Does Framing Integration in Pro-Diversity Terms Improve Attitudes Toward Newcomers? Assessing the Effects of Canadian Multiculturalism & Québécois Interculturalism

by

Colin Scott

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ABSTRACT

DOES FRAMING INTEGRATION IN PRO-DIVERSITY TERMS IMPROVE ATTITUDES TOWARD NEWCOMERS? ASSESSING THE EFFECTS OF CANADIAN MULTICULTURALISM & QUÉBÉCOIS INTERCULTURALISM

Colin Scott
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Advisor: Dr. Saba Safdar

Empirical research suggests that the way in which integration policies are framed with respect to their support for diversity can have a positive role in strengthening intergroup relations. In this thesis I outline the situational and individual factors that affect attitudes toward immigrants and present a survey experiment to assess the impact of several integration frames on measures of intergroup attitudes, feelings and evaluations under threatening and non-threatening conditions. Hierarchical moderated multiple regression analyses support existing research that integration frames can improve attitudes toward immigrants by reducing the relationship between social dominance orientation and prejudice, but not zero-sum belief and multicultural ideology; this effect increased as the hierarchy-attenuating nature of the integration frame increased. Findings are framed within the Canadian context by comparing Canada’s multicultural model of immigrant integration with the emerging model of interculturalism in Québec.
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Chapter 1: Perceptions of Threat & Attitudes toward Immigrants

Introduction

Managing the movement of peoples across borders has become an even more critical policy issue in the face of rising levels of international migration. As international migration becomes increasingly more normative, host societies will increasingly be challenged to integrate newcomers in a way that is conducive to the social, economic and political development of the host country and beneficial to the wellbeing of both local and immigrant.

Immigration is psychologically ambiguous (Pratto & Lemieux, 2001); it simultaneously appeals to psychological motives for both group inclusion and group threat. To some people, immigration is a resource; public policies are supportive of cultural pluralism, recognizing cultural rights and seeking to eliminate or at least significantly reduce inequality between groups. In other countries, immigration is a burden; cultural pluralism is seen as a source of conflict and instability. Not surprisingly, public opinion and government policy toward immigrant integration vary widely across countries.

In this thesis, I am concerned with the psychology of immigrant integration and the role of public policy in strengthening intergroup relations. In particular, I examine whether framing the discourse on immigrant integration in pro-diversity terms can strengthen intergroup relations. Through a survey experiment, I test this possibility under conditions where newcomers are portrayed as threatening or non-threatening. I begin by introducing psychological research on the situational and individual factors affecting attitudes toward immigrants (Chapter 1). Next, I discuss how policies of immigrant integration reflects a dominant narrative as to how newcomers should adjust to and participate in the larger society.
Highlighting a divide within the Canadian federation with respect to ideological approaches to immigrant integration, I then compare and contrast Canada’s model of multiculturalism with the emerging intercultural alternative in Québec (Chapter 3). Finally, through an experimental study, I ask whether a government’s ideological position on immigrant integration can moderate the relationship between individual differences and prejudice toward newcomers, and whether this effect depends on the hierarchy-attenuating nature of the integration frame (Chapter 4).

**Social Psychological Perspectives on Intergroup Threat and Competition**

In this introductory chapter, I review some of the primary situational and personality factors affecting attitudes toward immigrants. Here, I present two leading psychological models of threat and intergroup relations before introducing individual difference variables shown to affect support for diversity and immigration. This chapter lays the foundation for later sections of the thesis which discuss ideologies toward integration and host society members’ expectations of how newcomers should acculturate.

**Instrumental Model of Group Conflict**

For at least half a century, social scientists have studied how prejudice and discrimination often result from conflicting interests between groups (e.g., Campbell, 1965; LeVine & Campbell, 1972). A major source of intergroup conflict is resource competition (Esses, Jackson & Armstrong, 1998). Accordingly, the Instrumental Model of Group Conflict (Esses, Jackson & Armstrong, 1998; Esses et al., 2005) posits that competition over limited resources – whether real or perceived – negatively affects intergroup relations. Once access to resources are thought to be limited, a threatening dynamic arises whereby ingroup members
seek to remove the source of competition or at least reduce its perceived competititiveness relative to one’s own group.

Esses and colleagues (1998, 2005) argue that competition for resources such as jobs, political power, or relative status, for example, risk undermining positive intergroup relations, and dominant group members will act in order to reduce the perceived competitiveness of another group. Reactions to perceived competition are said to be instrumental in the sense that group members actively respond to minimize perceptions of competition. Group members might attempt to decrease the competitiveness of a target outgroup by either forming negative attitudes or attributing negative characteristics to the target group, by engaging in discriminatory behaviours, or by opposing programs which aim to ameliorate the relative position of outgroup members. Conversely, ingroup members might also attempt to increase their own group’s perceived competitiveness by showing ingroup biases and favouratism. Finally, group members might also work to distance themselves from a competitive group by avoiding members of the target outgroup altogether.

Applied to immigration, the Instrumental Model (Esses, Jackson & Armstrong, 1998) has demonstrated empirical evidence in support of the model’s premise that host society members respond negatively to newcomers when they are threatened by perceived resource competition. Experimentally, Esses and colleagues demonstrated that fictitious media editorials can be designed to increase the perception that immigrants are a source of threat, causing participants to show greater prejudices against immigrants. Similarly, it has also been shown that Canadians held more negative attitudes toward immigrants and were less likely to
support immigration to Canada when the labour market was presented highly competitive and immigrants as highly skilled (Esses et al., 2001).

**Integrated Threat Theory**

Esses and her colleagues’ Instrumental Model of Group Competition (Esses, Jackson & Armstrong, 1998) predicts that prejudice toward immigrants will result from perceived competition over resources. However, there are other types of threat in addition to resource competition that differentially affect intergroup relations. For their part, Walter Stephan and his colleagues developed Integrated Threat Theory (ITT; Stephan & Stephan, 2000; Stephan et al., 2002; Stephan et al., 2005) in order to differentiate between four different ‘types’ of threat. First, *realistic threats* are threats that are directly perceived to affect the welfare of the ingroup. Examples of realistic threats include the economic or political resources identified as sources of competition in the Instrumental Model. Second, *symbolic threats* occur when outgroups are perceived to challenge the cultural values or belief systems of the established majority. Symbolic threats, therefore, are threats to the cultural dominance or worldview of the host society. Third, *intergroup anxiety* refers to an expectation that intergroup contact might result in an embarrassing or otherwise negative exchange. Finally, individuals may hold *negative stereotypes* toward a target outgroup. Although not technically a source of threat in and of itself, negative stereotypes can enhance perceptions of threat as they may lead individuals to believe others will behave in a threatening manner (Stephan et al., 2005).

ITT researchers have demonstrated the additive effect of different types of threat on attitudes toward immigrants (e.g., Stephen, Ybarra & Bachman, 1999; Stephan, Ybarra, Martinez, Schwarzwald & Tur-Kaspa, 1998). Because immigration induces various types of
threat, attitudes toward immigrants are best predicted by assessing distinct threats together, as the additive effects of threat on attitudes are greater than the sum of their parts. For instance, Stephan and colleagues (2005) found that host society members held particularly negative attitudes toward immigrants when the immigrant group was portrayed as posing both a realistic and a symbolic threat to the host society. This combined effect of realistic and symbolic threats was greater than either individual threat presented in isolation.

**Who is Threatened by Diversity? Individual Differences and Attitudes Toward Immigrants**

While situational factors like competition for resources play a role in affecting attitudes toward immigrants and immigration, individuals’ ideological beliefs also shape how we think of and engage with diversity (Pratto & Lemieux, 2001; Ward & Masgoret, 2006). The likelihood that one will conceive of immigration in inclusive versus threatening terms, in addition to being influenced by situational forces like resource competition, is also affected by individual differences in desires for social (in)equality (Esses, Jackson & Armstrong, 1998) and the importance one attaches to the value of cultural diversity in society (Berry, 2006; Ward & Masgoret, 2006).

Social dominance orientation (SDO; Pratto et al., 1994; Sidanius, Levin & Pratto, 1996), a personality measure designed to assess desires for group-based social hierarchies, has been shown to be an especially strong predictor of political attitudes. Individuals’ orientations toward social dominance have been shown to be highly correlated ($r_s > 0.60$) with zero-sum beliefs toward group competition – the notion that gains for one group translate directly into loses for another (ZSB; Esses, Jackson & Pratto, 1998; Louis, Esses & Lalonde, 2013). In
their research on group competition and instrumental threat, Victoria Esses and her colleagues found that both SDO and ZSB have a strong, negative relationship with attitudes toward immigrants and immigration, and reduce peoples’ willingness to empower immigrants. Esses and her colleagues found that ZSB mediates the effect of SDO on prejudice.

The effect of threat on attitudes toward immigrants has also been shown to be mediated by a multicultural ideology (MCI), the belief that cultural diversity is good for society and its individual members and should be shared and accommodated (Berry, 2006; Ward & Masgoret, 2006). Individuals who’s ideological views favour group inequality respond negatively to policies that portray immigration as an opportunity for group inclusion (Pratto & Lemieux, 2001). While individuals scoring high in SDO but low in MCI favour policies that enhance hierarchical relations between groups, the reverse is also true in that those scoring low in SDO and high in MCI favour policies that attenuate hierarchical relations (Ward & Masgoret, 2006).

**Conclusion**

To summarize, both situational factors like resource competition and individuals’ support for hierarchically structured intergroup relations affect support for diversity and attitudes toward immigrants. Why is it that for some, immigration presents an opportunity for growth and progress, whereas for others it is construed as a challenge? Given that immigration can simultaneously invoke feelings of inclusion and threat (Pratto & Lemieux, 2001), social scientists are challenged not only to understand the basis of negative attitudes toward immigrants, but also to develop interventions and policy recommendations which might facilitate more harmonious intergroup relations. In the next chapter, I discuss how public
policies and political discourse, by framing whether immigration is construed in inclusive or threatening terms, has the power to shape society’s norms pertaining to integration.
Chapter 2: Managing Intercultural Relations: Hosts’ Acculturation Expectations and Ideological Perspectives on Immigrant Integration

Introduction

Host society members’ ideological attitudes toward integrating newcomers vary depending on the degree to which immigrants are expected to assimilate into the dominant national identity, and the extent to which minorities’ are permitted to maintain their own cultural heritage (Berry, 1980). For a society to be considered multicultural, there are several psychological preconditions which must be met (Berry & Kalin, 1995). First, there must be a widespread acceptance of the value to a society of cultural diversity. Second, there must be relatively low levels of prejudice among host society members. Third and relatedly, attitudes between dominant and non-dominant groups toward one another must be mutually positive. Finally, all groups must share a sense of attachment to the larger society. Accordingly, a multicultural society goes beyond one that is just cultural plural to one that responds positively to such pluralism and diversity (Ward, 2013).

