three ways: historical common goals, modern common goals, and potential future common goals.

In a historical reference, an Invest Lithuania employee (LITH 2) identified there was a common goal that brought the Baltic nations together: the goal of gaining re-independence in the early 1990s. The cooperation exhibited by these nations to regain independence from Soviet powers can be interpreted to demonstrate political and economic motivations. The cooperative effort the respondents refer to is known as the Baltic Way, or the Baltic Chain (Eglitis & Ardava, 2012; Lane, Pabriks, Purs, & Smith, 2013; Veemaa, 2010). This aligns with the collaboration
literature, ascribing the need for effective representation of stakeholders – in this case, the three nations – as their goals must coalesce in order for a proper collaborative action to be performed. The historical vignette here points out that the relationship between the three nations have not always been contentious, and thus some of the behaviours between the Baltic nations may not have soured the relationship between them. It can be inferred here that the idea of collaboration within the Baltic region for an economic freedom was successful, as all three nations met re-independence with relative ease while working together (Rebas, 1997).

A modern common goal between the nations that arose in the data is the development of infrastructure and logistics. The Rail Baltica project identifies a means to which the nations can collectively work together to capitalise on their location between Scandinavia, Russia, and continental Europe. Symbolically, Rail Baltica has been posited to be a geographic cohesion to the European Union and its member-states (Paajanen, 2014). An interesting note about Rail Baltica that arose in the data was that it the project caused some contention between the nations. An insight can be drawn that similar sentiments may be met if investment promotion collaboration were to be implemented among the three countries. If this insight holds, there may be a feasibility issue when it comes to collaboration among the three nations, despite overall positive views on collaboration for greater awareness and more investment into the region. The IPA respondents did not disclose the motivations for collaboration, but the Rail Baltica highlighted a presence of political will that may dissuade collaborative action.

A third form of common goal alignment is increasing international awareness of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania. As mentioned earlier in this section, a common goal of increasing their awareness can be created between the nations. All three IPAs mentioned there were issues of
awareness to geographic target markets of investors. This becomes salient when the prospect of collaborative branding arises; all respondents in this study addressed the issue of awareness.

The neoliberal nationalism discussion here arises from the post-national values of shared state gain (Carnegie, 2002). Carnegie’s conceptualisation of shared state gain to proliferate neoliberal globalisation arises in the context of the Caribbean, identifying that "sovereignty is anchored to bounded territorial units… populations over which that sovereignty might be exercised and resources those populations control are increasingly transterritorial" (2002:7). These diatribes indict the necessity to view nationalism as a regional issue; it may fundamentally transform global social order. This becomes germane in the interview with CC 4: the interviewee asserts that the nations must brand collaboratively and the common goal is a direction in where the nations must agree. Overall, the common goals have been identified in past (re-independence) and present (Rail Baltica) events, with the allusion for future common goal setting (awareness), identifying the neoliberal nationalist sentiment that common goals are present and common goals persist.

5.1.1.3 Increasing Visibility and Cost Saving

Cost saving arose as a comment on pragmatism. INV 1 identified that the act of cooperation helps attract more investment to the region by "sharing costs of [trade] missions.” The neoliberal nationalism sentiment exists, as working with other nations can help nations share resources (Glassman, 2004). This is exacerbated by highlighting how small the nations are. The data are thick with commentary on the size of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania, also positing that these limitations to their respective nation brands are not unique. This conversation was
embedded within one of awareness and the need for branding for the three nations. The discussion of saving costs and sharing resources was evident to INV 1, within the context of developing an investor-positive business environment in Lithuania. This shows the cost-saving initiative within the nation. In the instances of cost saving within and between the nations, collaboration here offers the pragmatic standpoint of nation branding and the nation branding process: it is better for budgets. This sentiment was echoed in LITH 2’s excerpt "to cooperate more, we can do more… if we do it together; I think it could be good results achieved.” Again, this highlights a pragmatic assertion to collaborate. It reflects the neoliberal nationalist sentiment of post-national capitalisation for shared resources. The data did not frame sharing resources to be politically expedient, but rather one of economic expedience. It can be argued here that pragmatic discourse such as resource sharing may not speak to a nationalist sentiment. However, the framing in which resource sharing – that it would be beneficial for all parties to resource-share within a competitive globalised milieu – can safely assert pragmatic, shared-resource commentary. This echoes neoliberal nationalist behaviour.

5.1.1.4 Reducing Competitiveness in the Region

Reducing competitiveness in the region was another theme that emerged in the data that aligns closely to neoliberal nationalism. This competitiveness reduction is twofold: addressing both the collaborative branding notion of reducing unnecessary conflict within the branding system (Fyall, Oakley, & Weiss, 2000), and dissolving archaic conflict between nations (Volcic & Andrejevic, 2011).
From the collaborative standpoint, collaboration is essentially dissolving competition: turning competitors into collaborators inherently reduces enemies and increases allies. This perspective lends itself to neoliberal nationalistic behaviour. Archaic conflict between nations is dominant in the Baltic case, as the threat of conflict can arise when comparing Baltic nations (i.e. respondents from Lithuania ascribe Estonia winning the FDI game) and the regional discourses in the area. One respondent (CC 4) framed this theme within the context of the Ukraine crisis of 2014, such that it has “made everyone think very carefully… about how the images of the countries are portrayed efficiently”. Nation branding literature regarding international alliances tend to be located in the public diplomacy discipline (Potter, 2009; Simonin, 2008), and is posited to be a kinship between national entities for mutual benefit. Extending this concept to a regional brand in the marketing discipline, the case here of the Baltic nations may attribute to this mutual benefit from a decrease in enemies in the market and an increase in allies in the marketplace. From a neoliberal nationalism standpoint, the decrease in enemies can be framed to be an act of neoliberal efficiency, such that the incentives to decrease competitors create an identity of economic strength; a strength that is only invaluable when those enemies help each collaborative state achieve economic gains (Greenfeld, 1992). Referring to the comment made by CC 4 about the “images of the countries…. portrayed efficiently,” the literature on neoliberal nationalism strongly aligns with this commentary. This suggests that reducing competitiveness in the region can be understood as a neoliberal nationalist sentiment exhibited in this study’s data.
5.1.1.5 Summary of Neoliberal Nationalist Research Question

Reflecting on the research question “to what extent does neoliberal nationalism as political will affect the triadic relationship between Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania’s FDI branding initiatives?” the emergent themes can be strongly argued to support neoliberal nationalist sentiments amid the context of collaborative action. The extent to which neoliberal nationalism as political will affects the triadic relationship between the three nations is very high. Reducing market-inhibiting actions, valuing shared state gains, capitalising on shared resources, and dissolving cultural conflict became salient in the study, suggesting collaborative instances in a nation branding framework provides salience to neoliberal nationalism.

However, it must be noted that the process of nation branding operates within a neoliberal paradigm (Varga, 2013). The distinction between neoliberal paradigmatic responses and neoliberal nationalist responses can be argued to be unclear in the literature. This paper identifies the neoliberal paradigm to be one that would motivate the state to brand, and the action by a state-level organisation (such as an IPA) to be an act of neoliberal nationalism. Nationalism is institutionalised here by the IPA, as a function of a subnationalist discourse (Eaton, 2010). Instituting the IPA as a branding agency for the state is an act of decentralisation, and the powers of nationalism are embedded into the policies set forth by the IPA. Eaton’s work attests decentralisation as a political opportunity for organisations to rebel against the "stranglehold of neoliberalism at a national level,” thus the IPAs from Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania do not necessarily have to ascribe to neoliberal nationalist sentiments. This supports the notion that IPAs are not inherently going to evoke neoliberal nationalist sentiments, because they operate in a neoliberal paradigm when commercialising the state for economic development.
With this distinction clarified, it can be argued that neoliberal nationalism acts as a form of political will in a Baltic collaborative branding effort.

**5.1.2 Economic Nationalism As Political Will**

In the investment promotion context, economic nationalism inhibits the state to brand the nation, and discourages the nation to take measures outside of the state to encourage future national success. Economic nationalism meets interdependence and globalisation acts with hostility, transforming protectionist acts of the state to autarkic governance to shelter cultural and economic stability (discussed in Appendix B). This paper suggests that this economic nationalism would arise in a collaborative branding action if respondents were to identify economic colonialism to drive fear of losing control, territorialist sentiments, distrust in a competitive market, and a fear within the threat of expansionist nationalism (see Table A2). This can be explored with the second research question: to what extent does economic nationalism as political will affect collaborative branding efforts between Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania?

