Remittances After Disasters: Case Study of Tacloban City, Philippines

After Typhoon Haiyan

by

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A Thesis
presented to
The University of Guelph

In partial fulfilment of requirements
For the degree of
Doctor of Philosophy
in
Political Science and International Development

Guelph, Ontario, Canada

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ABSTRACT

REMITTANCES AFTER DISASTERS: CASE STUDY OF TACLOBAN CITY, PHILIPPINES AFTER TYPOHOON HAIYAN

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Professor Craig Johnson

For the last forty years, remittances have been the Philippines’ lifeline in times of crisis as well as everyday life. So, it was no surprise when NGOs and the media credited the diaspora with playing a significant role in post-disaster recovery after Typhoon Haiyan (local name: Yolanda) struck the Philippines on November 8th, 2013. Despite the mass destruction and widespread poverty of the region, particular attention was drawn to the surge of remittances, the funds international migrants send to their family back home. While many macroeconomic studies on remittances and disasters also suggest an increase in remittances following major hazards, the distribution of these funds remain poorly understood. This thesis explores the question under what conditions are households able to turn access to migrants into remittances after major disasters?

This study argues that the income category of the household, the relation of the migrant abroad to the household, the occupations of the migrant, the country the migrant is living or working in and the social capital of the household are five main factors that affect a household’s ability to turn access to migrants into remittances after major disasters. Using Typhoon Haiyan as a case study, this dissertation presents data collected from seven months of fieldwork in Tacloban City, Philippines. Looking at three communities heavily affected by Haiyan, this study compares middle and lower income households that have access to remittances with households that do not. My thesis argues that households that are able to turn their access to migrants into remittances
after disasters tend to share these five conditions: they are middle income households, they have multiple skilled migrants abroad, those migrants are often in Western countries, those migrants are immediate family members, and the households have many bonding as well as linking ties. These middle income households are much better placed to turn their access to migrants into remittances after disasters because they have more economic and social capital than lower income households. Most lower income households have limited to no access to migrants and limited capacity to turn their access to migrants into remittances after a disaster.
DEDICATION

This dissertation was inspired by and dedicated to my father who sent remittances home from Canada while he was away from us for 6 years and to my mother who managed those remittances so our family had everything we needed.
It takes a village, or in my case a barangay, to finish a PhD. It is often a lonely, uphill battle and I am extremely grateful for those that supported me over the years to help me push this boulder up the hill. Against this backdrop, special thanks are in order for those who have contributed in diverse respects to the successful completion of this dissertation.

First and foremost, I would like to thank my supervisor, Dr. Craig Johnson. It was his class on aid and development during my undergrad at Guelph that inspired me to pursue graduate school in political science and international development. After completing my masters at the University of Oxford, it only felt natural to complete my academic journey at Guelph with the person responsible for sparking this intellectual curiosity. I would not have been able to complete this dissertation without the guidance and enduring support of Craig. I want to thank Craig for his enthusiasm and encouragement throughout this process. His patience while I worked through multiple proposals and the time he spent troubleshooting with me when I was conducting fieldwork is worthy of mention. Craig has been a wonderful mentor and role model and I would not have asked for a better supervisor.

A great depth of appreciation is also owed to the members of my advisory committee, Dr. Janine Clark and Dr. Loic Le Dé. I want to thank Janine for believing in my methodology and providing thought-provoking ideas that helped to strengthen my thesis. I want to thank Loic for doing the pioneering work that created the foundation on which a great deal of my dissertation builds on. Loic invited me to speak at the Auckland University of Technology at the end of my seven months of fieldwork and was extremely patient and kind to me as I unloaded a dissertation full of findings on to him. I am also grateful as well to Dr. Philip Kelly for providing a meaningful and substantive external appraisal of my dissertation.
I am also in debt to the late Dr. Kerry Preibisch and Dr. Nonita Yap. Dr. Preibisch taught the first migration course I took in my undergrad which sparked my interest in studying the topic and she taught my methods course during my PhD. It was also Dr. Preibisch that taught me that we need to see the humanity in those that we study and not treat them as subjects or people to simply extract information from. Her teachings pushed me to create a participatory research methodology and I thought of her often while I was conducting my fieldwork. Special thanks is also owed to Dr. Yap, a former member of my advisory committee who accompanied me on one of my trips to Tacloban City and introduce me to some key community members that assisted me with my research. I cherish the memories of us discussing disaster politics and kinship walking along beaches, through busy markets and in speeding vans.

It is also worthy to highlight the tremendous help received from other faculty members at the Department. I appreciate Dr. Ian Spears, Dr. Candace Johnson, Dr. Deborah Stienstra, Dr. Carol Dauda, Dr. David MacDonald, Dr. Troy Riddell, Dr. Leah Levac, Dr. Andrea Paras, Dr. Tamara Small, Dr. Adam Sneyd, Dr. Kate Puddister, Dr. Tim Mau, and Dr. Edward Koning for their time, patience and advice in supporting me in a multitude of ways over the last six years. In particular, I want to thank Dr. Ian Spears for teaching me to have unpopular opinions in his undergraduate classes and for his years of mentorship since. I also benefited greatly from my intellectual exchanges with my colleagues at the department, particularly, Yuriko Cowper-Smith, Gloria Novovic, Sivhuoch Ou, Dr. Steffī Hamman, Dr. Dustin Ciufo, and Dr. Ebenezer Agyei. I also want to thank Reneé Tavascia and Rachel Flucker for their loving administrative assistance. In particular, Reneé has been a great friend, someone who has always been there to help, to support and to listen.

I also need to thank my mentor and friend Dr. Jacqueline Murray, who taught me the significance of being the driver of my own education. Jacqueline’s support of me from the very
beginning is a key part of my success as a scholar. Her advice and mentorship has shaped me into the scholar I am today.

Other academics that have also played a significant role in shaping my research are the many academics that I have collaborated with and engaged with in different capacities over the last six years. Thank you to Dr. Pauline Eadie, Dr. Maria Tanyag, Dr. Nicole Curato, Dr. Jonathan Ong, George Borrinaga, Korey Pasch, Furqan Asif, Kenneth Cardenas, Dr. Aaron Opdyke, Dr. Punam Yadav, Dr. Maria Ela Atienza, Dr. Ilan Kelman, Dr. Daniel Aldrich, Dr. Catherine Bragg and Dr. Courtney Page-Tan. The intellectual exchanges I have had with many of these academics have helped to enrich my research and my understanding of disaster studies and international development.

The research would not have been possible without the assistance of my research team in the Philippines. In particular, I am especially grateful to Professor Ladylyn Mangada, who was instrumental in the success of every aspect of my fieldwork. The intellectual insights and most importantly the local knowledge that Ladylyn has imparted on me is a key ingredient of this thesis. Ladylyn’s deep commitment to conducting in-depth qualitative research that examines marginalized communities and voices is worthy of highlighting. Her strong connections with these communities and her overall friendliness contributed significantly to our ability to speak with so many households in the various barangays. Special thanks is owed because Ladylyn not only assisted me with all aspects of my fieldwork, she also made sure that I felt welcomed in my home away from home. She introduced me to local food like pancit, lechon and turon and always had a joke ready for every occasion.

I would also like to express my sincere gratitude to the members of my research team: Ara Pacoma, Jessa Turalba, Nezika Berongoy and Krizzia Bacoy. Their strong commitment to conducting quality research contributed to the large amount of rich data that was collected. I also
need to thank them for the friendship and kindness they showed me. And for the many many jokes. Fieldwork is challenging and serious but I’ve learned that it can also be fun and enlightening.

Special thanks is also owed to the many friends that I made while I was in Tacloban. These friends accompanied me for many meals and trips around town and contributed significantly to my quality of life while I was so far away from home. I will always remember my memories drinking bubble tea and enjoying street food with Phoebe Toba, Ruth Layson, Shelley Guyton, Roos Groen, and Shaye Palagi. I also need to thank Butz Eguia, a retired Overseas Filipino Worker, who has shared so much of his life story, his knowledge and his wisdom with me. I have learned so much from my conversations with Butz and I am continually inspired by his own curiosity to learn and grow. I am also indebted to Grace Yu, my landlady in Tacloban City, who not only housed me but took care of me when I was sick and made sure that my stay was safe and enjoyable.

A debt of gratitude is also owed to all of the people in Tacloban City that gave me their valuable time. In the course of the seven months, my research team and I must have interacted with almost a thousand people through the household surveys and interviews. Each and every one of those people opened up their homes and lives to us and shared their experiences. I hope that I have done their stories justice and reflected them in this dissertation. Without the generosity of the affected households, this dissertation would not exist.

Now I must give thanks to all of the friends and family back home that has supported me emotionally, intellectually and academically all these years. In particular, Tyler Valiquette has walked shoulder to shoulder with me from the very beginning of this journey. I have benefitted significantly from our many intellectual exchanges on politics and international development. His comments on my multiple proposals, conference papers and chapter drafts have contributed to
strengthening my research and this dissertation. Our travel to conferences together has been a source of many great memories. He was a key source of support for me during the rougher times of the PhD and I cherish his friendship dearly. I also owe a debt of gratitude to my friends, Michael Meddik, Maxime Bergeron, Patrick McBride, Iftekharul Haque, Shamin Mohamed Jr., Alicia Fung, Fraser Brandon-Sutherland, Janet Doner, Allison Meads, Gracen Johnson and Andrew Buckley, who have provided me with immense emotional support through their friendship. In particular, I am lucky to have Dr. Elizabeth Dubois as a mentor and friend. She assisted me greatly when I was struggling in the proposal writing stage and helped significantly in shaping my participatory research methodology which was a adaptation of her DPhil methodology. Special thanks is also owed to Dr. Dipali Patel, Dr. Kacper Rogala, and Dr. Matteo Gianella-Borradori, who will now have to stop teasing me because I am finally a Dr. now.

Next, I owe thanks to my friends and colleagues at the Samara Centre for Democracy. The last year of the PhD can be difficult because no one tells you how hard the final writing and editing process is. I am grateful for the support and kindness that my colleagues, Kendall Anderson, Jane Hilderman, Dr. Mike Morden, Dr. Paul Thomas, Adelina Petit-Vouriot, José Ramon Marti, Elizabeth Hawksworth and Christine Latimer, have shown me this past year.

My family deserves a ton of gratitude for their love and unwavering support of my intellectual endeavours. I want to thank my parents 苏丽山 and 杨肖莲, for instilling the importance of education in me from a young age and all of the sacrifices they made to give me the best education I can have. Their lived experiences have contributed significantly to informing this dissertation so it is as much a work of theirs as it is mine. I want to thank my brother Joey and my sister-is-law, Emily, for taking me on fishing trips and reminding me to enjoy the great outdoors. A significant amount of gratitude is owed to my cousin Lisa, who has been extremely supportive throughout this whole process. My travelling and fieldwork often keeps me away from
home for months at a time and during these times Lisa is always there to talk to me to starve off the homesickness. When I am home, Lisa makes it her mission to keep me well fed, physically active and entertained every day. She is the best cousin anyone can ever ask for.

Finally, I need to thank my husband and partner in life, Mateusz, for his support, encourage and love throughout this whole journey. A PhD is not an easy undertaking and because he had recently completed his before mine, he understood the challenges that were ahead and he went through all of them with me. As fate would have it, after my seven months of fieldwork was completed, Mateusz got sent on work assignment to Manila for six months. So just like how he did his PhD before mine, I feel I had done my time in the Philippines before his. Thank you Mateusz for explaining to me what a Jeepney is. I am forever grateful for your sense of humour, your immense patience and your constant encouragement throughout my academic journey. This PhD and my life would not be the same without your steadfast support of everything I do.
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION

1.1. Introduction

For the last forty years, remittances have been the Philippines’ lifeline in times of crisis as well as everyday life. So, it was no surprise when NGOs and the media credited the diaspora with playing a significant role in post-disaster recovery after Typhoon Haiyan (local name: Yolanda) struck the Philippines on November 8th, 2013. Typhoon Haiyan grabbed global attention not only because of the scale of devastation but also the outpouring of international support. Haiyan was the strongest storm to ever make landfall in recorded history (Lin et al., 2004; Schiermeier, 2013), killing 6,300 people and displacing 4 million people in a country that is already one of the most affected by disasters. Yet, despite the mass destruction and widespread poverty of the region, particular attention was drawn to the surge of remittances, the funds international migrants send to their family back home, following Haiyan because of the well-established Filipino diaspora. For example, the Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC) concluded “the diaspora played possibly the most direct and important role for many affected communities. In a year-to-year comparison, remittances to the Philippines rose by $600 million in the first three months following Haiyan.” (Hanley et al., 2014, p. 19). While many macroeconomic studies on remittances and disasters also suggest an increase in remittances following major hazards, the distribution of these funds remain poorly understood. Who benefits and who is excluded from the surge of remittances

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3 See NDRRMC, 2014; Takagi et al., 2016; IBON, 2015; Bayles & Larano, 2013; Gaillard, 2015; Bankoff, 2007
4 IASC (Inter-Agency Standing Committee) is the main mechanisms for inter-agency coordination of humanitarian assistance. For more information on the committee, see https://interagencystandingcommittee.org/ (accessed March 1, 2017).
5 See Yang, 2011; Yang, 2008; David, 2010
that arrives after major disasters? What are the factors affecting the ability of households to turn access to migrants into remittances after major disasters? How does social capital affect a household’s ability to turn their access to migrants into remittances after major disasters? All in all, my overall research question for this thesis is **under what conditions are households able to turn access to migrants into remittances after major disasters?**

This research question brings together research on two emerging fields in disaster research: remittances after disasters and the role of social capital after disasters. As a result of the rise in remittance flows to developing countries and the responsiveness of remittances after disasters, research on remittances after disasters has gained interest in the last decade (Yang, 2008; David, 2010; Mohapatra et al., 2012; Le Dé et al., 2015). However, most of these studies are macroeconomic evaluations that use large multi-country data to draw generalizable conclusions. These studies overlook the household level, where the majority of the sending and receiving of remittances take place. This thesis contributes to this discussion by analyzing remittances after disasters at the household level using data from surveys and semi-structured interviews of households from Tacloban City in the Philippines. There have been a few case studies on remittances after disasters, but no recent studies have examined the issue with a humanitarian perspective (Bragg et al., 2017).

Similar to the emerging literature on remittances after disasters, researchers of disasters have only recently begun looking at the role of social capital in driving post-disaster recovery (Aldrich, 2012; Meyer, 2013; Reininger et al., 2013). However, most of these studies are focused mainly in the North American setting (Veuthey, 2015). This thesis contributes to the discussion by analyzing how Lin’s (2001) network theory of social capital can be applied to understand how households can turn their access to migrants into resources such as remittances after disasters. There have been few studies of social capital in the archipelago, but they all confirm the
overwhelming dominance of strong bonds within families (Abad, 2005; Veuthey, 2015; Porio & See, 2017). While social capital is still a debated concept, it is becoming clear that the quality of relationships between people, and between citizens and their governments, play a vital role during disasters (Veuthey, 2015; Aldrich, 2012).

As a result of the optimism and potential that social capital and remittances hold for development, the two topics have become popular concepts in academic scholarship as well as humanitarian and development policy because they both specify resources, types of capital, to be tapped and strategically mobilized by individuals and groups to meet their needs. But this optimism, and the desire to maximize the benefits of remittances and social capital ignores the insights that have emerged from prior research with regards to 1) the selectivity and heterogeneity of the impacts of migrant and remittances on development and 2) the inequality in social capital. Research has continued to identify migration as a selective process which means the direct benefits of remittances are also selective and do not tend to benefit the poorest members of society (de Haas, 2005; Schiff, 1994). Similarly, there is research about the inequality in social capital or the extent to which social capital is unequally distributed across social groups in a community (Lin, 2000). As such, the inherently uneven processes of migration, remittances and social capital are likely to affect the post-disaster recovery of different households unevenly.
1.2. Objectives

Taking into consideration these various perspectives, the general objectives of this doctoral research are to analyze how households turn their access to migrants into remittances after disasters. The thesis’s specific objectives are:

1. To examine who benefits, and who is excluded, from the surge of remittances after major disasters.

2. To examine the factors that affect the ability of households to turn their access to migrants into remittances after major disasters.

3. To examine how social capital affects the ability of households to turn their access to migrants into remittances after major disasters.

1.3. Research Question

Under what conditions are households able to turn access to migrants into remittances after major disasters?

1.4. Sub-questions

1. Who benefits, and who is excluded, from the surge of remittances that arrive after major disasters?

2. What are the factors that affect the ability of households to turn their access to migrants into remittances after major disasters?
3. How does social capital affect the ability of households to turn their access to migrants into remittances after major disasters?

1.5. Central Argument

The thesis’ main argument is that the income category of the household, the relation of the migrant abroad to the household, the occupations of the migrant, the country the migrant is living or working in and the social capital of the household are five main factors that affect a household’s ability to turn access to migrants into remittances after major disasters.

In an analysis of these five main factors across three disaster-affected communities, this thesis argues that households that are able to turn their access to migrants into remittances after disasters tend to share these five conditions: they are middle income households, they have multiple skilled migrants abroad, those migrants are often in Western countries, those migrants are immediate family members, and the households have many bonding as well as linking ties. These middle income households are much better placed to turn their access to migrants into remittances after disasters because they have more economic and social capital than lower income households. Most lower income households have limited to no access to migrants and those that do have access to migrants often do not have the conditions required to turn their limited access to migrants into remittances after a disaster.
1.6. Contributions

This research makes six contributions in total: three empirical contributions as well as one theoretical, one methodological and one humanitarian contribution to the literature on social capital, remittances and post-disaster recovery.

1) Empirical: this study presents primary micro-level data on the social capital and social networks of affected households and the financial and non-financial assistance that they could mobilize from their networks for post-disaster recovery. This is significant because studies on social capital often just look at the number of bonding, bridging and linking ties and does not dig deeper into the types of assistance different types of social capital ties provide, or recognize the complexity of their relationships. There is also the assumption in remittance research that assess to a resources equals the mobilization of it and my research provides the empirical research to show that access to a resource does not equal the mobilization of that resource.

2) The second empirical contribution is data on the amount of remittances that households received after Haiyan and the frequency that households received remittances, to understand which households are getting larger amounts of remittances after Haiyan. This is significant because most studies on remittances are macroeconomic studies that utilize large multi-country data sets. These datasets often take a binary approach to remittance-receiving – you either receive remittances or you do not. Such a binary approach overlooks two significant factors, the frequency (regular or irregular) and amount (significant or minimal) of remittances that are sent which make a large difference to the everyday lives of households. This micro-level data on remittances is afforded more significance due to the sensitive nature of this topic which is why studies often are not successful in yielding
answers to the amount of remittances received. My participatory approach allowed for respondents to feel comfortable disclosing dollar amount when discussing the remittances they received which is an important and novel contribution to the remittance literature.

3) The third empirical contribution is the study of remittance patterns three years after disasters. Most research on remittances after disasters look at the flow of remittances immediately after the disaster or a year after which are all within the short-term. The study of remittance receiving patterns over a longer time frame makes a unique contribution to the current scholarship. This is significant because most studies on remittances are macroeconomic studies that utilize large multi-country data sets. These datasets often take a binary approach to remittance-receiving – you either receive remittances or you do not. Such a binary approach overlooks two significant factors, the frequency (regular or irregular) and amount (significant or minimal) of remittances that are sent which make a large difference to the everyday lives of households. This micro-level data on remittances is afforded more significance due to the sensitive nature of this topic which is why studies on remittances often do not contain these details.

4) Theoretical: the study, to my knowledge at the time of writing, is the first to apply Lin’s (1999; 2001; 2008) network theory of social capital to studying the access and mobilization of remittances after disasters. Lin’s (2008: 51) network theory of social capital defines social capital as “resources embedded in one’s social networks, resources that can be accessed or mobilized through ties in the networks.” The key being, having access to resources through ties in your network, does not mean you can actually ‘mobilize’ that tie to get resources when you need it. This applies very well to the study of remittances during times of disaster because a main assumption in the literature, as well as among humanitarian actors, is that households that have migrants abroad or those that receive remittances are
less vulnerable to and recover faster from disasters. But this is based on the premise that all households that have access to migrants can convert that access into remittances after a disaster. Applying Lin’s network theory of social capital, my findings demonstrate that there is a significant difference between access to migrants and mobilization of remittances after disasters and that this difference is often delineated along socio-economic lines. As such, this study contributes a nuanced theoretical approach to studying the access to migrants and the mobilization of remittances after disasters.

5) Methodological: the study contributes a novel method to collecting data on how households utilize their social capital and social network after disasters to receive financial and non-financial assistance through a special participant-aided sociogram called a ‘recovery-gram’. The recovery-gram is a systematic and participatory approach to gathering sensitive data regarding remittances from people directly affected by a significant disaster. This participatory method is significant because it contributes an alternative to surveys which is often the approach used in macroeconomic studies on remittances. The innovative approach also helps to overcome the issues of desirability bias commonly found in survey research because the hands-on and participant-led approach is focused on giving the respondent the time and control over what information they reveal and when they reveal it. The low-tech and tactile nature of the method is also beneficial for research in low income communities in developing countries as it is easy to understand and does not require a high-level of literacy.

6) Humanitarian: the study contributes to the emerging discussions in the humanitarian community about if, and how, to incorporate remittances into the humanitarian practices. Typhoon Haiyan marked the first-time remittances were formalized into the humanitarian response process when it was used as an exclusionary criterion for the UN Shelter Cluster
Philippines’ Shelter Prioritization Tool. The findings from this study caution against including remittances as an exclusionary criterion because households who have access to migrants but could not mobilize them into remittances after Haiyan may be wrongly excluded from much needed humanitarian assistance. As such, findings from the study provide much needed empirical evidence to support a more cautious approach to incorporating remittances into the humanitarian response process.

1.7. Structure

The thesis begins with a review of the literature on 1) migration, remittances and development, 2) remittances after disasters, and 3) social capital after disasters. Chapter Three goes over the theoretical framework and Chapter Four outlines the Filipino context and background necessary to understand the research by covering the relevant literature on: 1) the Philippines, briefly going over its history, issues with land ownership, poverty and socio-economic class, and politics and corruption, 2) labour migration and remittances in the Philippines, 3) disasters in the Philippines looking at vulnerability and resilience in the archipelago, and 4) social capital in the Philippines. Chapter Five describes the selection of the case, the methodology, positionality as well as the methodological challenges and limitations of the study. Chapter Six, Seven and Eight analyzes and discusses the data collected and answers each of the three sub-questions. Chapter Six examines who benefits, and who is excluded, from the surge of remittances after major disasters. Chapter Seven examines the factors that affect the ability of households to turn their access to migrants into remittances after major disasters. Chapter Eight examines how social capital affects the ability of households to turn their access to migrants into remittances after major disasters. Chapter Nine concludes the thesis.
CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW

2.1. Introduction

Three fields of literature will be reviewed: 1) migration, remittances and development, 2) remittances after disasters, and 3) social capital after disasters. The objective is to fill the gaps that lies at the intersection of these three bodies of relatively recent scientific scholarship. To my best knowledge at the time of writing, this project appears to be the first to research the intersection of these three bodies of literature.

My study addresses three main gaps that exist the within both the migration, remittances and development literature as well as the remittances and disasters literature and contributes to various central debates between remittance proponents and remittance critics. The first gap is the paucity of studies that bridge the gap between large macroeconomic studies and small qualitative case studies. While there are many studies on either extremes of the spectrum, there are few studies that link the macro and micro level together and engage in a dialogue between the two scales. Looking at the household level, my study addresses this gap by providing the local context to explain and understand the wider macroeconomic trends of a surge of remittances after disasters. My mixed methods approach allows the two scales to speak to each other when in other studies they have been kept apart. In addition, my surveys and interviews reveal the human stories behind the statistics. Similarly, the second gap that my study addresses within the two literatures is the tendency for studies to have a strictly economic focus on remittances which overlooks the

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6 See Clarke and Wallsten, 2004; Yang, 2007; Yang, 2008; Yang, 2011; David, 2010; Mohapatra et al., 2012; Naude & Bezuidenhout, 2014; Bettin & Zazzaro, 2017; Ratha, 2006; Gupta, 2005
7 Wong, 2006; Vogel & Korinek, 2012; Curran, 1995; Blue, 2004; Fagen, 2006; Deshingkar & Aheeyar, 2006; Wu, 2006; Suleri & Savage, 2006; Weiss-Fagan, 2006; Halliday, 2006; Le Dé et al., 2014; Le Dé et al., 2015; Savage & Harvey, 2007
major non-economic costs of global migration such as the social, emotional and psychological costs. My study examines both the economic and non-economic costs of migration as well as the financial and non-financial assistance that is sent after disasters. Moreover, it considers the various intra-family dynamics and cultural norms that affect whether households receive remittances after disasters. Lastly, my study challenges the tendency for remittance scholars to employ an idealistic and generally positive depiction of transnational families, and the surge of remittances after disasters by emphasizing the complicated social relations and processes that surround remittance sending and receiving after disasters. Sharing the different stories and experiences of affected households allows for contradicting evidence to be presented that challenged the singular and positive narrative that is currently dominant within the migration, remittances and development literature.

My study also engages in various debates within the migration, remittances and development literature. Remittance proponents argue that remittances have a positive effect on development and remittance critics are more cautious of the overly optimistic approach of proponents. My research supports the remittance critics’ call for caution as receiving remittances after disasters are revealed to be complex and non-linear process amidst conflicting and dynamic social relationships. Moreover, the approach of remittance critics is relevant and practical at a time when humanitarian organizations are using receiving remittances as an exclusionary criteria for receiving aid.

My study also addresses two gaps within the remittances and disaster literature. The first as highlighted by Ebeke and Combes (2013, p. 2241) is that “only a few papers have investigated the relationship between natural disasters and remittance inflows in developing countries”. My case study of remittances after Haiyan in the Philippines contributes to filling this gap. The second gap is that there are also very few articles on the unequal distribution of remittances among
different households after disasters. The current research on remittances after disasters is mainly divided into three main streams: 1) macroeconomic studies on the effect of disasters on remittance inflows, 2) case studies on the role of remittances in post-disaster recovery and 3) studies on the unequal distribution of remittances among different households after disasters. But the third stream is the most limited, as Le Dé et al. (2015) pointed out in their paper, there is a paucity of studies on how the limited access to remittances affect people’s ability to recover from a disaster. This dissertation extends this third stream of the literature on remittances after disasters by analyzing who benefits and who is excluded from the surge of remittances after disasters and the factors affecting the ability of households to turn their access to migrants into remittances.

Lastly, my research engages with a central debate within the social capital literature, and addresses two gaps within the social capital and disasters literature. A central debate among the social capital literature that is having an impact on the subfield of social capital and post-disaster recovery is whether social capital is an individual or solely a community concept (Kawachi, 1999; Lochner et al., 1999; Carpiano, 2005) or a function of both (Coleman, 1990; Portes, 1998, 2000). This leaves a gap in research at the household level. In the unique case of recovery from disasters where individuals and communities are equally devastated and households need to reach out to their networks outside their community, and if possible, outside their country, households are an important unit of analysis (Beggs et al., 1996; Haines, Hurlbert & Beggs, 1996; Hurlbert, Haines & Beggs, 2000; Elliot et al., 2010). A common source of those ties is migrants who send remittances home to their household and thus using the household as the unit of analysis addresses an important gap in the research. The second gap in research on social capital and disasters is on the impact of location on social ties. As Enns, Malinick and Matthews (2008, p. 255) observed “while most social capital research has focused on the types of ties, whether strong or weak, and the potential resources they represent, comparatively little attention has been given to the impact
of location on these ties.” Indeed, a defining characteristic of disasters is that they trigger need for assistance from outside the affected area. As such, a key issue that may be overlooked in times of disaster is the balance of ties that are located geographically closer or farther away and their ability to assist affected households as the disaster unfolds locally (Elliot et al., 2010). My research addresses this gap by adding in the spatial element of social capital ties. The next section will go over the relevant literature in the three fields and situate and justify the research question.

