
by

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ABSTRACT

"There is absolutely no room for optimism."

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Between 1941 and 1945, following Pearl Harbor and America’s entrance into World War II, Japanese began to feature prominently in editorial cartoons across North America. The depiction of the Japanese in these cartoons was neither accurate nor dignified. Popular themes of editorial cartoons depicting the Japanese during this time were: the dehumanization of the Japanese enemy, the destruction of Japan, and the degradation of both Japanese people and their culture. By depicting the Japanese as primitive and less than human, editorial cartoonists during the war worked to gather support for the war effort, while also demonstrating to Americans their interpretation of what the enemy was like. The information on which the cartoonists based their information was provided by both the American government and Western scholars who had little knowledge and understanding of the history and culture of Japanese people. Editorial cartoons are a powerful form of propaganda and commentary on situations of the day. The public, however, has to be cautious in viewing the information in the cartoons as a true reflection of both the people and the situation being represented.
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<tr>
<td>C.O.I.</td>
<td>Coordinator of Information</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F.I.S.</td>
<td>Foreign Information Service</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>O.F.F.</td>
<td>Office of Facts and Figures</td>
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<tr>
<td>O.W.I.</td>
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Introduction

“Propaganda is one of the great shibboleths of our time.”¹ — Michael Choukas.

When reading the newspaper today, politics of the day are often discussed through articles about what various governments are doing, letters from concerned citizens, editorials, and editorial cartoons. These cartoons not only present an amusing take on the political atmosphere of the day, but other important issues occurring around the world at the time. The caricatures in these cartoons illustrate what the cartoonist is thinking, as well as the kind of message that he or she wants the public to see. As this thesis demonstrates, while entertaining, editorial cartoons are also a form of propaganda.

Propaganda has been used for centuries as a tool to sway public support towards a particular idea or opinion.² There are a number of different ways to define propaganda. In its strictest definition it can be seen as “the putting forward of, and the insistence upon, a particular point of view.”³ It has also been defined as “the management of opinions and attitudes by the direct manipulation of social suggestion rather than by altering other conditions in the environment or in the organism.”⁴ The definition that most accurately defines propaganda was provided by Terence Qualter in 1962. He defined it as a “deliberate attempt by some individual or group to form, control, or alter the attitudes of other groups by the use of the instruments of communication, with the intention that in any given situation the reaction of those so influenced will be that desired by the

¹ Michael Choukas, Propaganda Comes of Age (Washington: Public Affairs Press, 1965), 1.
² Choukas, Propaganda Comes of Age, 3.
³ John Hargrave, Propaganda, the Mightiest Weapon of All: Words Win Wars,” (London: Love & Malcomson, Ltd., 1940), 53.
This definition implies that propaganda is deliberate in the message that it tries to deliver; while at the same time acknowledging that the message is the opinion of a single entity, the propagandist.

Propaganda has been seen by scholars such as Michal Choukas as an optimistic philosophy, founded on the belief in the decency and goodness of people – a realistic philosophy, where propaganda assumes the nature of people; their decency, spirit, and intelligence, and their place in the world, along with a way to direct the public to a “common social effort.” By others, like John Hargrave, it is seen as something essential, that a group of people or a government would be unable to exist without propaganda and that “people must be told what is happening and what to do.” The simplest way to tell the people this, without appearing overbearing, was to do so through more hidden forms of propaganda. Editorial cartoons in newspapers provided a good way to spread wartime propaganda.

Propaganda has also been seen, by Qualter, as two separate entities; the idea that there is “ordinary propaganda” and “evil propaganda,” depending on how it is presented to the public. Ordinary propaganda was made to appear interesting to the public often at the same time delivering an opinion, whereas evil propaganda, also interesting, was made to appear mundane. Through the later work of Lynette Finch, it came to be understood that “evil propaganda disguised the propagandist’s desire to influence opinion by pretending merely to inform.”

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6 Choukas, Propaganda Comes of Age, 3.
7 Hargrave, Propaganda, the Mightiest Weapon of All, 29-30.
8 Qualter, Propaganda and Psychological Warfare, 7.
9 Ibid.
Between the middle of the nineteenth century and until World War II (1939-1945), many societies viewed propaganda as being sinister. This particular image of propaganda depended on where a person lived and the kind of message that was trying to be spread. For example, the use of propaganda by the Roman Catholic Church was seen as being sinister in the more Protestant countries, whereas it was not seen as such in areas that were predominately Catholic. By World War I (1914-1918), however, opinions about propaganda began to change within the government, and academics and government officials, began to see the merit of using propaganda as a simple way to influence public opinion.

The use of propaganda during times of war can be traced back to January 1622 when Pope Gregory XV (1621-1623) employed it during the Protestant Reformation. The use of propaganda spread throughout Europe, used largely by the Roman Catholic Church as a tool for “carrying the faith to the new world, and for strengthening and reviving it in the old.” As time passed and the use of propaganda spread, other groups learned how to use it to gain support for their own causes.

In the United States, on 5 March 1770, the day of the Boston Massacre, Paul Revere (1735-1818) recorded his version of the event thus starting the United States’ use of propaganda during war. Rather than creating an accurate historical record, Revere borrowed from a drawing by Henry Pelham to create a work of propaganda that encouraged support of the “anti-British cause.” Revere’s portrayal of the enemy, in this

11 Qualter, Propaganda and Psychological Warfare, 4.
12 Finch, “Psychological Propaganda,” 367.
case the Red Coats, as vicious and alien created the perception of the “other” throughout the Colonies and worked towards gaining support for his cause, much in the same way that Pope Gregory XV used propaganda to promote the Roman Catholic Church and vilify Protestantism.\textsuperscript{15}

By World War II, the use of propaganda had become an essential tool of war and was used to manipulate the public and soldiers’ attitudes, ideas, conclusions and levels of tolerance over atrocities occurring at the time.\textsuperscript{16} Employed by all sides during the war, propaganda was used to raise popular support for the war and also to influence enemy soldiers and civilians.\textsuperscript{17}

One of the most powerful ways for propagandists to spread their message was through editorial cartoons. Editorial cartoons appear in newspapers and magazines as critiques on society. Wartime editorial cartoons are used as a way to justify the war being fought and the actions taken by a government, and to maintain public support for the war.\textsuperscript{18} Through this medium, editorial cartoonists have been able to create an image of the enemy with intentionally ridiculous or otherwise humourous depictions.\textsuperscript{19} They sought to mold the opinions of the public about the enemy that they were fighting, while expressing varied perspectives about the war.\textsuperscript{20} Editorial cartoons have proven to be effective media to reach the masses. As the images are usually poignant, the cartoon requires little time to digest and the message rarely depends on its audience being highly literate.

\textsuperscript{15} Caswell, “Drawing Swords,” 24.
\textsuperscript{16} Finch “Psychological Propaganda,” 370.
\textsuperscript{17} Ibid, 373-374.
\textsuperscript{18} Caswell, “Drawing Swords,” 13.
\textsuperscript{19} Ibid,14.
\textsuperscript{20} Ibid.
This thesis will demonstrate that during World War II, following the bombing of Pearl Harbor on 7 December 1941, the public in the United States was subjected to propaganda in the form of editorial cartoons. Through the use of stereotypes and themes of dehumanization, destruction and degradation, opinions about the Japanese as a people were put forward. The racial stereotypes presented in the cartoons reflected governmental goals, possibly the ideas of cartoonists, and influenced public beliefs about Japanese society in the press, in the attempt to garner public support for the government’s action against Japan.

This thesis examines editorial cartoons that were published during World War II, analyzing the messages they were meant to convey to readers and what information about the Japanese the cartoonists were basing their information on. This thesis has its origins in Hawai’i in the summer of 2012, during my examination of the editorial cartoons published on Maui during World War II. The newspaper archives at the University of Hawai’i, Maui, holds copies of The Maui News from the years 1939 to 1945; these were examined for editorial cartoons. Published on Mondays, Wednesdays and Saturdays, The Maui News is a major resource for editorial cartoons that were published during the war. Only a limited number of cartoons relevant to the Japanese were published during the war prior to the attack on Pearl Harbor, because of the United States’ limited involvement and, subsequently, less American interest in the subject. Additionally, there were cartoons that did not feature Japanese people, as well as days when editorial cartoons did not appear or when reproductions were not usable because they had faded over time. Obtaining editorial cartoons from The Maui News was beneficial because it is a source that is not widely available in Canada and which provides examples of how Japanese
people were being portrayed in an area that was directly affected by the war.

The library at the University of Guelph offered a plethora of newspapers from which to obtain editorial cartoons. The *Toronto Daily Star* offered cartoons that were published in an area close to home. While there was a significantly larger number of cartoons, printed between 1939 and 1945, there were days when cartoons did not feature Japanese people. Also, as in Maui, there were scans of cartoons that were not usable because of substandard reproduction. The internet also proved useful, allowing me to secure a rare book by Reg Manning (1905-1986), *Little Itchy Itchy and Other Cartoons*. This volume was published in 1944 and featured his works from the beginning of the war up until 1944.

Once the all the relevant cartoons were gathered, they were organized according to the major themes that emerged – dehumanization, destruction and degradation. In order to achieve a variety of how Japanese people were being portrayed, four cartoons from each of the sources, *The Maui News*, the *Toronto Daily Star*, and Manning’s book were selected. Both the themes that were represented in cartoons and their clarity were important in choosing the materials for this thesis. Cartoons that had more than one of the themes were chosen over cartoons that had only one of the themes. However, there were a few exceptions when the cartoon’s depiction of a single theme was stronger than cartoons that contained multiple themes. After the final twelve cartoons were chosen, they were closely analyzed for their themes, possible meanings behind them, and aspects that might have influenced cartoonists to depict people the way that they did. The analysis of these cartoons will demonstrate the influence that the United States government, and Western scholars, by publishing images of Japanese people that were
both historically and culturally incorrect, had on the creation of editorial cartoons depicting the Japanese during World War II. These cartoons were developed with the intent to influence the non-Japanese American public into believing in, and supporting, the war against Japan.

Chapter One examines the historiography of United States propaganda between World War I and the Cold War (1947-1991) in order to understand how the study of propaganda has changed over the years. Chapter Two examines the historiography of Japanese-American political relations to demonstrate how the study of the relationship between the two countries, and Japan’s and the United States’ entrance into the war, changed between World War I and the Cold War. Chapter Three analyzes political relations between Japan and America leading up to the United States’ entrance into World War II. It also discusses the various types of media that the United States used to spread propaganda throughout World War II. Chapter Four examines twelve editorial cartoons that were published during the war: four that were drawn by Reg Manning and published in his book *Little Itchy Itch and Other Cartoons* (1944); four that were published in *The Maui News*; and four that were published in the *Toronto Daily Star*. The editorial cartoons from both *The Maui News* and *Toronto Daily Star* were published on opposite sides of the continent, however, the cartoons were drawn by artists working in Chicago and were influenced by the same political pressures, popular ideas, and events of the war. This chapter focuses attention on the themes of dehumanization, destruction and degradation represented in the cartoons. Analysis of the twelve editorial cartoons, and various secondary sources, will demonstrate the way that Japanese people were depicted during World War II and the influence that previously held notions of Japanese
history and culture, perpetuated by Western scholars and the United States government, including those taken from the Toronto Daily Star which were taken from Chicago syndication, had on the cartoonists. Understanding editorial cartoons that North Americans viewed throughout World War II reveals what kinds of propaganda Americans were exposed to, and where their ideas of whom the “enemy” was and what they were like came from.
Chapter 1

“The problem of maintaining moral[e]is only in part a problem of propaganda, because propaganda is but one of the many devices which must be relied upon.” — Harold Lasswell.

The use of propaganda, images and slogans meant to relay and instill a specific point of view during times of war has been commonplace. People may fear or denounce “propaganda,” but they have come to expect it. Propaganda began to be used frequently during World War I (1914-1918) in order to garner and maintain public support for war. In the time from World War I to the Cold War (1947-1991), propaganda evolved as public opinion about it, and its varied targets, shifted. Studying America’s use of propaganda is an important endeavour. Many have written about it and its deployment, creating an extensive historical record that has become an important part of examining the history of war. This chapter argues that understanding changes in propaganda provides a better foundation for the analysis of American propaganda depicting the Japanese during World War II (1939-1945), and its development.

Not long after the end of World War I in 1922, Walter Lippmann wrote Public Opinion. Lippmann analyzes the importance of the government and media in the formation of public opinions through the use of propaganda. He also examines the role that a political scientist had as a “formulator,” rather than being an “apologist, critic, or reporter after the decision has been made.” He argues that public opinion is “the pictures inside the heads of these human beings, the pictures of themselves, of others, of

1 Lasswell, Propaganda Techniques, 8.
their needs, purposes, and relationships, are their public opinions,” and that it is reliant on second-hand accounts.3 Throughout his book Lippmann examines various aspects of the formation of public opinion that the government and media had power over, including the use of censorship, the use of popular interests and the types of media outlets that could be used, focusing on the use of newspapers. Lippmann also coined the term “stereotype,” by stating

“For the most part we do not first see, and then define, we define first and then see. In the great blooming, buzzing confusion of the outer world we pick out what our culture has already defined for us, and we tend to perceive that which we have picked out in the form stereotyped for us by our culture.”4

As one of the earliest works released after World War I on the subject of public relations, Lippmann, while not focused on wartime propaganda, examines the various aspects that influenced public opinion in order to show how governments and media can influence the public, and often mislead it.5 The media that he focused on was newspapers, which was one of the only forms of media at the time, and one that people placed their trust in, but at the same time had to be entertaining in order to maintain readership.6 He discusses the use of advertisements in newspapers and the way that it was paid advertisements that supported the industry, rather than the people paying for newspapers.7 He argues that this is a reason for the “defective organization of public opinion.”8 He also reasons that it is not the press that should form public opinion, but rather that public opinion should form the press.9 Lippmann’s insights to the formation

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3 Ibid 29.
4 Ibid, 81.
5 Ibid, 17.
6 Ibid, 321.
7 Ibid, 325.
8 Ibid, 32.
9 Ibid.
of public opinion and examination of stereotypes provided a beginning for the examination of propaganda and the government’s influence on the formation of public opinion.

In 1923, *Crystallizing Public Opinion* by Edward Bernays was published. Examining the growth and change in public relations in America during and after World War I, Bernays argued that public relations and the so-called education of the masses had become an important part of American life in the post-war period. The reason behind this growth in importance, Bernays argued, came from increased awareness of the influence of public opinion; whether small organizations or governments, the bureaucracy became reliant on or respectful of such opinion. Although not examining the use of propaganda directly, Bernays documents the shift that occurred in both the government’s need to appeal to the public and the growing theory of crowd psychology, which focused on a people’s behaviour in a crowd and how they are less inhibited and usually behave the way others in the crowd do. Bernays provides a critical analysis of how propaganda was viewed at the time. According to Bernays, “the only difference between ‘propaganda’ and ‘education,’ really, is the point of view.”

Bernays presents a unique view on how the relationship between the public and the government was transformed. Despite the limited number of sources available, Bernays builds upon the foundation for later historians interested in why the use of propaganda grew in the wake of World War I, that had been started by Lippmann the year before. Much of his analysis, as he explains, came from his personal experience in

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11 Ibid, 35.
12 Ibid, 214 and 102.
13 Ibid, 212.
public relations, while at the same time discussing Lippmann’s thoughts on the subject. Working to stimulate a more scientific approach to the study of public relations and, by extension, propaganda, Bernays approaches the topic analytically, relying on the work of psychologists and sociologists to expand his own interpretation of the topic. Although he does not specifically examine propaganda, Bernays’ in-depth examination of the shift in public relations and recognition of the importance of gaining popularity in public opinion illustrates why propaganda became popular during World War I and, later, of its importance during that war.

In 1927, four years after the publication of Bernays’ book, a more extensive examination of propaganda during World War I was published by Harold Lasswell. His book, Propaganda Technique in the World War, became one of the earliest materials available that focused on the subject of the use of propaganda during World War I. Lasswell not only examined the use and organization of propaganda, attempting to bring a definition to the term, but also focused on the various methods by which it was used. Lasswell argued that propaganda had become one of three main tools of war, the others being military and economic pressure. He stated that:

“Propaganda is one of the three chief implements of operation against a belligerent enemy:---
Military Pressure (The coercive power of the land, sea and air forces).
Economic Pressure (Interference with access to sources of material, markets, capital and labour power).
Propaganda (Direct use of suggestion).”

Focusing on propaganda through the written word, Lasswell worked to change the opinion of propaganda that had been created in publications following Bernay’s work,

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14 Ibid, lvii-lviii.
15 Lasswell, Propaganda Technique, 9.
16 Ibid.
arguing that propaganda was not evil but rather something that worked to unite a community against a common enemy while inspiring support for the soldiers. As a political scientist, Lasswell was not working to create a history of propaganda but rather to analyze the techniques and psychological effects that such material had on people during the war. He was also the first to recognize the changes taking place in warfare, with more advanced weapons being used, and how psychological propaganda would play an important part in the future.

Lasswell examined various types of propaganda from around the world, focusing on that coming from the major countries involved in World War I, America, Britain, France and Germany, and the propaganda they distributed during that period. Like Bernays, during his investigation Lasswell had few other sources to which he could refer that had dealt with propaganda. He was, however, able to examine a great number of propaganda items that had been used during World War I such as newspapers, letters and pamphlets. Despite their wide distribution, there had been little study into the use of propaganda and its influence during the war. Keeping his analysis simple through applying, what he called, “common-sense analysis” and by avoiding complicated evaluations of the propaganda at hand, Lasswell produced a cohesive history of its use around the world during World War I. His argument was that “Propaganda is the war of ideas on ideas.” He also explained the overall effects that propaganda might have on the psychology of the public, such as how groups of people were viewed both during the

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17 Ibid, 9-10.
19 Ibid, 221.
20 Ibid, 12.
21 Ibid.
war and in post-war society, both negatively and positively.22

Lasswell’s study of propaganda in the few years following World War I provided a critical step in documenting the history of propaganda usage during war-time. Combined with Bernays’ research on public relations and the rising importance of public opinion, a clearer understanding of how propaganda was used during the war started to form. These concepts continued to be studied in the 1930s as America’s use of propaganda during and after World War I became more prevalent.

In 1933, Edna Hines published a study of propaganda and the use of cartoons as a means of influencing the public entitled “Cartoons as a Means of Social Control,” in which she argued that cartoons were an essential form of propaganda.23 She also argued that it was through their “vivid, compact, attention-getting quality” that they were effective in gaining the public’s interest and were able to shape and sway opinion.24 Hines also stressed the use of caricatures as propaganda, an area that had not been explored prior to her article. Following the use of cartoons as propaganda, Hines described, as had been briefly addressed by Lasswell, the power that propaganda had over people and their opinions particularly during times of war, stating that “war marks the ultimate crystallization of prejudice. War cartoons are a most forceful means of propaganda either for or against war.”25 As this thesis makes clear, the messages that can be interpreted from propaganda, including editorial cartoons, can be graphic and powerful when deployed in the attempt to garner support for World War II.

Discussing various American propaganda cartoonists from World War I, Hines

24 Ibid, 455.
examined the various techniques of social control that had been described by Bernays and Lasswell, looking at both serious and humorous cartoons and the impact that each had on the public. Building upon Lasswell’s work, Hines did not make a judgment on an inherent nature of propaganda being either good or bad, but presented propaganda as something that had become a part of American life during World War I, and that was continuously being used to sway American popular opinion. Hines also supported the idea that the use of propaganda had increased since World War I, a notion that had been mentioned by both Lasswell and Bernays, but also described how propaganda had been around since the American Revolution, expanding the historic use of propaganda in America by 140 years.26

Like Bernays and Lasswell, Hines had only a limited number of sources with which she could work. While able to go into more detail about the cartoons, and briefly discussing how they were able to influence society, Haines provides little detail on how the government utilized propaganda during World War I. However, the detail that Hines does provide concerning the effects that propaganda had on society, building off of the works of Lasswell and Bernays, suggests that a shift in the use of propaganda occurred in World War I and suggests the importance of determining why such a shift, and increase in the use of propaganda, had occurred.

In 1935 Lasswell built upon his findings in Propaganda Technique in the World War with his article “The Person: Subject and Object of Propaganda.” As with his earlier work, Lasswell supports the idea that propaganda is not evil when used appropriately by a government during times of war. His article takes a closer look at the people who

26 Ibid, 457.
create propaganda, expanding on his previous focus on written propaganda to include cartoons. Like Hines, Lasswell examined those who created propaganda both during World War I and in the post-war period, but as a collective rather than focusing on a few individuals. He documents both the role and methods used by propagandists, along with the overall meanings that they attempted to relay to the public through their work, while continuing his argument from years earlier that propaganda is not inherently negative but simply conveys the message that the propagandist wants to send to the public.\(^{27}\) Despite this, Lasswell is more critical of propaganda as a whole than he was a few years earlier. He recognizes more clearly, as Hines did, that it is an effective method for social control, and he is more wary of the violence that it might arouse.\(^{28}\)

Both the dangers and the advantages of propaganda were explored between the 1920s and the end of the 1930s. Hines and Lasswell both described how propaganda maintained social control during World War I, while Lasswell expanded on Bernays’ understanding of propaganda’s effect on crowd psychology. Little examination of the propaganda itself was performed during this time. Instead, focus was on the techniques used and the impact that propaganda was having on society, and whether it should be considered good or bad. At the same time, Hines carefully examined propaganda used in World War I, placing the earlier work of Lasswell and Bernays into better context for future studies.

During the 1940s, focus centering on America’s use of propaganda during wartime became more important, with war once again arising in Europe and on the horizon.

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\(^{28}\) Ibid, 193.
for America. Published in 1940, *War Propaganda and the United States* by Harold Lavine and James Weschler, studied propaganda during World War II and how it had evolved since World War I. Encompassing a wide variety of propaganda, ranging from cartoons and pamphlets to films and music, Lavine and Wescher examined how propaganda had been used in Europe up until that point, and its historic use during World War I. Like Hines, they argue the importance of the use of propaganda during wartime and how it is a method for social control.\(^{29}\) They state that:

“"We live in a propaganda age. Public opinion no longer is formulated by the slow processes of what Professor John Dewey calls shared experience. In our time public opinion is primarily a response to propaganda stimuli.""\(^{30}\)

They also argue that propaganda was brought forth on three different fronts. First, the home front, which they deemed to be the most important as this was where public support for the war was gathered and where the people could be convinced to make necessary sacrifices for the war effort.\(^{31}\) The second was within enemy territory, where propagandists attack enemy morale and their relationships with other enemies. The final front was on the world stage, where propaganda was used in order to justify the war.\(^{32}\) Together these three fronts worked to gain support for a particular side of when fighting a war, from both those in enemy territory and those at home.