In an overview of collaboration and economic nationalism (see Table A2), there are parallels drawn between the two concepts. Table D3 is an augmented version of Table A1, which aligns the germane findings summarised in Table D1 to the predominant themes of neoliberal nationalism and collaborative branding (Fyall, Oakley, & Weiss, 2000). Adding the themes of these findings will address the second research question of this study: to what extent does economic nationalism as political will affect the triadic relationship between Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania’s FDI branding initiatives.
**TABLE D3: RELATING ECONOMIC NATIONALISM TO COLLABORATIVE BRANDING**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Collaborative Branding Reference</th>
<th>Economic Nationalism Reference</th>
<th>Reference in the Findings of this Study</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Fear amongst stakeholders of losing control over planning and development domain</td>
<td>Economic colonialism drives fear of losing control (Petersen, 1995; Stiglitz, 2002)</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>General concern of perceived loss of control over decision-making among stakeholders</td>
<td>Territorialist sentiments (Agnew, 2009)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unfamiliarity among stakeholders that can involve switching of resources to more familiar, ‘safer’ strategies</td>
<td>Distrust in a competitive market (Braumoeller, 1997)</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ideological and cultural conflict between stakeholders</td>
<td>Fear of expansionist nationalism (Van Evera, 1994)</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mutual suspicion and ill-feeling among stakeholders if competing against each other for sources of funds</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inertia due to inherent dynamic tension in the place branding marketplace</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>(1) Resistance (1a) Estonia and Finnish relations (1b) Identity-seeking behaviours (1c) Renewal of independence (1d) Competition (2) Regional alternatives to Baltic brand (2a) Cultural-based (2b) Sector-based</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Of the interview data, it is difficult to harmonise this study’s findings with economic nationalism in collaborative branding action. Economic nationalism in the literature meets free trade, interdependence, and globalisation with inherent hostility (Shulman, 2000). Manifestations
of economic nationalism arise in state protectionist behaviours and policy. Despite protectionist sentiments evidenced by informants in the study, the commentary in the interview does not align strongly with tenets of economic nationalism. This explains that Table D3 does not show findings from the data that align with the contents of the other two columns.

The data does not properly align to the economic nationalism sentiments, and thus exploring the tenets of economic nationalism may be required. As framed in Appendix B, economic nationalism speaks to protectionist sentiments fueled by the state, and manifests itself with protectionist policies. Economic nationalism in collaborative investment promotion was expected to demonstrate distrust in a competitive market, fear of expansionist nationalism, and sentiments of territorialism in the interview data. The literature mentions economic nationalism as a stately sentiment that perceives strong threat to a national brand (Shulman, 2000). The data identified the Soviet legacy as a threat to the Estonian, Latvian, and Lithuanian brands for investment attraction. It can be argued that the branding against Soviet legacy can be resistance to economic colonialism, but the data here framing the Soviet legacy disturbs the brand attributes of the brand, not the branding of the state in the state. Economic nationalism speaks more to the system of collaborative nation branding rather than the tactics in which the brand can perform. It is also posited in the nationalism literature as oppositional to globalisation forces (Pickel, 2003). Because the respondents in this study agree there is benefit to collaboration, and that there are opportunities to use marketing tools to promote themselves to greater markets, resistance to collaboration does not arise in a state-level protectionist function as economic nationalism boasts. Therefore, this paper argues that economic nationalism as political will has minimal influence on collaborative action between the Baltic nations.
5.1.3 Agency As Alternative to Economic Nationalism

State-level protectionist sentiments are not evident in the findings. The findings uncover two themes that currently deter the IPAs to collaborate for a single market brand for investment competition—Soviet legacies and general cultural resistance. The arguments that define economic nationalism may not align with the findings in this study. Looking at the themes that did emerge, there may be other sentiments that arise within the tropes of the interviews.

The marketing literature frames nation brands as a means to promote the state in a commercialised form, in order to increase capital inflows (Kotler & Gertner, 2002). With the exogenous pressures of modernisation and globalisation, developing nations are especially privy to adopt marketing tools for economic development (Zerillo & Thomas, 2007). These tools involve collaborative action to increase promotion of the state.

Marketing literature may discuss the commercialised forms of nations as brands, but it leaves the exploration of nation branding adoption absent. The Baltic nations have historically evidenced adopting marketing tools to better industrialise their states (Hooley, et al., 2000; Shinkle & Kriauciuunas, 2012; Springer & Czinkota, 1999), so marketing tools such as nation branding show the three countries would not be out of place. However, the adoption of marketing tools was embraced by Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania more readily than other post-Soviet nations (Jansen, 2008). The interview data cites the benefit of economic development to brand the nation, but it also cites the newness of the nations to the global marketplace.

The newness of nation brands becomes important when evaluating economic nationalism. Economic nationalism attends to state protectionism, and the literature review made assumptions
this protectionism would arise stronger in the transition nation context (see Appendix C). Transition nations are countries that have changed from centrally planned economic systems with limited private enterprise to freer market systems with greater democratic institutions (Kornai, 2000). Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania transition from a Soviet-imposed centrally planned economy to an independence-imposed freer market system. Transitioning between economic systems is a dynamic process, and performing economic activity throughout a transition yields sub-optimal economic efficiency of the state (Springer & Czinkota, 1999). The Baltic nations overcame this lack of efficiency by using marketing tools and marketing plans: national marketing plans grew more dominant than in other market-regulated economies in the three countries (Springer & Czinkota, 1999). The adoption of marketing plans at a state level grew quickly after re-independence, especially seen in new industries (Shinkle & Kriauciunas, 2012). Soviet socialist republics, such as the Baltic nations, were traditionally known for agricultural outputs, and the adoption of marketing tools in the service industry grew rapidly in its new market orientation since these nations’ re-independence in the early 1990s (Hooley, et al., 2000). Economic nationalism would suggest these nations would adopt a protectionist approach to their branding methods, but the Baltic nations in the study evidence this protectionism may be more embedded in its transitionhood rather than its economic action. Branding a nation for FDI is a choice a nation makes, and thus it is wise to explore the role of national choice in the discussion. Neoliberal markets for transition nations allow countries to exercise greater choice from previous economic paradigms. New choice may suggest lack of collaboration to protect national agency rather than protect statehood, as economic nationalism
entails (Shulman, 2000). Agency and the protection of agency are framed here to discuss the lack of collaboration of the new Baltic nations.

Bohle and Greskovits (2007) explore the embedded neoliberalism in Baltic agency. Their work addresses the revolutionary process of economic transition vis-à-vis statehood transition, whereby identity politics redefined each nation in a time and space in relation to Russia, Russian minorities, and the concept of the West. The themes evidenced in this study render lack of collaboration salient. Cultural resistance serves as a major theme to a lack of collaboration. This can be posited to reflect the role of new agency the states have after Soviet occupation.

The Baltic agency exercised in this study was evident with the major themes and subthemes that emerged through the data. The following will reframe the subthemes of cultural resistance against the concept of branding as agency for transition nations.

5.1.3.1 Renewal of Independence and Identity-Seeking Behaviours

Renewal of independence arose in the interview data. The evidence in the findings uncovers that the renewed independence of the three nations came with positive and negative sentiments. Positively, the independence gave agency back to the nations in order to create their image to the world instead of it being under the control of the Soviet powers (Aronczyk, 2013). The negative sentiments arise in the path of identity seeking and the frustrations that come with those identity-forming and identity-building processes (Konecnik & Go, 2007).

The findings highlight renewed independence as an impetus to brand for investment. The findings show this in Table F5, framing the current perceptions of the nations with the term Soviet with overall negative words such as "resourceless," "untrustworthy," and "unknown."
Such words can motivate a rebrand for the Baltic nations, such that the Soviet imagery imbued on them can be detrimental to brand success. This was evidenced in this study’s findings. For Estonia, the occupation of the Soviet Union provided the impetus to redefine the investment brand image to align with where Estonian participants feel Estonia ought to be perceived: a position similar to Finland currently. Interview data also informs the Lithuanian branding process to redefine its national identity using investment-branding process. For Latvia, the overt nationalism underpinning national promotion addresses a sense of rejuvenation in its nationhood, albeit via ostentatious use of its flag and the pride it exhibits in the marketplace. These examples demonstrate the transitioning nature of the nations, adopting nation branding as a means to reconstruct current perceptions of their respective nations. This alludes to transition nations using branding as an act of cultural resistance under the guise of nation building (Kaneva & Popescu, 2011).

Respondents evidence the matter to brand away from the Soviet power via the nations exhibiting identity-seeking behaviours and capitalising on stability for external recognition. This branding away from Sovietness is a theme evidenced in the data, and speaks to why the three nations may not currently collaborate. Commentary in the interviews suggests that Invest Lithuania currently opts to create new imagery to reflect its new position in the marketplace. This speaks to this cultural resistance to the post-occupational power (Annus, 2012)- a yearning to brand away from the perception of Sovietness. Interview data support Baltic nations branding away from Soviet legacy and join other recognised regional powers in the area. This echoes the literature on Baltic power in international relations literatures, describing stability as a mechanism to attune the Baltic nations as greater participants in global investment (Asmus &
Nurick, 1996) (Mole, 2012). As an interviewee in the study mentioned, the Lithuanian brand image is seeking its place in a European context, such that it regionally frames itself as a part of a greater European community: one it was absent from before re-independence (Švarplys, 2012).