2.2. Migration-Development Nexus: The Debate Between Remittance Proponents and Remittance Critics

To understand the debates on remittances after disasters, one must go over the larger debate that it stems from: the migration-development nexus. The migration-development nexus is “the pursuit to harness, maximize, and leverage the benefits of migration in order to promote economic growth and reduce poverty” (Preibisch, Dodd & Su, 2016, p. 2111). A great deal of the academic and policy enthusiasm is fueled by the surge of global remittances from migrants’ host countries back to their countries of origin. During the last two decades there has been more than a nine fold increase in the transfer of formal remittances\(^8\) to low and middle income countries, from $50 billion in 1995 to $466 billion in 2018 (World Bank, 2018a). By the end of 2019, it is projected that remittances will grow to $715 billion (World Bank, 2018b). The surge in remittances has given rise to a kind of ‘remittance euphoria’, with migrant remittances being proclaimed as the newest ‘development mantra’ among institutions like the World Bank, governments as well as

\(^8\) The remittances included in the World Bank data are defined as funds sent through official banking transfers or businesses such as Western Union. For this study, we are define remittances as the exchange of money and goods between a migrant, and the family they left behind (Goldring 2004).
development NGOs (de Haas, 2005). Dilip Ratha⁹ (2007, p. 5) famously claimed, “A 10 percent increase in per capita official remittances may lead to a 3.5 percent decline in the share of poor people”. But are remittances really that responsive and the panacea of global development? Such questions and the significant attention placed on remittances within the international development literature and global policy world (Ratha, 2014, Milanovic, 2011; Piper, 2009; Levitt & LambaNieves, 2011; Sorensen, 2012), has generated a debate about how effective remittances really are at lifting households and communities out of poverty and providing economic support during times of crisis. Building on de Haas’s (2010) categorization of a similar debate within migrations studies as one between ‘migration optimists’ and ‘migration pessimists’, I would categorize this more focused debate as between ‘remittance proponents’ and ‘remittance critics’. While the remittance proponents argue remittances can play a significant role in poverty alleviation, economic growth and development, the remittance critics argue that migration and remittances can have damaging effects in the sending regions and the positive effects of remittances are often overstated (de Haas, 2005; Preibisch, Dodd & Su, 2016; Castañeda, 2013; Piper, 2009; Silver, 2011). The two sides will be explored in the next section. Understanding this debate and their various arguments are important as these discussions inform the literatures on remittances and social capital after disasters.

2.2.1. Remittance Proponents vs. Remittance Critics

My study engages in various debates within the migration, remittances and development literature between remittance proponents and remittance critics. Remittance proponents argue that remittances largely have a positive effect on development and remittance critics are more cautious

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⁹ Dilip Ratha is the lead economist of the Migration and Remittances Team Development Prospects Group at the World Bank.
of the overly optimistic narrative set out by remittance proponents. My research explores the remittance critics’ call for caution as receiving remittances after disasters are revealed to be complex and non-linear process amidst conflicting and dynamic social relationships. By asking who benefits and who is excluded from the surge of remittances that occur after major disasters, I am challenging the remittance proponent’s depiction of the generally positive impact of remittances.

Remittance proponents argue that remittances can contribute to poverty reduction and economic growth (Jones, 1998; Kapur, 2003; Ratha, 2003). Indeed, research by Adams (2005), which used a large, nationally representative household survey to analyze the impact of internal remittances (from Guatemala) and international remittances (from the United States) on poverty in Guatemala found that remittances contribute to poverty reduction. Adams (2005, p. 68) found that with only one exception, both internal and international remittances reduce the level, depth, and severity of poverty in Guatemala. In another study, Adams and Page (2005) analyze a new data set from 1980 to 1999 on international migration, remittances, inequality and poverty from 71 developing countries. Using the new data to econometrically estimate the impact of the two variables of international migration and remittances on poverty in the developing world, the authors found that remittances significantly reduce the level, depth and severity of poverty in the developing world.

In terms of economic growth, remittance proponents argue that remittances are productively invested in physical assets and human capital. Adams (2007) in a review of findings from recent research argues that households receiving international remittances spend less on consumption goods, such as food, and more on investment goods like education and housing. Remittances have also been found to be put towards physical capital like housing, and

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developing human capital in the form of education and health, as well as investments, which are seen to stimulate growth (Cattaneo, 2005). Adams (1991) found that remittance-receiving households in rural Egypt have a higher propensity to invest than non-remittance receiving households. In addition to investments and savings, Brown and Walker (1995) observed in Samoa and Tonga that a significant proportion of remittances are used for entrepreneurial and business ventures. The same was observed in urban Mexico, where Woodruff and Zenteno’s (2001) study of 6,000 small firms in 44 urban areas showed that remittances accounted for about 20 per cent of the capital invested in microenterprises. These studies reinforce the argument that remittances are reducing poverty, being productively invested in physical and human capital and contributing to entrepreneurship and economic growth.

In addition to the economic case for remittances, remittance proponents argue that remittances have a positive effect on education and health. Yang’s (2005) research in the Philippines found that households receiving international remittances were able to reduce child labour and increase educational spending. Several studies of the effects of remittances on children’s education in Latin America have also yielded similar findings of remittances increasing education attainment of children (Acosta, Fajnzylber & Lopez, 2007) and prolonging a child’s education (Edwards & Ureta, 2003). In Mexico, Lopez-Cordova (2004) found remittances contributed to increasing child literacy and school attendance while Hanson and Woodruff (2003) found the largest impact of remittances on education was for girls in households where their mother has a low level of education.

In terms of health, studies have found that remittances positively affect the health status of recipient families through access to health care and improved nutrition (De & Ratha, 2005; Acosta, Fajnzylber, & Lopez, 2007). Hildebrant and McKenzie’s (2005) research in Mexico found that there were two channels that migration and remittances affect health outcomes. The first is
health improvements brought about by an increase in household income and the second is the increase in health knowledge through having a migrant family member abroad. These studies reinforce the remittance proponents’ argument that remittances are spent productively on education and health with positive outcomes for remittance-receiving households.

Remittance critics are cautious of the tendency to overstate the magnitude and potential of migration and remittances. For de Haas (2005), remittance proponents often ignore the selectivity and heterogeneity of the impacts of migration and remittances on development in migrant-sending regions. In addition, the development potential of migration is often uneven and far from fully realized. For example, as de Haas (2012) points out, individuals living in extreme poverty are often excluded from international migration, as such, remittances can be viewed as a mechanism for deepening existing economic inequalities as opposed to a tool for poverty alleviation.

Remittance critics are also highly cautious of the strictly economic focus on remittance proponents. Such an approach overlooks the major non-economic costs of global migration such as the social, emotional and psychological costs (Preibisch, Dodd, & Su, 2016; Castañeda, 2013; Piper, 2009; Silver, 2011). While several studies have shown that migration does not necessarily lead to passive dependency on remittances (Taylor et al., 1996a; 1996b; de Haas, 2003), concerns remain over specific stressors induced by migration such as family separation, the breakdown of social support networks, and the reconstitution of roles and responsibilities within the household (Silver, 2011). Due to the gendered nature of these processes, scholars emphasize the importance of analyzing gender as a central organizing principle shaping migration and the organization of migrants’ lives (Hondagneu-Sotelo, 2003; Lutz, 2010). Women have been found to be more vulnerable to the stresses implied by family member migration because of the central role families assume in their lives (Silver, 2011). Studies have found that in households where fathers migrate, mothers tend to expand their gendered responsibilities to adopt the roles previously performed by
the migrant (Parreñas, 2005). Research has pointed to this role adaptation as involving significant strain as mothers adopt additional responsibilities and tasks (D’Aubeterre, 1995; Silver, 2011). Conversely, in households where the mother migrates, men are often reluctant to take up gendered roles typically occupied by women, leaving non-migrating women—largely grandmothers and daughters—to take up the responsibilities left by the migrant (Parreñas, 2005; Schmalzbauer, 2004).

As such, migration and remittances may be further exacerbating existing inequalities in the household. From this, it can be seen that gender is an important factor in determining the impact of remittances on the household. For example, while households that receive remittances are cited to have more increased education attainment of children (Acosta, Fajnzylber, & Lopez 2007; Edwards & Ureta, 2003), a study in Nepal has found that investment in education is disproportionately spent on boys’ education, particularly in low income households relying on male remitters (Vogel & Korinek 2012, p.87). In addition, Wong (2006, p. 368) has identified “intrafamily politics around remittances” in regards to female Ghanaian remittance senders in Toronto. Wong (2006, p. 376) found that remittances were highly contested and negotiated in different contexts and at different scales shedding light on the struggle female migrants have reconciling competing demands in transnational spaces. Similar to findings in Thailand and Cuba (Curran, 1995; Blue, 2004), Wong (2006) found that recipients viewed remittance as a right and family obligation. As such, the inability to send remittances often resulted in a strong sense of shame (McKay, 2004). Helweg’s (1983) research on Punjabi families revealed that migrant families whose children did not remit experienced shame because remittances contribute to the honour of the kin group. Indeed, some of these social norms and family pressures to remit can cause some migrants to go into debt to send remittances home (Le Dé, 2015; Obokata, 2014). Wong (2006, p. 370) found that while remittances can empower women, male family members
often contest this power through their perception that women have less capacity than men which limits their ability to support the family.

As a result of the complicated power-dynamics that are involved with migration and the relationship between those who migrate and those who stay behind, remittance critics are cautious of overstating the positivity of remittances without taking into consideration the major non-economics costs that come with global migration. As many of these more in-depth and qualitative studies on the social dynamics of remittances in transnational have shown, transnational families and transnational relationships are fraught with tensions, sacrifices and emotional costs which are often not recognized in the literature (Wong, 2006). For Wong (2006, p. 369) “Remittances are not only about monetary transactions, as the literature emphasizes; they are also about how social relations are embedded in emotional ones, which counters prevalent conceptualizations of their commercial use.” It also highlights the tendency for remittance scholars to employ an idealistic and generally positive depiction of transnational families within their research to eliminate the complications brought on by the many non-economic costs described above. The contradicting evidence presented by remittance critics are significant but understudied in comparison to those of remittance proponents. The limited number of these studies highlights the need for more in-depth research that examines the social dynamics of remittances in transnational families. But there is also a need to reconcile the gap between large quantitative studies and small qualitative studies. For that reason, my study will be employing a mixed methods approach that will bridge the gap between large quantitative household surveys and more in-depth qualitative case studies to provide both a broad understanding of how remittances are used and the underlying social, cultural and political factors that determines its use within transnational families.
2.3. Remittances After Disasters

The dramatic rise in remittances over the last twenty years, combined with the increase in frequency and intensity of major disasters, has increased policy and academic interest in how migrant networks contribute to post-disaster recovery. However, the literature on disasters and remittances is still fairly limited. As mentioned earlier, Ebeke and Combes (2013, p. 2241) has noted that there are only a few articles that have investigated the relationship between disasters and remittance inflows in developing countries. My case study of remittances after Haiyan in the Philippines contributes to filling this gap. Moreover, there are even fewer articles on the unequal distribution of remittances among difference households after disasters. By asking under what conditions households can turn their access to migrants into remittances after disasters, I am addressing this gap and identifying the conditions that contribute to the unequal distribution of remittances among different households after disasters.

Despite the existence of remittance proponents and remittance critics within the remittances and development debate, the writing on remittances after disasters has largely been positive and in line with the ‘remittance euphoria’ experienced by some international institutions, NGOs and academics about the development potential of remittances. As IOM (2007, p. 46) wrote in their report on remittances and disasters after the Indian Ocean Tsunami, “Remittances can be an important resource in the emergency and recovery phases following disaster and diaspora communities are quick to transmit funds to areas affected by natural disaster”. Current research on remittances after disasters is mainly divided into three main streams: 1) macroeconomic studies on the effect of disasters on remittance inflows, 2) case studies on the role of remittances in post-disaster recovery and 3) studies on the unequal

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distribution of remittances among different households after disasters. The different streams of literature and the authors in each are summarized in Table 1 below.

**Table 1: Summary of the Three Main Streams of Literature on Remittances After Disasters**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Stream</th>
<th>Description of Stream</th>
<th>Authors</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>First Stream</td>
<td>Macroeconomic studies on the effect of disasters on remittance inflows</td>
<td>Yang, 2008; Naude &amp; Bezuidenhout, 2014; Clarke &amp; Wallsten, 2004; Bettin &amp; Zazzaro, 2017; Ratha, 2006; Gupta, 2005; David, 2010; Mohapatra et al., 2012</td>
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<tr>
<td>Second Stream</td>
<td>Case studies on the role of remittances in post-disaster recovery in past disasters</td>
<td>Fagen, 2006; Deshingkar &amp; Aheeyar, 2006; Wu, 2006; Suleri &amp; Savage, 2006; Weiss-Fagan, 2006; Halliday, 2006; Le Dé et al., 2014; Savage &amp; Harvey, 2007</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Third Stream</td>
<td>Studies on the unequal distribution of remittances among different households after disasters</td>
<td>Le Dé et al., 2015; Deshingkar &amp; Aheeyar, 2006</td>
</tr>
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The first stream of the literature examines the inflow of remittances after disasters and studies show that remittances tend to increase in the aftermath of disasters (Yang, 2008; Naude & Bezuidenhout, 2014; Clarke & Wallsten, 2004; Bettin & Zazzaro, 2017; Ratha, 2006; Gupta, 2005; David, 2010; Mohapatra et al., 2012). Studies in this stream tend to be macroeconomic studies that utilize large national datasets or multi-country datasets. Empirical evidence has been presented to show an increase in remittances after disasters by Clarke and Wallsten (2004) for the case of Jamaica in 1988 and Ra.ha (2006) for Bangladesh, Haiti, Honduras and the Dominican Republic. Using the Reserve Bank of India’s databases combined with IMF’s data on remittances, Gupta’s (2005) regression results found that remittances were higher during drought years in India. Yang’s (2008) in-depth quantitative study on the impact of hurricanes on
international financial flows from 1970 to 2002 across more than 70 developing countries affected by hurricanes during that time period found that hurricane exposure leads to substantial increases in migrants' remittances. Using panel data on 23 sub-Saharan African countries from 1980 to 2007, Naude and Bezuidenhout (2014, p. 89) found that remittances increase after disasters and disasters seem to have a significant long-term impact on remittances. Using a panel of 98 countries over the period of 1990-2010, Bettin and Zazzaro (2017) found that remittances increase after disasters and contribute to the reconstruction process. David (2010) using data from 1970 to 2005 from a sample of 78 developing countries showed that remittance inflows increase significantly in response to shocks to both climatic and geological disasters. Finally, Mohapatra et al. (2012) using a large panel dataset of developing countries, highlighted that countries that have a larger number of migrants abroad receive a large amount of remittances after disasters. These increases in remittances are captured in Figure 1 and 2 from Mohapatra et al. (2012).
Figure 1 and Figure 2: Remittances of percentage of GDP for the year before, the year of and the year after a disaster occurred (Mohapatra et al. 2012: 368)
While a majority of these macroeconomic studies highlight the benefits of remittances after disasters, a deeper examination of the literature in the second stream shows that the relationship between remittances and disasters is not strictly positive and that the results are varied and highly dependent on many factors such as, the severity of the disaster, the significance of remittances in the country prior to the disaster, the financial constraints of remittance senders, the ability for migrants to return home, the amount of government and NGO assistance, the amount of disruption to remittance access as well as the social and cultural norms of giving.

The second stream of the literature focuses on the role of remittances in post-disaster recovery in past disasters and these have mainly been case studies (Fagen, 2006; Deshingkar & Aheeyar, 2006; Wu, 2006; Suleri & Savage, 2006; Weiss-Fagan, 2006; Halliday, 2006; Le Dé et al., 2014; Savage & Harvey, 2007). A small number of studies focus on whether remittances contribute to a faster recovery time. Remittance-receiving households in Indonesia were found to have recovered faster from the 2004 Tsunami because of immediate relief provided by migrant remittances (Wu, 2006). A similar trend was observed in Gonavies, Haiti after Cyclone Jeanne in 2004 (Weiss-Fagan, 2006), Granada after Hurricane Ivan in 2005 (Harvey and Savage 2007), El Salvador after an earthquake in 2001 (Halliday, 2006) and Samoa after Cyclone Evan in 2012 (Le Dé et al., 2014).

Most of these studies stem from the main block of work on the role of remittances in disasters, an edited report by Savage and Harvey (2007) on “Remittances during crises: Implications for humanitarian response” for the Humanitarian Policy Group of the Overseas Development Institute. The report had six case studies, four of which were focused on remittances and disasters. Each case study examined how people used remittances before and after the disaster and the effects of the disaster on remittance flows.
The first case study was on remittances to Gonaives in Haiti after Tropical Storm Jeanne in September 2004. Fagen (2006, p. 18) found that “while remittances overall play an important role in the lives of individuals in Gonaives, they yield only small improvements in the quality of life and do not relieve poverty.” The study also found that while there was only a very small increase in cash remittances, in-kind transfers of clothing, food and other necessities were abundant. Fagen (2006, p. 19) concluded “the Haitian diaspora provides a lifeline to its compatriots, but it is too slender in normal times, let alone in the face of a disaster.”

The second case study was on remittances to Sri Lanka following the Indian Ocean tsunami. Unlike Haiti, remittances play a significant role in the Sri Lankan economy as the largest source of foreign exchange, bringing in around $1.5 billion a year (Deshingkar & Aheeyar, 2006). According to the Central Bank of Sri Lanka, the flows of remittances increased sharply in the months immediately after the tsunami. Remittances increased substantially by approximately 19 percent from $420 million in the first quarter of 2004, to $498 million in the corresponding quarter in 2005 (Deshingkar & Aheeyar, 2006). Remittances helped recipients rebuild their homes and purchase medicine, baby food and other essentials. The authors urged disaster agencies to recognize that it is dangerous to assume that remittance-receiving families do not need humanitarian or governmental assistance as there are delays in accessing remittances after a disaster and migrants may need to return home to tend to family.

The third case study was on remittances to Aceh, Indonesia after the 2004 tsunami. Due to the high casualty rate and the devastation of communications infrastructure, many migrant workers were not able to locate their family members in the first month after the tsunami (Wu, 2006). Moreover, while some migrants returned home immediately to search and care for their families, many could not return due to financial and legal barriers. Some migrants were in their first year of work and too heavily indebted to return, some had migrated illegally and feared arrest.
upon return and others could not get permission from their employers to take a leave (Wu, 2006). Many who could not return, sent remittances through relatives and friends who could. Wu (2006) also found that households in which the head of the family or the main breadwinner was abroad, and thus absent during the emergency, were more in shock than households which did not have a migrant.

The fourth case study was on remittances to Northern Pakistan after the devastating earthquake in October 2005. Before the earthquake, millions of people had already emigrated from Pakistan creating a vast diaspora. In Suleri and Savage’s (2006) study they found that almost all the recipient households (96%) reported that remittances were their main source of income and 50% said that remittances were their only source of income. As a result, when the earthquake struck and the communication lines were disrupted, people were unable to access their main source of income. The authors found that while remittances increased in the immediate aftermath of the disaster, the actual contribution remittances made to the household declined (Suleri & Savage, 2006). They also found that households that received remittances often had cement mortar homes while non-remittance receivers had homes built with stone masonry. During the earthquake, most stone masonry homes were destroyed while many cement-mortar homes remained standing. As a result, remittance receivers seemed less vulnerable to the earthquake due to their cement homes and were able to recover faster due to the need for less repairs. However, the authors did find that while cement-built homes were more resilient, they were more likely to cause fatalities when they collapsed than mud-built homes, leading to slightly higher mortality rates among remittance receivers than non-receivers.

Another notable study is Le Dé et al.’s (2014) research on of the role of remittances in rural Samoa after the tsunami of 2009 and Cyclone Evan in 2012. The authors found that remittances were one of the most important mechanisms used to achieve short-term coping and
long-term recovery objectives. Remittance-receiving households were observed to have easier access to food and health care and they were able to recover faster through rebuilding their homes and regenerating their livelihood more rapidly. Le Dé et al. (2014) also found that remittances also brought benefits to the wider community. As a result, they urged that aid agencies and governments should take remittances into account in their response and recovery programs. Le Dé et al.’s (2013) review of the literature found that following a disaster, remittances may be spent on basic short-term needs such as food, clothing, emergency health and funerals. It can also be directed at longer-term objectives such as education, business investment, and migration with the intention to remit and shelter reconstruction.

Within the literature, remittances have been shown to increase, decrease as well as change the level and type of vulnerabilities households face during times of disasters. Thus, the literature on remittances after disasters is not homogenous and instead reflects the diversity of experiences after disasters. While households that receive remittances may recover faster from a disaster than non-remittance receiving households (Wu, 2006; Weiss-Fagan, 2006; Harvey & Savage, 2007; Halliday, 2006; Le Dé et al., 2014), global households that lack working-age men and women may be more vulnerable during times of disaster as children and the elderly are left to fend for themselves (Savage & Harvey, 2007; Wu, 2006; Le Dé et al., 2014). Moreover, qualitative research by Obokata (2014, p. 83-84) found that remittances could contribute to increased vulnerability because many Filipinos have refused to leave their homes in advance of typhoons in the past because they are scared of leaving their possessions behind. This is understandable given that looting has been documented as a commonplace event during and after large-scale disasters (Miller, 2006; Wang, 2013; Luke, 2005). In addition, as mentioned earlier, remittances may change the type of vulnerability that households experience, as in the case of earthquakes, remittance receiving households may suffer higher mortality rates than non-recipients as their
cement-built homes are more likely to cause fatalities than mud-built homes (Suleri & Savage, 2006). The relationship between property and material possessions and risk and vulnerability during the onset of disasters need to be explored in future research.

Lastly, the third, and most limited, stream of literature is studies on the uneven distribution of remittances to different households after disasters (Le Dé et al., 2015; Deshingkar & Aheeyar, 2006). Studies in this stream apply the established findings that international migration is a selective process which has historically privileged better-off groups and do not tend to benefit the poorest members of society (de Haas, 2005; Schiff, 1994; Mazzucato, Van Den Boom, & Nsowah-Nuamah, 2008; Taylor et al., 2005; Arunatilake et al., 2010) to the context of disasters. For example, Mazzucato, Van Den Boom, and Nsowah-Nuamah (2008) show that in Ghana only 5 percent of remittances accrue to the poorest 20 percent of the population, while most remittances (57%) go to the richest 20 percent of the population. Similarly, Taylor et al.’s (2005) study on the impacts of remittances, on inequality and poverty in rural Mexico, found that because remittances are dependent on households getting access to labour market overseas, transnational remittances are likely to be mainly received by middle and upper-income families. In Samoan communities, researchers have observed that households have unequal access to remittances (Muliaina, 2003; Shankman, 1976), which suggests households have differential capacities to overcome crises (Le Dé et al., 2015). Arunatilake et al. (2010) found that only approximately 10 percent of households in Sri Lanka receive remittances, with the distribution concentrated among the richer and urban households. With this reality in mind, studies in this stream examines the uneven nature of the distribution of remittances after disasters. Indeed, as Le Dé et al. (2015) pointed out in their paper, there is a paucity of studies on how the limited access to remittances affect people’s ability to recover from a disaster.
Le Dé et al. (2015)’s study of remittances after Cyclone Even in Samoa, found that remittances tend to be accessible by households with middle to upper level incomes, rather than by the poorest. Le Dé et al. (2015) discovered that while many households in Samoa receive remittances on a regular basis, the poor only get remittances a few times a year and in very small amounts. Because the members of poor households have relatively low levels of education, migrants can only access poorly paid seasonal jobs or low skilled employment in the host country (Le Dé et al., 2015, p. 549). Also, the poor often only have one family member living overseas, implying that a significant financial burden is placed on the remitter. These factors mean migrants have limited capacities to send remittances both regularly and in higher proportions during disasters. In times of disaster, it may influence the capacity of the poor household to claim remittances and use them as a mechanism to overcome the difficulties faced. (Le Dé et al., 2015, p. 543). As Le Dé et al. (2015, p. 545) note:

Interviews undertaken with disaster affected households in Tafitoala revealed that remittances played a significant role in people’s response to the disaster. Most households that got remittances on a regular basis received more remittances after the cyclone. These served to counter-balance the loss of agricultural production and the lack of external aid. On the other hand, those with limited access to remittances and categorised as poor, seemed to experience greater difficulties in the face of the event.

Limited access to remittances not only affected poor people’s capabilities to deal with everyday struggle, results point out that such vulnerable positions are reinforced or at least reproduced, in time of disaster. Le Dé et al. (2015) found that, eventually, the households receiving little to no remittances became even more disadvantaged after Cyclone Evan. Deshingkar and Aheeyar (2006, p.18) came to the same conclusion following the 2004 tsunami in Sri Lanka, qualifying it as a “remittance gap”. Deshingkar and Aheeyar (2006) found that remittances often exclude the poorest households since they rarely send family members overseas. Moreover, interviews reveal that the poorest and most excluded groups before the tsunami became even worse off
afterwards, and did not benefit from remittances. There was therefore evidence of a remittance gap. This remittance gap can also indirectly affect people’s ability to access other resources. In Samoa, some people explained that relatives overseas could be used to guarantee loans, thus those who had a relative overseas were able to get a loan after Cyclone Evan but people who did not were unable to access this resource (Le Dé et al., 2015, p. 545). Limited access to remittances may also influence the way households use this resource both before and after a disaster. For example, Yang (2003) finds that those below a certain income threshold mainly use remittances for subsistence consumption, a pattern that is amplified in time of crises. As such, some studies have found that remittances may reproduce or even increase both inequalities and vulnerabilities existing within the community after a disaster (Le Dé et al., 2015; Deshingkar & Aheeyar, 2006).

This dissertation extends the third, and most limited, stream of the literature by analyzing who benefits and who is excluded from the surge of remittances after disasters and the factors that affect households’ access to remittances after disasters and the factors affecting the ability of households to turn their access to migrants into remittances after disasters. I also bring together the macroeconomic perspectives of studies in the first stream of literature with the case studies approach of studies in the second stream by bringing the macro- and micro- levels together in my research and allowing them to speak to each other through mixed methods. These aspects will be elaborated on in the methodology section.
My research question engages with the role of the household within the social capital literature, which has largely viewed social capital as something possessed by an individual or a community (Kawachi, 1999; Lochner et al., 1999; Carpiano, 2005) or a function of both (Coleman, 1990; Portes, 1998, 2000). My research question asks about social capital at the household level. In the case of post-disaster recovery where individuals and communities are equally devastated and households need to reach out to their networks outside their community, such as migrants, the households is an important unit of analysis (Beggs et al., 1996; Haines, Hurlbert & Beggs, 1996; Hurlbert, Haines & Beggs, 2000; Elliot et al., 2010). This brings in the element of location which is also commonly missing from studies on social capital. Indeed, a defining characteristic of disasters is that they trigger a need for assistance from outside the affected area so adding in the spatial element of social capital ties is significant to social capital and disaster research.

The conditions under which community members help each other has been a topic of interest for a long time because the social support that community members provide is a principal way by which people and households get resources (Wellman & Wortley, 1990). Ties with community members and relatives provide social support that make up much of the social capital people use to deal with daily life, seize opportunities and reduce uncertainty (Wellman & Wortley, 1990). They also underpin the informal arrangements that are vital for a household’s survival, expansion and reproduction (Pahl & Spencer, 2004). These ties are especially significant in times of disaster.

Social networks are recognized as “a central resource for people exposed to natural hazards” (World Risk Report 2011: 21). Indeed, studies consistently show that people rely on their social network to survive and recovery from disasters (Aldrich, 2012; Myers, 2013; Dynes, 2006;
Elliot et al., 2010; Bankoff, 2003, 2007; Casagrande et al., 2015; Bracamonte, 2015; Fafchamps & Lund, 2003; Gaillard, 2015; Marin et al., 2015). Other studies argue that social capital may play a role in post-disaster resilience (Nakagawa & Shaw, 2004; Dynes, 2006; Aldrich & Meyer, 2015; Hawkins & Maurer, 2010). Studies have shown that disaster-affected communities are often the first to respond in emergencies (IFRC, 2014; IIED, 2011) and kin are the most common source of informal aid after disasters (Drabek et al., 1975; Dynes, 2006; Casagrande et al., 2015).