In this chapter, I discuss two dominant ideological positions framing the debate around how immigrants should acculturate in their host society. First, I review research on host society members’ acculturation expectations, comparing and contrasting models of multiculturalism with ‘melting pot’ or assimilationist models of immigrant integration. Next, I discuss how individuals’ desires for social hierarchies and their orientations toward maintaining group-based inequality affect their policy preferences toward immigrant integration. Finally, by way of conclusion, I explore research on the implications of normative integration frames on attitudes and feelings toward immigration.
Acculturation Expectations and Support for Immigrant Integration Strategies

John Berry’s (1997, 2005, 2011) acculturation framework differentiates between the strategies employed by those who (i) favor or oppose the maintenance of heritage culture and identity; and, (ii) favour or oppose the participation of newcomers in the larger society. From the perspective of the host society, the framework proposes four ideological positions on how immigrants should acculturate. When host society members do not believe newcomers should participate in the larger society, they may advocate policies of “segregation” or “exclusion” based on whether they accept that non-dominant group members should retain their heritage cultural identity. However, Western political leaders tend to lament the lack of participation of ethnocultural groups in society (e.g., Cameron, 2011; The Guardian, 2010; Sarkozy, 2011). As a result, political rhetoric increasingly recognizes the need for strategies conducive to the integration and participation of minority groups in the wider society.

Integration policy in Western immigrant-receiving societies reflect one of two ideological perspectives on how immigrants should acculturate (Berry, 2011): (i) The Melting Pot model, which places minority groups on the fringes of society unless they are incorporated into the larger society via assimilation; and, (ii) the Multiculturalism model, where the host society has institutionalized a national social framework to accommodate the cultural heritage of all ethnocultural communities. Both models seek to integrate immigrants. The difference between the two approaches is captured by whether or not hosts support the maintenance of immigrants’ heritage culture.

Attitudes and policies that lend support to models of assimilation in principle advocate the blending of majority and minority cultures, though in practice involve the abandonment of
minority cultural heritage in favour of the cultural dominance of the majority (Levin et al., 2012). Assimilation, therefore, presents a culturally-threatening scenario for non-dominant group members. Because of its association with minority-group culture loss and the supremacy of the cultural characteristics of the dominant group, assimilation is not considered an ideological position that is inclusive and supportive of diversity. In the same vein, by viewing cultural pluralism as a problem to be reduced, “melting pot” approaches to integration serve as hierarchically-enhancing ideological beliefs because they propagate group-based dominance and inequality. Multicultural models, in contrast, view diversity as a resource and are fundamentally supportive of diversity with non-dominant groups being encouraged to maintain their heritage culture and identity. In this way, multicultural approaches to integration are inherently hierarchy-attenuating as they seek to remove or reduce relative group dominance based on culture. This perspective is supported by empirical studies using correlational as well as experimental designs to demonstrate the hierarchy-enhancing and hierarchy-attenuating effects of assimilation and multiculturalism, respectively. In countries with an objectively lower pro-diversity integration policy (MIPEX, 2014) or when experimentally primed to think of integration in assimilationist terms, the predictive power of SDO on prejudice has been shown to increase (Guimond et al., 2013; Kauff, Asbrock, Thörner & Wagern, 2013; Levin et al., 2012). On the other hand, in countries where pro-diversity integration policy is high or when individuals are experimentally primed to think in hierarchy-attenuating terms, the relationship between SDO and prejudice is weakened. Such research suggests that whether a social context is hierarchy-enhancing or hierarchy-attenuating in nature has important implications on how desires for dominance motivate prejudice.
Dominance, Social Hierarchy, and Integration Policy Preference

According to Social Dominance Theory (Sidanius & Pratto, 1999), individuals’ attitudes toward intercultural relations are motivated by their desire for group-based social hierarchies. Social Dominance Orientation is therefore a powerful predictor of prejudice and negative attitudes toward immigrants and has been shown to have a strong, negative correlate with support for diversity (Levin et al., 2012), as well as individuals’ ideological views toward integration and accommodation (Guimond et al., 2013). Levin and colleagues (2012), in one of the first systematic investigations of the relationship between individual differences in dominance orientation, ideological support for integration strategies, and prejudice (Guimond et al., 2013, p. 945) showed that SDO correlated positively with attitudes toward assimilation and negatively with attitudes toward multiculturalism. Moreover, individuals’ endorsements of assimilation and multiculturalism were significant predictors of prejudice (though in opposite directions) and together fully mediated the relationship between SDO and prejudice.

Researchers have shown that the relationship between SDO and prejudice is mediated by the intergroup ideologies endorsed by individuals (Guimond et al., 2013; Levin et al., 2012;). Such findings suggests that intergroup ideologies are likely antecedents of prejudice as opposed to consequences (Levin et al., 2012). As such, the normative ideological frames of integration influence the relationship between dominance and prejudice such that individuals predisposed to favour group inequality (those high in SDO, low in MCI) would typically support assimilation as an integration strategy because it perpetuates social hierarchies and is ideologically consistent with their social attitudes (Levin et al., 2012). Likewise, individuals predisposed to favour group equality (low in SDO, high in MCI) are likely to support policies
like multiculturalism that argues for the attenuation of group differences (Pratto &
Lemieux, 2001).

**Normative Discourse on Integration**

In their model, Guimond and colleagues (2013) do not propose that diversity policies
affect individual attitudes directly. Rather, the data supports the notion that integration
policies have a direct effect on what intergroup ideology is perceived to be normative, which
in turn affects personal attitudes toward diversity and policy support. Pro-diversity policies,
therefore, have potential for improving intergroup relations by fostering positive attitudes
toward diversity. Indeed, as others have argued, public policies at the national level that take
pride in cultural diversity are useful tools for improving intercultural relations in society
(Berry & Kalin, 1995; Berry et al., 1977; Park & Judd, 2005; Richeson & Nussbaum, 2004;
Verkuyten, 2005).

Personal endorsement of intergroup ideologies and their related public policies of
immigrant integration are also affected by specific norms such as the presence (or absence) of
a pro-diversity policy at the national level (Guimond et al., 2013). Because a country’s public
policy toward diversity affects what is perceived to be normative (Guimond et al., 2013), pro-
diversity legislation can foster more positive attitudes toward diversity among society
members, making integration policies like multiculturalism an important tool for improving
intercultural relations (Berry et al., 1977; Berry & Kalin, 1995; Guimond et al., 2013; Levin et
al., 2012; Plaut, Thomas & Goren, 2009; Richeson & Nussbaum, 2004; Verkuyten & Thijs,
2002; Verkuyten, 2005; Wolsko, Park & Judd, 2006). For example, Guimond and colleagues
(2013) showed that when pro-diversity policies like multiculturalism was the normative at the
sociopolitical level, and participants ranked low in SDO, their personal commitment to multiculturalism increased, leading to reduction in anti-Muslim prejudice. On the other hand, when assimilation was presented as normative and individuals were high in SDO, participants’ were more supportive of assimilation, resulting in even more prejudice toward ethnic and religious outgroups.

The way in which integration is framed has a powerful effect on host society members’ attitudes of how immigrants should acculturate. Visions of a culturally diverse society are likely to heighten perceptions of threat among host society members with a strong cultural identity because of the saliency of symbolic threats, competition for resources, and divergent belief systems or worldviews of cultural minorities. The extent to which cultural diversity will invoke feelings of threat is in proportion to the strength and saliency of their own group membership and cultural identity. In Canada, there are two contrasting narratives on immigrant integration. Within the province of Québec, pressure as a French-speaking minority within North America has heightened the salience of a threatened national francophone identity in the province. As a result, diversity and integration in Québec is understood differently than in the rest of the country (Bouchard, 2011; Taylor, 2012). In the next chapter, I examine how a threatened national identity has necessitated the adoption of a unique approach to integration in the province, compared to the multicultural model championed across the country.
Chapter 3: Emerging Political Discourses on Integration: Threatened identities and contrasting ideologies within Canada

**Introduction**

Our social and political environments shape our perceptions of what is perceived to be normative, affecting how we see ourselves and the world in which we live (Brewer, 2010). If individuals come to form opinions based on the considerations accessed “off the tops their heads” (Zaller, 1992), the intercultural context, and the public dialogue surrounding it, exerts enormous influence the complexity of feelings and opinions toward ethnic and cultural ‘others’. For instance, as Brewer (2010) argues, in societies where the rhetoric and lived experiences surrounding diversity facilitate high levels of positive intercultural contact, citizens are likely to have more nuanced social identities that integrate diversity into individuals’ self-concepts. Conversely, when societies are segregated or when diversity is portrayed negatively, social identities typically will remain relatively simple and culturally homogenous, restricting the incorporation of diversity (Brewer, 2010). In this sense, the normative political context becomes an important factors shaping public attitudes around diversity and integration, shaping individuals’ considerations sampled during surveys of public opinion.

In this chapter, I describe how these phenomena affect public opinion and policies of integration by shaping the socio-political environment and discourse surrounding diversity, in addition to the nomological networks by which national identity is defined. Using national-level representative public opinion data, I argue that national identity is constructed differently in Québec than it is in the rest of Canada. Specifically, while Canadian national identity is
culturally fluid, developing in tandem with changing ethnocultural demographics, Québécois national identity is much more rigid, defined in relation to the historic francophone culture. In this chapter I begin with an analysis of national-level Canadian public opinion data to compare and contrast the Canadian multiculturalism framework with the emerging model ofQuébécois ‘interculturalism’.

**Public Opinion, (Threatened) National Identity, and Attitudes Toward Diversity: Contrasting ideals from Canada and Québec**

A recent literature review of Canadian public opinion polling on diversity and attitudes toward multiculturalism between 2006 and 2009 depicts a society that is pro-diversity with strong, though conditional, support for the national integration policy of multiculturalism (Soroka & Robertson, 2010). Collectively, Canadians report positive attitudes toward cultural, linguistic and religious diversity, and are largely supportive of legislating accommodations for cultural minorities. Eighty-eight percent of respondents agree, “Canada’s multicultural makeup is one of the best things about this country,” while a further 58% believe that diversity is either “good” or “very good” for the country. Importantly, 61% of those polled believe that multiculturalism strengthens the national identity, suggesting that for a plurality of Canadians, national identity is open to constant re-negotiation as Canada’s ethnocultural composition develops. For these reasons, it can be said that Canadian public opinion, by supporting the maintenance and development of minority cultural heritage and the full participation of ethnocultural minorities in the larger Canadian society, is supportive of ideological multiculturalism (Berry & Kalin, 1995; Verkuyten, 2005; Ward, 2013). Yet, support for multiculturalism and cultural diversity is not uniform across the nation; rather, it is
conditional in the sense that a small though sizeable minority of the population polled consistently reports reservations around accommodating and integrating cultural minorities. For instance, in their review, Soroka & Robertson (2010) note typically 20% (and upwards of 30% in some samples) of respondents express concerns that minorities retain their heritage culture for too long, creating difficulties for integration, while a similar proportion of respondents question the need for policies designed to maintain or share minority cultural identities. Despite support for multiculturalism and cultural diversity more generally, analyses of Canadian public opinion survey data over the last number of years suggests about one fifth of Canadians hold attitudes that are ideologically linked with cultural assimilation.