Lavine and Weschler also examined how the use of propaganda against enemies of America had changed over the twenty years following World War I. By World War II, propaganda continued to be used to attack both racial and ethnic differences, depending on the enemy, with the desire to instill panic at home. At the same time, the motives

\(^{30}\) Ibid, vii.  
\(^{31}\) Ibid, 5.  
\(^{32}\) Ibid, 11-13.
behind propaganda remained the same: the desire for public support.\textsuperscript{33} Lavine and Wescholer’s work shows a change in how propaganda was perceived, compared to the work of Lasswell only five years earlier. Rather than promoting the belief that propaganda is not something to fear, Lavine and Weschler place the decision of determining the morality of using propaganda into the hands of those studying it. They propose a change in analyzing propaganda by examining the underlying motives and methods and whether or not the ends justify the means.\textsuperscript{34}

Lavine and Weschler’s examination of propaganda in the United States during World War II offers a previously unavailable perspective on its use. At the time that it was written most of the world was in the midst of World War II and countries were attempting to gain America as an ally. Lavine and Weschler focused on pre-World War II propaganda distributed by European countries. This allowed for a clearer perspective on how propaganda had changed since World War I, as it became more attention-getting than previously. They also proffer that there was a rising interest in the use of propaganda by Americans as well, particularly with another war having begun.

The messages contained in propaganda and the influence that these were trying to have over people are examined by Lavine and Weschler, whereas previous focus had been on the overall technique of the government’s use of propaganda. Both the influence and techniques of propaganda are important in studying the history of its use in America. A unique perspective is available through Lavine and Weschler’s understanding of America’s use of propaganda during World War I. They demonstrate a comparison between America’s use of propaganda during World War I to the types of propaganda

\textsuperscript{33} Ibid, 265-266.
\textsuperscript{34} Ibid, vii.
used in the early years of World War II, prior to America’s involvement. Lavine and Weschler then explain how propaganda had changed and how it had stayed the same. They are able to better demonstrate propaganda’s evolution through the years.

After the end of World War II, interest in the use and history of propaganda became more intense and popular. Having gone through one war, and with mounting fears of another spreading, understanding the history and use of propaganda became more important.35 Little had changed in the ways that propaganda was examined and analyzed since the 1940s, however, the overall opinion concerning propaganda had undergone a transformation once again. There is also a change in the types of propaganda that was able to be studied. The enemies fought in World War I were, for the most part European. In World War II, a different enemy needed to be portrayed as well, one that was not European. This change resulted in different images appearing in propaganda and created different areas that could be examined based on how Japanese people were portrayed in propaganda, particularly when compared to their European counterparts.

In 1953, after the end of World War II, amid the rising tensions of the Cold War between America and the Soviet Union, Truth is Our Weapon by Edward Barrett was published. The understanding of public opinion and the importance of crowd psychology, promoted by Bernays in 1923, is once again acknowledged through the work of Barrett. Barrett argues that, “the propaganda of truth – when linked with firm diplomatic, economic and military policies – can yield vast returns.”36 Barrett adopts a different approach to examining America’s use of propaganda. Rather than examining

propaganda from World War I or World War II, Barrett focuses on the use of American propaganda overseas in the midst of the Cold War, particularly on the use of radio transmissions as the main form of spreading propaganda in Western Europe.\textsuperscript{37} Much of his understanding came from his work as a journalist before, during and after World War II. Having been enlisted to help in establishing the Office of War Information (O.W.I.), Barrett was able to expand on previous ideas regarding the methods used in the creation of propaganda, such as Lavine’s and Weschler’s thoughts regarding the three fronts where propaganda was used, what made its use important, and the resulting influence that it had during World War II.\textsuperscript{38} While praising the use of propaganda during World War II, Barrett is also critical about how efficient it was, stating that President Franklin D. Roosevelt (in office, 1933-1945), like most people, did not fully understand the power of persuasion and, by extension, propaganda.\textsuperscript{39}

Through his experience in the media, Barrett was able to expand on ideas regarding propaganda that had been developing since World War I. World War II allowed for a refinement in the technique of how propaganda was used and distributed to the public, both at home and overseas. Barrett examined how propaganda was employed overseas during the Cold War, explaining not only its past use but how propaganda might be used in the continuing Cold War. This study of propaganda and “truth” by the American government helps make clearer the extent of propaganda and how it reached people. Since it was written during the early 1950s, limited study on the use of propaganda during the Cold War and World War II was available, but Barrett did

\textsuperscript{37} Ibid, 13-15.
\textsuperscript{38} Ibid, x-xii.
\textsuperscript{39} Ibid, 298.
highlight the propaganda methods used by Americans overseas, including radio as a means for its transmission.

The largest change that propaganda went through by the 1950s was that it was no longer seen as evil, but how it was perceived was fully dependent on who was looking at it and how they desired to interpret it. Barrett, while acknowledging that America was using propaganda, continuously referred to it as truth, provided that it came from the American government. He had less concern with the impact that propaganda had on American society than how it influenced people overseas. He explained this by stating that, “when the actions seem to conflict with the principles, America must spare no effort to explain those actions fully. The United States has no intelligent choice but to keep its case continually before the world.” Barrett expanded upon the ideas of Lasswell and Bernays, offering an even more concise analysis of how America utilized propaganda during the Cold War, with focus on the way that it was developed and spread. However, Barrett only briefly considered how the use of propaganda during World War II compared to its use during World War I.

In 1959, Karin Dovring presented an even more in-depth analysis of American propaganda during war, particularly during World War II, in *Road of Propaganda: The Semantics of Biased Communication*. Building upon other works regarding World War II propaganda, including that by Lasswell, Dovring moves past the basic depiction of propaganda as a method of influence to interpret it as a method of biased communication able to be distributed on a massive scale. Dovring argues that, while propaganda during

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40 Ibid, 299.
41 Ibid.
42 Dovring, *Road of Propaganda*, 5.
war has been generally accepted, its use during times of peace, including the Cold War, has been met with suspicion, leading it to be linked to lies and violence. Dovring systematically examines various aspects of propaganda, or “communication,” on a more psychological scale than previous scholars. Through examining the various forms of entertainment used to distribute propaganda, such as radio, she is able to demonstrate that the public needs to be interested, as had been observed by Lasswell and Bernays, in order for propaganda to sway opinion.

Dovring’s analysis of propaganda as a means of communication was not new, but her method of linking the then preferred method of distribution since World War II, entertainment that can reach everybody, to the influence that it had on the public, presented a new way of studying the history of propaganda and its usage by the Americans during war. She also analyzes how propaganda was distributed during World War II, how it influenced people on a large scale and how different groups could be affected by it. Her work reinforces understanding of the impact that propaganda might have on crowd psychology, as presented by Bernays in the 1920s. By combining the work of Dovring with previously available studies, historians are able to grasp how propaganda was used in the past, how its delivery and perception changed between World War I and World War II and how to further examine propaganda during the Cold War.

By the 1960s the more serious ramifications of the use of propaganda, such as racial tensions, began to be examined. One such examination was published in 1965: Michael Choukas’s Propaganda Comes of Age. Choukas uses a combination of World

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43 Ibid, 6.
44 Ibid, 5.
War II and Cold War political propaganda to demonstrate the “true nature of propaganda and its ramifications.”

Choukas states that “propaganda is more than a seductive word; it is a seductive idea, and especially so in the emotional climate of our day.” Unlike Lasswell and earlier historians, Choukas argues that propaganda should be considered negative and then works towards determining whether or not there could be ways for it to be considered “good”. In his book, Choukas tries to educate the public on what propaganda is, why it is used and how it can be detected.

Choukas’ book, like those before it, works to define “propaganda,” so that it can be better understood. With more studies of propaganda and its history being published, such as those by Lasswell, and Lavine and Weschler, Choukas had more resources available to him than historians in the past. He takes full advantage of such sources, particularly Lasswell, while developing his own conclusions. Choukas analyzes the human mind to determine how propaganda impacted people in the past, providing a wide range of examples to help illustrate the ramifications that propaganda had on manipulating a person’s, or people’s, opinions and actions. Propaganda Comes of Age also provides a method to examine propaganda used in previous generations, including World War I, to better demonstrate the impact that it could have had at the time. Through this, one is better able to not only perceive propaganda as a political and influential tool during war, and how it was able to influence the public, but also to expand on the ideas that had been presented by academics such as Lasswell.

By the 1970s, examination of propaganda focused on the particular war in which it

46 Choukas, Propaganda Comes of Age, 6.
48 Ibid, 4-5.
had been used. With the Cold War still in progress, much of the research concerning propaganda was being based on that of World War II, but with the understanding that propaganda was used as a means of gaining support for America’s involvement in World War I. The changing attitudes towards how people were treated and portrayed also changed the way that scholars examined the propaganda that they focused on. The acknowledgement of racism in the cartoons and other types of propaganda was more prominent and focused on more than in previous decades.

The use of propaganda during World War II is examined in John Blum’s 1976 book *V was for Victory: Politics and American Culture During World War II*. A different approach is used towards analyzing America’s use of propaganda as Blum describes the formation of the O.W.I. and the various forms of propaganda that it released, both to the American public and to people overseas, in attempts to garner support for the war. Rather than focusing on the techniques of propaganda and the increase in the value of public opinion, Blum instead examines the politics behind the propaganda of World War II. Blum also assesses the more frequent appearance of racism in World War II propaganda than during World War I. He discusses how the government, intentionally or not, supported the creation of depicting enemies as monsters and subhuman beings and allowing such depictions, in various forms of propaganda, to be released to the American public.  

He also argues that the propaganda of World War II fed the imagination of the American public, terrifying them, and thereby cultivating more support for the war.  

This idea can be seen in editorial cartoons that depicted

50 Ibid, 52.
Japanese soldiers as animalistic and determined to fight.

In his analysis of World War II propaganda, Blum continued the examination of the negative aspects of propaganda as examined by Choukas in the 1960s. He discusses the negative effects that propaganda had on immigrant groups, particularly those who were from enemy countries, and the hardships they faced because of the information in war propaganda. Despite the sources of propaganda available to him, Blum does not include images of those published during the war, instead giving brief descriptions of their content and appearance. He discusses the style of writing used in American propaganda during the war, and its ramifications. Unlike previous scholars, Blum is able to better depict the racism that was promoted by propaganda. He also makes no assertion as to whether propaganda employed by America during World War II was positive or negative, but discusses it as something that was just a tool for America and other countries to employ in support of their war efforts. Racism in propaganda had only been touched on briefly by academics such as Lasswell and Hines; Blum, however, was able to better demonstrate that shift in focus that propaganda underwent after World War I. Combining Blum’s examination with information about the psychological techniques employed provides a better picture of how propaganda and its use by America had changed.

Building upon Blum’s examination of propaganda and politics, Allan Winkler examined links between politics and propaganda during World War II with his 1978 book, *The Politics of Propaganda: The Office of War Information 1942-1945*. Winkler analyzed the creation of the O.W.I. and the various places where America had spread its propaganda during World War II, both at home and overseas. Unlike previous works,
including that of Blum, Winkler described the issues that America had surrounding its propaganda and the limitations it faced, the largest being the ability for the O.W.I to maintain government support throughout the war. Winkler’s main argument was that, within certain limitations created by the O.W.I., American propaganda had grown into something that reflected what the country considered to be important, such as strength and liberty, while at the same time showing the limitations of America’s view of the world.  

Winkler drew from a number of different sources, both primary and secondary, during his investigation. He took full advantage of government records and O.W.I. pamphlets to further his explanation of the close ties between politics and propaganda during World War II. Winkler’s analysis also details the political problems surrounding the use of propaganda during World War II, while maintaining that it was not inherently negative, but a resource that the government took advantage of in its attempts to reflect the war and America to the American public.  

Winkler also reintroduces the idea set forth by Lasswell fifty years earlier that propaganda was a tool of war, rather than something that should be feared, once again changing how propaganda was to be perceived after Barrett’s work questioned whether it could be considered “good” in 1953. When combined with Blum, and other works examining the use of propaganda during World War I and the Cold War in less of a political light, Winkler further illustrates the development of America propaganda during times of war and the various complications faced.

When examining propaganda in the 1980s, the greater focus remained on how it had been used in World War II. John Dower’s book *War Without Mercy: Race and Power in the Pacific War* was published in 1986. Dower examined the use of propaganda by both America and Japan, focusing on how propagandists in each country depicted those from other in political cartoons. In his examination, he separates the propaganda techniques employed by Americans from the propaganda used by Japanese to allow for clearer comparison. Dower argues that World War II was also a race war in which the use of propaganda was perpetuated on both sides.53 While arguing his point, Dower systematically moves through both American and Japanese use of racist propaganda in their attempt to justify the war. Unlike earlier works, Dower breaks down the different depictions of Japanese in American political cartoons and the perceptions created by the continued use of certain stereotypes such as the Japanese being depicted as childlike and needing to be led, until the end of the war.54 Dower also included images of propaganda from both Japan and America, providing for a visual comparison to be made between the two.55

Dower’s systematic analysis of the different propaganda methods used by America and Japan, reminiscent of those used by Lasswell to analyze propaganda used during World War I, provides for a greater appreciation of the techniques employed. The ramifications of propaganda, as proposed by Choukas in 1965, were also revisited by Dower as he discussed the impact they had on societal and soldiers’ actions during the war. Dower’s approach and detailed breakdown of America’s use of propaganda during

54 Ibid, 143-144.
World War II takes advantage of the numerous sources that increasingly became available relating to World War II. His unique approach, demonstrating insight into Japan’s actions and propaganda, allows for a comparison to be made between the two countries’ techniques and results. Dower supports Lasswell’s contribution that propaganda was a tool of psychological warfare and could be interpreted as either good or bad depending on the circumstances in which it is used. At the same time, he reaffirms the ideas presented by Choukas that propaganda could have serious ramifications. Dower’s book, particularly regarding World War II propaganda, further reveals how racism became involved in propaganda on a larger scale after World War I and how America and Japan used this propaganda during times of war.

By the 1990s more information about America’s use of propaganda during the Cold War became available. Prior to that, examination of Cold War propaganda was with the understanding, by the American public at least, that propaganda could be evil and something used excessively by the enemies of America. Meanwhile, scholarly examination of activities during World War II moved past propaganda and on to other horrific occurrences, such as the Holocaust.

Six years after the end of the Cold War and destruction of the Berlin Wall, as more information about America’s use of propaganda during the Cold War became available, Walter Hixson published Parting the Curtain: Propaganda, Culture and the Cold War, 1945-1961, in 1997. Hixson provides a systemic investigation into America’s use of propaganda during the Cold War as the American government attempted to promote American culture behind the “iron curtain.” As Hixson explained, little study

56 Finch, “Psychological Propaganda,” 369.
had been done on the use of propaganda by America as a weapon during the Cold War.\textsuperscript{57} Focusing on the use of propaganda abroad, Hixson’s main thesis is that American propaganda beyond its borders was more significant during the Cold War than had been recognized by the academic community.\textsuperscript{58} As Winkler presented in a portion of his book from 1978, and Barrett did in 1953, Hixson puts forward the idea that American propaganda was targeted outside, introducing American culture to those beyond its own borders. Up until this point, particularly during the time of the Cold War, there was very little study of the propaganda used during the Cold War.\textsuperscript{59}

Briefly examining the use of propaganda during World War I, Hixson outlined its re-emergence as a method of psychological warfare. Hixson’s approach to examining the various forms of propaganda, from film to pictures, once again broadens the political aspect involved in propaganda, examining the decisions that were made by the American government in the distribution of American propaganda to the Soviet Union. It also explores the further impact of the introduction of American culture to the people of the Soviet Union. As argued by Lasswell, Hixson supports the idea that propaganda is neither good nor bad. He describes psychological propaganda as merely a tool for the American government, as proposed by Lasswell in 1927.\textsuperscript{60} Through the use of State Department and United States Information Agency records, Hixson was able to increase awareness of how the government continued to be involved in the distribution and creation of propaganda after World War II, expanding on information that had been published in Winkler’s 1978 \textit{Politics and Propaganda}. The release of new studies of the

\textsuperscript{58} Ibid, lx.  
\textsuperscript{59} Finch, “Psychological Propaganda,” 369.  
\textsuperscript{60} Hixson, \textit{Parting the Curtain}, 27.
use of propaganda during the Cold War, combined with evidence of how it evolved since its use in World War I, allowed Hixson to promote a well-informed treatise that significantly adds to previous ideas about propaganda during America’s Cold War.

In the 2000s, after the end of the Cold War, propaganda became a greater focus of historical interest as it gained more prominence in venues such as political cartoons as tensions rose with Iraq and Afghanistan. The 2000s became a time when studying the current media and American war-time propaganda of the past allowed for a better appreciation of how it might be employed in the future. Renewed interest in propaganda led to the 2000 article “Psychological Propaganda: The War of Ideas on Ideas During the First Half of the Twentieth Century,” by Lynette Finch. Finch examines the use and study of psychological propaganda from 1900 to 1950, while exploring why propaganda had become an important part of warfare in the present day. Her re-examination of World War I propaganda brings Lasswell’s post-World War I book, Propaganda Technique in the World War, back to the forefront and she names him as the first person to acknowledge that propaganda was only a tool for the government during wartime, and not necessarily evil. Following the use of propaganda and creating a timeline, Finch draws upon numerous sources available that examined trends followed by studies of propaganda. Following each war, interest in the propaganda used during that war rose, and then slowly started to taper off until the next war. The continuous changing of whether propaganda should be considered good or evil was another trend observed by

61 Finch, “Psychological Propaganda,” 383.
Finch, relating it to the degree of paranoia occurring within the country at the time.64

Finch’s work provides a number of sources that have examined propaganda since World War I and how it has been viewed over the years. She re-integrates Lasswell’s suggestion that the use of propaganda during war is essential and not something to be feared. She is also able to explain the difficulties in studying the use of propaganda during the Cold War, accompanied by the continual shifting views over the definition of propaganda. Her systematic approach following the rise and fall in the popularity of propaganda allows a time line to be created, and the trends followed since its use in World War I to be more easily understood.

In 2002 Gerd Horten published Radio Goes to War: The Cultural Politics of Propaganda during World War II. While focusing on American propaganda featured on radio during World War II, he examines the influence that various government departments had on the creation and distribution of propaganda and the dominance that media corporations had over the cultural and civic sphere.65 He argues during World War II the United States “fought a unique kind of propaganda war” and that “the cultural politics of wartime radio propaganda provided a crucial link for the strengthening and relegitimation of the privatized culture of consumer capitalism.”66 He explained that the use of propaganda during World War II was a “privatized war” that worked to appeal to the “personal sacrifices or consumerist desires of the American people.”67 While focusing on the use of radio propaganda by the United States during World War II. Horten closely examines the government’s involvement with the broadcasting of propaganda and the

64 Ibid, 369-370.
66 Ibid, 9.
67 Ibid.
effectiveness that it had on the American public. He discusses the limitations that radio propaganda had such as the amount of time that they were able to broadcast propaganda, without disrupting regular programming, wanting to remain in good standing with the Federal Communications Commission.\textsuperscript{68} He also explains that propaganda was a personalized process and that people would acknowledge messages that reflected their views, while ignoring or distorting the media images that did not.\textsuperscript{69} Horten is able to provide a more modern analysis of the effectiveness of radio propaganda during World War II and how methods of using such propaganda changed following the war.

Two years later, in 2004, Lucy Caswell published a detailed examination of propaganda cartoons entitled “Drawing Swords: War in American Editorial Cartoons.” Focusing on a single area of propaganda, Caswell examines the use of editorial cartoons from the American Civil War onwards, only briefly touching on their infrequent use during the American Revolution and the War of 1812.\textsuperscript{70} In her article, Caswell argues that editorial cartoons worked towards justifying wars for the Americans.\textsuperscript{71} Focusing on World War I and World War II, Caswell re-emphasizes the shift seen during World War I in the use of propaganda by America. Caswell also emphasizes the shift in trends during World War II as editorial cartoons became more racist in their depiction of American enemies.\textsuperscript{72}

Like Hines’ article in 1933, Caswell’s focus is on editorial cartoons as propaganda, seeing them as a means to quickly grab the reader’s attention and make the

\textsuperscript{68} Ibid, 63.
\textsuperscript{69} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{71} Ibid,13.
\textsuperscript{72} Ibid, 28 and 32.
message clear through the use of stereotypes. Expanding on Hines, Caswell explains that stereotypes play an important role in propaganda, being a quick way of negatively portraying the enemy.\textsuperscript{73} This work also expands on the ideas presented by Lippmann in *Public Opinion* about stereotypes by looking closer at the media’s use of it in propaganda. She included various editorial cartoons spanning a number of wars, and breaks these down to point out the message being portrayed to the public. As with Dower, the degree of racism in cartoons after World War II is made apparent. The ideas of Lasswell are also reintroduced as Caswell examines his work more closely and presents his idea that, rather than propaganda being something evil, it is merely “one of three primary tools that nations use to fight their enemies (with the other two being military force and economic pressure).”\textsuperscript{74} As with Finch in 2000, Caswell presents historians with the names of important people to include when examining America’s use of propaganda between World War I and the Cold War, and analyzes the ideas of those historians of propaganda preceding her.

In 2009 a collection of essays studying the use of propaganda entitled *War and the Media: Essays on News Reporting, Propaganda and Popular Culture* was published. This examined America’s use of propaganda throughout multiple wars. The book was meant to serve as a prospectus for historians interested in learning more about America’s use of propaganda during war.\textsuperscript{75} In the book, two essays are especially valuable for their analyses. Both Rekah Sharma’s essay “Drawn-Out Battles: Exploring War-Related Messages in Animated Cartoons” and Burton St. John III’s essay, “An Enduring Legacy

\begin{footnotes}
\item[73] Ibid, 20-21.
\item[74] Ibid, 22.
\end{footnotes}
of World War I Propaganda Journalism and the Domestic Struggle over the Commodification of Truth,” stand out in their investigation of America’s use of propaganda.