Social support has been identified as an important factor in disaster recovery because networks can provide material, informational, or emotional support in a disaster setting (Kaniasty & Norris, 2000; Faas et al., 2015). Casagrande et al.’s (2015) study aimed to understand how people’s relationships helped them coordinate or access resources, information and other support. They ask whether people use social networks in different ways when seeking support to meet the different types of challenges presented by a disaster. The authors found people relied most on immediate family when securing life during the disaster. Then, networks expanded to friends, neighbours, professionals, and volunteers during non-life-threatening preparation and immediate recovery. They noted that immediately before the disaster’s impact, social networks extended outward into weak ties in a spirit of community. But such a sense of community did not last long and during long-term recovery, interviewees were most isolated and relied heavily on immediate family and professionals.

With this understanding of the significance of social networks in mind, academics and policy makers alike have begun to turn the attention to how these networks can play an even bigger role in post-disaster recovery given the frequent shortcomings of the international humanitarian community to provide adequate support in the face of mounting global crises (Elliot et al. 2010). Studies on social capital and disaster have generally used these definitions
and categorizations of social capital as bonding, bridging and linking (Woolcock 2000 as cited in Nakagawa and Shaw 2004, p. 10):

- Bonding social capital refers to ties among people who tend to be closely connected, such as immediate family members, neighbours, close friends, and business associates sharing similar demographic characteristics.

- Bridging social capital denotes ties among people from different ethnic, geographical, and occupational backgrounds who have similar economic status and political influence.

- Linking social capital are the ties among people in positions of influence in formal organizations, such as schools, agricultural extension offices, the police or local or national government entities.

This categorization of social capital has contributed to helping scholars identify and research the different types of social capital. It has also contributed to theories about which groups hold more of which type of capital. For example, Woolcock and Narayan (2000: 240) argue “social capital is the capital of the poor” because it is commonly asserted that while poor people lack material assets, they can generally rely on kinship and social networks to protect themselves against deprivation and occasional risks and shocks. This is based on the assumption that strong bonding ties help poor households to more easily recover, especially when other forms of material capital are in short supply. Woolcock and Narayan (2000, p. 227) argue,

> The poor, for example, may have a close-knit and intensive stock of "bonding" social capital that they can leverage to "get by" (Briggs 1998; Holzmann and Jorgensen 1999), but they lack the more diffuse and extensive "bridging" social capital deployed by the nonpoor to "get ahead" (Barr 1998; Kozel and Parker 2000; Narayan 1999).

With over 95% of disaster-related deaths occurring in developing countries (Zissner, 2011) and over 218 million people affected each year (CRED, 2015); there is growing interest in how households living in vulnerable countries can use the different forms of capital they have
(physical, human and social), to craft responses to climate shocks (Elliot et al., 2010; Aldrich, 2012; Dynes, 2006). Applying the lens of social capital as bonding, bridging and linking ties to assistance that arrives after disasters is what sets this new literature, on social capital after disasters, apart from previous scholarships on the role of kinship and community members in offering post-disaster support. The categorization of the types of social ties helps to advance discussions beyond kinship and community to look at closeness of the tie, differences between the networks in terms of ethnic, geographical, and occupational backgrounds and differences in power.

The two main authors that have applied social capital theories to post-disaster recovery are Russell Dynes and Daniel Aldrich. Both Dynes (2006) and Aldrich (2012) start from the premise that the role of social capital is an under-examined factor in the field of disaster recovery. Dynes (2006, p. 1) wrote:

Most disaster research has fixated primarily on the destruction of physical capital (structures) and secondarily on the destruction of human capital (lives); social capital is less tangible but, of all forms of capital, is less damaged and less affected by disaster. Consequently, during the emergency period of disaster response, it is social capital that serves as the primary basis for a community response. In addition, social capital is the only form of capital which is renewed and enhanced during the emergency period.

Dynes (2006) argues that social capital allows for social systems to be seen as active resources as opposed to victims. This allows for the shift of the focus from social vulnerabilities towards social capabilities. For example, a focus on social capital allows for the identification of social resources during emergencies, rather than primarily focusing on the destruction of physical capital. He uses James Coleman’s definition of social capital which divided the concept into six forms: obligation and expectations, information potential, norms and effective sanctions, authority relations, appropriate social organizations, and intentional organizations. Dynes (2006, p. 1) argues that “social capital is the only form of capital which is renewed and enhanced during the emergency
period”. As such, Dynes (2006, p. 2) calls social capital “our most significant resource in responding to damage caused by natural and other hazards.”

Similarly, Aldrich (2012) argues in his book “Building Resilience: Social Capital in Post-Disaster Recovery”, the seminal publication on this topic, that high levels of social capital serves as the core engine of recovery. Aldrich (2012) identifies six explanations for the pace of disaster recovery: quality of governance, external aid, amount of damage, population density, demographic/socioeconomic conditions, and social capital. Through looking at the literature on disasters and looking specifically at four case studies of mega catastrophes – Tokyo following 1923 earthquake, Kobe after the 1995 earthquake, Tamil Nadu after the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami and post-Katrina New Orleans – Aldrich argues that “high levels of social capital – more than such commonly referenced factors as socio-economic conditions, population density, amount of damage or aid – serve as the core engine of recovery” (Aldrich, 2012, p. 15). Aldrich’s (2012, p. 33) definition of social capital builds on Lin’s (2008) network view of social capital and envision it as the “resources available through bonding, bridging, and linking social networks along with the norms and information transmitted through those connections”. His definition builds from the assumption that social capital “reduces transaction costs, increases the probability of collective action, and makes cooperation among individuals more likely” (p. 39). In his book, Aldrich (2012, p. 42) used accessible proxies of social capital – voter turnout rates, participation in political activities, involvement in communal festivals, connections to extra-local organizations – to assess the significance of social capital in post-disaster recovery in four communities.

Aldrich (2012) found that higher levels of social capital facilitates recovery and help survivors coordinate for more effective reconstruction. Alternatively, neighbourhoods with lower levels of social resources can find themselves unable to organize collectively to deter looting and garbage dumping, to communicate necessary requests to the authorities, and to work together to
rebuild their community. Thus, Aldrich (2012) advocates that the most effective and least expensive way to mitigate disasters is to create stronger bonds between individuals in vulnerable populations before and after disasters.

However, similar to how Ostrom (1999) found a dark side to social capital, Aldrich (2012) also found a dark side of social capital for post-disaster recovery because helping in-groups recover more effectively can also slow rebuilding for those with fewer social resources. For example, the driving up of prices for rebuilding material and labour can mean that only households that can afford the higher prices due to their wealth, social status or network while leaving poorer households without access to the necessary labour or materials. Neighborhoods and groups with fewer social resources face negative outcomes, both inadvertent and deliberate. The absence of social capital can stall a community’s recovery, short-circuiting attempts to overcome collective action problems such as removing debris and rebuilding communal buildings and public spaces (Chamlee-Wright, 2010). As such, it can be seen that similar to the literature on remittances and disaster recovery, research on social capital and disaster recovery while appearing mainly positive also has negative aspects that are not discussed as much.

A central debate among the social capital literature that is having an impact on the subfield of social capital and post-disaster recovery is whether social capital is an individual or solely a community concept (Kawachi, 1999; Lochner et al., 1999; Carpiano, 2005) or a function of both (Coleman, 1990; Portes, 1998, 2000). While Bourdieu (1985) conceptualized social capital as a property of individuals, Coleman (1988) expanded it to the level of families and communities and Putnam (1993) made an even larger leap to conceptualize social capital as a property of communities, regions and even nations. Schuller et al. (2000) take a different approach arguing that social capital is unique as a concept because of its ability to bridge the theoretical gap between individual and community that spans from the micro to the macro in an interactive and
independent manner more effectively than previous theories. However, within this debate, the household level is often overlooked. With a focus on individuals and communities as well as how the two interact, the similarly significant level of households is not receiving much attention despite the household being an important level of analysis when it comes to social capital. A deeper discussion on this will unfold in the theory chapter but for this section, the debate is important to highlight as its implications are also unfolding in the social capital and post-disaster recovery literature.

In the social capital and post-disaster recovery literature, a large number of studies focus on social capital at the community level (Dynes, 2006; Aldrich & Meyer, 2015; Marin et al., 2015; Nakagawa & Shaw, 2004; Murphy, 2007; Li & Tan, 2019; LaLone, 2012; Chamlee-Wright, 2010; Elliot et al., 2010) and many focus on individuals (Haines, Hurlbert & Beggs, 1996; Varda et al., 2009; Weil et al., 2012; Casagrande et al., 2015). Some focus on both the individual and community level (Aldrich, 2012; Petrikova & Chadha, 2013; Chamlee-Wright & Storr, 2011; Meyer, 2013; Faas et al., 2004) because similar to Schuller et al.’s (2000) argument, they see social capital as a concept that can bridge the theoretical gap between individual and community. And like the general social capital literature, only a few studies have focused on the household level (Wei & Han, 2018; Sadri et al., 2018; Hawkins & Maurer, 2010; Fleming, 2012; Islam & Walkerden, 2015).

A similarity among Dynes’ (2006) and Aldrich’s (2012) research is the focus on the community level. Dynes (2012, p. 2) argues that the “locus of the response to disaster is the community, which as a unit has the social capital necessary to respond to disasters”. Similarly, Aldrich (2012, p. 7) focused on the community level, focusing on the ability of a neighbourhood, ward, or area to engage in positive, networked adaptation after a crisis. Other studies have also adapted the community or neighbourhood scale. Marin et al. (2015) examined social capital in
fishing communities in Chile after the 2010 tsunami. Nakagawa and Shaw (2004) examine the role of social capital in the post-earthquake rehabilitation and reconstruction programs in Kobe, Japan and Gujarat, India. Nakagawa and Shaw (2004) found that the community with social capital recorded the speediest recovery rate. Looking at two case studies in Canada and the United States, Murphy (2007) discusses how social capital resources within communities may work to improve a community’s resilience. Similarly, Li and Tan’s (2019) study of post-disaster community participation and recovery in earthquake-stricken areas in Sichuan, China, found that self-organized social-acquaintance networks within the village had a positive effect on villager’s participation in voluntary community activities after the earthquake. LaLone’s (2012) study of community-level social networks in a rural Appalachian region after tornados struck in April 2011 examined the potential for mobilizing social capital resources to aid disaster response and recovery.

Other empirical studies examine social capital after disasters on an individual level. Tatsuki and Hayashi (2002) connected individual recoveries after disasters to self-reported levels of trustworthiness and civic participation. In the United States, studies on social capital and recovery after Hurricane Andrew in 1992 found that social capital affected individual support provision, resource allocation, and aid availability (Haines, Hurlbert and Beggs, 1996) and that individuals who received more social support experienced better physical health and lower levels of depression than individuals who received less (Varda et al., 2009). Similarly, Tatsuki (2008) found that richer social capital, civic involvement, and active citizenship helped survivors of the Kobe earthquake to see themselves as recovered from the tragedy. On the other hand, Weil et al. (2012) found that individuals who were more socially-involved carried the greatest load with respect to helping the displaced population after Hurricane Katrina. They experienced more stress...
initially but were shown to be able to snap back from the events and have a more significant buffer against negative psychosocial experiences.

Several studies examine social capital at the individual as well as the community level and some examine how the two interact. Petrikova and Chadha (2013, p. 359) examined the impact of community-wide disasters at the individual and community level in India’s Andhra Pradesh state and found that “individual-level structural and community-level cognitive social capital significantly mitigate the negative effects of idiosyncratic shocks”. Chamlee-Wright and Storr (2011) examined how social capital aids in post-disaster community recovery in St. Bernard Parish after Hurricane Katrina and found that collective narratives can shape the recovery strategies that individuals adopt. Faas et al. (2015) studied social networks in two disaster-induced resettlements in the central Andean highlands of Ecuador employing both whole and personal social network analysis.

Wei and Han’s (2018) study on pre-disaster social capital and disaster recovery in earthquake-stricken rural communities in Wenchuan, China, found that households with more social capital recovered more easily and quickly from disasters. The authors also found that a larger network significantly increased the amount of government aid that was received for reconstruction because the households could draw on their network to assist in applications for aid. The authors chose to focus on the household level because “the house is the most essential for life during the post-disaster period” (Wei and Han 2018: 2). Similarly, household surveys to rural communities in Indiana that were affected by tornadoes in 2012 found that households that had higher levels of social capital recovered faster and that the more the individuals of a household were exposed to their communities, the greater their capacity to face sudden shocks (Sadri et al., 2018). Hawkins and Maurer’s (2010) research on how social capital operated in the lives of forty families after Hurricane Katrina in New Orleans found that residents used social capital to survive,
relocate and rebuild their lives and communities. They chose the household level because social capital can be a means to understand the relative strength of families and communities. Similarly, Fleming’s (2012) study of rural villages affected by the 2010 Chilean earthquake found that social capital is an important component of households for their access to and choice of coping strategies. In Bangladesh, Islam and Walkerden (2015) explored how links between households and NGOs promote disaster resilience in two coastal villages after Cyclone Sidr in 2007. The authors justified choosing the household as the primary unit of analysis because “households are the social unit through which villagers seek to recover from extreme events. Bangladeshi village households are tight-knit and work together in disaster recovery” (Islam and Walkerden 2015). The authors also note that villagers relate to NGOs primarily as a household unit.

Thus, mirroring the central debate over levels of analysis among the social capital literature, the social capital and post-disaster recovery sub-field is also primarily focused on studying social capital as an individual or solely a community concept. This leaves a gap in research at the household level. In the unique case of recovery from disasters where individuals and communities are equally devastated and households need to reach out to their networks outside their community, and if they have access, outside their country, households are an important unit of analysis (Beggs et al., 1996; Haines, Hurlbert & Beggs, 1996; Hurlbert, Haines & Beggs, 2000; Elliot et al., 2010). A common source of those ties is migrants and thus for the study of remittances after disasters, the household level is a logical unit of analysis because remittances are often sent to households to be used by households not just individuals alone. Moreover, as noted by Islam and Walkerden (2015), given the prominence of the household unit in both how families recover and how they deal with NGOs and other humanitarian actors, households are a good primary unit of analysis for researching about social capital after disasters. For these reasons, and more which will be discussed in the theory chapter, my study has focused
on the household as the primary unit of analysis.

2.5. Conclusion

The review of the three fields of literature identified the debates that this research engages in and the gaps that lies at the intersection of these three bodies of scholarship that this study addresses. The next section on the theoretical framework demonstrates how the bodies of literature on social capital, global householding and remittances fit together to create a framework that situations the findings of my study.
CHAPTER THREE: THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

3.1. Introduction

While the basic idea of social capital comes from the old saying “It’s not what you know, it’s who you know” (Enns et al., 2008; Woolcock and Narayan 2000), the term “social capital” as a concept of academic study has only been around for about 30 years. During this time, social capital has been used in many disciplines of the social sciences, it has been the subject of thousands of academic papers, and it has become a focus of policy initiatives (Castiglione, Van Deth & Wolleb, 2008). For example, in 1996, the World Bank launched the Social Capital Initiative and have since produced a high number of working papers and has a Social Capital Thematic Group which bring together 250 World Bank professionals from various sectors that are interested in how to apply social capital to World Bank operations. As Ismail Sergeldin, the former Vice-President of Special Programs wrote in the foreword of the Social Capital Initiative Working Papers No. 24, “There is growing empirical evidence that social capital contributes significantly to sustainable development” (Grootaert and van Bastelaer, 2001). Initiatives like these, validate Portes (1998, p. 1) concern that “social capital has evolved into something of a cure-all for the maladies affecting society at home and abroad”. Because of its ambiguity in meaning and application, the concept of social capital has also faced a great deal of criticism. This section will briefly summarize how the concept of social capital developed and its main criticisms before focusing on the theoretical framework used in this dissertation which is situation within the literature on social capital, global householding and remittances.
3.2. Brief Summary of the Origin and Criticisms of Social Capital

The concept of social capital has drastically grown since it was popularized by Pierre Bourdieu in 1985 and with this growth has come a significant amount of criticism. This section will provide a brief summary of the origin of the concept of social capital and outline its main criticisms. I argue that despite these criticisms social capital is a useful concept to understand the social networks embedded within migration processes of remittance sending and receiving. Moreover, it is the criticism that scholars often look over the dark side of social capital that makes it such a useful tool to understand the complex trade-offs involved in migration and transnational family relations that are at the core of remittance sending and receiving. Thus, these criticisms of social capital have contributed to strengthening the concept and making it relevant for addressing my research question.

The concept of social capital first emerged as a field of study through the work of Pierre Bourdieu (1985) who included social capital in his threefold distinction between economic, social and cultural capital. Bourdieu defined social capital as “the aggregate of the actual or potential resources which are linked to procession of a durable network of more or less institutionalized relationships of mutual acquaintance and recognition – or in other words to membership of a group - which provides each of its members with the backing of collectively-owned capital” (Bourdieu 1985, p. 248). Bourdieu (1985) saw social capital as a property of the individual rather than the collective. He focused on the benefits that individuals accrued by participating in groups and argued that social networks are not a natural given but must be constructed through the investment of economic and cultural resources. In return, the social relationships allow individuals to claim access to resources possessed by their associated. As Portes (1998: 4) describes, Bourdieu argued that “through social capital, actors can gain direct access to economic resources (subsidized loans,
investment tips, protected markets); they can increase their cultural capital through contacts with experts or individuals of refinement (i.e. embodied cultural capital); or, alternatively, they can affiliate with institutions that confer valued credentials (i.e. institutionalized cultural capital).

James Coleman (1988) developed the concept of social capital further and subjected the concept to empirical scrutiny and developed ways to operationalize the concept for research purposes. Coleman provided a broad definition of social capital as “a variety of entities with two elements in common: they all consist of some aspect of social structures, and they facilitate certain actions of actors – whether persons or corporate actors – within the structure. Like other forms of capital, social capital is productive, making possible the achievement of certain ends that in its absence would not be possible” (Coleman, 1988, p. 98). Despite Coleman’s significant contribution in advancing the field, his work was criticized by Portes (1998) for having a vague definition, conceptual confusion about membership of social structure and the resources acquired through such membership and an overemphasis on close/dense ties, while neglecting weak ties. Nevertheless, the work of Coleman was both influential and significant as noted by Schuller et al. (2000).

The most prominent scholar on the subject is Robert Putnam and his 1993 publication, Making Democracy Work. While Bourdieu and Coleman conceptualized social capital as an individual asset, Putnam expanded the scope of analysis and social capital became an asset of a community or region (Portes & Landolt, 2000, p. 535). Putnam defined social capital as “features of social organization, such as trust, norms, and networks, that can improve the efficiency of society by facilitating coordinated actions” (Putnam, 1993, p. 167). Putnam’s work was influential because he explicitly identified the triad of social capital – trust, norms and networks – which helped to produce indicators for social capital, which have since been a focus of conceptual discussion (Schuller et al., 2000). Compared to Bourdieu and Coleman, Putnam saw social capital
as a historically-created good, which is evident in his discussion of the discrepancies between Northern and Southern Italy as being rooted in their histories. While Putnam’s seminal work has been highly influential in introducing different approaches to modeling social relations, it has also garnered significant criticism particularly in regards to his selective choice of history.

To begin with, Putnam is often criticized for the circular logic found in his theory of social capital. With Putnam’s expansion of social capital as a property of communities and nations rather than individuals, social capital is simultaneously a cause and an effect (Portes, 1998, p. 20). Social capital leads to positive outcomes such as economic development and its existence is inferred from the same outcomes. Portes (1998, p. 20) illustrates this tautology by highlighting this quote from Putnam (1993, p. 36), Some regions of Italy… have many active community organizations… These “civic communities” value solidarity, civic participation, and integrity. And here democracy works. At the other end are “uncivic” regions, like Calabria and Sicily, aptly characterized by the French term incivisme. The very concept of citizenship is stunted here.

For Portes (1998, p. 20) this demonstrates that “if your town is ‘civic’, it does civic things; if it is ‘uncivic’ it does not”. Portes (1998) argues that this comes from the analytical decision to start with examining the effect such as well-governed towns of Italian North versus poorly governed town of the south, and working retroactively to find out what distinguishes them. Done in this way, the causal factor is determined by its effect (Lin 2008). As such, Lin (2008, p. 11) states “it would be impossible to build a theory where casual and effectual factors are folded into a singular function”. As such, Portes (1998) and Lin (2008) advocate that the causal and effectual factors must be treated as separated entities in future research to avoid logical circularity.

Next, Levi (1996, p. 46) criticizes Putnam for arguing, “trust is an essential component of social capital” (Putnam, 1993, p. 170) but not providing a precise definition of trust. As a result, Putnam effectively treats a whole range of relationships and expectations under the one title of
trust, while also leaving out the other side of the coin, which is distrust. Additionally, the key concepts of norms and networks are also not discussed in detail and without precise understandings of these key concepts, it is difficult to fully grasp how they come together to as a part social capital.

Lastly, one of the strongest theoretical criticisms of Putnam’s conception of social capital is its neglect of the ‘dark side’ of social capital (Ostrom, 1999). While Coleman initially conceptualized social capital as normatively neutral, Putnam’s conceptualization of it has a clear positive normative spin. Putnam has been criticized for having an uncritical conceptualization of social capital in his initial presentation of the concept (Portes & Landolt, 2000, p. 547). Levi (1996, p. 52) criticized Putnam for assuming that the capacity to engage in collective action is always commendable, but she notes there are many instances where it was demonstrably a “bad thing” citing the genocides in Bosnia and Rwanda as examples. For Foley and Edwards (1998), there are problems with putting such a positive normative spin to the concept of social capital because it overlooks the negative aspects of social capital. These criticisms of social capital have contributed to the strengthening of this still relatively young concept and have led to more comprehensive applications of the concept to studying dynamic topics.

Portes and Landolt (2000) argue that the same mechanisms appropriable by individuals and groups as social capital can have other, less desirable consequences. Specifically, it has often been noted that strong ties within a group can lead to more exclusion than inclusion and resources and preferences can be granted at the expense of universalistic rights of others. Waldinger (1995) cites two examples of how the strong ties that bring benefits to members of a group commonly enable them to bar others from access. The first is the control exercised by white ethnics over the construction trades and fire and police unions of New York. The second example is from two centuries ago when Adam Smith ([1776] 1979: 232) noted that meetings of merchants ended up
being treated as a conspiracy against the public as they were excluded from the networks and mutual knowledge linking the colluding groups (Portes, 1998). Moreover, scholars have made it clear that social capital cannot be taken uncritically as a social good as it can lead to many public “bads” such as mafia families, prostitutions and gambling rings and youth gangs (Portes, 1998, p. 17).

In the case of the Philippines, Asis (2006) argues, Filipinos are migration savvy with the ability to adjust to the demands of global labour markets through their use of various forms of social capital such as the migration networks that facilitate the movements of kin to foreign lands. However, these same migration processes have yielded negative forms of social capital for migrants abroad such as the restriction of individual freedom when it comes to workers remaining abroad because their families depend on their remittances. Advincula-Lopez (2005) highlights that some workers have verbalized the need to settle home permanently but the financial impositions of the family members deter them from doing this, so they stay abroad to work against their best wishes. Moreover, as the International Fund for Agricultural Development’s report on remittances noted,

> The budgetary situation of transnational families is markedly different from that of traditional ones. While migration increases income, the voyage is generally financed through debt. When migrants reach their destinations, the cost of living is significantly higher than in their home country and the expenses associated with living apart are far greater than those for a family living under one roof (2013: 44).

The issues of debt and the obligation to remit are exacerbated after a disaster. Research in Samoa by Le Dé (2015, p. 224) found that “remitting for months after disasters often represents a heavy financial burden on migrants, sometimes leading to a spiral of debt and increased economic vulnerability. In some cases, migrant workers may not be able to come back to their country of origin and have to stay overseas for a longer period than originally planned”. Thus, social capital as a concept that has evolved over time to encompass a bright side and a dark side is useful to
studying dynamic and complicated topics such as the intrafamily politics of remittance sending and receiving after disasters. Indeed, a fuller conceptualization of social capital that encompasses its whole spectrum of social good and bad and all the grey areas in between is needed in order to reflect the complexity of social life, collective organizing and its effects.

3.3. Network Theory of Social Capital

Despite the criticisms that have been raised about Putnam’s conceptualization of social capital, a great deal of work has been done to improve and focus the theory. Academics have worked to remove some of the ambiguity and broad application of social capital by recognizing two distinct conceptualizations of social capital (Meyer, 2013). One conceptualization of social capital is the social network-based approach from the academic tradition of Bourdieu (1985) and Lin (1999) and the other is the norms, trust, civic-based approach of Putnam (1993) and Fukuyama (1995). Social capital theorists such as Portes (1998) and Lin (1999) commonly use this differentiation. As Lin (1999, p. 3) argued:

> Divorced from its roots in individual interactions and networking, [the norms, trust, civic-based approach to] social capital becomes merely another trendy term to employ or deploy in the broad context of improving or building social integration and solidarity… [S]ocial capital, as a relational asset, must be distinguished from collective assets and goods such as culture, norms, trust, etc.

The main distinction between the conceptualization is on scale, while social capital was originally conceptualized as a property of an individual or a household by Bourdieu (1985) and Coleman (1988), Putnam’s conceptualizations of social capital expands it much wider into a property of communities, regions and even nations. Thus, the social network-based approach is rooted in interaction and networking between people and households as opposed to the norms and trust that is often observed on wider community scales. Similar to other studies of the role of social capital
in disaster preparedness, response and recovery, this study will employ the social network-based approach to social capital as I am examining the household level (Lin, 2008; Chamlee-Wright & Storr, 2011). I argue that a social network-based approach to social capital is the most relevant to studying the conditions under which households are able to turn access to migrants into remittances after disasters.

Moreover, as noted by Lin (2008, p. 51) “The general premise that social capital is network-based is acknowledged by all scholars who have contributed to the discussion (Bourdieu, 1980, 1983, 1986; Lin 1982; Coleman, 1988, 1990; Flap 1991, 2001; Burt 1992; Putnam 1993, 1993, 2000; Erickson 1995, 1996)”. As such, this study will use Lin’s definition of social capital “as resources embedded in one’s social networks, resources that can be accessed or mobilized through ties in the networks” (Lin 2008: 51). For Lin (2008), capital is both a concept and a theory. “As a concept, it represents investment in certain types of resources of value in a given society. As a theory, it describes the process by which capital is captured and reproduced for returns” (Lin, 2001, p. 3). Lin’s definition builds off of Bourdieu’s definition of social capital as “the aggregate of the actual or potential resources which are linked to possession of a durable network of more or less institutionalized relationships of mutual acquaintance or recognition” (Bourdieu, 1985, p. 248). In this study, social capital is conceptualized to have two components: a durable social network and the amount and quality of resources available to be passed through the network ties (Lin, 1999). Studies on disasters that have used this conceptualization of social capital have focused on how social ties affect the resources and support that survivors are offered (Nakagawa & Shaw, 2004; Varda et al., 2009; Meyer, 2013). Meyer (2013) found that social capital and disaster researchers often differentiate between financial (remittances, loans and gifts for property repair) and nonfinancial resources (search and rescue, debris removal, emotional support, shelter, information) that can be transferred through social ties after disasters.
For Meyer (2013, p. 30), empirical research on social capital and disasters highlights the proposition by Bourdieu and Lin, that “social capital amount and type affects life chances”. As mentioned earlier Quarantelli (2005, p. 357) noted, “Social capital might be a very useful concept to capture one major kind of resources that those involved in disaster-related activity might or might not have.” Moreover, network theories of social capital understand networks as different types of ties or social capital. The categorization of different types of social capital is helping to understanding remittance sending and receiving patterns because it helps to identify who the senders and receivers are and what relationship they have with each other. Here, I will explain bonding social capital, bridging social capital, linking social capital, as well as intra-community and extra-community ties.