Constructions of identity are a historic point of contention for Canadian social and political life, and have a particular impact in shaping discourse and policies around immigrant integration. A longstanding political and sociocultural cleavage exists between mostly-English speaking Canada and francophone Québec in this regard. While more than half (52%) of respondents outside of Québec agree that multiculturalism is “very important,” only 40% of those polled in the province responded in kind (Soroka & Robertson, 2010). Importantly, this is not to imply Québec is a society that is anti-diversity. Quite to the contrary, despite recent criticisms centered on the controversial policies of the separatist Parti Québécois (PQ) in English language media (e.g. National Post, 2014), Québec society has shown itself to be largely appreciative of the benefits that arise from the cultural contributions of newcomers by publically espousing the benefits of cultural pluralism (Bouchard, 2011).

Representative Canadian public opinion data suggest that for a large plurality, national identity is an inclusive concept and is open to changing ethnocultural demographics. For the
majority of Canadians outside of Québec, cultural diversity contributes positively to the
construction of a shared national identity. It could be said that Canadian national identity is a
fuzzy construct. In Québec however, where the francophone identity has historically faced
assimilationist pressures from English-speaking North America, national identity is indeed
fixed. While it is still inclusive to ethnocultural outgroups (Bouchard, 2011; Taylor, 2012),
national identity in Québec is more rigid; unlike Canadian identity which is not defined with
respect to any particular cultural group, Québécois identity is explicit with its reference to the
dominant francophone culture.

As social psychological models of intergroup relations presented earlier (Chapter 1)
suggest, the historic pressures of assimilation and the contemporary forces of immigration
create a precarious situation when balancing a need to preserve a historic cultural identity with
increased levels of immigration. However, public opinion outside of Québec is largely
unfamiliar with such pressures. For this reason, then, it is impossible for a unified integration
policy to borrowed from the Canadian context and applied uniformly in Québec. When asked,
for example, “Whether Quebec culture needs protection,” 86% of Quebecois respondents
agree compared with only 40% outside of the province (Angus Reid, 2013). Québec politics
(and by implication, national political life) have long been affected by the province’s unique
cultural heritage and special status within the Canadian federation. When asked about the
controversial Québécois Charter of Values, a failed policy project of the PQ that would have
imposed controversial limits on public expressions of religious diversity, more than two-thirds
of Québécois polled (68%) were supportive of “a law…that prohibits people who are public
employees from wearing religious clothing or symbols while at work” (Angus Reid, 2013).
To the same question, only 37% of respondents polled from the rest of Canada were supportive of the policy. Although there are still concerns outside of Québec on the ability of immigrants to integrate, many more in the province believe, “Minorities need to do more to fit in with the mainstream” (Soroka & Robertson, 2010). Asked whether “Creating a Charter of Quebec Values will bring harmony and a renewed sense of identity to Quebec society,” 63% of Québécois polled solidly agree while 76% disagree with the same statement outside the province (Angus Reid, 2013). In addition to the assimilationist pressures on the French language relative to English, growing cultural diversity threatens the dominance of Québec’s Christian tradition.

The demographic make up of the province is rapidly changing. Muslims are the fastest growing immigrant population in Québec and although many come from Africa’s Maghreb region and speak French, they remain a highly stigmatized group and increasingly experience discrimination from hypernationalists in the province and the less-welcoming environment created by the PQ’s Charter of Values (Arnopoulos, 2014; CTV, 2013; Hamilton, 2013). Analyzing the province’s changing ethnocultural demographics and the highly salient public debate surrounding the failed Charter, Richard Bourhis (2013) notes that although the number of Christians in the province has remained relatively stable over the years, the number of Muslims in Québec increased by 124% between 2001 and 2011. Still, Muslims remain a clear religious minority: 82% of Québec’s population identifies as Christian, compared with only 3% identifying as Muslim and 12% reporting no religious affiliation (In fact, the percentage of Québécois reporting no religion is the second lowest in the country, to Newfoundland and Labrador).
To safeguard the cultural values and traditions of Québec society, the then-governing PQ called and subsequently lost the 2014 provincial election around what amounts to legislating the Québec cultural identity into law. The Charter, which would have expanded legal protection to Québec values enshrined in past legislation around public language use to public secularism, would have banned symbols of religious and cultural diversity like the turban or the hijab by public servants or those receiving public services. Despite the PQ’s attempt to frame the Charter around the debate of secularism however, the legislation would have disproportionately affected non-Christian religions. A closer look at Québec public opinion data questions the impact the Charter has on intercultural relations in the province.

When asked whether they were in agreement or disagreement with the political commentary around the Charter as a project that will protect the values of Québec, 65% of Francophone respondents (compared to 19% of Anglophone respondents) said they agree with the PQ’s rhetoric. Importantly, however, when asked whether they thought the eventual adoption of the Charter would fix problems of religious accommodation in the province, 41% of Francophones (73% of Anglophones) thought it would only create more tensions, compared with only 32% (8% of Anglophones) who agreed the Charter would improve the situation (Leger, 2013). In other words, Québec public opinion appears to be largely ambivalent toward enshrining Québécois identity into law by legislating Québec values. Instead, the Québec public largely appears to be responding in a predictable way to the sociopolitical reality of identity threat through ingroup favouratism and outgroup derogation (Tajfel & Turner, 1986).
Social psychological theorizing of intergroup relations would suggest that attitudes and feelings toward minority groups would generally be more positive in Canada than they are in the province of Québec. To better explore this phenomena, I examined Canadian Election Survey (CES) data through a comparative analysis of intergroup affect among respondents from Québec and the rest of Canada.

**Analysis of 2011 CES Survey Data.**

Public opinion polling is useful in understanding trends in social attitudes, but sponsored opinion polls are often not accompanied by in depth analysis and data is rarely made available for independent scrutiny. To better contrast attitudes toward diversity in Québec and the rest of Canada, I examined 2011 CES (Fournier et al., 2011) on intergroup affect by analyzing average scores on a feeling thermometer task toward aboriginal peoples, “racial minorities,” and Muslims. The CES is a large-scale, representative public opinion survey (\(N = 4,308\)) proportionally sampled from every province in Canada. The CES polls respondents on a multitude of issues of national importance, including attitudes toward diversity and intercultural relations. In 2011, the CES included several questions utilizing the feeling thermometer scale, a task commonly employed in social psychological studies of intergroup attitudes and affect (e.g., Verkuyten & Zaremba, 2005). The feeling thermometer asks respondents, “How do you feel about [group]?”. Respondents used a 100-point scale where ‘cold’ responses on the lower end reflect negative sentiments toward the target group whereas higher, ‘warmer’, ratings correspond to more positive attitudes. Missing data (including ‘Don’t Know’ and ‘Refuse to Answer’) were removed and new feeling variables were re-coded. Mean feeling thermometer scores are presented in Table 1, which compares
feeling thermometer scores by respondents from Québec and the rest of Canada toward
three ethnocultural outgroups.

Table 1
Mean feeling thermometer scores toward target ethnocultural outgroups in Québec and theest of Canada (ROC)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Québec</th>
<th>ROC</th>
<th>t</th>
<th>df</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Feelings toward</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>aboriginal peoples</td>
<td>66.35</td>
<td>78.35</td>
<td>-13.59***</td>
<td>3131</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(23.37)</td>
<td>(20.97)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Feelings toward</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>racial minorities</td>
<td>67.94</td>
<td>77.34</td>
<td>-10.71***</td>
<td>3175</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(24.25)</td>
<td>(22.33)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Feelings toward</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Muslims</td>
<td>55.31</td>
<td>70.99</td>
<td>-14.49***</td>
<td>3109</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(27.81)</td>
<td>(26.66)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Generalized</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>feelings toward</td>
<td>63.76</td>
<td>76.29</td>
<td>-15.03***</td>
<td>2948</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ethnocultural</td>
<td>(21.35)</td>
<td>(19.45)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>outgroups (Averaged</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Score)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Collapsing feeling scores across ethnocultural outgroups to form a generalized index
of intercultural affect shows feelings toward ethnocultural outgroups are less positive in
Québec (M = 63.76, SD = 21.35) than they are in the rest of Canada (M = 76.29, SD = 19.45),
t(2948) = -15.03, p < .001. Looking at feeling thermometer scores across the three groups
indicate some groups appear to be evaluated more favourably than others. Feelings toward
aboriginal peoples are significantly more negative in Québec than they are in the rest of
Canada (t(3131) = -13.59, p < .001), as are feelings toward racial minorities in general
Results from the 2011 CES demonstrate a clear contrast in intercultural affect between respondents from Québec and the rest of Canada. Canadians generally feel very warm toward various ethnocultural outgroups. However, results are in line with social psychological theories on threat and intergroup relations whereby respondents from Québec are typically less warm in their ratings of outgroup members than their Canadian counterparts. In Québec, North American assimilationist pressures have long threatened the relevance of the French language and more recently, multicultural pressures sparked by rising immigration and cultural diversity are changing the ethnocultural make up of society. Not surprisingly, given a rich history of cultural diversity (Government of Québec, 1990), respondents from Québec, too, feel quite warm toward other cultural groups. Moreover, as the majority of migrants are of Muslim decent and are therefore more salient, motivational forces are particularly strong toward this group, resulting in particularly negative attitudes and feelings (Tajfel & Turner, 1986), which is supported by the analysis of CES data as other public opinion polls in the province (Leger, 2013). Public opinion results are in line with social psychological theories of threat (Stephan et al., 2005) and social identity (Tajfel & Turner, 1986), whereby perceptions of threat are expected to motivate outgroup derogation as a means of protecting the francophone culture and identity which is largely grounded around the French language and a historic, Christian tradition.
Contrasting Integration Strategies: Managing Diversity in Canada

Constitutional negotiations and recognition of Québec’s “special status” in Canada have led to a relatively high degree of autonomy for the province in managing its domestic affairs, including a high level of discretion in crafting integration policies to manage growing diversity (Government of Québec, 1990). The unique constructions of national identity between Canada and Québec mean that a unified national policy of integration is inappropriate; outside of Québec where national identity is without a specific cultural reference point, integration policies like multiculturalism are in line with public opinion because they value the continuance of minority cultures and champion the notion of building a shared national identity in collaboration with newcomers. In the terminology of the previous chapter, hierarchy-attenuating ideologies of multiculturalism are well-received outside of Québec where English-speaking Canadians are generally not concerned with keeping ethnocultural outgroups in a place of relative cultural subordination. In Québec, however, there is a clear desire to preserve the cultural identity and values of the francophone majority. Ultimately, this means establishing a hierarchical system of cultural dominance; one in which all cultural minorities are respected, but other cultural identities remain publically subordinate to the majority francophone identity. In Québec, both integration policy models of multiculturalism and assimilation are inappropriate because neither offers the ability to support cultural diversity while still ensuring the dominance of the province’s francophone national identity. Québec, then, requires an alternative integration paradigm to multiculturalism as it is defined in Canada; one that preserves the majority culture’s relative status of dominance without regressing to assimilation.
Multiculturalism and Integration in Canada

Multiculturalism has come under fire as of late, especially in Europe. As John Berry (2006, p. 724) remarked, “…in some societies (e.g., many countries in Europe and the USA) there is a common misunderstanding that multiculturalism means only the presence of many independent cultural communities in a society, without their equitable participation and incorporation.” In this regard, it is not that multiculturalism has failed Europe; rather, Europe has yet to truly develop multicultural societies (Ward, 2013). France and Germany for instance, cannot be considered multicultural because a political rhetoric of assimilation does not permit ethnocultural minorities the opportunity to live publically in their own cultural niche. British models of multiculturalism, on the other hand, are not truly multicultural because while they explicitly note individuals’ rights to retain their cultural heritage, they do not do enough to encourage the participation of ethnocultural minorities in British public life. In other words, when political leaders attack policies of multiculturalism, it is not because these policies have failed, rather it is because their idea of multiculturalism is misunderstood, taking for granted public constructions of identity and attitudes toward assimilation.

