The Use of Stigma as a Marker of Otherness by RTLM during the Rwandan Genocide

by

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A Thesis
presented to
The University of Guelph

In partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Science in Capacity Development and Extension

Guelph, Ontario, Canada

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ABSTRACT

THE USE OF STIGMA AS A MARKER OF OTHERNESS BY RTLM DURING THE RWANDAN GENOCIDE

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Stigma was defined by Goffman (1963) as a mark of discredited identity or inhumanity and recently, by Link and Phelan (2001), as a process of labelling, stereotyping, separating, discrimination, and status loss. These phenomena demonstrate the means by which a group can become a representation of “otherness” to another group. During the Rwandan Genocide, Radio Television Libre des Milles Collines (RTLM) broadcast messages which negatively stereotyped the Tutsi people (Straus, 2007). This investigation used Critical Discourse Analysis to investigate RTLM broadcasts during the Rwandan Genocide and to determine how stigmatization influenced the portrayal of the Tutsi people as social “others.” This investigation found that the historical context of the Rwandan Genocide influenced the formation of the Tutsi stigma and this stigma was used as a justification for the otherness of the Tutsi people. These results indicate that stigma can be used to facilitate the formation of social “others.”

Keywords: stigma, otherness, discourse, discrimination, institutionalized violence
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

I would like to thank Dr. Al Lauzon for his invaluable support, advice, and mentorship throughout my development in this program. This research could not have occurred without your guidance. I would like to thank Dr. John Devlin for his help in reviewing and editing the early drafts of this manuscript and for his support in the creation of this thesis. I would like to thank Dr. Jim Mahone for chairing the defense of this thesis. I would also like to state that I have not received any specific grants or financial support for this research, with the exception of the following: an Ontario Graduate Scholarship and University of Guelph Dean’s Scholarships.

To my parents, thank you for teaching me to pursue the unknown and to question the known. To Alicia, thank you for your love, friendship and support. You have been my inspiration since the first day I met you. To The One Who Illuminates All Things, thank you.
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<tr>
<td>CDA</td>
<td>Critical Discourse Analysis</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ICTR</td>
<td>International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MRND</td>
<td>Mouvement Republicain National pour la Democratie et le Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RPF</td>
<td>Rwandan Patriotic Front</td>
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<tr>
<td>RTLM</td>
<td>Radio Television Libre des Mille Collines</td>
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<td>UNAMIR</td>
<td>United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda</td>
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Chapter One: Introduction

Introduction

For centuries, the stigma symbol has represented the discriminated status of the stigma bearer in society (Goffman, 1963). In 1963, Erving Goffman revolutionized the discussion of this symbol by providing an empirical account of the societal properties of stigma. Part of Goffman’s review was his definition of stigma as a symbol of the discredited identity or inhumanity of an individual. Link and Phelan (2001) gave a further clarification of the properties of stigma by defining the process of enacted stigma formation as a sequence of “labelling, stereotyping, separation, status loss and discrimination.” Since both of these concepts describe a social identity of deviance or inhumanity, a property shared by social identities of otherness, there may be an inherent relationship between stigma and otherness.

The medium which is used to create both of these phenomena is language. While the interaction between language and thought is necessarily important to establish, in order to demonstrate that it can form such mental representations as stigma and otherness, there is limited empirical evidence which suggests that language directly defines thought (Hill and Manheim, 1992). Instead, language, through discourse, can influence thought (Lucy, 1997). The discursive formation of social identities, the kind of identities required to form stigma and otherness, also requires power (Van Dijk, 1993). Power is therefore also important for the formation of both stigma and otherness. As one explanation of these interactions, Foucault (1970) suggested that discourse is ultimately validated by institutions of power. This means that certain ideologies are reinforced, while others are not, by institutions of power. Institutions of power could therefore form both stigma and otherness.
This discursive mechanism which relates stigma and otherness is entirely hypothetical. This means that this mechanism must be empirically established before it can be accepted. This empirical gap represents an interesting focus of attention in stigma research. The trend in stigma research which views stigma as a result of trait deviance also tends to investigate the properties of the bearer of the stigma rather than the socio-cultural circles in which that bearer lives. Because stigma ultimately relies upon the perception and ideological development of social observers, the mechanism by which stigma can be formed and propagated cannot be fully investigated through a focus on the individual trait deviance alone. Instead an in-depth understanding of the properties of the social environment, in this case the discursive properties, is necessary in order to understand how stigma and otherness relate to one another. In order to test this conceptualization, radio broadcasts which were presented during the Rwandan Genocide will be analyzed. These broadcasts were involved in propagating stigmatizing and discriminating ideologies which targeted the Tutsi people group in Rwanda. As such, these broadcasts may help to reveal the linguistic properties of stigma and otherness.

Background

The Rwandan genocide lasted from 6 April 1994 to mid-July 1994, roughly 100 days (Des Forges, 1999). Yet within those 100 days, over 500,000 people were slaughtered as part of a systematically executed plan of extermination (Des Forges, 1999). Several theories have been offered regarding the underlying social mechanisms which supported these actions. One such theory describes the authoritarian presence that the Rwandan media discourse held in the extermination of the Tutsi population (Straus, 2007). The difficulty with this theory is that it assumes that discourse can cause violence directly. While Yanigazawa (2009) suggests that Radio Television Libre des Mille Collines (RTLM) broadcasts were responsible for 9% of the
Tutsi killings, there does not currently exist an empirically established causal mechanism between discourse and violence. The establishment of this causal link is not the focus of this research project, rather this research project investigates the discursive mechanism which contributed to the discriminatory environment in which this genocide was formed. This mechanism involves the stigmatization and othering of individuals who were Tutsi in that social environment. While both of these concepts, stigma and othering, suggest some form of discrimination, the properties of the concepts and their relationship must be made explicit before further investigation can occur.

Statement of the Problem

While the properties of stigma have been defined in relation to traits of discredited identity or otherness, there has been very little theoretical and empirical research which defines the mechanism that links stigma to otherness. This mechanism is critical, not only because of its importance to the definition of stigma, but also because of the implications that this mechanism would have for the future research of stigma. If stigma is an indication of otherness, then stigma may become a definable precursor to the heightened discriminatory treatment bound in the social identity of otherness.

Research Purpose and Objectives

Research Purpose

The purpose of this research project is the identification of how stigma was used as a marker of otherness during the Rwandan genocide.

Research Objectives
The objectives of this research are to: (1) determine how the RTLM radio broadcasts developed the Tutsi social identity as an identity of otherness through discourse; (2) determine how the Tutsi stigma was formed through discourse by RTLM radio broadcasts; and (3) to define the ideological relationship between the discursively formed Tutsi stigma and the discursively formed Tutsi social identity of otherness through the RTLM broadcasts.

Research Methods

This research project will use Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) to analyze RTLM radio broadcasts from 6 April 1994 to 15 July 1994. This form of analysis uses a mixed methods approach to investigate textual discourse in order to determine how the discourse produces ideologies through the discursive manipulation of power dynamics. Due to the fact that the radio broadcasts are taken from transcripts available at the Montreal Institute for Genocide and Human Rights Studies, which ascertained the transcripts from the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda and relevant research institutions, this project can be understood as using purposive sampling. This means that the results of this study will not be generalizable, both due to the methodology and the sampling method. Instead this investigation will be used to empirically observe an instance where stigma and otherness were related to one another through discourse.
Chapter Two: Stigma and Otherness

Introduction

Making sense of social environments is a complicated process. The nuance of social environments can be overwhelming for an individual. In order to make sense of that nuance, an individual must find ways to order their social environment by combining similar elements and separating dissimilar elements. This process allows the individual to break complex social environments into simple and yet meaningful units which are called “schemas.”

The idea of the schema was originally conceptualized by Immanuel Kant in 1781 through his work *Critique of Pure Reason*. Kant presented the schema as an intellectual mediator of the information being received from the senses (Radford, 2003). In other words, the schema was a cognitive structure which formed the connection between what a person knows cognitively with what they experience environmentally. Kant therefore proposed that the schema is both the product and process of a mental faculty. The schema is a product of an individual’s efforts to make sense of what they experience. As a psychological product, the schema is consciously organized in order to reduce the ambiguity which is present in the individual’s environment. The schema is also the process through which an individual can make sense of their experiences. This process of sense-making relies on schemas which have been previously formed such that, once a schema is formed, that schema can then be used to create more schemas.

Up until this point, there has not been any mention of the contents of these schemas. As has been pointed out, one schema can be used in the formation of other schemas, therefore indicating that schemas do make up some of the contents of other schemas. But at the basic level, a schema’s contents can be understood as mental representations or symbols of some
physical object (Radford, 2003). In other words, an individual’s environment is translated into a series of mental representations or symbols. Kant claimed that schemas then ordered these mental representations or symbols to create meaningful connections between these symbols. Kant also proposed that language was the key mediator of the schematic connections between these symbols. The first person to explicitly describe this feature was Ludwig Wittgenstein, who described how language serves as a means of creating symbols and then combining those symbols in order to create higher order concepts (Naugle, 2002). Kant’s theory therefore rested on the utility of language as a means of mediating reality perception.

The difficulty with Kant’s explanation is that the theory does not take into account the activity of the individual on the formation of the schema. In other words, Kant assumed that individuals did not change their perception of their environment after they have formed schemas to explain their environment. Kant therefore assumed that cognitive development only occurred through the creation of new schemas, rather than the modification of existing schemas to accommodate knew knowledge. In response to this conceptual gap, Piaget reconceptualised the schema in his analysis of intellectual development through his work *Human Experience and Physical Causality* which was published in 1924 (Radford, 2003). Piaget’s work was a reconceptualization of Kant’s proposed schema in two important ways. First, whereas Kant saw language as the only symbolic representation which could be subsumed and ordered by schemas, Piaget claimed that schemas could also subsume actions as symbolic representations in schemas. In other words, Piaget saw actions as symbols which could be ordered to make sense of experiences within schemas (Radford, 2003). In other words, Piaget proposed that it was not just what an individual was told, but also the actions an individual observed, which influenced that individual’s perception. Second, Piaget hypothesized that a schema could change as an
individual was presented with experiences that questioned that schema. Piaget explained that as
an individual experiences paradoxes (events which question existing schemas) they experience
“cognitive dissonance,” which is the misalignment of schemas with the environment. This state
forces the individual to modify existing schemas in order to better explain the paradoxes that are
experienced in that individual’s environment. This meant that the actions of the individual on
objects in their environment would result in changes on the schemas being developed to explain
that environment.

In summary of these contributions to schema theory, we find that: (1) schemas are
explanations of an individual’s experience which allow the individual to connect what they know
with what they experience, (2) once developed, schemas can be used as frameworks in the
construction of more complex interpretations of an individual’s experiences, and (3) schemas can
change as a person’s experiences develop. So, while a schema is the product of an individual’s
experience, a schema is also the means by which an individual explains their experiences.

The theory of schematic development has implications for understanding the means by
which social experiences are organized. If, in the process of human perception, the nuance of
social experience is broken into meaningful units which are then separated and combined, then it
becomes exceptionally important to understand the properties of those meaningful units. Of
particular interest in this regard is the understanding of the “us-them” separation. The means by
which individuals combine different schemas to represent what is “us” and what is “them” may
provide insight into how social identity formation, and discrimination, occurs in human society.
In order to investigate this link, the formation of an individual’s “self,” as a distinct social
identity from “other,” must be explained.
Among the different forms of schema, the self-schema is specifically related to the development of social identity. The self-schema concept was originally developed by Hazel Markus (1977), who defined the self-schema as “cognitive generalizations about the self, derived from past experience, that organize and guide the processing of self-related information contained in the individual’s social experiences,” (p. 64). According to Markus, then, the self-schema acted as a schema by mediating how an individual relates information in their social environment to their understanding of their own identity. Another interesting point that Markus makes is that the self-schema is based on cognitive generalizations. This suggests that individuals design their social identity by inferring their own personality traits from observations and interactions with their social environment.

As a representation of self, this schema plays an important role in the creation of social identity. Markus, Moreland, and Smith (1985) described how self-schemas are created and combined in order to create an individual’s self-concept (an individual’s perception of self). In other words, an individual’s self-concept is a collection of that individual’s self-schemas. The authors also point out that an individual’s identity is formed through comparisons with others in the social environment. This means that an individual develops their identity through comparisons with others. To this extent, the self and the other actually form a reciprocally deterministic nature, where one can influence the identity formation of the other. The differentiation of what is other and what is self therefore becomes a core aspect of social identity formation. In order to apply this discussion of identity formation to group identity, a review of the properties of social identity, as characterized through the “social identity theory,” must be reviewed.
The primary founders of social identity theory were John Turner and Henri Tajfel, who defined the term in their research of intergroup behaviour (Hogg, Terry, and White, 1995). According to social identity theory, an individual’s social identity is construed from the social category, or group, to which that individual belongs. The traits which make up an individual’s social identity are imbued from the social category to which that individual belongs. That is to say, the traits of the social category become the traits of the individual’s social identity. This social category therefore allows the individual to define themselves and others according to the prominent characteristics of the social category to which they belong. Tajfel claims that this identification process provides partial formation of an individual’s self-concept (Hogg, Terry, and White, 1995). By applying schema theory, and understanding that a social identity is an arrangement of schemas (see Markus, 1977), the individual actually takes on the schemas of their social category in the formation of his or her own social identity. Given the sense-making role of schemas, this process of social identification can provide a basis for understanding social thought (see Padilla and Perez, 2003).

The differentiation of “us” from “other” in social identity is important because it allows an individual to differentiate who he or she is according to his or her membership in certain social groups. This identity helps the individual differentiate what members of a social environment are “one of us” and what members of a social environment are “one of them.”

As is suggested above, the social identity theory has many implications for intergroup behaviour. One such implication is described in the “self-categorization theory.” This theory was derived from social identity theory and explains how social identities can be used to accentuate the differences between an “in-group” and an “out-group” (Hogg, Terry, and White, 1995). For the purposes of this theory, an in-group refers to the group of which an individual is a
member and an out-group refers to the group of which an individual is not a member (Turner, Brown, and Tajfel, 1979). By establishing an in-group (who is “us”), an individual is simultaneously able to define all out-groups (who is “other”). In other words, the self-categorization theory explains how an individual can use their own identity formation to define others. As is suggested in social identity theory, perceptions of group identity are also used to separate individuals through a process of social categorization.

Up to this point, the “other” has been used in this chapter to indicate any identity which is not subsumed in a given individual’s identity of “self” or “us.” This use of the “other” concept has ignored the various nuances of the term as it relates to social exclusion. From this point forward in this discussion, the “other” or “otherness” will be used to refer to a particular perspective on otherness which relates to its property as an identity which is devalued because of its incongruence with the identity of “us.”

In this sense, “the other” is broadly defined as the social identity which has been created as inferior to a more powerful group (Schwalbe et al., 2000). In the formation of identity, “the other” represents the opposition of “the same,” so that “the other” represents everything different from what an individual’s identity is. According to the interactionist perspective, as previously explained, “the other” is created through the collective formation of social categories during acts of social interaction. In their effective demonstration of this process of “us” and “other” formation, Hadden and Lester (1978) proposed two processes of identity formation: the process of self-identification and the process of other-identification. These two processes require the use of established “categories of identification” in order to both define the identities of the “us” and the “other” and create social separation between the identity of the “us” and the “other.” It is the
process of other-identification which is the focus of this chapter, however, it is important to keep in mind this reciprocal connection between the definition of the “self” and the “other.”

Defining “the Other”

Earlier in this chapter, the identity of “us” as a social identity was defined and explained as an identity whose traits are imbued from a group to an individual. In addition to those traits, the norms of a group can provide a valuable insight into group membership and social identity, where members of a group are defined according to their conformity to such norms. In the same way that conformity to norms is used to indicate social identity, deviance from norms can also be used to indicate social identity. Deviance here is used according to its sociological meanings as non-adherence to social norms. This definition stems from early work by Emile Durkheim.

Emile Durkheim, in his 1895 work on *The Rules of Sociological Method*, hypothesized that deviance was determined in reference to the judgement of the broader group of observers and their construction of what was normal and abnormal behaviour (it is important to note that expectations and norms are ultimately schema frameworks). One of Durkheim’s conclusions in this line of thinking was that the pursuit of group unity through the establishment of norms (or the establishment of in-group norms schemas) would invariably entail the definition of deviance (or the establishment of out-group norms schemas). Thus, in Durkheim’s analysis, the formation of deviance (or otherness) was helpful in establishing a unified social identity (sameness). We can then derive from this interpretation that “otherness” can result from attempts to institute “sameness.”

This institution of “sameness” is of particular relevance to the construction of the elite social identity (the contextual identity of a powerful group relative to other groups in a given
In his analysis of the interaction between racism and the construction of the elite identity, Van Dijk (1993) suggested that negative other-presentations are used to build a positive self-presentation. However, the institution of these negative other-presentations inherently requires some form of dominance or power. In addressing this observation, Van Dijk suggested that: “The very membership of the dominant group may be considered by its members as sufficient entitlement for the exercise of control over Others,” (Van Dijk, 1993, p. 21). This means that other-presentations are created by a dominant in-group, whose power is justified by their membership in that elite group. Van Dijk (1993) also proposes that the markers which groups use to define the “other” are socially constructed and may be arbitrary.

This proposal highlights one of the more ironic features of this discussion, in that these markers might otherwise be innocuous were it not for the significance which is given to them socially. Hadden and Lester (1978) suggest that the creation of these markers happens fluidly in the process of social interaction as a means of validating individual or group identities. To be more specific, individuals construct a “stock” of social identities which they use to categorize other individuals or groups in the course of social interaction with those individuals or groups. However, that stock of social identities may be open to modification in the course of social interaction. This means that the criteria used to determine the “other” is actually dynamically developed during acts of social interaction.

Summary of the Othering Process

In summary, the othering process (the means by which “the other” is created) can be considered an example of social identification (in that groups are identified through the process of othering) and classification (in that those established identifications are used to categorize
groups within the social strata of society). Based on the literature reviewed so far, otherness can be understood as a framework of schemas which form an out-group social identity that is devalued by society. Because this process ultimately relies upon the inference of negative group traits, this process can be represented as a two-fold process involving both separation and stereotyping.

Integration of Stigma in Othering

As has been indicated up to this point, the process of othering is ultimately a process of social identity formation. Individuals bearing stigmatized marks often report having their social identity partly determined by their stigma (Green, Davis, Karshmer, Marsh, and Straight, 2005). While the extent to which stigma affects the identities of individuals who bear stigmatized marks seems to vary (Crocker and Major, 1989), the implications of stigma for an individual’s social identity has the potential to cause exclusion and discrimination for that individual (Link and Phelan, 2001).

Stigma has been classically defined as a mark of discredited identity or inhumanity (Goffman, 1963) (from this point forward, “disqualified humanity” will be used to represent the discredited identity and inhumanity properties of the stigma bearer’s social identity). Goffman theorized that an individual bearing a stigmatized mark would conceal or exhibit their stigma as a means of controlling their social identity formation. Goffman (1963) therefore saw stigma as both a symbol of group inclusion and exclusion. In other words, the stigma could indicate membership in a stigmatized group as well as exclusion from a non-stigmatized group.

Stigma has more recently been defined by the “co-occurrence of its components—labelling, stereotyping, separation, status loss and discrimination” (Link and Phelan, 2001, p.
This definition lays the framework for categorizing stigmatized groups according to elements of social identity (labelling, stereotyping, and separating). In other words, this definition portrays stigma formation as the construction of schema frameworks for social identity formation. In line with this conceptualization, Falk (2001) described how stigma can be used to determine the insiders and outsiders in a social group. Falk explains that “Hence, ‘insiders’ depend on the existence of ‘outsiders’ who create a boundary that permits the insider to know who belongs, who does not belong, and what is right or legitimate and what is not,” (Falk, 2001, p. 340). This conceptualization demonstrates how group membership, as determined by stigmatized marks, can influence the legitimization of treatment against stigmatized groups.

Observers may also consider a stigma to be a pervasive part of the stigmatized individual’s social identity. In explaining the social identity of stigmatized individuals, Jones et al. (1984) note that “the discredit becomes more consequential when the deviant dispositions are judged to be persistent and central and, therefore, part of the marked person’s identity,” (p. 7). In other words, the more an observer judges the stigma to be unchanging, the more relevant that stigma becomes to the stigmatized individual’s social identity. The centrality of that stigma symbol to an individual’s social identity is determined specifically by the social judgements of the characteristics of the stigma. Jones et al. (1984) provide six factors which determine the extent to which a stigma influences social identity, which are summarized below.

1. Concealability (the extent to which an individual has control over the expression of their stigma symbol)
2. Course (the variability of the properties of the stigma over time as well as the outcome of the stigma)
3. Disruptiveness (the extent to which the stigma impedes social interaction)
4. Aesthetic qualities (the extent to which a stigma causes repulsion from observers)
5. Origin (the extent to which the person can be held culpable for the development of the stigma)
6. Peril (the extent to which the stigma symbol poses a danger to observers).
It is important to remember that these characteristics are derived from the judgment of the observers rather than necessarily being the actual properties of the stigmatized trait.

Stigma can become particularly devastating when it achieves what Goffman (1963) termed “master status” in its use as a means of defining the social identity of a person. This master status enforces one stereotyped identity on the individual, regardless of any other distinguishing traits the individual may have. Jones et al. (1984, p. 157) explains that “all of us belong to categories that are evaluated negatively in at least some contexts, and within these contexts, we can be described as stigmatized, but a person only possesses a stigmatized identity when membership in one, generally negative, category dominates all his or her interactions.” It can therefore be concluded that stigma has the properties of being both a representation and a creator of social meaning. Stigma represents social meaning through its property as a mark of the inhumanity, “otherness,” or discredited identity of the stigma bearer (Goffman, 1963). This representation is determined by collective consensus and is understood by the majority of members in a given group (Major and O’Brien, 2005).

Stigma also has the property of being a creator of social reality through enacted discrimination against certain groups. Yang et al. (2007) and Parker and Aggleton (2003) both indicate that stigmatization is often used in order to reinforce a moral code or social proscription by the broader society. Parker and Aggleton (2003) in particular demonstrate that stigma can serve to recapitulate a predetermined stratification of society and the marginalization of certain groups. In this way, stigma can be used to create a social justification for further marginalization.
One other property of stigmatized relations which is receiving increasing attention is the role of power in stigma. For the purposes of this discussion, we will assume Van Dijk’s (1996) definition of power, which is the transfer and attainment of social goods (material and symbolic units which are valued by a group) between social actors. In explaining this property of stigma, Link and Phelan (2001) noted the necessary involvement of power in the definition of stigma. In order for enacted stigma to occur (stigma resulting in discrimination), there must be a power differential between the stigmatized and the stigmatizer. While this power differential may be political, social, or economic, it is a necessary property in order for the stigma to result in discriminatory behaviour, and for the ideology supporting that stigma to be propagated.