“Drawn-Out Battles: Exploring War-Related Messages in Animated Cartoons,” takes a closer look at the use of cartoons as a means of American propaganda. Sharma argues that the study of war-related messages in animated cartoons is an important task for academics to understand how humans relate to one another during times of war. Sharma also revisits the idea that propaganda was also a method of psychological warfare, particularly after World War II, and leading into the Cold War. Sharma’s systematic approach to analyzing various cartoons as propaganda allows one to create a timeline of how propaganda in cartoons was introduced, and an overview of the research that has already been done on the subject. Sharma’s collection of secondary sources represents the interest in, and importance of, examining such material when creating a fuller understanding of how propaganda was used by the American government between World War I and the Cold War. It also demonstrates the far-reaching power of propaganda during times of war, as television and cartoons were accessible by most people. It also introduces the idea that propaganda was aimed at multiple generations, as opposed to simply the editorial cartoons and pamphlets to which adults would pay more attention. Similar to Lasswell and other like-minded historians, there is no longer any judgment about whether war-time propaganda was good or evil. With Sharma’s essay, by 2009 it had become more important to follow the evolution of propaganda over time,

77 Ibid, 78.
78 Ibid, 79.
and how it was used since World War I, than determining the morality of propaganda.

In the same book, Barton St. John III’s essay “An Enduring Legacy of World War I: Propaganda, Journalism, and the Domestic Struggle over the Commodification of Truth,” works to create a renewed interest in the study of World War I propaganda and the influence that World War I had as a leading factor in the rise of “professional journalism and domestic institutionalization of propaganda.”79 Similar to the ideas of Bernays and Barrett, the notion of truth and propaganda is explored briefly. St. John refers repeatedly to Bernays’ work on public relations and propaganda, *Crystallizing Public Opinion*, associating the rise of public relations with the growing idea of a legitimate form of propaganda being presented to the public.80 St. John’s investigation into the rise of propaganda during World War I brings back many of the basic ideas about propaganda presented in the 1920s and 1930s, when it was just becoming a topic of interest. Through an examination of secondary sources, St. John goes directly to what he deems to be the beginning of the increasing use of propaganda, World War I, and to the first person who began to investigate it, Edward Bernays, with his book from 1927. With the increase in the number of people investigating propaganda since World War I, St. John is still able to acknowledge how the study of propaganda had changed along with the original thoughts concerning the ethics surrounding its use. St. John promotes the idea that World War I was the time when America’s use of propaganda began to change, based on arguments similar to academics such as Lasswell, Caswell, Finch and others. Both Sharma and St. John build on ideas that were presented in the past regarding the use

80 Ibid, 158-159.
of propaganda and provide the tools necessary for those interested in learning more about America’s use of propaganda from World War I to the end of the Cold War.

The investigation of animated cartoons as propaganda, illustrated by Sharma in 2009, was furthered in 2011 by Richard Leskosky’s essay “Cartoons Will Win the War: World War II Propaganda Shorts,” which appeared in *Learning from Mickey, Donald, and Walt: Essays on Disney’s Edutainment Films*. In it, Leskosky examines the use of cartoons produced by Disney on the request of the American government during World War II as training films for their soldiers. At the same time, Leskosky examines only cartoons that depicted America’s enemies as subhuman or monsters, while at the same time working to sway the public’s opinion about the war, stating this was what he considered to be propaganda, and limiting the number of cartoons that he could research.81 Examining nine different Disney shorts, Leskosky argued that the technique used in the propaganda films during World War II had a very specific purpose in “educating” the troops during the war years, but also became a testing ground for various mechanisms in order to present movies that became popular in a post-war world, demonstrating further the impact that propaganda was able to have on society.82 While examining the films, Leskosky takes specific care to summarize and analyze each film and the messages being projected. He further builds on Lasswell’s ideas about the three tools required for war by separating propaganda into three different categories as well: agricultural documentaries; home front calls to action; and ‘psychological’ films,” with

82 Ibid, 59.
each meant to influence the target audience in a certain way.\textsuperscript{83}

With many sources available to him, Leskosky was able to build a better framework for analyzing the various Disney shorts on which he focused. He was also able to further the notion that there was more to employing Disney to create such shorts than simply creating propaganda to be utilized by the American government in the attempts to bolster support for the war. The importance of propaganda being entertaining for the audience, an idea that was proposed by Hines almost eighty years earlier in 1933, was also revisited. Leskosky re-introduces multiple ideas about what components were necessary for propaganda to be effective in influencing the public. While focusing on World War II Disney shorts, the ideas that Leskosky re-introduces to historians are transferable to other forms of propaganda and other wars and situations where it is used. They also demonstrate how large corporations could profit from the government’s use of propaganda and the extent to which the government would go in order to spread a message.

As this chapter demonstrates, the historiography of propaganda from World War I to the Cold War has significantly shifted over the years. Scholars have been studying propaganda since World War I to learn about how it has been used, the effects that it has had on society and how it has evolved between times of war and times of peace. Studying the use of propaganda during times of war has come to be as important as learning about other aspects of war. Still, further analysis of America’s use of propaganda during time of war remains to be explored in order to understand the impact that propaganda can have on a society. As this thesis will demonstrate, editorial

\textsuperscript{83} Ibid, 41.
cartoonists were influenced by historically and culturally incorrect images, which were created by both the United States government, to a certain extent, and Western scholars, in order to create public support for the war and anti-Japanese sentiment. The following chapter underlines the importance of considering where certain aspects of propaganda came from and the nature of the American government’s relationship with Japan by examining the historiography of Japanese-American political relations prior to World War II.
Chapter 2

"The foundation of the Pacific War of 1941-1945 was a fundamental dispute over both ends and means."¹ – Jeffery Record.

English-language scholarship has focused on the politics that surrounded World War II since its end in 1945, but comprehension of the political relationship between two key players, America and Japan, did not start to be fully investigated until the 1970s. Analysis of American politics throughout the war grew rapidly in its wake. Many articles were published speculating on such relations, but it was not until Japanese documents of the period became accessible that the nature of the American-Japanese political relationship during World War II could be examined in sufficient detail. English-language studies of American-Japanese relations during World War II evolved with the release of Japanese documents and the critical examination of America’s actions during and leading up to the war. While not all historians agree with who is to blame, or if blame can be placed on one group, consensus is growing on the reasons for tensions that surrounded the two countries’ relationship. The increasing availability of sources has strengthened the understanding of Japan and America’s wartime relationship. New studies that are more interdisciplinary, including closer analyses of economic factors, are furthering that understanding even more. Exploring this relationship builds a deeper understanding about the motivations behind American anti-Japanese propaganda during World War II and why the images were portrayed the way they were. This chapter examines the historiography of Japanese-American political relations leading up to World

War II to demonstrate the way that investigating America’s entrance into the war has changed over the years.

Political relations between America and Japan were strained by 1941 because of earlier interactions between the two countries. During the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, Japanese, along with Chinese, were the largest groups of Asians to migrate to the United States.² In the mid to late nineteenth century, there was a massive migration of people from China to the United States. Unprepared for such a flux in their population, American fears rose over race, class, and gender relations, increasing organized anti-Chinese sentiment, particularly in the west. Chinese workers were blamed for a lack of jobs for white workers.³ The belief that immigration from Asia was a threat to “white wages,” and the standard of living in the United States, became known as the “Yellow Peril.”⁴ It resulted in the United States government passing the 1882 Chinese Exclusion Act which prevented Chinese labourers from entering the United States in an effort to “protect” white workers’ jobs.⁵ While Chinese people were not allowed to immigrate to the United States, fears still remained as Japanese and South Asian people continued to immigrate to the United States.

Prior to the 1890s, Japan had been seen by the United States as “a potential market for products, arena for missionary activity, or exotic contrast to the dull routine of home culture.”⁶ As Japanese immigrated to California and Hawai‘i, they were welcomed by businesses and farmers, but also experienced hostilities similar to those that Chinese

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³ Ibid, 546-547.
⁴ Record, *A War it was Always Going to Lose*, 19.
⁵ Ibid, 543.
immigrants faced. With the problems of employment for white workers from when large
numbers of Chinese workers went to the United States still remembered, the growing
number of Japanese people immigrating to the United States created a new Yellow Peril
in the American West.\textsuperscript{7} In California in particular, some white Americans were angry
with Japanese immigrants who demanded equality in the work force and were supported
by the Japanese government.\textsuperscript{8} As with Chinese immigration, tensions remained until
1924 when the American government passed an immigration act that excluded all Asians
from immigrating to the United States.\textsuperscript{9} The tension surrounding such action, coupled
with Japan’s imperialist aggression in China and the disapproval of numerous Western
countries, including the United States, made American-Japanese political relations tense.
This was made even more tense by embargoes and boycotts such as the oil embargo put
into place in 1941.\textsuperscript{10} This relationship is important in understanding why Japan attacked
Pearl Harbor on 7 December 1941, and the kinds of feelings present in the United States
towards Japan prior to the war.

There is not a great deal that is written in English about the political relationship
between the United States and Japan immediately prior to, during, and following the end
of World War II. However, two important books that reveal not only American political
dealings with Japan, but also the relationship between the two countries and the tensions
that led Japan to attack Pearl Harbor were published only three years after the end of the
war. In 1948 Charles Beard’s \textit{President Roosevelt and the Coming of War 1941}, and in
1949 Morton Grodzins’ \textit{Americans Betrayed: Politics and the Japanese Evacuation} were

\textsuperscript{7} Ibid, 612.
\textsuperscript{8} Ibid, 612-613.
\textsuperscript{9} Lee, “‘Yellow Peril’ and Asian Exclusion in the Americas,” 560.
published. Each examined a different aspect of America’s political relationship with Japan and the Japanese people, both at home and abroad.

In President Roosevelt and the Coming of War, Charles Beard presents a radical argument that would come to be known as the “back door to war” thesis.\textsuperscript{11} While discussing the various embargos that America had put into place against Japan, and the American unwillingness to compromise with Japan at various conferences throughout 1940 and 1941, Beard argues that President Franklin D. Roosevelt (in office, 1933-1945), had manipulated Japan into attacking Pearl Harbor while appearing to the public that he was attempting to work towards peace.\textsuperscript{12} While ultimately rejected by scholars of the time, by the early 1950s and the beginning of the Korean War, Beard’s argument, while not being fully accepted, would come to be re-evaluated.\textsuperscript{13}

Beard uses various newspaper publications, Congressional Committee meeting records, and governmental communications in an attempt to demonstrate the manipulations that President Roosevelt orchestrated in his attempts to get Japan to attack. As Beard explains, President Roosevelt was elected for an unprecedented third term on a strong anti-war platform in the first few years of the war. By 1941, Roosevelt, as depicted by Beard, viewed the anti-war commitments he made as being obsolete with the evidence of the war in southeast Asia.\textsuperscript{14} Beard argues that the American government’s attempts to maintain peace with Japan were seemingly passive, but he also acknowledges that tensions were clearly rising between the American and Japanese governments.\textsuperscript{15}

\textsuperscript{11} Ibid, 235.
\textsuperscript{12} Charles A. Beard, President Roosevelt and the Coming of the War 1941: A Study in Appearances and Realities (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1948), 11-12.
\textsuperscript{13} Crowley, “A New Deal for Japan and Asia,” 236.
\textsuperscript{14} Beard, President Roosevelt and the Coming of the War 1941, 8.
\textsuperscript{15} Ibid, 183.
Beard demonstrates that Roosevelt denied repeated attempts by the Japanese to broker an amenable peace treaty, discussing various meetings between Roosevelt and Prince Fumimaro Konoe (in office, 1940-1941) and then Roosevelt and Tōjō Hideki (in office, 1941-1944) that occurred in the months leading up to 7 December 1941. Roosevelt’s reasoning was that Japan was not willing to give in to what the Japanese government argued were unreasonable American demands that had to be met before he would concede to even meet with the Japanese government.  

While Beard uses a large number of primary sources to support his argument, there is a lack of explanation regarding how the American government worked at the time. He also does not discuss the workings of the Japanese government and the reasons for Japan’s actions beyond what is represented by American documents. This is understandable owing to the lack of access to Japanese documents and the language barrier that Beard would have faced at the time, particularly since his analysis was written not long after the end of the war while America was occupying Japan, and that the Japanese government was going through a transition from being an imperialist country to a democratic one. Beard’s argument that there was a tense relationship between the American and Japanese governments, and Roosevelt’s prior knowledge of the attack on Pearl Harbor, leads Beard to conclusions that hedge on conspiracy. He offers little examination of documents that might present an alternative explanation for the events that occurred prior to the attack on Pearl Harbor. Despite shortcomings in offering a balanced understanding of American and Japanese relations, Beard is able to provide a foundation for historians to examine American policies and actions towards

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16 Ibid, 496-497.
Japan during the war.

*Americans Betrayed: Politics and the Japanese Evacuation*, by Morton Grodzins, was published the following year in 1949. While not focusing on American-Japanese relations, it provides further insight into American politics and attitudes towards the Japanese people, particularly following the attack on Pearl Harbor. Throughout his book, Grodzins critiques the government’s decision to place 112,000 Japanese-Americans in internment camps. He also explains the evacuation of Japanese from the Pacific Coast as an example of America’s policy-making process. Grodzins establishes how far-reaching the American government was as it condemned, stole property from, and imprisoned an entire group of people based on the actions of those who lived outside of the United States, without establishing individual guilt.

While not dealing specifically with American-Japanese relations during World War II, Grodzins is able to provide a better understanding of how policies were established and the sentiments the American government held toward the Japanese. As with Beard, there is, understandably, a lack of discussion on the reaction of the Japanese government to the actions taken by the United States government. However, Grodzins expands on Beard’s insight into American politics during World War II by examining the use of internment camps and America’s impressions of Japanese people more closely.

Information about American-Japanese political relations during World War II was limited in the 1940s, focusing primarily on the American government’s actions towards Japan. However, although limited, the information provided by the sources available from that

18 Ibid, 1.
19 Ibid.
time is valuable in presenting first hand, basically eye-witness, accounts of the American government’s actions.

Little changed, in English-language literature, in the following years as historians continued to examine American politics during World War II. Information published during the 1950s is limited in its analysis of America’s actions and non-existent in terms of analyzing those of the Japanese government at the time of the war. However, George Kennan provides his own analysis of the impact of American politics on various wars in his book *American Diplomacy 1900-1950*. In it, Kennan demonstrates the impact of various American foreign policies on America’s entrance into wars, such as World War II, and argues how different political strategies, such as attempting to understand the contemporary economic vulnerability of Japan, a resource-challenged island nation, might have resulted in peaceful resolutions that could have avoided war altogether.  

Kennan pays particular attention to World War II, arguing that it was “a war poorly understood by the peoples who fought it on the domestic side, and particularly ourselves.”

Similar to Beard, Kennan argues that American foreign policy played a partial role in the entry of America into World War II and the Pacific War. He is critical of how American statesmen handled relations with Japan. He also proposes that policies that were aimed towards avoiding war with Japan should not have been influenced by economic motives designed to protect America’s foreign interests in China. Kennan also acknowledges the importance of American-Japanese political relations in the course and

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21 Ibid, 74.
22 Ibid, 82.
resolution of the war.  

Unlike Beard, Kennan does not display hostility towards the American government, nor does he discuss specific policies that America put into place with regard to Japan and the Japanese. However, Kennan faced the same difficulties as Beard and Grodzins; sources that might provide a starting point for examining the Japanese side of the American-Japanese political relationship were simply overlooked. Unlike Beard, however, Kennan does not blame the American government for Pearl Harbor. While he does not completely condemn Japan for the actions taken by its government, recognizing that there were difficult political factors at play, he does not excuse the Japanese either. Due to his time spent working in the Foreign Service department and as part of the Policy Planning staff in the years following the end of World War II, Kennan provides insight into the processes involved to enable the American government to enact various foreign policies. While not having the same level of detail as Beard’s or Grodzins’ works, Kennan is able to further the understanding that both combatants were to blame for the war rather than just America, as was Beard’s contention.

During the 1960s more information became available to historians with regard to the politics of war as carried out by Japan. The publication of translated documents provided alternative reasons for Japan’s actions, particularly those leading up to the attack on Pearl Harbor in December of 1941. In 1967, Nobutaka Ike’s book, Japan’s Decision for War: Records of the 1941 Policy Conferences, became one of the first sources available, providing deep insight into the political minds of those working in the Japanese government and offering some clarity on the processes that ultimately led to

23 Ibid.
Japan’s attack. It provides translated records of a number of Japanese policy conferences that occurred between September 1940 and December 1941.25

Ike does not provide a thorough examination of the conference documents, although a brief explanation of some of the politics of the Japanese government is offered in order to help the reader understand how some of the policies discussed in the meetings came to be enacted. Ike also stresses that the translated documents are not transcripts from the meetings, but rather are detailed notes of what occurred. As he explains, there were no surviving minutes of the conferences after the war, and notes, such as the ones that he translated, were later used by the army to aid in subsequent decision-making processes.26 In spite of providing little analysis of the documents presented, Ike’s work provides details of the political relationship between America and Japan previously overlooked by historians. With Ike’s work, the historiography of American-Japanese political relations during World War II becomes more complete and a more balanced examination of both sides of the relationship becomes possible.

A change in the examination of America’s policies towards Japan occurred the following year in 1968. In his book, *The Politics of War: The World and United States Foreign Policy 1943-1945*, Gabriel Kolko takes a more nationalist and systematic approach to examining American-Japanese political relations during World War II. Unlike Beard and Kennan, Kolko focuses more on the reasons why America was so interested in protecting China from the invading Japanese, and these reasons, he argues,

26 Ibid, xiv.
were strictly economic.\textsuperscript{27} However, Kolko is able to provide insight into the political relationship between America and Japan in a post-World War II setting, something that had been overlooked by earlier scholars. He stresses the political planning necessary to establish a post-war relationship with Japan and the degree of leniency in the policies that America implemented.\textsuperscript{28}

As with previous authors, Kolko does not analyze the way that Japan’s government worked and its political actions towards America. The sources available at the time did not allow for such an examination; accessibility was still a problem when attempting to investigate American-Japanese relations, in spite of the more recent history of amicable relations between the two countries. The sources that Kolko did access included primary sources from both America and China. This would have fuelled his nationalist inquiry into American-Japanese relations since the actions being depicted by the Chinese may have been biased as they were being invaded by the Japanese at the time.\textsuperscript{29} However, Kolko provides a less disapproving view of the American government and its political actions towards Japan when compared to Beard’s work from the 1940s. The Politics of War also allows for a more critical assessment of the role of economics in directing America’s policy-making during the war, a subject only briefly discussed in Kennan’s work from a decade earlier.

As with the study of propaganda, a shift began to occur in the way that American-Japanese relations were examined. However, rather than focusing on the way that Americans portrayed the Japanese and the negativity surrounding it, a nationalist

\textsuperscript{28} Ibid, 544-545.
\textsuperscript{29} Ibid, 643-646.
approach began to occur that placed the United States in a more positive position. This approach is opposite to the way that the historiography of propaganda evolved, focusing more on the way that the United States was in the right, over the way that they were racist towards the Japanese during the war. However, another shift occurred that brought the historiography of American-Japanese relations to mirror the historiography of American propaganda. Authors began to relate more to the issues that Japan had faced in the years leading up to the war and the treatment of Japan by the United States.

In the twenty years following Kolko’s work, a great deal of information regarding the political relationship between America and Japan during World War II became available. The 1970s, in particular, brought forth greater focus on the American political side while publications in the 1980s focused on the Japanese side of the relationship. More information, particularly sources coming out of Japan, also became available, allowing for a more in-depth examination of the complex political relationship between the two countries. Cultural relations were starting to be explored as the understanding of how culture can impact both politics and political relations became more apparent. The historiography of American-Japanese relations began to reach a balanced point in the 1970s when more information became available that depicted the Japanese view of their relationship with America, especially stressing the tense relations surrounding Japan’s move into China.

While the American side of relations with Japan during World War II was the focus of most historians in the 1970s, James Crowley’s essay “A New Deal for Japan and Asia: One Road to Pearl Harbor” stands out. Published in 1970, it is one of the first English-language works that closely examines the workings of Japanese politics and
Japan’s relations with America. Crowley is critical of the works that came prior to his, such as those by Beard and Kennan. While he acknowledges that some of their ideas were sound, he also points out that their discussions tended to “confirm the conviction that Japan’s prewar diplomacy was atavistic aggression, pure and simple.”\(^{30}\) He also raises concerns regarding politicians’ and historians’ ‘true’ understanding of the ‘racism’ and ‘nationalism’ displayed by Asians, along with the dynamics that surrounded such notions.\(^{31}\) Crowley is critical of America, while being more lenient towards Japan’s actions, as he argues that American policies, particularly the oil embargo of 1941, interfered with Japan’s ability to grow as a nation in the years leading up to war and resulted in the conflicts that arose within the Japanese government.\(^{32}\) Like Ike, Crowley is also able to provide insight into the workings of the Japanese government during the war, and demonstrates how policies were required to go through various Cabinets before being enacted, similar to the political processes in America.\(^{33}\) Using both sources from Japan and the United States, Crowley’s work brings a balance to the examination of American-Japanese political relations during World War II. By outlining the political processes in Japan, a previously unexplored area of English-language historiography, Crowley initiated a more comprehensive approach to the study of American-Japanese relations during World War II and the politics involved, something that was not achieved by either Beard or Kennan.

Other primary sources describing interactions between Japan and America became available during the 1970s, particularly those pertaining to the American

\(^{30}\) Crowley, “A New Deal for Japan and Asia,” 237.
\(^{31}\) Ibid.
\(^{32}\) Ibid, 243.
\(^{33}\) Ibid, 247-249.
military. Published in 1974, *The United States and World War II: Military and Diplomatic Documents*, by Albert Buchanan, outlines the various diplomatic phases through which America progressed during the war.\(^{34}\) Buchanan also provides a brief introduction to each series of documents with a short analysis of the political situations and hostilities existing at the time the documents were written.

Similar to Kolko in his analysis, Buchanan uses the documents to justify America’s political actions toward the Japanese during the war. By providing context to the documents included in his book, America is presented as having a more neutral stand than described by Beard and Kennan decades earlier. Buchanan also presents historians with numerous official government documents in a single location, providing easier access than might have been normally available. Like Ike, Buchanan is able to advance research into the history of American-Japanese relations during World War II by providing access to a number of the various conferences and discussions that occurred within the American government and by documenting the process through which policies involving Japan were subjected prior to enactment.

An important book regarding the history of American politics and America-Japanese relations during World War II was published in 1976. *V was for Victory: Politics and American Culture During World War II*, by John Blum, examines the extensive power and impact that the American government had prior to and during World War II. Blum takes a nationalist approach in following and creating an understanding of America’s political actions throughout the war. The impact that two differing cultures, American and Japanese, had on the relationship is also briefly examined, demonstrating

\(^{34}\) Albert R. Buchanan, ed., *The United States and World War II: Military and Diplomatic Documents* (Columbia, South Carolina: University of South Carolina Press, 1974), preface.
how different the two countries were. When investigating the politics that surrounded America’s relationship with Japan, he discusses the actions taken, after Pearl Harbor, by the government and how these were influenced by the desire to win the war as quickly as possible and to leave the enemy defeated.\textsuperscript{35} He also demonstrates how the government was able to influence public perception of the Japanese people through the use of propaganda, depicting the Japanese in a monstrous way; for example, depicting Japanese soldiers as especially cruel in battle, and focusing on the Japanese pilots’ use of kamikaze attacks.\textsuperscript{36} By using a combination of primary and secondary sources that had become more readily available over the years, Blum is able to portray the political interactions and racial motivations of America’s actions towards the Japanese in the years prior to, during, and after the end of World War II.