To begin, I draw from Putnam’s (2000, p. 22-24) popular distinction between “bonding” and “bridging” forms of social capital, which he argues are the two most important dimensions along which social capital varies. Noting that these dimensions are more relative than absolute, Putnam defines “bonding” social as emerging from inward-oriented networks among socially similar kinds of people that reinforce group identities to the exclusion of others; by contrast, he defines “bridging” social capital as emerging from outward-oriented networks among socially different kinds of people that effectively span “diverse social cleavages.” In this way, Putnam (2000, p. 23) explains “Bonding social capital constitutes a kind of sociological superglue, whereas bridging social capital provides a sociological WD-40,” The underlying point is that not all social capital is the same: some spans social divisions and eases the flow of informal support across them, whereas, other types of social capital contribute to these divisions, restricting flows of informal support across them (Elliot et al. 2010, p. 627).
More specifically, as mentioned earlier, the different types of social capital (bonding, bridging and linking) are defined in terms of the type of relationships these people will have (Woolcock 2000 as cited in Nakagawa and Shaw 2004, p. 10):

- “Bonding social capital” refers to ties among people who tend to be closely connected, such as immediate family members, neighbours, close friends, and business associates sharing similar demographic characteristics.
- Bridging social capital denotes ties among people from different ethnic, geographical, and occupational backgrounds who have similar economic status and political influence.
- Linking social capital are the ties between the community and people in positions of influence in formal organizations, such as schools, agricultural extension offices, the police or local or national government entities.

A defining characteristic of disasters is that they trigger the need for assistance from outside the affected area (Elliott et al., 2010). As such, a key issue in times of disaster may not be the balance of socially similar and dissimilar ties in one’s network (in terms of class, economic status and ethnicity) but the balance of intra and extra-community ties that are differently positioned in space to assist as the disaster unfolds locally (Elliot et al., 2010). Elliot et al. (2010, p. 629) argues, “it may be that the most useful spatial “bridges” for such translocal support are actually “bonding” sources of social capital (e.g. a family member or close friend to whom one is socially close by spatially distant).” This conceptualization helps to reconcile two prominent but previously disconnected findings in research on social support and disaster. The first is Drabek et al.’s (1975) finding that kin remain the most common source of informal aid after disasters. The second is that social support after disasters typically come from personal ties positioned outside one’s core network, defined as individuals with whom recipients discuss important matters or
socialize frequently during the six months preceding the disaster (Beggs et al., 1996; Haines, Hurlbert & Beggs, 1996; Hurlbert, Haines & Beggs, 2000). A spatial view of social capital allows us to see that the two findings come together to demonstrate that the most common source of supportive social capital are ties who are personally close but due to geographical distance outsider of their core network. Or as Elliot et al. (2010, p. 629) state “the most useful form of social capital during disaster and displacement may be bonding ties that bridge space”.

While Elliot et al. (2010) do not make this further connection in their paper; “bonding ties that bridge space” are exactly what migrant remittances are. A spatial view of social capital allows for the connections to remittances, bonding and bridging ties and disaster recovery to be made. While “remittance bonding ties” or extra-community bonding ties are ideally placed to contribute to disaster recovery, achieving a good balance of intra-community and extra-community ties are not easy.

The significance of focusing on intra-community and extra-community ties is illustrated by Woolcock (1998) in his discussions in relation to economic well-being. Woolcock (1998) states that both intra-community (bonding) and extra-community (bridging) ties are important to the economic stability and well-being of a community. While he supports Portes’ (1998) caution about overly-strong bonding ties being detrimental to a community’s ability to form bridges with the outside. Woolcock (1998, p. 170-3) argues that communities that are able to strike a balance between strong intra-community ties and high levels of trust, while maintaining supportive networks through weaker ties without outside communities; are in the best position to achieve future economic well-being.

Building on the earlier discussion on intra-community and extra-community ties, Woolcock and Narayan (2000) argue that as a community member’s welfare change over time, so too does the optimal calculus of costs and benefits associated with particular combinations of
bonds and bridges. Using the example of poor entrepreneurs, Woolcock and Narayan (2000) demonstrate how while they may initially be depending on bonding social capital (immediate neighbours and friends) for credit and support, if they want to reach the market and expand the reach of their product they must use their bridging social capital. Granovetter (1995) argues that economic development takes place through a mechanism that allows individuals to draw initially on the benefits of close community membership but that also enables them to acquire the skills and resources to participate in networks that transcend their community, thereby progressively joining the economic mainstream. A similar temporal pattern of how different households seek help during their recovery process may also exist whereby disaster-affected households rely on their bonding ties until the resources locally are exhausted and they are forced to seek help from bridging ties. Indeed, both Casagrande et al. (2015) and Hawkins and Maurer (2010) found that bonding ties such as close family were important for immediate support such as securing life during the disaster. Casagrande et al.’s (2015) study on people affected by the 2008 Mississippi floods found that after the immediate recovery phase passed, networks expanded to weaker bridging and linking ties such as friends, neighbours, professionals, and volunteers. Similarly, Hawkins and Maurer (2010) found that bridging and linking social capital offered pathways to longer term survival and wider neighbourhood and community revitalization among the families they interviewed following Hurricane Katrina.

3.4. Global Householding

To understand transnational families, it is important to see the household as a global unit that is located at both the place of origin and place of residence and not just at the place or origin. I argue
that global householding provides a conceptual bridge between micro and macro as well as local and global forces, and is ideal for the investigation of the interconnections among households.

Households are seen as a single economic and social unit in which members typically share meals and other household expenses (Jocano, 1969; Jocano, 1975; Mendez & Jocano, 1974). As noted by Advincula-Lopez (2005, p. 64), in the Philippines, the household is the “ultimate source of physical, psychological and financial security”. As a result of the rise of international migration in the Philippines over the last forty years, household arrangements among different household members have been and continue to be global (Porio, 2007; Advincula-Lopez, 2005). As such, this study employs the concept of global householding (Douglass, 2006, 2014). According to Douglass (2014, p. 313), “the idea of global householding was introduced as an attempt to contribute to four dimensions of migration research: 1) the household as a basic social institution in decision making about migration; 2) the ways in which migration contributes, or does not contribute, to the reproduction of the household; 3) the phenomenal globalization of households in Asia over the past two decades, and 4) the relationship between the reproduction of the household and reproduction of society as a whole”. Thus, the conceptual bridge between micro and macro that the concept of global householding provides is ideal for the investigation of the interconnections among households (Porio, 2007). In the context of migrants, they would have a household at the place of origin and the place of resident for their work abroad. The concept of global householding allows for the investigation of both these households as well as the network of support in both these places. In this case, as Porio (2007, p. 221) notes “the original meaning of a household, which assumes members to be “sharing a pot or cooking arrangements” in a particular geographic space or locality, gets transformed to also mean sharing “virtual pots” of material and nonmaterial (e.g. emotional labor/capital) resources across territories to sustain the household.” Porio (2007) further elaborates that the analytical power of the concept is in its ability
to address activities of both deterritorialized members and territorialized members of the household. As my research is understanding the dynamics of access and mobilizing remittances, it inherently involves the analysis of interactions between different households locally and globally. Another contribution of global householding to this research is that it allows for the understanding of the household as a complex social institution that includes affection, altruism and material dimensions (Douglass 2014). As Douglass (2014, p. 313) notes “recent research has added a new understanding of the household that allows for both multiple motives for cooperation and contestations and for human agency to have a role in negotiating positions and benefits in ways that could be contrary to preconceived expectations.” As Advincula-Lopez (2005) explains, the lives of migrants and those of their families back home are linked through remittances and that the allocation of remittances is constrained by the social relations maintained by workers to their immediate and extended families. Having such an understanding of households will contribute to debunking the many assumptions that are often made about remittance support after large disasters. For example, it is commonly assumed that the greater humanitarian needs owing to a disaster would lead to more remittance sending but the research conducted by Bragg et al. (2007) demonstrates this is not the case. Bragg et al. (2017) fund that a mega disaster simply does not change the economic conditions of the migrant and therefore additional funds are often unavailable for post-disaster recovery purposes. An understanding of the household as a complex social institution allows for such contradictions to be revealed.

Moreover, global householding is relevant to the Philippines context because as Porio (2007) argues, the survival of the Filipino households in the last 30 years have increasingly relied on the global migration of OFWs. These have an impact on disasters because, in the Philippines, members of the family depend on one another during times of crisis (Islam & Walkerden, 2015). As Advincula-Lopez (2005, p. 64) explains, members of the family “are expected to provide
assistance for mutual dependence and mutual sharing including material goods. The success of one member is considered the success of the whole family and this ongoing concern for the family partly explains the generosity and the great sacrifices endured by the OFWs for their respective families (Valerio, 2002)”. Advincula-Lopez (2005, p. 64) notes that Filipino children are socialized at a very young age to “consider the needs of the family as a unit before that of the individual”. Thus, when OFWs are abroad they are expected to help those back home during times of crisis.

These reciprocal obligations play a role in determining who gets assistance after disasters. Valerio (2002) explains that assistance is often provided according to the closeness of ties and that priority is given to lineal relatives (i.e. spouse, children, parents and siblings), followed by collateral relatives (i.e. uncles, aunts, cousins, nephews, and nieces). For non-relatives, assistance is dependent on the degree of closeness and frequency of interaction. These norms extend to assistance that is sent after disasters.

3.4.1. Remittances and the Household

Much of the literature on remittances focuses on why migrants remit, suggesting at least four possible reasons. This section goes over those four reasons and I argue that these reasons all surround the household and thus, the household unit is a logical choice if I want to understand remittances after disasters.

One of the possible reasons migrants remit is self-interest: the migrant hopes to return home someday and wants to retain good relations with his family in order to, for example, insure an inheritance. A second possibility is that remittances are simply a repayment of an intra-family loan that older family members provided to talented younger members to help them migrate
(Poirine, 1997). A third motivation may be intra-family altruism. Funkhauser (1995), for example, develops a model in which migrants maximize functions that include both their own and their family’s utility. Finally, remittances might be intended to help families co-insure against shocks in the foreign and domestic economies, such that family member give to each other on the premise that they may need the assistance in return one day (Stark, 1991; Stark and Bloom, 1985). As Lucas and Stark (1985) note, however, the truth is likely to be some combination of all these possibilities.

What I am interested in this study is how the lives of migrants and their families back home are linked through remittances. As Go (2001) describes, sending remittances is considered the responsibility of the workers to their immediate household and to their relatives. The remittances are used for many purposes such as the education of children, daily consumption, and home repair. Advincula-Lopez (2005, p. 63) argues,

Remittances are not only coping mechanisms for the precarious situation of families left behind but are also forms of insurance for the migrant, as these reinforce the obligations of the family toward the migrant in case he loses his/her job.

Another reason why the household is an interesting level to study in terms of remittances and disaster is because as Advincula-Lopez (2005, p. 71) has observed, “for many Filipinos it is still a challenge to go beyond the household as a unit of mutual assistance and consequently prioritize the needs of the larger social units”. Thus, if I am interested in the idea of remittances as a form of mutual assistance after disasters then the household unit, as opposed to community or individuals, is a logical choice for the Philippines context.
CHAPTER FOUR: CONTEXT AND BACKGROUND

4.1. Introduction

In the previous chapters, the subject was introduced, the research question was justified and situated within the three literatures it engages with and the thesis’ theoretical framework reviewed. In this chapter, the socio-historical, geographical and social context is laid out for the Philippines. This section will go over the relevant literature on:

1) the Philippines, briefly going over its history, issues with land ownership, poverty and socio-economic class, and politics and corruption,
2) labour migration and remittances in the Philippines
3) disasters in the Philippines looking at vulnerability and resilience in the archipelago, and
4) social capital in the Philippines.

The objective is to provide the historical and political background for the contemporary social tensions and drastic income inequality within the archipelago. Setting the historical background is important to understanding the current dynamics and help to illustrate the national and local drive towards labour migration. The geographical context helps to understand the country’s vulnerability to disasters and sources the roots to the recent discourse of resilience. Lastly, it reviews the literature on social capital in the Philippines to provide the necessary context to understand the research findings.
4.2. The Philippines

The drastic income inequality in modern Philippines and the national phenomenon of labour migration cannot be understood without some background on the Philippines’ colonial past and historical tensions over land ownership. As Heer (1961, p. 1) stated, “History is the present, and the present is history”. This section will go over the relevant literature on colonialism, land ownership, poverty, socio-economic class, and politics and corruption.

4.2.1. Brief History of the Philippines and Issues of Land Ownership

The Philippines has a long history of colonialism. Three countries - Spain, the United States and Japan occupied the Philippines before their independence in 1946. Like many postcolonial nations, the Philippines continues to struggle with the legacies of colonialism, both in terms of continuing internal violence in some parts of the country due to struggles over land, as well as due to neoliberal economic policies that were adopted with encouragement from the World Bank and International Monetary Fund (McCoy, 2009). Due to the long-running insurrections in Mindanao and central Luzon and the inability for the Filipino state to insure its own policing functions, the Filipino state can be characterized as a weak state based on the Weberian definition (Camroux, 2008; Abinales & Amoroso, 2005). Abinales and Amoroso (2005, p. 2) add “state weakness is manifest in uncollected taxes and uncontrolled crime, bloated bureaucracies and denuded forests, low teacher salaries and high emigrating rates.” Politically, the United States is the strongest ally of the Philippines. The country has experienced significant American patronage over the decades and the U.S. presence is almost ubiquitous at the political and economic levels. The U.S. influence on the Philippines is so significant that Kang (2002, p. 22) states “for the past 50 years almost
nothing has happened without tacit or explicit U.S. consent.” As a result of these factors, Filipino governmental policies always remained subject to manipulation, with trade policies focused on import substitution and financial policies never consistently implemented (Kang, 2002, p. 10).

Some of this can be seen in the historic and continual issues of highly unequal land tenure. Franco & Borras (2008, p. 1) note that “For over a century, the Philippines has been characterized by fierce, sometimes bloody, power struggles over land. Typically, governments won votes and appeased protestors by promising to reform land ownership but have then failed to deliver more than token levels of redistribution.” As such, despite commitments to land reform by a succession of governments, the land shortage of poorer people has changed very little over time (Collins, 1989; Boyce, 1992; Putzel, 1992, 2000; Wisner et al., 2004; Abinales and Amoroso 2005). Land reform has long been a contentious issue rooted in the Philippine’s Spanish Colonial period when all land was owned by the Spanish crown or state (Abinales & Amoroso, 2005). The government did not seriously attempt to systematically issue land titles until 1880 and since then the concentration of landownership has been extremely unequal (Putzel, 1992).

As James Putzel’s (1992) book, *A Captive Land: The politics of agrarian reform in the Philippines*, highlights, while successive governments have recognized the unequal ownership, many underestimated the extent of the inequality. Putzel (1992, p. 27) recalls, “In justifying a call for land redistribution, the government and particularly the Department of Agrarian Reform have often proclaimed that, ‘Only 20 per cent of the population owns 80 per cent of the land’. In fact, the government’s land registration programme in 1988 demonstrated that not more than 5 per cent of all families owned 83 per cent of farm land.” A similar misrepresentation can be seen in the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP), which the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) (1988) states is “the redistribution of public and private agricultural lands to farmers and farmworkers who are landless, irrespective of tenurial arrangement. CARP’s vision is to have an
equitable land ownership with empowered agrarian reform beneficiaries who can effectively manage their economic and social development to have a better quality of life.” However, 27 years later after CARP was enacted, only an estimated 4.5 million hectares out of the 8 million CARP target was redistributed (Bejeno, 2016). The slow progress on land reform and redistribution of land to the landless perpetuates unequal landownership, which heavily affect the poor. While there is no conclusive evidence of the correlation between land inequality and poverty in the Philippines, Putzel (1992) states “the skewed pattern of landownership and control had led to the development of a complex pattern of land tenure that appears to contribute not only to poverty but also to a low rate of agricultural productivity.

4.2.2. Poverty, Inequality and Socio-economic Class in the Philippines

Poverty and inequality have historically been and continue to be a challenge in the Philippines. A detailed report from the Asian Development Bank (ADB) (2009) titled Poverty in the Philippines: Causes, Constraints and Opportunities, found that the proportion of households living below the poverty line has only declined slowly in the last four decades. The report notes, that great inequality across income brackets, regions, and sectors, as well as unmanaged population growth, are considered some of the key factors constraining poverty reduction efforts. The latest poverty line for 2014 was a per capita income of 10,534 pesos a year and according to the National Statistical Coordination Board, 25.8 percent of the population fell below the poverty line in the first semester of 2014, an approximate 4 per cent increase since 2013 (PSA, 2014). In comparison to neighbouring countries such as China, Thailand, Indonesia and Vietnam, whose economies experienced similar levels of poverty in the 1980s, the decline in poverty has been slow and uneven. One of the reasons the Philippines continues to lag behind other countries in poverty
reduction is because high economic growth does not translate into poverty reduction in recent years (ADB, 2009; Orante, 2015). While the Philippines’ Gross Domestic Product (GDP) grew by an average of 4.9 percent from 2004 to 2009, its poverty incidence actually increased during that period and the number of poor families increased by 185,000 from 2006 to 2009 (Orante 2015). The ADB (2009, p. 2) outlined eight main causes of poverty in the country: 1) low to moderate economic growth for the past 40 years, 2) low growth elasticity of poverty reduction, 3) weakness in employment generation and the quality of jobs generated, 4) failure to fully develop the agriculture sector, 5) high inflation during crisis periods, 6) high levels of population growth, 7) high and persistent levels of inequality, 7) recurrent shocks and exposure to risks such as economic crisis, conflicts, disasters, and “environmental poverty. However, poverty levels vary greatly by region and poverty remains a mainly rural phenomenon but urban poverty is growing (ADB, 2009). The report also found that poverty levels are strongly linked to educational attainment as people with only an elementary school education or below head two-thirds of poor households.

As a result, class in the Philippines is highly defined along the lines of education level, income, profession, type of housing as well as land and land tenure. Due to the dramatic income inequality, class is a significant category in social analysis for social scientists studying the Philippines (Aguilar, 2003, 2005; Benedicto, 2009; Pinches, 1987, 1999; Tadiar, 2004; Tolentino, 2007, 2011). The dramatic inequality is demonstrated by the distribution of families by socio-economic class, as measured by the Family Income and Expenditures Survey (FIES) of National Statistics Office (NSO), which classified 0.1 percent of Filipinos as upper class, 24.2 percent middle class and 74.7 percent lower class (Vilora et al., 2013). This breakdown is true even in the most developed Mega Manila area (Ong 2015). Combining industry standards and the work of McCann Erickson (2009), Aguilar (1998), Kerkvliet (1990), Ong (2015, p. 190) provides clear
definitions of upper class, middle class and lower class households in the Philippines context based on the monthly income, education level and profession of the head of the household as well as the type and location of house that the household occupies. Table 2 is a consolidated classification of socio-economic class in the Philippines extrapolated from Ong (2015).

Table 2: Consolidated Classification of Socio-Economic Class in the Philippines extrapolated from Ong (2015)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Upper Class</th>
<th>Middle Class</th>
<th>Lower Class</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Monthly Income of Head of Household</td>
<td>50,001 pesos (US$988) or more</td>
<td>15,001 to 50,000 pesos (US$297 to US$988)</td>
<td>below 15,000 pesos (US$297)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education Level of Head of Household</td>
<td>undergraduate from an exclusive university</td>
<td>college-level education from state colleges (with or without a diploma)</td>
<td>high school or elementary education</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Profession of Head of Household</td>
<td>white-collar occupations considered highly paid and highly skilled, such as business executives or professionals</td>
<td>occupations in skilled and technical jobs (including nurse, call center agent, overseas worker, small-scale businessman)</td>
<td>occupations as unskilled labours (including plumber, vendor, janitor, maid)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Type of House</td>
<td>a house located in an exclusive subdivision/ expensive neighbourhood enclave</td>
<td>houses in permanent or semi-permanent conditions in mixed neighbourhoods</td>
<td>live in semi-permanent and temporary homes, usually in slums or squatters’ communities</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Ong (2015, p. 190) also added observations about each socio-economic class. The upper class is often seen as “the landed elite class (Aguilar, 1998) who distance themselves in geographical and cultural terms from the poor who seek patronage (Kerkvliet, 1990) and the middle class that challenges their dominance (Pinches, 1999).” The middle class is seen to occupy a precarious
space because they can easily lose their middle class-status as a result of major internal or external shocks such as family tragedies, financial crises or disasters due to the absence of a social safety net and a strong welfare state (Ong, 2015, p. 190). The lower class are even more susceptible to internal and external shocks and because of their vulnerability they have been observed to make “creative uses of ‘idioms of persuasion, reluctance and pity’ to draw recognition from the elite” (Canell, 1999; Kerkvliet, 1990 as cited in Ong 2015, p. 190). Similar to Ong (2015), I recognize that the Philippine socio-economic class structure does not consist of just three classes, but there also exist socio-demographic differences and sub-classes within classes (Benedicto, 2009; Pinches, 1999). As Wright (1999, p. 1) explains, “[t]he word class is deployed in a wide range of explanatory contexts in sociology and, of course, depending upon that explanatory context, different concepts of class may be needed.” Wright (1999, p. 1) outlines three broad kinds of questions for which the word “class” figures centrally in the answer:

1) How do people locate themselves within a social structure of inequality?
2) What explains inequalities in economically-defined life chances and standards of living?
3) What sorts of struggles have the potential to transform capitalist economic oppressions in an emancipatory direction?

My research question fits within the second category of questions that the concept of class can help to answer. While the first question defines class as subjectively-salient attributed of social relation and the last question is a distinctively Marxist question, the second question is focused on the relationship of people to income-generating resources or assets of various sorts. In the case of my research, these income-generating resources or assets are migrants and their migrant remittances. However, using the term class can cause conceptual confusions that can distract from the main interest of my research, which are the factors that contribute to turning access to migrants into remittances after disasters. As such, for this dissertation, I adapt Ong’s (2015) Classification
of Socio-Economic Class in the Philippines and change Upper, Middle and Lower Class into Upper Income, Middle Income and Lower Income Households. The focus on income groups is a reaction to the significance that income plays in a households’ ability to send migrants abroad. As the literature has noted many times, wealthier households are more likely to send family members abroad for work because prerequisites such as higher education, visa application costs and agency fees are all costly to obtain (Funkhouser, 1992). The methods section will elaborate on the definitions of Upper Income, Middle Income and Lower Income households.

4.2.3. Politics, Patronage and Corruption in the Philippines

A major contributing factor to the income inequality and slow poverty alleviation has been attributed to poor governance and rampant corruption in the Philippines (ADB, 2009; World Bank, 2000; Azfar & Gurgur, 2008; Gupta, Davoodi, and Alonso-Terme, 1998; Akcay, 2006). The Philippines is commonly seen as a corrupt state (Hutchcroft, 1991; McCoy, 1993; Kang, 2002; Sidel, 1999; Ong et al., 2015; IBON, 2015). Hutchcroft (1991, p. 415) classifies the Philippines as a patrimonial oligarchic state where “Political administration – whether in the pre-martial law period or under martial law or in the Aquino years – is often treated as a personal affair, The state apparatus is choked continually by an anarchy of particularistic demands from, and particularistic actions on behalf of, those oligarchs and cronies who are currently most favoured by its top officials.” Similarly, Kang (2002, p. 2) notes that “[s]ince WWII, the country has been ruled by a set of elites – quasi dictators and their rich business friends,” and the Philippines has failed to develop rapidly because of political meddling. Putzel (1992) notes that in this way, the Philippines is a captive of the elite interests of the clans that dominate political life. For Kang (2002, p. 3), it is political – not economic – considerations that dominate policy making in the Philippines. As a
result, much of the delays in the development of the Filipino state are political as politics drove policy choices and policies were often made to benefit business and political elites.

Politics in the Philippines, especially at the local level have been traditionally described through the concept of patron-client relationships (Kerkvliet, 1995; Rafael, 1988). Patron-client relationships refers to how wealthier and more powerful individuals provide benefits to protect their poorer clients. Ong et al. (2015, p. 18) argues, “While [patron-client relationships is] used to describe caciquismo in Latin America and warlordism in China, in the Philippines it is specifically informed by cultural norms of utang na loob, where poorer clients are morally obliged in profound ways to find ways to reciprocate in their relationship by giving assistance, services, and general support within contexts of power asymmetries”. Anthropological work on the Philippines has identified utang na loob, or debt of gratitude, as a key moral principle that underpins social relations in the country (Ong et al., 2015). As Ong (2015 et al., 2015, p. 17) describes, “people observe an utang na loob (debt of gratitude) to those who have extended them help, especially to those who have gone beyond normal expectations of kin relationships. Refusing to give assistance to somebody who had extended past help, or having a general “mind-your-own-business” or “each-to-his-own” attitude would be violations of utang na loob”. Madianou and Miller (2012) elaborate that those who violate norms of reciprocity are labelled as having no debt of gratitude or no shame. Because of the power imbalance between barangay (the lowest political division in the Philippines) officials and citizens, poor citizens often worry that they are not able to ever return that debt of gratitude.

The Philippines continues to have a public image of cronyism, corruption and bad government stalling its development (Kang 2002, p. 2). This is reflected in Transparency International’s (2016) recent assessment of the Philippines on its Corruption Perceptions Index in which the country scored 35/100, with 0 being very corrupt and 100 being very clean. The
organization’s Global Corruption Barometer, a public opinion survey on views and experiences of corruption found that between 2008-2010, 69% of people surveyed felt that the level of corruption increased, 48% of respondents felt the government’s efforts to fight corruption are ineffective and the police and political parties were the most affected by corruption (Transparency International, 2016). These findings highlight the patron-client culture that pervades Filipino politics (Ong et al., 2015). Anderson (1988) describes the Philippines as a cacique democracy, which refers to the presence of seemingly functional democratic structures and institutions that are actually covertly controlled by a small group of elite families. Patronage today is seen in the continued influence of dynastic political clans and forms of corrupt favours exchanged between political leaders and constituents (Kerkvliet, 1995). In “An Anarchy of Families”, Historian Alfred McCoy (2009), details how the power of Filipino family-based oligarchies both derives from and contributes to a weak, corrupt state.

Its former president, Ferdinand Marcos, typifies corruption in the Philippines. Marcos served as the President of the Philippines from 1965 to 1986 and ruled under martial law from 1972 until 1981. While Marcos initially seem to fit the model of an authoritarian developer, which would accelerate economic growth through strong authoritarian leadership like others in less developed countries, the Philippines failed to keep pace with its neighbours and fell far short of becoming the next Asian economic miracle (Kang, 2002). A simple explanation for this failure is that Marcos, his family and his cronies stole significantly from the country. When public outrage and the People Power Revolution removed Marcos from office and sent him into exile in 1986, it was estimated that Marcos alone had siphoned some $10 billion into overseas bank accounts (Camroux, 2008, p. 18). For Kang (2002, p. 138), “Marcos created new oligarchs who were dependent solely on him for their success, and he also rewarded traditional elites who cooperated with him… Thus the direction of corruption shifted from the bottom-up plundering of the state to
the top-down plundering of society.” One of the legacies of Marcos is labour export.

4.3. Labour Migration and Remittances in the Philippines

The country’s history of colonialism, poverty and corruption laid the foundation for a strong drive towards labour migration in the last 40 years which has drastically reshaped the politics, economy and social configurations of society. Seen as a lifeline out of the twin pressures of chronic inequality and high unemployment the government started to build programs that used labour export as a solution to the state’s political and economic problems. Forty years on and labour export has become an embedded aspect of the Philippines state and undoubtedly part of their national brand and identity. The ubiquitous nature of the migrant in Filipino society can make the complicated everyday dynamics of migration and remittance sending and receiving difficult to study. This is why remittances after disasters reveals a unique opportunity to understand the often hidden and largely invisible forces that affect remittance sending and receiving processes. The objective is to provide the historical and social background for the contemporary dynamics of remittance sending and intrafamily politics necessary to understand my research findings.