As a mark of separation, othering acts as an integral part of stigma. Stigma can be understood as a marker used in the process of determining who is “other.” In this role, stigma is first and foremost defined by both context and relationships. While stigma can be understood as trait deviance, the stigma is not created or maintained by the stigma bearer but by the social environment in which that person exists. It is the created norms of a group, rather than the actual properties of the deviated trait, which create deviance.

In summary, it is plausible that stigma can serve as an indication, and possibly as a creator, of otherness through the development of schema frameworks. There are a few lines of similarity between these two phenomena which can serve to better relate them. In reviewing these lines of similarity, it is important to keep in mind that ultimately both stigma and otherness rely on social identity, stereotyping, and social categorization.

Conceptual Framework
Based on the literature which has been reviewed, the relationship between stigma and otherness appears to be a dynamic one where one facilitates the other. It appears that, while stigma is a form of otherness, not all groups who are othered are also stigmatized. In order to demonstrate the conceptual link between stigma and otherness, the following conceptual framework will be presented. First, it is evident that stigma serves as a form of otherness, as conceptualized in Figure 1. This conceptualization demonstrates that stigma is a specific form of otherness and that not every instance of otherness is also an instance of stigma.

Figure 1. Conceptualization of the relationship between stigma and otherness

In order for this conceptualization to be supported, there must be a definition of what makes stigma a particular form of otherness as opposed to simply being an occurrence of otherness. In line with Goffman’s (1963) interpretation, stigma may be differentiated as an occurrence of inhumanity (Figure 2).

Figure 2. The differentiation of stigma from otherness via the definition of inhumanity
Stigma can therefore be understood as a specific form of otherness which integrates inhumanity in the definition of the stigma bearer’s identity. In the literature reviewed, it was established that both stigma and otherness were ultimately related to the process of social identity formation. Given the importance of social identity formation as a property for both of these phenomena, a model of stigmatized identity formation will be reviewed. Prior to the review of this model of stigmatized identity formation, a model of enacted stigma formation will be reviewed.

In Link and Phelan’s interpretation of enacted stigma, the formation of stigma happens through co-occurrence of five different processes (labelling, stereotyping, separating, status loss, and discrimination). While their definition focuses on the co-occurrence of these processes, the order that these processes occur in is significant to the ultimate formation of stigma. As such, enacted stigma can be understood according to the process shown in Figure 3.

Figure 3. Depiction of Link and Phelan’s (2001) conceptualization of enacted stigma development
In order to better understand the formation of enacted stigma, these processes need to be defined. First, labelling refers to the identification of individuals according to their group membership. In this process, the identity of the individual is simplified to their group identity such that the individual’s identity, outside of that individual’s group identity, is lost. Thus the entire group to which that individual belongs is treated as a uniform identity and any variation within that group is lost. Stereotyping concerns the assumed correlation between any two traits. In the case of enacted stigma formation, this process involves attributing traits to a social identity. This process expands and potentially changes the meaning of certain social identities. Separation refers to the ultimate separation of “us” from “them.” This process involves defining a group of individuals as not being a member of the broader group. This can be understood as the separation of a social identity from other social identities. The following process, status loss, refers to the ascription of a devalued position or identity to that social group. This process is the outcome of its preceding processes, where the labelling, separating, and stereotyping that occur help to determine the kind of status loss which is ascribed to a given social identity. The final process, discrimination, is the behavioural outcome of these psychosocial processes, where the targeted group is treated in a structurally, or individually, discriminatory manner. This aspect has been difficult to empirically establish, as this form of discrimination relies on a link between attitudes and behaviours. As such, this behavioural outcome must be treated cautiously in light of the empirical evidence available.

In reviewing these processes, it is apparent that the formation of enacted stigma can also be viewed as the formation of psycho-social schema frameworks, where, each process relies upon the framework established through the preceding process. In this way each framework acts
as a schema for the next identity process. As such, enacted stigma formation can also be understood according to Figure 4.

Figure 4. Structural development of enacted stigma

![Diagram showing structural development of enacted stigma]

By conceptualizing enacted stigma formation in this way, the nature of enacted stigma can be better understood as a particular form of the preceding frameworks (labelling, separating, stereotyping, status loss, discrimination). As such, the development of enacted stigma can be understood as increasingly specific forms of psycho-social processes, ultimately resulting in the formation of enacted stigma. In other words, stigma is supported by a schema framework of specifically ordered psycho-social processes.

Similar to the development of enacted stigma, the development of stigmatized identities can also be viewed as a process of identity development. Therefore, the development of stigmatized identities can be understood according to Figure 5.
This process of stigmatized identity development involves the formation of specific kinds of identities or attributes in the process of forming what Goffman (1963) termed a “master status stigma.” The process begins with the formation of a Social Identity, which is the identification of individuals according to their group membership. In this stage, the individual is assumed to have traits which are usually ascribed to the group which they have membership in. After this process, negative attributes are ascribed to that out-group in a way that emphasizes the negativity of that identity. It is at this point that this process is contrasted with the ascription of positive attributes to the In-group. Following this stage, the individual is allocated to an Outgroup. This outgroup is defined by the separation of “us” (the In-group) and “them” (the Out-group). Therefore the individual is separated from a broader group according to their social identity. This process results in the formation of “the other” which is a forcibly ascribed identity of deviance from instituted norms and is thus devalued by a group. The ultimate outcome of an increasingly negative attribute emphasis, and othering, is the disqualified humanity of a targeted group. In other words, the group is devalued to such an extent that the individual, and the group that individual belongs to, is treated as less than human. This means that the group is not
allowed access to resources or processes which are usually given to “normals”, thus insinuating that individual’s status in regards to other humans. The identity which is developed through this process is what Goffman (1963) termed “master status stigma”, where the group’s identity is stigmatized to the extent that the stigma overrides other individual attributes. This form of identity development can also be understood as the construction of a psycho-social schema framework, resulting in the ultimate formation of a master status stigma (Figure 6).

Figure 6. The structural development of stigmatized identity development

It is apparent that there are similarities between the process of enacted stigma formation and stigmatized identity formation. Both can be conceptualized as either processes or psycho-social framework development. Both also deal, in some form, with the development of societal expectations regarding a devalued group. There is, however, one key difference between these two models. While the development of enacted stigma is exclusively focused on the
development of attitudes or behaviours which determine the treatment and perception of stigmatized groups, the development of stigmatized identities is focused on social identity development. So while enacted stigma focusses on the development of psychological processes, stigmatized identity formation focusses on the development of sociological processes or identities. Ultimately, however, the formation enacted stigma can help to facilitate the development of those sociological processes or identities, as it is conceptualized in Figure 7. In order to demonstrate the properties of this facilitative relationship between enacted stigma and stigmatized identities, the relationships between the models will be described.

Link and Phelan (2001) noted that labelling occurs when individuals’ identities are simplified and grouped into group identities. In this process, individual identity is lost. Similarly, an individual’s social identity is constructed from the group which that individual is a member of. Furthermore, the characteristics of that group identity are imbued to the individual such that, the individual’s identity is over-ridden by the individual’s social identity (Hogg, Terry, and White, 1995). In the process of forming and ascribing a social identity, the psychological process of labelling, as described by Link and Phelan (2001), provides the framework through which this social process can occur. In this regard, labelling can be understood as an act of developing and ascribing a social identity to an individual.
Figure 7. The facilitative relationship between enacted stigma and stigmatized identity
Turner, Brown and Tajfel (1979) noted an interesting separation of social identities in their analysis of intergroup behaviour. In their investigation, they noted that that groups are often separated into In-groups (who is us) and Out-groups (who is them). This process is mirrored by Link and Phelan’s (2001) conceptualization of separation. According to Link and Phelan, separation is achieved through the differentiation of a group from a social group’s conceptualization of “us”. This may indicate that separation ultimately underlies the process of In-group and Out-group formation or it may demonstrate two disciplinary approaches to the same topic. Whatever the reasoning, we can see that Link and Phelan’s (2001) process of separation is ultimately linked to Out-group and In-group formation as conceptualized by Turner, Brown, and Tajfel (1979).

In the formation of otherness, Van Dijk (1998) noted the propensity of social groups to differentially emphasize attributes according to this In-group and Out-group formation. In Van Dijk’s (1998) analysis, he found that In-groups (Us) tended to emphasize the positive attributes of their group while emphasizing the negative attributes of an Out-group (Them). The emphasis of an attribute in relation to a social group is ultimately a demonstration of stereotyping, where certain attributes are assumed to correlate with social group memberships. In this regard, Link and Phelan’s (2001) conceptualization of stereotyping, as the ascription of negative attributes to a given social group, provides a framework through which this negative emphasis can occur. Thus, in this case, stereotyping can provide the psychological framework for the emphasis of negative traits to occur.

The outcome of this negative attribute emphasis is the formation of “the other” which Schwalbe et al. (2000) broadly define as an identity which is stereotyped as different and therefore inferior to a more powerful group. The formation of “the other” therefore relies on the
processes of labelling, separating, and stereotyping. These processes help to form the raw identity building framework which supports the formation of otherness. The correlate to otherness in Link and Phelan’s (2001) model would be status loss. This is the ascription of a devalued identity to an individual or group. Otherness can therefore be understood as a form of status loss in which the individual or group is devalued. Like otherness, status loss also relies on the occurrence of labelling, separating, and stereotyping. It is therefore apparent that certain building blocks in stigma can provide a means for understanding basic units in the creation of otherness.

The ultimate outcome of these identity building processes is the disqualified humanity of the stigma bearer. One insight into the inhumanity of certain groups is given by Barash and Webel (2009, p. 126), who note the propensity in structural violence to “dehumanize members of other groups—that is, to give the impression (to compatriots and, at least at the subconscious level, to oneself) that the other group members are not really (or fully) human at all. It is especially easy to dehumanize those who are recognizably different because of language, appearance, cultural practices, political ideology, and so on.” While the link between the dehumanization of a group and the committing of violent acts against a targeted group has been difficult to empirically establish, there is at least a correlation between dehumanization and discrimination. Link and Phelan (2001) noted this in their review of discrimination. They noted that stigmatizing attitudes as causal factors in discrimination were difficult to establish. It is, however, possible to establish that treating an individual as inhuman can be considered a form of discrimination in itself and may be created by individual or structural discrimination as Barash and Webel (2009) seem to indicate. The result of these processes is the schematic formation of enacted stigma.
These processes together demonstrate how both enacted stigma can be developed and how the processes involved in the creation of that stigma can influence the development of stigmatized identities.

Implications of this theoretical framework

It is important to note that these processes may occur at the same time. As an example, there are certain stigmatizing words which can accomplish a number of processes in this model at once. One example is the word “Inyenzi” which was used during the Rwandan Genocide in reference to the Tutsi population in Rwanda. This term was literally translated as meaning “cockroach” and was used to: 1) label Tutsi individuals as part of a broader Inyenzi group, 2) stereotype the qualities of a cockroach to the Tutsi group, 3) separate those individuals from the Hutu majority in the country, and 4) demonstrate the status loss of those individuals as being from a devalued category in Rwandan society. The fact that these processes can occur simultaneously does not negate the necessary order in which these processes occur. Each process necessarily assumes that its preceding process has occurred. In other words, each process can only occur with the support of the framework established by the previous process.

These conceptualizations also infer an interesting development in the relationship between stigma and otherness. Because the development of stigmatized identities relies upon the established schematic framework of otherness, stigma can be understood as a particular form of otherness, one which signifies the disqualified humanity of the stigma bearer. This relationship also demonstrates how empirically established properties stigma (as a marker for a particular form of otherness) can influence the form of otherness which a group can be ascribed. This aspect will be dealt with in greater detail later in this chapter.
In addition, certain building blocks (labelling, stereotyping, and separating) which form an inherent part of stigma development provide a means by which otherness can be created. This suggests that, while all instances of stigma are also instances of otherness, not all instances of otherness are also instances of stigma. In order for otherness to become stigma, the extreme devaluation of an individual or group, to the extent of being treated as inhuman, must occur.

Functions that Stigma serves in Othering

Stigma, as a marker of otherness, provides an avenue through which an individual or group may be othered. As an example, stigma serves as a trait whose meaning is understood by nearly all members of a cultural group. This is accomplished through the collective representations (dominant views or understandings) which are established regarding the stigma symbol. Major and O’Brien (2005) note “virtually all members of a culture, including members of stigmatized groups, are aware of cultural stereotypes, even if they do not personally endorse them” (p. 399). This characteristic allows stigma to become a powerful tool in the othering process, by ensuring that the views concerning the group being othered are collectively shared by every member of a social group.

The stereotypic conclusions which are associated with stigma can guide the process of othering. In this context, Jones et al. (1984, p. 158) define a stereotype as “a presumed correlation between one trait (category membership) and other traits (e.g., personality and physical characteristics).” The stereotypes which can accompany a stigma may facilitate the categorization of stigmatized individuals as “other.”

“Stigma theories” can explain the othering process (Goffman, 1963). Stigma theories are explanations of how the stigmatized trait was created and the implications which that stigmatized
trait therefore holds for stigma bearers. These stigma theories are used to justify the treatment of
a stigmatized group by another group. Weiss et al. (2006) point out that these stigma theories are
social judgments which are determined by social norms and proscriptions. In a related study,
Yang et al. (2007) found that the discrimination associated with stigma theories in different
cultures tend to be associated with narratives of morality and other social proscriptions.

Stigma may also manipulate the stigmatized individual to behaviourally conform to the
identity of the “other”. In other words, stigmatized individuals who are aware of their othered
status will behave as “other” to members of the stigmatizing group. This occurs through the
process of “automatic stereotype activation-behaviour,” a phenomenon where stigmatized
individuals are induced to fulfil the stereotypical expectations of the observer population (Major
and O’Brien, 2005). This phenomenon defines the parameters through which the expectations of
an observer population can create otherness.

Stigma also summons a response from other individuals known as “perceiver threat,”
which is a fight/flight threat response (Blascovich, Mendes, Hunter, Lickel, and Kowai-Bell,
2001). This threat response, which can be understood as a response to differentness or otherness,
is also found in an individual’s response to individuals who represent otherness (Schaller, Park,
and Faulkner, 2003). This response helps to solidify the identity of the stigmatized individual as
“the other” by providing emotional reinforcement for othering groups which are perceived as a
threat. Unlike instances of expectation, this phenomenon demonstrates how fear can induce the
motivation necessary to create otherness.
In summary, stigma is not only a means of creating a shared interpretation, but also a means of enforcing conformity to “us-them” stereotypes. This is accomplished ultimately through processes already established in social identity formation.

**Perspectives on Stigma and Othering**

*Biological Perspective*

As was mentioned previously, the concept of “the other” (as a marker for differentness) is often marked by aggressive or fear responses. Blascovich et al. (2001) demonstrated this aggressive/fear response through the phenomenon of perceiver threat. Perceiver threat is marked by a heightened state of sympathetic nervous system arousal (the fight/flight response) which accompanies being in the presence of a stigmatized individual. Blascovich et al. (2001) suggested that this phenomenon might provide a further conceptual explanation into why stigma is so intrinsically linked with issues of social proscription and morality. This is because when a social proscription or norm is broken, a similar fear response can occur. It is in this conceptual bridge that perceiver threat can demonstrate how stigma can represent “the other” of a social proscription or moral code.

*Evolutionary Perspective*

An evolutionary theory of stigma provides a similar hypothesis of the link between stigma marks and indications of “otherness” in human categorization. This perspective hypothesizes the link between the stigmatization and genetic fit-ness of an individual in response to the kinds of pressures which were known to be present over long periods of human evolution (Schauler, Park, and Faulkner, 2003). The evolutionary perspective therefore attempts to discern the patterns common to the stigmatization process across history.
In line with this perspective, Schauler, Park, and Faulkner (2003) note that it is rare for an instinctive fear reaction to develop in the absence of a perceived threat. The same principle applies to the evolutionary development of certain instinctive fear reactions (for example to snakes and spiders) which, while not always indicative of danger in modern times, may have presented a physical threat in the past. Using this conceptual understanding, Schauler, Park, and Faulkner (2003) suggest that the perceiver threat phenomenon (a state of heightened fear response when in the presence of a stigmatized individual) may have evolved at a time when stigma (as a label of otherness) did present the threat of injury or disease. The authors hypothesize that stigma therefore became linked with the perception of vulnerability to harm, thus invoking a fear response to a stigma.

Stigma may also have been adaptive at one time. As an example, Kurzban and Leary (2001) suggest that stigma may promote the avoidance of resource parasitism. The authors propose that in the evolutionary past of the human species, individuals bearing a stigma were more likely to drain the resources of a group rather than invest in the resources of the group. It was therefore in the group’s best interest to ostracise such individuals from the group. A second possible explanation is that the stigma symbol became a marker of reduced mate quality. This explanation of the stigma symbol demonstrates how the stigma could further reduce ties between the stigmatized individual and the broader group (Kurzban and Leary, 2001).

In line with this understanding, Neuberg, Smith, and Asher (2000) proposed that the ultimate reason for the exclusion of stigmatized individuals was for the greater survival of the group. Since it is in the best interest of the individual to maintain contact with a broader group (in order to maintain access to the resources of that group) it would also be in the best interest of each member of the group to safeguard that group from dangers to group resources. This model
would therefore predict that stigmatization would not only focus on individuals who are likely to parasitize group resources, but also would vary according to the severity of the resource constraints placed on the group by environmental pressures. To that extent, the process of “othering” stigmatized individuals may also vary according to differential environmental pressures (Neuberg, Smith, and Asher, 2000).

**Socio-cultural Perspective**

The socio-cultural perspective describes how stigma and otherness are constructed as identities in relation to the broader social environment. Yang et al. (2007) note that “the negative emotional reactions (prejudice) or negative behaviors (discrimination) of stigmatizers can be seen to derive from social ‘others,’” (p. 1526). In other words, stigma can be understood as a representation of a social “other.” Stigma can also be understood as a means of reinforcing social proscriptions and norms. If these norms are broken by an individual, that individual is stigmatized as a representation of the moral “other” to the social proscription (Yang et al., 2000). This conceptualization demonstrates a function that stigma might serve in socio-cultural contexts. By punishing individuals who break social proscriptions or norms (with social exclusion and otherness), stigma may serve as an agent of societal order in a given context.

Perhaps ironically, the identity of individuals bearing a stigmatized mark may be confounded by their understanding that they represent “the other” in their social environment. This situation can result in two similar phenomenon known as “attribution ambiguity” and “identity threat.”

Attribution ambiguity refers to the uncertainty that a stigmatized individual feels when confronted with positive or negative feedback. The stigmatized individual experiences
uncertainty regarding this feedback because he or she is unsure whether to ascribe this feedback to his or her individual or group identity as a stigmatized “other” (Crocker, Voelk, Testa, and Major, 1991). This phenomenon varies with the extent to which the stigmatized individual experiences identity threat (Major and O’Brien, 2005). Identity threat refers to the extent to which the stigmatized individual is aware of their negative identity stereotype or the “otherness” of their social identity.

A related hypothesis is “The Ultimate Attribution Error” (Ross, 1977). This phenomenon is related to “the fundamental attribution error,” which describes how individuals are more likely to attribute a behaviour to an individual’s nature rather than to contextual factors (Pettigrew, 1979). The ultimate attribution error, on the other hand, describes the phenomenon of individuals attributing a negatively perceived behaviour to an outgroup’s nature, assuming that nature to be constant and unchanging, and attributing any positively perceived behaviour by an outgroup member to be an exception to the norm (Pettigrew, 1979). This phenomenon explains how otherness can be accomplished through stigmatization. By committing these errors and stereotyping a stigmatized deviance as a trait which is shared by the entire group, that stigmatized group can then be described as “other” to the perceiving group.

The psychodynamic literature hypothesizes a reason for the kind of hostility and aggression which is linked to both the stigmatization and the othering process. It has been hypothesized that the negative traits associated with stigma and otherness are possibly projections of the internal, negatively perceived traits of the observer. As a means of dealing with these traits, the observer chooses to project them onto stigmatized individuals in order to not only “other” those individuals, but also to distance themselves from their own negative traits (Jones et al., 1984).
**Linguistic Perspective**

Zola (1993) demonstrated how grammar can help to determine the extent to which disability labels are stigmatizing. In reviewing the research available on stigmatizing disability labels, Zola noted that changing the means by which an individual is related to their disability can change the severity of the stigmatization imposed on the individual using those devices. In other words, choosing to use a possessive (individual has schizophrenia) rather than passive (schizophrenic individual) grammatical choice, can allow an individual’s identity to remain independent of the stigma of their disability and less likely to represent a social “other.”

Another line of similarity is presented by discourse theorists. Foucault (1970) hypothesized that discourse is really construed according to rules which govern the assembly of language into thought. In other words, the way in which language assembles ideas is validated by institutions of power. The same can apply to the creation and propagation of stigma theories, which require the validation of institutions of power in order to become a “general grammar” according to Foucault’s framework. Similarly, Van Dijk (1993) hypothesized that discourse can be used to separate and categorize individuals into elite and subordinate groups. The formation of these group identities can be determined by investigating the ideologies present in certain forms of discourse, which provide an implicit categorization and hierarchy according to predetermined identity structures.

These approaches together demonstrate that language can reveal how otherness is created through the construction of stigma. These linguistic approaches also demonstrate the pervasive interaction between power and the creation of certain forms of discourse.

**Conclusion**
The collected literature identifies how the creation of the self is really also a creation of otherness. That otherness, in turn, is identified and categorized according to negative stereotypic traits which are created and collectively validated by social groups which hold some form of power. In the process of reviewing the literature, stigma was found to be a potential tool which could both represent and create the social identity of “the other.” Various perspectives on this process of stigma integration in otherness were considered, demonstrating the various avenues in which this phenomenon could be investigated and addressed. For the purposes of this manuscript, the linguistic perspective of the interaction between stigma and otherness will be investigated and applied in further detail.
Chapter Three: Constructing Otherness through Discourse

Introduction

In the previous chapter, it was established that stigma and otherness were part of the construction of identity and it was hypothesized that language served as a medium for the construction of identity. In this chapter, the properties of that medium will be investigated. This chapter will also investigate a theoretical mechanism by which language can create otherness.