In the style of Kolko, Blum’s work focuses more on the accomplishments of America during the war rather than the negative aspects highlighted in Beard and Kennan’s works. He also examines the impact that differing cultures had on the political relationship between the two countries. \textit{V was for Victory} is one of the better-known books depicting the political workings in America during the war. Cultural differences between Japan and America, such as Japanese-Americans’ desire to remain bicultural, maintaining their knowledge of the Japanese language and celebration of their own festivals, are examined more than in previous works. This also leads to a better understanding of how the material and images in editorial cartoons were selected to have the greatest impact on the public, because of emphasis on the differences between the two groups. While he does not focus on the relationship between America and Japan, Blum

\begin{footnotes}
\textsuperscript{35} Blum, \textit{V was for Victory}, 7-8.
\textsuperscript{36} Ibid, 45-47.
\end{footnotes}
does not dismiss it either.

Unfortunately, as with most works examining relations between World War II America and Japan up until this point, with the exception of Crowley, Blum does not investigate Japan’s side of the relationship. Few reasons are given for Japan’s attack on Pearl Harbor beyond the “surprise attack” and “mounting antagonisms” between the two countries.\textsuperscript{37} Such a stance is taken in spite of the work of Ike and Crowley, which became available in 1967 and 1970 respectively. While not specifically dealing with American-Japanese relations during the war, \textit{V was for Victory} provides valuable information for historians interested in examining America’s political actions during the war and the United States’ aims to defeat Japan.

Methodologies for examining American-Japanese political relations during World War II changed in the 1980s. A shift was made from focusing on American politics and its justification for war to one that centered on Japan’s political reasons for going to war. While Crowley and Ike had touched on such ideas, focus had remained on American politics and its influence. This is also when the historiography became more detailed and more inclusive of Japan’s version of events.

In 1981, a project that spanned three countries resulted in the publication of \textit{Politics and Culture in Wartime Japan} by Ben-Ami Shillony. This was an effort to better establish what was occurring politically in Japan during the war, as had been done by historians of America in decades prior.\textsuperscript{38} In numerous chapters and with the help of various sources including political documents, diaries, memoirs and other secondary sources from across the globe, such as Ike’s \textit{Japan’s Decision for War}, Shillony offers a

\textsuperscript{37} Ibid, 7.
less subjective position concerning the events, and explains Japan’s politics during World War II. Shillony’s work is a mirror image of Blum’s *V was for Victory*, in that it focuses on the politics and culture of Japan rather than America. He documents the power of the Japanese government and its influence over particular avenues, such as propaganda, along with political interactions between the Japanese and Americans. He also discusses the differences between Japanese politics and American politics based on their respective cultures. Shillony also directly examines the political shift in the Japanese government following the change in leadership from Prince Fumimaro Konoe and his “soft China” policy to the more militant Tōjō Hideki in 1941.  

39 He stresses the important role that that change played in the breakdown of peace talks with America during 1940, as was briefly explored in Crowley’s work ten years earlier.  

40 With the examination of different countries and their cultures, Blum and Shillony, when used together, are better able to document the intricacies of American and Japanese politics on their home fronts during World War II, and how they interacted with one another on a more global political stage.

*Power and Culture: The Japanese American War 1941-1945* by Akira Iriye was also published in 1981. It is one of the few examinations of American-Japanese politics and political relations focusing on both countries simultaneously, with specific attention to how the two countries interacted on the political stage. Iriye, like Shillony, was not concerned with assigning blame for the attack on Pearl Harbor or the resulting war between Japan and America, a major trend in the works from the 1950s and 1960s. Rather, *Power and Culture* is a blunt interpretation of the facts concerning American-Japanese relations, contemporary politics, and cultures. The comparative fashion of

39 Ibid, 8.  
40 Ibid, 9.
Iriye’s work makes for a clearer perception of each side of the relationship leading up to
and during the war. Important areas where Iriye’s approach is helpful are his studies of the trade embargo implemented by America against Japan in 1941, the freezing of Japan’s assets in America after Japan invaded China, and Japan’s further colonial expansion into Asia. Iriye is careful to explain both America’s justification for its actions and the political perception that “Japan’s New Asian order was threatening to become more than mere rhetoric and therefore must be opposed by alternative ideas of international order.” This is immediately followed by a presentation of the impact, politically and economically, that such actions had on Japan, and the steps that the Japanese government felt it had to take to continue the development of both Japan and Asia as it intended. As Iriye points out, “Japan’s policy was aimed at the development and ultimate industrialization of Asian countries.”

Unlike previous works that focused on the faults of one side of the American-Japanese political relationship, Iriye systematically describes the faults of both the American and Japanese governments when it comes to their political relationships. He also documents the differences in political proceedings between the two governments particularly when it came to their approaches to ending the war, something overlooked by Crowley’s depiction of the Japanese government in “A New Deal of Japan and Asia.” It provides a relatively equal representation of both countries, their cultural differences and similarities, and the political relations between America and Japan during World War II, allowing for a more balanced perspective. Iriye also takes advantage of the works that

42 Ibid, 34.
43 Ibid, 183.
had been published in the decades following the end of the war, referring to those by Blum, Kolko and Crowley in his analysis of American-Japanese relations. *Power and Culture* demonstrates how the focus of studies of wartime American-Japanese politics and political relations had changed since 1948, becoming more sympathetic to the issues that Japan faced in its relationship with the United States.

An alternative examination of Japan’s invasion of China, and the political strain that it put on relations with America leading up to World War II, can be found in the 1987 book *Japan Prepares for Total War: The Search for Economic Security, 1919-1941* by Michael Barnhart. Barnhart, while examining an extended time period, argues how American-Japanese political relations were strained between 1939 and 1941 over Japan’s attempt at colonization, as discussed three years earlier by Iriye. Unlike past studies of American-Japanese relations, Barhart devotes a large part of his work to the examination of interactions between America and Japan on a political level, with both sides attempting to protect their own interests. Barnhart presents a balanced combination of private letters, political documents and conference records, including those supplied by Ike in *Japan’s Decision for War*, along with various other secondary sources. Numerous chapters are devoted to analyzing the tensions arising between Japan and America due to the economic pressures from America’s “moral embargo,” in which the American government stopped the export of oil to Japan in 1940.44 He follows this by discussing Japan’s political retaliation by attempting to expand further into Asia and the Western colonies.45

Barnhart, while systematically presenting both sides of American-Japanese relations leading to America’s entry into World War II, is critical of America’s actions leading up to Pearl Harbor. Similar to Crowley, although not as extreme as Beard, he speculates how great a role miscommunication between American and Japanese foreign diplomats might have played in the tensions leading up to the attack. Through the use of political documents, Barnhart is able to corroborate and expand upon Iriye’s observations a few years prior, how the breakdown of talks was caused by inter-political rivalries. He also offers a new analysis suggesting that war between Japan and America was motivated more by two conflicting ideas on how East Asia should have been established politically, and in terms of culture, rather than as retaliation for Pearl Harbor. Barnhart’s method of comparing how the respective government of each country reacted and made political decisions with regards to the same occurrences helps in establishing a clearer and more comprehensive understanding of American-Japanese relations.

Also in 1987, six years after his book *Power and Culture*, Akira Iriye wrote *The Origins of the Second World War in Asia and the Pacific*, wherein he examines the various relationships between America and Japan along with the political tensions that surrounded both countries leading up to the attack on Pearl Harbor. Similar to his earlier work and others being presented at the time, Iriye maintained his neutral standpoint on how the strained political relationship between America and Japan led to the former’s entrance into World War II following the bombing. He also stresses the political disunity and anti-American feelings that had been growing by 1940 as factors that limited Japan’s

46 Ibid, 263.
ability to establish a stable peace arrangement with America during various conference between 1938 and 1941.\textsuperscript{48} Such sentiment had been argued in other works, including in \textit{Japan Prepares for Total War} which was published in the same year.

Unlike earlier works, Iriye does not devote much space to explaining or comparing the political processes of Japan and America, instead focusing more on the various political relationships that both America and Japan had beyond their own. Similar to other historians, he also focuses on the continuous political debate that occurred during numerous liaison conferences held throughout 1940 and 1941, and with the development of war strategies on the part of the Japanese as America instituted a \textit{de facto} oil embargo in 1941.\textsuperscript{49} Irye used a balance of the primary and secondary sources that had become available by the end of the 1980s, written in both Japanese and English. His systematic approach to documenting relations between America and Japan prior to the outbreak of the war helps to improve understanding of the intricacies and frailty of American-Japanese relations leading into World War II.

A year later, in 1988, Waldo Heinrichs’ \textit{Threshold of War: Franklin D. Roosevelt and American Entry into World War II}, presented a closer examination of the American politics that surrounded the beginning of America’s war with Japan. While other books of the time focused on Japan’s history, Heinrichs revisits the ideas presented in the 1970s by historians such as Shillony and Blum. His nationalist approach to the examination of American-Japanese relations leading into the war is made clear when he refers to Japan’s invasion of China as being no more than “arrogant pretensions and progressive

\textsuperscript{49} Ibid, 149-150.
intrusions.” The language used by Heinrichs is different than in previous histories that focused on the American politics of American-Japanese relations; he is also more hostile in his description of Japan’s actions than most previous authors. Heinrichs takes advantage of prior published works, including those that offered a perspective opposite to his own, such as Iriye’s *The Origins of the Second World War* and Barnhart’s *Japan Prepares for Total War* published only a year earlier. By relating his analysis of the tensions felt by the American government in the years leading up to the attack on Pearl Harbor to the explanations of Japanese actions presented in earlier works, Heinrichs posits the argument that diplomacy between the two countries was impossible because of the disagreements that kept arising. While more nationalistic than other works published during the 1980s, *Threshold of War* revisits ideas that were established in the 1960s and 1970s by historians such as Kolko and Blum. Accompanied by the works of Blum, Iriye and Crowley, Heinrichs is able to help establish a more balanced analysis of American-Japanese relations during World War II.

While discussions about the politics that governed American-Japanese relations going into and throughout World War II grew in the 1970s and 1980s, a decline in publications about the politics of World War II began in 1989 and lasted throughout the 1990s. The historiography of American-Japanese relations reached a standstill as focus became centered on the atrocities surrounding the Holocaust and persecution of Jews, while most information examining American-Japanese relations was simply republished works. However, in 1994 Tadashi Aruga published an article entitled “Reflections on the

51 Ibid, 263 and 265.
52 Ibid, 126.
History of U.S.-Japanese Relations,” examining the political relationship between America and Japan from 1853 until the 1990s.53

While not focusing solely on World War II, Aruga does document the rise and fall of relations between America and Japan prior to the war and how they interacted with each other on a political level. The tensions that arose during Japan’s colonization of China were presented as a leading reason for political tension between America and Japan, as had been suggested in numerous sources published during the 1980s. The racial factors for war that had been examined by Blum, were also used by Aruga to establish a pattern of racism on the part of both the American and Japanese governments, linking it to the political decisions that America made during World War II, including the use of the atomic bomb.54 This racism, and the perpetuation of certain stereotypes by the American government influenced the way that Japanese people were illustrated in editorial cartoons.

Aruga’s analysis of American-Japanese relations, starting with the arrival of Commodore Matthew Perry’s fleet in Japan in 1853 and continuing until 1994 when the paper was written, is extensive, covering a long duration in a short space.55 While the trends of interactions between Japanese and Americans, both cultural and political, provide additional explanation to their respective actions taken during the war, Aruga’s analysis of World War II is limited by his inability to fully separate it from the rest of the content. He does, however, provide more reasons behind the actions taken by America during World War II and additional background information supplementing the works of

55 Ibid, 8.
earlier historians who focused more closely on American-Japanese relations specifically during World War II.

Heading into the new millennium, interest in political relations became more popular, including those between Japan and America during World War II. This interest stemmed from the rising tensions occurring throughout the world and a desire re-examine why and how political relations had broken down in the past. In 2006, *The Peace of Illusions: American Grand Strategy from 1940 to the Present*, by Christopher Layne, was published. Layne takes an interdisciplinary and political science approach to the history of America’s political strategies starting with World War II. He argues how American politicians, by 1939, had already started planning for a post-war period and what their political standing would be in such a world. Layne is able to clearly present the role of economics in the decision making processes of American politicians, as had been discussed decades earlier by Kennan, Barnhart and Kolko. He also examines the impact that memories of the Depression, and the possibilities of a relapse, had on the approaches the American government took in dealing with the Japanese threat to their economic interests in China.

Using a political science approach to American-Japanese relations, Layne is able to examine both the primary and secondary sources published in the decades following World War II, including works by Iriye and Kolko, yet he provides different interpretations. Layne explores the economic motives behind America’s actions more deeply than previous historians while maintaining a historical context discussing how.

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57 Ibid, 42-43.
He found that America’s actions during the 1930s, and leading into World War II, was working towards a stronger presence in the global market. He stated that the idea that shaped America’s economic and political approach, both prior to and following World War II, was that “America’s domestic economic and political system can be safeguarded only in a world that is sympathetic ideologically to the United States.” However, the lack of investigation into Japan’s politics prevents Layne from being able to present a full history of American-Japanese relations. As a political examination of American-Japanese relations, there is little discussion of the impact America’s approach had on the Japanese beyond the attack of Pearl Harbor and America’s entrance into World War II. The critical analysis of the political motives of America during World War II provides an understanding of how America saw its relationship with Japan and builds on the ideas presented by Iriye, Shallony and Barnhart during the 1980s.

In 2010, a critical and historical examination of American politics during World War II was published, *The United States and the Second World War: New Perspectives on Diplomacy, War, and the Home Front*. In it, one essay analyses the political relationship between America and Japan leading up to the attack on Pearl Harbor. “Containment, Rollback, and the Onset of the Pacific War, 1933-1941,” by Sidney Pash, reexamines the ideas presented by Iriye, Barnhart and Crowley and explores them more closely by including additional works that had become available over time. Pash goes into more depth with regard to America’s relationship with China during the early 1930s, bringing a more detailed explanation as to why America was opposed to Japan’s invasion. He also details the creation of a new National Defense Act in 1940, which

58 Ibid, 32.
would later lead to the embargo that resulted in Japan’s attack on Pearl Harbor.\textsuperscript{59} Also, similar to the argument that Kennan presented in 1950, Pash discusses how the war between Japan and America could have been avoided had both sides been willing to compromise somewhat on their respective positions.\textsuperscript{60}

Pash’s essay benefited from a variety of sources that have accumulated over the years, particularly during the 1970s and 1980s. He attempts to bring some of these sources together in a comprehensive examination of the American-Japanese political relationship leading into America’s entrance into World War II. Like most of the works before his, Pash avoids laying blame on a particular group by discussing primary documents that show the mistakes made by both sides in their strive for more power. Unfortunately, Pash does not go much beyond the attack on Pearl Harbor and the relationship that developed between America and Japan over the subsequent years.

With the continued examination of sources provided from the 1980s, and more open access to primary documents that detail the politics of America and Japan during World War II, a better appreciation of the nature of their relationship can be formed. Overall, scholars have come to recognize that economic and political tensions played a large role leading to America’s entrance into the war and how its relationship with Japan would change both during the course of the war and after it was over. These tensions have been seen as having great influence over the decision-making processes of both governments and how they viewed each other during the war. Since the end of World War II, the availability of sources from both Japan and America has grown, leading to a

\textsuperscript{60} Ibid, 55-56.
more informed analysis on American-Japanese relations and their evolution, both within and outside the discipline of history. Understanding the political atmosphere surrounding American-Japanese relations prior to World War II is important when examining American use of stereotyped Japanese people in their wartime propaganda. Their attitudes towards, and their understanding of, Japan influenced how propagandists portrayed the Japanese during the war. The following chapter will examine the political relationship between Japan and the United States leading up to Pearl Harbor as well as various media that the United States government used to spread propaganda during the war, in order to contextualize the editorial cartoons that form the basis of this thesis.
Chapter 3

“The Second World War actually consisted of two wars, one in Europe and the Atlantic, and the other in Asia and the Pacific.”—Akira Iriye.

The political relationship between Japan and the United States of America prior to the outbreak of war on 7 December, 1941 had been surrounded by conflict. Two different systems, both politically and culturally, were attempting to foster a beneficial political relationship, with each country focused on the way that it could use the other. Unfortunately, their relationship had experienced drastic hindrances from the beginning, when the “Black Ships” from Western countries, including the Netherlands and the United States, first started to make contact with Japan between the 16th and 19th centuries, to the Paris Peace Conference in Versailles in 1919. Japan attended the latter as the only non-white majority power in the League of Nations, and recognized the possibility of being treated as a lesser member in a conference dominated by both European and American powers. In an attempt to prevent such an occurrence, Japanese delegates put forth a declaration that would require “…to all alien nationals of States members of the League, equal and just treatment in every respect, making no distinction, either in law or in fact, on account of their race or nationality.” Although the declaration had the support of the majority of the delegates present, delegations from both Britain and the United States, led by President Woodrow Wilson (in office 1913-1921), rejected the declaration. Wilson overturned the vote in favour of racial equality, by stating that a

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1 Iriye, The Origins of the Second World War, 1.
2 Iriye, Power and Culture, 1.
3 Record, A War it was Always Going to Lose,18.
unanimous vote was required for it to be passed because of the strength of the opposition.\(^5\)

When Japan threatened to withdraw from the Versailles Treaty, Wilson endorsed the Japanese claim to Germany’s former territorial and commercial concessions that were located on China’s Shantung Peninsula. The willingness of Wilson to sacrifice one country’s integrity in order to appease another demonstrated the lengths to which the United States was willing to go in order to foster a political relationship with Japan, albeit one that maintained the United States’ political superiority.\(^6\)

In the United States, racist ideals, exacerbated by “Yellow Peril” fears from the early 20\(^{th}\) century continued into 1922 when the United States Supreme Court determined that “no Oriental immigrant could become a naturalized American citizen.”\(^7\) An Exclusion Act that banned all Japanese immigration followed this two years later, in 1924, and was passed by the United States Congress as part of an immigration bill.\(^8\) The blatant racism occurring on American soil created a toxic environment for the development of Japanese-American relations. This stemmed from the Yellow Peril, as many white Americans felt threatened by an increase of immigration from Asian countries, including China, Korea and Japan. During this time, white workers, particularly those living on the west coast, felt that their jobs and standard of living were threatened, and resulted in an immigration act excluding Asian people from being able to immigrate to the United States.\(^9\) Such views also resulted in American workers seeing

\(^5\) Ibid, 18.
\(^6\) Ibid, 19.
\(^7\) Ibid.
\(^9\) Record, A War it was Always Going to Lose, 19.
Japanese immigrants as a form of pest trying to take over their way of life. As will be seen in Chapter Four, editorial cartoons were a popular outlet to portray Japanese people as pests such as beetles and rodents.

Also in the 1920s, beginning with the Nine-Power Treaty of 1922, numerous treaties were signed by Japan, the United States, Britain and other European countries that were meant to work towards maintaining an “arms equilibrium in the world,” and stabilizing the Asian-Pacific region. The treaties also led to the acceptance of the gold standard in 1927. At the same time, the treaties and their signatories also worked to aid China in maintaining its independence and providing an environment for the development of a stable Chinese government, establishing clauses to support China in a treaty in 1928. This series of treaties, and the way that they were established, would later come to be known as the “Washington Conference system.” The Japanese military, while accepting the treaties, was disappointed with the limitations that they now faced with regards to their plans to expand into China.

In the first decades of the twentieth century, Japan increasingly integrated its economy into the world capitalist system. The Japanese government, which was turning to the United States and Great Britain to guide its own international behaviour, embraced many of the ideas outlined in the Washington Conferences. Japan’s dependency on the Western Powers began to change in 1929 with the world economic crises that resulted in uncertain relations between nations around the world. Japan began to see a shift, in both politics and trade, from international to regional as countries began to focus more on

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11 Ibid, 2-3.
maintaining domestic stability, while cooperation between nations focused more on maintaining equilibrium among the more self-sufficient countries. These countries were trying to maintain their financial superiority by working with one another, while poorer nations were left excluded.13 In an effort to adapt to the crisis situation, Japan, like most nations, attempted to use various monetary measures to create more stability. However, as trade continued to decline and Japan’s gold reserves began to run out, the Japanese government experienced a decline in its purchasing power, resulting in unemployment across the country.14

Upset with the situation in Japan, a small group of Japanese soldiers, in the Kwantung Army clashed with Chinese soldiers outside of Mukden in southern Manchuria (September 1931 – February 1932). This was a unilateral, unauthorized action designed to entrench Japan’s presence more firmly in Manchuria, and expand the Japanese economy and empire in order to establish a lifeline.15 This was the beginning of war between China and Japan – war that would span a decade until Japan’s attack on Pearl Harbor and the establishment of the United States and Japan as combatants in World War II.

The political tensions between Japan and the United States had increased since the Manchurian Incident, as China sought intervention from the League of Nations with regards to Japan’s actions. China’s pleas went ignored until 8 October 1931, when the Kwangtung Army bombed the city of Chinchow and began other operations throughout

15 Ibid, 7-8.
Manchuria in an attempt at “detaching the ‘north-eastern provinces’ from China.”\(^\text{16}\) It was after this aggression that the League of Nations denounced Japan for violating the treaty of 1928 and Japan had to attempt to justify its actions.\(^\text{17}\)

While Japan was viewed as having violated the treaty, the United States’ interest in preventing Japan from expanding further into China was not completely altruistic. The United States had been trading with China for decades and had worked hard to maintain the trade lines when they were threatened in the past.\(^\text{18}\) For example, by the end of the nineteenth-century, when China was weakened by war, the United States issued the first Open Door Note, in September 1899, to the powers involved in China, urging them “not to discriminate, within their own spheres of influence, against the trade of other states.”\(^\text{19}\)

A year later, following the Boxer Rebellion (1899-1901), another Open Door Note was issued which declared that the United States meant to continually promote “permanent safety and peace in China, preserve Chinese territorial and administrative entity…and safeguard for the world the principle of equal and impartial trade with all parts of the Chinese empire.”\(^\text{20}\) This sentiment was adopted into the treaty of 1928 and it was this treaty that Japan was viewed to be in violation of. It was more the United States’ desire to maintain uninterrupted trade with China that influenced its concern for China’s territorial integrity and insistence on Japan’s adherence to the treaty of 1928, than it was Japan’s actions behind the government’s critique of Japan’s actions.\(^\text{21}\) At the same time that Japan was advancing into China, tensions were growing in Europe. The

\(^\text{16}\) Ibid, 14.  
\(^\text{17}\) Ibid.  
\(^\text{19}\) Ibid, 20.  
\(^\text{21}\) Iriye, Power and Culture, 15.
United States became less worried over the situation in Asia, viewing Japan as less of a threat than Germany was likely to become because Japan, as illustrated in the editorial cartoons analyzed in Chapter Four, was seen as being more “primitive,” as the Axis alliances grew.