4.3.1. Labour Export and Migration in the Philippines

In 1974, President Marcos introduced President Decree 442, a policy of labour export that created state agencies charged with deploying Filipino workers overseas (Government of the Philippines, 1974; Asis, 1992; Carino, 1992; Gonzalez, 1998). This was part of the Marcos administration’s export-oriented and foreign-capital-dependent economic program, which was compliant with the dominant development paradigm advanced by global capital and multilateral institutions like the
International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank (Hawes, 1987). While the Marcos administration had only intended for labour export to be a temporary solution to the state’s political and economic issues of the time, overseas employment has become a more permanent and critical feature of Philippines economy, providing jobs, increasing household income and generating foreign exchange (Abella, 1992; Alegado, 1997; Canlas, 1996; Aguilar, 2014).\footnote{For more historical narratives and in-depth analysis of Filipino migration see Filomeno Aguilar’s (2014) seminal book \textit{Migration Revolution: Philippine Nationhood and Class Relations in a Globalized Age}.}

As Camroux (2008, p. 18) observed,

> Emigration for Marcos, and indeed his successors, offered a social safety valve to relieve the twin, underlying problems of Filipino society. On the one hand, to cope with chronic inequalities, with an effective programme of land reform in order to empower the landless peasantry, and, on the other hand, through a vigorous family planning programme to address the Philippines’ demographic explosion that each year brings thousands of unemployable individuals into the labour force.

As labour export became more critical to the Philippines economy and as governments changed over, politicians were able to change the political discourse as well as the public’s perception of labour migration. While labour export was seen as an unfortunate necessity under the Marcos administration, and a glorified sacrifice under President Aquino and President Ramos, under President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo, labour migration is being portrayed as the highly praised Filipino contribution to the global economy (Camroux, 2008, p. 20).

While this portrayal of labour export is effective political discourse, Migrante International sees this as the Filipino state profiting from brokering Filipino labour as cheap labourers for global capital: “The Philippine state has bartered us to satisfy the needs and requirements of its foreign master and partners in exchange for dollars necessary to prop up its crises-ridden economy, finances its operations, and to fill up dirty dangerous, and difficult jobs which nobody in our host
countries ever want” (Migrante International, 1994). Indeed, the exploitation and abuse of Filipino migrants, particularly female migrants, is well documented by NGOs, academics and within the media.¹³ In May 2015, the Red Cross held the inaugural Manila Conference on Labour Migration to bring attention to the urgent humanitarian situation of labour migrants – specifically female domestic workers. The conference profiled female domestic workers who have been physically and sexually abused, tortured, wrongfully convicted and forced into prostitution, among other forms of ill treatment (Red Cross, 2015). The profiles featured in the Manila Conference on Labour Migration and the conference itself highlights the vulnerabilities that have been created due to the feminization of Overseas Filipino Workers (OFWs). The situation is so dire that the Red Cross has considered a humanitarian crisis and is committed to providing life-saving services that protect and life and dignity of Filipinos migrant workers in vulnerable situations.

While the working conditions of OFWs are often sub-optimal, many endure because they need to remit and support their families. The few studies that examine the struggle between workers’ agency and structures of power show that choices are being made and trade-offs being considered between staying in the village and migrating for low-skilled and risky labour such as domestic work (Deshingkar & Zeitlyn, 201, p. 176). For poor households, labour migration may represent the only chance of a better life for people with few employment or investment opportunities. As such, the agency of households and individuals who make strategic decisions to move out of poverty needs to be taken into consideration when studying labour migration (Deshingkar & Zeitlyn, 2015, p. 176). At the same time, Aguilar (2015) argues that,

amid global capitalist structures and the reproduction of transnational social inequalities, labor migrants – who come from lower-middle-class, upper-working-class, and rural-petty-commodity-producer class positions – exercise human agency when they choose to work overseas. Their decision requires some level of social, cultural, and financial capital. It is not out of abject poverty from which most labor migrants are fleeing; rather, their global movements are driven mainly

¹³ See Migrante International 1994; Ball and Piper 2002; Lindio-McGovern 2003; Falconer 2014
by desires for upward social mobility that are constrained by Philippine social structure: to give children a good education, to build a modern house, and even to see the world.

Moreover, Aguilar (2014) argues that global labour migration must be viewed as a transnational process where surplus value is extracted in the host country and then wages are remitted to the migrant’s home community which lead to upward class mobility. In addition, the desire to remit and improve the social-wellbeing of their families is promoted among society because of a combination of political discourses which shape the migrant experience as a glorified sacrifice or a praised contribution and due to the Catholic tradition’s emphasis on martyrdom (Camroux, 2008, p. 10). The Philippines is the only Christian nation in Eastern Asia and 96 per cent of the population believe in God (Bankoff, 2004). As a result of these various historical, political and social factors, the Philippines is seen to have a ‘culture of migration’ and a ‘remittance economy’ (Asis, 2006).

4.3.2. Migration and Remittances in the Philippines

Migration and remittances are part of an overall livelihoods strategy by which households try to insure against shocks (Mohapatra et al., 2012; Le Dé et al., 2014). This is a strategy that has been taken up by many in the Philippines as remittances have more than trebled over the past decade, reaching US$23.6 billion in 2012. The number of Filipinos living abroad rose by 3.1 million between 2000 and 2012 and data from the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA) estimates that roughly 9.5 million to 12.5 million Filipinos currently work or reside aboard. This is approximately around 10-11% of the total Philippines population. Globally, the Philippines is now the third largest recipient of remittances, after India and China (Swithern,

Despite the growth of remittances to the Philippines, the macro- and micro- economic effects of remittances are complex. An Asian Development Bank Working Paper (Ang et al., 2009), “Remittances and Household Behavior in the Philippines” found that remittances help to lift households out of poverty but it does not help to rebalance economic growth and create long-term human and capital investment. Remittances help households escape poverty because migrant remittances are often transferred directly to their families and immediately become part of the household budget that can be spent on basic needs, increase consumption of durable and nondurable goods or saved (Ang et al., 2009). As such, remittances can be seen to raise the standard of living of recipient households. Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas’ consumer expectations survey found that out of the households that received remittances in third quarter of 2009, 93 per cent spent part of it for food and other household needs, 72 per cent for education, and 63 per cent for medical expenses. Several studies have examined the impact of remittances on households in the Philippines. Tabuga (2007) found that remittances increase consumption of goods and leisure, including spending on education, housing, medical care, and durable goods. Similarly, Tullao et al. (2007) note that remittances lead to higher human capital investments in education and health. Their results revealed that remittances enhance household savings and spending on education and health care. Thus, the share of remittances in household income raises the likelihood of a household getting out of poverty.

Moreover, remittances may contribute to the creation of new social assets and services and community physical infrastructures such as schools, health centres, roads, and other community projects. Through migrant associations, migrants can pool their resources together and send them to their home communities (Ghosh, 2006). According to Sorensen and Pedersen (2002), they may
serve as platforms that bring significant development in the communities, benefiting both migrant and non-migrant families. At the community level, remittances are found to affect the distribution of income. But Dakila and Dakila’s (2006) study found the main beneficiaries of remittances are the middle classes, which is similar to the trend found in other remittance receiving countries (Le Dé et al., 2014). Tullao et al. (2007) showed that the proportion of employed workers in families receiving remittances in the Philippines is lower than those that did not, contributing to theories of remittance dependency. Tullao et al. (2007) argue that the benefits of migration will be reaped by the more educated and families with the ability to pay and this will contribute to widening of income inequality.

Some studies have found that remittances can generate dependency behaviour at the household level (Bredi, 2005; Chami et al., 2005). Bredi (2005) argued that remittances could promote idleness on the part of remittance-receiving households members. Similarly, Chami et al. (2005) highlight that remittances can create disincentives to work among migrant household members. There is also evidence of a decline in labour force participation among remittance-receiving household members in the Philippines (Rodriguez & Tiongson, 2001; Tullao et al., 2007). But the relationship between remittances and a decline in labour is not as clear because there were also observed increases in entrepreneurial activities, such as microenterprises for women and self-employment for men at the same time (Acosta, 2006; Yang, 2004; Rozelle, Taylor, & DeBraw, 1999). Other studies have shown that migration does not necessarily lead to passive dependency on remittances (Taylor et al, 1996a; 1996b; de Haas, 2003).
4.4. Disasters in the Philippines

After situating the current issues of drastic income inequality and the national and local drive towards labour migration, it is important to establish the many significant historical and ongoing environmental, social, economic and political factors that contribute to the vulnerabilities of the Philippines to disasters and extreme climate events. Just as Philippines’ history with colonialism, poverty and corruption helped to explain the government’s use of labour export as a solution to its political and economic issues, an understanding of the frequency of disasters in the Philippines helps to explain why the narrative of the diaspora coming together quickly to send funds home after every disaster sounds more optimistic than realistic. The objective is to provide the geographical, economic and social background necessary to understand my research findings.

4.4.1. Disaster-prone Philippines and its ‘Culture of Disaster’

The Philippines is one of the world’s most disaster-prone regions and climate change is expected to increase the frequency and intensity of disasters, which will compound the vulnerability of the country (Gaillard, 2015). Located within the volcanic “Ring of Fire” and the Pacific Typhoon Belt, the country is vulnerable to a variety of disasters such as earthquakes, typhoons, cyclones, landslides, and volcanic eruptions (Fernandez & Gordon, 1993). This seismically and climatically active landmass is shaken on average five times a day by earthquakes and visited by twenty or more typhoons a year (Bankoff, 2007). In 2013, the Philippines was struck by so many typhoons that the 25 names used by the Philippine Atmospheric, Geophysical, and Astronomical Services Administration (PAGASA) to assign typhoons was completely used. This is the first time that the PAGASA has run out of names since the last significantly active season in 2004 (Milgram, 2015).
Figure 3 shows the number of major disasters associated with natural hazards in the Philippines between 1960 and 2019 using data from CRED-EMDAT. In addition to the geological location of the country, many significant historical and ongoing environmental, social, economic and political factors contribute to the vulnerabilities of the Philippines to disasters and extreme climate events.

Figure 3: Yearly Number of Major Disasters Associated with Natural Hazards in the Philippines Between 1960 and 2019 (data from CRED-EMDAT)
Bankoff (2003, p. 61) captures the relationship between these factors well in his book, *Cultures of Disaster: Society and Natural Hazards in the Philippines*, where he argues that the cumulative effect of hazards in Philippine society is a “significant factor in national politics, deflecting economic policies and programmes… [while] natural hazard, national disaster, international relief and foreign debt are woven into a complex and symbiotic cycle that maintains the Philippines among the less affluent nations”. Bankoff (2003, p. 178) argues that the experience of hazard as a frequent life experience by people in the Philippines had led them to develop a “culture of disaster” in which risk and hazards become “normalized” as a part of everyday life. An example of how disaster is woven into everyday life in the Philippines can be seen through architecture. As Bankoff (2007) points out, the simple nipa palm and bamboo hut is a good example of how indigenous society took notice of seismic and meteorological hazards because the hut can easily be rebuilt when damaged and was less likely to injure people during a disaster. Adaptation to the threat of hazards can also be seen in local agricultural systems where the focus is on the reduction of crop losses as opposed to maximizing efficiency and yield. Various strategies are employed to achieve this goal such as planting crops that mature underground such as yams and sweet potatoes so they are less affected by typhoons and planting in widely scattered parcels of land to minimize the likelihood that a whole harvest would be destroyed in a disaster (Bankoff, 2007).

Indeed, Anderson (1965) and Wenger and Weller (1973) had previously defined the concept of disaster subcultures as the study of mechanisms that people develop to overcome recurrent disasters such as local norms, values, knowledge and technology. This perspective has also been echoed by anthropologist Veena Das (2006) who argue that attentiveness to mundane habits and routines reveal how events of disaster are folded into everyday practice. While this perspective has been criticized as “too environmentally determinist” (Curato & Ong, 2015, p. 13),
Bankoff clarifies that his goal was not to disregard the social but to ask for the consideration of non-human elements. He elaborates that “The Philippines are as much cultures of coping as they were ever culture of disaster” (Curato & Ong, 2015, p. 216). His intent with the argument that the Philippines had a ‘culture of disasters’ was to suggest that it is the cumulative experience of communities in coping with disasters that have shaped social life. It does not mean that people in the Philippines should be simply viewed as vulnerable. Instead Bankoff argues, “Filipinos are primarily resilient with great capacities to organize, resist, learn, change, and adapt” (Curato & Ong, 2015, p. 216).

Building on Bankoff’s (2003) conceptualization of disasters in the Philippines as frequent life experiences, JC Gaillard (2015) argues for a focus on the importance of the everyday over the extraordinary when trying to understand disasters and people’s responses. Gaillard (2015, p. 2) criticizes the dominant view of disasters, or the “hazard paradigm” which defines natural hazards as extreme and rare natural phenomena that exceed human’s ability to resist. This is the common understanding of disasters found in the Philippines as academics, politicians, and the media point to nature as the most obvious alleged cause of disasters (Gaillard, 2015; Bankoff, 2003; Luna, 1996; Vicente & Villarin, 2005). But for Gaillard (2015) and others (Hewitt, 1983; Bankoff, 2001), this focus on the extreme dimension of natural hazards separates disasters out from the regular social fabric they are embedded in. This focus also fosters an emphasis on monitoring and predicting extreme events and teaching people to have a high perception of risk. In the Philippines, people, generally the poor, are often accused of not being fully aware of the risk of disasters and making poorly informed decisions in facing hazards. As such, the dominant view assumes that both the exceptional dimensions of disasters and people’s poor perception of disaster risk are responsible for the scope of damage and human impact. But Gaillard (2015) disagrees with this dominant view and argues that disasters are neither natural nor the fault of vulnerable and helpless
people. Instead, Gaillard (2015) citing Wisner et al. (2004, p. 49) argues that in the Philippines, the risk of disaster is “a compound function of the natural hazard and the number of people, characterized by their varying degrees of vulnerability to that specific hazard, who occupy the space and time of exposure to the hazard event”. For Gaillard (2015, p. 65), like Bankoff (2003), “the root causes of disasters lie in everyday, hazard-independent constraints that trap people in permanent vulnerability rather than in the extraordinary dimension of natural hazards. Disasters should thus be considered as the extension of permanent emergency situations and should not be considered as accidents in society or the consequence of the occurrence of rare and extreme natural hazards.”

4.4.2. Vulnerability

Underlying the Philippines ‘culture of disaster’ is vulnerability (Bankoff, 2003). The study of disasters requires an interdisciplinary approach because the natural and social aspects of a disaster cannot be separated from each other (Wisner et al. 2004). Instead, research on disasters needs to consider historical, environmental, social, economic and political factors that contribute to the vulnerability and resilience of a population.

An approach that takes all of these aspects into consideration is the vulnerability approach, which was initiated in the 1970s when authors began to question the ‘naturalness’ of ‘natural disasters’ (O’Keefe et al., 1976 as cited in Wisner et al., 2004, p.19). The vulnerability approach departs from the literature before it, which saw disasters as departures from normal social functioning.¹⁴ Instead, the vulnerability approach is focused on the various ways in which social

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¹⁴ See Bryant, 1991; Alexander, 1993; Tobin & Montz, 1997; Dynes et al., 1987; Lindell & Perry, 1992; Oliver-Smith, 1996
systems operate to generate disasters by making people vulnerable (Wisner et al., 2004, p. 10). Wisner et al. (2004, p. 11) define vulnerability in relation to natural hazards as “the characteristics of a person or group and their situation that influence their capacity to anticipate, cope with, resist and recover from the impact of a natural hazard (an extreme natural event or process).” Vulnerability involves combination of factors that determines the amount of risk someone will face due to an event in nature and society. Wisner et al. (2004, p. 11) identify these key variables as “class (which includes differences in wealth), occupation, caste, ethnicity, gender, disability and health status, age and immigration status (whether ‘legal’ or ‘illegal’), and the nature and extent of social networks.” Built into the conceptualization of vulnerability is the idea that different people will experience different magnitudes of vulnerability (Wisner et al., 2004, p. 12).

The pressure and release model (PAR) is a simple framework that shows how disasters occur when natural hazards affect vulnerable people. Wisner et al. (2004, p. 50) argue that “Their vulnerability is rooted in social processes and underlying causes which may ultimately be quite remote from the disaster event itself”. According to the PAR, a disaster is the intersection of two opposing forces: those processes generating vulnerability on one side, and the natural hazard event on the other. These two forces increase pressure on people from either side and to ‘release’ the pressure, vulnerability has to be reduced. While this model of the two sides applying pressure to the people in the middle may make the people in the middle appear helpless, it is important to remember that people do possess significant capabilities as well, as to not render people as passive victims and individuals without relationships (Hewitt, 1997).

As such, a concept that often complements vulnerability is that of resilience. The IPCC (2012, p. 563) defines resilience as, “the ability of a system and its component parts to anticipate, absorb, accommodate, or recover from the effects of a hazardous event in a timely and efficient manner, including through ensuring the preservation, restoration, or improvement of its essential
basic structures and functions.” Similar to vulnerability, the concept of resilience has been used in disaster studies since the 1970s (Torry, 1979) and has been subject to many interpretations. While older conceptualizations of resilience are focused on ‘bouncing back’ or returning to a previous status quo (Lavell, 2012, p. 34), the uncertain consequences of climate change are highlighting that ‘bouncing back’ is no longer a sufficient goal in disaster risk management.\textsuperscript{15} Simply returning back to a previous status quo is a problematic approach within post-disaster recovery and reconstruction because “rapidly rebuilding houses, reconstructing infrastructure, and rehabilitating livelihoods often leads to recovering in ways that recreate or even increase existing vulnerabilities” (Lavell, 2012, p. 10). As a result of past failures in reconstruction and recovery, humanitarian organizations have adopted the narrative of ‘building back better’ which approaches the reconstruction undertaken after a disaster as an opportunity for development (Lyons, 2009). In a similar vein, scholars have pushed for the idea of ‘bouncing forward’ and/ or eventually ‘thriving’ to be included within the concept of resilience (Davies, 1993; Manyena, 2006).

4.4.3. Perceptions of Disasters, Vulnerability and Resilience

In addition to the different interpretations of disasters, vulnerability and resilience that exist among academics, there are also different interpretations among NGOs as well as the affected populations themselves. As Hilhorst and Bankoff (2004, p. 4) highlight,

Vulnerability is also about people, their perceptions and knowledge. People’s ideas about risk and their practices in relation to disaster constitute the compass with which they measure and chart the landscape of vulnerability. Perception, of course, is not knowledge, nor does knowledge necessarily translate into action. Yet, perception is important in understanding why people exhibit certain behaviours.

\textsuperscript{15} See Pelling 2003; Vale and Campanella 2005; Lavell 2012.
Understanding local people’s perceptions on disaster, vulnerability and resilience is particularly significant given how often local perceptions are ignored in humanitarian responses. Bankoff and Hilhorst (2009, p.1) point out that “it is not generally appreciated that what constitutes vulnerability to one person is not necessarily perceived as such by the next. Different actors ‘see’ disasters as different types of events and as a result prepare for, manage and record them in very different ways.” Yet, generally, disaster agencies think on behalf of affected populations, not realizing that disaster-prone communities might interpret their circumstances differently (Heijmans, 2004, p. 125). Such assumptions are common among aid agencies that often treat affected populations as recipients of aid as opposed to creative actors in disaster risk reduction (Heijmans, 2004; Le Dé et al., 2014). This sentiment is reflected in a common saying among humanitarian staff that ‘we ask them what they need then give them what we have’, which points to the underlying reality that the humanitarian system has not been built to access individual or even community needs but to provide an assumed package of needs. The dangers of this approach underline the concerns over asking affected households if they receive remittances. By applying the humanitarian assumption that remittance receiving households are less vulnerable and non-remittance receiving households are more vulnerable, agencies are making assumptions about the local population that are not grounded in evidence or the local context.

The lack of representation of local perspectives is also reflected in the literature on disaster risk management, which often does not mention explicitly how people at risk experience and understand disasters (Heijmans, 2004, p. 117). Yet, having an understanding of individual perceptions of vulnerability and resilience is vital to research because local people will often not perceive the concepts in the same way as it has been constructed in Western literature (Delica-Willison & Willison, 2004, p. 151). As such, it is important not to analyze and measure the vulnerability and resilience of local populations and households based solely on externally
established criteria (Heijmans, 2004, p. 120). Instead, strong efforts need to be made to gain a local context to understand how affected populations discuss and perceive vulnerability, resilience and recovery.

Understanding this thought process is helpful in analyzing the different coping and livelihood strategies that vulnerable populations use to adjust to a fast-changing environment. As increasingly vulnerable conditions render traditional coping strategies ineffective, people are searching for new ways of adjusting their livelihood strategies with the aim of reducing risk. One of those coping strategies to build resilience is international migration as a means to diversify livelihoods, reduce risk to local shocks, and increase household income via remittances (Adger et al., 2002; Savage & Harvey, 2007; Le Dé et al., 2014).

Oftentimes, vulnerabilities of populations are understood in the scale of impact and devastation of disasters to their lives—the larger the natural physical phenomenon and the larger the impact, the more vulnerable they are. For Bankoff, this departs from the wider aspect of disaster vulnerabilities as historical and social results (Bankoff, 2001). People’s vulnerability to disasters is actually the result of a history of marginalization and oppression. Vulnerable people are not just the most at risk because of exposure to hazards but also because their lives, as a result of societal marginalization, are always on emergency (Porteria, 2015, p. 185).

4.5. Social Capital in the Philippines

While various components of social capital - kinship, networks, mutual assistance - have been studied in the Philippines, rarely has the conceptual framework of social capital been used to study these social dynamics. Nor is the concept of social capital often applied to study post-disaster recovery in the Philippines. Yet, an emerging literature has been highlighting social capital as a
positive determinant of resilience in case studies of other disasters around the world (Aldrich, 2012; Aldrich & Meyer, 2015). Yet, as outline in the theoretical framework chapter, there is also a dark side of social capital so one needs to be careful not to only present the positive aspects of social capital. The objective is to provide the historical, social and cultural context of social capital in the Philippines to understand my research findings.

4.5.1. Studies on Social Capital in the Philippines

The Philippines social science literature has rarely been examined using the conceptual framework of bonding, bridging and linking social capital (Abad, 2005). Nevertheless, recent studies based on national survey research have provided some valuable insights into the state of social capital in the archipelago (Abad, 2005; Porio & See, 2017). Both studies concluded that rich bonding capital among family and friends is pervasive in Philippines society but most Filipinos lack bridging and linking capital as well as associational ties (Abad, 2005; Porio & See, 2017).

These findings confirm decades-old findings about the strength of kin and friendship ties in Filipino society (Pal, 1966; Carroll, 1968; Morais, 1981). Exchanges of assistance within a network are often seen as acts of duty, love and care. “Thick trust” operates within these networks. Thick trust is defined by Putnam as “trust embedded in personal relations that are strong, frequent, and embedded in wider networks” (2000, p.136). In contrast “thin trust” or generalized trust is a person’s estimation of the general moral standards of the surrounding society. Studies suggest there is a scarcity of social cohesion and a lack of thin trust in Filipino society (Abad, 2005; Rothstein and Uslaner, 2005). Rothstein and Uslaner (2005) note that while some measurements of trust are low in the Philippines, there are many different types of trust. Thick trust is extremely strong so much so that when members of one’s family makes a request of them, it is almost
impossible to refuse. However, such forms of allegiance can also lead to negative forms of social capital such as the “in-group” acceptance of corruption and nepotism (Lin, 2001) or criminal behaviour.

Abad (2005) found that cooperation, as a communal coping mechanism akin to bonding social capital, is based on cultural norms such as bayanihan as opposed to associational regulations. Bayanihan has been described by Bankoff as “toiling on another’s behalf and assuming another’s burdens” (2003, p.163) whilst Cox and Cox refer to bayanihan as “a cultural immune system that heals over wounds [...] allowing life to carry on” (2016, p.48). Bayanihan was first referenced in relation to the communal effort in agricultural communities however “the tradition has diffused throughout Filipino society and is an expression of team spirit and sharing of labour” (Beza et al., 2018, p.142). The bonding inherent in these norms is akin to social capital and fosters thick trust within communities. People trust that if they follow the norms of bayanihan then they will get a return on their investment as people will help them too. Bayanihan is further explored later in this section.

Sztompka (1999, p.25) defines trust as a “bet about the future contingent actions of others.” Similarly, Ostrom and Ahn see it as “a particular level of subjective probability with which an agent assesses that another agent or group of agents will perform a particular action” (2003, p.xvi). Both of these definitions see trust as a belief and a commitment which is what separates trust from “hope” or “confidence”. Sztompka (1999, p.24) argues that trust is not a “discourse of faith” but a “discourse of agency” demanding the agents to actively anticipate and face an unknown future and make a bet to act favourably towards one another. A major contributing factor to the low levels of thin trust in Philippines society is inequality. Despite sustained economic growth there is significant deprivation in the Philippines with 26.3 percent of the population living in poverty
in the first quarter of 2015 (PSA, 2016). Meanwhile in 2016, the wealth of the 50 richest Filipinos equated to 24.24% of the countries’ entire GDP (Dela Paz & Schnabel, 2017). Rothstein and Uslaner argue that as a result of severe inequalities, the “sense of a shared fate” is eroded between the rich and the poor or in the worst case, it has completely disintegrated (2005, p.46). This contrast is especially evident in densely packed urban environments.

4.5.2. Social Capital and Resilience in the Philippines

A number of authors have highlighted social capital as a positive determinant of resilience. Aldrich (2012, p. 34) examines how social capital operates in relation to disasters by examining bonding (kinship, friendship and loyalty amongst those closely connected), bridging (ties between heterogeneous groups) and linking (across vertical authority gradients), capital. Aldrich examines how these links provide information and resources under conditions of crisis and to ‘illuminate the ways social capital accesses or alters public policies’ (2012, p. 33). Bankoff argues that over time exposure to frequent seismic and meteorological hazards coupled with weak central leadership in the Philippines has equated to a culture of “voluntary action for collective benefit” (2007, p. 328) and in turn the deepening of civic engagement. Bankoff argues that Filipinos have become ‘primarily resilient with great capacities to organize, resist, learn, change and adapt’ (Curato & Ong, 2015, p. 216). Bankoff and Aldrich both focus on how collective action comes about and the difference that it can make. Under disaster conditions social capital acts as a kind of informal insurance involving trust, norms and networks. This is closely linked to social networks and notions of “the mutualisation of labour”, known in the Philippines as bayanihan (Gaillard, 2015, p. 78). Gaillard (2015, p. 78) argues that “bayanihan is critical to mobilize labor
in emergency preventive actions such as raising or building fishpond embankments and securing furniture and appliances to safer grounds”.

However, post Typhoon Haiyan, the social capital-based notions of resilience outlined above were revealed to be overly optimistic. Based on data from a multi-year study of Typhoon Haiyan affected communities, Eadie and Su (2018, p. 341) argue for a more negative reading of social capital arguing that people only “‘invest’ in social capital/relationships because they have the expectation of some sort of return’. After Typhoon Haiyan that ‘return’ became uncertain due to perceived inequalities in the allocation of relief goods thus trust was undermined (Ong et.al., 2015). Meanwhile, those whose homes were destroyed suffered a series of displacements from one temporary home to another whilst also vying with other similarly placed families for limited resources thus creating a ‘culture of mistrust’ (Curato, 2018). Thus, the trust, norms and networks that could have nurtured bottom up resilience were disrupted. Nevertheless, social capital is one of the few sources of capital available to the poor and normatively thought of as a good thing. The potential for effective civic engagement should remain central issue for resilience building.