Ludwig Wittgenstein described the impact of language on thought in two ways: first, language is a logical form which combines objects to make theories about the world and, second, language is a human activity which combines words to create new concepts (Naugle, 2002). Language is therefore an important mediator of understandings of social reality. This conceptualization reveals two important aspects of language. First, language is a means of translating objects in the external environment into internal mental representations which can be combined and separated. Second, in the combination and separation of these mental representations, language can serve to create new social meaning.

In Vygotsky’s seminal work on the mental processing of language, he suggested that language served as an external representation of psychical processes (Vygotsky, 1978). In support of this claim, Vygotsky found that when a child was presented with a dilemma, that child would speak aloud to his or herself, giving step by step instructions. As the child grew older, the child reduced their use of self-directed spoken instructions while resolving dilemmas. Vygotsky hypothesized that as the child grew older, that child would still continue to use language to solve dilemmas, but would do so silently. This suggests that language could be used to internally organize psychical processes during problem-solving.
In response to these observations, the field of cognitive linguistics was born as a means of investigating the potential role of language in relation to cognitive processes. The core impetus for the formation of this field of investigation was the possibility that the formation of schemas could mirror the formation of language (Hill and Manheim, 1992). In other words, psychological schemas and linguistic forms may be co-dependent.

O’Halloran (2003, p. 16) summarized the three functions of language, as noted by the linguist Michael Halliday:

1. “Ideational – to represent people, objects, events, and states of affairs in the world
2. Interpersonal – to express the speaker’s attitude to these representations
3. Textual – to array 1. and 2. in a cohesive and appropriate manner”

Halliday saw language as a representation of what is psychological (ideational) and what is social (interpersonal), and saw the main role of the text as the medium through which these two aspects of language are combined. While these developments are helpful in the definition and parameters of language, these developments also give impetus to understanding the relationship between language and thought.

In their review of the properties of language, Kress and Hodge (1979) explain that “language fixes a world that is so much more stable and coherent than what we actually see that it takes its place in our consciousness and becomes what we think we have seen. And since normal perception works by constant feedback, the gap between the real world and the socially constructed world is constantly being reduced, so that what we do ‘see’ tends to become what we can say,” (p. 5). What the authors are explaining here is that language formation is really a process of perception formation. Language therefore allows us to form our perceptions of the
world to such an extent that it becomes near impossible to determine what is linguistically formed perception and what is universal reality.

The nature of the interaction between language and thought has been a subject of investigation dating back to the late 17th century, when philosophers such as Locke, Condillac, Diderot, Hamman, and Herder were concerned about language’s potential role as a mediator of thought (Lucy, 1997). Lucy (1997) notes that “they were stimulated by theoretical concerns (opposition to the tenets of universal grammarians regarding the origin and status of different languages), methodological concerns (the reliability of language-based knowledge in religion and science), and practical social concerns (European efforts to consolidate national identities and cope with colonial expansion),” (p. 293). The impetus for this discussion was primarily the propositions of universal grammarians, who not only assumed that there was a universal grammar underlying language, but also that languages could be hierarchically ranked according to this presumed universal grammar. While the topic was discussed, specifically its methodological problems and nationalistic rhetorical implications, the interaction between thought and language remained unexplained.

As mentioned, the theory of the interaction between language and thought was constructed at a time when universal grammarians were attempting to establish a universal criterion for determining the grammar of different languages. In response to these assumptions, Boas later “argued that it was critical to identify grammatical patterns by criteria internal to the language,” (Hill and Manheim, 1992, p. 384). This argument was meant to counter the assumptions of the Universal Grammar theory by presenting that theory as both inaccurate and discriminatory.
Following Boas’ argument, Edward Sapir and Benjamin Whorf began work on the interaction between language and thought, ultimately forming the Sapir-Whorf hypothesis (Lucy, 1997). The basis of this hypothesis is that “certain properties of a given language have consequences for patterns of thought about reality,” (Lucy, 1997, p. 294). This theory implies that language might mould or even constrain the human experience of social reality. Ultimately, the literature indicates that language interacts with thought through two hypothetical models: linguistic relativity and linguistic determinism.

*Linguistic Relativity*

Linguistic relativity seeks to answer the question of how language influences thinking along three lines: semiotic, structural, and functional. The semiotic level of language interaction seeks to understand how the use of language, as a system of symbols, can mould thinking. Lucy (1997) explains that the semiotic level of language interaction is concerned with “whether having a code with a symbolic component (versus one confined to iconic-indexical elements) transforms thinking,” (p. 292). The structural level of language interaction seeks to understand how different languages can change thinking structurally. This level of language interaction seeks to understand how language-specific combinations and separations of meaning among linguistic symbols can affect thought. The functional level of language interaction seeks to understand whether instituted ways of using language can influence thinking. This level of language interaction is concerned with the propensity of discourse to affect thought through the transformation of the structure of language (Lucy, 1997).

As an example of the kind of empirical support underlying linguistic relativity, Lucy (1997) provides a summary of a classic study performed by Whorf on the comparison of
conceptions of time by English-speaking and Hopi-speaking individuals. Whorf found that while English speakers tended to view time as linear, Hopi speakers tended to view time as cyclical. Whorf hypothesized that this view of time was linked to the differing grammars inherent in the two languages. Whereas English grammar tends to treat concepts as independent objects, Hopi grammar treats concepts as cyclically related entities. Whorf hypothesized that these differing grammars guided the resulting differences in the perception of time.

*Linguistic Determinism*

The key difference between linguistic relativity and linguistic determinism is that while linguistic relativity suggests that language influences human thought, linguistic determinism suggests that language determines human thought. Linguistic determinism would propose that phenomena which are not conceptualized through a language would not be conceptualized by human thought. As a theory which suggests the complete constraint of thought by language, linguistic determinism has tended to lack the same level of empirical support enjoyed by linguistic relativity.

This process is built upon the structure demonstrated by Foucault’s (1970) episteme. The episteme is a theory which proposes that all knowledge is ultimately translated through language. That language is in turn validated by an institution of power. The final result of this theory is that institutions of power can shape thinking by directly validating and moulding language.

Gordon (2004) provided one of the most robust empirical supports for the theory of linguistic determinism. In his linguistic analysis of the language of the Piraha tribe in South America’s Amazon region, Gordon found that their numerical system, as expressed through their language, did not allow for the exact counting of large quantities (any quantity greater than three
units). In light of this result, Gordon found that not only did the Piraha language not allow for exact counting, but that participants who spoke that language were also unable to count large quantities. This study suggests that the Piraha language constrained thought (numerical computation).

In summary of these perspectives, it is at least possible to conclude that language may mediate experience. As a medium for the communication of social meaning, language is necessary for the transmission of knowledge regarding social identities. Language is also a medium for the transmission of ideologies. As a medium of such cultural constructs, the means by which the representation or creation of cultural symbols by language must be explicitly defined.

**Reciprocal Determinism of Language and Social Thought**

Hill and Manheim’s (1992) review of the interaction between language and culture reveals some of the problems inherent in this discussion. The most troubling being the determination of whether language directly constrains thought, and thereby constrains the construction of culture, or merely represents the underlying schemas which are responsible for the formation of social thought. In short, is it language, or the psychological schemas underlying language, which mediates thought?

Lucy (1997) suggests that “language embodies an interpretation of reality and language can influence thought about reality,” (Lucy, 1997, p. 294). While this statement may seem to be purposefully ambiguous, it is the only responsible conclusion which the literature on the topic can support. At the very least, we can conclude that “the semantic representation of a sentence is a cognitive structure susceptible to being encoded in linguistic form by the syntactic and lexical
principles of a language.” (Langacker, 1972, p. 94). In other words, the meaning underlying a sentence might use the principles of language to form the thought being expressed in the sentence.

As a means of explaining this ambiguous relationship, Van Dijk (1993) suggested that “these structural properties of text and talk are assumed to be monitored (and explained) by underlying cognitions of language users, that is, by memory processes and representations such as mental models of specific events, knowledge, attitudes, norms, values, and ideologies. At the same time these discourses, interpreted as situated forms of action, as well as their underlying social cognitions, are acquired and used in sociocultural contexts, such as those of politics, education, scholarship, the media, and corporate business,” (p. 13). In summation, there seems to be consensus in the literature that there is at least a reciprocal relationship between thought and language formation.

Power and Language

Foucault hypothesized the interaction between power and discourse through the concept of episteme. According to Foucault’s conceptualization, the episteme concept can evolve over time based on the differential validation given by changing institutions of power. The episteme ultimately organizes social thought through this modification of language. The episteme therefore is validated by, and represents, the dominant narratives of institutions of power within a given society. This concept helps to explain how power can be so infused in language formation.

Gee (2011b) suggested a definition for power, as it is seen in language, as well as a means of explaining how that power can be moulded by language. Gee suggests that politics (as the practice of power) is “any situation where the distribution of social goods is at stake. By
'social goods’ I mean anything a social group or society takes as a good worth having,” (2011b, p. 118). Gee then goes on to explain that “when we are using language, then, one thing we build is what counts for us as social goods. We also distribute these to or withhold them from others, as well as to the groups, cultures, and institutions to which people belong,” (2011b, p. 120). In other words, language can be used to both build and then allocate these social goods to individuals or groups. Because the production and distribution of these social goods is inherently an act of power re-distribution to the recipients of the social goods, via the validation given in these forms of linguistic expression, this act imbues language with the potential to shape social power.

The difficulty with analyzing such broad concepts such as thought, power, and language, is that too narrow a focus on the properties of either concept may lose sight of the theoretical bridge which ultimately links the terms. For that reason, this topic may be better analyzed at a higher order of linguistic complexity.

Sherzer (1987) suggests that discourse may provide a solution to the problem of inherent complexity. Rather than focusing on how grammar may influence culture or vice versa, discourse analysis allows researchers to study language as a mediator of ideological formation. In other words, discourse is the medium through which the ideologies that support both language and culture are expressed and formed. By analyzing the implications of language at the level of discourse, then, it is possible to determine how language can influence the ideological formation of cultural norms, beliefs, and practices. To this extent, discourse can also provide an insight into social identity formation.
One particular stream of discourse analysis which focuses on the formation of ideology and social identity is Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA). This form of analysis focuses on the interaction between power and discourse as a means of creating and maintaining ideologies. CDA is a form of discourse analysis which critically investigates the interaction and distribution of power through the ideological claims made in discursive acts (Rogers et al., 2005).

Van Dijk (1996) noted that the analysis of the relationship between texts and power was of vital importance to critical discourse analysis as “such an analysis should describe and explain how power abuse is enacted, reproduced or legitimised by the text and talk of dominant groups or institutions,” (p. 84). Specifically, Van Dijk (1996) demonstrates 7 major presuppositions regarding the interaction between power and discourse:

1. “Power is a property of relations between social groups, institutions, or organizations. Hence, only social power, and not individual power, is considered here.
2. Social power is defined in terms of the control exercised by one group or organization (or its members) over the actions and/or the minds of (the members of) another group, thus limiting the freedom of action of the others, or influencing their knowledge, attitudes, or ideologies.
3. Power of a specific group or institution may be ‘distributed’, and may be restricted to a specific social domain or scope, such as that of politics, the media, law and order, education or corporate business, thus resulting in different ‘centres’ of power an elite groups that control such centres.
4. Dominance is here understood as a form of social power abuse, that is, as legally or morally illegitimate exercise of control over others in one’s own interests, often resulting in social inequality.
5. Power is based on privileged access to valued social resources, such as wealth, jobs, status, or indeed, a preferential access to public discourse and communication.
6. Social power and dominance are often organized and institutionalised, so as to allow more effective control, and to enable routine forms of power reproduction.
7. Dominance is seldom absolute; it is often gradual, and may be met by more or less resistance or counter-power by dominated groups.” (Van Dijk, 1996, p. 84-85)

The influence of power through language, then, can lead to the creation of ideology as well as the forced categorization of social identities according to the distribution of such power.
This is because the distribution of social goods is also an act of validation by an institution of power. The concepts or identities which receive this validation are supported and propagated through the instituted ideology being presented in the text.

The literature reviewed up to this point regarding the relationship between language, discourse, ideology and schemas can be summarized in the following four conclusions: (1) ideology can be interpreted as the sum formation of various schema frameworks regarding social identity, norms and practices, (2) those schema frameworks can be represented through language, (3) the cumulative use of language over time to communicate ideologies can be understood as discourse, and (4) institutions of power can therefore theoretically influence the formation of ideology through the manipulation of that discourse.

Fowler and Kress (1979) provide an interesting insight which summarizes what has been said so far in regards to language: “If linguistic meaning is inseparable from ideology, and both depend on social structure, then linguistic analysis ought to be a powerful tool for the study of ideological processes which mediate relationships of power and control,” (p. 186) and that “the need then is for a linguistics which is critical, which is aware of the assumptions on which it is based and prepared to reflect critically about the underlying causes of the phenomena it studies, and the nature of the society whose language it is,” (p. 186). Given the utility of language in the study of societal ideologies, and the importance of discourse to this discussion of power and social thought, a form of Critical Discourse Analysis is fundamental to the further investigation of these kinds of phenomena.

Critical Discourse Analysis
Rogers et al. (2005) note that Critical Discourse Analysis is reliant upon traditions influenced by the linguistic turn (academic traditions which focus on how language is used to conceptualize reality). The structure of Critical Discourse Analysis is based on a form of critical theory which was developed through the Marxist approaches which were conceptualized in the Frankfurt school. Hammersly (1997) explains that “the early Frankfurt theorists inherited from Marx the idea that how society ought to be is not a matter of mere subjectivity, but an objective fact that is built into how society is and how it has developed historically,” (p. 240).

Critical Discourse Analysis also shares its roots in the French critical linguistics of the 1970’s. This form of criticism investigated: “(a) the use of language in social institutions, (b) the relationships between language, power, and ideology, and (c) who proclaimed a critical, left-wing agenda for linguistics,” (Blommaert and Bulcaen, 2000, p. 453). While these two schools of thought complimented each other in ideology and approach, there was a key difference between the two.

These two schools break on one key philosophical issue in that the French critical linguistics “take over from existentialism and structuralism a rejection of any attempt to derive value judgements from socio-historical analysis. Instead, they seem to rely on what Habermas has termed decisionism; and this is the second basis on which CDA could be founded. Where Marxism presented ideals-how things can and should be- as discoverable through investigation of the world, decisionism denies that values are open to rational justification,” (Hammersly, 1997, p. 242). In other words, French critical linguistics, and CDA as well, maintains a suspicion of value-laden claims to truth. Instead, CDA sees the concept of a truth as a constructed entity which is validated by an institution of power.
In line with a constructivist view of language and culture, Gee (2011) explains that discourse analysis is used to build different aspects of social reality. Specifically, Gee notes that discourse is used to build: significance, practices, identities, relationships, connections, and sign systems and knowledge. In the construction of significance, Gee explains that while there are certain events which are, for one reason or another, considered significant to nearly everyone, it is only through language that the significance of certain events can be explained and built. A practice is defined as a “socially recognized and institutionally or culturally supported endeavour that usually involves sequencing or combining actions in certain specified ways,” (2011, p. 17). Identities are defined through discourse by establishing role-taking. Discourse is also used to establish the form of relationships which are presented between actors in the text. As Van Dijk (1996) proposed, politics is defined in the literature on discourse according to social goods. Discourse is therefore used to validate or explain the distribution of those social goods in the creation of politics. The connections between linguistically constructed items are also determined by language, that is, language is used to establish how different items are connected or separated. Finally, discourse is ultimately a created system of signs which are used to represent knowledge. In this sense, language serves as a representation of what is known in the experience of reality.

Van Dijk (1993) supports this view of discourse, suggesting that the ideologies formed through discourse provide “coherence to the system and development of attitudes,” (p. 40). Discourse, then, becomes a medium for the formation of ideologies which justify the system of attitudes that a society endorses.

Formation of Social Identities through Discourse
As has been shown in the first chapter, social identities are ultimately formed via schemas. In order for language to mediate social identity formation, language must manipulate those schemas. Hill and Manheim (1992) claim that cognitive linguistics describes how “the boundaries of denotation of a linguistic element are held to coincide with the boundaries of a cognitive schema,” (p. 393). This is difficult to demonstrate as “Cognitive linguistics is often vulnerable to the critique of ‘linguacentrism.’ Rather than relating patterning in language to patterning in nonverbal cultural or cognitive practice, linguacentric research relates a pattern in one form of linguistic organization to a pattern in another,” (Hill and Manheim, 1992)

Gee (2011b) suggests that it is not just what is explicitly written in discourse which determines identity, but also how ideas are presented through discourse which determines identities. As an example, Gee demonstrates that the vernacular of an individual speaking to someone in authority tends to be more formal than the vernacular of an individual speaking to their peers. This process of using formal versus informal vernaculars helps to determine the identity of the individual being spoken to (as a person of authority or as a peer). In this way, the expression of language can shape the identity of both the speaker and the audience.

Van Leeuwen (1996) noted the particular ways in which discourse can form identities. Specifically, Van Leeuwen demonstrated that it was the actions taken by the author, in the creation of the text, which formed the identity of the social actors described in the text. One of these methods included exclusion, or the lack of information given about an actor in the text. Van Leeuwen demonstrated two types of exclusion: suppression (the lack of information about actors anywhere in the text) and backgrounding (the actors are not mentioned in relation to an event but are indirectly referred to by insinuation). These two forms of exclusion diminish the
role of certain actors in the discursive representation of an event. Thus, exclusion creates social identities by narrowing the representation of these actors in discourse.

Social actors are also given roles through discourse through a process of activation (social actors are portrayed as active agents) or passivation (social actors are portrayed as passive recipients of activity). Interestingly, passivation may present actors as either beneficialised (the actors are portrayed as third parties to events which may or may not benefit from action) or subjected (the actors are treated as commodities which are traded throughout the text).

The actors can also be presented as representations of groups through discourse. The means by which actors become representations of groups can occur along multiple lines of definition in discourse. The actors may be portrayed in a process of genericisation (the actors are seen as members of a category) or specification (the actors are seen as individuals). A mirror process is the process of assimilation (actors are mentioned according to their status as groups) or individualisation (actors are mentioned as individuals). Interestingly, the discursive text can also be used to form groups rather than merely represent them. This process occurs through assimilation (the text groups different individuals into a group) or dissociation (the text separates different individuals or groups from another group) (Van Leeuwen, 1996).

The identity of groups as presented in discourse can be formed in a number of ways. The identity may be formed through indetermination (the identity is left unmentioned) or determination (the identity is explained in the text). The identity given to actors in a text may be nominated, where the actors are given identities according to their own individual traits, or categorized, where the actors are given identities according to their membership in certain social categories. These identities can be ascribed through functionalisation (identities given because
of the action of the actors) or identification (the identities are given because of who the actors are). Ultimately these identities can be used to personalize (present the actor as a human being) or impersonalize (present the actor as other than human) (Van Leeuwen, 1996).

The most insidious error which can be committed through this process of discursive identity formation is that of overdetermination. Van Leeuwen (1996) notes that this phenomenon “occurs when social actors are represented as participating, at the same time, in more than one social practice,” (p.61). In other words, through one label, multiple meanings can be created for any one social actor. Van Leeuwen (1996) points out four kinds of overdetermination: “inversion, symbolisation, connotation, and distillation,” (p. 62). Inversion occurs when the social actors are described as engaging in two different and contradictory actions. Symbolisation occurs when fictional social actors come to represent real social actors. Connotation occurs when one attribute comes to define all members of a category. Distillation occurs when an abstraction of a group’s identity comes to be generalized as a means of categorizing that group (Van Leeuwen, 1996). The error of these means of overdetermination is in their production of overarching stereotypes. The over inclusion of multiple actors in one group, as well as the overproduction of multiple labels for one group, demonstrates this reliance upon stereotypes in overdetermination. This process also demonstrates the power of predetermined assumptions in determining faulty social identities.

Functions of Otherness in Discourse

The creation of the otherness of a group has been used recurrently in political discourse as a means of justifying the treatment of a group by an institution of social power (Van Dijk, 1993). This creation of otherness is more reliant upon a process of stereotyping rather than the
use of “buzz-words” for racist or prejudiced thinking. Ultimately, as Van Dijk notes, the avoidance of these “buzz-words” merely ignores the underlying process of stereotyping which allows for such words to become interchangeable and yet achieve the same purpose.

One function that otherness serves in discourse is in the creation of the positive self-image. Van Dijk (1993) found that in political discourses on racism and immigration, ascribing negative attributes to the other (them) was taken to mean inversely, and implicitly, that positive attributes could be assigned to the same (us). While Van Dijk found that this form of negative-other presentation was common when doubts were expressed regarding national virtues (virtue by comparison with worse groups), this form of discourse was also present when there were no doubts or attacks made.

Anderson (2007) suggests that otherness may provide a comparative reference point for judgments of propriety, noting that speech styles are related to these judgments of rightness. Anderson found, similarly to Gee’s proposition, that the correctness of vernacular usage was used to determine otherness. In other words, the way in which one actor speaks to an audience will provide a partial basis for the formation of the audience’s identity as “other.”

Stigmatization through Discourse

In his original definition, Goffman understood the importance of language to the creation of stigma (Goffman, 1963). Goffman noted that stigma was really formed through discrediting language which was used to define the discredited identity. This discrediting language also formed stigmatizing ideologies which supported the discrimination of the discredited individual.

Gerhard Falk (2001) put forward a similar theory, in line with the Sapir-Whorf hypothesis, and “called stigma and stigmatization-producing language ‘inventive thought,’ which
means that people who have little or even no experience will nevertheless express opinions on a subject they do not know by using language which then constructs the reality that is thereafter perceived,” (Falk, 2001, p. 22). What Falk, and Sapir, are suggesting is that the discursive formation of stigma becomes a schema for perceiving the world. Once a stigma is formed in language, that stigma becomes a “given” in further perceptions of the world, thus actively searching for and storing information which confirms and validates the use of that stigmatizing schema concept.

In his review of the relationship between discourse and racism, Van Dijk (1993) suggested that stigmatization could be created by the elite (individuals or groups holding social power). This is because “the elites dominate these means of symbolic reproduction, they also control the communicative conditions in the formation of the popular mind and hence, the ethnic consensus,” (Van Dijk, 1993, p. 10). In other words, those individuals or groups which control the distribution of social goods through symbolic representation in text, can control the formation of racism or stigmatization.