By 1939, when war broke out in Europe and in light of Japan’s cooperation with Germany, the United States began to recognize a need to prevent Japan from developing a formal alliance with Germany. The United States government continued to view Japan as less of a threat and vulnerable to outside pressures, such as from the United States, because the Japanese lacked natural and vital resources, including oil, rubber, tin and other raw materials. When Japan signed the Tripartite Pact with Germany on 27 September 1940, the United States worked to soften the effects of the alliance by advising China, Indochina and the Dutch East Indies not to succumb to Japanese imperialism; to prevent the Japanese from accumulating large oil reserves; to work out joint strategies with British, Chinese and Dutch authorities in Southeast Asia; and to signal to Japan that its alliance with Germany was the major obstacle in their attempt to unite the Pacific. The Japanese were also informed that if they renounced the alliance that they made with the Axis, cooperative relations with the United States, and other non-Axis countries, could be restored and they would gain far more with such an arrangement than they would by siding with Germany.

When Japan did not renounce its relationship with Germany and continued its aggression towards China, the United States declared economic war on Japan as an

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22 Ibid, 17 and 20.
23 Ibid, 21.
24 Ibid.
attempt to deter continued Japanese advances into Southeast Asia. On 26 July 1940, President Franklin D. Roosevelt (in office 1933-1945) signed an order freezing all Japanese assets in the United States. While President Roosevelt did not intend for an immediate shutdown of all United States trade with Japan, he did intend to use the order’s requirement, that the Japanese obtain export licenses to release frozen dollars for the purchase of any further United States products, as a “noose around Japan’s neck.” The asset freeze, for the United States, was an attempt to “avoid provoking Japan while bringing more and more pressure to bear, not only to impede Japan’s war production but also to haunt it with the constant threat that more severe measures might be applied.”

By 1 August 1941 the United States had revoked all export licenses for shipping petroleum to Japan. Soon after, the Dutch authorities in the East Indies followed suit by refusing to issue export permits without proof of exchange licenses. These could no longer be obtained because payment had to be made in American currency, which had been blocked by the asset freeze in July. By 5 August, Japan was no longer receiving oil from the United States or the Dutch East Indies. While they had their own oil reserves, it was not enough to power the navy which could go through an entire year’s oil production of 400,000 kilolitres in a month.

The economic war that the United States had declared left Japan with only two choices. It could continue with its attempted conquering of Southeast Asia, or it could submit to the United States and return to the power hierarchy outlined during the 1920s.

25 Record A War it was Always Going to Lose, 48.
28 Iriye, Power and Culture, 28.
29 Ibid.
on the basis of accommodations with the Anglo-American nations.\textsuperscript{30} Despite the realistic threat of complete petroleum depletion, the price that the United States was asking of Japan in order to lift the sanctions, and restore American-Japanese trade to a semblance of normality, was seen by the Japanese government as being too high: complete abandonment of empire.\textsuperscript{31} This would have Japan not only terminating its membership in the Tripartite Pact, but also withdrawing its military from China and Indochina.\textsuperscript{32} This meant that Japan’s work towards gaining land on the Asian mainland would have been for naught and they would have to abandon further attempts at becoming the dominating power in East Asia. It also meant that Japan would continue to be subject to Caucasian imperialism, which it tried to remove, and in the position of economic dependency on the United States, which had been a major factor in initiating the attempt to expand into the mainland.\textsuperscript{33} To Japan, the United States was demanding that not only Japan “renounce its status as an aspiring great power, but also consign itself to a state of permanent strategic dependency on a hostile America”, something that any country would have found unacceptable.\textsuperscript{34}

Despite the firm stance of the United States, Japan was still attempting to negotiate a peaceful resolution, under the leadership of premier Fumimaro Konoe (in office, 1940-1941), but Japan was determined that if no resolution could be reached by the beginning of October 1941, then Japan would prepare to be at war with the United

\textsuperscript{30} Ibid, 31.  
\textsuperscript{31} Record, \textit{A War it was Always Going to Lose}, 54.  
\textsuperscript{32} Ibid.  
\textsuperscript{34} Record, \textit{A War it was Always Going to Lose}, 55.
States by the end of the month.\(^{35}\) As the beginning of October came and went without war breaking out, negotiations continued despite the feeling of futility among many of the participants. However, things soon changed, as a shift in power occurred in Tokyo and Konoe was replaced as premier by General Tōjō Hideki (in office, 1941-1944). General Tōjō believed that war in the Pacific was inevitable and relations between Japan and the United States were doomed to fail.\(^{36}\) While this was General Tōjō’s belief, he was under pressure from much of the rest of the Japanese government to continue trying to preserve the peace, despite the fact that negotiations had not been able to progress and the United States current offer was no more appealing than it had been when first presented.\(^{37}\) Neither the United States nor Japan were willing to back down from their position when it came to Japan’s expansion into mainland Asia. With raw resources becoming more scarce in Japan, the government came to believe that its only choice was to find a pan-Asian solution. Attacking both American and British possessions in Asia was a first step that culminated in the attack on Pearl Harbor on the morning of 7 December 1941.\(^{38}\)

The attack on Pearl Harbor brought the United States of America into World War II. At the same time it also continued the trend of the use of propaganda and censorship, similar to that which had been introduced en masse during World War I (1914-1918).\(^{39}\) Propaganda became integrated in most offerings by the media, including radio, film and newspapers. Based on how it had been successfully used in World War I, propaganda was seen to be a weapon that had terrifying potential, according to the American

\(^{35}\) Iriye, Power and Culture, 32.
\(^{36}\) Ibid, 33.
\(^{37}\) Ibid.
\(^{38}\) Ibid, 34.
government, because of the large number of people that could be reached and affected by its message.\textsuperscript{40} Six months after the attack on Pearl Harbor and the United States entrance into World War II, the federal government created a large-scale propaganda program to gain support for the war effort. The Office of War Information (O.W.I.) was officially established in June, 1942.\textsuperscript{41} Replacing the Office of Facts and Figures (O.F.F.), the O.W.I. was meant not only to broadcast and publish information about what was occurring overseas, but also to defend and explain the policies the government passed in regards to the war to the general public.\textsuperscript{42} The mandate of the O.W.I. was to “Coordinate the dissemination of war information by all federal agencies and to formulate and carry out, by the means of the press, radio and motion pictures, programs designed to facilitate an understanding in the United States and abroad of the progress of war effort and of the policies, activities and aims of the Government.”\textsuperscript{43}

There were a number of political issues involved in the use of propaganda. The O.W.I. had to battle against the negative public perception that propaganda had received since the end of World War I. The O.W.I. faced a great deal of criticism, both from the public and from within the government, affecting the functioning of the office.\textsuperscript{44} Tensions became even more prominent as disagreements arose on what the aims of the United States were in the war. Those leading the creation of propaganda quickly realized that their views of the war and the views of United States’ goals and their portrayal of them were more ambitious than what leaders in Washington had been thinking. They

\textsuperscript{40} Shulman, \textit{The Voice of America}, 3-4.
\textsuperscript{42} Blum, \textit{V was for Victory}, 31.
\textsuperscript{43} Quoted in Blum, \textit{V was for Victory}, 31.
\textsuperscript{44} Blum, \textit{V was for Victory}, 31.
quickly found themselves having to follow the lead of the policy makers in Washington when it came to what would be released to the public.\footnote{Winkler, \textit{The Politics of Propaganda}, 1.} The first struggles of American propaganda appeared on the home front in the Domestic Branch of the O.W.I. Those working in the branch had joined in order to demonstrate their belief in the idea that the war was part of an ideological battle between the forces of good and evil.\footnote{Ibid, 38.} They wanted to disclose to the public a full, honest account of the war, the issues surrounding it, and the facts about what was occurring overseas. This, however, was where censorship took hold as the Domestic Branch met continued resistance from other powers in the administration, including the United States military, of what it would be allowed to publish. The problem, however, was not only about how honest they could be, but also about how to use propaganda during the war, in a democratic society.\footnote{Ibid.} It had been debated for some time how manipulative the government could be when using propaganda. Because of this, a lot of pressure was placed on the O.W.I. over how the propaganda system would unfold, and how it would be used yet still be accepted by the populace.\footnote{Ibid.}

Three men who were deeply involved with the O.W.I. were Elmer Davis (1890-1958), Archibald MacLeish (1892-1982) and Robert Sherwood (1896-1955). MacLeish, director of the O.F.F. prior to the creation of the O.W.I., had pressured American writers to recognize that “‘The spread of fascism’ was ‘a matter of principal concern’ to them.”\footnote{Blum, \textit{V was for Victory}, 22.} His strong support of propaganda and the entrance of the United States into World War
II, however, was objectionable to President Roosevelt who did not want to have an agency under MacLeish that could lead to the United States intervention into the war.\textsuperscript{50} After its creation, MacLeish was made the assistant director of the Policy Development Branch of the O.W.I.\textsuperscript{51} Sharing in his beliefs was Sherwood, a liberal playwright and presidential speech-writer.\textsuperscript{52} Wanting to fight Nazi propaganda with American propaganda, Sherwood created the Foreign Information Service (F.I.S.), which became the Overseas Branch of the O.W.I.\textsuperscript{53} Both men wanted the O.W.I. to be a place for the creation of democratic propaganda that was based on the “strategy of truth” and trusted the people to draw the desired conclusions based on what was presented to them.\textsuperscript{54}

Davis was a popular and respected journalist. Like Sherwood and MacLeish, he recognized the fascist threat, but was less emotional and more analytical about the matter. He focused more on relaying news about the war “clearly and concisely in his nightly broadcasts to his regular listeners.”\textsuperscript{55} He stressed the importance of having a singular head in charge of war information in order to help the public understand the government polices that were being created and to boost support for the war.\textsuperscript{56} Davis’ ability to think critically, desire to have the truth about the war published, and his ability to cohesively relay the information to the public led to him being named director of the O.W.I. on 13 June 1942.\textsuperscript{57}

Davis quickly organized the agency into clear and functioning divisions, as

\begin{footnotes}
\item[50] Ibid.
\item[53] Shulman, \textit{The Voice of America}, 5.
\item[55] Ibid, 32-33.
\item[56] Ibid, 33.
\item[57] Ibid, 33-35.
\end{footnotes}
domestic operations were separated into seven desks, each providing information about a specific phase of the war effort. Overseas operations, which were charged with reaching both allied and enemy peoples, were organized by region, with major offices responsible for all of Europe and Asia.\textsuperscript{58} All information had to go through the Board of War Information before being released to the general public. The Board originally consisted of Davis, MacLeish, Sherwood, along with Milton Eisenhower and Gardner Cowles Jr.\textsuperscript{59} Different ideologies concerning propaganda, however, led to a quick breakdown of the Board as those involved often found themselves in disagreement about the overall goals of the O.W.I. and how the agency should present its information. Both MacLeish and Sherwood demanded that the O.W.I. play a larger role in guiding the United States’ aims for the future. Eisenhower and Cowles claimed that such an aggressive stance was out of place with what the office was meant to do. Davis, unfortunately, quickly found himself having to mediate between both groups and quickly learned that he was going to have to make compromises between the two if the O.W.I. was going to operate smoothly.\textsuperscript{60}

These disagreements led to the departure of both MacLeish and Eisenhower. MacLeish left at the end of January 1943, after acknowledging that the O.W.I., and the propaganda program, would not serve the purpose that he had hoped which was that the issues of the war would be presented to the people in a serious way, persuading them that they should support the war.\textsuperscript{61} Much of this had to do with the limits created by outside forces, such as the military board, which prevented specific information about what was

\textsuperscript{58} Blum, \textit{V for Victory}, 32.
\textsuperscript{59} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{60} Winkler, \textit{The Politics of Propaganda}, 40.
\textsuperscript{61} Ibid, 42.
occurred in the war effort from being released.\textsuperscript{62} The following summer, Eisenhower also left the O.W.I., but rather than his departure being due to a clash of opinions about how the O.W.I. was being run, he decided to pursue different career goals, becoming president of Kansas State College.\textsuperscript{63}

Despite the role the O.W.I. was meant to play in the releasing of information to the public and supplying propaganda to raise support for the war, there was only so much information that was being given it by other government agencies.\textsuperscript{64} One example occurred in 1942, early in the O.W.I.’s development, when Davis could not get the army or Federal Bureau of Investigation to release more than skeletal information about Nazi saboteurs who landed in the United States, were captured and then tried by a military tribunal.\textsuperscript{65} Davis’ feelings were known when he stated that the O.W.I. followed

“the guiding principle…that the American people have a right to know everything that is known to the enemy, or that would not give him aid if found out…We believe that the better the American people understand what the war is about the harder they will work to fight and win it. We are not press agents for the government. We expect to set forth…the difficulties with which both the military and civilian branches of the government are faced, and their shortcomings as well as their success.”\textsuperscript{66}

This ideal clashed with the professional habits of both the army and navy which understood the use of propaganda as a tool of psychological warfare. Both military sectors felt Davis, and the O.W.I., could “advise,” but not “direct” the way that information was released to the public.\textsuperscript{67}

The O.W.I. also experienced difficulty when trying to obtain information from the

\textsuperscript{62} Ibid, 42.  
\textsuperscript{63} Ibid, 105.  
\textsuperscript{64} Blum, \textit{V was for Victory}, 33.  
\textsuperscript{65} Ibid.  
\textsuperscript{66} Quoted in Blum, \textit{V was for Victory}, 34.  
\textsuperscript{67} Ibid, 33-34.
navy as well. Since the attack on Pearl Harbor, it was suspected that the navy was trying to hide any losses that it experienced during the war. This was later proven to be true when the navy admitted to the extent of losses that it had experienced during the Battle of the Coral Sea (4-8 May, 1942), months after the fact. President Roosevelt and Secretary of the Navy, Frank Knox, wanted to quell rumours of war information being withheld, at least until after the congressional elections, the navy relented and on 13 October 1942, began to report a backlog of originally unreported sinkings of American ships. It was not until 28 October that all of the American navy losses had been reported to the public.

Such censorship was not uncommon, particularly during the early months of the war when the United States military faced a series of defeats and stalemates. It was thought that such information would demoralize the public and create a sense of panic and urgency for peace. It was noted by *Time* magazine that, in the first six months of war, the United States had “not taken a single inch of enemy territory, not yet beaten the enemy in a major battle of land, not yet opened an offensive campaign.” Officials became worried over the way that such inaction would be perceived by the public and that the majority of the public would come to desire a compromise settlement with Germany. Shortly after the attack on Pearl Harbor, President Roosevelt created the Office of Censorship, giving it the authority of mandatory censorship over all

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69 Ibid.
70 Ibid, 49-50.
73 Ibid.
international communications not covered by military censorship. Newspapers and editorial cartoons censored themselves for the most part, declining to run images of death and “loyally followed directives important to the war effort.”\textsuperscript{74} Newspapers focused on publishing cartoons that portrayed America’s enemies in a negative way, while showing American soldiers to be braver and more intelligent than their enemies. The Office of Censorship also had control over the domestic information that originated from military installations and certain industrial facilities that had military contracts. However, the censorship of most other domestic information had to be voluntary on the part of the public and press with the guidelines created by the Office of Censorship.\textsuperscript{75}

Images from American combat zones were not subject to a voluntary censorship program; the military only allowed accredited photographers who had agreed to abide by certain rules, which would change over time and would vary depending on with which branch of the military the photographer belonged.\textsuperscript{76} While there were few restrictions on the sorts of images photographers could take, the military relied on censors to prevent objectionable material from being released.\textsuperscript{77} The images that the photographers took had to go through numerous screenings before being released to the public. The censorship began immediately after the photographs were taken; they had to be submitted to field censors who would classify them according to guidelines created by the military and civilian leaders before being sent back to the United States for further review. The captions for the pictures also had to be reviewed by the American military censors.\textsuperscript{78}

\textsuperscript{74} Ibid, 12. 
\textsuperscript{75} Ibid, 8. 
\textsuperscript{76} Ibid, 9. 
\textsuperscript{77} Ibid. 
\textsuperscript{78} Ibid.
This policy of censorship had gone unchallenged during World War I, but this was something that Davis, as head of the O.W.I. was trying to change in order to provide the American public with a more realistic depiction of the war. Davis was motivated by both his personal beliefs and the O.W.I.’s mandate to guard against the use of security requirements to “unduly restrict the flow of information.” His continued pressure, along with the support of President Roosevelt and other military leaders, created changes in how information was released to the public. Rather than the O.W.I. having to justify what material should be seen by the public, the burden was put upon the military to demonstrate what material should not be released and why.

Censorship not only affected what information was released in the news, but that put forth in other forms of media as well. During World War II, one of the most common ways for information and propaganda to be spread both at home and overseas, apart from newspapers, was through radio. By 1932, sixty million radio receivers were scattered throughout the United States and ninety percent of the American public owned radios, making it an excellent media for spreading propaganda. Originally radio stations followed the recommendations made by the O.F.F., allocating times for spot announcements and advertisements for military recruitment, purchases of war bonds, and other war related messages.

Recognizing how important and far-reaching radio was, the O.W.I. resolved to continue to work as much as possible with broadcasting heads. Rather than disrupt the

79 Ibid, 9-10.
81 Roeder, The Censored War, 11-12.
82 Blum, V was for Victory, 25.
83 Winkler, The Politics of Propaganda, 60.
84 Blum, V was for Victory, 26.
standard radio patterns already in place, the O.W.I. and broadcasting stations worked to superimpose wartime necessities on already established systems, wanting to keep audience levels high in order to allow radio to continue as an effective media for propaganda. Following the methods of the O.F.F., the O.W.I. had originally continued to include war-related activity on the air-waves at random intervals. Radio personnel, however, recognized the need for a balance between radio programming and war-related material, and worked on methods to balance the war contributions and range of topics being put forth by the O.W.I. They began to allot specific air-time on a regular basis for government sponsored messages regarding the war, an approach that worked well for the duration of World War II. O.W.I. radio officials were also able to channel messages into popular programs, including “The Lone Ranger” and “Terry and the Pirate,” which had high audience numbers. They also established a series of one-minute transcriptions about the war effort for all radios stations to broadcast in an intensive campaign, approaching popular radio personalities including H.V Kaltenborn (1878-1965), Raymond Gram Swing (1887-1968), and William L. Shirer (1904-1993) to read them. They then had popular programming insert the transcripts into their shows by incorporating war-related themes into the story lines. The O.W.I. Radio Bureau took advantage of the cooperative relationship with the broadcasting stations and worked to communicate both the somber issues of war, balanced with campaigns for support that were deemed important for the home front at war.

85 Winkler, The Politics of Propaganda, 60.
86 Ibid.
87 Ibid.
88 Ibid.
89 Ibid, 62.
Abroad, radio played an important role in the spreading of American propaganda. Overseas news formed the back-bone of the campaign and, starting early in the war, Sherwood avoided the use of emotional appeals to gain support. This was based on his assumption that years of enemy propaganda had deafened the Europeans so, instead, Sherwood used more sober representations of the facts of the war. Spot news transmitted over the radio as quickly as possible following battles made for much of the broadcasts, but there were also featured stories and interpretive pieces that helped place the events that were occurring within the framework of the war. The most widespread American program was the newly founded “Voice of America,” which was established in February 1942. Created by John Houseman (1902-1988), it was meant to “spread the gospel of democracy throughout the world.”

The Overseas Branch of the O.W.I. concentrated on the content of their programs and the specifics of foreign policy, rather than on propaganda. In France, Voice of America broadcasts covered three large categories, each of which included both news and featured programming. First, they discussed the state of French politics, followed by relaying battlefront news and reviewing overall developments in the war. Finally, it distributed propaganda about the United States by discussing the American spirit, its strengths and hopes for the world once the war had ended and the Allies had won.

Concentrating on French politics and the political leadership of the premier of the Vichy regime (1940-1944), Marshal Philippe Pétain (in office 1940), and vice premier,

90 Ibid, 78.
91 Ibid.
92 Ibid, 27.
93 Shulman, The Voice of America, 60.
94 Ibid.
Pierre Laval (in office 1940), The Voice encouraged the French public to resist further cooperation with the Nazi regime (1933-1945) and Adolf Hitler (1889-1945). It also indirectly encouraged rebellion against Vichy.\footnote{Ibid.} The Voice defined French politics as “a choice between collaboration and resistance” when it discussed Vichy leadership.\footnote{Ibid, 61.} At home, however, the use of radio propaganda was faced with resistance. By 1943 criticism was directed against the government’s use of radio propaganda. Politicians began to argue against O.W.I. and saw Roosevelt using it more as a tool for public relations.\footnote{Horten, Radio Goes to War, 65.} It was argued that radio propaganda was having limited influence on the opinions of the public regarding the war.\footnote{Ibid.}

The O.W.I. faced tensions again between 1942 and 1943 when the Overseas Branch of the O.W.I. came into conflict with American domestic political leaders. It began early in 1942 when William Donovan (1883-1959), who was the head of the Office of Coordinator of Information (C.O.I.), began to criticize and attack the Overseas Branch of the O.W.I. His largest conflict was with Sherwood over propaganda and the way that it should be used. Donovan’s policy was that propaganda should act as the “initial arrow of penetration for covert actions.”\footnote{Winkler, The Politics of Propaganda, 27-28.} Unlike others in the O.W.I., Donovan did not care about the standard of ‘truth’. His policy men in Washington continuously made remarks that the New York O.W.I. office followed the requirements of radio production and good journalism too closely and did not recognize the potential that radio

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\footnote{Ibid.}
\footnote{Ibid, 61.}
\footnote{Horten, Radio Goes to War, 65.}
\footnote{Ibid.}
\footnote{Winkler, The Politics of Propaganda, 27-28.}
could provide. While his arguments were acknowledged, Donovan was pressured to step down as the head of the C.O.I. and the C.O.I. was dissolved.

The preparations of the United States to go into North Africa on 10 June 1940 led to Donovan to renew his attack on the O.W.I. and the leadership of the Overseas Branch. The conflict brought the O.W.I. under Congress examination and resulted in a reduction in the budget of the Overseas Branch from $27 million to $24 million. Despite the cut in the budget, the Overseas Branch and the Voice of America continued to try and reach the public abroad, still believing that the most important way to spread propaganda was to tell the world that “the United States was bent on establishing and preserving democracy, not on maintaining order and political stability at all costs…”. The Voice of America continued to be broadcast throughout the war, spreading American propaganda throughout Europe and Asia.