Renewal of independence may not support collaborative action, but it cannot strongly support the ideas of economic nationalism either19. Economic nationalism reprises a sense of fear that is born out of economic vulnerability (Shulman, 2000). The data here does not evoke a sense of vulnerability in Invest Lithuania. Rather, the data evokes a fear of the Soviet legacy in that the remnants of the powers still lie within the nations with different extents. The commentary regarding Latvia and its brand image strongly identifies the detriment of corruption, and corruption as a function of the "Russian business mentality" that persists and lingers in the nation. Corruption in Latvia has been framed in the literature as a function of a lingering legacy (Pridham, 2014). The Latvian accord attests the corruption as a mechanism of the Russian minority in the nation (Bohle & Greskovits, 2007). The data ascribes this Russian business mentality diminishes the potential of Latvia as investment brand, and an impetus to brand away from this lingering legacy and the manifestations thereof. It can be argued here that the function

19 The general concern of perceived loss of control over decision-making among stakeholders is a noted issue of collaborative circumstance. This may hinder successful collaborative action (Fyall, Leask, & Garrod, 2001). This loss of control was evident in the data, but it did not speak to the loss of control due to any territorialist regime that was initially posited in the economic nationalist literature (see Appendix B). It rather may speak to a navigation of national agency, and the agency to brand a state and control its imagery is more germane to the loss of control. The data speaks to this strongly in the Latvian commentary [CC 1] of “Latvians want to wrap themselves in their flag.” The sheer pride in the Latvian newfound independence from Soviet occupation suggests a necessity to protect agency, rather than protect statehood as framed in the economic nationalist literature (Shulman, 2000).
of branding away from the perception of Sovietness is not one of economic nationalism, but rather a function of exercising agency framed within liberalism. Branding away as a measure to restructure the nation brand imagery, as highlighted in the Latvian examples, exemplifies the ability for the nation to do so, as it once could not as a Soviet socialist republic. Liberal agency in the findings negotiates the repertoire of Western economic, political, and ideological discourse amid shifting the historically variable pattern it once sustained under Soviet hegemony (Jessop, 2002). The agency exercised here is one to be more palatable to interlocutors, and navigating that agency in the nation’s relative newness in the global marketplace adds to the conversation of nation building via nation branding.

The findings expose the creation of new investment country brands, focusing on garnering stronger awareness of each Baltic nation rather than changing damaged reputations. This echoes literature of transition nations focused on production rather than reproduction of national identities, mainly due to relative unawareness to global audiences (Konecnik & Go, 2007). There were no examples given in the interviews that addressed a damaged reputation of the nation by its own doing. In terms of navigating national identities and the nation branding process, the interview data suggest that creating national identities for investment nation branding exercises an agency for the states to adopt modern, efficient management tools. In the data, the agency in nation branding is exercised as educating interlocutors about what the nation wants to be perceived as, and shying away from aggrandising stereotypes for national imagery (Aronczyk, 2008). The findings in this study show that the IPAs brand through educating their target markets: informing potential interlocutors that their nations are more than a living relic of the Soviet past. The data informs this educational aspect by commenting on trade missions to
target markets to promote the state. The data also informs that collaboration between the nations could help with these promotion ventures. This addresses the caveat that Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania are aware of each other’s need to brand in the market (for awareness and branding away from Sovietness), and are aware of the navigation of national identities of each other. This aligns strongly with the transition nation branding literature (Szondi, 2007).

5.1.3.2 Competition

Competition – as a form of resistance – emerges as a theme that underpins neoliberal interrogation of nation branding practices at its core (Ong, 2006). The competition that arises between these nations creates conflicting comments made by the respondents. A Lithuanian macro-net respondent claimed competition between the nations could be a friendly rivalry, construed as embedded within a cultural code encapsulated by neighbourly ethnic jokes. The Estonian macro-net respondent attributed this competition towards a sense of similarity between the nations, such that the nation brands are so similar that competition would arise. The Latvian macro-net respondent attributed this competition to a Russian form of business, such that the typical Latvian businessperson adopts a sense of winner-takes-all competitive framework evident in many post-Soviet states. This winner-takes-all competitive framework is echoed in the literature (Elkus, 2009). These tropes of interview data may be interpreted to align with an economic–nationalist perspective: an inherent state of chaos functions when a perceived economic threat arises through foreign competition (Baughn & Yaprak, 1996). However, this foreign competition is not cited in the data to be a major threat to these nations, and thus it would be unreliable to inform this competition as one of economic nationalism. This is because the
economic threat is not one that threatens the livelihood of the state. Rather, it threatens the ability for the nation to "win" at the globalisation game. The framing of winning and losing is one based in neoliberal competition, such that nations exhibit an "inherent state of chaos", as stated by one respondent (LITH 2) in this study.

Overall, the findings posit that competition may be based in the nature of the Baltic re-independence and nationhood. Resistance to Soviet legacy has been argued to be common among the Baltic nations, representing an "outpost of Western civilization" (Smirnov, 2003; Zubkova, 2008). Aspiring for legitimacy after Soviet occupation aligns a sense of self at odds with aligning with similar nations, despite these nations all aspiring for legitimacy to the West and Western interlocutors (Galbreath, 2014). The legacy of competition between Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania is exacerbated by self-interest (Mole, 2012). It is the interest of the nation to see the other nations as competitors. This is a manifestation of its aspirational national imagery and exercise of national agency (Endzina & Luneva, 2004). Self-interest can be framed as an illusory value (Ringrose & Lerner, 1993), as branding of a nation or a collective nation is still partially in the power of the interlocutor. The imbalance of power between the Baltic nations and the Western target market contrives the actual agency of the nation in its branding effort and forces the nations to choose values desirable the interlocutor. As an Invest Lithuania employee cited, “the nation must stay flexible.” This identifies the notion that, despite the act of will exercised by
these investment promotion agencies to promote\textsuperscript{20}, the nations are still subject to their market. This response to external interlocutors does encourage collaboration, especially if collaborative action yields the nation greater positive attention. This highlights that competition outlines the parameters of the agencies of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania. Exercising agency is limited by the exogenous variable of competition.

5.1.3.3 Regional Alternatives as National Imaginaries

Respondents were aware of benefits to collaborative action, and set it within the context of collaborating with nations aside from each other. The interview data made comments inciting regionalist alternatives to collaborative effort outside of the Baltic brand of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania.

The comments regarding historically greater security powers make note that joining the European Union and NATO were beneficial to the countries, to make them "more attractive for investors" as well as "increasing the brand recognition" of the nations to interlocutors. The comments on recognisability and creating more possibilities can be interpreted to stemming from a "renewal of independence." This renewal of independence suggests that the nations join these regional powers in a form of a rebrand, and that separating itself from the negative sentiments of Sovietness (see Table F5) may remedied by affiliations to NATO and the EU.

\textsuperscript{20} The micro-net informants of this study are employees of the investment promotion agencies. Workers in the organisation act on behalf of the state, and cultural resistance may be inherently built into how they function as an investment promotion agency.
The exercise of agency via nation branding and the potential to adopt collaborative action create struggles for national identity, as the freedom of choice complicates nation-branding context (Endzina & Luneva, 2004). The interaction between the economy and nation dominates the struggle for brand identity, calling forth the nation-state as the locus of collective will. In the context of the Baltic nations, the struggle for identity in a post-Cold War period within an international state system is posited in the literature to be a product of history, not one of nature (Ringrose & Lerner, 1993). Since the product of the Baltic history in this study demonstrates a sense of yearning for profitable Western attention (data cites Scandinavia and North America as target markets for their investment promotion attempts), building national identity for these Baltic nations can highlight the aspirational quality that comes with nation branding. The lack of awareness respondents identify that Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania could be circumvented with a collective Baltic brand, but the aspiration for Estonia to be perceived as more Nordic and Lithuania as more European grows salient, leading to a discussion of nation branding as an aspirational tool amidst creating a modern national identity. Some may argue that exercising this agency is forming Westernisation as a form of neocolonialism (Aronczyk, 2013; Jaakson, 2000), so the interviewees collectively speak to a greater concept of Westernisation as a means to be perceived as more modernised. The data frames nation branding as a tool for nations to negotiate the exogenous variables of modernisation and globalisation. The singular concept of Western capitalism can be framed as neutral, progressive, and peaceful (Aronczyk, 2013). International marketing practice is inherently not open to markets, and tends to find money in unexploited places such as the Baltic nations, thus these nations capitalise on their newness to not only create
new national imagery to Western interlocutors, but also manage positive brand equity in their investment promotion efforts.

The Baltic nations diminish the brand concept of a Baltic region product, as further evidence of the aspirational form of nation branding and exercising the collaborative agency to these greater regions. Such diminishing occurs through a process of othership. Estonian respondents evidence othership against the Lithuanian respondents. This ascribes Estonia’s nation-brand strategy to an aspirational identity politic (Bellini, Loffredo, & Pasquinelli, 2010; Petersoo, 2007). Estonian respondents specifically frame the otherness as a means to argue cultural closeness to their Nordic neighbours, inciting a cultural conflict with the Baltic neighbours as potential co-branders. Ideological and cultural conflict between stakeholders is identified as a limitation to collaborative action in the organisational theory literature (Fyall, Leask, & Garrod, 2001; Jamal & Getz, 1995). However, it did not arise in this data. It is important to provide commentary on this matter because the current culture evokes nationalism, and aspirational culture speaks to national imaginaries. This is not a reflection of economic nationalism, but rather a protection of national agency amid the discourses of re-independence and navigating away from Soviet legacies.

5.2 Nationalism as Political Will

The third research question of this study asks how nationalism as political will be accounted for in the process of cross-border collaborative place branding in a transition nation context. This will be addressed in multiple parts.
Firstly, neoliberal and economic nationalism interplay affects collaborative branding decisions. This study demonstrates that neoliberal nationalism was salient, but economic nationalism was not, among the branding decisions between the investment promotion agencies. Despite neoliberal nationalism and economic nationalism posited as oppositional in the conceptual framework of this paper, the data did not show economic nationalism as present. Interview data suggests there may be another factor at play. This may be attributed to the nature of the transition nation. Conflict and cooperation has been present in Baltic politics since re-independence (Metzger & Schmitt, 2012; Wellmann, 1992). The nature of the transition nation here uncovers the need to explore agency in adopting commercial practices as nation branding for building national identity.