Van Dijk (1993) also notes the process by which discourse establishes the stigmatized identity of the “other.” “Categorization, stereotyping, prejudice, and discrimination affect Other People primarily because they are thought to belong to another group, that is, as group members and not as individuals. Negative properties attributed to the group as a whole are thus applied to its members, who therefore are seen as essentially alike and interchangeable. And vice versa, negative characteristics attributed to a group member in a particular situation may be generalized to those holding for the group as a while,” (p. 20). This process is similar to Link and Phelan’s (2001) process of enacted stigma formation via a process of labelling, separating, stereotyping, discrimination, and status loss. Similar to Van Dijk’s hypothesis of the elite’s use of power to
form language, Link and Phelan (2001) also noted the need for power in the creation of enacted stigma.

In their review of discursive representation of HIV-AIDS in Israeli media, Soffer and Ajzenstadt (2010) demonstrated that the media portrayal of AIDS stigma was actually used to create an ideology of otherness. The media portrayed AIDS either along lines of nationalism, suggesting that the disease originated in foreign countries, or along lines of deviance, describing AIDS as originating from deviant sexual practices. In both of these lines of definition, the created AIDS stigma was used to construct a social identity of otherness for individuals bearing the stigmatized condition.

Power is ultimately, as in the formation of any linguistic symbol and its interconnections, necessary for the formation of stigma through discourse. Van Dijk (1993) explains that “control is enacted through social practices of oppression, suppression, exclusion, or marginalization of out-group members by in-group members,” (p. 24). In essence, power is enacted through identity formation as based on the distribution of social goods.

Discourse and the Rwandan Genocide

One application of this discussion on discourse and otherness formation is the interaction between the media and the 1994 Rwandan Genocide. Studies indicate that the Radio Television Libre des Milles-Collines (RTLM) radio coverage was responsible for a nine percent increase in village violence (Yanagizawa, 2009). That amount of variation explained 45,000 Tutsi deaths (Yanagizawa, 2009). These findings demonstrate that the radio broadcasts played a significant role in the violence associated with the Rwandan genocide (Straus, 2007).
In order for this phenomenon to be understood as an application of discursive identity formation, the contextual factors which surrounded the genocide must be investigated. Through the investigation of these contextual factors, it will not only make it possible to discern the parameters of the influence which was exercised by the discursive ideologies present in Rwanda, but this investigation will also demonstrate the historical formation of such ideologies.
Chapter Four: Rwandan Genocide and the Media

Introduction

While causal explanations of the Rwandan Genocide have varied greatly, there have been three main categories of explanations for the Rwandan Genocide: (1) the interference of external forces such as colonialism and neo-colonialism, (2) domestic influences from demographic characteristics to ethnicity, and (3) heightened authoritarian obedience and other psychosocial factors (Hintjens, 1999). In all three of these categories, the perpetrators of the genocide are presented as predominantly passive recipients of influence (whether international, domestic, or psychosocial).

Given the complexity of this phenomenon, a more responsible interpretation would most likely involve more than one of these categories. In order to demonstrate the complexity of this genocide, a review of the properties of this genocide will be presented.

The Rwandan Genocide

Historical Precedent

The Rwandan population is composed of Hutu, Tutsi, and Twa people groups. Historians suggest that the Tutsi people group arrived in Rwanda in the 15th and 16th century, driven by possible droughts. The Hutu people group had come to Rwanda centuries before the Tutsi arrived. The third group, the hunter-gatherer people group named the Twa, was present in Rwanda before either the Tutsi or the Hutu. These three groups compose the demographic present in Rwanda to modern day. Prior to the Rwandan Genocide, these groups integrated their cultures to such an extent that the three groups shared the same language and the same religious
beliefs. This cultural integration suggests that the Tutsi and the Hutu were not as distinct as they are at times presented. In fact, before colonial rule, the only separation between the Hutu and the Tutsi seemed to be defined economically by the number of cows in an individual’s herd (Uvin, 1997). The larger an individual’s herd, the more Tutsi an individual was considered. Alternatively, the smaller an individual’s herd, the more Hutu an individual was considered.

In the late 1800’s, the Tutsi line of kingship was established through the formation of a strong and centralized form of political leadership. This form of leadership would survive for a century after its creation (Caplan, 2007). This centralization of authority instituted an oligarchy of power which was held by a select few, and predominantly Tutsi, individuals.

The German occupation of Rwanda began in 1897 and lasted until 1916. This occupation remained light (only 96 German occupiers were present in the country in 1914). As such this occupation relied on the administration of the previously formed Tutsi oligarchy (Prunier, 1995).

Following World War 1, the colonial occupation of Rwanda changed hands from Germany to Belgium, as part of a mandate from the League of Nations. Under Belgium rule, the ethnic differences between the Hutu and Tutsi, which had existed prior to this colonial occupation, were accentuated by Belgian policies which strongly favoured the Tutsi minority over the predominantly Hutu population (Yanagizawa, 2009).

In order to increase administrative efficiency, the Belgian occupiers attempted to further centralize bureaucracy in order to stabilize the previously existing political hierarchies within the country. As part of this form of government, the Belgians instituted reforms which did not allow migration through the country without the permission of municipal authorities. In this way, the Belgians were able to ensure that migration could not be used as a means of escaping subjugation
under certain municipal rulers (Des Forges, 1999). These policies led to the maintenance of the Tutsi oligarchy and reinforced the domination of the Rwandan population by the Rwandan government.

During Belgian rule, a system of official ethnic identification was put into place. This system required all citizens of Rwanda to carry identity cards which labelled them either Hutu, Tutsi, or Twa. This form of ethnic identification not only made the political system more staunchly ethnically divided, but also ensured that the division of the ethnicities could be more easily instituted by the national bureaucracy (Caplan, 2007).

Ironically, there was little state violence during this colonial occupation. The Hutu and the Tutsi saw their ethnic divide as being reasonable, based on their definition of their ethnicities. However, only a fraction of the Tutsi population gained any benefit from the Belgian occupiers (Caplan, 2007). Though this period was predominantly non-violent, it was not void of tension and aggression which, though repressed, would soon become evident.

During the Rwandan revolution (1959-1963), in which the Belgian occupation came to an end, there was extensive violence against the Tutsi population in the North of Rwanda. Following this period of violence, this area remained under the leadership of a few Hutu kingdoms with few Tutsi communities in the area. The Tutsi communities in this area had little access to political power (Uvin, 1997). The violence and oppression felt in this area also drove a massive Rwandan Tutsi population across the border into Uganda.

Following the Rwandan revolution, the Tutsi oligarchy was overthrown and a predominantly Hutu, and viciously anti-Tutsi, party was elected into government. This government transition was marked by massive Tutsi killings, predominantly in the north of
Rwanda. Following this government transition, there were recurring attempts by Rwandan Tutsi refugees in Uganda to re-enter the country through military force (Uvin, 1997).

This one party Hutu government caused a great deal of dissatisfaction in the country. For the Tutsi and Hutu population, their livelihoods were even more at risk, and for the Hutu elitist elements in the north of the country, there was disdain for their limited access to political power (Caplan, 2007). In order to maintain control, the predominantly Hutu government began a campaign of ethnic violence in hopes of creating a common enemy in the Tutsi which the country could unite against.

These efforts were justified by the slaughter of the Hutu population in Burundi by the predominantly Tutsi government. The flood of Hutu civilians across the southern Rwandan border spread word of the violence and reinforced the need for the ethnic division in Rwanda (Caplan, 2007). The need to suppress the Tutsi population was now seen as necessary not only to maintain unity in the country, but also to protect a predominantly Hutu population.

In 1973, a rebel force composed of both Hutu and Tutsi fighters crossed the Burundi border and entered Rwanda. This force was able to successfully stage a coup d’état and put their own man, Juvenal Habyarimana into power in Rwanda (Yanagizawa, 2009). While this party claimed to bring greater democratic reform, the national anti-Tutsi sentiment continued to be bolstered by the Rwandan government.

The economic hardship of 1980’s left an indelible mark on Rwanda’s position on the international stage. As the government’s external debt began to climb, the fall in coffee prices, one of Rwanda’s main exports, further exacerbated the situation. The Rwandan government was forced to stage a redistribution of social welfare and social services. Strictly instituted ethnic
quotas, which had been instituted under the Belgian colonial rule, meant that this redistribution would fall most severely on the Tutsi communities in Rwanda, who were already facing educational quotas and limited representation in civil service (Hintjens, 1999). This form of economic oppression would later play an important role in the creation of the form of nationalistic fundamentalism which would define the Rwandan genocide.

Following this economic downturn, the food production in the northern areas of Rwanda was especially diminished, with the unemployment rising into the early 1990’s (Uvin, 1997). These difficult circumstances led to unrest among the Hutu elite, many of whom held positions of influence in the Rwandan government.

In the early 1990’s, there was widespread political discontent by the Hutu elite in the North of Rwanda which was coupled with widespread corruption in the central and Southern areas of the country. The population of Rwanda was dissatisfied with the progress of development in Rwanda. In addition, with the collapse of Soviet Block, there was increased international pressure for the democratization of the country. All of these factors combined to explain a county in political turmoil and social unrest (Uvin, 1997).

Coinciding with these oppressed circumstances, as Rwanda sought to implement democratization in the country, there was increased political party tension as the prospect of democratization threatened to undermine previous national political alliances. In order to consolidate power, the Habyarimana administration attempted to institute “a redefinition of national identity along exclusively racial or ethnic lines” (Hintjens, 1999, p. 242). This attempted restructuring of national identity would become “the prelude for (the) later implementation of genocide” (Hintjens, 1999, p. 242).
In October, 1990, the Rwanda Patriotic Front (RPF) invaded Rwanda from the North (Uganda). This militia was formed 30 years earlier by Rwandan refugees who were exiled from the country during the Rwandan revolution (Newbury, 1998). This rebel force presented themselves as a representation of the multi-ethnic population of Rwanda, and sought to establish democracy and an end to the corrupt ethnic favouritism which marked the Rwandan government at that time (Yanagizawa, 2009).

This invasion reinforced the vilification of the Tutsi population within Rwanda. The invasion was used as evidence to support the racial ideology of separation between the Tutsi and the Hutu in the country (Uvin, 1997). Ironically, though this invasion was bolstered by a proposed multi-ethnic ideology, it was perceived as support for the cultural truism that the Tutsi represented a dangerous political entity.

The Rwandan military carried out a search in late 1990 to early 1991 for “internal enemies.” These searches involved rounding up and killing a few hundred suspects at a time. It is believed that this action was carried out under the pretence of securing national order, when in fact it may have been an exercise carried out by military leaders to test the outcomes of killing civilians. Newbury (1998) notes that “the military leaders learned two principal lessons from this exercise: that such tactics were feasible, and that they generated no meaningful response by outside powers,” (p. 79). As a result, the extremist elements of the government were able to cultivate a sense of immunity via concealment.

In reference to the future organizers of the Rwandan genocide, Caplan (2007) records that “as the terror heightened, the organizers learned that they could not only massacre large numbers of people quickly and efficiently, they could get away with it. Wholehearted backing of the
regime by the French government and general indifference to the escalating racism by the churches reinforced this feeling. A culture of impunity developed as the conspirators grew bolder. Extremist army officers colluded with the circles surrounding Habyarimana and the Akuza to form secret societies and Latin American-style death squads known as ‘Amasasu’ (bullets) and the ‘Zero Network.’ They did not remain secret; in 1992, their existence and connections were publically exposed,” (p. 24).

Records of these killings continued following this first incident of mass Tutsi killings by the Rwandan government. Caplan (2007) notes that “massacres of Tutsi were carried out in October 1990, January 1991, February 1991, March 1992, August 1992, January 1993, March 1993, and February 1994,” (p. 24). It is impossible to ascertain the intention of these killings, only the results of these actions is evident.

The Rwandan government, in response to the fall of the Soviet Block, the growing popularity of democracy internationally, and the increased international diplomatic pressure, put in place a multi-party political system in April of 1992 (Yanagizawa, 2009). This was followed by the signing of the Arusha Accords, which brought an end to the hostilities which had marked the early 1990’s between the Rwandan government and the RPF. This signing was enforced by a UN mandated peacekeeping force which was designed to facilitate the diplomatic process of integrating the RPF into the Rwandan government and providing international accountability to the agreed upon ceasefire between the two forces (Yanagizawa, 2009).

The democratization of Rwanda brought new political parties to the Rwandan governmental system. Each political party also came with its own radical youth wing. In fact, Habyarimana’s own party, the Mouvement Republicain National pour la Democratie et le
Development (MRND), was attached to the Interahamwe, the most well-known of the death squads during the Rwandan genocide (Caplin, 2007).

In October 1993, a predominantly Tutsi force assassinated the Burundi president, who was from the Hutu people group. Given the close ties between these two countries since the Rwandan Revolution, this assassination provided an indication of events to come for the Hutu majority in Rwanda. This event not only polarized the view of Hutus towards Tutsis in the nation, but also demonstrated to them the timeless truth that Tutsis and the Hutus could not coexist in peace (Des Forges, 2007). Within a few months of this incident, the genocide began.

**Timeline**

The genocide is known to have lasted from April to July of 1994 and resulted in the deaths of roughly 10% of the Rwandan population (Newbury, 1998) and roughly 75% of the entire Tutsi population in Rwanda (Yangizawa, 2009). The genocide itself began in Kigali and then spread to the outlying areas of the country. The killings were perpetrated by armed gangs, the most known of which was the Interahamwe. These gangs used machetes, grenades, and guns to carry out their killings (Newbury, 1998). The organizers of the genocide included members of government, such as defence minister, Augustin Bizimana, the Presidential Guard (PG), and elements of the Rwandan gendarmerie (Prunier, 1995).

The genocide began on April 6, 1994 when the plane of Rwandan president, Juvenal Habyarimana, crashed in Kigali. The plane was brought down by two rocket propelled missiles. This event was particularly problematic, given that the flight was a return trip for Habyarimana from negotiations of the Arusha Accord. After months of stalling, in this session of negotiations, the president was forced to make concessions in negotiation which displeased many of those in
leadership in the Rwandan military, potentially putting thousands of new army recruits out of the military (Newbury, 1998).

These Arusha Accords also called for changes to the Rwandan political system, which for 20 years had been ruled by a single party, allowing Hayarimana to stay in power over that time. The Rwandan government had already become a multi-party political system, however, this system was criticized as a façade designed to allow Rwandan elites to maintain positions in government (Newbury, 1998).

In the first few hours following this plane crash, organized groups set up road blocks in Kigali while armed troops performed a widespread manhunt for “enemies” of the state. The targets of this manhunt included several leading politicians in the government, including the prime minister of the country, Agath Uwilinguiyamana. Newbury notes that “with but a few exceptions, for several days these killings were contained within Kigali, as deaths mounted to some 40,000-50,000 people within the city,” (Newbury, 1998, p. 80).

Following this first stage of the genocide, the killings extended outside of Kigali, particularly to the north and northeast of the country. This area had previously seen incursions from the RPF and had now become populated with Tutsi communities which had been displaced by the killings in Kigali and who were now making their way to the RPF front line. It should be noted that killings in this area also occurred immediately following Habyarimana’s plane crash, suggesting a coordinated plan of extermination had already been in place prior to Habyarimana’s death (Newbury, 1998).

The third stage of the genocide occurred in the area of Butare, in southern Rwanda. This area is the second largest city in Rwanda. Home to universities and research institutes, the area
was known to be more progressive. The municipalities in Butare attempted to maintain peace in the area, delaying the slaughter of the Tutsi and moderate Hutu groups taking refuge in the weapon free zone which had been established by those municipalities. This stalling act was only able to hold out the Interahamwe for the first two weeks of April. After this time, the killing squads, bolstered by extremist elements of government, entered the area. It was in Butare that the most savage acts of slaughter were witnessed. Schools, hospitals, and churches which had been used to house the displaced peoples became sites of group killings. When Butare fell, the south of the country was left open to the Interahamwe (Newbury, 1998).

In the fourth sequence of the genocide, the international community, which had not been involved during the first months of the genocide began establishing plans for refugee areas in Zaire. These refugees fleeing Rwanda, and the advance of the RPF, included genocide perpetrators in their ranks. The French government also established Operation Turquoise in the south of Rwanda, allowing a steady flow of refugees to leave the country into Zaire (Newbury, 1998).

The exit of these refugees signalled the fifth and final stage of the genocide. Following this exit, there were several reprisal attacks by the established Tutsi government, composed partially of former RPF militia leadership, against Hutu communities. The newly formed government did not represent a clean transition of democratic reform. There were instead instances of political abuse, even against the survivors of the genocide (Newbury, 1998).

These stages demonstrate that the killings involved in this genocide occurred in waves in many different areas of Rwanda. Figure 8 demonstrates the timeline of killings linked to the Genocide in a prefecture in Western Rwanda.
During the genocide, unlike other conflicts, women and children were not just a collateral victim of the violence, but were now targets of the genocide. This targeting was very intentional in order to ensure that the representation of the Tutsi ethnic group would not continue in Rwandan society (Newbury, 1998). This act demonstrated the intention of the genocide to permanently exterminate bearers of the Tutsi stigma.

Controversy

The Rwandan genocide has been primarily contested for its very use of the term “genocide,” because the parameters of the genocide term differ between institutions. Given the
ambiguity of these definitions, one of the major contests suggests that the extermination of the Tutsi was a war crime, understandable in the context of civil war, but not a genocide given the fact that the act occurred during war time (Hintjens, 1999).

Nature of the Tutsi Stigma up to 1994

The Separation of Hutu and Tutsi Social Categories

“It is not difficult to isolate the key steps that led from the late pre-colonial period in Rwanda to the genocide a full century later. There was nothing inexorable about this process. At its heart was the deliberate choice of successive elites to deepen the cleavages between the country’s two main ethnic groups, to dehumanize the group that was out of power and to legitimate the use of violence against that group,” (Caplan, 2007, p. 20).

The Hutu and Tutsi population in Rwanda amounted to 98% of the national population, with the Twa composing the final 2% (Yanagizawa, 2009). During the colonial occupation of Rwanda, the differences between the Hutu and the Tutsi were accentuated by the colonial occupiers. These differences were drawn from racial sciences “involving such ‘modern scientific’ methods as the measurement of nose and skull sizes,” (Uvine, 1997, p. 95).

Hintjens (1999) notes that “since at least the 1950’s, average BaTutsi and BaHutu have been identical in the language they speak, in their religious beliefs, in their education and income levels, and in the acres they farm and the number of children they bear,” (p. 247). The differences in appearance between the Tutsi and the Hutu were not as clearly defined as historical records may indicate, in fact, there were frequent accounts of mistaken identity throughout the Rwandan Genocide (Hintjens, 1999).
It is interesting to note that, in spite of the fact that the BaTutsi and BaHutu lived together in communities, the Rwandan culture still maintained a strict regime of authoritarian class structure. This sense of disciplined submission to authority remained steadfast in spite of drastic regime changes, as happened in the 1959-1962 revolution (Hintjens, 1999).

The official identification of BaTutsi and BaHutu individuals was determined solely through the paternal line (Hintjens, 1999). This meant that the identification of whether an individual was from the Tutsi or Hutu ethnic group was reliant upon the accuracy of paternal, rather than maternal, identification. To make matters even more complicated, in the categorization of Hutu and Tutsi, the practice of intermarriage between Hutu and Tutsi communities was common place in Southern Rwanda (Hintjens, 1999). This practice resulted not only in the ambiguous classification of an individual’s physical features, but also complicated the process of determining ethnic lineage by marriage. Newbury (1998) suggested that “At least 25% of Rwandans today (in 1998) would have representatives of both Hutu and Tutsi among their eight great-grandparents,” (p. 84).

Since the colonial era in Rwanda, there was a considerable hardening of the ethnic identities in Rwanda. Prior to the arrival of colonial powers in Rwanda, it was possible for an individual to change from being a Hutu or Tutsi dependant on the rise or fall of their economic wealth. If a person gained wealth or power, they became a Tutsi, if a person lost wealth or power, they became a Hutu. Following the Rwandan revolution, this was not the case, with ethnic identities becoming instituted as socially categorized identities (Newbury, 1998). This situation was exacerbated by the 1990’s national identity formation along ethnic lines (Hintjens, 1999).
The Formation of Hutu and Tutsi Social Identity

Uvins (1997) notes that “in Rwanda, basic psychocultural images about ‘the Tutsi’ and ‘the Hutu’ are basic building blocks of society. These profoundly engrained images treat Hutu and Tutsi as radically and unchangeably different, in their history as well as in their moral, intellectual and social attributes,” (p. 103).

Hintjens (1999) notes that “hardened identity boundaries caused changes in attitudes towards mixed marriages and concubinage, particularly between BaHutu and BaTutsi,” (p. 250). This attitude was prevalent in the early 1990’s, demonstrating the growing societal expectations which accompanied either the Hutu or Tutsi social identity.

The development of the Tutsi social identity as socially superior to the Hutu social identity has its roots in the early European explorers, who suggested that the Tutsi were descended from invaders from Ethiopia and the Middle East, while the Hutu and indigenous Twa were descended from the Bantu people group. This explanation of ethnicity was used to institute the historical nobility of the Tutsi people as rulers over the Hutu and the Twa. Using this presumed lineage as a springboard, theories of the differences between the two groups were further romanticized by suggestions that the Tutsi were ‘Hamites,’ who descended from Noah’s son Ham (Hintjens, 1999).

Hintjens (1999) explains that “the notion of inherited and immutable inter-racial differences in ability and make-up bolstered what was seen as a pre-colonial ‘premise of inequality,’ on which inter-lacustrine aristocracies had long based their claims of legitimacy” (p. 253). This method of social stratification was supported by beliefs that these systems of
classification replicated some religious-spiritual order, opening the door to imported European religious values and the social application of racial science (Hintjens, 1999).

Uvin (1997) suggests that the theory of the origins of the Hutu and the Tutsi people groups differs according to the people group. In other words, each group supports a different theory of origin for the Tutsi and the Hutu. The hard line Hutu groups present during the Rwandan genocide suggested that the Tutsi were foreign invaders, while the predominantly Tutsi government, which was instituted following the genocide, have presented the people groups as indiscernible only suggesting that groups are separated by socio-economic status.

*The Degradation of the Tutsi Social Identity*

The Tutsi social group developed a social identity of ‘Inyenzi’, a term which is literally translated in Kinyarwanda to mean ‘cockroaches’. Hintjens (1999) notes that “interestingly, the term Inyenzi is not as negative as it sounds, and was first used by the BaTutsi exiles in the 1960s to describe themselves, because of their practice of conducting cross border raids under cover of darkness,” (p. 261). While the origin of this label may not have been malicious, the term was used in a derogatory fashion during the genocide.