4.5.3. Bayanihan

A cultural coping mechanism that is commonly evoked after major disasters in the Philippines by NGOs, governments and media to demonstrate the resilience of the Filipino people is bayanihan. As such understanding bayanihan, conceptualized as a form of post-disaster solidarity, can contribute to understanding the potential and limitations of local networks (kin, neighbours and wider community). A brief analysis of the literature on bayanihan and disaster recovery found that varying definitions of bayanihan exists. In 1979, Gertrudes R. Ang defined bayanihan as “the ancient Filipino custom of group work”, arguing that it is “a system of mutual help and concern
which has become the backbone of family and village life through the Philippines”. This definition captures what is at the heart of bayanihan and it is from this basis on which other definitions have evolved, with various differences in terms of scale and type of assistance. The original idea of bayanihan is in reference to the Filipino tradition of helping families move their house, where “[t]he able-bodied men would insert bamboo poles under the locally-made house in order to facilitate the task of lifting the entire house for relocation”. Thus, the origins of bayanihan were around the collective sharing of labour within a community. This concept is very similar to idea of barn-raising which was popular in 18th and 19th century rural North America. While more traditional conceptualisations are distinctly on the community scale revolving around community action and community service, more contemporary definitions use a smaller scope defining bayanihan as collective help, volunteerism and just helping each other. Thus, with its changing definition over time, bayanihan may be better defined as ‘collective cooperation’.

When Typhoon Haiyan was about to make landfall, President Benigno Aquino III called on all Filipinos to practice bayanihan noting ”Alam nating walang bagyong maaaring magpaluhod sa Filipino kung tayo’y magbabayanihan” (No storm will make the Filipino get down on his knees as long as we help each other). As noted earlier, the prevalent use of the principle made it all the way to the White House in Obama’s reaction statement to Haiyan, where he called on the “spirit of bayanihan” to carry Filipinos through the tragedy of Haiyan (White House 2013). While such rallying cries from politicians and citizens alike for mutual assistance has the potential to galvanize affected communities into action, in times of disasters it may not be adequate to overcome the collective action problem that is common on post disaster recovery. Mancur Olsen (1965) famously theorized that in some situations involving public goods, individuals are not incentivized to contribute or cooperate because of the collective action problem – whereby individuals can free-ride off of the hard work of others and benefit from the collective
results without doing the work themselves. In times of disaster, while it seems obvious to share limited resources, this mentality may only last a few days before it becomes apparent to some that reserving resources for themselves and their family is more beneficial than sharing with others. As a result, social cohesion is found to only increase immediately after disasters. Thus, in the case of bayanihan after Haiyan, it will be important and interesting to understand if bayanihan was observed, in what form and for how long. These understandings of disaster solidarity and collective cooperation can provide insights into the benefits and limitations of relying on local networks of support in post-disaster recovery.

Research on bayanihan after Yolanda undertaken by the University of Nottingham and the University of the Philippines (Su and Mangada, 2017) found mixed responses to the question “How will you describe the community/barangay participation and cohesion after Yolanda”. Six of the 11 focus groups provided similar answers that noted initial cooperation right after Yolanda but soon after people went back to pre-Yolanda behaviour which was often individualistic. This is captured well by this quote from an elderly participant in Palo, “Cooperation in the community was at its best immediately after Super Typhoon Yolanda. We were more sympathetic with each other. But it was only for about a month. Once we were back to our feet, we turned to being more individualistic.” This sentiment was echoed by a participant in Palo, “Immediately after Super Typhoon Yolanda, we helped each other. Now, it is to each his own”. A participant from Tacloban City noted the same but actually saw that relations in the community got worst after Yolanda: “People became friends after Yolanda but when relief operations started, there were again squabbles. Attitudes and behaviour worsened. It was as if people did not learn from the Yolanda experience.”

Three different focus groups from Tacloban City, Tunauan and Palo, provided answers that only cited an increase in community cohesion noting that there was “better participation and
cooperation” in the community, residents were “more helpful” and interact more with one another, and in general the residents are “more organized”. Finally, two focus groups shared purely negative perspectives on community participation and cohesion after Yolanda. One focus group participant in Tunauan said “People in the barangay are back to being individualistic. Generally, they only show up of there is distribution of any assistance. Envy cannot be avoided”. Among the 11 focus groups, bayanihan was rarely mentioned. As such, it can be seen that most of the participants in the different focus groups shared the perspective that community cohesion and participation increased immediately after Yolanda but the cooperation did not last long and people quickly returned to being individualistic.
CHAPTER FIVE: SELECTION AND METHODOLOGY

5.1. Introduction

This chapter explores 1) the reasons I selected post-disaster recovery in Tacloban City after Typhoon Haiyan as my case study, 2) the criteria on which I selected the three communities I examine, 3) the ethics of conducting field work in post-disaster environments, 4) the methodology I used to produce the findings on which this thesis is based, 5) the challenges I faced in the field, 6) the limitations of this study and 7) my positionality as well as those of my research team.

In this dissertation, I completed a case study of three barangays in Tacloban City in the Philippines using a mixed-methods participatory approach. Case study research provides in-depth descriptions of a process or phenomenon within a bounded system or setting such as a community (Creswell, 2012; Lincoln & Guba, 1985). This type of research has a long tradition in research on disasters and offers a way to incorporate vulnerable population into studies (Philips, 2002). These traits made case study methodology a useful fit for my research interests. Case studies are also a method to gather different forms of data. Using surveys, semi-structured interviews and participant-aided sociograms, I gathered both qualitative and quantitative data in all three barangays to generate a more robust picture of social capital and remittance access and mobilization for post-disaster recovery. Mixed methods allow for rich detail, an understanding of context, and a validation of findings. The use of multiple data sources allows for triangulation wherein multiple perspectives on the process of remittance access and mobilization are provided and assessed in concert.
5.2. Selection

The criteria on which I selected Typhoon Haiyan as the disaster to focus on were principally qualitative. Of primary importance was the notion that humanitarian organizations have formally engaged with the concept of remittances and the role they played in post-disaster recovery. While humanitarian organizations have known about the role that remittances can play in post-disaster recovery, Haiyan marked one of the first humanitarian disasters that formally engaged with remittances as part of the response.\footnote{Informal discussions with experts who have been working in the humanitarian disaster field for several decades have confirmed that they have not heard about the formalization of remittances in the humanitarian world until Haiyan.} The inclusion of remittances in the UN Shelter Cluster’s prioritization form\footnote{The Shelter Cluster Philippines, “Shelter Prioritization Tool,” had a question that asked if respondents were in receipt of overseas remittances/financial support from relatives nationally or internationally. https://www.sheltercluster.org/sites/default/files/docs/140414%20shelter%20prioritisation%20tool%20-%20final%20%20%2814%20Apr%202014%29.pdf.} and the proclamation that the diaspora played possibly the most important role for many affected communities by the Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC) formalized the role of remittances in post-disaster recovery in the humanitarian system. The UN Shelter Cluster’s prioritization form was created to be used as a template for beneficiary prioritization for over 70 shelter partners during Haiyan. The motivation behind the tool was to provide one simple questionnaire to overlay on top of the various households or needs assessments completed by the many shelter partners to emphasize vulnerable groups that should be prioritized for assistance. The tool and its implications will be discussed later in the dissertation. In the context of ad hoc and dwindling support for international humanitarian assistance, remittances are often looked upon as a panacea, however, little is known regarding the processes by which affected populations are able to access and use remittances in the wake of humanitarian disasters. This poor state of
knowledge on access to remittances after a disaster and the income group-based inequalities that structure this access was a motivation for selecting this case.

Another reason I chose to study an large scale disaster event such as Typhoon Haiyan was because as Curato and Ong (2015, p. 5) articulate in the introduction to the Special Issue of the Philippine Sociological Review on the Sociology of Disasters “Analytically, disasters provide the opportunity to examine the “exception” in order to better understand “the rule,” as exceptional circumstances tend to expose the social structures and processes that are often hidden in the ordinariness of everyday life (Stallings, 2002, p. 283). In other words, as Steven Lukes puts it, “disasters can lift veils” (Lukes, 2005).” Lukes (2005) argues that disasters can be “transformative or confirmatory,” they can generate new ways of thinking or reinforce prevailing structures of power. Similarly, Oliver-Smith’s (1979, 1994) research has found that while disasters can present unique opportunities for change that encourages transformations in the social fabric of society, the change is often temporary and social divisions within the community return after the immediate danger passes. As such, studying how middle and lower income households access and mobilize remittances in the context of Haiyan can reveal the social structure of Filipino society that may be hidden in the everyday but are revealed in the post-disaster recovery context. Understanding who and how households mobilize remittances in extreme conditions can tell us a great deal about who and how households mobilize remittances on a regular basis. Particularly, if households with access to remittances are not able to mobilize financial resources during times of exceptional need, then the chances that they are able to mobilize them during normal times is highly unlikely. Moreover, the extreme circumstances provide an opportunity to discuss the rare topic of remittances, as it is not a subject that is regularly discussed with people outside of one’s household. Therefore, the disaster creates an exceptional situation whereby the usually taboo discussion of remittances with outsiders is acceptable, shedding light on both disaster-induced
remittance receiving patterns as well as regular remittance receiving patterns. Given the disaster-context, it is socially acceptable to not just ask sensitive questions about if they receive regular or irregular remittances and the amounts they receive, but to go further and ask questions such as “why do you think you did not receive any remittances from your relatives” or “why did you not reach out to your relatives abroad for help?” It would be much more difficult to ask these questions in normal times because there would be no critical juncture that would have justified such a question, but during a disaster, there is an expectation for overseas relatives to help so the fact they some do not does raise a justified curiosity into the matter. As such, the exceptional context of the disaster was a major reason why I selected Haiyan as my case study. For a figure of major recent disasters in the Philippines, please refer back to Figure 3.
Figure 4: Map of where Tacloban City is in the Philippines (Source: Adapted from van Leonhout et al. 2018)
I chose to focus on Tacloban City over other affected areas because it was the city that suffered the most amount of damage in both causalities as well as infrastructure (Takagi et al., 2016; NDRRMC, 2014; IBON, 2015). See Figure 4 for a map of where Tacloban City is in the Philippines. See Figure 5 for the path of Typhoon Haiyan across the Philippines. Figure 6 for a photo of the infrastructure damage in Tacloban City immediately after Haiyan and Figure 7 for a photo of the road to the airport in Tacloban City after Haiyan. 93.7 per cent of the total number of deaths and 91.3 per cent of those injured came from Region VIII, most of which was in Tacloban. It has been estimated that the homes of 90 per cent of residents of Tacloban
(population 242,000) were affected (Davis & Alexander, 2016; PSA, 2015). Moreover, Haiyan caused approximately 2.5 billion PHP, or 56.6 million USD in infrastructure damages in Tacloban, which accounts for 38.7 per cent of the total damages caused by Haiyan (NDRRMC, 2014).

Figure 6: Photo of the survivors standing among the debris and ruins of houses destroyed after Typhoon Haiyan in Tacloban City on November 10, 2013 (Source: Erik De Castro, Reuters)
The deadliest flooding from Haiyan was caused by the storm surge, which was reported to be up to 7.5 meters in Tacloban (NASA, 2013). As a result of the storm surge, it was possible to select barangays that all experienced the storm surge and a similar level of damage. I decided against comparing urban and rural areas because vulnerability to climatic hazards is different in rural and urban areas (Zelenakova et al., 2015). There are specific ways in which cities are vulnerable to disasters that rural areas are not such as high population density, restricted mobility during disasters, dependence on systems and infrastructure for essential urban services such as good and clean water and high risk of cascading events (Pelling, 2003) The concentrated population density of cities increases the risk of causalities in disasters as buildings collapse and squatter
communities along the coastline are flooded. Urban populations also face restricted mobility during disasters because people often choose not to leave their homes so they can protect their assets from looters or higher ground is simply too far away to evacuate to. Next, urban areas have a dependence on systems and infrastructure that make them unable to be self-sufficient or self-reliant when it comes to food, clean water or health care. Lastly, urban populations experience a higher risk of cascading events, such as the disaster producing a breakdown in infrastructure whose failure contaminates water casing diseases to spread (Pescaroli et al., 2015). In Haiyan’s case, the storm surge destroyed the walls of local prisons allowing prisoners to escape into the community, heightening peoples’ sense of danger and insecurity.

In addition, the high level of damage in Tacloban meant that a great deal of humanitarian aid and government assistance focused on the city, which makes barangays in the city easier to compare because they would likely be served by similar NGOs (NASA, 2013). Figure 8 is a photo of the poster at the entrance of Tacloban City thanking NGOs, international agencies and the private sector who donated to the city after Typhoon Haiyan. For example, most of the most heavily damaged barangays were offered shelter support in the form of a newly built house on the lot they owned or a new house on a resettlement site. So, it would be difficult to compare barangays that were receiving higher levels and more valuable types of humanitarian assistance to those that received very little. It is important for the study that the three communities shared similar characteristics and experiences and humanitarian assistance is one of those aspects. Humanitarian assistance also concentrated in Tacloban because it had an airport that made the transportation of aid more convenient. Rural areas that were affected either did not receive assistance or assistance was delayed due to issues of transportation. This convenient location to the airport also meant that NGO headquarters were often station in Tacloban making expert interviews with NGO staff more accessible. Lastly, as a highly-urbanized city, Tacloban is the
economic center of Eastern Visayas and a key source of OFWs from the Eastern Visayas. Moreover, there is an Overseas Workers Welfare Office (OWWA) in Tacloban, which has organized various barangay-based associations for OFW beneficiary families, which makes access to this group possible.
Figure 8: Photo of the Poster at the Entrance of Tacloban City Thanking NGOs, International Agencies and the Private Sector Who Donated to the City After Typhoon Haiyan. (Source: Author)
Three barangays in Tacloban were chosen as field sites. The barangays were chosen based on the criteria that they were 1) affected by the storm surge, 2) experienced a great deal of International NGO assistance and 3) had an organization for Overseas Filipino Workers.\textsuperscript{18} For reasons of confidentiality the names of the three barangays will not be used in this study but I will explain how they meet the three criteria. To begin, all three barangays were affected by the storm surge because they were all located along the coastline. Two barangays were located adjacent to the coast and one was located on the coastline. All three barangays were identified by the local government officials and community leaders as being heavily damaged by Haiyan and during interviews with International NGOs, it was confirmed that the barangays all received similar forms of assistance such as shelter, livelihood training and relief goods. Lastly, the Overseas Workers Welfare Association (OWWA) confirmed that all three barangays had an operating OFW beneficiary organization. In addition to these three criteria, the communities also shared similar characteristics of being urban and composed mainly of lower income households with some middle income households and very few upper income households.

My study focused on lower and middle income households because they were more vulnerable than upper income households. In Tacloban City, most upper income households live in gated, in-land communities in big concrete homes. As a result, they were not often geographically located near middle and lower class households along the coast making it difficult to compare the three classes in one community. Since middle and lower income households were the ones commonly found in the three selected communities – and therefore shared similar risks to hazards and had access to similar public infrastructure as well as NGO and governmental assistance – they were more comparable. In addition, migrants and OFWs often come from the

\textsuperscript{18}OFW organizations are composed of the OFWs and their family members. The organizations recognize that having family members abroad can be difficult for those left behind, so the group provides emotional support as well as opportunities for skills training and entrepreneurship.
middle or lower income, whereas upper income would be undertaking skilled immigration as opposed to temporary work overseas. Therefore, this research focused on the middle and lower income.

As discussed in the context and background chapter, Jonathan Corpus Ong’s classification of class in the Philippines was adapted for this study to determine if households were middle income or lower income. In his book, *The Poverty of Television*, Ong (2015) brings together various indicators from the literature\(^\text{19}\) and market research categories\(^\text{20}\) to provide definitions of upper class,\(^\text{21}\) middle class\(^\text{22}\) and lower class\(^\text{23}\) in the Philippines context based on the monthly income, education level and profession of the head of the household as well as the type of house that the household occupies. For the purposes of this study, I have taken Ong’s descriptions of each class and adapted them to focus on income as opposed to class as shown in Table 3. I was not interested in, nor did I have the capacity, to undertake a class analysis for this study. As such, I focus more on income categories as opposed to class in my analysis. But I wanted to use Ong’s (2015) classification due to its comprehensive nature.


\(^{20}\) Ong noted that class in the Philippines is typically defined using market research categories based on indicators such as income, education, occupation and household size/location/durability.

\(^{21}\) For the description of upper class households in the Philippines, Ong drew from the work of McCann Erickson 2009; Aguilar 1998; Kerkvliet 1990 and Pinches 1999.

\(^{22}\) For the description of middle class households in the Philippines, Ong drew from the work of McCann Erickson 2009; Pinches 1999; Parrenas 2001 and Pingol 2001.

\(^{23}\) For the description of lower class households in the Philippines, Ong drew from the work of McCann Erickson 2009; Bankoff 2003; Hollnsteiner 1973; Jocano 1975; Cannell 1999 and Kerkvliet 1990.
Table 3: Classification of Income Groups in the Philippines adapted from Ong (2015)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Upper Income</th>
<th>Middle Income</th>
<th>Lower Income</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Monthly Income of Head of Household</td>
<td>50,001 pesos (US$988) or more</td>
<td>15,001 to 50,000 pesos (US$297 to US$988)</td>
<td>below 15,000 pesos (US$297)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education Level of Head of Household</td>
<td>undergraduate from an exclusive university</td>
<td>college-level education from state colleges (with or without a diploma)</td>
<td>high school or elementary education</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Profession of Head of Household</td>
<td>white-collar occupations considered highly paid and highly skilled, such as business executives or professionals</td>
<td>occupations in skilled and technical jobs (including nurse, call center agent, overseas worker, small-scale businessman)</td>
<td>occupations as unskilled labours (including plumber, vendor, janitor, maid)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Type of House</td>
<td>a house located in an exclusive subdivision/expensive neighbourhood enclave</td>
<td>houses in permanent or semi-permanent conditions in mixed neighbourhoods</td>
<td>live in semi-permanent and temporary homes, usually in slums or squatters’ communities</td>
</tr>
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As discussed in the theory section, I chose to focus on the household as the unit of analysis as opposed to individuals or the whole community because in the Philippines the household is an important unit of social organization and households are the social unit through which residents seek to recover from extreme events (Islam & Walkerden, 2015). Households are also the unit in which remittances are sent to and allocated among. Employing the concept of global householding was important for this study because as Porio (2006) argues, the survival of the Filipino households in the last 30 years have increasingly relief on the global migration of OFWs. These have an impact on disasters because, in the Philippines, members of the family are expected to
provide assistance for mutual dependence. Moreover, in the Philippines, it is a cultural norm to consider the needs of the family as a unit before that of the individual (Advincula-Lopez, 2005).

Another reason why the household is an appropriate level to study in terms of remittances and disaster is because as Advincula-Lopez (2005, p. 71) has observed, “for many Filipinos it is still a challenge to go beyond the household as a unit of mutual assistance and consequently prioritize the needs of the larger social units”. Thus, if I am interested in the idea of remittances as a form of mutual assistance after disasters then the household unit is a logical choice for the Philippines context.

5.2.1. Ethics of Conducting Fieldwork in Post-Disaster Environments

Before engaging with the fieldwork aspect of this dissertation, it is important to highlight some of the literature on the ethics of conducting fieldwork in post-disaster environments and clearly outline the research ethics process that the research proposal underwent. To begin, through the various research methods courses that I have undertaken in my undergraduate and graduate studies, I am aware of the significance of ethics in qualitative research. As Davies and Dodd (2002, p. 281) explain “Ethics exist in our actions and in our ways of doing and practicing our research… Ethics are integral to the way we think about rigor and are intertwined in our approach to research, in the way we ask questions, how we respond to answers, and the way we reflect on the material”. It is important for researchers to be aware of the potential harm or benefits the study might cause participants and to undertake appropriate steps to protect participants because disasters often cause a tremendous amount of suffering and harm to survivors (Hobfoll, 1991; Rothman, 1991; Cohn et al., 2004; Canino et al., 1990). As a result of the physical, physiological, economic and social harm that survivors experience after disasters, researchers have to be careful about how they access respondents, how they conduct their research and what they ask in order to minimalize any
risk of harm to the respondents. As Rubin and Rubin (2012, p. 85) argue, “At the core of the expectations and obligations that are part of a research relationship is assuring that the [participants] do not come to harm as a result of the research”. Moreover, Benight and McFarlene (2007) point out that “Researchers also have to be sensitive to the fact that survivors might be dealing with strained resources and practical everyday concerns and may have less tolerance for research that are not of immediate relevance to them”. Taking stock of the literature (Benight and McFarlene, 2007; Collogan et al., 2004; Kilpatrick, 2004; Knack et al., 2006; Lavin et al., 2012), Mukherji, Ganapati and Rahill (2014) identified four main ethical concerns when conducting fieldwork with survivors in a disaster setting: 1) the risk and benefit of participation for the disaster survivor, 2) the ability of the participant to make decisions, 3) the importance of informed consent, and 4) the helicopter researcher trap. The following section goes through the steps I took to consider and address each of these four ethical concerns.

5.2.1.1. Risks and Benefits of Participation for the Disaster Survivor

Mukherji, Ganapati and Rahill (2014, p. 822) noted that it is important to understand “where disaster survivors would consider research participation an opportunity to share their personal experiences or a burden since they have to devote extra time during a difficult period and to subject themselves to numerous inquiries related to the crisis event. Another consideration is whether research questions require participants to recall socially and physically painful experiences that can cause emotional distress and re-traumatization and how it would impact the participant”. Those were some of the considerations on my mind before and during my fieldwork experience. My research proposal went through a detailed and extensive ethics approval process through the University of Guelph’s Research Ethics Office. I was asked to think carefully through the risks
and benefits of each method and procedure employed during my research in terms of physical, psychological, social and economic risk. Below I outline the risks identified for each method employed in the study and describe how the risk will be managed:

1) Key Informant Interviews: There is a low probability of any risk for key informants as it is often their professional role to speak with researchers and provide information that will be helpful to the community.

2) Semi-structured interviews and recovery-grams: There is no physical risk that comes from participating in my research. There is some psychological risk involve with the interviews because I am asking people to remember a disaster where people may have suffered emotional and physical loss. However, the psychological risk of feeling demeaned, embarrassed, worried is low as the questions within the interview do not ask questions that give many opportunities for those feelings to emerge. What the participants may feel the most are feelings of sadness because they will be reminded of the loss and damage they experienced during Haiyan. However, the risk is low because the disaster did take place two years ago and there is also a culture of speaking about loss within the Philippines that makes it so speaking about loss is not a taboo or uncommon topic. The risk will be managed by being mindful that the participants may not want to discuss too much about loss of loved ones so if they are upset then my research team and I should move on to other questions and topics. In the case that participants are emotional about the loss of a loved one or just the disaster in general, I will have a list of diverting questions to ask to change the subject for the participant. Depending on the severity of the psychological state of the participants, I may also end the interview and ask to return on a different day. The potential social risk for interview participants deals with the fact that divulging any information obtained from participants to someone else could have repercussions on that person’s
reputation or their personal relationships with certain people. Due to the sensitive nature of funds after a natural disaster, I may find that certain members of the community had funds that they did not share with their family members or the community, if such information was leaked it could cause reputational damage. For this reason, it will be important to maintain the confidentiality of my participants. To further mitigate risk, prior to implementing the interviews, local barangay captains and community leaders will be consulted to ensure that the purpose of the study is known within the community and that all possible questions by participants other community members are answered. The potential economic risk for interview participants is surrounding the discussion of remittances and loans. Participants may be detailing loans or funds from illegal sources which may make the individual vulnerable if they information was overheard. As such, all aspects of confidentiality will be maintained and the participants will be encouraged to have their interviews inside of their homes with the doors closed so they will not be heard or seen by strangers passing by.

The Ethics Research Office also requested that I describe any benefits to the participants. A possible benefit to the participant is a better knowledge of their social network during times of disaster. After the participant completes the recovery-gram they will have a knowledge of who provided help to them so for future disaster they may reach out to those people or depend on them for help again. Research shows that participation in research can improve the well-being of disaster survivors because it slows them to reflect on the disaster in a safe context and it provides an outlet for survivors to share their experience (Newman & Kaloupek, 2004; Knack et al., 2006).
5.2.1.2. The Ability of the Participant to Make Decisions

Studies of people with post-traumatic stress disorder have found that most individuals, even under extreme stress, can make rational decisions about research participation (Rosenstein 2004). Researchers agree that although disaster-related stress might affect some individuals’ decision-making capacity, disaster survivors are still able to make informed decisions regarding research participation (Collogan et al., 2004; Knack et al., 2006; Levine, 2004). For my study, it was important to give participants the ability to make decisions about how much information they disclose, particularly when it came to questions about how much remittances they received and from who. As such, I designed the recovery-gram in a way that allows the respondent to decide when and how much information to disclose. The details of how the recovery-gram works will be described later in this section.

5.2.1.3. The Importance of Informed Consent

The third concern is informed consent. Informed consent is especially important for research on disaster survivors to ensure that respondents understand the nature and purpose of the study. To ensure local relevance, I asked researchers and academics in Tacloban City whether written or oral consent was preferred by community members and the overwhelming answer was for consent to be given verbally. As such, the respondents were asked to participate via a verbal script and the respondents were asked to ask any questions about the nature of the project before initiating the interview and they were told that they could withdraw at any point of the interview and up to six months after the interview. After six months, the data may be written into a publication which would make withdrawing data impossible at that point. If participants withdraw, their data will be
destroyed via shredding and the respondents were told that there are no consequences to withdrawing from the study.

5.2.1.4. The Helicopter Researcher Trap

One of the biggest concerns in disaster research is the helicopter researcher trap or “grab and run” research (Stevens, 2001, p. 72), described by Mukherji, Ganapati and Rahill (2014, p. 823) as “wherein a researcher comes into a disaster-hit community abruptly with no prior engagement with the community, quickly gathers relevant data and exits the field with little regard for reciprocity or follow-up to share research results with the community”. Similarly, researchers have labeled this type of approach to disaster research immediately after disasters as a “research gold rush” (Gaillard & Gomez 2015, p. 1) and the resultant articles as “gold rush publications” (Gomez and Hart 2013: 272). Gaillard and Gomez’s (2015) analysis of academic peer-reviewed articles related to disasters available from Scopus found that the number of publications peaked immediately or a year after the disasters. Aware of the helicopter research trap and the research gold rush, I deliberately waited until a year and a half after Haiyan to visit the Philippines for my preliminary scoping trip and made a secondary trip the year after to conduct expert interviews with NGO staff, local leaders and barangay officials to build trust with the gatekeepers to the affected communities. I also visited the field sites multiple times before data collection started so my face would be more familiar to local. In addition, my research was designed so that we would interact with the respondents on multiple occasions. First through the survey, then again to ask when they were free for us to come back for the semi-structured interview and recovery-gram. Often we had to visit their homes multiple times to be able to find a time that worked. These repeated interactions helps to build trust but also establish that I was living locally and staying in
touch with the community throughout as opposed to doing “grab and run” research. In the end, I spent seven months in the field over a period of two years. Lastly, I waited until three years after Haiyan to formally collect data and interview respondents about their experience during Haiyan to ensure there was temporal and psychological distance from when the disaster happened and when I was asking them to recall their experiences during the disaster for my research. Moreover, I was sure to share my research anonymized data with local researchers so they can make use of the research. To date, several local researchers have written articles based on my data and I have personally collaborated with five local researchers in different capacities on various academic writing projects. I also made a short trip back to Tacloban City in February 2019, after the bulk of my dissertation was written to share the research findings with local researchers, NGO staff, barangay officials and some of the affected households, to ensure that the findings are shared with those that I interviewed.

The various risks and benefits and ethical concerns played a significant role in how my research was conducted and should be kept in mind when reading the rest of this section.