In Canada, however, the presence of both cultural diversity and a public that inherently values diversity creates a constructive environment for multiculturalism to flourish. According to Ward (2013), societies that are truly multicultural have three distinct features. First, they are plural societies; that is, they are culturally diverse. Second, all ethnocultural groups can maintain their heritage, living publically as well as privately in the cultural identity of their choice. Third, all ethnocultural groups in a nation can participate in the country’s political and social life in a fair and equal manner. Multiculturalism, therefore, is more than
the presence of diversity – rather, it entails accepting the inherent value of diversity on an individual and social level. To summarize, for a society to be truly multicultural, both dimensions of maintenance and participation are essential (Berry, 2006; Ward, 2013). Canada’s multiculturalism policy is grounded on the participation of diverse ethno-cultural groups in Canadian society. Indeed, as Minister Kenney notes, “the success of multiculturalism in Canada is contingent on the participation in Canadian society of all citizens – not just newcomers to Canada” (Government of Canada, 2013: 4).

Canada’s integration policy of multiculturalism is part of an inter-related network of legislation with the Canadian Multicultural Act (1988) at the core (Government of Canada, 2013). However, multiculturalism in Canada permeates across a number of institutions and is reflected across a wide array of legislation that includes the Citizenship Act (1977), the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms (1982), the Canadian Human Rights Act (1985), the Employment Equity Act (1995), the Official Languages Act (1988), the Broadcasting Act (1991) and the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act (2002), as well as several other pieces of legislation at the municipal, provincial and territorial levels of government (Government of Canada, 2013). Taken together, Canada’s legislative framework of multiculturalism supports the recognition of diversity and the promotion of cultural sharing and equal opportunities regardless of cultural heritage by removing barriers to public participation and development or minority cultural heritages.

By emphasizing heritage cultural maintenance and development, building acceptance and tolerance, and by encouraging intergroup contact and sharing, Canadian multiculturalism rejects assimilation and promotes a shared, cohesive national identity that is not defined in
relation to any one particular group. But multiculturalism (and integration more generally) goes beyond government programs and legislation. Rather, multiculturalism is the day-to-day reality of Canadian public life. It is captured by the ways in which Canadians from all cultural backgrounds work and live side-by-side, co-existing in an integrated, socially cohesive society where institutions that are clearly pro-diversity respond to the cultural needs of all of Canada’s peoples. Through public commitments to diversity and legislations guaranteeing the rights of cultural minorities, the lived experiences of Canadians that make multiculturalism a reality, whereby all Canadians are able to maintain and develop their own cultural identities, sharing their heritage and traditions publically with other citizens all the while remaining free from prejudice and discrimination (Berry, 1984).

Interculturalism and Integration in Québec

Because Canadian multiculturalism does not operationalize national identity with respect to any one cultural group, it is a policy model that attenuates group-based hierarchies and promotes inclusion. Québec, however, has never accepted the Canadian model of multiculturalism (Government of Québec, 1990) because of the central of francophone culture to national identity. In response, Québec has crafted an alternative to Canadian integration called “Interculturalism” (Armony, 2012; Bouchard, 2011; Taylor, 2012).

Québec is a culturally diverse society. Over one million immigrants arrived in Québec in the half-century following the Second World War (Government of QC, 1990) and by 2011, 19.2% of all newcomers to Canada were landing in the province, second, nationally, only to Ontario (Statistics Canada, 2014). The changing ethnocultural makeup of Québec has for many decades presented a social challenge for integration into the communauté francophone.
Québec has long been reliant on immigration for economic prosperity (Government of Québec, 1990), however the mother tongue of about 78% immigrants arriving in Québec last year is neither English nor French (Government of Québec, 2014a).

Because of the historic narrative around identity and cultural preservation in Québec, immigration policies must be designed to reinforce the francophone reality in the province (Government of Québec, 1990). The need to balance the development of the province’s francophone identity with the much-needed economic benefits of immigration has led the province to favour French-speaking immigrants in the short terms as well as to develop a long-term strategy of attracting allophones that can integrate more easily into Québec’s francophone public life. As such, Québec’s immigration policy is founded on three pillars (Government of Québec, 1990): first, it is recognized that immigration is essential for Québec’s future prosperity, shaping the provinces demographic, economic, linguistic and sociocultural development; however, the contribution of immigration to the province’s long-term sustainability is dependent on the ability of newcomers and their descendants to integrate into Québécois society; finally, mutual respect and appreciation for diversity is fundamental to the success of any policy of immigrant integration.

Québec’s official policy of immigrant integration is not as formally operationalized as the Canadian model; however, two pieces of legislation are at its core. Together, these legislative initiatives illustrate the emerging model of interculturalism in the province as they stop short of advocating assimilation, though also place limits of the extent to which newcomers can participate in Québec society. Already discussed briefly above, the introduction of Bill 60: A Charter affirming the values of State secularism and religious
neutrality and of equality between women and men, and providing a framework for accommodation requests (Charter; National Assembly, 2013) hoped to establish the strict religious neutrality of State institutions by banning religious symbolism deemed to be “ostentatious” by the bill’s supporter, former Minister Responsible for Democratic Institutions and Active Citizenship, Bernard Drainville. The reach of the Bill is extensive, given the provinces bloated public service. Although the intention of the Bill is to enshrine values of secularism in law and practice, the legislation applies disproportionately to religious non-Christians, and does not take issue with an equally ostentatious Crucifix that remains the focal point of the province’s legislature. While the Charter is religiously neutral on the surface, it is implicitly tailored toward protecting traditional francophone values by stifling public expressions of religious diversity. A second piece of legislation in the interculturalism framework is Québec’s “language law”, Bill 101: A Charter of the French Language (Government of Québec, 2014b). The bill was initially passed in 1977 and amended on several occasions since. The Bill recognizes French as an integral means of expression of Québécois national identity and ensures all public communications (and even the day-to-day work environment of small businesses), takes place in French. Over the years, the Bill has been updated to extend its reach to smaller organizations and workplaces outside traditionally francophone centres. Importantly, the Bill acknowledges the distinct linguistic culture of the provinces Native American and Inuit populations and ensures their rights to develop and live in their own linguistic and cultural milieu. One of the main goals of Bill 60 is to guard against growing linguistic diversity and the spread of English in the province by ensuring public discourse takes place in French.
In line with the sociopolitical narrative around diversity in the province, defined today in relation to a historic threat of assimilation into the larger North American linguistic and cultural context as well as a more recent influx of culturally diverse immigrants. As Charles Taylor (2012, p. 420), one of the most prominent thinkers around accommodation and cultural diversity in Québec, writes, “[t]he Achilles heel of the ‘inter[culturalism]’ story is thus the gears it can arouse that ‘they’ may change ‘us’. The notion that ‘they’ can be equal collaborators in remaking our common culture rings alarm bells in all who share this anxiety.” Because of this long-standing perception of identity threat, policies of integration in Québec must place the continuance of the francophone cultural identity ahead of the maintenance and development of minority cultures.

**Conclusions**

Public policies of immigrant integration are central toward building a positive political narrative around diversity and integration. Integration policy models are frameworks used to “define and facilitate immigrants’ transition toward full national membership” and are reflections of a society’s ideals of membership; put differently, integration policy models are tantamount a social contract governing the expectations of newcomers and the limits or conditions (if any) placed on their inclusion in a larger national identity (Armory, 2012, p. 82). Québec’s model of interculturalism carves out a middle ground between policies of assimilation and multiculturalism as the policy insists that newcomers first conform to the existing francophone cultural majority by adopting its language and values before there can be any discussion on cultural minorities becoming “co-deciders” (Government of Québec, 1994; Taylor, 2012, p. 420). But interculturalism also limits the degree to which ethnocultural
outgroups can participate fully in social and political life; equal participation is dependent on learning French and shedding public displays of (non-Christian) religious heritage. In this regard, interculturalism departs clearly from multiculturalism by placing limits on participation but stops short of assimilation by recognizing and supporting the continuance of heritage cultures. In the historic socio-political context of identity threat in Québec, interculturalism is an understandable compromise between the need to preserve the traditional francophone identity will still being an attractive location to newcomers and future immigrants.

As Jean Burnet (1978, p. 112, as quoted by Berry, 1984, p. 353) argued, “If [a] policy is to remain vital, it must not be based on untested assumptions and political pressures. It must be based on a growing body of sound research and sophisticated theory.” While much research has been done on policy models of integration, Québec’s model of interculturalism remains un-explored and to date, to my knowledge, no study has sought to compare how competing models of immigrant integration influence intercultural attitudes in Canada. While the manipulations presented in the previous chapter were not successful at capturing this dynamic, normative political discourse surrounding immigrant integration in Québec clearly reflects an approach to integration that is neither assimilation nor multiculturalism. Despite valuing cultural pluralism, Québec limits the participation of immigrants to the extent to which they publically assimilate to the national language. At the start of the present chapter I proposed that public support for integration policies is influenced by the normative debate around cultural diversity and inclusion. Here, I argue through national-level representative public opinion data that attitudes and feelings toward ethnocultural outgroups are in line with
social psychological theories of threat and intergroup relations whereby respondents from Québec consistently report less positive perceptions of cultural outgroups than their counterparts in the rest of Canada. To better understand the impact of Québec’s emerging model of interculturalism, future research must better hone a paradigm by which to capture this dynamic and adequately measure its affects on intercultural relations in the province.
Chapter 4: The Effects of Threat and Alternative Integration Frames on Majority Group Members’ Intergroup Attitudes: Results from a survey experiment

**Background**

Ideological messages about integration have been shown to have a significant effect on host society members’ judgements about cultural outgroups (Fasel, Green & Sarrasin, 2013; Guimond et al., 2013; Levin et al., 2012; Richeson & Nussbaum, 2004; Verkuyten, 2005; Wolsko et al., 2000). Returning to an earlier point, public policy, political rhetoric and public opinion all reflect society’s normative response to diversity. If pro-diversity legislation can foster positive public opinion toward diversity (Guimond et al., 2013), integration policy might be an effective tool for strengthening (or undermining) intergroup relations (Berry et al., 1977; Berry & Kalin, 1995; Guimond et al., 2013; Levin et al., 2012; Plaut, Thomas & Goren, 2009; Richeson & Nussbaum, 2004; Verkuyten & Thijs, 2002; Verkuyten, 2005; Wolsko, Park & Judd, 2006).