During the early years of the predominantly Hutu government, which was formed during the Rwandan revolution, the Tutsi were presented by the newly formed government as overlords who sought to subjugate the Hutu people. The government presented itself as the representation of democracy in the face of the feudal system instituted under the Tutsi. During the early years of this government, the public discourse was particularly racist. The president explicitly suggested that should the Tutsi attempt to gain power, then they should be exterminated (Uvin, 1997).
The first president of Rwanda following the Rwandan revolution proposed a “Hutu Manifesto” which suggested that the Tutsi will forever attempt to dominate the Hutu and that the Hutu and the Tutsi could never become truly integrated (Uvin, 1997). This document paints these ethnic differences as a fight for survival, suggesting that both ethnic groups could not co-exist without conflict.

Interestingly, because of the representation of the Tutsi as a social evil, little justification was needed for painting the Tutsi as usurpers before the Rwandan genocide. Even during the genocide itself, the Tutsi were blamed for their own extermination, an act which effectively removed culpability from the actual perpetrators of the genocide (Hintjens, 1999).

Uvin (1997) notes that the ethnic identification papers, the national discriminatory discourse regarding the Tutsi, and the quotas placed on the Tutsi all combined to maintain a discriminatory ideology, though not necessarily enacted discrimination prior to the Rwandan genocide. Uvin (1997) states that “these institutionalized structures of discrimination were both an outgrowth, and a facilitator, of prejudice,” (p. 101). These methods were designed by the government to keep the racial ideologies regarding the Hutu and the Tutsi alive in order to serve the interests of the government.

In Straus’s (2007) investigation of the influences of the Radio Television Libre des Milles Collines (RTLM) on the Rwandan genocide, he made an interesting finding regarding the nature of the Tutsi stigma, as it was perceived by perpetrators of the genocide. When interviewing perpetrators of the genocide, Straus investigated the respondents’ knowledge of the following areas: “first, whether Tutsis were racial others, in particular “Hamites” who had, according to legend, descended from North Africa to dominate Hutus in the past; second,
whether respondents had heard that Tutsi rebels’ objective was to reinstall a monarchy and enslave Hutus; and third, whether respondents believed the rebels were dangerous,” (p. 627).

The investigation yielded the following results: “On the Hamite question, of 204 respondents, 58 percent said they had not heard that idea; 28 percent said that they had heard it but did not believe the claim; 14 percent said they believed the statement to be true. On the monarchy question, of 197 respondents, 49 percent said that they had not heard the idea; 32 percent said they heard it but did not believe it; and 20 percent said that they had heard it and believed it. On fear of the rebels, of 198 respondents, half said they were afraid of the RPF. The survey includes other relevant questions on interethnic relations. One in particular is a question about how respondents got along with their Tutsi neighbors. Of 200 respondents, 87 percent said the relationships were good; 11 percent said they were without problem; 2 percent said they were bad,” (p. 627). These results indicate that, unlike the properties of stigma as a collective representation which is shared by all members of a population, the Tutsi stigma theories were not shared by all perpetrators of the Rwandan genocide.

The Role of the Rwandan Media in Rwandan Power Dynamics

Since the majority of the Rwandan population could not read or write, the radio was a prime staging ground for quickly and efficiently disseminating information to the Rwandan people from institutions of power. RTLM itself was often used to spread propaganda about MRND, the president’s own political party, in addition to notifying the country of changes in the government’s structure (Des Forges, 2007).

As the RPF attacks against Rwanda continued from 1990 into 1992, Des Forges (2007) also notes another interesting role of the radio in Rwanda, “in that atmosphere of growing RPF
strength and weakening French support, some Habyarimana supporters – and perhaps Habyarimana himself – turned to the idea of mobilizing large numbers of civilians as a ‘self-defence’ force to back up the national army. Military correspondence, as well as propaganda, had made clear in the preceding months that the ‘enemy’ included Tutsi civilians as well as RPF combatants. Thus the self-defence force was apparently meant as much to attack these civilians as to confront the soldiers of the RPF force,” (p. 43). This self-defence force provided a mechanism through which the media could initiate state sanctioned violence.

When the Burundi president was assassinated by a predominantly Tutsi force in October 1993, the official report was that he was stabbed in the chest by a bayonet. When RTLM provided their report of the assassination, they described acts of torture, mutilation, and castration which were inflicted upon the president by the Burundian Tutsi militia. These actions were symbolic of the same practices used by Tutsi kingship during the colonial occupation as a means of enforcing their dominance over enemy rulers (Des Forges, 2007).

Des Forges (2007) notes that during the genocide, “RTLM used terms like Inyenzi and Tutsi interchangeably with others referring to RPF combatants, leading listeners to believe that all Tutsi were necessarily supporters of the RPF force fighting against the government,” (p. 48). This observation suggests another phenomenon at play in these radio broadcasts. By using these terms interchangeably, the broadcasts effectively tied the Tutsi social identity with the national enemy, creating a national “other.” This process of portraying the Tutsi social identity as a national enemy provided a framework in which the Tutsi stigma could be developed. This act can also be viewed as part of a historical trend of the Rwandan government portraying the Tutsi as both national enemies and dangerous.
RTLM also gave directions to Tutsi targets as well as directions to kill key leaders, such as Romeo Dallaire, the commander of the UNAMIR forces in Kigali (Des Forges, 2007). While RTLM was previously involved in forming anti-Tutsi propaganda, the radio station had now become involved in directing the extermination of the Tutsi people.

Des Forges (2007) notes that “authorities supporting the genocide urged citizens to listen to the radio. One official even told the residents of his area that they should regard what the radio told them as having the same importance as direct orders from him,” (p. 50). This act may have been an activation of the self-defence protocols or a directive to engage in genocide under the direction of the radio broadcasts. While these actions may be speculated upon further, it is only responsible to conclude that authority was given to the radio broadcasts by Rwandan members of government.

In Chretien’s (2007) systematic review of the racial propaganda developed during the Rwandan genocide, he notes the different forms that this propaganda can take: “The first is associated with racist ardour against the Tutsi ‘cockroaches’ and the second pertains to the legitimacy of the elimination of these ‘cockroaches’ by the ‘majority people,’” (p. 56). This analysis underlines some key themes regarding the racial propaganda present during the Rwandan genocide. First, the propaganda was primarily focused on dehumanizing the Tutsi social identity (effectively helping to create the Tutsi stigma) and, second, the propaganda was intent on justifying their slaughter through supposed democratic ideals (creating the link between Tutsi stigmatization and violent discrimination).

Along these lines, Li (2007) notes three functions which RTLM served during the Rwandan genocide: “ideologically, it played on existing dominant discourses in Rwandan public
life for the purposes of encouraging listeners to participate in the killings; performatively, the station’s animateurs skillfully exploited the possibilities of the medium to create a dynamic relationship with and among listeners; and, finally, RTLM helped the Rwandan state appropriate one of the most innocuous aspects of everyday life in the service of the genocide,” (p. 90-91).

The media’s role in the Rwandan Genocide is a stunning example of the purposeful manipulation of social identities and ideas by institutions of power through media. In order to appropriately situate the messages being condoned by the media, a brief review of RTLM during the time of the genocide is necessary.

RTLM

“In some villages, radio was like the voice of God. At the height of the killing, in the camps for the displaced and refugees, you could still find people with portable radios. I wondered where they got the batteries. We couldn’t even get batteries for our flashlights” (Dallaire, 2007, p. 16).

The RTLM, Radio Television Libre de Milles-Collines, was established in July 1993. The radio transmissions continued until the RPF controlled the country in July 1994. The radio had two main transmitters, the most powerful of which (1000 watts) was installed on Mount Mahu, while a 100 watt transmitter was installed in Kigali (Yanagizawa, 2009).

For a map of the broadcasting range of the RTLM broadcasts, refer to Figure 9. This map demonstrates the two environs of the RTLM broadcasting towers and also maps the onset of the genocide killings within the different provinces in Rwanda.
Des Forges (1999) describes the extensive links which the RTLM shared with the Rwandan government: “Of the fifty original founders (of RTLM), forty were from the three prefectures of northern Rwanda, all but seven of those from Gisenyi and Ruhengeri, the region identified with Habyarimana. One of the chief financiers of the project was Felicien Kabuga, a wealthy businessman whose daughter was married to a son of President Habyarimana. Another contributor was Alphonse Ntilivamunda, a son-in-law of President Habyarimana, and an
important official at the Ministry of Public Works. Two ministers were among the founders, Augustin Ngitabatware, the minister of planning, and son-in-law of Kabuga, and Andre Ntagerura, the minister of telecommunications. Simon Bikini, an employee of the Ministry of Youth who was also an extremely popular musician best known for his virulently anti-Tutsi songs, was part of the group, as was Pasteur Musabe, general director of the Banque Continentale Africaine. Augustin Ruzindana, governor of the National Bank of Rwanda, joined later. The MRND was represented among the founders by Joseph Nzirorera, subsequently its executive secretary, and later by Mathieu Ndirumpatse, who served as president of the MRND after President Habyarimana left that post. In addition, Georges Rutaganda, vice-president of the MRND militia, the Interahamwe, was among the founders,”” (p. 68-69). As is evident from this description, the RTLM broadcasts were not only founded by members of the Rwandan government, but also enjoyed the continued support of the Rwandan government.

The RTLM had a massive following, such that it was the most popular radio broadcast in the country and would bring in listeners who would share radios with others in order to hear what was being said by RTLM (Yanagizawa, 2009). This popularity was in part due to the high illiteracy rates in the country as well as the witty dialogue the station offered. This popularity may explain how the message content of RTLM might have extended beyond the coverage of the RTLM environs, which did not cover the entire country. This conjecture, however, does not sufficiently justify RTLM’s direct role in the genocide.

The RTLM was broadcast in Kinyarwanda, rather than French or English, which made the broadcasts more accessible to the Rwandan people. The station was well-known for its comedic narratives and it was reported that RPF troops actually preferred listening to RTLM rather than the national Radio Rwanda (Hintjens, 1999).
Strause (2007) provides a summary of RTLM’s involvement in the genocide: “Before the genocide, RTLM broadcast a steady digest of belligerent, nationalist, antirebel, and often openly inflammatory statements. During the genocide, RTLM announcers encouraged listeners to fight, and in some cases, announcers broadcast names of individuals and places, which were subsequently attacked by citizen bands,” (p. 612).

The literature on the relationship between RTLM and the Rwandan genocide demonstrates two possible conclusions: first, “radio broadcasts implanted ideas in listeners that subsequently caused them to hate, dehumanize, and fear Tutsis. Radio thereby conditioned, facilitated, and legitimized violence and became a tool for the mobilization of genocide,” (Strause, 2007, p. 613). Second, the radio represented authority to such an extent that it was perceived like the voice of god by Rwandans. This authority given to the radio broadcasts, coupled with the heightened sense of authoritarian obligation among the Rwandan population, is hypothesized to have helped lead the genocide perpetrators to commit heinous acts in obedience to these broadcasts (Straus, 2007).

Straus (2007) points out that the difficulty with these models of explaining the media’s influence in the Rwandan genocide is that: (1) the models rely on a hypodermic model of communication, whereby an ideology can effectively be “injected” seamlessly into an audience. This model discounts the potential for interference in the line of communication either from the environment or from the audience themselves. (2) Related to the previous criticism, these models discount the potential for the audience to have agency. That is to say, the models suggest that the audience were only passive recipients of the information and would not have been able to discern judgment for themselves outside of these radio broadcasts. (3) Many of these models are not situated in theories of societal violence. That is to say that the models explain how
communication can be used to build dehumanizing ideology, but do not effectively demonstrate how that dehumanizing ideology contributes to violence.

In support of this critique of communication models of the Rwandan genocide, Mironko (2007) found that not all individuals who listened to RTLM did accept the ideology being presented by the radio broadcasts. This demonstrates that the RTLM helped to build upon the racial ideology being infused into the justification of the Rwandan genocide. In other words, RTLM built upon the structure of the racial ideology already present in Rwanda.

Straus (2007) provides some alternative explanations of motivations for the Rwandan genocide, suggesting that the genocide was a result of “an intense civil war following a presidential assassination, a state with strong local capacity, and a pronounced history of ethnic categorization,” (p. 631). This suggests that the radio broadcasts of RTLM only played a role in the genocide, rather than being the sole cause.

In conjunction with these analyses, the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) made the following legal findings regarding the RTLM’s role in the genocide:

“The Chamber has found that RTLM broadcasts engaged in ethnic stereotyping in a manner that promoted contempt and hatred for the Tutsi population and called on listeners to seek out and take up arms against the enemy. The enemy was defined to be the Tutsi ethnic group and Hutu opponents. These broadcasts called explicitly for the extermination of the Tutsi ethnic group. In 1994, both before and after 6 April, RTLM broadcast the names of Tutsi individuals and their families, as well as Hutu political opponents who supported the Tutsi ethnic group. In some cases these persons were subsequently killed. A specific causal connection between the RTLM broadcasts and the killing of these individuals – either by publicly naming
them or by manipulating their movements and directing that they, as a group be killed – has been established.” (ICTR, 3 December 2003: 63)

Presentation of the Problem

Li (2007) notes that “accounts of RTLM’s ideological role that focus solely on racist aspects do not explain why the station’s particular ideological world views caught on more than those of other stations; moreover, they fail to show how RTLM transcended ordinary propaganda, from simply propagating certain beliefs or feelings about Tutsi as an ethnic category, to encouraging and facilitating participation in the murder of friends, neighbours and relatives,” (p. 93).

Kimani (2007) observed that RTLM did not create the racial discourse which it presented, instead the broadcasts were designed to rely upon predetermined structures built in Rwandan society to promote the ethnic divides. Kimani (2007) noted that “through RTLM, the Hutu elite of the time created an environment in which the ‘Tutsis of the past’ and the ‘Tutsis of the present’ became the same,” (p. 112).

The means by which RTLM achieved this goal, and the social mechanism that these broadcasts relied upon in their presentation of anti-Tutsi stigma propaganda, is not clearly defined. This manuscript will analyze the discourse created by RTLM during the Rwandan genocide in order to analyze the properties of this mechanism.
Chapter 5: Methods

Analytical Approach

The analysis which was undertaken in this investigation was based on Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA). This approach focuses on how linguistic trends can demonstrate the formation of broader discourse. More specifically, CDA focuses on how institutions of power can manipulate the formation of discourse. One aspect of discourse which is very relevant to this investigation is identity formation. The social process of identity formation relies upon narratives and assumptions which are formed by discourse and therefore open to institutional manipulation (Van Dijk, 1996).

Given that Rwandan political parties were an integral part of RTLM’s hierarchical organization, the broadcasts which were presented by RTLM may demonstrate the direct influence of institutions of power on discourse formation. This observation makes CDA a highly applicable research tool for this investigation. In addition, as was proposed in chapter 3, language may provide a theoretical underpinning to social thought formation. As such, discourse provides a highly relevant platform for investigating social identity formation. While CDA has not been applied comprehensively to the investigation of stigma, the approach has been used to investigate racism.

In his analysis of racism, Van Dijk (1993) found that “much of the motivation and many prejudiced arguments that seem to inspire popular racism are “prepared” by elites” (p. 10). In order to investigate these prejudicial ideologies, Van Dijk noted that the analysis of textual properties like grammar and semantics was necessary. It is important to note that the semantic and grammatical structures which are observed in the text are not inherently racist or prejudicial. It was rather the context in which these grammatical and semantic properties are presented which
determines the extent to which these linguistic features could become prejudicial (Van Dijk, 1993).

In this investigation, CDA was used to analyze the presence of stigma and otherness in RTLM texts. In order to investigate these properties, the textual context of the linguistic features in these RTLM texts was analyzed. This analysis provided a description of how the Tutsi actor-noun (linguistic correlate of social actors) was created as a stigmatized identity of otherness in Rwandan public discourse. In other words, Tutsi stigma and otherness were present in Rwandan public discourse, which itself was manipulated by these RTLM broadcasts (see Figure 10).

Figure 10. Theoretical framework of the nested existence of Tutsi stigma within the broader discourse present in the RTLM transcripts

In order to complete this analysis, transcripts of Radio Television Libre de Milles-Collines (RTLM) broadcasts were obtained from the Montreal Institute for Genocide and Human Rights Studies (MIGS). The transcripts cover broadcasts over the course of the first 100 days of the genocide (April to July of 1994). These transcripts were used during the hearings at the
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) as court evidence. In order to provide a form of validity for both the quality of the translations, and the quality of this analysis, only transcripts which were translated by ICTR sanctioned translators into English (the language of the Investigator) were used in this analysis. The transcripts cover roughly 1225 minutes (about 20 hours) of broadcasting time in total. Information regarding the broadcast transcripts which were included in this investigation is summarized in Table 1.

Table 1. RTLM broadcast transcript background information

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date of Transcript</th>
<th>Length of Broadcast</th>
<th>Language of Broadcast</th>
<th>Transcriber/Translator</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>April 3, 1994</td>
<td>60 minutes</td>
<td>Kinyarwanda</td>
<td>Rosine Uwimana</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>April 6-8, 1994</td>
<td>~5 minutes</td>
<td>Kinyarwanda</td>
<td>ICTR transcriber</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>April 9, 1994</td>
<td>60 minutes</td>
<td>Kinyarwanda</td>
<td>Penine-Joie Muteteli</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>April 11, 1994</td>
<td>~30 minutes</td>
<td>Kinyarwanda</td>
<td>Charles Zikuliza</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>April 14, 1994</td>
<td>~60 minutes</td>
<td>Kinyarwanda</td>
<td>Lydie Mpambara</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>April 15, 1994</td>
<td>90 minutes</td>
<td>Kinyarwanda</td>
<td>Olga Uwere Gatimboiro</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>April 22, 1994</td>
<td>60 minutes</td>
<td>Kinyarwanda</td>
<td>Drocella Icyitegetse</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>April 22, 1994</td>
<td>~30 minutes</td>
<td>Kinyarwanda</td>
<td>Ndimurukundo Yves-Florent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May 15, 1994</td>
<td>~60 minutes</td>
<td>Kinyarwanda</td>
<td>Bimenyimana K. Ephem</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>Kinyarwanda</td>
<td>Fabien Nsengiyumva</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>Kinyarwanda</td>
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<td>~5 minutes</td>
<td>Kinyarwanda</td>
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<td>Kinyarwanda</td>
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<td>~60 minutes</td>
<td>Kinyarwanda</td>
<td>Ndimurukundo Yves-Florent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May 29, 1994</td>
<td>~60 minutes</td>
<td>Kinyarwanda</td>
<td>Lydie Mpambara</td>
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<td>May 30, 1994</td>
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<tr>
<td>May 31, 1994</td>
<td>~1 minute</td>
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<td>ICTR transcriber</td>
</tr>
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<td>June 3-4, 1994</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
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</tr>
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<td>Lydie Mpambara</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June 19, 1994</td>
<td>40 minutes</td>
<td>Kinyarwanda</td>
<td>ICTR transcriber</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June 20, 1994</td>
<td>~30 minutes</td>
<td>Kinyarwanda</td>
<td>ICTR transcriber</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June 21, 1994</td>
<td>~1 minute</td>
<td>Kinyarwanda</td>
<td>ICTR transcriber</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July 2, 1994</td>
<td>~1 minute</td>
<td>Kinyarwanda</td>
<td>ICTR transcriber</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July 3, 1994</td>
<td>60 minutes</td>
<td>Kinyarwanda</td>
<td>Gatimboiro Uweru Olga</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July 3, 1994</td>
<td>~30 minutes</td>
<td>Kinyarwanda</td>
<td>Fabien Nsengiyumva</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Analytical Framework

Critical Discourse Analysis

As was mentioned, a Critical Discourse Analysis Framework was adopted in this investigation. This analysis included a micro-analysis component and a macro-analysis component.

Micro-Analysis

The micro-analysis component relied on determining grammatical markers of stigma and otherness within their context. These grammatical markers were determined using two linguistic models: Van Leeuwen’s (1996) Representation of Social Actors and Van Dijk’s Ideological Square.

Van Dijk’s (1998) ideological square is a conceptual tool used to classify actor-nouns in text according to an “us-them” framework. In this framework, actor-nouns (for the purposes of this investigation, social actors will be linguistically defined as actor-nouns, or, nouns used to refer to social actors) are assigned to either the “us” or “them” column. The actions or events which are linked to these actor-nouns are then listed below their respective column. These actions or events are then categorized as being either positive or negative. According to Van Dijk (1998), positive events are often emphasized for the “us” group and de-emphasized for the “them” group. Alternatively, negative events are often de-emphasized for the “us” group and emphasized for the “them” group. The emphasis and de-emphasis of these events is accomplished through grammatical structures.

Van Leeuwen’s (1996) model for determining the representation of actor-nouns was developed in order to classify social actors in a given text. This approach ties grammatical and semantic structures in the text with discourse. To be specific, the approach assumes the
grammatical and semantic means by which a actor-noun is portrayed in a text is a representation of that social actor’s position in discourse. The classification of actor-nouns occurs through a taxonomic differentiation process as demonstrated in Figure 11. For the purposes of this investigation, this analysis will focus primarily on the branches extending from Impersonalisation (7, 8, 9, and 22 in Figure 11).

Figure 11. Van Leeuwen’s (1996, p. 66) model of the representation of social actors in text

Macro-Analysis

The macro-analysis component of this investigation included an analysis of the trends in these grammatical structures. The grammatical structures being measured in this investigation focussed on three actor-nouns: Tutsi, Inyenzi, and Inkotanyi. These terms semantically have very different meanings; however, they were all ultimately referents for the Tutsi social identity
during the time of the 1994 Rwandan Genocide. These three actor-nouns were chosen in order to better understand the meanings applied to the Tutsi identity during the Rwandan Genocide.

Tutsi

As has been described, the Tutsi people group represent 10% of the Rwandan population and have been identified as a unique ethnic identity in Rwanda since at least the 15th century. Since the occupation of the Belgium colonialists, the Tutsi people group was identified through a combination of physical feature analysis (based on racial science) and lineage analysis through the paternal side (Uvin, 1997). However, intermarriage between ethnic groups have made this process of Tutsi identification ambiguous (Hintjens, 1999).

Inyenzi

Inyenzi is the Kinyarwanda word for “cockroach” and was originally given to the predominantly Tutsi militia following the Rwandan revolution, who would perform night time raids across the Rwandan borders. Over time, however, this term was applied more broadly to Tutsis in a derogatory fashion (Straus, 2007).

Inkotanyi

Inkotanyi is a Kinyarwandan word which has a much more vague meaning. The term has been roughly translated to mean “militia” or “warrior” although the term is predominately used in specific reference to the RPF militia (Straus, 2007; Hintjens, 1999).