Censorship and propaganda also appeared in film as well. The public’s desire for news about the war was tied to the United States’ participation in the war and was brought forward in newsreels. This also meant that cooperation with the United States government, and the military, would be needed in order to successfully broadcast a newsreel film. Cameramen, and their crews, were required to have the same accreditations as photographers who covered the war. They were also subjected to similar forms of censorship. Their films had to be cleared by the censors overseas and at home, and any archived military footage that they wanted to include had to be granted

100 Shulman, The Voice of America, 31.
101 Ibid, 31-33.
102 Ibid, 93.
103 Ibid, 97.
104 Ibid, 97-99.
105 Roeder, The Censored War, 18.
military approval prior to it being used.\textsuperscript{106}

However, while film faced the same censorship as photography, it was much stricter. In 1941 a memo was released stating the military policy on the use of film. It stated that “commanders should cooperate with newsreel companies only if cooperation did not create any extra expense or work and if the companies agreed to submit all material for review.”\textsuperscript{107} They were also not allowed to show “any reel or any part thereof which has been disapproved by the War Department.”\textsuperscript{108} When the O.W.I. was formed, it had no effective means of loosening the military’s control over combat film. They had to request invitations for its representatives to attend screenings of footage that the navy had made available to the newsreel companies.\textsuperscript{109} Despite attempts made by the O.W.I. to loosen the restrictions on film, they did not have the same rapid successes that had been accomplished with issues surrounding photography.\textsuperscript{110}

The relationship between the government and motion picture studios, while cooperative, had also been tense, and continued to be so during the war. Prior to Pearl Harbor, when war had broken out in Europe, the film industry had established the Motion Picture Committee Cooperating for National Defense, which was meant to help maintain soldiers’ morale overseas in the event that America was drawn into the war, while also building public support for the war at home. After the bombing of Pearl Harbor the Committee changed its name to the War Activities Committee.\textsuperscript{111} As troops went off to war, the newly named committee worked to bolster the troops’ morale throughout the

\textsuperscript{106} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{107} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{108} Quoted in ibid, 18.
\textsuperscript{109} Ibid, 19.
\textsuperscript{110} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{111} Ibid.
war. One way that it did this was by distributing current films, without charge, to the American troops. By the end of the war they had shipped 43,000 prints to the troops overseas.\textsuperscript{112}

Both President Roosevelt and the movie-makers shared the same idea of the potential of the film industry in gaining public support for the war.\textsuperscript{113} The Bureau of Motion Pictures was the division of the O.W.I. that dealt directly with the movie-makers. Together with Hollywood, the bureau produced films of its own and coordinated the distribution of films produced by other government agencies. They were also responsible for ensuring that films coming out of Hollywood worked towards, or at least did not interfere with, the government’s aims for the war.\textsuperscript{114} Such films that were produced included \textit{Guadalcanal Diary} (1943) and \textit{Thirty Seconds over Tokyo} (1944).\textsuperscript{115} Its efforts were continuously hampered by various issues, including internal disputes, industry executives’ determination to protect their established prerogatives, and the desire to the studios to maintain relations with the military.\textsuperscript{116} The largest problem, however, came to be the representation of death and suffering of the soldiers working overseas. Early in America’s participation in the war, propaganda that portrayed deaths of American soldiers, made them out to be heroic and meaningful but lacked the truth about how modern warfare could mutilate the human body.\textsuperscript{117} Heroic deaths being featured in propaganda early in the war were rare; by the O.W.I.’s estimation, of the sixty-one feature films containing war scenes released between May and November, 1942, only

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{enumerate}
\item Ibid.
\item Ibid.
\item Ibid, 20.
\item Ibid, 21-22.
\item Ibid 20.
\item Ibid, 21.
\end{enumerate}
\end{footnotesize}
five of them contained images of death. Instead, companies like Disney released propaganda shorts that dealt with specific and distinct aspects of the war. In movies, the essentials of war, such as food, money, and various recycled goods including cooking grease, and the need for them were demonstrated on the screen, allowing the audience to see how their actions would help the troops fighting. A combination of humour and seriousness was enlisted to help demonstrate the appropriate behaviour for people at home in regards to their contributions to the war effort. One film created by Disney entitled The New Spirit released in 1942 followed Donald Duck through his daily routine and pointed out the ways that he could help the war effort while remaining at home. This comedic spin brought some lightheartedness in a dark time. As will be shown in the next chapter, this was also done visually through the use of images in editorial cartoons.

As the war continued, the film industry evolved. The realities of war were shown in film more accurately with the O.W.I. making suggestions on how accurate results of battle could be portrayed. For example, in an “Information Manual” in 1942, the O.W.I. suggested that “in crowds unostentatiously show a few wounded men. Prepare people, but not alarm them, against the casualties to come.” By the final years of the war the “mortal realities” of war were being relayed to the public more clearly. Movies came to portray surgeries and death, although not in great detail, to help demonstrate the realities of war. Films such as Objective Burma (1945) demonstrated the emotional breakdowns that soldiers could have while Thirty Seconds over Tokyo, the showing a brief amputation

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118 Ibid.
119 Leskosky, “Cartoons Will Win the War,” 45.
120 Ibid, 48.
121 Ibid, 49-50.
122 Quoted in Roeder, The Censored War, 21.
of a leg demonstrated to the public the physical truths of war.\textsuperscript{123}

By the end of the war in 1945, through the work of the O.W.I., the American public was being provided with a more revealing and honest idea of war. The public also developed a more complex and realistic understanding than when the war first started. Officials and the O.W.I. made the changes in protocol that were necessary to gain support for the war and inform the public, both on the home front and abroad. This was demonstrated in the evolution of the images and in the availability of information regarding both battle wins and losses of the United States troops.\textsuperscript{124} In the beginning, realist consequences about the war were hidden in order to prevent loss of public support and uphold the morale of the troops; as time passed the “truth” grew to be used as a propaganda tool and “the most powerful weapon in their motivational arsenal.”\textsuperscript{125}

The use of propaganda during World War II was not something new, it was popularized during World War I, recognized as a way to sway public opinion in favour of certain ideas. The political relations between the United States and Japan in the years leading up to the war influenced editorial cartoons created during World War II, and their depictions of Japanese people. Both radio and editorial cartoons worked towards gathering support for the American troops, however, editorial cartoons provided more freedom to portray the war than radio did. The publishing of wartime editorial cartoons was not interrupted by other programming and could be included without interfering with the rest of the newspaper. The cartoons were also able to reach those who did not have a radio, spreading propaganda on a larger scale. Government departments, such as the

\textsuperscript{123}Ibid, 23-24.  
\textsuperscript{124}Ibid, 25.  
\textsuperscript{125}Ibid.
O.W.I., while not in complete control of the creation of propaganda, worked to maintain public support for Americans fighting overseas, and to stress the idea that Japanese people were a great threat to American society. Chapter Four examines twelve editorial cartoons that depicted the Japanese enemy during World War II. It will focus on three themes: dehumanization, destruction and degradation, in order to demonstrate the kinds of influence that the United States government, scholars, and cartoonists had on the creation of editorial cartoons and the way that Japanese people were depicted in them, thus adding another dimension to the propaganda activities conducted in the United States.
Chapter 4

“With few exceptions, Americans were obsessed with the uniquely evil nature of the Japanese.”—John Dower.

With the breakdown of Japanese-American relations after the attack on Pearl Harbor on 7 December 1941, the United States entered World War II (1939-1945) and wartime propaganda began to spread. On the home front during World War II in the United States, newspapers, and editorial cartoons published in them, played an important role in spreading propaganda. Editorial cartoons have been seen as being “part of the democratic tradition,” that are “a long established part of U.S. publications.” While World War II was viewed as a giant war between multiple nations, at the time the Hearst Newspaper declared that the war in Asia was separate from the war in Europe. Japan was labeled as being a cultural, religious and “radical menace”. There was a fear, propagated by the government and news outlets, that if Japan were victorious in the Pacific there would be “perpetual war between the Orient ideals and the Occidental.”

This chapter will examine twelve cartoons, containing the themes of dehumanization, destruction, and degradation, from three different areas: Toronto, Canada; and Arizona and Hawai’i, United States. While found in three distinct areas, the cartoons from Toronto and Maui originated in Chicago and were published in a syndication network. This network allowed newspapers across North America to publish stories and editorial

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3 Dower, War Without Mercy, 7.
4 Ibid.
5 Quoted in Ibid, 7.
cartoons that they might otherwise not have had access to.

Stereotypes, a concept that was popularized by Walter Lippmann shortly after the end of World War I (1914-1918), played a large part in the portrayal of Japanese in editorial cartoons. The racist imagery that was distributed throughout the United States was often graphic and harsh in its depiction of Japanese, who were portrayed as “subhuman” and primitive with inferior intelligence. The common goal for propagandists was to explain a reason for what the Japanese were doing. One way to achieve this was to portray that they were childlike, impulsive, and suffered collectively from mental and emotional deficiencies. At the same time, they were also portrayed as having “superhuman” abilities in order to explain why they were able to continuously defeat the United States early in America’s involvement in the war.\(^6\) These images allowed propagandists to promote various perceptions of the Japanese to the public: subhuman, superhuman, inhuman – all except the idea and reality, that the Japanese were just as human as everyone else.\(^7\) As the war continued, editorial cartoons also came to include various images of Japanese homes and ships being destroyed as a way to boost morale and support for the American troops; it was also a way for the United States to demonstrate its superiority and strength over Japan.\(^8\) John Dower discusses racism in Western propaganda saying:

\[\text{“The racist code words and imagery that accompanied the war in Asia were often exceedingly graphic and contemptuous. The Western Allies, for example, persisted in their notion of the “subhuman” nature of the Japanese, routinely turning to images of apes and vermin to convey this. With more tempered disdain, they portrayed the Japanese as inherently inferior men and women who had to be understood in terms of primitivism, childishness, and collective mental...”}\]

\(^6\) Ibid, 9.
\(^7\) Ibid.
\(^8\) Ibid.
and emotional deficiency. Cartoonists, songwriters, filmmakers, war correspondents, and the mass media in general all seized on these images…”

The focus in editorial cartoons was on the stereotypes that Japanese people were childlike, animalistic, weak, and “subhuman,” while at the same time being “superhuman” in the way that they fought. The term derogatory “Jap,” a shortened form of Japanese, was also popular in editorial cartoons and was used to underline that all Japanese people should be considered the same.

Stereotypical images presented in the cartoons were used to demonstrate the supposed superiority of the Americans over the Japanese, in strength, intelligence and evolution. Japanese were drawn much smaller than their Allied counterparts, oftentimes more childlike in their sizes. Their eyes were drawn resembling those of an animal. Squinting eyes, with exaggerated slants, and top jaws protruding from their faces, often with bucked teeth, were the most common images of Japanese people in editorial cartoons. This brought an appearance of the Japanese forces being angry, evil, or stupid. They were also drawn with very little muscle mass and occasionally overweight, making them appear substantially weaker, or not as in shape, when compared to images of the Allied forces. These images were based on concepts about the Japanese as derived from the knowledge of supposed expertise of Japanese specialists, such as Geoffrey Gorer (1905-1985). They were also meant to instill both racial and national pride in domestic readers and the troops overseas while degrading the overall character of

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9 Ibid.
10 Ibid, 79.
11 Ibid, 10.
12 Allied refers to Americans in this case.
13 For example see figures 1 through 12.
14 For example, see figures 1 through 12.
the Japanese, despite the fact that some of the audience would have been Japanese-American. Stereotypes were used to emphasize the differences between Americans and Japanese while perpetuating myths about Japan and its people that conflicted with the ideals and beliefs that Americans had, or what the propagandists wanted them to have, about the United States.

The dehumanizing portrayal of the Japanese enemy as animals was a popular image during the war. They were often portrayed as a variety of different animals: rodents, reptiles, and insects. These animal groups, like Japanese soldiers in the cartoons, are also depicted as having squinting eyes, while rodents and snakes have upper jaws that protrude over their lower ones, creating an overbite. The most popular depiction of the Japanese, however, was of them as primates, usually baboons, gorillas, or monkeys. Such dehumanizing propaganda worked in two ways: it allowed the fostering of a sense of superiority among the white American population while that the same time perpetuating the idea that Japanese people were less evolved than “Westerners” on a variety of levels, including intelligence, fighting ability and morality.

The Japanese enemy also appeared frequently as primates in editorial cartoons. To ensure that readers made the connection that the primate represented Japan and its forces, the popular stereotypes, which had been present during the years leading up to Pearl Harbor, of how Japanese people were thought to look were used, causing the reader to focus on the slanted eyes and bucked teeth. One cartoon with the depiction of Japanese fighters as monkeys was published on 6 January 1942, in the Toronto Daily Star

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16 Qualter, Propaganda and Psychological Warfare, 52.
17 Ibid.
18 Dower, War Without Mercy, 81.
19 Ibid, 84.
It was illustrated by Vaughn Shoemaker (1902-1991) who worked out of Chicago, and entitled “Tarzan was a Piker”; at the time, “piker” was an Australian slang term for a person who was lazy. The cartoon depicts a white American soldier chasing, through a jungle a group of monkeys, that were meant to represent Japanese soldiers who had been hiding in the trees. It also suggests comparisons between Tarzan and an American soldier. While Tarzan was described as being muscular and living in the jungle, a lifestyle that would have required a lot of work, it was instead a feisty American soldier chasing the Japanese soldiers out of the jungle. The cartoon infers that Tarzan was lazy, in comparison, and that it was up to American soldiers to take up the cause and defeat Japan. Although there are three monkeys, they are fleeing from a single man. The monkeys in the cartoon also have human faces, particularly the front monkey at the centre of the panel, drawn in the stereotypical way that the Japanese were commonly depicted. The helmets of the monkeys have a circle on the front representing the red sun that is seen on the flag of Japan (see figure 1).

The Japanese in the image are also shown to be smaller and weaker looking monkeys that have little muscle mass when compared to the single soldier. Such imagery glorified the strength of the American soldier, who was depicted as being able to fend off three Japanese enemies, while also belittling Japanese strength by showing them as submissive to the “stronger” United States. This idea was a common theme in editorial cartoons during World War II. It also perpetuated the racial stereotype that Japanese

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20 Taken from Chicago syndication. Vaughn Shoemaker, “Tarzan was a Piker,” Toronto Daily Star, January 6, 1943, 6.
were weaker than Americans because they were thought to be more “primitive.” This “primitiveness” is also represented in that cartoon by making it appear that the Japanese enemy is incapable of shooting well. The monkeys in the image are seen to be dropping their weapons, both because they had paws instead of hands and because they were sweating with fear, while fleeing. Appearing unable to do two things at once, to flee the might of the “superior American soldier” and hang on to their weapons (despite the fact that there is a sling on each rifle) made a mockery of the Japanese soldiers. The soldier’s abilities are demonstrated as being superior, because not only is he able to swing on a vine while carrying a gun, he is also able to accurately shoot while swinging, only just missing one of the monkeys (see figure 1).

Cartoonists producing propaganda and using an artistic media to spread it, gained some of their inspiration from popularly held views that people from Japan were more primitive than Westerners. Many Western social scientists also held this view. Much of what cartoonists were drawing when depicting Japanese was based on ideas that had been published by social scientists working from the concept of “white supremacism,” which held that if a group of people was not white then they “represented a lower stage of evolution.” The theory that Japanese people were biologically more primitive than Westerners, and therefore more related to primates, was incorrectly supported by some physical anthropologists, still believing in biological determinism and racial superiority. The Smithsonian Institute, for instance, maintained that Japanese people were primitive based on the examination of Japanese skulls, advising President Roosevelt (in office,

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24 Ibid, 231.
1933-1945) that they were “some 2,000 years less developed” than Americans.\textsuperscript{25} The dehumanization of Japanese people by cartoonists was impacted by both the pseudoscience that allowed such theories to become public knowledge and the need to show the public that the Japanese could not be considered to be on the same biological level as people from the Western world.

Depicting the Japanese enemy as reptiles was also popular with cartoonists during the war. Vipers and other kinds of snakes were used by cartoonists to promote the idea that the Japanese were evil. Snakes are often depicted in stories as being evil, or are a pet of the main antagonist. In the Bible, the serpent persuaded Eve to eat the apple, resulting in her and Adam being expelled from the Garden of Eden.\textsuperscript{26} Such religious imagery spoke to a large part of the American population during the war. Newspapers took advantage of this and perpetuated the idea of Japanese being snake-like in their behaviour, sneaky and underhanded in their methods of attacks, such as the way they “ambushed” American troops during Pearl Harbor, although according to Charles Beard, such an attack was inevitable because of the political tensions between the United States and Japan at the time.\textsuperscript{27} In one case, an article in the Los Angles Times stated, “A viper is nonetheless a viper wherever the egg is hatched – so a Japanese-American, born of Japanese parents, grows up to be Japanese not American.”\textsuperscript{28} This idea worked to increase hatred of Japanese-Americans, and Japanese more generally, instilling the idea that it did not matter if a person were born in the United States, if he or she were of Japanese

\begin{footnotes}
\item Ibid, 232.
\item Genesis 3: 1-7 and 23-24 RSV.
\item Beard, President Roosevelt and the Coming of the War 1941, 183.
\item Quoted in Dower, War Without Mercy, 80.
\end{footnotes}
descent they could not be trusted.²⁹

Such a cartoon displaying the Japanese as snakes was published on 4 August 1943, in the *Toronto Daily Star* and entitled “They Don’t Die Until the Sun Goes Down.” In it, a viper is depicted with labels on its body having the names of important Japanese cities, Tokyo being at the head, along with areas that the Japanese had conquered during the war to that point (see figure 2).³⁰ This imagery, and the stereotypical image of how Japanese eyes were portrayed, is meant to link the idea of Japan and, by extension the Japanese, for the cartoon’s audience. Three pieces of the snake have been sliced from the rest of the body, each representing a win of the American military and a strong looking arm is working on dissecting another part of the snake. It is beginning to separate Munda, which represented the American victory at Munda Point on New Georgia, from the hold of the Japanese (see figure 2).

Despite being injured, the viper still appears vicious in the way that it is drawn and is ready to attack the arm of the person holding the machete. Its fangs are bared and the tongue is drawn in such a way that it makes the snake appear to be hissing (see figure 2). This underlines to the idea of propaganda making the Japanese enemy appear not human and yet “superhuman,” determined to continue to battle against the United States, Allied forces, and Western World, even as they were being decimated. The reality of this, however, was that the idea of the Japanese enemy being superhuman and continuously battling the United States against all odds was a myth. In later years, this would contribute to various atrocities being carried out by American troops due to their

²⁹ Ibid, 80-81.
overestimation of the will of the Japanese and their capacity to continue fighting, even after Japanese soldiers were separated from food supplies and began to starve to death.\footnote{Dower, “Race, Language and War in Two Cultures,” 236.}

As Dower explains, “the superman image was especially compelling because it meshed with the greatest of all the racist bogeys of the white men, the specter of the Yellow Peril.”\footnote{Ibid, 236 and 238.} The reptilian images in editorial cartoons allowed the cartoonists to express their opinions about the Japanese. It also worked to instill a loathing of the enemy amongst the public by using an image of something that most people feared, or disliked, and linking it to the Japanese.

The Japanese were also depicted as insects. Reg Manning (1905-1986), an editorial cartoonist for the Arizona Republic, illustrated a cartoon entitled “The Plague,” in which a large group of beetles is seen to be making its way along the road, destroying everything in their path (see figure 3). These are beetles, with six legs, and bodies separated into three separate sections: the head, the thorax and the abdomen. They are also shown to have shells. This can be seen clearly on the front beetle, as it is splitting to let its wings out (see figure 3). The swarm is identified as being Japanese by the stereotyped facial features that can be seen on the beetles in the front of the mass, similar to the ideas of the ‘Yellow Peril’ that had been directed against the Chinese prior to the war, but came to include the Japanese.\footnote{Dower, War Without Mercy, 10.} On the backs of the beetles is the rising sun, a national symbol of Japan, allowing the reader to make further connections between the insects and the Japanese army that they are meant to represent. One of the inspirations for this drawing is the infestation of Japanese beetles that occurred on the eastern coast of

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\footnote{Dower, “Race, Language and War in Two Cultures,” 236.}
\footnote{Ibid, 236 and 238.}
\footnote{Dower, War Without Mercy, 10.}
the United States between 1935 and 1943.\textsuperscript{34} The Japanese beetle is an invasive species that thrived in suburban areas and agricultural areas where they had access to large amounts of fruit trees, cultivated crops and other types of flowering plants.\textsuperscript{35} Adult Japanese beetles would feed on nearly 300 different species of plants, eating both the flowers and leaves, causing the destruction of crops. The larvae of Japanese beetles also cause problems, feeding on the roots of plants, preventing them from growing.\textsuperscript{36} These insects spread rapidly throughout the eastern United States.\textsuperscript{37} At the same time, in 1941, a similar fear of the Japanese military invading on the west coast was felt. Manning took advantage of beetle infestations to relay the idea of Japanese being little more than insects wanting to invade and destroy the United States. “The Plague” also worked to create fear about the number of Japanese soldiers that were fighting. In the cartoon, a mass of insects is seen, each representing a single soldier that could overwhelm Americans about how many Japanese soldiers were willing to fight. Unlike other cartoons that dehumanized the Japanese, such as “Tarzan was a Piker,” there is no image of an American soldier or other Allied forces, just a mass of identical insects making their way across the terrain and destroying everything along the way. While the eye is drawn to the larger, front bugs, the small insects in the background can also be seen causing the trees to die as they climb all over them (see figure 3).

Published after the attack on Pearl Harbor, “The Plague” was an effective, frightening piece of propaganda because it showed that a threat was coming and that the

\textsuperscript{35} Ibid, 13.
\textsuperscript{37} Hawley and Dobbins, “The Distribution and Abundance of the Japanese Beetle from 1935 through 1943” 5.
numberless enemy was willing and capable of destroying everything in its path. It also establishes the idea that the threat is never ending as the line of beetles stretches far and over the hills in the horizon. Even the title, “The Plague,” is used to frighten the reader, linking the image with almost biblical destructive powers that could spread quickly, far, and are very difficult to stop, similar to the employment of blitzkrieg employed by the Germans. It also brings to mind the plague, also known as the “Black Death,” that spread via fleas throughout Europe during the mid-1300s A.D., and caused an overwhelming loss of life.38

This fear of the Japanese, and the depiction of them being nothing more than snakes or insects was also supported by some extremists in the American government who felt that, like insects, the Japanese people needed to be exterminated. Among military leaders, Admiral William Halsey (1882-1959) was the most vocal in his thoughts about the Japanese enemy; often he was heard making racist remarks in public, remarks that were dangerous in their message. Many of Halsey’s statements regarding the Japanese bordered on advocating genocide. He often referred to Japanese as “yellow monkeys” and once declared that he was ready to start a naval operation “to get some monkey meat.”39 While he was criticized for his remarks, and often accused of being drunk, his view was still popular among the men serving under him. He also attracted press coverage, allowing his racist hatred to be spread easily to the general public, much in the same way that editorial cartoons were distributed.40 For example, at one news conference early in 1945 he stated “the Japanese were a product of mating between

39 Dower, War Without Mercy, 85.
40 Ibid, 85.
female apes and the worst Chinese criminals who had been banished from China by a benevolent emperor.\footnote{Quoted in ibid, 85.} Such imagery would stay with the American public, as would the idea that the Japanese were a plague, or a group of pests that needed to be exterminated as similar depictions were presented during the war. The use of “exterminationist” figures of speech became more popular, particularly in the later years of the war, as a way of referring to those who had killed Japanese and the killing of Japanese. This term not only referred to the killing of large groups of Japanese soldiers, but also to the deaths of Japanese civilians caught in bombings or crossfire.\footnote{Ibid, 90.} Japanese came to be seen as pests and in one cartoon a sergeant was depicted as asking “Well, which would you druther do – exterminate bug-insects or Japs!?”\footnote{Quoted in ibid, 91.} Such phrasing reflects the impact that images like Manning’s “The Plague” had on other cartoonists as well as the attitudes of the American public, how it affected their perception of other ethnic groups, and how the mass death of Japanese was posited as an acceptable consequence of the Japanese government’s policies.