Agency in the study is a dimension of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania that becomes salient in the collaborative instance. The decision to collaborate is an act of national agency: exercising the choice to work with another nation and to be perceived to operate jointly with another nation (Volcic & Andrejevic, 2011). It may appear that nationalism is not warranted as political will in the discussion of collaboration, but within the framework of the neoliberal act of nation branding, national agency inherently involves act of acceptance or resistance. It is the choice of the nation to do so. This becomes especially important for nations with newfound agency, and newfound choices. Nations with newfound agency include transition nations (Sussman, 2011). In the collaborative literature, resistance to brand between products may arise when collaboration undermines individual brands' abilities to attract resources (Venkatesh, Mahajan, & Muller, 2000). This resistance to brand can be framed as an aspirational cultural resistance. The aspiration was visible within the data in the Estonian framing of its Nordicness and Lithuanian
framing of its Europeanness. Adopting nation branding for a nation-state serves two purposes: economic gain and nation building. Increasing country attractiveness is most relevant in nation branding practice (Anholt, 2011), and thus this ability to choose how a country wants to be perceived can be framed as a recent luxury to transition economies. The economic gain a nation wishes to garner with the act of nation branding can be done with Nordicness in the case of Estonia, and Europeanness with the case of Lithuania.

The marketing perspective of the nation branding literature ascribes to a pro-forma technical-economic paradigm in which commercial nationalism will ensure success for the state and its many goals regarding sustainable gains (Kaneva, 2011). The critical marketing perspective suggests nation branding is inherently reductionist, and thus frames the idea of branding as an economic solution to be objectionable (Varga, 2013). The Baltic nations adopting the commercialisation of nation for investment can be seen as an adoption of Westernisation practice, whereby commercialisation of the nation aligns to a Western practice of modernising the nation-state (Volcic & Andrejevic, 2011). However, this thesis lends itself to explore the rethinking of branding as more than a conventional binary category. The two poles in this binary are nation branding as solution and nation branding as problematic. Branding for the Baltic nations here suggest these polar co-exist. The fluidity of responses in this study suggests that the idea of collaboration is not inherently rejected, despite the fact it is not happening currently in the Baltic nations. The coexistence of these phenomena can urge the discussion about nation branding and collaborative action to be less hegemony vs resistance, but rather hegemony via resistance, in order to appease interlocutors in a matter of investment. This is exacerbated by the role of the IPA as a governmental agency. One respondent identified that the investment...
promotion agency here is a "political organisation charged to achieve an economic result, but with a conflicting mandate", identifying there is discord of political will at play. With this political will present, it sheds further light on national action as political will in a transition nation arena, at the intersection of nation branding and collaborative action.

5.3 General Conclusions

This thesis attempts to explore nationalism in the context of collaborative nation branding. Previous research explores nationalism as impetus to brand (Endzina & Luneva, 2004) and branding as a method in which nationalism can be exacerbated in an attempt to create self-sustaining myths in building coherent identities (Aronczyk, 2008; Olins, 2001). Moreover, underpinnings of nationalism in nation branding are mostly from critical theories of communication and culture (Aronczyk, 2013; Kaneva, 2011). This research aimed to blend the marketing application of collaboration and the critical inquiry of nationalism, addressing the discourses supporting (in the form of neoliberal nationalism) and opposing (in the form of economic nationalism) collaboration. The dissonance between these forms of nationalism was to be identified and addressed in the research. The oppositional nature of these nationalisms, however, was not strongly evidenced in the findings. Expectations of the researcher included respondents’ collaborative strategic examples to be argued in a relationship between neoliberal nationalist and economic nationalist sentiments. The position of collaboration as a function of neoliberal nationalism was more germane to the position of anti-collaboration as a function of economic nationalism. The data from the 14 interviews collected suggests that the anti-
collaboration function may speak to a protection of newfound agency born out of transitionhood and entrance into a modern, globalised nation marketplace.

5.4 Contribution of Research

This study explores the nation product in the context of collaborative transition nation branding for foreign investment. Research contributions extend to both theoretical and managerial domains.

This paper prominently extends the research in place branding theories. Place branding currently attends to the concept as a solution to national economic gain and sustainable sovereignty, or that the concept risks decontextualising the nation and must proceed with caution. This research enlightens this binary by showing that transition-nation products experience a navigation of identity, both of geopolitical and commercial identities in concert. The temporal aspect of a transition nation’s development allows for another layer of nation-branding research to arise: one that addresses the temporality in nation branding processes.

Current place branding theories attend to collaboration as an intranational domain (e.g. Fyall, Oakley, & Weiss, 2000; Fyall, Leask, & Garrod, 2001; Wang & Xiang, 2007). This paper extends collaborative research in place branding using theories of intranational contexts to international contexts. The international dimension highlights the geopolitical dimensions of place as brand; one that warrants further exploration academically. Attending to those geopolitical dimensions of brand, this research also extends nationalism from a geopolitical matter to one of a collaborative matter in a place-branding instance. Nationalism continues to encourage nations to identify individually as political and commercial reputations in a
marketplace. National identification to global audiences in this study shows nations that operate as both political and commercial entities must negotiate nationalism in both realms, rather than traditionally seen as mostly a geopolitical matter in the political studies literatures.

This research attends to the extension of place branding literature via a macromarketing lens. Macromarketing involves a network of entities linked through shared participation in economic exchange (Layton, 2010). In the case of the Baltic nations, the three nations work together as a network of entities to transform the present economic standpoint of the states, and aid in their plight to create their political and economic legitimacy in a globalised world. This research highlights the nature of Post-Soviet occupation paradigms of nation products, such that the relics of a political past creates commercial spaces where the once powerless now have agency, and the act of agency is marred with pressure to support citizens while protecting its national imaginaries. In terms of branding, strategic branding falls unto logical market structures. Kay (2006) says this is akin to metaphors, allegories, or other representations that affect meaning. Brands with market success are consistent and well understood. Adopting marketing strategies to promote the states in a neoliberal paradigm suggests that the nations see both willingness and imperative to turn an otherwise public diplomacy act (nation branding) into a market activity. Macromarketing perspectives on nation branding in this paper shows the nuances of nationalism as political will to expand reputational capital models and explore the "awkwardness" of the international brand concept in a less nebulous approach (O'Shaughnessy & O'Shaughnessy, 2000).

Practical contributions of this research are also present. Branding decision makers at investment promotion agencies must be aware of negotiating the histories of each nation in order
to create economic growth for the region. In promoting the nation with historical attributes of the country as brand attributes, branders at these agencies must take histories and futures of the brand into consideration to promote the nation sustainably. Secondly, promotion agencies in his study identify that collaboration is pragmatically a good idea for their nations, and this study highlights regional promotion may feasibly aid nations, those with smaller brand concepts and shorter positive brand legacies, to increase foreign direct investment. This renders a contribution by creating the space for collaboration to be a viable option for modern nation branding practice.

5.5 Limitations of the Research

Firstly, this research tends to be descriptive in nature. Despite the call from Gertner (2011) to advance testable models and hypotheses in the realm of nation branding, this research subscribes to an in-depth inductive approach to this group of nations because of the imperative to address transition nations in place branding.

Secondly, there were also limited claims to validate that the Lithuanian IPA, Invest Lithuania, acted on directly behalf of the government. Addressing this relationship is imperative to the study: verifying the strong relationship between an IPA and the federal government ensures validates assumptions that branding decisions made by the IPAs can be analysed as nationalist.

Thirdly, the literature review here framed the conceptualisation of nationalism as an inherent state of being that is identified through behaviour. This research disregards the possibility that the nations may not want to work together due to poorly-executed collaborative
action that may have transpired earlier. Their choice not to work together may be attributed to failed attempts of collaborative action rather than anything nationalist (Jamal & Getz, 1995). From a methodological standpoint, some limitations were present and could have been mitigated in order to make the findings more robust. The research would have benefitted from a second transcriber and second coder in order to ensure a more fair and objective understanding of the data. It would have saved time rather than the alternative that occurred: the single researcher transcribing and coding the data twice for similar results. Likewise, the data should have been properly triangulated with other available promotional materials from the three investment promotion agencies to have a fuller understanding of their proposed brand and branding actions thereof. This would inform a stronger exploration of nationalist rhetoric within branding materials, and inform the researcher of branding conduct with the three investment promotion agencies.

To scrutinise the conduct of methodology further, additional questions in the methodology should have included specifics on target markets and definitions of branding. Such questions may have uncovered robust sentiments of American hegemonic imperialism in the investment promotion. Also, constructivist theory suggests that informants should be aware of the researcher’s initial findings and discussion before finalising documentation. This would have been a proper administration of the constructivist paradigm, by fully allowing a co-creation of realities within the data. The researcher felt there were time limitations to conduct this fully. The researcher also had fears of respondents editing their responses after transcription and did not want to risk the loss of rich data that was initially provided. This will be mitigated once the defense is completed; the researcher will create a document solely for the informants, to inform
them of the findings and discussion of this study. Co-creation of the truths will happen post-thesis and will help in the formation of a manuscript for journal publication.