Textual analysis

The grammatical structures which occurred for each of these actor-nouns were compared in order to demonstrate the differential classification of each of those actor-nouns in the discourse presented by these broadcasts. In order to accomplish this, the RTLM transcripts were thoroughly read and all instances of the terms “Tutsi,” “Inyenzi,” or “Inkotanyi” were identified
in the text (the English translation of Inyenzi was also accepted). The text surrounding these identified terms was then analyzed in order to determine the contextualized meaning of these references. This was accomplished through grammatical analysis (a description of the different forms of grammar used in a given text) using a combination of Halliday’s functional grammar and Van Leeuwen’s model for the representation of actor-nouns. These grammatical structures were then charted over the timeline of the Rwandan Genocide in order to demonstrate any temporal properties of these structures. Finally, the discursive findings from these broadcasts were compared with two historical documents which are linked with the stigmatization of the Tutsi ethnic group. These two documents are the Hutu Manifesto and the Mugesera Speech given in 1992 which highlighted the dangerousness of the Tutsi people group.

**Hutu Manifesto**

The Hutu Manifesto was published during the Rwandan Revolution by a group of Rwandan Hutu Intellectuals. The document proposed that the Tutsi and Hutu people groups were ultimately incompatible and that the Tutsi people group would continue to attempt to subjugate the Hutu people group. In addition, given that this manifesto has been identified as the source for so much of the anti-Tutsi rhetoric (Hintjens, 1999), this document provided a useful source of external validity for the findings in this investigation. The copy of the Hutu Manifesto used in this investigation was collected from the Centre de Recherche et d’Information Socio-Politiques (C.R.I.S.P.) in Brussels, Belgium.

**Mugesera Speech**

Biju-Duval (2007) noted that “In November, 1992, just a few months after the massacres of the Tutsi population of the Bugesera region, Mr. Mugesera, a well-known Rwandan university professor, and an influential politician, made a speech in his commune that the ICTR’s official
historiographers, on the authority of the prosecutor’s expert witnesses Alison Des Forges and Jean-Pierre Chretien, have since cited as the archetype of speech that incites genocide” (p. 350). Given the influence that this speech had during the genocide, as well as its properties as an inherently stigmatizing document (according to the opinions of these expert witnesses), this speech provided an excellent source for comparison with the findings in this analysis. A copy of this speech was collected from the Faculty of Law at the University of Toronto.

Otherness Coding

As was indicated in the course of this manuscript, otherness is not only an identity of difference (as indicated by deviation from instituted norms) but is also often devalued. In order to determine otherness in the transcripts which were analysed in the process of this investigation, a modified form of Van Dijk’s (1998) ideological square was used. Due to the fact that the representation of “us” in the broadcasts was not explicitly defined, the investigation was forced to only consider representations of “them.” In order to observe whether references to Tutsi, Inyenzi, or Inkotanyi could be categorized in the “them” column of the model, the events and actions stereotyped to the Tutsi, Inyenzi, and Inkotanyi actor-nouns were analyzed to determine whether they represented negative aspects of the actor-nouns (see Figure 12).

Figure 12. Van Dijk’s (1998) ideological square

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>“Us”</th>
<th>“Them”</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Positive Events/Traits</td>
<td>Emphasize</td>
<td>Minimize</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Negative Events/Traits</td>
<td>Minimize</td>
<td>Emphasize</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Determining negativity proved to be difficult. In lieu of using the researcher’s own frame of reference for determining negativity, the investigation relied on Chibnall’s (1977, p. 21-22) dominant values criteria. This dominant values criterion was produced by Chibnall in an analysis of crime reporting over the course of a decade (1965-1975). Chibnall’s analysis demonstrated that the way in which criminal deviance was reported stemmed from broader societal values and ideology. The analysis demonstrated that the ideology of a given society could influence the way in which actions were interpreted by the media. As part of these results, Chibnall created a list of the positive and negative values which seemed to determine whether the attributes of a group were presented positively or negatively in the media. In addition, this criteria has been used to determine the otherness of actor-noun representations in the past (Caldas-Coulthard, 2003) and provided a reliable tool for the determination of negativity. As such, this criterion was a helpful tool in determining the positive and negative values attributed to groups in these RTLM broadcasts. The dominant values used in this investigation are summarized in Table 2.
Table 2. Chibnall’s (1977, p. 21-22) dominant values criteria

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Positive Legitimating Values</th>
<th>Negative Legitimating Values</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Legality</td>
<td>Illegality</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moderation</td>
<td>Extremism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Compromise</td>
<td>Dogmatism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cooperation</td>
<td>Confrontation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Order</td>
<td>Chaos</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peacefulness</td>
<td>Violence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tolerance</td>
<td>Intolerance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constructiveness</td>
<td>Destructiveness</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Openness</td>
<td>Secrecy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Honesty</td>
<td>Corruption</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Realism</td>
<td>Ideology</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rationality</td>
<td>Irrationality</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Impartiality</td>
<td>Bias</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fairness</td>
<td>Unfairness</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Firmness</td>
<td>Weakness</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Industriousness</td>
<td>Idleness</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Freedom of choice</td>
<td>Monopoly/uniformity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Equality</td>
<td>Inequality</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The de-emphasizing of positive events was determined through the use of Interpretive Action Verbs and Descriptive Action Verbs. According to the Linguistic Category Model, the emphasizing of actions or de-emphasizing of actions can be accomplished through the abstraction or concreteness through which actions are grammatically portrayed. Actions are emphasized when they are abstracted to an actor-noun, that is, when they are presented in a way that demonstrates an aspect of that actor-noun’s character. This high level of abstraction is accomplished through the use of adjectives and stative verbs (verbs which demonstrate the state of the actor-noun). In this way, the actions become demonstrations of the actor-noun’s character. Alternatively, actions are de-emphasized when they are described concretely. This is accomplished by describing actions using Interpretive Action Verbs (the actions are interpreted for the reader) or Descriptive Action Verbs (the properties of the actions are described). When actions are described in this way, the actions do not demonstrate anything about the actor-noun’s
character, but instead simply record the action being performed by the actor-noun (Reitsma-Van Rooijen, Semin, and Van Leeuwen, 2007).

In applying this approach to this research, all positive actions which were performed by the actor-nouns of interest (Tutsi, Inyenzi, Inkotanyi) and which were described in concrete terms (using interpretive action verbs or descriptive action verbs) were noted in this analysis. In addition, all negative actions or adjectives (as determined by Chibnall’s (1977) dominant values) which were ascribed to the actor-nouns (Tutsi, Inyenzi, or Inkotanyi) in the text were also noted. The ascription of negative actions was determined by the use of stative verbs (verbs which infer the mental state of an actor). Table 3 provides a reasonably comprehensive list of stative verbs.

Table 3. List of stative verbs

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Stative Verbs</th>
<th>Stative Verbs</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>to adore</td>
<td>to agree</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>to believe</td>
<td>to belong to</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>to contain</td>
<td>to cost</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>to detest</td>
<td>to disagree</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>to feel</td>
<td>to fit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>to imagine</td>
<td>to include</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>to lack</td>
<td>to like</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>to matter</td>
<td>to mean</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>to owe</td>
<td>to own</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>to realize</td>
<td>to recognize</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>to see</td>
<td>to seem</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>to surprise</td>
<td>to taste</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>to weigh</td>
<td>to think</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Otherness Coding Examples

Otherness Negativity Emphasis Example from the Text (Stative Verbs)

“They did so saying that they want to punish the presidential guards because they say it is them who might have caused trouble to the population” (RTLM, April 11, 1994)

Otherness Negativity Emphasis Example from the Text (Adjectives)
“But the Inkotanyi, who have the reputation of being “ruthless”…what can I say…heartless, because it is incredible to throw grenades at women, children and old people sheltered in a house to protect themselves from the cold” (RTLM, April 15, 1994).

*Otherness Positivity De-emphasis Example from the Text*

“We find that the terms in which this shameful and recurrent act of attacking the civilian population was condemned appears to encourage them instead, because it was described as ‘an act of bravery by the Inyenzi who have the city in their grips’” (RTLM, July 3, 1994).

**Inhumanity Coding**

An interesting aspect of this investigation is the understanding of terms of inhumanity. While stigma was defined by Goffman (1963) as a mark of disqualified humanity or otherness, otherness and inhumanity may be semantically different terms. In order to differentiate these terms, this investigation also determined instances of inhumanity in the text.

In order to define inhumanity, this investigation used Van Leeuwen’s (1996) model for the representation of actor-nouns in text (22 in Figure 2). In this model, Van Leeuwen noted that actor-nouns can be impersonalized by being represented by semantic features which do not necessarily include human in their definition. In other words, actor-nouns can be described in the text in ways which may explicitly or implicitly preclude their human characteristics. Van Leeuwen noted that this can be accomplished through two processes: abstraction and objectivation.

Van Leeuwen (1996, p.59) notes that “abstraction occurs when social actors are represented by means of a quality assigned to them by the representation.” For this
investigation, abstraction was noted in any case where a noun, which defined an attribute of the actor-noun, was used in place of the actor in the text. In defining objectivation, Van Leeuwen (1996, p. 59) noted that “Objectivation occurs when actor-nouns are represented by means of reference to a place or thing closely associated either with their person or with the activity they are represented as being engaged in. In other words, objectivation is realised by metonymical reference. A number of types of objectivation are particularly common: spatialisation, utterance autonomisation, instrumentalisation, and somatization.” In this investigation, objectivation was noted to occur when a noun, whose meaning does not include human and which, was used in place of an actor-noun.

Inhumanity Coding Examples

*Inhumanity Abstraction Examples from the Text*

“They are actually bandits (Inkotanyi)” (RTLM, April 22, 1994).

“But can you imagine these suicide attackers (Inkotanyi) who came, found people in their homes and took them hostage there and are now starving them!” (RTLM, April 22, 1994).

*Inhumanity Objectivation Example from the Text*

“So then, get up and fight the Inyenzi. They have turned out to be ghosts” (RTLM, May 30, 1994).

Stigma Coding

In order to define the presence of stigma in these transcripts, this investigation relied on Link and Phelan’s (2001) definition of stigma as the “co-occurrence of labelling, stereotyping, separation, status loss and discrimination.” By breaking stigma down into separate processes, this definition made it possible to create linguistic markers to measure stigma. In order to ensure
the reliability and validity of these markers, this investigation relied upon established linguistic approaches which enabled the key features of this definition to be measured in the text.

Labelling

In order for labelling to occur, Link and Phelan (2001) identified two necessary processes. “First, substantial oversimplification is required to create groups” (p. 367). This oversimplification is such that any variability in the group is ignored and the entire group is treated as a uniform identity. “Second, the central role of the social selection of human differences is revealed by noting that the attributes deemed salient differ dramatically according to time and place” (Link and Phelan, 2001, p. 368). In this process, the group which was originally formed is identified by a socially salient marker. The identity given to that group, however, is only semi-permanent in that the salience of the identity, as a differentiating social force, changes over time. So, labelling occurs when a uniform group is formed, on the basis of one marker, and that group’s identity changes over time.

In Van Leeuwen’s (1996) model, the process which most resembles this definition is Assimilation (9 in Figure 11). Assimilation is the process of referring to an actor-noun by a group rather than that individual’s identity. In this way, assimilation is related to a form of impersonalization, where the identity of the individual actor is lost in the reference. In his definition of assimilation, Van Leeuwen (1996, p. 49) noted that there are “two major kinds of assimilation, aggregation and collectivization. The former quantifies groups of participants, treating them as ‘statistics’, the latter does not. Aggregation plays a crucial role in many contexts. In our society the majority rules, not just in contexts in which formal democratic procedures are used to arrive at decisions, but also and especially in others, through mechanisms such as opinion polls, surveys, marketing research, etc. Even legislative reform is increasingly
based on ‘what most people consider legitimate’. For this reason aggregation is often used to regulate practice and to manufacture consensus opinion, even though it presents itself as merely recording facts.”

In this investigation labelling was recognized by the use of plurality (mass nouns or a noun denoting a group of people) when referring to a specific actor-noun in the text.

Labelling Coding Examples

“I do not know what the Inkotanyi would say about this” (RLTM, May 30, 1994).

“As I mentioned earlier, these small Inyenzi tried the night before to enter in Muhima” (RTLM, May 30, 1994).

Stereotyping

Jones et al. (1984, p. 158) defined a stereotype as “a presumed correlation between one trait (category membership) and other traits (e.g., personality and physical characteristics).” Link and Phelan (2001, p. 369) note that “this aspect of stigma involves a label and a stereotype, with the label linking a person to a set of undesirable characteristics that form the stereotype.” Based on these definitions, the linguistic marker for stereotyping would therefore include the presence of both assimilation (labelling) as well as a form of abstraction (stereotyping). For the purposes of this investigation, stereotyping was noted whenever: (1) An assimilated group was formed and (2) that assimilated group was given attributes through a process of abstraction. In Jones et al.’s (1984) conceptualization, this process would reveal the correlation between the traits of group membership and whatever attributes were assigned to that group.

In order to determine the abstraction of attributes, this investigation used two linguistic markers of abstraction: adjectives and stative verbs. Adjectives reveal the very direct application of attributes (trait 1) to an entire group (trait 2) uniformly, thus making their use in this context a
form of stereotyping. In this context, stative verbs demonstrate the application of a mental state (trait 1) to an entire group (trait 2). Table 3 provides a reasonably comprehensive list of stative verbs.

Stereotyping Coding Examples

*Stereotyping Examples in the Text (Adjectives)*

“These Inkotanyi are extraordinary” (RTLM, May 30, 1994)

“The Inyenzi are indeed suicidal” (RTLM, May 30, 1994)

“He is discouraged because of the large sum of money Tanzania has spent in Arusha pleading with the Tutsi terrorist” (RTLM, May 30, 1994)

*Stereotyping Examples in the Text (Stative verbs)*

“It is not the first time that the RPF Tutsi-Inyenzi clique, that this clique wants to take and monopolise power, just to oppress the Hutus and thus do away with democracy” (RTLM, April 22, 1994).

Separating

“A third feature of the stigma process occurs when social labels connote a separation of ‘us’ and ‘them’” (Link and Phelan, 2001, p. 370). This feature is important to the stigma process as it involves the separation of group identities in preparation for the devaluation of certain identities. The difficulty with this process is that separations between “us” and “them” are not always explicit in a given text. This investigation therefore approached the coding of this marker very conservatively. Separation was marked as having occurred whenever a group was referred to in such a way that the semantic definition for that group could not have included the speaker’s group.
This was established in instances where terms for “us” (us, we, our) acted directly on, or were acted directly on by, another actor-noun in the text. In this way, the semantic difference between the actor-noun and the speaker’s group could be explicitly observed. This process is also demonstrated in Van Leeuwen’s (1996) model through the process of differentiation (12 in Figure 11): “Differentiation explicitly differentiates an individual actor-noun or group of actor-nouns from a similar actor or group, creating the difference between the “self” and the “other”, or between “us” and “them”” (p. 52).

Separating Coding Examples

“And now the Inkotanyi are shooting us” (RTLM, May 30, 1994)

“I agree what you have just said about the white men…those white men who sold us, those Tutsis who sold us abroad” (RTLM, May 17-18, 1994).

Status Loss

Link and Phelan (2001) note that status loss is the ultimate devaluation of the social actor as a result of multiple processes in stigma formation. Link and Phelan propose that status loss is “an almost immediate consequence of successful negative labeling and stereotyping” and that it is “a general downward placement of a person in a status hierarchy. The person is connected to undesirable characteristics that reduce his or her status in the eyes of the stigmatizer” (p. 371). Thus status loss includes: (1) the labelling of according to a social group, (2) the stereotyping of that group, (3) the linking of that group with negative attributes, and (4) the downward placement of the individual in a status hierarchy.

Linguistically, the closest correlate to this marker of stigma is van Leeuwen’s (1996) conceptualization of Categorization (14 in Figure 11), where the actor-nouns are identified according to “identities and functions that they share with others” (p. 52). These identities are
established within a given society and ranked according to the value set of that society. In order for this classification to be a form of status loss, however, the category which the actor-noun is placed in must be a de-valued category. This is an ambiguous process as the hierarchical structure of a society is a necessary requisite in order to perform this linguistic process. For the purposes of this investigation, status loss was determined to have happened if the category which the actor-noun was placed in was also linked to Chibnall’s (1977) negative legitimating values (Table 2).

Status Loss Coding Examples

“Therefore, he should not invite this group of criminals (Inyenzi)” (RTLM, May 30, 1994)

“The Inkotanyi who must have realized that their end was near, and beaten a hasty retreat. They are now thieves, stealing from our fields” (RTLM, May 17-18, 1994).

Discrimination

In this component of stigma, Link and Phelan (2001) note the need to connect attitudes with behaviours. In this sense, the foundation of stigma is connected with behaviours which discriminate against the bearer of the stigma. Link and Phelan contend, however, that the link between attitudes and behaviours is not well established in the literature, making the criteria for this component of the stigma process ambiguous.

This investigation, therefore, will take a conservative approach in determining the markers of this component in the text. The marker for this component will be an imperative grammatical structure (a grammatical structure used to give commands) paired with Specification (van Leeuwen, 1996, p. 46-50) (8 in Figure 11). In Van Leeuwen’s model, specification is the reference to an identifiable group. Specification can be found by the
existence of a plural with an article and may be preceded by a quantifier. In this investigation, that specification is in reference to the actor-nouns Tutsi, Inyenzi, or Inkotanyi. The imperative grammatical structure will be such that the speaker will be calling for one actor-noun to either endanger or limit access to previously accessible resources by the Tutsi, Inyenzi, or Inkotanyi actor-nouns in the text.

Discrimination Coding Examples

“We should provide them with guns to enable them to fight these enemies of Rwanda (Inyenzi)” (RTLM, April 15, 1994)

“In any case, exterminate them (Inyenzi)” (RTLM, May 30, 1994).

Linguistic Analysis

After these grammatical markers were coded, the occurrences of those codes were counted according to actor-noun (Tutsi, Inyenzi, and Inkotanyi). The occurrence of those codes was then used to identify the extent to which these actor-nouns were stigmatized or othered in the text. The code summaries will also be mapped over time to see if there is any variation over time in their representation.
Chapter 6: Results

Overview

After completing the analysis in this investigation, the findings in the RTLM transcripts demonstrated a significant reliance on otherness markers in representations of Tutsi actor-nouns in the RTLM texts. In addition, stigma markers were associated with Tutsi actor-nouns to a varying degree in the RTLM texts. The temporal properties of these grammatical markers of stigma and otherness indicated that actor-nouns were presented differently in the text over the course of the Rwandan Genocide. One interesting property which was revealed in this analysis was the stereotyping properties of “othered” actor-nouns, which presented these actor-nouns as a uniform identity of deviance from instituted norms and ignored any variability in the identities of these actor-nouns. The results of this analysis will be presented according to the research objectives of this investigation.

In the analysis of these texts, the occurrence of each actor-noun varied, with the Inkotanyi actor-noun being the most frequently occurring and the Tutsi actor-noun being the least frequently occurring (Table 4). Table 1 is meant to provide the totals for each actor-noun so that, in the following analysis tables, the differential total occurrences of each code can be compared with this table in order to determine the sum of the code occurrences.

Table 4. Number of actor-noun references in the RTLM transcripts

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Actor-Nouns</th>
<th>n (%) of all actor-noun references</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Tutsi</td>
<td>210 (13.2%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inyenzi</td>
<td>510 (32.2%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inkotanyi</td>
<td>866 (54.6%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>1586 (100.0%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Objective One: Determine how the RTLM radio broadcasts developed the Tutsi social identity as an identity of otherness through discourse.

In the RTLM transcripts, the actor-noun references were differentially associated with negative events (See Table 5 for a summary of the negative events attached to the actor-nouns). The extent to which each actor-noun was depicted as having performed a negative event lays the framework for understanding how those actor-nouns were depicted overall in the text. In particular, the Inyenzi actor-noun demonstrated the greatest number of negative event references than any other actor-noun in the text.

Table 5. Negative events attached to actor-nouns

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Actor-Noun</th>
<th>Negative n(%)</th>
<th>Neutral n(%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Tutsi</td>
<td>69 (32.9%)</td>
<td>141 (67.1%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inyenzi</td>
<td>232 (45.5%)</td>
<td>278 (54.5%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inkotanyi</td>
<td>355 (41.0%)</td>
<td>511 (59.0%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The exact properties of the negative events (as determined by Chibnall’s (1977) dominant values criteria) demonstrate the kind of actions which were attributed to each actor-noun (Table 6). Overwhelmingly, each actor-noun was depicted as being highly violent in the text. This was followed closely by the number of references to either the illegality of the actor-noun’s actions or how those events depict the weakness of each actor-noun. These events describe the kinds of frameworks through which each actor-noun was depicted in the text. While these frameworks do not directly determine the identity of each actor-noun, they do implicitly demonstrate the kind of qualities which the actions of those actor-nouns demonstrate.
Table 6. The properties of negative events ascribed to actor-nouns

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Negativity Criteria</th>
<th>Tutsi n (%)</th>
<th>Inyenzi n (%)</th>
<th>Inkotanyi n (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Illegality</td>
<td>4 (5.8%)</td>
<td>27 (11.6%)</td>
<td>31 (8.7%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Extremism</td>
<td>5 (7.2%)</td>
<td>2 (0.9%)</td>
<td>5 (1.4%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dogmatism</td>
<td>7 (10.1%)</td>
<td>5 (2.2%)</td>
<td>13 (3.7%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Confrontation</td>
<td>3 (4.3%)</td>
<td>9 (3.9%)</td>
<td>14 (3.9%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chaos</td>
<td>1 (1.4%)</td>
<td>1 (0.4%)</td>
<td>8 (2.3%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Violence</td>
<td>22 (31.9%)</td>
<td>115 (49.6%)</td>
<td>165 (46.5%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intolerance</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2 (0.9%)</td>
<td>5 (1.4%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Destructiveness</td>
<td>5 (7.2%)</td>
<td>19 (8.2%)</td>
<td>32 (9.0%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Secrecy</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>8 (3.4%)</td>
<td>9 (2.5%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Corruption</td>
<td>9 (13.0%)</td>
<td>17 (7.3%)</td>
<td>23 (6.5%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ideology</td>
<td>1 (1.4%)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3 (0.8%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Irrationality</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>7 (3.0%)</td>
<td>10 (2.8%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bias</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unfairness</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1 (0.3%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Weakness</td>
<td>7 (10.1%)</td>
<td>19 (8.2%)</td>
<td>36 (10.1%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Idleness</td>
<td>2 (2.9%)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Monopoly/Uniformity</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1 (0.4%)</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inequality</td>
<td>3 (4.3%)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>69 (100.0%)</td>
<td>232 (100.0%)</td>
<td>355 (100.0%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In the RTLM broadcast transcripts which were analyzed, the indicators of otherness (as demonstrated by emphasizing the negative actions or attributes of actor-nouns or de-emphasizing positive actions or attributes of actor-nouns) were identified. For a summary of those results, refer to Table 7. This analysis demonstrates that negative attributes or actions were more often applied to the Tutsi actor-noun than any other actor-noun. As well, positive attributes were more likely to be de-emphasized for the Tutsi actor-noun than the other actor-nouns. This observation contrasts with Table 2 which demonstrated that the Inyenzi actor-noun was linked to the most negative events, while being the least stereotyped by these negative events. This finding should be interpreted with caution, as positive actions and attributes were rarely found in the text, undermining the reliability of this finding.
Table 7. Summary of otherness markers in the text

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Otherness (negative emphasis) (OEN)</th>
<th>Otherness (positivity devaluation) (ODP)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>OEN n(%)</td>
<td>Neutral n(%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tutsi</td>
<td>32 (15.2%)</td>
<td>178 (84.8%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inyenzi</td>
<td>48 (9.4%)</td>
<td>462 (90.6%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inkotanyi</td>
<td>109 (12.6%)</td>
<td>757 (87.4%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The exact properties of the negative attributes or actions which were attached to actor-nouns also gives an important insight into how these actor-nouns were portrayed in the text (refer to Table 8). In analyzing those properties, the most frequent negative attribute concerned the violent, destructive, and corrupt nature which was portrayed in reference to actor-nouns in the text. In addition, the actor-nouns were portrayed as both illegal and weak in the text. In these properties, it is again apparent that the Inyenzi actor-noun was more dramatically othered in the text than other actor-nouns.