The depiction of Japanese as animals and dehumanizing them was a way to desensitize both soldiers and the general public to the idea of killing Japanese soldiers and citizens. Seeing a group of people as less than human was intended to alleviate issues surrounding the Christian concept that killing a person, even an enemy soldier, was a sin. Instead it became a matter of hunting small game, or larger animals with the idea that ‘I have to kill it, before it kills me.’ The depiction of Japanese soldiers as dangerous animals allowed American soldiers to see their actions of killing the enemy as being
protective against an inhuman force, and therefore, less objectionable.\textsuperscript{44} It began to be seen as a form of hunting, as Dower describes,

“Fighting Japanese in the jungle was like going after “small game in the woods back home” or tracking down a predatory animal. Killing them was compared to shooting down running quail, picking off rabbits, bringing a rabid and desperate beast to bay and finishing it off. The former sportsman was now simply “getting bigger game.” One put the crosshairs on the crouching Jap, just as in deer hunting back home.”\textsuperscript{45}

Dehumanization not only occurred by depicting Japanese people in editorial cartoons as animals, but also by allowing them to be visually compared to animals. When the image of a certain animal appeared in a cartoon with a Japanese man, exaggerated similarities were included to influence the public to make subconscious connections between the person and the animal. One cartoon that features such imagery was drawn by Paul Berdanier (1879-1961): “Tōjō Gets a Jolt,” which was published on 19 June 1943, in The Maui News (see figure 4).\textsuperscript{46} Another was Vaughn Shoemaker’s “Indeterminate Sentence,” published in the Toronto Daily Star on August 31, 1945 (see figure 5).\textsuperscript{47} In both cases, the Japanese man is not drawn as an animal, but as human. However, there are animals in the picture with them.

In “Tōjō Gets a Jolt,” General Tōjō (in office, 1941-1944) is depicted riding a rearing horse (see figure 4). The horse, representing the Japanese military and military command, however, bears a striking resemblance to its rider when it comes to facial features. The eyes and the way that the top jaw sits are similar and in both cases the teeth are protruding, the stereotypical way of depicting Japanese people at the time. The horse

\textsuperscript{44} Dower, “Race, Language, and War in Two Culture,” 229.
\textsuperscript{45} Ibid, 229-230.
\textsuperscript{46} Taken from Chicago syndication. Paul Berdanier, “Tōjō Gets a Jolt,” The Maui News, June 19, 1943, 6.
\textsuperscript{47} Taken from Chicago syndication. Vaughn Shoemaker, “Indeterminate Sentence,” Toronto Daily Star, August 31, 1945, 6.
appears menacing because of the squinted eyes. Further, the horse is malnourished, with bones visible all over its body, giving it a skeletal appearance, bringing to mind the horseman of the apocalypse. Like many of the cartoons that depicted the Japanese as animals, the similarities between the horse and its rider speaks to the idea that the Japanese were primitive and less evolved than Westerners. It also illustrates the idea that Japanese animals, such as horses, are inferior to their American counterparts by showing them to be less healthy and strong.

“Indeterminate Sentence” is more subtle in the way that it compares Japanese people to animals. The man sitting on the bed in the jail cell is the focus of the image, however, on the left side of the panel is a small mouse (see figure 5). The man and the mouse have similarly shaped eyes and pupils; they are also sitting in similar, slouched positions in the cell. The mouse and Japanese man have more characteristics in common than the man does to the Caucasian jailer seen in the background and on the other side of the prison bars. This encourages a subconscious connection linking the man and mouse in the cell, while separating the man in the cell and the jailer as well as, or better than, the iron bars between the two. The statement made by the “guard,” further implies that the prisoner is not human. This reinforces more subtle connections between the prisoner and the mouse. With “Indeterminate Sentence,” the link between mouse and man also reflects how Japanese-Americans were treated during the war. In the cartoon, both are seen as being undesirable to the rest of society, the mouse because it is a rodent and the man because of the way that he, and by extension all Japanese, has acted. During the war, after the bombing of Pearl Harbor, over 100,000 Japanese-Americans living on the west coast of the United States were forced from their homes, stripped of their property, and
placed into facilities meant to house them until they were relocated to interment camps further east. This began not long after the attack on Pearl Harbor.\textsuperscript{48} Often, the camps were filthy; the pens where the Japanese were forced to stay were originally meant for farm animals, such as pigs and cows.\textsuperscript{49}

Similar interments happened on Hawai‘i as well, where close to 40 percent of the Hawaiian population, almost 160,000 people, were Japanese or of Japanese descent.\textsuperscript{50} Unlike the perception of Japanese-Americans perpetrated in the mainland United States, in Hawai‘i, the Japanese were more respected than feared, even after Pearl Harbor, and were major contributors to the Hawaiian economy.\textsuperscript{51} While there was a large number of interment camps on the mainland United States, Hawai‘i had five: two on O‘ahu, one on the Big Island, one on Maui and one on Kauai‘i, and these housed only 1,400 Japanese people during the war.\textsuperscript{52} It is interesting to note the way the Japanese were treated in Hawai‘i, the site of Pearl Harbor. Significantly fewer Japanese were sent to camps, with a large amount of the population remaining free, and overall hostilities felt towards them were less compared to what was occurring on the mainland, despite the propaganda that was being published throughout the war, including syndicated cartoons from Chicago.

The dehumanization of Japanese people in editorial cartoons worked to distance the non-Japanese public from relating to people from Japan. It made Japanese people appear to be so different from the American public that there was nothing wrong with mistreating or killing them. As well, it also worked to dispel any feelings of guilt over

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\textsuperscript{48} Dower, \textit{War Without Mercy}, 83.
\textsuperscript{49} Ibid. For further reading see Morton Grodzins, \textit{Americans Betrayed: Politics and the Japanese Evacuation} and Jerry Stanley, \textit{I am an American: A true story of Japanese Internment.}
\textsuperscript{50} MacKinnon Simpson, \textit{Hawai‘i Homefront. Life in the Islands During World War II}, (Honolulu, Hawai‘i: Bess Press, 2008), 85.
\textsuperscript{51} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{52} Ibid, 90.
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how the Japanese-Americans were treated, being sent to internment camps without proof that they were helping Japan in any way.

Another popular theme in World War II editorial cartoons was depiction of the destruction of Japan and its forces by American and Allied forces. There were various ways that the destruction was portrayed: collapsing buildings, fire and explosions, the sinking of Japanese warships, and the frightening or sacrificing of animals that portrayed either the Japanese forces or conquests. In some cases, the destruction is seen as being the end result of an attack made by what is assumed to be the United States military or other Allied forces, while in other cartoons the attack is ongoing. The degree of violence in the cartoons also varies, in some cases the amount of destruction is implied or is more comedic in its depiction, while in others the imagery is much more graphic. However, while destruction was a popular theme, death was not a common image in editorial cartoons. In cartoons where Japanese homes and ships had been destroyed, there are no images of dead Japanese. Instead they are either off to the side seeing the destruction happen, or are commenting on the destruction around them, but still alive.

An example of the more graphic and cruel depictions of the destruction of the Japanese enemy is “They Don’t Die Until the Sun Goes Down” (see figure 2). The strong arm of the Allied forces is taking a machete to the viper that represents Japan. The result of the destruction is seen in the three pieces of snake that are at the bottom of the cartoon. They show to the reader the once Japanese-controlled regions that the United States and Allied forces had already liberated, and that they were currently liberating. What makes the image cruel is the way that the snake is seen to still be alive while being mutilated. Unlike other images, there is also seen to be blood pooling under the snake. There is
nothing lighthearted about this cartoon; it is meant to relay the seriousness of the war.

The title of the cartoon implies that the cruelty and destruction appearing in the image above it appear necessary. It gives the impression to the reader that Japanese enemies could not be stopped until they were completely destroyed. The image also portrays an enemy willing and able to strike back, despite the damage that it had already suffered. This also worked to give the impression to the populace that Japan was a “superhuman” and non-human force, portraying a vicious, determined and strong enemy while at the same time making sure that the Japanese would not be seen as being what they were, people.53

The image of the snake also brings to mind the idiom “a snake will not die until the sun goes down.”54 The idiom indicates that it would not matter when one tried to kill the snake, or in what matter, it would remain alive until sunset. It begs the question as to why the illustrator thought it necessary to depict a snake being sliced from the tail towards the head, which is a horrifying way to kill something. This shock tactic, and the graphic destruction of Japan, reflects contemporary hatred towards the Japanese. Even the title, “They Don’t Die Until the Sun Goes Down,” plays on Japan being referred to as the “land of the rising sun,” by its citizens.55 This was taught to Japanese children from an early age throughout school, and was also represented by their national flag.56 The title is a direct reference to this idea and links Japan’s flag, and Japan’s national ideology, with the image of a vicious snake. After being subjected to various images of Japanese

as primates, reptiles and overall vicious people, as incorrect as those images were, feelings towards the Japanese had been created such that it did not matter how the enemy was destroyed, so long as there would be no way for it to come back again.

In a number of cartoons the word “Jap” also appears (see figure 1, 6, 7, and 8). This was a derogatory term used to refer to anybody who was Japanese or of Japanese descent. Unlike the political term “Nazi,” used to refer to enemy Germans, “Jap” encompassed the entirety of the people, both soldier and civilian. The term Nazi left the impression that there were “good Germans,” who were also being affected by the war. However, “Jap” left no interpretation that there were “good Japanese.”57 There was no distinction between Japanese soldiers, Japanese civilians, or Japanese-Americans, with people like General John DeWitt (1880-1962) making statements such as, “A Jap’s a Jap…It makes no difference whether he is an American citizen or not…I don’t want any of them…There is no way to determine their loyalty.”58 Such ideas were reinforced by editorial cartoons and other media with the use of the phrase “the Jap” when referring to a group, creating the impression that the enemy was a singular group of people rather than allowing the public to perceive them as individuals.59 Admiral Halsey also publicly reinforced the thought that all Japanese people were the same, regardless of where they had been born and whether or not they were soldiers by stating “the only good Jap is a Jap who’s been dead for months,” and later saying that it was not only Japanese soldiers that he was referring to, reiterating his ideas about the genocide of Japanese people.60

Another image that shows the ongoing destruction of Japan is Berdanier’s cartoon

57 Dower, Without Mercy, 79.
58 Quoted in Blum, V was for Victory, 159.
59 Dower, War Without Mercy, 79.
60 Ibid.
“Something on Account,” published in *The Maui News*, on 28 February 1945. In it, a demolished house with a man in the rubble is at the forefront of the cartoon. Based on the text under the house reading “Jap Homeland,” the attack is taking place somewhere in Japan. In the background, a B-20 bomber plane can be seen dropping bombs with explosions occurring as well (see figure 6). The destruction of Japan in this cartoon is catastrophic, with the house demolished beyond recognition and nothing remaining standing around it. There is also an image of Japan’s Rising Sun flag lying in tatters across the rubble just to the right of the man. The flag is important in this image because a flag is meant to unite people and is a strong symbol of a country, but in this case the flag has fallen. The man under the rubble is also speaking, making a direct reference to Pearl Harbor. This implies that the attack being depicted is in retribution for the attack on Pearl Harbor on 7 December 1941 (see figure 6). A similar image was depicted a few months later on 31 May 1945 in the *Toronto Daily Star*, illustrated by Jack Lambert (1892-1967). His cartoon “‘There is Absolutely No Room for Optimism’ (Jap Spokesman)” is taking place in a Tokyo that has been bombed. Tokyo, the capital of Japan, is seen to be burning in the background with a man in the rubble of a destroyed building, speaking to the audience (see figure 7). The title in quotations and the use of the word ‘spokesman’ gives the impression that this was a quotation overheard by the illustrator, directly from Japan. In both cartoons, the man is being crushed in what is supposed to be a more comical fashion, by the rubble of a destroyed building. The images are also similar to “Something on Account.” The man in the cartoon has a similar

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63 Taken from Chicago syndication. Jack Lambert, “‘There is Absolutely No Room for Optimism’ (Jap Spokesman),” *Toronto Daily Star*, May 31, 1945, 6.
lump on his head, reminiscent of ones that other animated cartoon characters, such as Wile E. Coyote and Elmer Fudd, get when they are hit on the head (see figures 6 and 7).

These images relay the message to the reader that the United States and Allied forces were making much progress against the Japanese enemy, being able to target cities in Japan rather than liberating areas that had been occupied. They also build on the sentiment displayed in cartoons like, “They Don’t Die Until the Sun Goes Down,” which left the reader with the impression that the only way to beat Japan was to take out the capital, bringing the “sun” down. It also speaks to the need for continued support and unity behind the war, showing what the American public’s support had allowed the military to accomplish and to instill confidence in the abilities of the United States military among the populace.⁶⁴ By the end of the war the United States military had lost over 400,000 soldiers, most of the losses occurring in the final two years of the war.⁶⁵ Meanwhile, Japan lost over 900,000 soldiers to the United States military during the war, not including the civilian casualties from the atomic bombs that were dropped on Hiroshima (6 August 1941) and Nagasaki (9 August 1941).⁶⁶ Images portraying the destruction of Japan would show the public that their faith and support in the war was not misguided, along with demonstrating the abilities of the soldiers against the Japanese enemy.

Destruction of the Japanese military was also an important image in editorial cartoons during the war. One such image, illustrated by Manning, is entitled “Please to Wipe Hon. Specs!” In it, three Japanese men are watching two Japanese navy boats in

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⁶⁴ Finch, “Psychological Propaganda,” 374.
⁶⁶ Dower, War Without Mercy, 297.
the distance. The man on the left, possibly Hirohito because of his appearance and since the admiral on the right is respectful, assumes that they are becoming smaller because they are moving away over the horizon. However, the admiral on the right is quick to point out that they are actually sinking, a result of an attack by the United States submarine that can be seen on the right hand side of the panel (see figure 8). While there is not a lot of destruction depicted, the message in it is similar to the one that was seen in both “Something on Account,” and “‘There is Absolutely No Room for Optimism’ (Jap Spokesman),” in that it promotes the concept that the United States military is quite capable of destroying a part of Japan, in this case its navy. Like Berdanier’s and Lambert’s cartoons, Manning’s effort aimed to gain public support for the military by showing a triumph of the United States over its enemy. In this case there is also an element of humour as well, in that the one man does not understand that the ships are sinking, and cannot imagine that this could happen. This also emphasized the alleged stupidity of Japanese military leaders. The destruction of the ships by a single United States submarine allows the reader to visualize the impact that the United States navy was having on Japan’s navy.

There is also the presence of a smaller Japanese man, behind the first two, named Little Itchy Itchy, a character that was created by Manning and meant to show the impact that the United States was having against the Japanese military’s confidence. This character was created by Manning to show how the Japanese generals and admirals were beginning to “lose face.” The character’s name, “Itchy Itchy,” is a play on the Japanese

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67 Reg Manning, “Please to Wipe Hon. Specs!” in Little Itchy Itchy and Other Cartoons (New York: J. J. Augustin Publisher, 1944), 55.
68 Ibid, 6.
word, *ichi* – meaning one; thus the character is Little One, an explicit denigration of Japanese people. His presence belittles Japan and the Japanese. Little Itchy Itchy also brings to mind the way that a thought can be in the back of a person’s mind; a persistent, tiny “itch” that does not stop, or a scratch that a person tries to ignore, but will not go away.

The propaganda that the American public had been exposed to early in the war was a scare tactic, showing the viciousness of the enemy, as in “They Don’t Die Until the Sun Goes Down,” (published on 4 August 1943) and the need to destroy them. The message changed later in the war, showing destruction of the Japanese military, areas of Japan, and the Japanese empire. These images first worked to show to the public the importance of supporting the war, before evolving into demonstrating the impact that their support had and the results of the United States’ military attacks on the Japanese enemy.

The use of destruction in editorial cartoons worked at attacking the implied confidence of the Japanese military, and showing the American public that their presence in the war was causing worry in Japan. One such cartoon was published on 28 January 1942 in *The Maui News*. It was illustrated by Berdanier and entitled “Must A Been Somethin’ He Et.” In it, an angry looking man with Japan written across his chest appears to be having a nightmare. The nightmare consists of two men, representing the United States and Britain, riding an angry-looking bucking horse named Democracy. The horse, and man on it, appear to be stomping on Japan, while he yells in fear that they are attacking him (see figure 9).69 The image depicted to the public that the United States

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and Britain were on the minds of the Japanese and that the Japanese were afraid of what was to come. The confidence that Japan had in its military is displayed to the reader as being shaken by the notion that both the United States and Britain were allied to fight against Japan. It is also meant to instill confidence in the American public regarding the abilities of their own military to defend against the enemy, in this case, the Japanese military.

The title of the cartoon, “Must be Somethin’ He Et,” also foreshadows the destruction that would occur. It implies that the man is having the nightmare because he is having a stomach ache, brought on by something that he had eaten (see figure 9). The phrase “he bit off more than he can chew,” also comes to mind when examining this cartoon. Published just over a month after the events of Pearl Harbor, the illustrator is showing that the public can have confidence in their military, and the British military, and that it would come at the expense of Japanese ambition. It also portrays the Japanese with the stereotypical eyes and large teeth, making the character appear vicious and angry, even in sleep. This also helps relay the importance of supporting the United States military, and working at destroying the confidence of Japan, which would also create more confidence in American abilities.

Another example of a cartoon that shows the destruction of Japan’s confidence, rather than the physical destruction of Japan is “Tōjō Gets a Jolt.” In it, Tōjō is being thrown from his horse, labeled “Japanese Military High Horse,” in the face of an explosion labeled “News of Allied Victories,” (see figure 4). Such an image was meant to raise faith in the abilities of the American troops within the public sphere, and show that the Japanese were overly proud of their military. The United States had faced a
number of losses when it first entered the war, including the Battle of Guam (8 December – 10 December 1941) and the Battle of the Java Sea (27 February 1942). As the United States military began to win more battles, its power became better known to its enemies. This image shows the perceived reaction by the Japanese enemy being one of surprise. It also worked to display the impact that a loss of confidence can have on the abilities of a military force. In this case, Tōjō, being shaken by the explosion of allied victories, is seen to be falling from his horse in shock, presumably allowing for more Allied and United States’ victories to occur because his confidence has been shaken.

In both of these cases there is no physical destruction being shown, but rather a mental image of Japan’s destruction is being created. This allows the reader to speculate on the confidence that the Japanese would have in their abilities, and the overall strength of their own military to be able to incite fear and worry in their enemy. It helped to demonstrate the psychological aspects of war by demonstrating what an impact a decrease in confidence can have on the abilities of the military. Such cartoons, as “Tōjō Gets a Jolt” also served as a warning of what can happen if people lose faith in the abilities of their military.

Destruction, as a theme of editorial cartoons, worked towards gaining support for the war by showing the accomplishments of the military and the enemy’s failings. Depiction of the destruction of Japan was meant to raise the confidence of the American public in their troops overseas, while at the same time giving the impression that the military had achieved retribution for the attack on Pearl Harbor. It was not only physical destruction that was portrayed, however, editorial cartoonists also illustrated the impact

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70 McCloskey, Artists of World War II, 179.
that confidence can have on the abilities of a military force by showing the destruction of
the confidence of Japan. While not always graphic, the images drew the eye of the reader
while the titles implied that the Japanese enemy in the cartoons deserved the destruction
that was depicted.

The degradation of Japanese people was also an image that editorial cartoonists
used in their depictions of the war. Similar to the images depicting the Japanese as
subhuman, the degradation of the Japanese also employed a number of stereotypes, the
most significant being the representation of them as childlike and impulsive.\textsuperscript{71} The
degradation in cartoons went further to include the idea that the Japanese were of lesser
intelligence than white Americans, and continuing the stereotype that they were more
‘primitive’ than the rest of the Western World.\textsuperscript{72} These portrayals made their way into
the images through ideas such as having Japanese characters speak in broken English,
being smaller in stature with clothes that do not fit correctly, and as a group of people that
need to be led, among other portrayals.

The perception of Japanese people being childlike adults was a popular image.
Reg Manning depicts the Japanese military as being childlike in their appearance in a
number of his cartoons. One cartoon of Manning’s in which this image is dominant in
“Alaska’s Fate Sealed” (see figure 10).\textsuperscript{73} The image depicts members of the Japanese
navy claiming that they have captured an Alaskan island and taken its population hostage.
The soldiers’ boat is also small, not more than a little row boat, also alluding to the idea
that Japanese men were small, needing nothing larger than a row boat to get around, and

\textsuperscript{71} Dower, “Race, Language, and War in Two Cultures,” 229.
\textsuperscript{72} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{73} Reg Manning, “Alaska’s Fate Sealed,” in Little Itchy Ich and Other Cartoons, 51.
therefore not much of a threat. What the reader sees, however, is that they have landed on a large piece of ice where a number of seals have made their home. The seals are standing upright on their rear flippers, and appear to be the same height, or taller than a number of the Japanese soldiers. This makes the Japanese soldiers appear similar to seals (see figure 10). The Japanese naval clothing is old-fashioned, despite the fact that the Japanese military had modern uniforms. This perpetuates the idea that Japan was more primitive than the United States. The uniforms also resemble outfits that parents would make their young children wear on formal occasions. This makes them appear even more childlike, despite the mature look of their faces.

“Alaska’s Fate Sealed” speaks to the image of the Japanese being “little men,” throughout the war.\(^74\) This was supported by the belief, as based on so-called physical science which had been popular during the nineteenth-century, that the Japanese were more primitive than the majority of people in the United States and the rest of the Western World.\(^75\) Between 1895 and leading into the end of World War II, behavioural and cultural studies were undertaken to determine differences between Japanese and Americans.\(^76\) These were carried out by anthropologists, including Franz Boas (1858-1942) who did not believe in the idea of “biological determinism,” or “scientific racism,” which had been the mainstream of thought amongst anthropologists in the nineteenth century and carried over into the early twentieth century. The use of “scientific racism” led to the belief that the Japanese were less evolved biologically than people of the

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\(^74\) Dower, “Race, Language, and War in Two Cultures,” 229.
\(^75\) Ibid, 232.
\(^76\) Dower, War Without Mercy, 149 and 164.
Western world. A different view was taken by behavioural anthropologists; academics like Margaret Mead (1901-1978) and Ruth Benedict (1887-1948) who, under the tutelage of Boas, examined cultures of other countries, including Japan, to expand on the idea of “national character.” Instead of considering biology as an explanation for the Japanese people’s behaviour, they examined Japan’s culture. The work of these scholars contributed to the determination that Japan and its people were troubled by “heavy psychic burdens, taut with enervating anxieties at both the individual and societal levels.”