5.6 Further Research

For further research, five items have been identified that aim to address some of the gaps identified in this research. First, a further interrogation of transition nations ought to be looked at from the investment perspective – framing of access and agency with nation branding behaviour. Second, addressing the marketisation of transition nations via branding initiatives would be a strong venue to explore, particularly the role of American imperialistic modernism in transition nation-branding action. Third, the nature of investment promotion warrants stronger research in order to discern assumptions made in this paper regarding destination-branding principles as similar to those in the investment promotion context. Fourth, the case of the Baltic countries brings forth the idea of "branding away" from a Soviet perception of brand while using an American-based neoliberal tool such as branding to allow this post-Occupation identity to arise. It is encouraged for research to explore the influence of American and Russian cultural hegemonic practice in post-Soviet transition nations.
CHAPTER 6: BIBLIOGRAPHY


APPENDIX A: INVESTMENT AND NATION BRANDING

Literature suggests FDI is a common reason to create a nation brand (Capik, 2007; Deichmann, 2010; Jacobsen, 2009; Jansen, 2008; Kotler, Jatusripitak, & Maesincee, 1997; Middleton, 2011; Pantzalis & Rodrigues, 1999; Perugini, Pompei, & Signorelli, 2008; Skinner & Kubacki, 2007; Warnaby, Bennison, Davies, & Hughes, 2002). Attracting businesses from elsewhere and expanding outside investments can do this. In doing so, investment promotion agencies must brand their nation product differently from destination marketing organisations or other government agencies. This is because the nation brand now changes the marketing exchange from a business-to-consumer (B2C) relationship to that of business-to-business (B2B)\(^2\).

The investor audience also differs from other nation brand audiences due to the length of market exchange with the nation as product. The investor-nation brand dynamic ensures a longer purchasing cycle, with a more rigorous pre-purchase research phase and longer pre-exchange buyer-seller interaction. Investors need to be assured that the nation brand they invest in will have sustainable brand attributes in the long term. Because of this unique interaction, IPAs must be very aware of their obligation of governance (Warnaby, Bennison, Davies, & Hughes, 2002).

\(^2\) Brand equity and spillover effects have proven to function similarly between B2C and B2B contexts (Homburg, Klarman, & Schmitt, 2010; Kotler & Pfoertsch, 2007; Kuhn, Alpert, & LI Pope, 2008; Morgan, Deeter-Schmelz, & Moberg, 2007). The difference lies in the expectations the audience has of the place. Whereas destination-branding practices by IPAs suggest recreation and leisure activities for its audiences, the investor expectations of a place brand differ. Market accessibility, client accessibility, strong calibre of clientele, market size, and demand conditions have been tested to be the most important brand attributes an investor requires of a place brand before it provides its endowment (Faeth, 2009; Haaland & Wooton, 1999; Piteli, 2010).
IPAs need to exercise strong nation brand strategic management approaches for such end users, and thus investment place marketing calls for more developed nation brand processes and research thereof (Jacobsen, 2009; Metaxas, 2010).

Investment-oriented place marketing is generally seen to increase FDI, as FDI is historically one of the major drivers of economic development of a country (Moosa, 2002; Papadopoulos, 2004). The impacts of FDI on a state economy include industrial modernisation, productivity improvement, increase of quality, and increase of competitiveness of economic outputs (Perugini, Pompei, & Signorelli, 2008). Investment creates jobs, expands a place’s tax base, manages budgets, and funds education, infrastructure, and services (Middleton, 2011). Countries have traditionally marketed themselves to large multinational firms to be places of wholesaling or manufacturing; and to ease market operations for a multinational in their geographic region. Countries such as China and India have grown to be notable nation branders for FDI (Anholt, 2011), growing as world leaders in manufactured consumer products and outsourcing services respectively (Kaur, 2012). Because of this phenomenon, there is ample research to support focusing on FDI and nation branding within nations of high manufacturing or industrial need for FDI (Jacobsen, 2009; Kotler, Jatusripitak, & Maesincee, 1997; Metaxas, 2010).

Investment Promotion Agencies (IPAs) are instituted by governments to implement marketing activities to increase local and foreign investment to the municipalities and regions. Similar to DMOs for the tourism sector (Pike, 2007), IPAs are mandated to increase investment into a region using marketing tools such as designing advertising campaigns, co-ordinating trade missions, and implementing strategic plans (Moilanen & Rainisto, 2009). Examples include the
Czech Republic and their FDI promotions firm CzechInvest (Deichmann, 2010), Switzerland’s science and technology international promotions firm Swissnex (Fetscherin & Marmier, 2010), or Denmark’s ministry of foreign affairs’ investment promotions division Invest in Denmark (Therkelsen & Halkier, 2008).

The FDI process itself involves investment promotion and, in turn, place promotion. The four stages of investment promotion of a place are strategy, lead generation, investment facilitation, and investment servicing (Loewendahl, 2001). This implies that the process to bring in foreign dollars for economic development is heavily ingrained in the marketing activity of investment promotion22 (Capik, 2007).

Conceptual models in marketing have been evident to support investment promotion practice for FDI. Metaxas (2010) suggests a methodological framework to test FDI processes in place branding (Metaxas, 2010). Examining both the supply and demand side of place brands in order to imply their interplay toward place brand equity is necessary for effective FDI attractiveness. Jacobsen (2009) looked specifically at the role of investor equity in the place brand context, concluding that the relationships between the decision-making processes of the place investor, the nature of the place brand, and the operationalisation of managing place brands must work in concert to ensure quality attraction of FDI location (Jacobsen, 2009). Empirically,

22 Place branding has been explored in the FDI context with mainly under the term ‘investment promotion’ (Capik, 2007; Harding & Javorcik, 2007; Lim, 2008; Loewendahl, 2001; Metaxas, 2010; Wells & Wint, 1990). This urban economics term relies on the assertion that places must brand themselves in order to increase inward investment. Analytical models suggest that investment promotion agencies are effective in influencing the decision to invest, mostly influenced by key factors such as quality of investment and country’s market size (Morisset, 2003).
Capik (2007) looked at Czech Republic, Slovakia, and Poland for a Central and Eastern European perspective, comparing the newly marketised states and their capital cities to understand the effectiveness of place branding in an investment context. The research found regional authorities in these nations were aware that place promotion in the FDI context required a recognition of local competition, either within the nation, or between nations. Moreover, the comparative case study asserts that more research is required among authorities to ensure active improvement of foreign investment behaviours (Capik, 2007).

Investment promotion is also conceptualised as a business process. As argued by Cass (2007), processes such as market segmentation, brand development, promotions, and the marketing mix are devised by IPAs in order to increase FDI. In doing so, the IPAs are able to ensure success for FDI for their brand and their nation overall. It also identifies that IPAs are adopting marketing practice to increase FDI (Cass, 2007).
APPENDIX B: NEOLIBERAL VS ECONOMIC NATIONALISM

AB.1 DRIVING COLLABORATION: NEOLIBERAL NATIONALISM

Neoliberal nationalism may seem oxymoronic in its nomenclature, but ‘neoliberal rationality extended to the state itself indexes state success according to its ability to sustain and foster the market and ties state legitimacy to such success’ (Brown, 2003). Neoliberalism is contingent on nationalism to increase solidarity between majority and minority narratives of the state. This includes inclusion of foreign minorities, gender and sexual minorities, and racial and ethnic minorities (Watanabe, 2007). Neoliberalist sentiments without nationalist underpinnings would only exacerbate superior and inferior viewpoints under the state’s overarching narrative. It acts to cultivate parochial nationalism, but in doing so transforms it to decontextualise nationality, and thus naturalises power differences.

Neoliberal nationalism encourages new meanings of nation in modern times. The purpose is to elucidate current state of challenges and policies as time progresses, where nations must focus on long-term perspectives of national viability and livelihood (Kawai, 2009). The reasons why implications for neoliberalism are germane to nationalist governance and decision-making are twofold. First, neoliberalism is globalising in and of itself (Bourdieu, 1998; Giroux, 2004; Harvey, 2005). Second, neoliberalism concerns power, nation-states, and worldview (Giroux, 2004; Harvey, 2005): items imperative to national orientation and policy in place branding phenomena (Dzenovska, 2005). Moreover, neoliberal nationalism encourages the nation to be free to engage in any activity – separate of cultural and historical contexts – to provide itself present and future utility (Conway, 1995). It acts as a metaphor of consequentialism, often
exhibited as ‘the ends justify the means’: free activities of the state in global markets are often supported if it is for economic and livelihood strategic goals (Tan, 2004).

Neoliberal nationalism is a composite of other forms of nationalisms as well. In particular, postnationalism and commercial nationalism articulate neoliberal nationalism in this distinct orientation.

Postnationalism as philosophy references states that globalise; as ideology, postnationalism supports the process to contrive traditional nationalist sentiments to remain current in the modern world. Born out of economic, political, and cultural pressures on nations, postnationalism suggests nations are to lose patriotism to forge international bonds for global relevance in capital, political, and cultural markets. Postnationalism can be concluded to be anti-statist (Soysal, 1994), given nationalist sentiments should be devalued based on empirical, conceptual, and normative grounds set out in a Soysalian perspective. Seen primarily in international human rights law (Ingram, 2003; Shafir & Brysk, 2006), the state of the nation prohibits for economic success of states in a globalised world. Postnationalist sentiments for state-building purposes suggest solidarity and duty to citizens and national organisations alike, in order to discern singular national identities for a formation of a postnational belief system. The attachment to citizenship and nationalism may linger, but truncation thereof suggests the nation can more readily participate in global economic and cultural competition.