Much empirical research has looked at the relationship between pro-diversity integration policy and prejudice toward outgroups. An experimental paradigm, developed by Christopher Wolsko and colleagues (2000) has been the most commonly used framework. Participants are randomly assigned to conditions where different integration policies are advocated as being the socially accepted (i.e., normative) way to manage diversity. The key manipulation is the acculturation ideology that is primed. In each condition, participants are presented with a different ideological approach to integrating newcomers that is ostensibly supported by the wider society. Usually the effects of priming hierarchy-enhancing policies of assimilation are compared to the effects of priming hierarchy-attenuating policies of
multiculturalism. Overall, studies show that relative to assimilation, integration strategies that promote a multicultural ideology show the most promise at reducing prejudice among the dominant society (Richeson & Nussbaum, 2004; Verkuyten, 2005; Wolsko et al., 2000).

**Alternative Integration Policy Models in Canada**

The Canadian federal government began to consolidate a national framework of multiculturalism in 1971 in an effort to encourage all ethnicities and cultures to share their language and heritage with other Canadians (Berry, 1984; Esses & Gardner, 1996). Québec, resulting from the need to protect their francophone cultural identity, explicitly rejected the Canadian multicultural model out of concerns that encouraging the development of all cultural communities without provisions to protect the Francophone language and culture threatens the development of the Québec’s national identity (Government of Québec, 1990).

In response to Canada’s multiculturalism, the province of Québec began to craft an “intercultural” alternative policy framework in the 1980s. Although not formally recognized in provincial legislation, interculturalism as an approach to immigrant integration began with the province’s first francisation programs tailored toward “the integration [of newcomers] to the francophone majority” (Government of Québec, 1990, p. 7). Based on a respect for diversity within a framework promoting Québec’s language and values (Government of Québec, 1990, p. 7), interculturalism as a model of integration is unique in that it strives to retain a pro-diversity approach to intercultural relations while simultaneously embracing a degree of assimilation to ensure the vitality of the province’s national identity.

In 1990, the Québec government of Robert Bourassa released the province’s first consolidated plan on integration (Government of Québec, 1990). Recognizing that an influx
of immigration presents both a threat and an opportunity to the development of Québec’s francophone identity, provincial integration policy sought to “reconcile ethnocultural diversity with the continuity of the French-speaking core” (Bouchard & Taylor, 2008, p. 19).

Interculturalism is a balanced approach to integration that recognizes Québec’s position as a cultural minority within North America while also supporting the maintenance of newcomers’ heritage identity. In doing so, interculturalism emphasizes the public use of the French language as a necessary pre-requisite to participating fully in the larger Québécois society.

As an intergroup ideology (sometimes referred to as an ‘acculturation ideology’ (e.g., Berry, 2011), multiculturalism views cultural diversity as a resource to be shared, promoting cultural diversity as a means by which to foster tolerance (Berry, 1984, 2011; Guimond et al., 2013; Levin et al., 2012). In contrast, ‘melting pot,’ or assimilationist intergroup ideologies, support the participation of newcomers in the larger society, but only after non-dominant groups adopt the cultural values of a single, dominant group. For this reason, assimilation approaches to integration are said to enhance group hierarchies (Levin et al., 2012). Québec’s model of interculturalism reflects a unique acculturation expectation that is related, though conceptually distinct, from both assimilation or multiculturalism.

**Present Study**

Recent research has begun to explore how integration frames might serve a prejudice-reducing function (e.g., Guimond et al., 2013; Levin et al., 2012). While experimental research and large-scale correlational studies have demonstrated that pro-diversity policies are associated with less prejudice toward non-dominant groups (e.g., Guimond et al., 2013; Levin et al., 2012; Plaut, Thomas & Goren, 2009; Richeson & Nussbaum, 2004; Verkuyten & Thijs,
35

2002; Verkuyten, 2005; Wolsko, Park & Judd, 2006), research to date has examined this
effect along a dichotomy, comparing multiculturalism policies that are strongly supportive of
diversity with their polar opposite, assimilation, at times including a diversity-neutral (or,
‘colorblind’) condition.

In practice, integration policies reflect a continuum rather than a dichotomy, where
particular public policies and specific normative contexts differ in the extent to which they
enhance or attenuate group-based hierarchies. The Canadian context provides such an
example: A nation policy of multiculturalism strives to attenuate group hierarchies by
championing the equality of all cultural groups. It does this by simultaneously promoting the
maintenance of heritage cultural identity and the full participation of newcomers within the
larger Canadian society. However, for sociopolitical reasons, multiculturalism is
inappropriate in the province of Québec because it does not recognize the need to protect
Québécois national identity. In its place, the government of Québec has been promoting and
developing its own alternative of interculturalism. From a theoretical perspective,
iculturalism is effectively a middle ground between multiculturalism and the hierarchy-
Enhancing policy of assimilation. By promoting the relative cultural dominance of the Québec
society, interculturalism is less hierarchically-attenuating than multiculturalism; however, its
principled valuing and promotion of cultural diversity means that it is not as hierarchically-
Enhancing as assimilation.

If intergroup ideologies that support cultural diversity are truly an effective way at
reducing prejudice, it suggests that promoting integration policies that attenuate group-based
social hierarchies might be an effective intervention to strengthen intergroup relations. As
Levin and colleagues (2012, p. 212) showed, “efforts to reduce the detrimental role of SDO in driving prejudice may be more successful when national norms of…multiculturalism are emphasized over norms of assimilation” (p. 212). But what of ideological positions and public policies that lie along the continuum, falling somewhere between assimilation and multiculturalism? In the present study, I experimentally test the prejudice-reducing effects of strong, moderate and weak pro-diversity policies.

Hypotheses

In line with past research (Guimond et al., 2013; Levin et al., 2012; Richeson & Nussbaum, 2004; Verkuyten, 2005; Wolsko et al., 2000), I hypothesize that pro-diversity intergroup ideologies can serve a prejudice-reducing function by moderating the relationship between individual difference variables (SDO, ZSB, MCI) and attitudes toward immigrants, evaluations of intergroup contact, and ingroup bias – three variables that have important implications for intercultural relations. More specifically, I suspect that the moderating effects of intergroup ideologies, as reflected here by normative integration policies, will be in direct relation to the degree to which the ideological approach to integration is supportive of integration. In other words, the moderating effects of multiculturalism will be greater than those of interculturalism, which in turn will be greater still than those of assimilation (Hypothesis 1). Relatedly, in line with past research on the effects of threat and intergroup relations (e.g., Esses, Jackson & Armstrong, 1998; Piontkowski, Rohmann & Florack, 2002; Rohmann, Florack & Piontkowski, 2006; Stephen et al., 2005) I suspect that the prejudice reducing effects of pro-diversity policies will be lessened under threatening conditions.
(Hypothesis 2). Finally, I suspect that framing integration in pro-diversity terms will increase participants’ acceptance of a large group of Syrian refugees into Canada (Hypothesis 3).

**Methodology**

**Participants**

The present study analyses data from 381 university student participants. Participants were all Canadian born, mostly from the province of Ontario (87%) and female (78%). The average age of participants was 20.9 years, with ages ranging from 17- to 64 years. Outliers, as defined by scoring three or more standard deviations from the mean on one or more dependent variables, were removed from the analyses.

**Procedure**

Participants were invited to participate in a study of “public attitudes and opinions on current political issues in Canada.” After following a link to an online survey, participants completed a demographic questionnaire. At the start of the survey, participants were randomly assigned to one of the six experimental conditions. After the demographic questionnaire, participants read one of six articles ostensibly outlining the federal government’s ideological position toward integrating a large number of Syrians refugees whom have been displaced by the civil war. After reading the article, participants were presented with a series of ‘feeling thermometers;’ the first thermometer asked participants to rate their feelings toward the government’s position on integrating Syrians in Canada; the remaining thermometers asked participants to rate their feelings toward a number of...
ethnocultural groups including English Canadians (ingroup) and Syrians (outgroup) amidst several distractors. Finally, participants were asked about their attitudes towards having contact with Syrians and their attitudes toward immigrants more generally before being debriefed and thanked for their participation.

Design

A 3 (policy) x 2 (threat) experimental design was embedded in an online survey. Participants read one of six fictitious news articles designed to replicate an actual story that had appeared on the Canadian Broadcast Corporation’s online news page several months before the present study began. Each article described how the Canadian government is “opening its doors” to a large number (10,000) of Syrian refugees fleeing the civil war. Articles differed in the way in which a government spokesman described their policy toward integrating the refugees and whether the group of refugees was portrayed as a threat to Canadian values and society. Specifically, the articles portrayed one of three ideological positions on integration as normatively supported by the Canadian government.

Manipulations

Normative Policy Frame. Articles argued for either an assimilationist, intercultural or multicultural approach to integrating immigrants. The government’s strategy to integrate Syrians was manipulated through ostensible comments made by the Prime Minister’s chief spokesman regarding the ideological strategy that the federal government considers most appropriate to manage the large number of Syrian newcomers. In the multiculturalism

1 In reality, Canada has agreed to admit approximately 1,300 Syrian refugees, while the policy manipulations stated Canada would admit close to 10,000 Syrians.
condition, the government spokesman argued that integration is best achieved when legislation and programs acknowledge that “Canadian culture isn’t any more important than Syrian culture,” and that such an approach ensures all individuals are able to maintain “their cultural identities and values and take pride in their ancestry.” Conversely, in the assimilation condition, participants were told that, in the government’s view, Syrians would integrate more successfully when they can “feel at ease with their Canadian identity,” highlighting the importance of adopting “Canadian beliefs and values”. Both multiculturalism and assimilation primes were adapted from past research on multiculturalism in Canada (Berry & Kalin, 1995). An interculturalism prime was constructed by consulting Government of Quebec sources (Government of Québec, 1990; 2014a, 2014b) and academic research on interculturalism in Québec (e.g., Bouchard, 2011). Participants in the interculturalism condition were told the government believes the best way to successfully integrate Syrians was to encourage Syrians to adopt Canadian values while simultaneously respecting their own cultural heritage.