Table 8. Summary of the properties of otherness markers in the text

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Negativity Criteria</th>
<th>Tutsi n (%)</th>
<th>Inyenzi n (%)</th>
<th>Inkotanyi n (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Illegality</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>18 (37.5%)</td>
<td>20 (18.3%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Extremism</td>
<td>4 (12.5%)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1 (0.9%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dogmatism</td>
<td>4 (12.5%)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>8 (7.3%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Confrontation</td>
<td>1 (3.1%)</td>
<td>5 (10.4%)</td>
<td>19 (17.4%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chaos</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3 (6.3%)</td>
<td>2 (1.8%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Violence</td>
<td>8 (25.0%)</td>
<td>6 (12.5%)</td>
<td>18 (16.5%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intolerance</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2 (4.2%)</td>
<td>2 (1.8%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Destructiveness</td>
<td>1 (3.1%)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>5 (4.6%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Secrecy</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Corruption</td>
<td>4 (12.5%)</td>
<td>4 (8.3%)</td>
<td>15 (13.8%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ideology</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Irrationality</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1 (0.9%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bias</td>
<td>1 (3.1%)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1 (0.9%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unfairness</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Weakness</td>
<td>6 (18.8%)</td>
<td>9 (18.8%)</td>
<td>17 (15.6%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Idleness</td>
<td>1 (3.1%)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Monopoly/Uniformity</td>
<td>1 (3.1%)</td>
<td>1 (2.1%)</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inequality</td>
<td>1 (3.1%)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>32 (100%)</td>
<td>48 (100%)</td>
<td>109 (100%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The markers of inhumanity, as defined by abstraction and objectivation, are summarized in Table 9. The Tutsi actor-noun was more likely to be abstracted as inhumane while being the least othered.

Table 9. Summary of inhumanity markers in the text

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Inhumanity (Abstraction) (IA)</th>
<th>Inhumanity (Objectivation) (IO)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>IA n(%)</td>
<td>Neutral n(%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tutsi</td>
<td>19 (9.0%)</td>
<td>191 (91.0%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inyenzi</td>
<td>16 (3.1%)</td>
<td>494 (96.9%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inkotanyi</td>
<td>36 (4.2%)</td>
<td>830 (95.8%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In comparing the representation of the Tutsi, Inyenzi, and Inkotanyi actor-nouns, the exact properties of those representations provide a helpful insight into what characteristics were abstracted to those actor-nouns (refer to Table 10).

In reviewing the Tutsi actor-noun representation, the abstracted characteristics most frequently used refer to the Tutsi social group portrayed the members of that group as extremists, terrorists, and enemies (Umwanzi). Correspondingly, the text assigns the Tutsi social group with stereotypical traits of pre-supposed superiority. This explanation, however, does not sufficiently characterize the abstraction of the Tutsi actor-noun. The actor was also abstracted according to terms of kinship, which, while meeting the criteria for inhuman markers, presents a paradox to the de-valued representation of the Tutsi social group in the text.
Table 10. Properties of inhumanity abstraction markers in the text

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Inhumanity Abstraction</th>
<th>Tutsi n (%) of references</th>
<th>Inyenzi n (%) of references</th>
<th>Inkotanyi n (%) of references</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Alliance</td>
<td>1 (5.9%)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assassins</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1 (2.9%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bandits</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2 (5.7%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brothers</td>
<td>2 (11.8%)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cannibals</td>
<td>1 (5.9%)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Children</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1 (6.7%)</td>
<td>1 (2.9%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cowards</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2 (13.3%)</td>
<td>1 (2.9%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Criminals</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4 (26.7%)</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dare-Devils</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1 (2.9%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Death Squad</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1 (2.9%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Enemies</td>
<td>1 (5.9%)</td>
<td>3 (20.0%)</td>
<td>14 (40.0%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Extremists</td>
<td>3 (17.6%)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Feudal Monarchist</td>
<td>1 (5.9%)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Idiots</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1 (2.9%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Killers</td>
<td>1 (5.9%)</td>
<td>2 (13.3%)</td>
<td>2 (5.9%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nihilists</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1 (2.9%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not Strategists</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1 (6.7%)</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Officers</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1 (6.7%)</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Problem</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1 (6.7%)</td>
<td>1 (2.9%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Propagandist</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2 (5.7%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rascals</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1 (2.9%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Suicide Attackers</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1 (2.9%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Superiority Complex</td>
<td>2 (11.8%)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Terrorists</td>
<td>5 (29.4%)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2 (5.7%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thieves</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1 (2.9%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tramps</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1 (2.9%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Umwanzi</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1 (6.7%)</td>
<td>1 (2.9%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>19 (100.0%)</strong></td>
<td><strong>15 (100.0%)</strong></td>
<td><strong>36 (100.0%)</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

This approach is strikingly different from the objectivation of the Tutsi identity, which was characterized by both references to animals and geographic locations. The references to geographic locations are hypothetical in nature. They refer a proposed demarcated geographic area which is constrained to only the Tutsi identity. In the text, these references suggested that this geographic area would be forcibly imposed upon Rwanda.
The Inyenzi actor-noun presented a different form of inhumanity. Since Inyenzi is the Kinyarwanda term for “cockroach,” the term inherently imposes an inhuman semantic meaning on the social group. As such, any reference to this term in the text as a group identity was marked as an instance of inhumanity. This also explains the extremely high objectivation figure demonstrated by the Inyenzi actor-noun in Table 9. Therefore, given the obvious properties of the objectivation of the Inyenzi actor-noun, only the objectivated references to the Tutsi and Inkotanyi actor-nouns are presented in Table 11.

The representation of the Inyenzi actor-noun in the text was focused far more on the illegality of their actions and attributes. This portrayal also included references to military labels as well as devalued societal labels. This textual representation appears to explicitly demonstrate the perceived deviance of the group from institutional norms, while still maintaining the use of institutionalized forms of identification (through the use of military labels).

The portrayal of the Inkotanyi actor-noun demonstrated abstracted attributes more similar to the Inyenzi actor-noun, with an overwhelming focus on their identity as an enemy (refer to Table 4). Interestingly, the abstracted attributes assigned to the Inkotanyi actor-noun are far more related to violent, frenetic, or confrontational attributes. These attributes demonstrate an interesting aspect of the Inkotanyi portrayal, indicating the dangerousness of this actor-noun in particular. The objectivation of the Inkotanyi actor-noun is also much more explicitly non-human, spanning animals, geographic areas, as well as hypothetical entities (ghosts). The objectivation of the Inkotanyi is also similar to the Tutsi objectivation in its inclusion of dangerous objectivated attributes. While the Tutsi actor-noun is related to a snake, the Inkotanyi actor-noun is related to a plague. Similar geographic references are also made about the
Inkotanyi, though these references (zone and area) appear to be far more concrete than the hypothetical locations which were ascribed to the Tutsi actor-noun.

Table 11. Properties of inhumanity objectivation markers in the text

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Inhumanity Objectivation</th>
<th>Tutsi n (%) of references</th>
<th>Inkotanyi n (%) of references</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ants</td>
<td>1 (16.7%)</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Area</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1 (14.3%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ghosts</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2 (28.6%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inyenzi</td>
<td>2 (33.3%)</td>
<td>2 (28.6%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Plague</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1 (14.3%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Snake</td>
<td>1 (16.7%)</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tutsiland</td>
<td>2 (33.3%)</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zone</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1 (14.3%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>6 (100.0%)</strong></td>
<td><strong>7 (100.0%)</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Objective Two: Determine how the Tutsi stigma was formed through discourse by RTLM radio broadcasts.

The Tutsi stigma, along with its ancillary identities as Inyenzi and Inkotanyi, was measured according to grammatical structures in the text. Of the grammatical markers of stigma, the most frequently occurring aspect was social labelling (refer to Table 12). This tendency to label individuals according to groups in the text was an important basis for grammatically developing the stigma attached to certain actor-nouns. This property of the textual representation of actor-nouns meant that any attributes assigned to those actor-nouns would automatically meet the criteria for stereotyping. This observations explains why stereotyping was the next most frequently occurring marker of stigma in the text, closely tied with separation. Perhaps due to the conservative approach which was taken in determining discrimination in the text, the discrimination marker of stigma became the least frequently occurring stigma marker.
It is interesting to note that the actor-noun Inyenzi, as with the indications of otherness and inhumanity, appears to be the most highly labelled and stereotyped actor-noun. Equally interesting to note, is the heightened separation of the Tutsi actor-noun in comparison with the Inyenzi and Inkotanyi actor-nouns.

Table 12. Summary of stigma markers in the text

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Stigma Marker</th>
<th>Tutsi Marker n (%)</th>
<th>Neutral n (%)</th>
<th>Inyenzi Marker n (%)</th>
<th>Neutral n (%)</th>
<th>Inkotanyi Marker n (%)</th>
<th>Neutral n (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Labelling</td>
<td>199 (94.5%)</td>
<td>11 (5.5%)</td>
<td>509 (99.8%)</td>
<td>1 (0.2%)</td>
<td>826 (99.5%)</td>
<td>40 (0.5%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stereotyping</td>
<td>32 (15.2%)</td>
<td>178 (84.8%)</td>
<td>80 (15.7%)</td>
<td>430 (84.3%)</td>
<td>110 (12.7%)</td>
<td>756 (87.3%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Separation</td>
<td>41 (19.5%)</td>
<td>169 (80.5%)</td>
<td>59 (11.6%)</td>
<td>451 (88.3%)</td>
<td>121 (14.0%)</td>
<td>745 (86.0%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Status Loss</td>
<td>25 (11.9%)</td>
<td>185 (88.2%)</td>
<td>24 (4.7%)</td>
<td>486 (95.3%)</td>
<td>48 (5.5%)</td>
<td>818 (94.5%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Discrimination</td>
<td>8 (3.8%)</td>
<td>202 (96.2%)</td>
<td>23 (4.5%)</td>
<td>487 (95.5%)</td>
<td>35 (4.0%)</td>
<td>831 (96.0%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

This semantic separation of the Tutsi actor-noun from conceptions of “us” did not seem to influence the extent to which the Tutsi actor-noun was discriminated in the text. However, in observing the stereotypes which were assigned to the Tutsi stigma, the overwhelming devaluation of the Tutsi actor-noun appears to be based in political and historical traditions (Table 16 in the appendix A).

The preoccupation with stereotyping the intention of the Tutsi actor-noun to take power is shared with the Inyenzi actor-noun (Table 17 in the appendix A). However, the Inyenzi actor-noun is also predominantly portrayed as an enemy, both politically and publically. The Inyenzi actor-noun is also frequently stereotyped as a current political threat. This compares with the portrayal of the Tutsi actor-noun, which was portrayed according to historically established roles. The Inyenzi actor-noun is also given a more uniform set of stereotyped attributes. Where the
Tutsi actor-noun was given positive, or at least neutral, stereotyped attributes, the Inyenzi actor-noun was given more uniformly dangerous and degrading stereotyped attributes.

The stereotypes assigned to the Inkotanyi actor-noun are very similar to those assigned to the Inyenzi actor-noun (refer to Table 18 in the appendix A). Like the Inyenzi actor-noun, the Inkotanyi actor-noun is also portrayed as a current and dangerous threat, both politically and publically. The Inkotanyi actor-noun is also given a very uniform set of degrading stereotypes, which paint the Inkotanyi actor-noun as weak, dangerous, and immoral.

The underlying narratives of morality in the Inyenzi and Inkotanyi stereotyped attributes reveal an interesting element of the discourse supporting these stereotypes. Morality, as an institution of norms for a society, provide a reference point for determining groups which are not a part of the dominant group. The consistent portrayal of the Inyenzi and Inkotanyi actor-noun as immoral provides a means by which these groups can be excluded. In other words, morality provides an institutionalized justification for the differentness of the social group being portrayed as immoral.

*Objective Three: To define the ideological relationship between the discursively formed Tutsi stigma and the discursively formed Tutsi social identity of otherness through the RTLM broadcasts.*

The markers of otherness (negative emphasis) were depicted according to time in order to reveal any temporal qualities of these markers. As this is an aspect of stigma, its comparison across actors and time may indicate properties which are shared by stigmatized and othered actors. In comparing these markers it is interesting to note that these markers appeared more
immediately following the assassination of President Habyarimana (April 6, 1994) for the Inkotanyi actor-noun (Figure 14) than the Tutsi or Inyenzi actor-noun (Figure 12, 13).

Figure 13. Markers of Tutsi otherness over time

Figure 14. Markers of Inyenzi otherness over time
These markers continued to be present throughout this period (April to July 1994), regardless of any reduction in instances of violence after April 1994. Overall, while the spikes in the occurrences of these grammatical markers seem to vary across actor-nouns, the clustering of those spikes in occurrences seems to be shared across actor-nouns.

As was pointed out in the stereotyping of the Tutsi, Inyenzi, and Inkotanyi actor-nouns, many of the stereotyped attributes were similar across the groups. This may demonstrate an interesting aspect of otherness as a stereotyped deviance from instituted norms, meaning that the attributes of one group may be applied to another group due to their shared identity as the “other.”

One demonstration of this phenomenon is the hyphenation of various identities over the course of the text (Table 13). Interestingly, the Inyenzi and Inkotanyi actor-nouns were the most frequently hyphenated and similarly stereotyped. One interesting note regarding these hyphenations is the Tutsi-German hyphenation which was also observed in the text, suggesting how broadly defined the “other” may become. This is significant, as the stigma of one of these
groups may become associated with another group which shares the identity of otherness through the stereotyped uniformity which accompanies otherness.

Table 13. Summary of the hyphenated identities in the text

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Hyphenated Identities</th>
<th>n (%) of references</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Inyenzi-Inkotanyi</td>
<td>162 (77.5%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RPF-Inkotanyi</td>
<td>40 (19.1%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RPF-Inyenzi</td>
<td>2 (0.9%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RPF-Tutsi</td>
<td>1 (0.5%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hutu-Inyenzi</td>
<td>1 (0.5%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tutsi-German</td>
<td>1 (0.5%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>208 (100%)</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In order to validate this analysis of these RTLM transcripts, important discursive documents which were related to the formation of the Tutsi stigma were also analysed. These documents were the Hutu Manifesto which was published in 1959 and the Mugesera Speech which was delivered on November 22, 1992.

*The Hutu Manifesto*

The Hutu Manifesto was drawn up by prominent Rwandan academics who outlined the differential identities of the Hutu and Tutsi people groups. The document outlines the historical political divide between the two groups and notes the incompatible existence of both groups. As such, the document suggests future political and economic reforms which would favour the Hutu social group in order to reverse the historical favouritism given to the Tutsi social group.

Similar to these RTLM transcripts, the Hutu Manifesto also outlines the intention of the Tutsi social group to create political and cultural monopolies. As evidence for these claims, the manifesto cites the historical political structures put in place by the predominantly Tutsi oligarchy in Rwanda. The manifesto also paints this group as being against the democratic
process. Similar to the RTLM broadcasts, the discourse in the Hutu Manifesto relays the image of the Tutsi group as part of a historical feudal system which was tightly interlinked with colonial powers. In this regard, there were also a few hyphenated identities between the Tutsi and Belgium actor-nouns in the Hutu Manifesto.

An interesting aspect of the discourse in the Hutu Manifesto, which is mirrored in the RTLM transcripts analyzed in this investigation, is the reliance upon historical narratives to provide identities to actor-nouns. At several points in the Hutu Manifesto, references are made to the Hamitic tradition of the Tutsi people group. While these explicit references are not made in the RTLM broadcasts, the process of using history to validate social identification is common to the RTLM broadcasts.

*The Mugesera Speech*

The Mugesera speech was given in 1992 to a group of MRND supporters. While the speech focuses on the relationship between the political parties in Rwanda, and suggests a high level of distrust in certain groups, the speech also demonstrates an interesting perception of the Tutsi group. Unlike the Hutu Manifesto, the Mugesera speech portrays the Tutsi social group as a dangerous entity which is preparing to advance against Rwanda. The historical links made in this speech are much more proximate, referring primarily to the history of predominantly Tutsi Rwandan refugees entering Uganda in 1959 and returning with the RPF in the 1990 invasion of Rwanda. So, while the Hutu Manifesto presents the Tutsi actor-noun as a historical enemy, the Mugesera speech presents the Tutsi actor-noun as a current and immediate threat to the Rwandan people.
Interestingly, the historical narratives in this speech focus specifically on tying the Inkotanyi identity with the Inyenzi identity. This process appears to be very similar to the form of hyphenated identities which were observed in the RTLM transcripts. This may suggest the broadening of the identity of the enemy to an ancillary social identity, as is exemplified in the uniformly devalued identity of the “other.” In this way, the Inyenzi actor-noun can become a more immediate threat in the way that the Inkotanyi were an immediate threat.

Both of these transcripts provide a form of external validation for the form of historical and political narratives which underline the othering process in the RTLM transcripts. In addition, these documents portray the broadening of the identity of the “other,” demonstrating how the stigma of one group can be transferred to another through the stereotyping involved in otherness.
Chapter 7: Discussion

Overview

In this investigation, the properties of stigma, as a marker of inhumanity and otherness, were defined and applied to the discourse which was presented by Radio Television Libre des Milles-Collines (RTLM) during the Rwandan Genocide. These broadcasts were used as a case of discursively created inhumanity or otherness. As such, the focus of the investigation was to better understand the relationship between stigma and otherness through the analysis of these broadcasts. Given the observation that stigma and otherness can be linguistically created by institutions of power (Chapter 3), a Critical Discourse Analysis framework was a suitable analytical approach for this investigation. Before reviewing the outcomes of this investigation, a note regarding the importance of social power in the linguistic creation of stigma and otherness should be reviewed.

Social Power

In Chapter 4, the history of the RTLM, and its relationship to Rwandan political parties, was reviewed. As part of this historical review, it was found that RTLM’s organizational structure included relatives of Rwandan government members and, in some cases, Rwandan political party leaders as well. The political party which was the most represented in RTLM was the Mouvement Republican National pour la Democratie et le Development (MRND). The MRND was the political party which was led by Rwandan President Habyarimana. This political party, as many political parties in Rwanda, had a militia youth wing (the Interahamwe). This militia was one of the main perpetrators of killings linked to the Rwandan Genocide. In addition, the MRND political party included several Hutu extremist leaders. These observations demonstrate the potential role which MRND may have played in the Rwandan Genocide via their influence with RTLM.
The political ties between RTLM and the MRND party demonstrate a mechanism through which the political views of the MRND could be presented to the broader population. As such, the broadcasts in the RTLM can be understood, at least in part, as a representation of the political views of the MRND. Thus, the discourse which was presented in the RTLM broadcasts can be understood as a “general grammar” (Foucault, 1970) of an institution of power in Rwanda. As was described in Chapter 3, this implies that the discourse in the RTLM broadcasts may have received at least implicit validation from the MRND political party. This political validation allowed RTLM to enjoy a level of authority in Rwandan public discourse. Furthermore, the use of RTLM as a means of organizing the Rwandan public in times of national unrest (as demonstrated in Chapter 4), accentuated this authoritarian positioning of the RTLM in the Rwandan public.

As such, it is interesting to note the properties of Tutsi stigma and otherness in relation to historical and political development in Rwanda. Understanding that this stigma was formed as part of a political party’s views, demonstrates the function that this stigma may have served in achieving certain political goals. As an example, in Chapter 4 it was reviewed that the Habyarimana administration made several attempts to unify the Hutu population by describing the Tutsi people group as an enemy of the state.

In the course of this discussion, as the properties of Tutsi stigma and otherness are reviewed, it is important to keep in mind the historical development of the Tutsi identity, as influenced by political institutions of power like the MRND. In other words, the Tutsi stigma which was discursively formed by RTLM broadcasts can be understood in light of the political stances which that political party chose to take regarding the Tutsi population. In this regard, it
is important to also recognize that stigma can be manipulated to achieve certain goals in managing the identity of either the targeted population or the general public.

Otherness

It is interesting to note the form that the otherness of the Tutsi population took in this investigation. The most common element of the Tutsi identity which was presented in the text was its violent attributes. The overt nature of this description, which focused on emphasizing the negative aspects of the Tutsi identity rather than de-emphasizing the positive aspects of the Tutsi identity, may demonstrate a quality of taken-for-grantedness. That is to say that the danger of the Tutsi social group was already accepted by the population and its recurring use as a descriptor of the Tutsi people group was therefore met with little resistance.

This feature of the Tutsi identity was partially formed by the Hutu manifesto, which stated the intention of the Tutsi social group to subjugate the Hutu population and maintain its political, cultural, and economic monopolies. Given that this feature of the Tutsi social identity had been a part of political discourse for almost 40 years before these broadcasts were given, it is reasonable to assume that the feature was taken for granted by the producers and the audience of the RTLM broadcasts.