5.4. Fieldwork in Tacloban City

The fieldwork for this study was conducted for seven months over three periods of field research undertaken between February 2015 to February 2017 in Tacloban City, Philippines. Part One was a preliminary scoping trip to gain an understanding of the situation on the ground and to make some connections with NGOs and establish a relationship with local faculty members in Tacloban. Part Two involved piloting methods, selecting field sites and interviewing community leaders. Part Three involved data collection in the three barangays through surveys, semi-structured interviews and participant-aided sociograms as well as other expert interviews. Table 4
summarizes the different phases of fieldwork. In total, on the preliminary scoping trip, I informally spoke with three barangay captains, six NGO staff, ten community members and six affected households in resettlement areas in Tacloban North. During Part Two of the fieldwork, I conducted seven expert interviews with NGO staff, three expert interviews with government officials at city hall and five OFW beneficiary organization presidents. I also tested ten versions of the short survey and three versions of the recovery-gram as well as piloted the survey and recovery-gram with 31 people through convenience sampling. In Part Three of the fieldwork, I piloted the final version of the survey one last time to 15 households through convenience sampling in the barangay near their university conducted. I conducted 500 short surveys, 72 semi-structure interviews and 72 recovery-grams in three barangays. Table 5 is a summary of the fieldwork that was completed in each part.

Table 4: Fieldwork Timeline Over a Seven Month Period

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>2015</th>
<th>2016</th>
<th>2017</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Month</td>
<td>Feb</td>
<td>Apr</td>
<td>May</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Preliminary Scoping Trip</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Piloting Methods, Selecting Field Sites and Interviewing Community Leaders</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Sampling and Data Collection</td>
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Table 5: Summary of Fieldwork Completed in Each Part

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Part One: Preliminary Scoping Trip</th>
<th>Part Two: Piloting Methods, Selecting Field Sites and Interviewing Community Leaders</th>
<th>Part Three: Sampling and Data Collection</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>- Spoke with 3 Barangay Captains</td>
<td>- Conducted 7 expert interviews with NGO staff</td>
<td>- Piloted the final version of the survey one last time to 15 households through convenience sampling</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Spoke with 6 NGO staff</td>
<td>- Conducted 3 expert interviews with government officials at city hall</td>
<td>- Conducted 500 short surveys</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Spoke with 10 Community Leaders</td>
<td>- Conducted expert interviews with 5 OFW beneficiary organization presidents</td>
<td>- 72 semi-structured interviews</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Spoke with 6 affected households in resettlement sites in Tacloban North</td>
<td>- Tested 10 versions of the short survey</td>
<td>- 72 recovery-grams</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Tested 3 versions of the recovery-gram</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Piloted the survey and recovery-gram with 31 people through a convenience sampling of the friends and colleagues of my primary research assistant</td>
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5.3.1. Part One: Preliminary Scoping Trip

Part One was completed in the month of February 2015 in Tacloban City. In Part One, I travelled throughout Tacloban City to gain an understanding of the extent of damage caused by Haiyan and get a sense of the recovery process two years on. On this trip, I connected with a faculty member at the University of Philippines Visayas Tacloban College, Ladylyn Mangada, who agreed to be the research coordinator for my project. I also spoke informally with six NGO staff to get a sense
of the role of remittances in post-disaster recovery. In addition, I spoke with three barangay captains to understand the extent of damage Haiyan caused and the distribution of humanitarian relief.

It was on this trip that I had discovered that remittances were included in the UN Shelter Cluster prioritization forms and NGO beneficiary selection forms. I also spoke informally with approximately 10 individuals that I had met throughout the trip, all of whom were affected by Haiyan. In addition, I spent a day volunteering on the ground with an international NGO to rebuild houses in a heavily damaged barangay and visited several shelter project in resettlement sites in Tacloban North. In these locations, I spoke informally with six affected households through a translator to get a sense of what type of assistance they received after Haiyan and what support they still need. While most spoke openly about assistance from NGOs and the government, very few discussed assistance from family or remittances from abroad. Even households that were known to the barangay for having relatives abroad were reluctant to speak about remittances. When my translator brought up the topic, the individuals shook their heads or waved their hands to signal at the discomfort and unease to which people have towards discussing remittances.

This experience confirmed for me that remittances and the household dynamics that surround the sending and receiving of remittances is a sensitive topic to discuss and therefore creative data collecting methods will need to be sought to discuss this topic. It was clear that data on remittances, and more specifically the details of who sent what and how much, is not something that can be asked on a survey alone. The topic is too sensitive, dynamic and political to be reduced to a few questions on a short survey; instead a longer and more thought out process is required to build trust and rapport in a way that makes the participant comfortable to reveal information about remittances. This realization pushed me towards exploring participatory methods.
My experience speaking with affected households about remittances and money in addition to my discussions with key informants has made me realize that conventional approaches such as surveys and interviews may not be the most effective methods to getting respondents to share information on such sensitive and personal topics. Participatory techniques contrast conventional approaches by using a range of tools to learn “from, with and by” local communities (Cornwall, 2000 as cited in Le Dé, 2015, p. 13). Moreover, as Le Dé (2015, p. 13) points out “Remittances involve social networks, and thus have social, cultural and emotional meanings and implications. Appraising the tangible and more intangible elements linked to this practice should reflect the view of those who receive and send remittances”. The close-ended questions used in surveys have a limited ability to capture those more intangible social, cultural and emotional implications, as such a more participatory approach is needed. Participatory methods are more useful to my research because they allow local people “to share, enhance, and analyse their knowledge of life and conditions, to plan and to act” (Chambers, 1994, p. 953 as cited in Le Dé, 2015, p. 13). However, it is important to note that I do not employ a Participatory Action Research (PAR) approach, defined by Kemmis and McTaggart (2000, p. 568) as “an alternative philosophy of social research (and social life, *vivencia*) often associated with social transformation in the Third World”. Brydon-Miller et al. (2011, p. 396) define PAR as “the intersection of popular education, community-based research, and collaborative action aimed at achieving positive social change”. PAR was not suitable for my research project because I was interesting in looking at the household level, not the community level. Moreover, PAR advocates for many group activities and for community members to learn from each other which would not be an environment that would be conducive for respondents to discuss sensitive and personal matters such as remittances. One of the reasons, research on the quality and quantity of remittances on a household level is so difficult to conduct is because it is not often information that is discussed or shared outside of the
immediate household unit. Thus, asking respondents to discuss these topics in a group of their community members would not only be ineffective, it would also put respondents at psychological and social risk as respondents would be put on the spot to disclose sensitive financial information. Thus, the participatory nature of my methods is from the respondent being very hands-on in their activities and having control over how much and what information to disclose and when in the process they want to disclose it. The participatory aspect does not come from it being a collective group activity.

What I have learned from these experiences led me to invent a special participant-aided sociogram, called a “recovery-gram”. I designed the recovery-gram to help me understand the different ties in a households’ network and how those ties helped or did not help the respondents after Haiyan. A participant-aided recovery-gram allows the participants to visually display the various ties in their social network. This hands-on approach allows respondents to tell their story of recovery in a way that lets them control their own narrative and disclose financial information as they wish. The tactile approach and visualization allows both the interviewer and respondent to see concrete representations of what they are discussing (Hogan et al. 2007, p. 117). This systematic and participatory approach to analyzing social networks and post-disaster recovery is a creative and engaging way for respondents to document what resources they received (financial and non-financial), who they received it from and when. This method contributes a novel approach to asking questions about sensitive topics such as money and remittances, as the participatory approach allows respondents to feel comfortable and in charge of the information that they choose to disclose. The end result is rich data on the respondent’s basic social network, the financial and non-financial resources the household was able to receive from their social capital ties, the timing of the assistance they received and the importance of the ties for recovery.
A need to invent a new approach was clear because when asking sensitive questions about money and remittances, to ask the direct question of “who gave you money after Haiyan and how much did they give?” may not illicit truthful answers or any answers as respondents may be uneasy why such specific questions are being asked. In addition, when asked directly, I may be making my respondents uncomfortable. Instead, with a participant-aided recovery-gram, respondents are asked to use stickers to identify which ties provided financial assistance and which ones provided non-financial assistance. Thus, the respondent has more agency over what information they want to reveal then when the stickers are placed and they reveal that they have received financial assistance they can decide to disclose the amount. From the pilot testing, it was found that the process that respondents go through with first using the post-it notes and stickers makes them feel much more engaged in the interview and in charge of the answers that they are giving. When I did directly ask about remittances in the first few interviews during the pilot period, it was clear that directly asking about funds that were given without much of an engaging process does not receive positive results and leads to the respondent being more on guard for the rest of the interview.

The details of the recovery-gram will be further explored later in the chapter. This also highlighted the importance of being introduced to participants through connections with organizations and community leaders. As an outsider with no official local affiliations, I need those local connections to gain access to participants. Thus, the realization that remittances were a difficult topic to ask about and the discovery of the question on remittances on the UN Shelter Cluster prioritization form and NGO beneficiary selection forms created the basis for the further development of my research project.
The second phase of the field research took place from the beginning of April to end of May in 2016 in Tacloban City. In Part Two, I conducted a total of 19 expert interviews with NGO staff, government officials at city hall, OFW beneficiary organization members and community leaders. I had seven expert interviews with NGO staff, government officials and community leaders to get an understanding of the post-disaster recovery process in Tacloban City. I approached the OWWA to ask for a list of Overseas Filipino Workers (OWFs) but they were not able to provide me with such a list due to privacy concerns. Instead, they provided me with a list and contact information of five OWF beneficiary organizations in Tacloban City. My primary research assistant contacted the president of each OFW organization and I conducted expert interviews with all five of the presidents as well as four of the executive members of the organizations. The interview guide of the interviews with OFW organizations can be found in Appendix 1. Of the five OFW organizations, only three were barangay based organizations; as such I chose those three barangays as our field sites. As mentioned earlier, they also share the properties that they were affected by the storm surge and experienced a great deal of International NGO assistance. At the expert interviews with OFW organization presidents, I secured the list of members from the three barangays I was interested in. Having this list would be very helpful for Part Three of the research project. In my interviews with the presidents, all of them were very welcoming and offered to hold meetings with all of their members when I return to the field for data collection. Getting access to members through the OFW organizations was very important in establishing trust and legitimacy with the participants.

I developed and tested 10 versions of the short survey and 3 versions of the recovery-gram. The survey was adapted from the World Bank’s Social Capital Assessment Tool (SOCAT). The
final version of the survey can be found in Appendix A. The recovery-gram used in this study was inspired by Dubois’s (2015) adaptation of Hogan et al’s (2007) participant-aided sociogram approach.

I began piloting the survey and the recovery-gram through a convenience sampling of the friends and colleagues of my primary research assistant. She helped introduce me to 10 respondents, 5 of which had OFWs and 5 who did not. I also conducted 8 surveys and recovery-grams through a convenient sample of friends that I met while in the field. Lastly, another research assistant, Krizzia Bacoy, conducted 13 surveys and recovery-grams. In total, I piloted the survey and recovery-gram with 31 people. It was also through the survey and recovery-gram piloting process that my research team and I started to work out the questions that were better suited for the semi-structured interview as they require more elaboration than a survey can cater and are not as open ended to be explored in the recovery-gram. The semi-structured interview was further refined after I left the field and tested in the beginning of Part Three.

5.3.3. Part Three: Sampling and Data Collection

Part Three was completed from November 2016 to February 2017 in Tacloban City. This part of the field research was completed three years after Haiyan struck. At that time, most physical signs of damage from the typhoon had been cleared. Public services in the communities had been restored, damaged shelters within the community were repaired and some new NGO houses had been built. In Part Three, a total of 500 short surveys and 72 semi-structured interviews and 72 recovery-grams were completed in three barangays. The questions in the short survey can be found in Appendix A, the interview guide for the semi-structured interviews can be found in Appendix B and the guide for the recovery-gram can be found in Appendix C.
Part Three was broken up into two phases. The first phase is a short survey to establish which households have access to migrants and which households can turn them into remittances after Haiyan. The second phase is semi-structured interviews and recovery-grams that use the lens of social capital to examine how households access and mobilize remittances as well as other resources through bonding, bridging and linking ties. This two-phase approach, is what Creswell et al. (2003, p. 178) call an “sequential explanatory design.” More specifically, they call it a “participant-selection variant” given that results from phase one are used in part to select participants for phase two. The explanatory design is used when quantitative findings are needed to direct the selection of participants for a qualitative investigation (Morgan, 1998). For this study, I needed to collect basic quantitative data on the households in the community myself because I was unable to get that data from the barangay officials. For most of the barangay officials I spoke with they told me their paper as well as electronic records were damaged in the typhoon. As such, an explanatory sequential design was employed so I could get the quantitative data needed to direct selection of participants for the qualitative component of my study.

For this study, I relied on more quantitative data from the short surveys. Phase two employs more qualitative methods mixing semi-structured interviews with recovery-grams generating richly detailed and nuanced understandings of each households’ social network. Systematically employing a range of techniques allows each phase of research to benefit from previous phases (Ivankova, Creswell & Stick, 2006). This mixed methods approach permits triangulation of perspectives lending to a deeper understanding of each case and higher quality theory development (George & Bennett, 2005; Creswell & Clark, 2007; Lincoln & Guba, 1985). More generally, by mixing methods this study benefits from a diversity of views, increased breadth and a detailed look at remittance access and mobilization after disasters.
5.3.3.1. Phase One: Short Surveys

For this phase, data collection and initial analysis took place between November 2016 to December 2016. Phase One began with meetings with the barangay captains of each community and the presidents of each OFW organization. Meetings with barangay captains were important because they have the authority to grant permission to conduct research in their communities. We presented the barangay captain with a letter which clearly stated the purpose of our research and outline the days in which we would be in the community. Authorization to conduct research was granted by all three barangay captains. I also conducted expert interviews with the barangay captains as well as other barangay councillors to understand how the typhoon affected the community, which NGOs came to the barangay and what type of assistance they provided, the state of recovery three years on and general characteristics of the households in the community. These interviews help to triangulate the survey responses in each community. These meetings also served as opportunities to understand the geography and layout of the barangay. Each barangay captain provided me with a hand drawn map of the community outlining where roads, streams and houses were. The barangay captains gave us information on areas which were largely abandoned by their residents, areas that continue to be affected by hazards such as floods and easy to identify landmarks in the community. These maps proved to be very helpful resource when my research assistants and I were sampling for our surveys. Our time in each community ranged from four to six days depending on the size of the community and the weather.

After the meetings with barangay officials, the research assistants spent a day acquainting themselves with the layout of the community and developing a strategy to make sure the whole community is covered. Issues came up regarding the official boundaries of the barangay which will be discussed in detail in the challenges section. In addition to the field site orientations, the
research assistants also took part in an orientation about the survey tool. At the orientation, the purpose of the survey was outlined and each question was discussed in detail, particularly pertaining to how the Waray-Waray translation could be adapted to be more conversational to generate a more comfortable experience for the respondents. When the final translations were agreed on, the final survey was piloted.

As noted earlier, I developed and tested 10 versions of the short survey in Part Two of the fieldwork. The final version of the survey was then piloted one last time to 15 households by my research assistants in the barangay near their university. Piloting the survey in a barangay they were familiar with allowed them to test the survey with households they knew to be lower class and middle class. This way we were able to get a sense of the responses we would receive and understand any issues that may arise during the real survey period. The research assistants were instructed to go through the survey, then ask a few evaluative questions such as how the respondents felt about the length or difficulty of the questions. This information was shared with me at the end of the day and we discussed different strategies that research assistants could employ to speed up the process. We agreed that familiarity with the survey questions was the most important so the research assistants were instructed to practice conducting the survey with each other as well as with family and friends to get more practice with asking the questions. In total, each research assistant had practice conducting the survey 10-12 times before going into the field.

As mentioned above, the reason I had to collect basic data on households in the community was because barangay officials did not have this data available. While barangay captains know everyone in their community they did not have organized, systematic and up to date data on their residents. Moreover, it is important to note that, Haiyan displaced families and while a majority returned, the reorganization of the community created challenges for sampling because a small number of households relocated to temporary housing and others left the communities to live with
relatives. At the time of my fieldwork, large relocations to permanent housing in Tacloban North had not taken place. The lack of a up to date resident list combined with the reorganization of the community meant we were unable to employ sampling by randomized list. Though the goal of this study is not to generalize results to a larger population, it is still important to select participants in a way that is as close to random as possible and eliminate known biases. As such, the study employed systematic random sampling of those who stayed or returned to the community by knocking on every two to four doors depending on the size of the barangay to achieve a representative sample for each barangay.

My research assistants and I took great care to respect the sampling rule by carefully recording the houses that we had surveyed on the hand drawn map of the community. Since the map outlined every house that was in the community in the form of rectangular box, it was easy for us to place an X over houses that were surveyed. If someone was not home, we would move on to the next house. The issue of non-response will be discussed in detail in the challenges section. In cases of rejection at the door, research assistants were instructed to take down the reason why the household did not want to be interviewed. For the most part, households often did not take part in the survey because they were too busy. There were three main reasons the members of the households were busy: the first was because they were working, the second was because they were taking care of children and the third was that they were not in the community at the time of the typhoon. Since sari sari stores, small convenient shops run out of a window in the front of the house, were common throughout the barangays, it was common to have respondents who were working at home when we approached them. Some households moved into the community after the disaster and others were simply living or working outside of the city when Haiyan struck. From surveys and interviews with affected households and barangay captains, two main reasons emerged for why new people move into the community after the disaster. The first
is people from neighbouring barangays moving in with their relatives immediately after Haiyan because their homes had been destroyed and they did not have the capacity to rebuild in the long-term. The second reason is people who moved into the community more than two years after to settle into rental units of the newly built NGO homes. Some NGO homes that were built had more rooms or floors than the household required so extra rooms or floors were often rented out. In both cases, these households were not surveyed or interviewed because they did not fit the criteria of being in the community when Haiyan struck. Lastly, several households mentioned they did not want to participate in the survey because they were not interested. The lack of interest may stem from the fact that at three years since the disaster, many NGOs workers, government workers and researchers have come to their door to ask them to fill out forms, evaluations and surveys of a similar nature leading some people in the community to not want to participate in further activities of this nature. Another possibility may be that the disaster remains still too painful to discuss. These concerns about the importance of letting disaster survivors have the ability to make decisions about whether to participate in research that might bring up upsetting memories were discussed earlier in the chapter and as such, these rejections were expected and planned for. Across the three communities there was a total of 60 rejections.

In total, 460 short surveys were conducted across all three communities through systematic random sampling. The oral surveys were conducted by research assistants in the local dialect of Waray-Waray. Answers were recorded on a tablet or smartphone using the survey tool Qualtrics. Qualtrics is software that enables users design surveys to collect and analyze data online. The survey tool uploads the surveys onto an online platform as they are being completed in the field. At the end of each field day, the team gathered at my apartment and we looked over each answer on each survey on the Qualtrics platform to make sure that no questions were left unfilled and to clarify any confusing answers. This was important to limit human error in inputting answers. A
final data checking meeting was held at the end of the survey period to go over all the surveys using the Qualtrics platform to ensure that all the survey answers were filled out for each survey and there were no visible sources of error or confusion.

When the surveys of the barangay were completed, surveys were conducted with OFW beneficiary households. Since OFW beneficiary households were not evenly distributed in the barangay and vary from barangay to barangay, they were a more difficult group to access. Therefore, to increase the number of households that had access to overseas migrants, surveys were done through convenience sampling with the assistance of OFW organizations. Among these three communities, 40 surveys were completed. Therefore, a total of 500 surveys were conducted for this research.

At the end of Phase One, the 500 surveys were downloaded from Qualtrics into an excel spreadsheet where they were classified on the basis of 1) access to migrants, 2) income group. Access to migrants and income category were the two factors that were most important to this study. The literature suggests that income is a significant indicator of access to migrants (Aldrich, 2012; Le Dé et al., 2014; Le Dé et al., 2015). Since migrants and OFWs often come from the middle or lower income households this study is focused on the middle and lower income households. Thus the four categories of households we were interested in were:

1) Lower Income No Migrant
2) Lower Income Migrant
3) Middle Income No Migrant
4) Middle Income Migrant

After the surveys were all categorized, the names of the respondents were written on a piece of paper, folded and placed inside a plastic bag. The plastic bag was shaken several times to scramble the names. Then 18 names were pulled from the bag for each category. These are the
names chosen to take part in Phase Two, which is a semi-structured interview and recovery-gram. A spreadsheet was made with the respondents’ names and contact information.

5.2.3.2. Phase Two: Semi-structured Interviews and Recovery-grams

The goal of the second phase of research was to understand how households mobilize remittances through their social capital ties. Like Phase One, a great deal of orientation and training was provided to the research assistants to ensure they are familiar with the interview guide and research tools. All three research assistants were trained for three weeks in preparation for Phase Two of the research project. In the first week, they were trained on the purpose of this phase of research, the theory behind the research, the research tools and a step-by-step guide of how to conduct the research. The last two days of the first week were focused on practicing the semi-structured interviews and recovery-grams.

First, I got the research assistants to practice interviewing with each other with the person pretending to be the respondent acting as someone who was talkative, someone who was reserved and someone who was a mix of both. This was so the research assistants could experience what it would be like to interview various types of respondents but also for them to understand what it is like to be a respondent. Understanding the experience from both sides allowed the research assistant to have a deeper grasp of the task at hand. It acted to motivate the research assistants to have a strong memory of the interview guide so the conversation can be smooth and informative. After the research assistants gained a strong understanding of the interview guide and were comfortable executing the recovery-gram, they practiced them with six acquaintances of mine (four females and two males) who I know had experienced the typhoon and were willing to participant in the practice to give feedback to my research assistants about their performance.
After these practice interviews and recovery-grams, we discussed the feedback they received and the strategies they could employ to improve their performance.

To ensure the research assistants had practice interviewing the different categories of households in this study, we did a dry run, giving the research assistants eight names, one from each of the eight categories of households in the study. The respondents for the dry run were picked from the names that were not chosen for Phase Two from each category. The research assistants had two weeks to complete the eight interviews and recovery-grams. The research assistants were also required to practice inputting the data from the interviews and recovery-grams into Qualtrics at the end of each day so they could become familiar with the data-inputting aspect of this Phase. At the end of the two weeks of practice, we held a meeting to discuss the experience, what lessons the research assistants learned and the strategies they employed to improve the quality of the research. For example, the research assistants shared that they found it was easier to discuss the remittances that households received by making jokes about the migrant. When discussing the migrant(s) connected to the households, some respondents are open about their relationship while others are more reserved. For those that are more reserved, one research assistant found that it was useful to make a joke along the lines of “so they send you big money from overseas then?!” to break the ice. This will be discussed in more detail in the challenges section along with the general challenge of getting respondents to discuss remittances. Armed with experience and strategies to deal with more reserved respondents, my research assistants felt confident in their knowledge of the research tools before they went to the field to carry out Phase Two of this study. Overall, the research assistants practiced and tested the interviews and recovery-grams a total of 17-20 times each, before they went to the field.

The research assistants were given a list of respondents to contact to arrange interviews with. The research assistants would first try to call and if that was unsuccessful they would go to
the homes of the respondents. I made sure that the same research assistant that conducted the survey for the respondent was the same one that was conducting the semi-structured interview and recovery-gram to build on the trust and rapport that was built from the survey. Only a few times, due to issues of scheduling, were research assistants different but we still made sure that the contact for the interview scheduling was made by the original research assistant to ensure some level of consistency and trust. Research assistants would conduct 1-3 interviews a day and I would attend 2-3 of those depending on the timing and location of each interview.

5.2.3.3. Participant-aided Recovery-grams and Social Capital Name Generator

A participant-aided recovery-gram is my adaptation of a participant-aided sociogram. A sociogram is a graphic representation of social links that a person has. The participant-aided approach was developed by Hogan et al. (2007) to create a visual depiction of a participant’s personal social network during an interview. Visual depictions of relations among individuals have always been an attractive aspect of social network analysis but this visual is often an outcome of the research as opposed to a component of it. A participant-aided socio-grams allows for the visual depiction of networks at the data-gathering stage so both the respondent and the researcher can see the visual depiction of the network in real-time (Hogan et al., 2007, p. 117). The approach builds on the well-known name generator technique for creating social networks of individuals (Wellman, 1979). This section will first explain what a name generator is and its advantages and disadvantages. Next, I will describe the participant-aided sociogram design that I have adapted from Hogan et al. (2007). Then I will go through a step-by-step process of how the recovery-gram is created as well as the data entry and verification process I designed to minimalize data-entry error.
5.2.3.3.1. Social Capital Name Generator

Name generators are used to identify people in an individual’s social network. Name generators follow a characteristic structure. To begin, interviewers ask respondents (referred to as “egos”) to name other people (referred to as “alters”) with whom ego has a specific connection. After enumerating a set of alters, ego describes the attributes of these alters and reports on ego-alter connections (Hogan et al., 2007, p. 117). The interviewers can get respondents to bring up alters in two ways. The first is through free recall with defined scope conditions such as “name those you are close with” and the condition applies to everyone in the network (Hogan et al., 2007, p. 118). The second way is the interviewer goes through a set of questions defining a range of potential or actual supportive alters such as “name someone who could lend you $500”. Under this method, different questions bring up different alters (Hogan et al., 2007, p. 117).

Previous work on name generators (Wellman, 1979; Fischer, 1982; Fischer et al., 1977) found that personal networks are multiplex, varied, geographically dispersed and sparsely knit. They found that individuals would have stronger ties with people with whom they share more than one social context (such as work and neighbour) (Hogan et al., 2007, p. 117). However, despite the usefulness of this technique there are also some limitations that need to be recognized. Hogan et al. (2007, p. 120-122) has organized them into four broad categories: reliability, generalizability, specificity, and cost.

1. Reliability – The method is susceptible to the respondent’s cognitive biases because it relies on the respondent to remember members of their network. However, Freeman, Romney and Freeman (1987) found that individuals were usually good at recalling networks of individuals they have repeated interactions with. Their biases are often against ones they have infrequent interactions. Specific to my research, concerns of reliability surround the possible reluctance of respondents to reveal all of the alters in their network
due to social desireability bias. For example, respondents may not want to name sources of funds from loan sharks, criminals or corrupt officials.

2. **Generalizability** - Most personal network studies gather their data by surveying a random sample of a population so the sample will only reflect a small percentage of the population.

3. **Specificity** – Name generators usually cannot capture someone’s entire network which will contain hundreds or even thousands of people (de Sola de Pool & Kochen, 1978; McCarty et al., 2000). As such, the comparatively small set of strong ties captured by name generators may not be the most relevant.

4. **Costly of time** – Name generators can take some time to create depending on how in-depth the researcher would like to get. The exercise also requires a great deal of repetition because the same questions are asked about each network member.

These criticisms have been taken into account in designing my research. To mitigate cognitive biases, my study will make a clear theoretical link between the questions being asked and the means of data collection. To reduce issues of generalization, I will focus on comparing personal networks rather than discuss overall connectivity in the population. In addition, while the specific findings from the study cannot be generalized statistically, the logic behind how individuals utilize their social networks to gain resources in disaster response and recovery can be generalized. Lastly, to mitigate the issue of time, the exercise was piloted and tested several times with the aim to reduce the burden on the respondent.

5.2.3.3.2. **A Step-by-Step Process of How the Recovery-gram was Created**

This section will go through a step-by-step process of how the recovery-gram is created.

*Step 1:* The interviewer will explain to the respondent that they will complete an exercise that asks them about their social network.
Step 2: The name generator display board will be presented to the respondent. The display will have 2 columns of coloured post-its under two column titles: “A. Very Close Ties” and “B. Somewhat Close Ties”. These are also commonly known as strong ties and weak ties and for the purposes of this study, very close ties are generally bonding ties and somewhat close ties are bridging ties. Very close ties are defined as: "People with whom you discuss important matters, with whom you regularly keep in touch, or who are there for you when you need help" (Hogan et al., 2007, p. 123). Somewhat close ties are defined as: "People who are more than casual acquaintances but not very close" (Hogan et al., 2007, p. 123). These definitions are clearly stated in the title. The reason the columns are not labeled as bonding and bridging ties is because locals would not understand what bonding and bridging ties mean, however, they would understand very close and somewhat close ties. While there is a chance that very close ties can sometimes be bridging ties, and somewhat close ties can be bonding ties, there is a lower chance of the two being mixed up because very close ties are typically bonding ties and somewhat close ties are bridging ties. However, to ensure that there is as little error as possible, the research team and I triangulate the column the ties is placed under with the relation of the tie to the respondent so if a bridging tie is put under the very close tie column, it would be corrected in data entry. But its good to note that such an occurrence was often low.