The manifestation of neoliberal nationalism in a branding context is commercial nationalism. Commercial nationalism, a form of banal nationalism (Billig, 1995), is a more muted form of nationalism that is seen in a less extreme and more frequent capitalist-oriented fashion (Volcic & Andrejevic, 2011). Commercial nationalism uses shallow methods to
promulgate nationalistic imagery in a less extreme fashion as war or sporting events. In doing so, commercial nationalism adopts neoliberal techniques to create social and cultural narratives that the state can readily govern.

Postnational state governance encourages seeking resources outside of the state, in order to achieve future narrative success, outlined by citizens, governors, and businesses alike. Postnationalism has been supported by collaborative policy, seen both among Eurozone members using a single currency (Shabani, 2006), and Caribbean states embracing postnationalism to increase global power and participation (Carnegie, 2002). These collaborative policies ensure co-creation between nations, to ensure participant values are voiced and responded to for long-term orientation. Moreover, these postnational sentiments encourage pooling of resources, while scale politics encourage expanding geographical range of organisational alliances in order to capitalise on resource availability. This tends to be most common among states facing struggles to move ahead and meet strategic economic goals (Castells, 2003) (Glassman, 2004). In a nation branding context, postnationalism can be proliferated through electing to collaborate with other states. Promotion of multiple states under a singular nation brand is very much a postnational sentiment. National representation through nation branding – a neoliberal marketing activity (Kapferer, 1992) – does indeed inform nation-building policies, often addressed in academic literature (Billig, 1995; Edensor, 2002; Fox & Miller-Idriss, 2008; Yuval-Davis, 1997).

The sentiments of commercial nationalism have been argued to be a final attack of the obsolete institution of traditional nationalism (Levitt, 1993), albeit purported as a technique of contemporary governance (Volcic & Andrejevic, 2011). It elects to promote solidarity
throughout the state by dissolving archaic forms of cultural conflict via disaggregating collectives into branding ideals and nation-states. The state operates as enterprise, and thus elects for stakeholder participation in creating nationalist narratives. Moreover, commercial nationalism surmises external participation of culture creation and dissipation (Volcic, 2009), evidenced from as early Roman propagation of victory with Greece, Corinth, and Carthage (Moffatt, 1928). More recently, commercial nationalism can be seen in creating national communities in new nations in Balkan Europe (Volcic & Andrejevic, 2010; Volcic & Zajc, 2013).

This paper posits neoliberal nationalism as a strong driver of collaborative branding. Neoliberal nationalism as political will has the determination to create unique circumstances for nation brands to elect towards collaboration. This is mostly demonstrated if neoliberal nationalism is more salient than a conflicting economic nationalism in the branding process. Using the framework of Fyall, Oakley, and Weiss’s (2000) concatenation of research, the support of collaboration can easily be underpinned by neoliberal nationalistic tendencies in the branding process.

**TABLE A1: COLLABORATIVE BRANDING AND NEOLIBERAL NATIONALISM COMPARISONS**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Support to Collaborative Branding Adapted from Fyall, Oakley, &amp; Weiss, 2000</th>
<th>Neoliberal Nationalism Reference</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>More effective and efficient means to develop place product</td>
<td>Disciplining states to reduce market-inhibiting actions (Harnes, 2012)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Opportunity for stakeholders to advanced shared visions</td>
<td>Postnational values of shared state gain (Carnegie, 2002)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
More effective representation of stakeholders. Mutual benefit among stakeholders to be derived from the exchange/pooling of resources, including time, financing, and expertise

Opportunity to improve communication of place brand to prospective consumers that require complex resource-intensive distribution channels

Chance to achieve greater degree of environmental and sociocultural expertise

Opportunities for stakeholders to raise their profile, embark on joint-marketing activities, benefit from joint-research, and participate in forums

Reduction/avoidance of unnecessary conflict in wider place branding system

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>More effective representation of stakeholders.</th>
<th>Postnational capitalisation of shared resources for state enhancement (Castells, 2003) (Glassman, 2004)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mutual benefit among stakeholders to be derived from the exchange/pooling of resources, including time, financing, and expertise</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Opportunity to improve communication of place brand to prospective consumers that require complex resource-intensive distribution channels</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chance to achieve greater degree of environmental and sociocultural expertise</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Opportunities for stakeholders to raise their profile, embark on joint-marketing activities, benefit from joint-research, and participate in forums</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reduction/avoidance of unnecessary conflict in wider place branding system</td>
<td>Dissolution of archaic cultural conflict (Volcic &amp; Andrejevic, 2011)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**AB.2 INHIBITING COLLABORATION: ECONOMIC NATIONALISM**

Nationalism arises from stately goals of unity, identity, and autonomy of a geopolitical state (Shulman, 2000). This has manifested historically through civic nationalism – the association of people who identify as members of a nation (Breton, 1988) – in terms of nation building of new geopolitical states (Wimmer & Glick Schiller, 2002). However, modern nationalism -states competing in global markets for economic development - may manifest as resistance to participate in globalisation, or resistance to create interdependence between nations. In economic thought, this phenomenon is called economic nationalism (Gilpin & Gilpin, 1987; Helleiner, 2002; Johnson, 1965; Nakano, 2004; Shulman, 2000).

Economic nationalism suggests that the response to free trade, interdependence, and globalisation by a state are met with inherent hostility (Shulman, 2000). This hostility is met by
protectionist sentiments and economic warfare, such that it encourages autarky, or closing off the state economically (Margerum Harlen, 1999). Reasons for economic nationalism to arise in a state include protection of autonomy through economic independence, unity through a single economic space, identity shaped by sharpened economic boundaries, and protection of cultural identity (Shulman, 2000). It may result from the gap between a nation’s inadequate capacity for collective action and acute threats to its economy overall (Snyder, 1993). The justification to avoid collaboration or a form of integrative process with other nations lies in the ideology that nationality overrides and includes substitute criteria for alliance and antipathy (Szporluk, 1988). This is heavily present in constitutional irredentist nationalism.23

Fear as threat and power are intertwined in economic nationalism. Fear and control are two main facets in which nationalism imbues (Kim, 2007). Nationalism saliency among organisations differs across countries, culturally and historically speaking. Negative nationalistic rhetoric emerges in the wake of fear, such as xenophobia or radical right-wing sentiments (Weiss, 2003). These fears are plenty, ranging from political to economic (Helleiner & Pickel, 2005), to social (Glassman, 2004). In the realm of economic fear, the saliency has surged immensely with the growth of modernisation and economic globalisation. The mantra ‘the more a nation increases its foreign ties, the increase in economic diversification a state has, ultimately reducing national economic vulnerability’ instigates this fear (Shulman, 2000: 369). The fear can manifest itself as potential conflict between nations (Frieden, 1988). External forces that threaten

23 Irredentism supports states opting to annex based on commonality, whether it is ethnicity, history, culture, or politics.
national success can lead to a distrust between nations, and anxiety about losing while subscribing to an ideology of international community (Weiss, 2003). If nation-states identify as participant in a collaborative branding effort, nations may feel threatened that larger economic powers in the collaboration will have greater influence throughout the decision-making process, and the overall hegemony on the communicated brand (Pedersen, 2002). This fear is further aggrandised by the threat of economic colonialism\(^{24}\) (Petersen, 1995; Stiglitz, 2002). In lieu of political or military control, the power of influence exercised by geopolitical entities via globalisation and/or cultural imperialism can lead to both weakened economies and weakened faith in national identity as prominent. As a result, the decision to collaborate and create a single, unified brand amongst ‘competitive’ nations in the marketplace disturbs the strength of economic nationalism.

Neoliberal discourse deters individual nations from collaborating with other nations, not only due to competition, but also due to radical aggressiveness towards expansionism (Van Evera, 1994). Expansionism as nationalist rhetoric is a common fear of once-colonised states, such that colonisers supported expansionist sentiments to encourage taking over other nations in the pursuit to enlarge. This sentiment is supported by expansionist diction expressing that colonies are honoured to garner the benefits of the virtuous expansionist state. African nations and post-Soviet states are especially susceptible to such fears (Moore, 2001; Tsygankov, 2003;

\(^{24}\) Economic colonialism can also be referred to as neocolonialism; acting as modern imperialism practised heavily in capitalised modernised economies. The effect is similar to that of political colonialism; one nation has heavy influence on the operation of statehood of another nation.
Weldemichael, 2013); recent national histories of these states encourage ardent hostility towards any benefit as incentive given by other nations, out of fear to be suffering from the dire implications of colonisation once again (Braumoeller, 1997). A second form of this capitalist discourse would suggest territorialism; the sacredness a state has in its allegiance to itself. Citizenship fuels this rather than ethnicity (Agnew, 2009). This sacredness suggests that constructing a group identity would be blasphemous to the nation’s livelihood (White, 2000). Territorialism as philosophy counteracts the role of expansionism, as territorialist governance and policies stunt expansionist behaviours.

Using the framework of Fyall, Oakley, and Weiss’s (2000) concatenation of research, the drawbacks of collaboration can easily be supported by economic nationalistic tendencies in the branding process.