This led to the belief, by scholars who were involved in various national-character studies of Japan, that the basic value system used in rearing the Japanese children caused a stunting of their psychological development, leaving them at an infantile stage. General Douglas MacArthur (1880–1964), acting as Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, had similar ideas about the maturity of Japanese people, seeing them as people who needed to be treated like twelve-year-olds. This was also reflected in the belief that their impulsive actions, combined with Freudian inferiority complexes such as penis envy or a castration complex, was increasing the Japanese’s desire to conquer other countries.

“Alaska’s Fate is Sealed” degrades the Japanese in other ways as well. The image of the Japanese man in charge has him speaking to a radio technician, wanting him to relay a message to the United States military. His speech appears awkward with missing articles that would have made the sentence correct. Simple mistakes in the English

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77 Ibid, 119.
79 Dower, War Without Mercy, 121.
80 Ibid, 303.
81 Ibid, 122-123.
language, such as missing the word “the,” would cause the reader to question the intelligence of the Japanese men being depicted. The question of their intelligence is furthered with the realization that they have not captured an Alaskan island, but rather ice where seals are living, giving the impression that the Japanese were not smart enough to recognize what America, or an American, looked like (see figure 10).

A similar image is also seen in Manning’s “Please to Wipe Hon. Specs,” (see figure 8). Again, the Japanese men appearing in the carton have the stature of children, while their facial features reflect the fact that they are adults. The speech in the cartoon is also broken in a similar manner as in “Alaska’s Fate Sealed,” (see figure 8 and 10). The manner in which Japanese people speak English is further mocked in this cartoon with over-use of “hon.” meaning “honourable.” This plays off of the negative impression that some Americans had of Japanese showing their respect. Much of this came from the differences in attitudes towards the class system that existed between the Japanese and the Americans. It was thought, by “experts” such as Gorer, that while Japan appeared to have become more modern after entering the international market, the appearance was just a façade put on by the Japanese, similar to the political talks between the United States and Japan to avoid fighting while at the same time planning an attack. To the United States government, Japan had remained feudalistic in the way that it operated. This meant that people were subordinate to the state and those who ran it. The cartoons placed an over-emphasis on the politeness of Japanese people, while also portraying them as being untrustworthy, willing to use underhanded tactics, such as the “surprise attack” on Pearl Harbor, to reach their goals.

82 Iriye Power and Culture, 32.
83 Dower, War Without Mercy, 21.
In “Please Wipe Hon. Specs!” the character Little Itchy Itchy also appears. He is seen to be carrying a sword that reads “Hara-Kiri On” (see figure 8). *Hara-kiri* is a term that was used to refer to a form of ritualistic suicide that was most prevalent during the Edo period (1600-1868) and generally committed by samurai.\(^{84}\) By committing *hara-kiri*, a person could preserve one’s honour after he was disgraced or after his honour was brought into question.\(^{85}\) The appearance of Little Itchy Itchy and his sword degrades the tradition behind such an act by making light of it, while also bringing to mind the stoicism of the British message to ‘Keep Calm and Carry On’ which had been popularized during the war. It also shows that the lower ranks of the army were beginning to lose confidence in their leaders. Little Itchy Itchy, a private, is continuously prompting his superiors to commit *hara-kiri* (see figures 8 and 11). This promoted the idea that the Japanese military should give up and surrender, or fall on its own sword, because the United States was more powerful.

The reference to *hara-kiri* reappears in the Manning’s cartoon “With Increase of Hon. War Action” (see figure 11).\(^{86}\) In this cartoon, Little Itchy Itchy is followed by a new character named Twitchy. While Little Itchy Itchy continues to carry the sword with *hara-kiri* written on it, Twitchy is seen to be carrying a golf bag full of similar looking swords. This belittles *hara-kiri* even further, having it bring to mind a recreation sport, rather than the ceremonial act that it is. They are also speaking to a caricature of the Japanese emperor, Hirohito (1901-1989), while asking if it is the appropriate time to commit *hara-kiri* (see figure 11). Again, the message to the public degrades the


\(^{85}\) Doris G. Bargen, *Suicide Honor. General Nogi and the Writing of Mori Mori Ōgai and Natsume Sōseki* (Honolulu, Hawai‘i: University of Hawai‘i Press, 2006), 14.

\(^{86}\) Reg Manning, “With Increase of Hon. War Action,” in *Little Itchy Itchy and Other*, 87.
significance of the act of *hara-kiri* making it into little more than a joke. It also is used to boost public morale by showing that more battles are being won by American troops because the number of swords that are needed by Little Itchy Itchy has increased to the point where he needs assistance to carry them all (see figure 11). Better English appears in “With Increase of Hon. War Action” than what had been featured in other cartoons by Manning, such as “Alaska’s Fate Sealed,” and “Please to Wipe Hon. Specs!” However, “With Increase of Hon. War Action” further degrades Japanese culture with the punchline of the joke being “I had to get Hon. assistant to Kiri my Hara” (see figure 11). The term “kiri” is meant to be read as “carry,” while “hara” is meant to be the sword, making further jokes of a Japanese tradition.

Manning also degraded the Japanese characters in his cartoons by illustrating them to look subhuman. Although they are not drawn as primates, they do not look completely human either. Their appearance takes on a caveman quality. Comparing the three men in the cartoon “With Increase of Hon. War Action,” the further down the military rank the person appears to be, the more subhuman appearance the person takes on (see figure 11). Again, this works to perpetuate the idea that the Japanese were more primitive, and distanced from the white American, non-Japanese public and soldiers from the reality that the enemy were people, just like them.

The childlike image of Japanese people is also seen in “With Increase of Hon. War Action.” Both Little Itchy Itchy and Twitchy are in clothing that appears far too large for their stature, with the pant legs bunching just above their boots. The oversized clothing relays the idea of the “immaturity” of the Japanese, which had become a critical

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87 Reg Manning, “Introduction,” in ibid, 2.
concept for those studying Japanese behaviour by 1944. The people making the analyses of Japanese behaviour by 1944 were often social scientists, psychiatrists, and Japanese specialists who had little contact with Japan outside of a war time period. In December 1944, a conference in New York, attended by over forty distinguished psychiatrists, social scientists and “Japanese specialists,” concluded, based on a Japanese character study, that “the most conspicuous new insight which developed was the comparison between Japanese character structure and behaviour which is characteristic of the adolescent in our society. This comparison makes it possible to involve our knowledge of individual adolescent psychology and the behaviour of adolescents in gangs in our society, as a systematic approach to better understanding of the Japanese.”

The scientific community, like editorial cartoonists, was putting forth the concept that the Japanese acted as a group of adolescents who were part of a gang, and this idea was further spread to the public through the use of editorial cartoons, such as Manning’s, which depicted them in a childlike fashion.

Also in “With Increase of Hon. War Action,” the faces of Little Itchy Itchy and Twitchy have no facial hair, and they are younger-looking than Hirohito. This lack of facial hair, combined with their smaller stature, when compared to their Western counterparts, also reflects the depiction of Japanese men as “little boys” and perpetuated the idea that they were more childlike in their behaviour. The average height of Japanese soldiers (five feet three inches) made them considerably smaller than their American counterparts.

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89 Quoted in ibid, 131-132.
counterparts (averaged at five foot seven inches).\textsuperscript{90} They were also more cleanly shaven, had less body and facial hair, and sported a seemingly younger appearance. This difference was made apparent when Japan first started attacking in Southeast Asia, causing a rumour to be spread to the public that the Japanese army had been composed of “inexperienced and poorly trained youth,” Which further stressed Japanese military weakness.\textsuperscript{91}

Shoemaker’s cartoon “Indeterminate Sentence,” which was published after the bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, further degrades an already broken country. The appearance of the man, labeled “Japanese people,” is haggard and hairy, something that was not often depicted when drawing Japanese people during the war. The thicker hair and moustache give the character a more adult appearance, however the baggy clothes and wide eyes still promote the childlike portrayal of Japanese adults as seen throughout the war (see figure 5). It also groups the Japanese all together, similar to Halsey and DeWitt’s contention that there was no “good Japanese” person during the war.\textsuperscript{92} This cartoon shows that they all had to be punished as well. This is similar to the use of the word “Jap” that appeared in editorial cartoons during the war, which grouped the entire Japanese population as a single entity rather than as civilians and soldiers.

In the cartoon “Indeterminate Sentence,” the jailor’s words, “You’ll stay there until you can learn how to act in human society,” also degrades the Japanese people (see figure 5). Like the dehumanization of Japanese people in editorial cartoons during the war, the warden’s words degrade them by inferring that their actions alone were the ones

\textsuperscript{91} Ibid, 123.
\textsuperscript{92} Ibid, 79.
that were inhumane. Both sides of the war committed atrocities, yet the cartoon implies that the only ones who were behaving inhumane were the Japanese. It also encourages the reader to believe that the Japanese belonged behind the gates of the internment camps that they were in during the war, because they did not know how to “act in human society.” For example, the Governor of Idaho, declaring his opinion of Japanese people and their presence in America, stated “The Japs live like rats, breed like rats and act like rats. We don’t want them.” This thought was due, at least in part, to racist-inspired fear that Japanese were undermining Caucasian American lives, that the Japanese would attack the west coast of the United States, and that Japanese-Americans would then sabotage the United States’ defenses. The cartoon further stresses that the Japanese should not be included in a civilized society.

The degradation of Japanese people did not stop with the end of the war. One example of the continuing degradation is illustrated by Paul Berdanier’s “Charley McCarthy’s Rival,” published on 3 October 1945 in The Maui News, a month after the war ended, during the American occupation. In it a large, faceless man with “U.S. Control” written across his chest is seen holding a small ventriloquist’s dummy, with the name “Hirohito” written on it, on his lap. At his feet there is a small wooden toy horse that the image of Hirohito is meant to ride, similar to the horse that he would have been seen riding prior to and during the war (see figure 12). The image represents the Japanese people, most importantly the emperor, being under the control of the United

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93 Quoted in Blum, V was for Victory, 160.
States.\textsuperscript{96} The imagery of Hirohito as a ventriloquist dummy is degrading towards Japan because it sends the message to the American public that anything the Japanese emperor said, to his people or to the world, was under the control of the ventriloquist, the United States (see figure 10). The cartoon’s title, “Charley McCarthy’s Rival,” makes direct reference to a popular ventriloquist comedy act from the 1930s to 1950s.\textsuperscript{97} Charlie McCarthy was the name of a puppet whose show was broadcast over the radio. While giving the impression that he was larger than life, the public knew that he was just a puppet with a man controlling his actions. This comparison made the Japanese a harmless, comical plaything for the United States; Americans had taken away Japanese independence and their ability to inspire fear. While this is a change from the way that they were being portrayed as primitive during the war, it still degrades Japanese people by sending the message that they were harmless and needed to be controlled and spoken for, as a way for the Japanese to “be guided toward maturity.”\textsuperscript{98}

Social scientists continued to impact images that appeared after the war, but they turned to analyze Westerners instead of the Japanese. This, too, while placing the United States in a teacher or parental role, degraded the Japanese in the minds of the public. General Douglas MacArthur, acting as Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, had a similar views of the way that the Japanese should be treated, publicizing in a Senate hearing in 1951 that the Japanese should be treated as twelve-year-olds.\textsuperscript{99} The image also reflects MacArthur’s comparison of the Japanese to the Western world, in terms of ages. His idea was that Anglo-Saxons were approximately forty-five years of age, while the

\textsuperscript{96} Iriye, \textit{Power and Culture}, 266.
\textsuperscript{98} Dower, \textit{War Without Mercy}, 303.
\textsuperscript{99} Ibid.
Japanese were more like twelve-year olds. He felt that the basic concepts of how to act were present in the Japanese, but that they needed to be guided by the more mature Americans in order to be able to be considered fully grown.\textsuperscript{100}

The degradation of the Japanese in editorial cartoons served a number of purposes, the most important of which was to show the supposed differences between Americans and Japanese to the white American public. The themes presented in this chapter – dehumanization, destruction and degradation – were meant to encourage the non-Japanese American public to perceive that the people they were fighting were not as intelligent or mature as they, or their troops, were. It also reduced the Japanese to a single group, fostering mistrust toward the Japanese, attempting to justify the separation of Japanese-Americans from the rest of the public. After the war the degradation continued, but changed the way that Americans viewed Japan; rather than seeing people who were angry and vicious, focused on the idea that they were a people who needed to be guided by Western countries. Instead of being seen as less intelligent, They were seen as young and inexperienced, people who would grow with time, when in reality they were no less mature, or human, than the rest of the world.

\\[100\text{ Ibid.}\]
Conclusion

“Certain forms of war propaganda, reinforced by censorship and the natural wartime decline in toleration, were designed to create a state of mass hysteria and unrestrained patriotism in which rational thought would be impossible.”

– Terence Qualter.

World War II affected people in many ways, both on the front lines and at home. Editorial cartoons appearing in the United States and Canada during World War II were tools for the government, and cartoonists, to raise support for the war and troops overseas. They served to raise morale at home while the war continued, and distinguished who “the enemy” was. When depicting the Japanese, cartoons were racist with images based on preconceived stereotypes of whom the Allies thought they were fighting, stereotypes that had been influenced by incorrect historical and cultural information disseminated by the government, scholars, and cartoonists.

The Office of War Information (O.W.I.) was a prominent figure in the distribution of wartime propaganda in the early years of the war. In an attempt to give the public an honest account of the war, the issues surrounding it, and the facts about what was occurring overseas, the O.W.I. encountered continued resistance from other powers in the administration, including the United States military, of what it would be allowed to publish. This resistance was not only because the United States military had faced a number of losses, but also about the use of propaganda in a democratic society. Debates were ongoing about how manipulative the government, and media, should to be when using propaganda. Because of this, considerable pressure was placed on the O.W.I. over

1 Qualter, Propaganda and Psychological Warfare, 151.
how the propaganda system could unfold, and how it would be used yet still be accepted by the populace.\(^3\) As time passed, however, the O.W.I. came under much criticism by both public and political figures. In the political sphere, the Domestic Branch of the O.W.I. came to be seen as a tool used by President Franklin D. Roosevelt (in office 1933-1945) for public relations, rather than the department that broadcasted and published information about the war and defended the policies that were put into place during the war.\(^4\) While the O.W.I. came to have less influence over the publication of propaganda by the end of the war, the information that the government, and Western scholars, created was still being used on a regular basis. A negative depiction of Japanese in editorial cartoons was a way for the O.W.I., for a time, and the American government to bolster support for the war effort.

In 1922, Walter Lippmann coined the term stereotype, analyzing the way that a person’s culture influences perceptions of one’s own and other cultures.\(^5\) He argued that “all strangers of another race proverbially look alike to the visiting stranger.”\(^6\) Lippmann’s description of the use of stereotypes in World War I as a way to define good and evil in the American public’s mindset of the enemy, was mirrored by its use in World War II and the way that the Japanese were depicted in the cartoons examined in this thesis.\(^7\) Examining the promotion of stereotypes, as depicted by Western scholars and cartoonists during World War II, is suggestive of how their use in propaganda during World War II became more prevalent than in previous years. Propaganda, such as

\(\text{\footnotesize \cite{3} Ibid.}\)
\(\text{\footnotesize \cite{4} Horten, Radio Goes to War, 65.}\)
\(\text{\footnotesize \cite{5} Lippmann, Public Opinion, 81.}\)
\(\text{\footnotesize \cite{6} Ibid, 80.}\)
\(\text{\footnotesize \cite{7} Ibid}\)
editorial cartoons, worked to enforce the idea that, based on stereotypes, all Japanese people were the same and deserved to be treated and, especially, punished in the same way. Stereotypes of Japanese were based on racist beliefs that Western countries were more “advanced.” Such understandings, which have long since been disproved, reflected the idea of “white supremacism,” which was still popular in North America. Cartoonists used the ideas that those who were not Caucasian were of lower intelligence and lower on the evolutionary scale than Caucasians, even if they were born and lived in North America or Hawai‘i.8

This study examines twelve different cartoons, published in North America and Hawai‘i, and the messages that cartoonists were trying to convey. While those published in The Maui News and the Toronto Daily Star were originally taken from Chicago syndication, they worked to spread a similar message about why the war was important and who the American military was fighting against. The study examines three specific, yet common, themes that links the cartoons and demonstrates the ways in which the cartoonists attempted to influence the public.

Dehumanization of the enemy was a popular theme in American editorial cartoons during the war, particularly when depicting the Japanese. Such images were used to desensitize soldiers to killing, and to desensitize the general public to the thought of killing large groups of Japanese soldiers or civilians.9 Images like “Tarzan was a Piker,” “They Don’t Die Until the Sun Goes Down,” and “The Plague,” were used to demonstrate to the public supposed difference between “Americans” and “Japanese.”10

8 Dower, “Race, Language and War in Two Cultures,” 231.
9 Ibid, 229.
10 Shoemaker, “Tarzan was a Piker,” Unknown, “They Don’t Die Until the Sun Goes Down,” and Manning, “The Plague.”

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Some of the inspiration for such images came from information published by scholars, such as Gorer, about how “primitive” the Japanese were when compared to Caucasian Americans. For some cartoonists, such as Manning, the depiction of Japanese as insects was more popular, depicting them as never-ending pests, like in “The Plague,” where one beetle brought to mind thousands more that could not be seen.

Destruction was also a popular theme for editorial cartoons. It allowed the illustrator to show America’s military in action. Such propaganda reassured the public that their troops were fighting the best that they could, and were gaining ground against the Japanese, despite the losses that they experienced during the early phases of the war. Images like “Something on Account” also illustrated that the United States military had not forgotten what happened at Pearl Harbor and was working towards retribution. Physical destruction was not only depicted. Destruction of the Japanese military’s confidence was just as important, leading Reg Manning to illustrate cartoons such as “Please to Wipe Hon. Specs!” and “With Increase of Hon. War Action.” These showed low-ranking Japanese soldiers recognizing defeat and losing confidence in their, and their leader’s, abilities. The theme of destruction was meant to show a reason for the public to continue to support, if not celebrate, the war effort by demonstrating what the troops had already accomplished.

Degradation of culture was also used in propaganda and editorial cartoons to show to the American public and soldiers the differences between Japan and the United States. While not as obvious in some of its racism as the theme of dehumanization, they demonstrated a different type of racism, targeting the intelligence of the Japanese rather than their humanity.

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than their biology. Images degrading Japan, like the images that dehumanized the Japanese military, were influenced by the information supplied about the history and culture of Japan by so-called experts on the subject. They promoted stereotypes of primitive and childish Japanese.\textsuperscript{13} Such degradation continued after the war while the United States was occupying Japan, as seen in “Charley McCarthy’s Rival,” continuing preconceived notions of Japan and its people, after the war had ended.\textsuperscript{14}

Japan also used editorial cartoons to gain support for the war. Unlike American cartoonists, Japanese cartoonists demonized Allied soldiers and politicians rather than depicting them as animals.\textsuperscript{15} Despite this, their propaganda was similar to its American counterparts by working to demonstrate their superiority over the enemy. They based much of their propaganda in their traditions and the concepts of purity and pollution.\textsuperscript{16}

There was also the idea of the divinity of the imperial line. As Dower describes:

“The intense self-preoccupation ultimately led to the propagation of an elaborate mythohistory which emphasized the divine origins of the Japanese imperial line and the exceptional racial and cultural homogeneity of the Japanese people.”\textsuperscript{17}

These ideas are in some ways similar to those employed by the cartoonists in the United States who deployed elements of “white supremacism” to denigrate non-white societies, and suggest that the Japanese “represented a lower stage of evolution.”\textsuperscript{18}

However, while the cartoons can be seen as racist today, contemporary Caucasian Americans may not have seen them that way. For sure, the cartoonists did not take into

\begin{footnotes}
\footnotetext{13}{Dower, War Without Mercy, 9.}
\footnotetext{14}{Iriye, Power and Culture, 266.}
\footnotetext{15}{Dower, War Without Mercy, 237.}
\footnotetext{16}{Ibid, 203.}
\footnotetext{17}{Ibid, 205.}
\footnotetext{18}{Dower, “Race, Language and War in Two Cultures,” 231.}
\end{footnotes}
consideration the way that Japanese-Americans may have viewed such imagery.

Long after World War II ended, editorial cartoons are still a popular medium for people in North America. Every day, editorial cartoons are published in newspapers, and on the internet as a way for cartoonists to express themselves. A major difference in the way that the editorial cartoons in mainstream newspapers are used today is that they are no longer as explicitly racist as they were during the war. While racism has not disappeared completely, popular opinion frowns on the explicit use of racist imagery, such as depicting a specific group as being animalistic. Comparing a person, or group of people, to animals is considered incorrect, and justifiably so. Editorial cartoons instead tend to feature caricatures of politicians and other famous people rather than a specific society or cultural groups. Politics is a popular topic in editorial cartoons today, encouraging people to think about what the government is doing and if it is in the best interest of the country’s population. At the same time, there are subjects that are considered taboo. Insulting or marginalizing religion is viewed as unacceptable by general society, as are humorous depictions of national tragedies, such as school shootings or mass bombings. This does not mean, however, that such images do not get published. With the growing popularity of the internet as a means to spread opinions, the chances of such images becoming public are greater than they were during World War II, or even thirty years ago. Unlike the newspaper and magazine industry however, images on the internet are not as easily censored or removed in North America. The ability to retract or apologize for such images is also not easily enforced when such images can be uploaded to a website anonymously.

Editorial cartoons can still be considered propaganda in the way that they work to
influence public opinion about the government, as they often take varied political stances, depending on the paper, or magazine, and the political opinions of the media or individual cartoonist. Other topics are also examined, but an underlying political commentary is often visible. When war is happening there are editorial cartoons about the battles, those fighting and the war itself, but the cartoons are more interspersed with cartoons depicting what is occurring at home as well.

War, even when necessary, can be a terrible thing. It destroys lives, both the soldiers who die fighting, and the families who are left behind on both sides. World War II was no different. The editorial cartoons examined in this thesis were used as propaganda that stressed the themes of dehumanization, destruction and degradation of the enemy, reflecting the opinions of cartoonists and government policies. The need to garner support for the troops and the actions that the government was taking during the war overshadowed the realities of who the Japanese were, and targeted specific emotions in order to relay the message to domestic audiences of who the enemy was and how the populace should view “the enemy.” Editorial cartoons are a powerful form of propaganda and commentary on situations of the day. The public, however, has to be cautious in viewing the information in the cartoons as a true reflection of both the people and the situation being represented.
Figure 1. Tarzan was a Piker.
Figure 2. They Don't Die Until the Sun Goes Down.
Figure 3. The Plague.
Figure 4. Tōjō Gets a Jolt.
Figure 5. Indeterminate Sentence.
Figure 6. Something on Account.
Figure 7. There is Absolutely No Room for Optimism.
Figure 8. Please to Wipe Hon. Specs.
Figure 9. Must a Been Somethin' He Et.
Figure 10. Alaska's Fate Sealed.
Figure 11. With Increase in Hon. War Action.
Figure 12. Charley McCarthy's Rival
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