**Outgroup Threat.** In half of the conditions, participants were primed with a message portraying immigrants as threatening across three dimensions. Specifically, readers were told Syrians i) prefer to live amongst themselves, removed from Canadian society; ii) risk undermining Canadians’ access to limited economic and social resources; and, iii) could challenge Canadians on cultural issues. No mention of Syrians as potential source of threat was made in the remaining conditions. The threat manipulation was constructed in consultation with research on intergroup threat (e.g., Stephan et al., 2005) and discordant acculturation attitudes (Rohmann, Florack & Piontowski, 2006).
Measures

**Social Dominance Orientation.** Participants completed a 16-item Social Dominance Orientation Scale (SDO; Pratto, Sidanius, & Levin, 2006). Participants responded on a seven-point scale, ranging from ‘Strongly Disagree’ (1) to ‘Strongly Agree’ (7). Sample items are, “Some groups of people are just more worthy than others,” and, “We would have fewer problems if we treated different groups more equally.” Half the items were reverse-coded such that higher scores reflected higher levels of SDO.

**Multicultural Ideology.** A ten-item Multicultural Ideology scale (MCI; Berry & Kalin, 1995) was used. Participants responded on a five-point scale, ranging from “Strongly Disagree” (1) to “Strongly Agree” (5). Sample items include, “A society that has a variety of ethnic and cultural groups is more able to tackle new problems as they occur,” and, “It is best for Canada if all people forget their different ethnic and cultural background as soon as possible” (reverse scored). Higher scores reflect stronger ideological support for multiculturalism.

**Zero-Sum Beliefs.** A 14-item zero-sum beliefs scale (ZSB; Esses, Jackson & Armstrong, 2010) was included. Participants rated statements of group competition on a seven-point scale, ranging from “Strongly Disagree” (1) to “Strongly Agree” (7). A sample item is, “The more power immigrants obtain in Canada, the more difficult it is for Canadians already living here.” Higher scores reflect a greater belief that intergroup competition is defined in zero-sum terms.

**Evaluation of Intergroup Contact.** A three-item measure of intergroup contact was adapted from Verkuyten (2005). Participants evaluated working with Syrians, having Syrian
friends, and being married to someone from Syria on a seven-point scale, ranging from 1 ‘Extremely Unpleasant’ to 7 ‘Extremely Pleasant’. Higher scores suggest a more positive evaluation of intergroup contact.

*Attitudes toward Immigrants.* A six-item scale measuring attitudes toward immigrants was used (Vogt Isaksen & Jakobsen, 2012). Participants responded on a seven-point scale, ranging from ‘Strongly Disagree’ (1) to ‘Strongly Agree’ (7), with higher scores reflecting more positive attitudes toward immigrants. Sample items include, “Immigrants are helping to build a stronger national economy,” and, “Immigrants make Canada a worse place to live” (reverse coded). Higher scores reflect more positive attitudes toward immigrants.

*Feeling Thermometer Score toward Admitting Syrian Refugees.* One question asked participants, “how much do you approve or disapprove with the government’s policy toward admitting Syrians into Canada?”

*Ingroup Bias.* Two feeling thermometer questions asked participants to rate their feelings to the target outgroup (Syrians) and their ingroup (English Canadians) amidst several distractor items (e.g., Latinos, Chinese). Difference scores were created by subtracting participants’ feeling thermometer scores for the target outgroup (Syrians) from the ingroup.

**Results**

**Preliminary Analyses**

On average, the participants had low levels of SDO ($M = 2.38$, $SD = .85$) and ZSB ($M = 2.87$, $SD = 1.35$) and a relatively strong multicultural ideology ($M = 3.84$, $SD = .60$). The sample held positive evaluations of intercultural contact with Syrians ($M = 4.61$, $SD = 1.13$) and positive attitudes toward immigrants ($M = 5.18$, $SD = 1.03$). All scales had strong internal
reliability ($\alpha$s > .84). Table 2 notes the means, standard deviations, and internal reliability for each variable in the analysis. Table 3 highlights the bivariate correlations. There were no significant differences between males and females on SDO, ZSB, MCI, evaluations of intercultural contact, or feeling thermometer scores towards the government’s policy of admitting Syrians, $ps > .05$. Males ($M = 5.41$) had more positive attitudes toward immigrants than females ($M = 5.12$), $t(365) = 2.19, p < .05$, and showed less ingroup bias ($M = 9.22$) than females ($M = 17.31$), $t(332) = -2.68, p < .01$.

Table 2.
Means, standard deviations, and reliability scores for each variable.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Measure</th>
<th>Mean (SD)</th>
<th>Cronbach’s Alpha</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Social Dominance Orientation</td>
<td>2.38 (.85)</td>
<td>.88</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Zero Sum Beliefs</td>
<td>2.87 (1.35)</td>
<td>.97</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Multicultural Ideology</td>
<td>3.84 (.60)</td>
<td>.82</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Evaluation of Intergroup Contact</td>
<td>4.61 (1.13)</td>
<td>.86</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Attitudes toward Immigrants</td>
<td>5.18 (1.03)</td>
<td>.84</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Feeling Thermometer Difference Score</td>
<td>15.86 (21.52)</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: * $p < .05$, ** $p < .001$. Higher scores reflect higher levels of construct, positive evaluations or attitudes.
Table 3. Bivariate correlations.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Scale</th>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>4</th>
<th>5</th>
<th>6</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Social Dominance Orientation</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Zero Sum Beliefs</td>
<td>.50**</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Multicultural Ideology</td>
<td>-.53**</td>
<td>-.57**</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Evaluation of Intergroup Contact</td>
<td>-.29**</td>
<td>-.40**</td>
<td>.43**</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Attitudes toward Immigrants</td>
<td>-.46**</td>
<td>-.69**</td>
<td>.64**</td>
<td>.54**</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Ingroup Bias</td>
<td>.24**</td>
<td>-.49**</td>
<td>-.40**</td>
<td>-.39**</td>
<td>-.48*</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: * p < .05, ** p < .001.

Main Effects of Policy and Threat

To explore the main effects of policy and threat manipulations on attitudes toward immigrants, evaluations of intercultural contact and ingroup bias, a 3 (policy) x 2 (threat) ANOVA was run for each dependent variable. No significant main effects were observed for attitudes toward immigrants, or for evaluations of intergroup contact. For attitudes toward immigrants, no significant main effect was found for policy condition, $F(2, 362) = .79, p > .10$, threat condition, $F(1, 362) = .50, p > .10$, nor the interaction between the two, $F(2, 362) = .36, p > .10$. For evaluations of intercultural contact, no significant main effects for policy condition, $F(2, 366) = .14, p > .10$, threat condition, $F(1, 366) = .045, p > .10$, or the interaction between the two, $F(2, 366) = .091, p > .10$ were observed. With respect to ingroup bias, a marginally significant main effect for policy, $F(2, 329) = 4.17, p = .04, \eta^2_p = .013$ and threat, $F(1, 329) = 3.01, p = .05, \eta^2_p = .018$ were observed. No significant main effect was
observed for the interaction between conditions of policy and threat, $F(2, 329) = .70, p > .10$. Post-hoc comparisons using LSD testing indicated that participants presented with a multicultural policy ($M = 16.10, SD = 20.33$) showed less ingroup bias than participants presented with a policy of assimilation ($M = 19.94, SD = 20.76$), $M_{diff} = -6.59, p < .05$. The difference in ingroup bias between participants presented with a multicultural policy and a policy of interculturalism ($M = 18.49, SD = 19.51$) was marginally significant, $M_{diff} = -5.68, p = .05$.

**Does intergroup ideologies affect support for admitting Syrians into Canada?**

To examine whether the strength of pro-diversity policy or the presence of a threatening prime affected participants’ support for the government’s decision to admit Syrian refugees into Canada, a two-way ANOVA was run with policy and threat as factors and feeling thermometer scores toward the government’s policy of admitting Syrians as the dependent variable. No significant results were found. No significant main effect for policy, $F(2, 350) = .47, p > .05$, or threat, $F(1, 350) = 1.67, p > .05$ were observed. Likewise, the interaction between threat and policy was non-significant, $F(2, 350) = 1.39, p > .25$.

**Moderated Multiple Regression**

Next, the individual and interactive effects of individual difference variables (SDO, ZSB, and MCI), strength of the pro-diversity intergroup ideology and presence of threat on attitudes toward immigrants, evaluation of intercultural contact, and ingroup bias were examined using moderated multiple linear regression (Aiken & West, 1991). Coding schemes for threat (two levels) and policy condition (three levels) were developed through dummy
coding. The effects of each of the three individual differences variables were considered in separate regression models.

The effects of threat, individual differences (SDO, ZSB and MCI; all centered) and policy condition (captured across two dummy coded vectors) were entered into the first step of the analysis. Two-way interaction terms involving threat, policy vectors, and SDO were entered into the second step as recommended by Aiken and West (1991). The two vectors capturing the three-way interaction were entered in the final step.

No evidence of moderation was found for ZSB or MCI across dependent variables ($p$s > .10). SDO approximated significance for attitudes toward immigrants ($p < .10$) but not for evaluations of intergroup contact or feeling thermometer difference scores ($p$s > .10).

**Attitudes toward Immigrants**

A significant three-way moderating effect between SDO, threat and policy condition was found for attitudes toward immigrants, but not evaluations of intercultural contact or ingroup bias.

The first step of the regression equation accounted for nearly 22% of the variance explained, $R^2 = .22$, $F(4, 318) = 22.13, p < .001$. Steps two ($\Delta R^2 = .016, F(5,313) = 1.27, p > .05$) and three ($\Delta R^2 = .011, F(2, 311) = 2.29, p > .05$) did not explain any additional variance over and above the first step. The unstandardized regression coefficients for the variables included at each step are presented in Table 4 below.
Table 4. Unstandardized regression coefficients for the linear regression predicting attitudes toward immigrants

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Step</th>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>$R^2$</th>
<th>Δ$R^2$</th>
<th>$F$</th>
<th>$b$ (SE)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>SDO\textsuperscript{1} Threat</td>
<td>.22</td>
<td>.22</td>
<td>22.13***</td>
<td>-.55 (.15)***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>PolicyContrast\textsubscript{1} (C\textsubscript{1})</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>.00 (.17)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>PolicyContrast\textsubscript{2} (C\textsubscript{2})</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>.22 (.17)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>SDO x C\textsubscript{1}</td>
<td>.23</td>
<td>.02</td>
<td>1.27</td>
<td>-.11 (.21)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>SDO x C\textsubscript{2}</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>.01 (.22)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>SDO x Threat</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>-.31 (.20)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Threat x C\textsubscript{1}</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>-.37 (.24)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Threat x C\textsubscript{2}</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>-.14 (.25)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>SDO x Threat x C\textsubscript{1}</td>
<td>.24</td>
<td>.01</td>
<td>2.29</td>
<td>.55 (.29) †</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>SDO x Threat x C\textsubscript{2}</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>.53 (.31) †</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\textit{Note:} * $p < .05$; ** $p < .01$; *** $p < .001$; † $p < .10$; \textsuperscript{1} Variable centered at its mean.