This feature of being taken for granted is ultimately a demonstration of discursive power. Gee (2011) suggested that when something is taken for granted, it is a demonstration of the extent to which that feature is entrenched in the public discourse. This also demonstrates a feature of stigma that Jones et al. (1984) described as the “peril” of a stigma (the extent to which the stigma poses a danger to observers). It becomes evident then, that the creation of certain features of otherness can have a facilitating influence on the formation of certain features of stigma. As a feature of otherness is discursively formed by an institution of power, that feature
can then become implemented in the stigmatization of certain groups whose exclusion from the public would benefit that institution.

*Inhumanity*

The inhumanity of the Tutsi group did not show as much of a presence in the RTLM transcripts as the otherness of the Tutsi group did. There was one exception to this observation, and that was regarding the Inyenzi referent identity for the Tutsi social group. This term scored very highly as a term of inhumanity on the basis of its definition (cockroach). This demonstrated that certain terms can, in and of themselves, be highly stigmatizing and dehumanizing. It is important, however, to remember that no linguistic symbol or term exists in isolation. When a stigmatizing term is treated as inherently stigmatizing, while disregarding the context of the term, the importance of the term’s discursive formation is lost. In other words, it would be a misunderstanding of the process of stigmatization to simply highlight certain terms as “buzzwords” for stigmatization.

Van Dijk (1993) explained in his analysis of racism that many stigmatizing terms seem to be treated in this way by the general public. The term itself is considered stigmatizing without regard to the reason or history of the term’s formation. Thus, the term is used or avoided, in order to indicate something about the individual being described. The difficulty with this approach is that it avoids dealing with the context in which that term was created, and thus misrepresents a key facet in the formation of stigmatizing relationships: that the meanings of words or symbols are created over time for a purpose.

In regards to the Inyenzi label, it would be a mistake to simply use a different term for the Tutsi social group without understanding the historical formation of the Inyenzi label. This is because the Inyenzi label was created at a time when the Tutsi social group was highly
marginalized and certain groups of Tutsi individuals were performing cross border raids from Uganda to Rwanda. As a result, these individuals were perceived as highly dangerous and attempting to usurp the Rwandan government. These features (dangerous and insubordinate) were then integrated into public perceptions of the Tutsi social group (as demonstrated by the stereotypes linked to the Tutsi identity). Simply using a different term for the Tutsi social group, rather than Inyenzi, would disregard this important historical formation of the Tutsi social identity.

Labelling

Of the many makers of stigma which were used in this investigation, labelling was by far the most prevalent in the RTLM broadcasts. While labelling can be fairly innocuous, simply as a reference to groups, the way in which it was used in these broadcasts may have been more detrimental. In this case, because Van Leeuwen’s (1996) concept of Assimilation was used in the operationalization of labelling, the form of labelling which was used in these broadcasts demonstrates the impersonalization of Tutsi individuals. That is, the identity of the Tutsi individual was lost in the way that they were referenced in the text. This also means that the group was treated as a uniform entity, glazing over any individual differences among the group’s members.

This reliance upon labelling in the text also reveals an interesting aspect of the Tutsi otherness which was presented by the RTLM broadcasts. In the course of the broadcasts, there were several instances when the Tutsi referent social identities (Tutsi, Inyenzi, and Inkotanyi) were all treated as one group in spite of the fact that they were originally unique social identities. Thus the three groups were together represented as a uniform identity of otherness. One indication of this process was the use of hyphenated social identities in the RTLM broadcasts.
The implications of this process of labelling the three groups as a uniform identity are fascinating.

One such implication is that the traits of one of the groups can become stereotyped to the other groups through this uniformed identity. Thus, if the Inkotanyi social identity was identified as dangerous and an enemy of the state, then it is possible for those attributes to be transferred to the Tutsi and Inyenzi groups. This is because ultimately, the differentiating boundaries between these groups are lost in the process of labelling the “other” in a given society.

This conceptualization links back to Durkheim’s (1895) analysis of deviance, which demonstrated that otherness can be understood as a stereotyped representation of deviance. In this case, the deviance of one of the groups is stereotyped to the other groups who are perceived as part of the “other.” This process may also indicate the means by which individual Tutsi members of Rwandan society may become represented as state enemies in that they are grouped together with the Inkotanyi as social “others.” Through this mechanism, one possible explanation for the genocide, as an act of self-defence against a perceived enemy, may be implicitly demonstrated by this investigation.

Separation

This marker of stigma has provided a paradox in this investigation. The separation of social identities is not only a part of the stigmatization process but it is also necessary for the formation of otherness. In this regard, it is important to note that this process of social separation may itself be innocuous while being fundamental to the stigmatization process. As such, the separation of the Tutsi social identity from the general public should have been a more commonly occurring stigma marker in the broadcasts.
This marker was still the second most frequently occurring marker, as was expected by this study’s theoretical framework. One possible explanation for the limited presence of separation in the transcripts is the conservative approach which this investigation took in assessing separation in the broadcasts. It should be noted that this approach was far more conservative than Link and Phelan’s (2001) approach or the approach suggested by van Leeuwen (1996). This conservative approach was adopted by this investigation in order to provide a more reliable (replicable) study of the RTLM broadcasts. One of the factors taken into consideration in developing this approach was the fact that these broadcasts were themselves translations. Therefore the grammatical markers presented in this broadcast were themselves interpreted and transformed prior to this investigation. Thus, in order to avoid mislabelling an innocuous text as separating (a Type 1 error), the methodology used in this investigation instead risked mislabelling a separating reference as innocuous (a Type 2 error).

The development of a reliable linguistic method for determining social separation is still under investigation among discourse analysts, given the importance of this feature of public discourse. Future research should focus on developing clear linguistic tools which can be applied in this form of investigation. The development of these tools would not only aid investigations of discursively formed otherness but also inform future research on the linguistic formation of stigma.

*Stereotyping*

This marker of stigma demonstrated the historical formation of the different social identities investigated in this research project. Throughout the broadcasts, the types of stereotypes used in reference to the actor-nouns (Tutsi, Inyenzi, or Inkotanyi) portrayed each actor as a threat in a different historical capacity. The Tutsi were portrayed as a historical threat,
who subjugated the Hutu population during, and prior to, the Colonial period in Rwanda. The Inyenzi were portrayed as a historical threat dating back to the 1959 Rwandan revolution when their armed groups would perform cross-border raids. The Inkotanyi were portrayed as an immediate threat, which was currently seeking to overthrow the Rwandan government and subjugate, or even exterminate, the Hutu population. Interestingly, in all of these stereotypes, these identities are portrayed as state enemies which intend to subjugate the Rwandan people. In addition each social group was portrayed as a physical or political threat to both the Hutu people group and the Rwandan people in general.

The use of stereotypes to attribute features to a group is itself a cognitive fallacy (as it ignores the inherent nuances in the individual identities of that group’s members) and reveals an interesting aspect of the discourse related to group references. As the process of abstraction demonstrates, stereotypes are often taken for granted, demonstrating the extent to which the definitions of certain social groups are entrenched in public discourse. As such, the use of stereotypes can be used to not only define the features of an othered group but also demonstrate the extent to which those features are taken for granted in a given public discourse.

This also demonstrates one approach to understanding a given stigma theory. By analyzing the linguistic formation of a stigmatized social group’s identity (through an analysis of the abstraction of certain attributes to that group’s social identity), the stigma theory supporting the exclusion of certain social groups can be better understood. In this case, the stereotypes which were attributed to Tutsi social group demonstrated the historical formation of that Tutsi social group’s identity through both political and social differentiating processes.

*Status Loss*
In Link and Phelan’s (2001) interpretation of enacted stigma, they noted that status loss was the sum of multiple stigma features (labelling, separating, and stereotyping of negative events). As such, when the marker of status loss occurs in a statement, it is an indication that the statement is significantly stigmatizing. This marker therefore demonstrated a very definitive indication of stigmatization. This definition of status loss also meant that of all the markers of stigma, this marker would be one of the less frequently occurring markers. This definition demonstrates an interesting link between stigma and otherness, where the occurrence of status loss is accompanied by the occurrence of otherness in the text (due to the inherent definition of status loss which includes the stereotyping of negative attributes).

This investigation demonstrated that status loss may be the single best indicator of stigmatization in discourse. In order for this marker of stigma to be applied successfully, however, an understanding of the society in which the analysed discourse exists must be established. This is because the positioning of social identities in the hierarchy of society requires an in-depth knowledge of that society. This caution demonstrates an essential feature of stigma research, which is the understanding of the context in which a stigma is created. By focusing on stigma as the creation of a socio-cultural context, the investigation allows stigma to be understood as such rather than simply being the product of a group’s trait deviance.

In the context of the Rwandan Genocide, status loss was established through comparisons with institutionalized norms (morality, legality, societal expectations) as determined by previously established research. This approach reinforced the definition of stigma as a deviance from institutionalized norms, and also reinforced the importance of context in stigma research. If institutionalized norms are established by a given socio-cultural context, then the deviance from those norms would also be established by that socio-cultural context.
Discrimination

The discrimination of the Tutsi social group was the least frequently occurring stigma marker in the RTLM broadcasts. In part this was due to the conservative definition of discrimination which was taken in this investigation. This was because of the empirical difficulties with demonstrating the link between attitudes and behaviours as would be necessary for discrimination to occur. Link and Phelan (2001) noted that this lack of empirical support made the definition of discrimination difficult to determine in its relationship to stigmatization. As such, this investigation was forced to take a highly conservative approach.

It is interesting to note that this investigation used an imperative grammatical structure (a grammatical structure for giving commands) to determine where discrimination was occurring. This should be differentiated from social imperatives, which suggest what should be done rather than commanding direct action. In this sense, only direct commands to discriminate were included as occurrences of discrimination. In future research, however, a broader empirically based linguistic marker (which includes social imperatives) would be recommended in the investigation of stigma.

Paradoxes in the Text

This analysis does not explain all of the text. Contrary to what has been indicated so far, there were areas of the broadcasts which called for an end to the sectarian violence which was occurring. Additionally, some broadcasts claimed that if Tutsi individuals decided to join other Rwandans in fighting against the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF), then they would be considered brothers and should not be harassed. Although these instances represented a minority of the broadcast content, they do portray a much more nuanced media influence on the Rwandan Genocide than previous reports have indicated.
Integration of Findings with Broader Literature

These findings are comparable to similar studies of the RTLM around the time of the Rwandan Genocide. In 2007, Kimani published a content analysis of the RTLM broadcasts. This content analysis covered most of the time that RTLM was on air and involved up to 72 hours of broadcasting time. In addition, Kimani’s content analysis was applied to the entirety of the RTLM broadcast and did not focus specifically on the portrayal of the Tutsi social identity as this investigation did.

As such, Kimani’s (2007) report offers a broader overview of the discourse which was apparent in the RTLM broadcasts over the course of its airtime. This report therefore provides a useful validity check for the findings made in this investigation, in order to determine whether the sample broadcasts used in this investigation biased the interpretation of this investigation’s results. The incidences of inflammatory content in the RTLM broadcasts were recorded by Kimani and summarized in Table 14.

This content integrates neatly with this investigation’s findings regarding the portrayal of Tutsi social groups as “other.” The recurrent allegations of violence being committed by the Tutsi social group was also demonstrated throughout the RTLM broadcasts. In addition, the frequent stereotyping of the intentions of the Tutsi social group to usurp Rwandan authority and subjugate the Hutu population is also demonstrated in Kimani’s investigation.

The main difference between Kimani’s (2007) findings and the findings in this investigation are in regards to the direct calls for extermination. This would be coded under discrimination in the current investigation and the discrimination findings in this investigation only found 64 instances of discrimination against the Tutsi, Inyenzi, and Inkotanyi social group in comparison with the 165 instances found by Kimani. While this discrepancy may be related
to the broader sampling which Kimani undertook in her investigation, it may also be related to
the differential operationalization of discrimination in these investigations.

Table 14. Kimani (2007, p. 119) inflammatory content of broadcasts

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Instances</th>
<th>% of total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Allegations of RPA atrocities</td>
<td>294</td>
<td>16.32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Encouragement to Hutu to fight, kill</td>
<td>252</td>
<td>13.99</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No inflammatory content</td>
<td>238</td>
<td>13.21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Direct calls for extermination</td>
<td>165</td>
<td>9.16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Allegations that RPA wants power and control over Hutu</td>
<td>106</td>
<td>5.89</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Allegations that Tutsis in the region are helping those within</td>
<td>127</td>
<td>7.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Insult to Tutsis and RPA</td>
<td>88</td>
<td>4.89</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Description of how the past influences present events</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>3.89</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Congratulations to FAR</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>3.33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Allegations that Tutsis plan to subjugate the Hutu</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>3.16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Allegations that RPA killed Habyarimana</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>2.78</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Allegations that political parties are supporting RPA</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>2.50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Broadcast insults/slurs against Hutus sympathizing with the RPA</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>2.28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tutsis, RPA are social deviants, abnormal</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>2.28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Allegations that Tutsis are exterminating Hutus</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>2.17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Attack or harm Belgians or UNAMIR personnel</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>2.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Threats to Hutus sympathizing with RPA, fleeing war</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>1.33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Allegations that invalids, women, old men armed, support RPA</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>1.33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Broadcast justifies massacres</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>1.11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not all Tutsis are enemies; should live together with Hutus</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>0.89</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Allegations that Tutsis killed Habyarimana</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>0.44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>1,801</td>
<td>100.00</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In order to account for the different forms of discrimination which were included in
Kimani’s investigation, the differences between targeted group violence will be observed in her
report (see Table 15). This table demonstrates that most of the targeted group violence related to
the RPF, while the direction to engage in violence against the Tutsi, Inyenzi or Inkotanyi was far
less common. In addition the most common warning, as was observed in this investigation, was
in regards to being watchful of the Tutsi social groups.

Kimani’s (2007) findings demonstrate an interesting correlate to the findings in this
investigation. In addition, these findings indicate that the broadcasts which were analyzed in this
investigation were reasonably representative of the broadcasts which were presented before the Rwandan Genocide. This observation is important in order to demonstrate a level of validity in the results of this investigation.

Table 15. Kimani (2007, p. 120) group targeted for violence or hatred

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Instances</th>
<th>% of total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Warnings</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Seek, watch out for RPF, RPA, Inkotanyi</td>
<td>598</td>
<td>38.61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Seek, watch out for Inyenzi, Tutsi</td>
<td>164</td>
<td>10.59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Seek, watch out for individual</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>4.91</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Seek, watch out for members of particular party</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>0.58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Directives</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No targeting of any group for harm</td>
<td>287</td>
<td>18.53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Harm or kill members of RPA/Inkotanyi</td>
<td>149</td>
<td>9.62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Identification of person/groups as accomplices of Inyenzi</td>
<td>89</td>
<td>5.75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kill or harm Inyenzi, Tutsi</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>3.55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Identified accomplice should be sought</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>2.26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kill or harm individual</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>1.61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Specific targeting of Tutsi females as tools of RPA to be resisted or harmed</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>1.36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Specific and direct call for restraint</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>0.90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Targeting Belgians for hatred and violence</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>0.90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Identified accomplice should be harmed or killed</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>0.58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Encouragement of Hutu females to participate at roadblocks/fighting</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0.26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>1,549</td>
<td>100.00</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Implication of the Findings**

These findings demonstrate that both otherness and inhumanity provide an important framework for the development of stigma. The processes of othering and inhumanity ascription also demonstrate the detrimental influence of stigma on the positioning of individuals or groups within a given society in that the process of separating and stereotyping individuals as inhuman facilitates the development of societal devaluation.
Another interesting aspect of the findings in this study is the importance of context to the formation of stigma. The Tutsi stigma did not exist in isolation but was formed through established psychological processes which occurred during the historical development of the Tutsi social identity. In other words, it was the fact that the Tutsi people had been separated from the broader Rwandan population, and then presented as national “others” by the Rwandan government, which allowed for the later discursive attribution of inhuman attributes to the Tutsi social actors. Those inhuman attributes were exemplified by the Inyenzi social label which was ascribed to the Tutsi social group. This historical framework presumably influenced the later discrimination of Tutsi social groups which was observed during the Rwandan Genocide.

Whether that facilitation occurred through the entrenchment of the Tutsi social identity, or via another psycho-social process, it seems likely that the discursively formed Tutsi stigma did play a role.

This investigation also demonstrated that social phenomena, like stigma, can be studied discursively. In other words, the RTLM transcripts, whether as creators or representations of social thought, did demonstrate the same social processes which were inherently involved in the formation of the Tutsi stigma. This observation implies that certain social processes involved in identity development are present in public discourse and therefore open to linguistic analysis.

Limitations

This investigation inherently faced several limitations. The first of which was the limited environ coverage of RTLM in Rwanda. RTLM’s limited environ coverage limits the extent to which RTLM influenced Rwandan public discourse. Based on the coverage of the RTLM environs and the onset of the Rwandan genocide, it is evident that other explanations were at play in the onset of the genocide in certain areas of Rwanda. It is also possible that, due to
RTLM’s popularity, the broadcasts were passed by word of mouth to individuals living outside of the RTLM environs. Ultimately, however the limited coverage of the RTLM environs introduces a paradox in this study, demonstrating the potentially limited effect that RTLM had on Rwandan public discourse.

The fact that the linguistic analysis was forced to rely upon translations of the original text was another limitation in this study. This meant that the text had already been interpreted by another individual before the investigator was able to analyze the linguistic features of the text. In spite of the fact that these translations were performed by ICTR sanctioned translators, the very act of translating the original text removes the investigation one step further from observing the context of the linguistic features which were analyzed.

Another limitation in this investigation was the non-random sampling which was used in collecting the broadcasts used for investigation. This means that the findings which this investigation produced cannot be applied to the rest of the RTLM broadcasts or to other Rwandan media during the time of the Rwandan Genocide. Another issue with the sampling was the differential quantity of broadcasting time which was given by each transcript. This meant that certain dates of broadcasts were given more representation in the investigation than others, confounding a detailed review of the timeline of these linguistic features and potentially misrepresenting the varying focus of the RTLM broadcasts.

In addition, it is impossible to determine whether the RTLM broadcasts were representations of the broader public discourse in Rwanda or creators of that public discourse. Methodologically, this inference is impossible to make without the use of a control group. Linguistically, it is again theoretically impossible to determine as language acts as both a representation and creator of social thought, as demonstrated in Chapter 3.
Finally, it is impossible to discern if these broadcasts actually influenced the violence which occurred in the Rwandan genocide. While this was never an objective of this research project, it is important to remember when interpreting the findings of this investigation. While there have been previous research which, to varying degrees, demonstrate this phenomenon, this investigation cannot be used in support of those models. Rather, this investigation was performed in order to better understand the properties of stigma and otherness in these RTLM broadcasts.
References


Appendix A

Table 16. Properties of Tutsi stereotypes in the text

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Tutsi Stereotypes in the Text</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Arrogance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bent on overthrowing the government</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brothers who fled in the 1959’s</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Enemies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Extremist (x4)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Feudal-monarchist</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Have the will to dominate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In trouble</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intransigent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inyenzi (x2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inkotanyi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Killers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moderate (x2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Muabura, that voice of Tutsis</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No Tutsi is richer than Kabuga</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>On the king’s side</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Only interested (in) power</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Radio muabura, the voice of the Tutsis</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spiteful</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Superiority complex (x2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Terrorist (x4)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thrilled after the invasion of Rwanda</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Very few (x2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Want to exterminate the Hutus</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Want to keep power by force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Want to kill</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Want to show us they only know how to destroy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wanted total power</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wants to take and monopolize power</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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Table 17. Properties of the Inyenzi stereotype in the text

**Inyenzi Stereotypes in the Text**

- Ailing Animals
- Are against this newspaper (Kangura)
- Are not strategists
- Barbarism
- Children of the Tutsis
- Conscious of their defeat
- Cowards
- Criminals (x2)
- Cursed
- Do not respect humankind (abbreviated)
- Do not want to give up their vile acts
- Don’t want to hear of elections
- Enemies (x3)
- Feel that everybody who preaches peace and unity, who does not support their cause, must also die
- Frantically agitated
- Funny
- Ghosts
- Have the objective of killing people
- In favour of the flowing of blood
- Intimidation
- Killers
- Mad (insane)
- Officers
- Problem
- Small (x2)
- Suicidal
- Sweet words
- The objective of the Inyenzi is not the capture but the liberation of the whole country (x2)
- They are the Tutsis
- They want to bring the old refugees from Uganda and settle them here
- Trick (x3)
- Umwanzi
- Want to attack our people
- Wants to take and monopolize power
- Wicked (x14)
- Wild
Table 18. Properties of the Inkotanyi stereotypes in the text

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Inkotanyi Stereotypes in the Text</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A known accomplice of the RPF</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All you (Inkotanyi) are able to do is bombing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Are in great distress</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Are poised to capture the country</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arrogance (x3)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bandits (x2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Barbarism (x2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Became aware that in any case all Rwandans are united and fighting them</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Believe in a superior race (abbreviated)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Big-headed because of being arrogant and haughty</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Boastfulness</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brave</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bungling idiots</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Children of the Tutsis</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cowards</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Craziness</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cruel and wicked</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cruelty</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dare-devils</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dead</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Death squad</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Desperate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Difficult</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Do not understand Kinyarwanda</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Enemies (x12)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Enemy of all Rwandans</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Envisaged killing him (president Habyarimana)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ever present arrogance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Extraordinary</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fear elections</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Feel that everyone who preaches peace and unity, who does not support their cause, must also die</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Frantically agitated</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ghost (x2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guilty of licentiousness</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Has never really agreed to stop the combats</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Have a lot of problems</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Have a lot of tricks</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Have many tricks</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Have no strength</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In favour of the flowing of blood</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In their usual wicked manner</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intend to catch us</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inyenzi (x2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>It is not some new Inkotanyi (x2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Killer (x2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Know the traps very well</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mad (insane) (x2)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
New fresh
Nihilists
No Inkotanyi weighs 60 kg
No Inkotanyi weighs more than 60 kg
Not a democrat
Objective of killing people
Objective was to see the Rwandan army dissolved
Observing you for the slightest opening
Of the RPF
Plague
Pride
Problem
Propagandist (x2)
Ruthless
Seem to have lost the war
Small
Smiles full of hypocrisy
Smooth talking
Smooth tongue, pride, arrogance
Spitefulness
Strange
Suicide attackers
Sweet words of the wicked
Terrorists
Terrorists
Thieves
Tramps
Tricks (x3)
Umwanzi
Useless
Want to acquire property and power (abbreviated)
Want to attack our people
Want to punish
Want to run to their death
Want to take this country
Wants to take power by force
Who do not want to lose their hold
Wicked (x11)
Wild
Wish to split the country in two