**TABLE A2: COLLABORATIVE BRANDING AND ECONOMIC NATIONALISM COMPARISONS**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Limitations to Collaborative Branding</th>
<th>Economic Nationalism Reference</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Adapted from Fyall, Oakley, &amp; Weiss, 2000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fear amongst stakeholders of losing control over planning and development domain</td>
<td>Economic Colonialism drives fear of losing control (Petersen, 1995; Stiglitz, 2002)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>General concern of perceived loss of control over decision-making among stakeholders</td>
<td>Territorialist Sentiments (Agnew, 2009)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unfamiliarity amongst stakeholders that can involve switching of resources to more familiar, ‘safer’ strategies</td>
<td>Distrust in a Competitive Market (Braumoeller, 1997)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ideological and cultural conflict between stakeholders</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mutual suspicion and ill-feeling among stakeholders if competing against each other for sources of funds</td>
<td>Fear of expansionist nationalism (Van Evera, 1994)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inertia due to inherent dynamic tension in the place branding marketplace</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
APPENDIX C: DECISION CRITERIA FOR CONTEXT

The following are the decision criteria to select a site for this study:

1. Nations must have active place branding initiatives.
2. Selected nations must enjoy geographic proximity.
3. Selected nations must have exhibited forms of neoliberal and economic nationalism in its history.

The sites selected in this study are the Baltic nations, made up of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania. These nations are characterised as transition economies. Against the criteria above, the below will go into detail of why these nations suit this study and to test this model.

AC.1 NATIONAL PLACE BRANDING INITIATIVES

To address the first criteria, nations must be in a position to place brand. This means either they may have to identify an opportunity to place brand, or are in a position to be competitive. The former refers to the option nations have when they hold an internationally attended event, such as the Olympics (Fetscherin, 2010; Kalamova & Konrad, 2010; Mihailovich, 2006). The latter refers to nations that feel economic threat to their continued growth and prosperity. It can also refer to states that have an ‘economic illness’ (Kotler, Haider, & Rein, 1993), framed to only rectified by marketing a nation in a neoliberal practice (Aronczyk, 2013). Albeit most nations are in this position, in particular nation branding yields most germane for transition economies. These economies include former USSR republics, ex-communist Central & Eastern European nations, and nations such as China and Vietnam (McKenzie &
Merrilees, 2008). Transition economies\(^{25}\) have evidenced nation-branding initiatives. This is summarised in Table A3.

### TABLE A3: SELECT TRANSITION ECONOMIES WITH STUDIED NATION BRANDING INITIATIVES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Nation</th>
<th>Reference</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Estonia</td>
<td>(Aronczyk, 2013; Jansen, 2008)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latvia</td>
<td>(Dzenovska, 2005; Endzina &amp; Luneva, 2004; Frasher, Hall, Hildreth, &amp; Sorgi, 2003)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lithuania</td>
<td>(Aronczyk, 2008; Park, 2009)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ukraine</td>
<td>(Gertner, Berger, &amp; Gertner, 2007; Uçok-Hughes &amp; Bagramian, 2013)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poland</td>
<td>(Aronczyk, 2008; Capik, 2007; Florek, 2005; Young &amp; Kaczmarek, 1999)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slovenia</td>
<td>(Konecnik Ruzzier &amp; de Chernatony, 2012; Konecnik &amp; Go, 2007)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bulgaria</td>
<td>(Konecnik &amp; Go, 2007; Volcic &amp; Andrejevic, 2011)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kazakhstan</td>
<td>(Gaggiotti, Cheng, &amp; Yunak, 2008; Marat, 2007; Marat, 2009; Saunders, 2008)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russia</td>
<td>(Dinnie, 2008; Ostapenko, 2010; Simons, 2011)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Albania</td>
<td>(Volcic &amp; Andrejevic, 2011)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>China</td>
<td>(Berkowitz, Gjermano, Gomez, &amp; Schafer, 2007; Fan, 2010; Loo &amp; Davies, 2006)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Macedonia</td>
<td>(Graan, 2013)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Transition economies differ from free market economies in many ways, one of which is based on differences in characteristics of its citizens. Citizens in transition economies, compared to counterparts in free market economies, demonstrate higher values of conservatism and hierarchy, while scoring lower on egalitarianism, affective autonomy, and intellectual autonomy (Schwartz & Bardi, 1997), which bleed into transition economies’ nation branding efforts (Young, 2005). This relative dearth of curiosity and broadmindedness that transition economies

\(^{25}\) The cultural system that produces the modern phenotypes of globalisation and modernisation for transition nations especially – in the form of state government and economy-orientation of sustainable growth – is nationalism (Seymour, 2004). Globalisation promotes the spread of nationalism as a diffusion of cultural norms in the system, making it possible for individual states to succeed in conditions of considerable integration.
may face are engrained in the problems of motivation found during Soviet times (Horvath & Lukacsy, 2011), tied to a principle of socialist equality (Vajhala & Strang, 2014).

A modern environment characterised by high levels of uncertainty, turmoil, and new demands has created the urgency for transition economies to participate in place branding exercises (Czinkota, 1997; Volcic & Andrejevic, 2011). However, the neoliberal market orientation of these nations is still in their primacy, evidenced by transition nations to elect short-term efficiency goals instead of long-term, market-dominated goals (Hooley, et al., 2000; Shinkle & Kriauciu纳斯, 2012). The nature of collaborative nation branding can be characterised as a long-term, market-dominated goal (Fyall, Oakley, & Weiss, 2000; Pasquinelli, 2013). The reputation transition economies have is a deterrent for investment; research suggests the post-Soviet nations’ unattractiveness is inherited from communism (Collis, Berekeley, & Noon, 1999). These nations are characterised by risk, uncertainty, poor legal framework, and weak infrastructure (Young, 2005). Because of this, collaborative actors define the nation brand image for potential investors as increasingly imperative. Because of these characteristics, transition economies are strong candidates to explore the proposed conceptual model in a collaborative supranational investment brand context.

The separation from the Soviet Union’s national imagery drives the urge to rebrand as each Baltic state regained independence in the last twentieth century (Aronczyk, 2008; Dzenovska, 2005; Endzina & Luneva, 2004). Branding to break from this, in the investment context, may be much more to do than from a tourism, education, or immigration driver for supranational region branding and place promotion. Firstly, after the fall of the Soviet Union, many manufacturing firms and plants remained in the outer socialist republics of the union where
they were established, and operated for much of the last century (Alanen, 2004; Filatotchev, Dyomina, Wright, & Buck, 2001). Plants that manufactured electronics and textile production were especially prevalent in the Baltic SSRs (Maciuika, 1972) (Martinsons & Valdemars, 1992). Because of this, the social republics that gained re-independence were able to use these plants as form of economic development in their quest to Westernise (Filatotchev, Dyomina, Wright, & Buck, 2001; Martinsons & Valdemars, 1992). Secondly, the assumption of FDI includes the role of knowledge and knowledge-based industries (Kalamova & Konrad, 2010). The growing linguistic importance of English and German as lingua franca was especially capitalised on in the education systems of transition economies in the last two decades (Darquennes & Nelde, 2006; Holden, 1987; Lopes, 2013). As considered fundamental for FDI flow, the trade openness spearheaded by the use of English and German in these nations increased location-based FDI location attractiveness for global firms (Globerman & Shapiro, 2003). Thirdly, evidence of FDI verifies spillover effects into local and indigenous business development (Javorcik, 2004).

**AC.2 GEOGRAPHIC PROXIMITY**

To address the second criteria, nations must be geographically proximate. Geographically proximate nations share similar environmental effects, including influences of war or accessibility to resources (Robst, Polachek, & Chang, 2007). Such nations may face similar issues with infrastructure that lead to underdeveloped systems (Brown, 1980). Moreover, constructing nation brand alliances may occur more efficiently if the nations are close together.
There are examples of alliances created between geographies of great physical distance\(^{26}\), but there has not been striking evidence to advance branding literature in such a context. Many transition economies, especially those in the Central and Eastern European and ex-USSR republics are geographically proximate. In the case of the Baltic nations, the three nations are reputedly similar, often classified as a ‘block’ of nations in the literature (Hiden & Salmon, 2014; Lamoreaux & Stoddard, 2011; Mole, 2012; Taagepera, 2011). Summaries by Huettinger (2008) show Baltic citizens share similar antipathy towards Soviet identities, are more attuned to self-determination in politics, and displayed similar paths to re-independence – epitomised with the Singing Revolution in the late 1980s. This not only purports the geographic proximity of the nations, but also the cultural and behavioural similarity amongst them.

**AC.3 EXHIBITION OF NEOLIBERAL AND ECONOMIC NATIONALISMS**

Transition economies have also fared to contain both neoliberal and economic nationalist sentiments in its recent history. After re-independence of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania, nationalist sentiments grew immensely. Given subjugation to both Nazi German and Soviet occupation over the century prior (Nørgaard, 1999), each Baltic state yearned for the

\(^{26}\) Brand alliances may occur across geographies, notably in the case of sister cities. Sister cities as practice, known as ‘town twinning’ (Zelinsky, 1991), has the ability to increase economic development, tourism, and peace relations from a municipal level, but does not collaborate to create a single identity or image. Rather, sister city alliances admit to creating partnerships between cities that can resource share between geographies if need be, as opposed to working in concert towards a common goal. Moreover, the geographic distance of sister cities may also see cultural distance between cities. Albeit these cultural distances can bring new insight to an alliance, it could prove too difficult to manage if both cities were to engage in a joint endeavour (Ramasamy & Cremer, 1998).
independence it felt robbed of (Budryte, 2005). The intensity of nationalistic sentiments in the 1990s drove much policy and national narrative to support government action towards military, state, and economic development. These nationalist sentiments were driven primarily out of a post-Communist European realm of thought, giving critical nation branding studies a possibility to challenge regionally dominant political paradigms of transition. The case here would include Westernisation and modernisation. It is important to revisit nation branding in the post-communist landscape, as identity politics here may also be at play, and manifesting in a suite of conflicting nationalist sentiments.