Although adding the interaction terms in steps two and three of the regression model did not account for any significant increase in the variance explained, the effect of SDO on attitudes toward immigrants was qualified by a marginally significant three-way interaction between SDO, the degree of pro-diversity policy presented as normative, and threat.

Although the three-way interaction terms did not reach statistical significance as commonly defined, given the theoretical frame of the present study, their marginal significance warranted further exploration of the interaction term by condition. Simple slopes (Aiken & West, 1991) were calculated by breaking the three-way interaction down by levels of threat. Specifically, the simple slopes for the relationship between SDO and attitudes toward immigrants were calculated for assimilation, interculturalism, and multiculturalism normative policy primes within each level of threat. As can be seen from Figure 1, when participants were primed to think of an incoming group of refugees as threatening and they were presented with a normative integration policy that favoured assimilation, SDO had the
greatest effect on attitudes toward immigrants, $b = -0.86, t(65) = -6.00, p < .001$. The effect was weakened, although still significant, when participants were presented with a normative approach to integration favouring interculturalism, $b = -0.42, t(64) = -3.16, p = .002$, and when they were presented with a multicultural approach to integrating newcomers, $b = -0.40, t(63) = -3.18, p = .002$.

As can be seen from Figure 2, the same general trend remained, though the ability for pro-diversity intergroup ideologies to influence the SDO-prejudice relationship was less apparent in the absence of a threatening prime. In the assimilation condition where pro-diversity policy was the weakest, SDO had the strongest effect on attitudes toward immigrants, $b = -0.73, t(69) = -6.06, p < .001$. Again, the relationship was weakened, although still significant, when primed with a moderate pro-diversity policy of interculturalism, $b = -0.66, t(59) = -4.33, p < .001$, and when participants were presented with a strong pro-diversity approach of multiculturalism, $b = -0.51, t(55) = -3.26, p = .001$. Comparing the unstandardized regression coefficients across threatening conditions shows that under conditions of threat, SDO is associated with a greater decrease in attitudes toward immigrants than in the absence of the threatening prime. The moderating effects of interculturalism and multiculturalism are weaker in the presence of threat.
Figure 1. Effect of social dominance orientation on attitudes toward immigrants for assimilation, interculturalism, and multiculturalism policy primes and when participants are primed to think of Syrians as threatening.

Figure 2. Effect of social dominance orientation on attitudes toward immigrants for assimilation, interculturalism, and multiculturalism policy primes and when participants are not primed to think of Syrians as threatening.
Discussion

In the present study, I assessed the moderating effects of hierarchy enhancing (assimilation) and moderate (interculturalism) and strong (multiculturalism) hierarchy attenuating intergroup ideologies on intercultural relations. By manipulating a government’s ostensible integration policy for a large number of incoming Syrian refugees, I explored whether the strength of pro-diversity intergroup ideologies can moderate the relationship between individual difference variables across three measures of prejudice and influence support for admitting a group of Syrian refugees into Canada. Previous research has shown that different intergroup ideologies can influence hosts’ judgments toward newcomers (Fasel, Green & Sarrasin, 2013; Guimond et al., 2013; Levin et al., 2012; Richeson & Nussbaum, 2004; Verkuyten, 2005; Wolsko et al., 2000). Traditionally, researchers have typically studied intergroup ideologies in dichotomous terms with assimilation on the one hand and multiculturalism on the other. However, in practice, intergroup ideologies fall across an ideological continuum with the hierarchy enhancing or hierarchy attenuating nature of an integration policy being a matter of degree. Although intergroup ideologies like assimilation and multiculturalism anchor the ideological spectrum of intercultural attitudes, in practice there is much variation in support for diversity with government integration policies localized at various points along the assimilation-multiculturalism continuum (e.g., MIPEX, 2014).

In the present study, I aimed to extend previous research on intergroup ideologies and intercultural attitudes by manipulating the degree to which a policy is hierarchy enhancing or hierarchy attenuating by including interculturalism as theoretical middle ground between assimilation and multiculturalism. Adding a new dimension to a now classic paradigm to
explore the effects of intergroup ideologies on intercultural relations (see Wolsko et al., 2000) has practical utility in that the contemporary divide in political and popular support for immigrant integration goes beyond an assimilation-multicultural dichotomy. Indeed, this specific divide has been evolving in Canadian politics for several decades where a federal policy of multiculturalism is juxtaposed with an emerging model of interculturalism in the province of Québec. While Canadian multiculturalism encourages all ethnicities and cultures to share their language and heritage with other Canadians, Québec’s emerging model of interculturalism moves to simultaneously encourage diversity within a social context that prioritizes Québec’s language and values. In this regard, while interculturalism has some elements of assimilation, the policy position retains theoretical underpinnings to attenuate group hierarchies (e.g., Bouchard, 2011).

The data presented here lend support to the notion that the prejudice-reducing effects of intergroup ideologies are a function of the degree to which they are hierarchy attenuating in nature. The present study supports this claim (Hypothesis 1), with some limitations. In line with past research (Guimond et al., 2013; Levin et al., 2012) SDO related more strongly to prejudice when a hierarchy enhancing ideology of assimilation was presented as the normative approach to integration. Contributing to this line of research, the present study suggests that the prejudice-reducing effects of intergroup ideologies appear to be dependent on the degree to which a normative context attenuates group hierarchies, however this effect does not generalize across various measures of prejudice. For example, while Hypothesis 1 predicted a prejudice-reducing effect of hierarchy attenuating ideologies across three measures of
prejudice, this effect was only observed for participants’ attitudes toward immigrants and not their evaluations of intercultural contact, nor their level of ingroup bias.

With respect to attitudes toward immigrants, a hierarchy enhancing ideology of assimilation had a very strong, negative affect on the relationship between SDO and prejudice. Interculturalism, an intergroup ideology that is less hierarchy enhancing than assimilation but not as attenuating as multiculturalism, reduced the relationship between SDO and negative attitudes toward immigrants, but this reduction was strongest when participants were primed with a normative approach to integration that aligns with multiculturalism, a strongly hierarchy attenuating intergroup ideology. Put differently, the data presented here lends support to the notion that the moderating role of intergroup ideologies on the relationship between SDO and prejudice are in proportion to the degree to which the integration frame attenuates group hierarchies. Interestingly, no moderating effect was observed for measures of zero-sum group beliefs or multicultural ideology, suggesting that integration policy frames that capture hierarchy attenuating intergroup ideologies best serve to reduce prejudice by countering social attitudes of group dominance, but not zero-sum group competition or one’s ideological support for diversity.

While the prejudice reducing effects of intergroup ideologies were anticipated based on past research, it was expected that the moderating effects of hierarchy attenuating ideologies (i.e., interculturalism and multiculturalism) would be lessened when participants were primed to think of Syrians as posing an economic and cultural threat (Hypothesis 2). The data presented here supports this notion. Although hierarchy attenuating policies of multiculturalism, and to a lesser extent, interculturalism were associated with a weakened
relationship between SDO and attitudes toward immigrants in the threatening condition, the size of the effect, as indicated by a comparison of unstandardized regression coefficients between threatening and non-threatening conditions indicate that the prejudice-reducing effects of hierarchy attenuating integration frames are stronger when normative discourse does not portray a target outgroup as threatening.

Finally, it was anticipated that hierarchy attenuating ideological frames would increase participants’ acceptance of the government’s policy of admitting Syrian refugees to Canada. The data presented here do not support this notion and thus there was no support for Hypothesis 3.

**Limitations and Future Directions**

The present study is not without limitations. First, although an effort was made to increase the representativeness of the sample, participants were drawn overwhelmingly recruited out of convenience from a university participant pool. Second, although the policy primes of assimilation and multiculturalism were developed with reference to existing empirical measures (e.g., Berry & Kalin, 1995), no such measures are available for interculturalism. Although the interculturalism condition was developed through extensive reference to official Government of Québec documents that outline the policy as well as Québécois philosophers and social researchers who have commented extensively on the nature of interculturalism, beyond face validity, further empirical assessments of interculturalism – and alternative integration ideologies more generally – are an area for future research. In this regard, in addition to replicating the present study with a more representative sample, future research on hierarchy-attenuating and -enhancing integration frames would benefit from
comparative analyses where respondents have been socialized into different normative ideological climates of immigrant integration. To better understand the effects of intergroup ideologies and integration policy frames on attitudes toward immigrants and support for diversity, cross-national studies can capitalize on a ‘natural laboratory’ by tapping the extensive variation in governments’ approaches to integration (e.g., MIPEX, 2014).

**Conclusion**

The present study reaffirms existing research arguing that the normative political context is an important factor affecting attitudes toward immigrants. Normative social and political contexts that are supportive of diversity strengthen intercultural relations by weakening the relationship between individual differences associated with prejudice. The present study replicates support for the prejudice-reducing affects of pro-diversity integration frames and extends the current research by demonstrating that this effect is related to the degree to which an intergroup ideology attenuated group hierarchies. Results suggest that multicultural frames have a greater potential to reduce prejudice than lesser-hierarchy attenuating frames such as interculturalism. The prejudice-reducing effects of intergroup ideologies appear to function by targeting specific individual differences. Data presented here suggests that hierarchy attenuating ideologies reduce the relationship between individual’s orientations toward social dominance, but not zero-sum group competition or ideological views of diversity, though future research is needed to explore this further. The findings also position interculturalism as an ideological ‘middle ground’ between multiculturalism and assimilation. This is consistent with the political discourse on integration in Québec, where the model is practiced; here, an approach to integration, which on its surface is supportive of
diversity, is challenged to simultaneously assimilate newcomers into Québec’s language and values in order to protect the province’s national cultural identity.


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Appendix A: Vignettes

No Threat, Multiculturalism Condition

Canada is opening its doors to those displaced by the Syrian civil war, including refugees, asylum-seekers, and both skilled and unskilled migrants.

Immigration Minister Jason Kenney announced on Wednesday that the Canadian government will resettle thousands of “extremely vulnerable” persons from the Syrian conflict in 2013 and 2014, as part of his government’s commitment of humanitarian assistance to the war-torn country.

The violence in Syria between forces loyal to President Bashar al-Assad and those seeking his ouster has driven more than 1.6 million to leave for neighbouring countries such as Jordan, Turkey and Lebanon. With millions more displaced internally, the exodus of Syrians fleeing the violence is expected to keep growing with no apparent end in sight.

The Canadian government has already pledged more than $180-million to help Syrians, including $115-million to help refugees in Syria and neighbouring countries. In a move that drastically expands Canada’s response to the crisis, the Canadian government has adopted an “open-door” policy toward those who wish to flee Syrian, drastically increasing the number of approved immigration requests provided applicants pass rigorous screenings designed to identify extremists.

Experts agree that the government’s decision to significantly increase the number of Syrians admitted into Canada is a complicated issue. Dr. Patrick Dearin, Director of Research with the Canadian Centre for Migration and Ethnic Policy, an Ottawa-base non-profit specializing in immigrant integration and wellbeing, applauds the government for taking brave action while expressing concern for how the government plans to successfully integrate such a large number of Syrians into Canadian society in relatively little time.

"It’s the position of the Canadian government to extend safe passage to all Syrians, provided they do not pose a security threat,” says Dearin. “The government’s decision to lift restrictions on temporary and permanent settlement to those Syrians who are already in the country and actively recruit both skilled and unskilled migrants, in addition to refugees and asylum seekers, requires a well-planned integration strategy to ensure a smooth and pleasant experience for Canadians and Syrians alike."

When asked about the government’s plans to successfully manage the integration of so many newcomers fleeing violence, Andrew MacDougall, the Prime Minister’s chief spokesperson, highlighted the government’s recent successes integrating newcomers and Canada’s historic ability to manage diversity.

“We are a diverse nation. We have a duty to recognize and promote this diversity while ensuring all Canadians and those who wish to become Canadians can maintain their own culture and values. We believe that we should help ethnic and racial minorities preserve their cultural heritages in Canada because a society that has a variety of ethnic and cultural groups is more able to tackle new problems as they occur. We believe immigrants integrate successfully when our legislation and programs acknowledges that Canadian culture isn’t any more important than Syrian culture. Our approach ensures that all citizens have a sense of belonging by maintaining their cultural identities and values and taking pride in their ancestry. Our policy toward incoming Syrians ensures that we recognize the potential of all people, encouraging them to integrate into society and take an active part in its social, cultural, economic, and political affairs.”
The UN, which sent a convoy of investigators to Damascus on Monday to launch a probe into whether chemical weapons were used by Syria last week, says more than 100,000 people have been killed since the uprising against President Bashar al-Assad began more than two years ago.
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Maria Smithson, former special adviser to current Immigration Minister Jason Kenney, and lead researcher on the Global Cultural Relations Project, a multi-year international study of ethnic relations, says that it is important to be aware of the difficulties increasing the number of migrants can have on Canadian society. "Year after year our research shows that Syrians, as a group, prefer to live amongst themselves, removed from Canadian society, while the overwhelming majority of Canadians prefer newcomers to make an effort to better integrate themselves into daily Canadian life. Such a significant increase to the number of immigrants admitted into Canada during such a short period of time has a real chance of influencing Canada’s cultural landscape."

A large increase in the number of Syrian migrants also undermines Canadians’ access to limited economic and social resources. Studies have shown that migrants fleeing civil unrest are particularly costly to social programs like healthcare and other government services. Canadians must also compete with incoming Syrians, particularly the relatively large number of those who are considered to be “skilled”, for an increasingly limited number of job opportunities. Some who are opposed to the government’s policy worry that many Syrians who are admitted to Canada will be given preferential access to jobs in many sectors, as they are more willing to work for a lower salary.
According to Smithson, “Syrians’ potential to challenge Canadians on economic and cultural issues means that the government must work closely with local municipalities to ensure a mutually-beneficial integration experience for Canadians and Syrians alike.”

When asked about the government’s plans to successfully manage the integration of so many newcomers fleeing violence, Andrew MacDougall, the Prime Minister’s chief spokesperson, highlighted the government’s recent successes integrating newcomers and Canada’s historic ability to manage diversity.

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"It’s the position of the Canadian government to extend safe passage to all Syrians, provided they do not pose a security threat,” says Dearin. "The government’s decision to lift restrictions on temporary and permanent settlement to those Syrians who are already in the country and actively recruit both skilled and unskilled migrants, in addition to refugees and asylum seekers, requires a well-planned integration strategy to ensure a smooth and pleasant experience for Canadians and Syrians alike.”

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“Although we recognize and value Canadians’ diversity, we have a duty to promote Canadian beliefs and values in order to ensure that all those who wish to come to Canada can feel at ease with their adopted Canadian identity. We believe that we should help ethnic and racial minorities adopt Canadian culture and values because a society that has a common cultural group is more able to tackle new problems as they occur. We believe immigrants integrate successfully when our legislation and programs acknowledge the importance of adopting a Canadian identity. Our approach ensures that all citizens have a sense of belonging by fully adopting a Canadian culture. Our policy toward incoming Syrians ensures that we recognize the potential of all people, encouraging them to integrate into society and take an active part in its social, cultural, economic, and political affairs.”
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Maria Smithson, former special adviser to current Immigration Minister Jason Kenney, and lead researcher on the Global Cultural Relations Project, a multi-year international study of ethnic relations, says that it is important to be aware of the difficulties increasing the number of migrants can have on Canadian society. “Year after year our research shows that Syrians, as a group, prefer to live amongst themselves, removed from Canadian society, while the overwhelming majority of Canadians prefer newcomers to make an effort to better integrate themselves into daily Canadian life. Such a significant increase to the number of immigrants admitted into Canada during such a short period of time has a real chance of influencing Canada’s cultural landscape.”

A large increase in the number of Syrian migrants also undermines Canadians’ access to limited economic and social resources. Studies have shown that migrants fleeing civil unrest are particularly costly to social programs like healthcare and other government services. Canadians must also compete with incoming Syrians, particularly the relatively large number of those who are considered to be “skilled”, for an increasingly limited number of job opportunities. Some who are opposed to the government’s policy worry that many Syrians who are admitted to Canada will be given preferential access to jobs in many sectors, as they are more willing to work for a lower salary. 
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“We are a diverse nation. We have a duty to recognize and promote this diversity while ensuring an adherence to Canadian culture and values. While we encourage newcomers to practice their cultural traditions and values, we recognize the importance of conforming to Canadian values for those who wish to immigrate to Canada because a society that has a common cultural group is more able to tackle new problems as they occur. We believe immigrants integrate successfully when our legislation and programs acknowledge the importance of adopting a Canadian identity. We believe immigrants integrate successfully when our legislation and programs recognize the importance of Canadian beliefs and values while respecting Syrians’ cultural heritage. Our approach ensures that all citizens have a sense of Canadian identity while maintaining their cultural identities and. Our policy toward incoming Syrians ensures that we recognize the potential of all people, encouraging them to integrate into society and take an active part in its social, cultural, economic, and political affairs.”
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Appendix B: Scales

Multicultural Ideology Scale (Endorsement of Multiculturalism; 10-items; Berry & Kalin, 1995)

We should recognize that cultural and racial diversity is a fundamental characteristic of [Canadian] society.
We should help ethnic and racial minorities preserve their cultural heritages in [Canada].
*It is best for [Canada] if all people forget their different ethnic and cultural backgrounds as soon as possible.
A society that has a variety of ethnic and cultural groups is more able to tackle new problems as they occur.
*The unity of this country is weakened by people of different ethnic and cultural backgrounds sticking to their old ways.
*If people of different ethnic and cultural origins want to keep their own culture, they should keep it to themselves.
*A society that has a variety of ethnic or cultural groups has more problems with national unity than societies with one or two basic cultural groups.
We should do more to learn about the customs and heritage of different ethnic and cultural groups in this country.
Immigrant/ethnic parents must encourage their children to retain the culture and traditions of their homeland.
*People who come to [Canada] should change their behaviour to be more like us.

Three-Factor Model of Social Identity (Measure of Canadian Identity; 12-items w/3 dimensions of identity; Cameron, 2004).

Ingroup Ties
I have a lot in common with other __________.
I feel strong ties to other ____________.
I find it difficult to form a bond with other ____________.*
I don’t feel a sense of being “connected” with other ____________.*

Centrality
I often think about the fact that I am a ______________.
Overall, being a(n) ______________ has very little to do with how I feel about myself. *
In general, being a(n) ______________ is an important part of my self-image.
The fact that I am a(n) ______________ rarely enters my mind.*

Ingroup Affect
In general, I’m glad to be a(n) ______________.
I often regret that I am a(n) ______________.*
I don’t feel good about being a(n) ______________.*
Generally, I feel good when I think about myself as a(n) ______________. 
Social Dominance Orientation (Pratto et al., 1994; Jost & Thompson, 2000; Ho et al., 2012).

Some groups of people are just more worthy than others.
In getting what your group wants, it is sometimes necessary to use force against other groups.
Superior groups should dominate inferior groups
To get ahead in life, it is sometimes necessary to step on other groups
If certain groups of people stayed in their place, we would have fewer problems.
It’s probably a good thing that certain groups are at the top and other groups are at the bottom
Inferior groups should stay in their place
Sometimes other groups must be kept in their place
It would be good if all groups could be equal
Group equality should be our ideal
All groups should be given an equal chance in life
We should do what we can to equalize conditions for different groups
Increased social equality
We would have fewer problems if we treated different groups more equally
We should strive to make incomes more equal.
No one group should dominate society

Zero-Sum Belief Scale (14-items, Esses, Jackson & Armstrong, 2010.)

When immigrants make economic gains, Canadians already living here lose out economically.
Immigrants tend to open up small businesses, which means that there are fewer business opportunities available to Canadians already living here.
Money spent on social services for immigrants means less money for services for Canadians already living here.
The more power immigrants obtain in Canada, the more difficult it is for Canadians already living here.
As immigrants take advantage of Canadian education, there are fewer spots and opportunities available for Canadian students already living here.
Imigrants are taking our jobs.
Allowing immigrants to decide on political issues means that Canadians already living here have less say in how the country is run.
More immigrants in positions of power means fewer opportunities for Canadians already living here.
The more immigrants Canada accepts, the harder it is for Canadians already living here to get ahead.
Immigrants have too much say about political matters
Immigrants have been trying to get ahead economically, at the expense of Canadians already living here.
More good jobs for immigrants means fewer good jobs for Canadians already living here. Financial aid to immigrants hurts Canadians already living here. Canadians already living here may no longer have a say in how the country is run because immigrants are trying to take control.

Evaluations of Intergroup Contact (Verkuyten, 2005)

To work with Syrian people seems to me…
To have many Syrian friends seems to me…
To be married to a Syrian person seems to me…

Ethnic Tolerance (Vogt Isaksen & Jakobsen, 2012)

Immigrants are good/bad for the local economy
Country’s cultural life undermined or enriched by immigrants
Immigrants make country a better/worse place to live.

\[i\] Although the Charter will not be adopted as law given the fall of the PQ, it is a legislative document with clear public support as outlined above.