From a neoliberal standpoint, Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania have evidenced their nationalism to create investment promotion organisations. **Table A4** outlines these. These agencies have existed for approximately twenty years.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>COUNTRY</th>
<th>INVESTMENT PROMOTION AGENCY</th>
<th>GOVERNED BY …</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ESTONIA27</td>
<td>Enterprise Estonia</td>
<td>Enterprise Estonia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LATVIA28</td>
<td>Investment and Development Agency of Latvia</td>
<td>Ministry of Economics of the Republic of Latvia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LITHUANIA29</td>
<td>Invest Lithuania</td>
<td>Ministry of Economy</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

27 (Estonian Investment Agency, 2014)
28 (Investment and Development Agency of Latvia, 2014)
29 (Invest Lithuania, 2014)
The Estonian Investment Agency is part of Enterprise Estonia, a government agency promoting foreign investments to the nation, and in doing so supporting international firms to find business opportunities in the country. The main objective for the department is to sustain positive development for the Estonian economy (Estonian Investment Agency, 2014). The Ministry of Economics of the Republic of Latvia, a government department facilitating growth of foreign investment and support for local entrepreneurship in domestic and foreign markets, oversees The Investment and Development Agency of Latvia. The main objective for the department is to promote foreign trade and facilitate improvement in business environments. The agency has over 200 employees in its 20-year tenure (Investment and Development Agency of Latvia, 2014). Invest Lithuania operates as a Lithuanian national government agency, providing investment assistance, project management resources, and after care for international businesses aiming to grow operations in Lithuania. The objective of the department is to attract foreign direct investment (Invest Lithuania, 2014).

From an economic nationalism standpoint, each of these three Baltic nations has exhibited such tendencies in their policies and behaviours in interregional programmes. The last notable (Salines, 2010) investment-oriented, multinational branding initiative that involved these three countries – the Baltic Sea Region programme – saw the 11 nations in the scheme did not have a strongly anchored common identity. The Scandinavian and Germanic participants were more focused on economic and environmental issues, whereas the Baltic participants were more focused on security (Galbreath, 2014), leading to a ‘perfunctory’ process driven by EU interest rather than participant motivation (Salines, 2010). Despite scoring comparably on Hofstede’s Cultural Dimensions (Huettinger, 2008), political independence drives economic nationalism.
Throughout the Baltic Sea Region programme initiatives, sentiments of Estonia to be ‘more Scandinavian’ (Kuldkepp, 2013), Latvia to be ‘closer to Germany’ (Hiden & Salmon, 2014; Manning & Poljeva, 1999), and Lithuania to feel ‘more Polish and Ukrainian’ (Huettinger, 2008) created enough identity politics to stir the nations (Salines, 2010). In particular, arguments in Lithuania suggest that the cost of accession process with other nations will lead to the destruction of the Lithuanian economy, where collaboration would be meagre for Lithuania at best and disastrous at worst (Karbauskis, 2000; Pavlovaite, 2003). Such outlooks are echoed in Estonia (Bennich-Björkman & Likić-Brborić, 2012; Jakobsen & Jakobsen, 2011) and Latvia (Balabkins, 1999; Tsygankov, 2000).
APPENDIX D: SAMPLE INTERVIEW GUIDES

The questions for the micro-net and macro-net interviewees were similar. The following will show sample micro-net and macro-net interview guides. Semi-structured interviews allow for questions aside from the ones in the guide to be asked to participants. Because of this, there were themes of questions that emerged in the interviews. These question themes will be shown after the interview guides.

AD.1 SAMPLE MICRONET INTERVIEW GUIDE

TO: [INTERVIEWEE]  
RE: BALTIC BRANDING STUDY 2014

The objectives of these next 60 minutes are to learn more about your role in the organisation, [Your IPA]’s promotional and branding efforts, and the relationships [your nation] has with neighbor nations for branding.

1. What are your daily activities & position?  
   a. For how long have you been involved in the organisation?  
   b. What changes have you seen in your role since during your time working for the Institute?  
   c. What is the role of [your nation’s] federal government your organisation’s current decision-making processes?

2. What are the opportunities [your nation] has for investment: as a nation and as a brand?  
   a. How do you measure the success of the [national] brand?

3. One of [the investment promotion agency]’s main goals is to facilitate growth for foreign investment in [your nation]. How does [the country] currently promote itself to other nations for foreign investment?  
   a. Do you promote to specific nations currently? Are these promotions successful?  
   b. Which countries do you hope to promote to in the future? Why?

4. What is your organisation’s relationship with other Baltic international investment promotion agencies?

5. Can you discuss times of when [nation] has been promoted as part of a region?

6. When would [nation] promote itself as part of the Baltic region, or other international relationships?

7. What are your organisation’s goals in the next few years?
The objectives of this interview are to learn more about your role in the organisation, [nation]’s promotional and branding efforts, and the relationships [nation] has with other post-Soviet nations to brand itself for foreign investment.

1. Could you share with me your daily activities?
   a. For how long have you been working in the organisation?
2. What are your organisation’s goals for the next few years?
   a. Does this include working with [nation]’s nationalised promotional agencies? What types of organisations would this involve?
3. How do you believe [nation] is perceived by other nations and businesses as a country in which to invest?
   a. How do you see the future of [nation] for investment? Do you believe [nation] should change its strategy to promote itself?
4. What are the opportunities for [nation] for investment?
   a. Can you discuss [nation]’s success as a nation for investment?
5. From your perspective, what factors determine cooperation between [nation] and other European nations?
   a. In what types of situations would you see it beneficial for [nation] to promote itself from the Baltic perspective?
   b. In what types of situations would you see it detrimental for [nation] to promote itself from the Baltic perspective?
APPENDIX E: INTERVIEW PROFILES

TABLE A5: OVERVIEW OF CONTACT SCHEDULE WITH PARTICIPANTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Organisation</th>
<th>Contacted</th>
<th>Interviewed</th>
<th>Interview Rate</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Micro-net Estonia</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>28.57%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Macro-net Estonia</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>33.33%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Micro-net Latvia</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>40.00%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Macro-net Latvia</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>11.76%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Micro-net Lithuania</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>33.33%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Macro-net Lithuania</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>18.75%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Macro-net) Baltic</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.00%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>66</strong></td>
<td><strong>15</strong></td>
<td><strong>22.73%</strong></td>
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</tbody>
</table>

TABLE A6: RESPONDENT PROFILES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Code</th>
<th>Position</th>
<th>Organisation Type</th>
<th>Interview Date</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Latvia</td>
<td>CC 1</td>
<td>Vice Chairman</td>
<td>Chamber of Commerce</td>
<td>2014-05-23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Estonia</td>
<td>CC 2</td>
<td>Chairman of the Board</td>
<td>Chamber of Commerce</td>
<td>2014-06-03</td>
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<tr>
<td>Lithuania</td>
<td>CC 3</td>
<td>Chairman of the Board</td>
<td>Chamber of Commerce</td>
<td>2014-06-14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Estonia</td>
<td>CC 4</td>
<td>Chairman of the Board</td>
<td>Chamber of Commerce</td>
<td>2014-06-17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lithuania</td>
<td>CC 5</td>
<td>Treasurer</td>
<td>Chamber of Commerce</td>
<td>2014-06-23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Estonia</td>
<td>CC 6</td>
<td>Chief Executive Officer</td>
<td>Chamber of Commerce</td>
<td>2014-07-16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latvia</td>
<td>CC 7</td>
<td>Chairman of the Board</td>
<td>Chamber of Commerce</td>
<td>2014-07-31</td>
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<tr>
<td>Estonia</td>
<td>EST 1</td>
<td>Information Manager</td>
<td>Investment Promotion Agency</td>
<td>2014-05-11</td>
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<tr>
<td>Estonia</td>
<td>EST 2</td>
<td>Investment Manager</td>
<td>Investment Promotion Agency</td>
<td>2014-05-30</td>
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<tr>
<td>Lithuania</td>
<td>INV 1</td>
<td>Executive Director</td>
<td>Business Association</td>
<td>2014-06-26</td>
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<tr>
<td>Estonia</td>
<td>INV 2</td>
<td>Baltic Blogger</td>
<td>Independent</td>
<td>2014-08-04</td>
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<td>Latvia</td>
<td>LAT 1</td>
<td>Senior Investment Advisor</td>
<td>Investment Promotion Agency</td>
<td>2014-05-29</td>
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<tr>
<td>Latvia</td>
<td>LAT 2</td>
<td>Public Relations Specialist</td>
<td>Governmental Agency</td>
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<tr>
<td>Lithuania</td>
<td>LITH 1</td>
<td>Brand Manager</td>
<td>Investment Promotion Agency</td>
<td>2014-05-22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lithuania</td>
<td>LITH 2</td>
<td>Director of Business</td>
<td>Investment Promotion Agency</td>
<td>2014-08-12</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
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