Each column will have 10 post-its on it. The two columns of post-its are in different colours. Pink post-its represent very close ties. Yellow post-its represent somewhat close ties. See Figure 9 for the Name Generator Display Board. The colour pink was chosen for very close ties to signify warmth and yellow was chosen for somewhat close ties to symbolize that the tie is still a warm colour but not as warm as pink. I chose these colours but I had also asked my research team to verify that the colours would be appropriate for the local context. Each post-it is labeled with an identifying code that has a letter and a number. The letter A or B identifies which group
it belongs – A for very close ties and B for somewhat close ties. The number is the rank number to organize the alters in order and do not have that much significance alone as alters are brought up via free recall. However, the letter and the number together will act as the unique identifying code for the alter as every alter on the board will have a different code.

Figure 9: Name Generator Display Board

### Social Capital Name Generator

#### A. Very Close Ties
Defined: “People with whom you discuss important matters, with whom you regularly keep in touch, or who are there for you when you need help” (Hogan et al. 2007: 123)

- A2.
- A3.
- A4.
- A5.
- A6.
- A7.
- A8.
- A9.
- A10.

#### B. Somewhat Close Ties
Defined: “People who are more than casual acquaintances but not very close” (Hogan et al. 2007: 123)

- B1.
- B2.
- B3.
- B4.
- B5.
- B6.
- B7.
- B8.
- B9.
- B10.
Step 3: After the display has been shown to the respondent and each part explained, the interviewer will ask the respondent to free recall to provide the names of anyone that they feel are very close ties and somewhat close ties. The respondents are free to go back and forth between close ties and somewhat close ties. The respondents will be asked for the first names of their alters. When it seems that the respondent can no longer provide any more alters through free recall, the interviewer will prompt the respondent by asking if they have missed any relatives, neighbours, colleagues, classmates and friends and family from abroad or outside the city. This will be viewed as their baseline social network.

Step 4: After a baseline social network has been created, the respondent will be asked to go back to the name generator and a 3rd column will be revealed as seen in Figure 10 – organizational ties. Organizational assistance is defined as “Ties to local officials and other people in power. Assistance from NGOs (i.e. Red Cross, Oxfam, Care), Religious organizations (Churches) and Government organizations”. For the purposes of this study, organizational ties are linking ties. And they are on green post-its, the colour green was chosen because organizational ties are often more distant so I chose a cooler colour to represent it. Given the locals would not be able to understand linking ties easily, I used organization ties as the label because it was easy to understand. The organizational ties will be enlisted once again through free recall and they will be asked what assistance was provided by each organization. For this part of the exercise, the respondents’ answers will be recorded on a separate sheet of paper (Table 6).

Step 5: When these organizational post-its are completed. The recovery-gram display will be introduced to the respondent (Figure 11). The recovery-gram is in the shape of a three-ring bull’s eye. They are asked to imagine that this bull’s eye represents their recovery process.
There are two important components of the recovery-gram: A) Importance of ties for recovery and B) Time.
Figure 10: Name Generator Display with All 3 Columns

Social Capital Name Generator

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>A. Very Close Ties</th>
<th>B. Somewhat Close Ties</th>
<th>C. Organizational Ties</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Defined: “People with whom you discuss important matters, with whom you regularly keep in touch, or who are there for you when you need help” (Hogan et al. 2007: 123)</td>
<td>Defined: “People who are more than casual acquaintances but not very close” (Hogan et al. 2007: 123)</td>
<td>Defined: Ties to local officials and other people in power. Assistance from NGOs (i.e. Red Cross, Oxfam, Club), Religious organizations (Churches) and Government organizations.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 6: Table About Organizational Assistance

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Organization Name</th>
<th>Assistance Provided</th>
<th>The assistance was provided immediately, 1 month, 3 months, 6 months, 1 year)</th>
<th>From 1-4 how much did it contribute to your recovery?</th>
<th>Additional Notes: justification for scoring</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Figure 11: Example of a Blank Recovery-gram
A) Importance of Ties for Recovery: To understand how important the social ties were to the respondent’s recovery process, I designed a diagram that allowed respondents to visually represent the level of importance for recovery of each tie. The three blue rings within the bull’s eye represent the level of importance for recovery. The closer the level is to the core, the more important the tie was and this is presented by the darker colour blue and the less helpful levels are colours in a lighter blue. Each level is also labeled. Level 1 is help that is “Very important for recovery”. This is meant to denote assistance that is very significant and placed the household in a stronger position than before. An example of this can be the construction of a completely new home by an NGO as opposed to simply supplies for reconstruction. Level 2 is “Important for recovery” such as significant funds or pivotal non-financial support such as medicine or temporary accommodations. Level 3 is “Somewhat helpful for recovery” such as hygiene kits from humanitarian organizations or the assistance of neighbours on small tasks. Level 4 is assistance that is “Not important for recovery”.

B) Time: the recovery-gram is divided into six slices to represent 6-month periods of time each for a total time frame of 3 years. The first slice represents the time from when the typhoon made landfall on November 8, 2013 to 6 months after, the second slice represents 6 months to 1 year, the third slice represents 1 year to 1.5 years, the fourth slice represents 1.5 years to 2 years, the fifth slice represents 2 years to 2.5 years and the last slice represents 2.5 years to 3 years after Typhoon Haiyan. The aspect of time allows the respondent and interviewer to visualize when the tie was activated to provide assistance. It can demonstrate patterns of assistance that have been found in the literature on humanitarian disasters and remittances. Humanitarian assistance is known to be much better at providing disaster response than recovery. In fact, many organizations were seen to leave Tacloban City around 1 year after the disaster with only a few organizations
such as Plan International and Care International which have mandates that were longer than 2 years. Bragg et al.’s (2017) macroeconomic study of 18 major disasters from 2000 to 2014 in 12 countries found that remittances traditionally increase in the first quarter of the disaster but drops back down to regular levels in other quarters. As such, time is an important element to incorporate into the recovery-gram.

After it is clear that the respondents understand the recovery-gram. The interviewer would bring the name generator display back into focus. For each alter, the respondent is asked a list of questions about the alter, the ego-alter relationship and the assistance that they provided. Each response was recorded onto a separate chart (Table 7) as well as coded onto the post-it through letters and coloured stickers. The layout for the chart was adapted from Michelle Meyer’ (2013, p. 69) Disaster Social Capital Name Generator from Mail Survey table from her dissertation.

A look at how each of the 3 columns would be coded can be seen in Figure 12. A photo of a respondent completing the name generator component can be seen in Figure 13. In the image you can see the respondent placing stickers onto the post-its to code them for whether the social tie provided financial or non-financial assistance.
Table 7: Alter Details (adapted from Meyer 2013)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Code</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Relations (R, I, F, N, S, W, C, O, A)</th>
<th>Occupation</th>
<th>Help they provided</th>
<th>What non-financial help was provided?</th>
<th>When was the non-financial assistance provided?</th>
<th>How much non-financial assistance was provided?</th>
<th>When was the financial assistance provided?</th>
<th>Did you also provide help to them for Yolanda?</th>
<th>From 1-4 how helpful was the assistance for recovery? Explain?</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>☐ Non-fin</td>
<td>☐ Fin</td>
<td>☐ No</td>
<td>☐ Non-fin</td>
<td>☐ Fin</td>
<td>☐ No</td>
<td>☐ Non-fin</td>
<td>☐ Fin</td>
<td>☐ No</td>
<td>☐ Non-fin</td>
<td>☐ Fin</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>☐ Non-fin</td>
<td>☐ Fin</td>
<td>☐ No</td>
<td>☐ Non-fin</td>
<td>☐ Fin</td>
<td>☐ No</td>
<td>☐ Non-fin</td>
<td>☐ Fin</td>
<td>☐ No</td>
<td>☐ Non-fin</td>
<td>☐ Fin</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>☐ Non-fin</td>
<td>☐ Fin</td>
<td>☐ No</td>
<td>☐ Non-fin</td>
<td>☐ Fin</td>
<td>☐ No</td>
<td>☐ Non-fin</td>
<td>☐ Fin</td>
<td>☐ No</td>
<td>☐ Non-fin</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>☐ Non-fin</td>
<td>☐ Fin</td>
<td>☐ No</td>
<td>☐ Non-fin</td>
<td>☐ Fin</td>
<td>☐ No</td>
<td>☐ Non-fin</td>
<td>☐ Fin</td>
<td>☐ No</td>
<td>☐ Non-fin</td>
<td>☐ Fin</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Other: □ ☐ Non-fin | ☐ Fin | ☐ No
□ Moral Support
□ Food ☐ Water
□ Clothing
□ Shelter ☐ Med
☐
□ 6m □ 1yr
□ 1.5y □ 2y
□ 2.5 yrs
□ 3 yrs
□ < P1000
□ P1000-5000
□ P5000-10,000
□ P10,000-20,000
□ other:

☐ ☐ Non-fin | ☐ Fin | ☐ No
□ Moral Support
□ Food ☐ Water
□ Clothing
□ Shelter ☐ Med
☐
□ 6m □ 1yr
□ 1.5y □ 2y
□ 2.5 yrs
□ 3 yrs
□ < P1000
□ P1000-5000
□ P5000-10,000
□ P10,000-20,000
□ other:

☐ ☐ Non-fin | ☐ Fin | ☐ No
□ Moral Support
□ Food ☐ Water
□ Clothing
□ Shelter ☐ Med
☐
□ 6m □ 1yr
□ 1.5y □ 2y
□ 2.5 yrs
□ 3 yrs
□ < P1000
□ P1000-5000
□ P5000-10,000
□ P10,000-20,000
□ other:

☐ ☐ Non-fin | ☐ Fin | ☐ No
□ Moral Support
□ Food ☐ Water
□ Clothing
□ Shelter ☐ Med
☐
□ 6m □ 1yr
□ 1.5y □ 2y
□ 2.5 yrs
□ 3 yrs
□ < P1000
□ P1000-5000
□ P5000-10,000
□ P10,000-20,000
□ other:
As discussed previously, A1 represents the identifying code of the alter. A represents the group of ties they are in – very close ties and 1 is the rank of the alter during free recall. Next there is the first name of the alter. The letter inside the circle represents the ego-alter relationship. There are eight options:

- I stands for immediate family
- R stands for relatives
- F stands for friends
- N stands for neighbours
- W stands for people from work
- S stands for people from school
- C stands for people from church
- P stands for politicians that ego knows personally
- O stands for others not captured above
Figure 13: Respondent Completing the Name Generator Component in the Field (Source: Author)

So the letter that represents the ego-alter relationship will go into the circle. Next, if the alter provided non-financial assistance that would be represented by a green dot sticker. If the alter provided financial assistance that would be represented by a red dot sticker. If this financial assistance was remittances, it would be notified by a gold star sticker. After this is done with the alter and the post-it is complete, I will ask them to move the post-it from the name generator display and move it to the recovery-gram. They can place the post-it on the recovery-gram based on level of importance for recovery and based on when the intervention took place – 6 months, 1 year, 1.5 year, 2 years, 2.5 years or 3 years. These steps are to be repeated with each alter on the
name generator until it is finished. The completed recovery-gram will look like Figure 14. And Figure 15 shows a respondent completing the recovery-gram in the field.
Figure 14: Example of a Completed Recovery-gram

Legend:
- Pink Post-its: Very Close Ties
- Yellow Post-its: Somewhat Close Ties
- Green Post-its: Organizational Assistance

- 2 year from Typhoon Haiyan, Nov 8, 2015
- Nov 8, 2013, Day of Typhoon Haiyan
- 1.5 year from Typhoon Haiyan
- 1 year from Typhoon Haiyan
- 6 months from Typhoon Haiyan

Increasing level of helpfulness for response and recovery
5.2.3.3. Data Verification and Entry Process

After the recovery-gram was complete and the interview was over, the research assistant was instructed to look over the interview guide to fill in any answered they did not finished writing out and to open up the recovery-gram and write out important information into the recovery-gram itself. For example, if there was a story pertaining to a specific tie and the assistance they provided, the research assistant can write out those details next to the place where the alter is placed on the recovery-gram. Another example is when important recovery milestones were reached, for example if a family moved into their new NGO built home two years after the typhoon struck then
I would ask the research assistant to note that at the two-year mark on the recovery-gram. It was also important to note down on the recovery-gram when the household felt fully recovered if they did so within the three-year timeframe of my study. Otherwise they could mark down how recovered (no recovery, low recovery, intermediate recovery, complete recovery or better recovery) the family felt at the three-year mark. I felt it was important for these notes to be written onto the recovery-grams because it helped to provide a fuller picture of the households’ recovery process.

To reduce human error in inputting the data, I created a three-step review and verification process. The first step is inputting. After the interviews and recovery-grams were completed on paper, research assistants were instructed to input the data into Qualtrics as soon as they can which often meant the same day if there were only 1-2 interviews that day or the day after if there were 3 interviews. The second step is verification. I would download the Qualtrics data onto a spreadsheet the same night the data was inputted and look through each question to check for unanswered questions and areas of confusion. I recorded these errors and areas of confusion on a separate spreadsheet detailing which question of which respondent was unanswered or needed clarity. The third step is follow up. I would arrange a meeting with each research assistant at the end of each week of fieldwork and I would follow up on each of the unanswered questions or areas of clarification with the research assistants. Since the research assistants took detailed notes and audio recorded their interviews, it was easy for them to go back to find the missing answers and expand on areas of confusion. I developed this rigorous data checking process because I was highly aware that the research assistants were dealing with a large amount of information which can easily become mixed up or forgotten if the information was not inputted and double checked in a timely manner. At the end of data collection for Phase Two, the research team gathered to discuss and analyze the various trends and patterns that emerged from the interviews and recovery-grams.
5.3. Methodological Challenges

Four major challenges were faced while conducting fieldwork. The first is non-response, the second is ambiguous barangay boundaries, the third is proper compensation of respondents and the last is getting respondents to speak about remittances. This section will outline each challenge and discuss how my research team and I overcame those challenges.

As mentioned previously, the study employed systematic randomized sampling for the short surveys, so we knocked on every 2-3 doors in each barangay depending on its size. As such, non-response was naturally a challenge. Most of the non-response was a result of adult members of the household not being home because they were at work during the day. When my research team and I were deciding on when we should be in the community, we initially settled on 8 am to 5pm with a break in between for lunch. Our focus at the time was on the safety of the research team because some of the barangays were known to be poorly lit in some areas and safety at night is always a priority. But after the first few days in the field, we noticed that missing households where the adults were at work may be an issue so we tried two separate tactics. The first was to create a day shift and a night shift, so we would be able to conduct interviews with the head of the household when he or she returned from work. However, given the issues with safety mentioned above, after one evening, the team decided it was not safe to conduct research at night. We found that since we were not completely familiar with the barangay, it was hard to navigate ourselves around the community at night and the stress that came from this unfamiliarity was magnified due to the poor lighting in most parts of the barangay. Therefore, it was concluded that evening shifts in the barangay were not an option for safety reason. So we moved to our next solution, we dropped off an information letter to households with a request to come back on the weekend at a time that was convenient for the respondent. We left phone numbers for the respondents to get in
contact with us. This method did not prove to be very effective and we did not receive any phone calls back. We believe that households are just busy so it is not a priority for them to contact us to arrange a special time just for a survey. Therefore, we had to adapt to this by going to the barangays more on weekends than during the week. So we made sure that for all three barangays we were able to do two days during the week and two days during the weekend. Going on the weekends lowered out non-response rate as most adults are home on weekends.

The second issue was ambiguous barangay boundaries. When I first approached the barangay officials for a map of their community, I wrongly assumed that their map would be an accurate depiction of the barangay boundaries. It was only when we sent our research assistants for a walk around the barangay to get acquainted that they realized that the maps were not fully accurate. Rivers and streams which were labelled to be within the barangay actually belonged to the next barangay. When we asked the barangay officials about these discrepancies they were not able to give us fully convincing answers. This was because some barangays have expanded after Typhoon Haiyan so there may be some changes that the officials are not exactly sure about. As such, I had to use triangulation to figure out the boundaries of the barangay. In addition to the map provided by the barangay officials, I also retrieved official maps from the City Hall and my research assistants went on the ground to ask families that lived close to the boundaries between barangays which barangay they belonged to. Bringing the different sources of information together, my team and I created a more conclusive and accurate map of our own. This was the map we used when we conducted our systematic random sampling for the short survey.

The third issue is the proper compensation of respondents. One of the first discussions I had with my research coordinator about fieldwork was what would constitute proper compensation for respondents undertaking my surveys and interviews. I wanted to understand what previous researchers had done and what she thought was most appropriate for the local context. She told
me that researchers she had worked with before had all given small tokens of appreciation as opposed to money. She said it is very important that we give something because we are taking up people’s time. She stressed that we must offer something because offering nothing would be considered highly inappropriate and rude by the respondents. She also said that giving respondents cash is not appropriate because they will reach out to ask us for even more money. She noted that in the past, she had seen researchers give out cash to respondents and it did not lead to positive outcomes. The researchers would inevitably end up being seen as a source of money and respondents would ask for more interviews and recruit their relatives and friends to complete the research in order to get the funds. I agreed with her that giving out cash was not a good idea and that it would contribute to desirability bias with respondents just telling me what they think I want to hear. Moreover, given the humanitarian context of post-Haiyan Tacloban, many households had already been promised cash by organizations and some have under-delivered or not delivered at all causing a great deal of grievances among community members. Thus, giving cash as a form of compensation could bring on unnecessary comparisons to humanitarian actors that have come before. Another aspect that was of significance was that given the sensitive nature of my research on remittances, building trust with my respondents is of utmost importance to the success of the overall research project. Therefore, introducing cash compensation, which may erode this trust was not ideal for relationship building. I also consulted four other academics that had, or were currently, conducting research in Leyte after Haiyan about compensation and they all agreed that small tokens were must better than cash. The four others also took the route of giving small tokens for their research. As such, it was settled that respondents would get small tokens composed of canned goods and packets of coffee purchased at local sari sari (convenient stores) so they would be locally appropriate. These tokens were well received by the respondents.
Lastly, the biggest challenge I had to overcome was creating strategies that would make respondents comfortable speaking about remittances and migrant connections. This has been the key methodological challenges throughout the whole proposal writing stage and the first part of fieldwork in the scoping study. As I mentioned before, asking questions about money and specifically remittances is difficult because it is a sensitive subject. When asked directly about it during the scoping study, people were uncomfortable and reserved. As a result, I had to research more participatory methods to collect this data. After some exploring, I came upon the participant-aided sociogram which allowed participants to play a strong role in the data collecting process. I realized that respondents may feel much more comfortable speaking about sensitive subjects such as remittances if they felt they had control over what information was being disclosed as opposed to being asked directly about it. Therefore, I invested a great deal of time into developing the recovery-gram which involved many layers of testing.

The first time I tested the recovery-gram in Part Two, I noticed an immediate change in attitude from when the respondents were being interviewed to when they were presented with the recovery-gram. Many of them were very curious about this diagram and interactive activity. They learned how the recovery-gram worked in a relatively short amount of time. The straightforward nature of the name generator made it so respondents were breezing through that part of the activity. Their excitement and engagement usually grew when they were presented with stickers and as they worked through their alters they were very focused on correctly identifying which alter gave them financial assistance and which alter gave them non-financial assistance. This approach, where we simply explain to them that the green dot symbolized non-financial assistance, the red dot symbolized financial assistance and the gold star symbolized a migrant meant that if they wanted us to ask questions about finances and remittances they would let us know through the stickers so we would not be asking them directly. This way they are able to slowly consent to
providing the type of information they want and the process feels more organic and conversational as opposed to unnatural and forced. This participatory method proved to be very successful at motivating respondents to open up about remittances because most respondents were comfortable enough to reveal to us the dollar amounts they received in financial assistance or remittances. Initially, in our alter details table, we had check boxes for the amount of financial assistance in ranges, for example <1000 Pesos, 1000 Pesos to 5000 Pesos because we did not think respondents would give us exact amounts. But we were proven wrong about this. Very often when we asked how much an alter gave, the respondents were fine to give us an exact dollar amount. Only on very few occasions did respondents not give us a dollar amount and we felt that this may be because respondents were concerned about the intra-family politics regarding remittances whereby some family members receive more remittances than others but they may not be aware of the difference. For example, two sisters within the same household may be receiving remittances from the same brother who is abroad but for whatever reason one sister receives more than the other sister but it would be seen as unfair if this information was known so in those situations, it may be within the interest of the sister who receives more to not disclose the amount she receives in remittances to anyone. Other times, respondents simply forgot the exact dollar amount because the money was sent a few years ago. Therefore, we felt the participatory approach was effective in getting respondents to discuss remittances.

We also found the use of humour to be useful in discussing remittances. As I mentioned above, during the training of my research assistants for the recovery-grams, I got them to conduct multiple practice interviews and recovery-grams. This practice allowed them to try out different strategies to discuss remittances and migrants. The research assistants shared that they found it was easier to discuss the remittances that households received by making jokes about the migrant. For the respondents that were more reserved about speaking about remittances, one research
assistant found that it was useful to make a joke along the lines of “so they send you big money from overseas then?!” to break the ice. This was an effective strategy because the concern that some respondents have about discussing remittances is that they might be falling victim to the assumption that households that have a migrant abroad are better off. So by making a joke that addresses this assumption and pokes fun at it, shows the respondent that the interviewer is aware of this assumption and knows that for most households “big money” is not sent by migrants. This also allows the respondents to give an easy answer of “no” and expanding on what amount they do get. This also has the benefit of allowing households who do not receive a significant amount of remittances to address this issue in a light-hearted manner. Moreover, making jokes enables the interviewer to build rapport and trust with the respondent. The jokes were particularly well received as they were delivered by local research assistants who speak the local language and know the culture and approach. Using these strategies have allowed my study to overcome the challenge of discussing the sensitive topic of remittances, enabling me to collect rich data on how households access and mobilize remittances for post-disaster recovery.

5.4. Limitations

George and Bennett (2005) discuss the strengths and limitations of case study methods in their book “Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences”. The authors (2005, p. 19) note “case studies are generally strong precisely where statistical methods and formal models are weak”. As noted before, macroeconomic studies on remittances that use multi-country data sets have often failed to capture the role of remittances at the household level. As such, the case study approach undertaken in this study allowed for a higher level of conceptual validity because many contextual factors, often difficult to do in statistical studies, were considered in my study. Another
strength of case study methods is the ability to derive new hypotheses or variables through the course of fieldwork. As my empirical chapters will demonstrate, an in-depth look at remittances at the household level allowed me to find new analytical categories for social capital. But while there are certainly strengths to case study methods, there are also trade-offs and limitations.

To begin, the most important limitation to note is that the findings from this study are not generalizable. Instead, the basic patterns outlined are valuable for understanding the socio-economic inequalities that structure the access and mobilization of remittances. My study is limited because I am only looking at one city that was affected by Typhoon Haiyan and I am only examining the remittance access and mobilization of households that have migrants from this region which is the second poorest region of the Philippines. Therefore, the study is not representative of the remittance sending patterns of the over 2.4 million Filipino migrants that originate from all over the Philippines and communities affected by Typhoon Haiyan. However, I did not have the resources and funds to conduct a country-wide study that would compare multiple cities in different provinces that were affected by Haiyan. This approach may not be the most comparable anyways because Typhoon Haiyan struck many different places but they all varied in terms of level of impact. But for Tacloban since it was the most heavily hit, and struck by a storm surge, the barangays that were struck by storm surge are more comparable to each other than barangays not struck by storm surge. Thus, for the phenomenon that I was interested in studying, a more focused and in-depth look at fewer cases that had comparable experiences was more useful than a broad look at a diversity of cases. This appears to be a common trade-off experienced by case study researchers. As George and Bennett (2005, p. 31) note, “Case study methods involve a trade-off among the goals of attaining theoretical parsimony, establishing richness, and keeping the number of cases to be studied manageable… In view of these trade-offs, case study researchers generally sacrifice the parsimony and broad applicability of their theories to develop cumulatively
contingent generalizations that apply to well-defined types or subtypes of cases with a high degree of explanatory richness.” Therefore, the focus of my research is to be representative of the phenomenon of remittances and migrant networks during times of disaster. I am not aiming to be representative of the whole of the Philippines, all OFWs or all areas affected by Typhoon Haiyan. What I am examining is within the narrow scope of three barangays in Tacloban City that were all heavily affected by Haiyan, their homes were destroyed by a storm surge, they received a lot of NGO support and all of them have OFW households that may have had a difference experience (or not) of post-disaster recovery. As summed up by George and Bennett (2005, p. 31), “Case study researchers are more interested in finding the conditions under which specified outcomes occur, and the mechanisms through which they occur, rather than uncovering the frequency with which those conditions and their outcomes arise”.

A second limitation of my study is it relies on respondents to self-report the amount of remittances they received. These self-reported amounts are not completely reliable as it is commonly understood that households may not report or underreport the amount of remittances they have received. Some do not report because they simply do not want to share financial information with people, others may not report because they do not trust us as outside researchers. Some households may underreport because they may be concerned that my research team and I are somehow linked to the INGOs that provide assistance so they do not want to give the impression that they have received a large amount of financial help. However, given that there are limited ways that one can ask someone about their remittances that does not constituent an invasion of privacy, self-reporting appeared to be the only course of action. It would not be ethical to ask respondents for their banking statements or remittance slips from Western Union. Moreover, it is important to take into consideration that many lower income households do not bank formally, thus such statements would not even exist to be examined in the first place. As such, I went into
the field with a strong understanding that asking people about remittances was going to be challenging and that self-reported amounts were not as reliable. As a foreigner, I needed to be aware that it was extremely important for me to build trust with my respondents. I did this by visiting the homes of the respondents multiple times. As I noted earlier, I also made a significant effort to create strategies that would make respondents comfortable speaking about remittances. I invested a great deal of time into developing the recovery-gram which involved many layers of testing and that in the end, only on very few occasions did respondents not give us a dollar amount when discussing remittances they received after Haiyan.

A third limitation of my study is the absence of the sender’s perspective. At the proposal stage of this thesis, it was clear that there was not enough resources of capacity to study both remittance receivers as well as the remittance senders. As such, I had to make a choice and I chose to study remittance receivers because most of the literature on remittances in post-disaster recovery and remittances generally is focused on remittance receivers. I felt this was a better choice for a PhD thesis because I needed to be able to draw on a large body of literature. Studying remittance receivers also had the benefit of a singular location whereas researching remittance senders would mean trying to find senders from all over the world that sent remittances to Tacloban City which would be more time-consuming and costly as I would need to fly to multiple cities and spend the time it takes to find remittance senders and build trust. For those reasons, I chose to focus on remittance receivers knowing that throughout the thesis, the senders’ side will be absent except through what receivers tell me about the senders.

A fourth limitation of my methodological approach is that it did not sample explicitly on the basis of gender because gender was not a central focus of the study. In addition, it does not give specific focus to more vulnerable groups such as people with disabilities, elderly, widows or members of the LGBT community. However, people from all of these vulnerable groups did take
part in my study, even without having a specific objective to sample for them. One of the main reasons that this blind spot existed in my research was because these are often the factors that are missing or ignored in other studies on remittances or disasters. For example, missing from many of these studies is a discussion of gender. While vulnerability, disasters and global migration are gendered processes, gender is rarely a focus of the literature on remittances and disasters. Understanding the gendered nature of migration as well as the gendered nature of the household is important to understanding household decision making when it comes to remittances and the role of remittances in building resilience. But, with my focus largely shaped by the literature when I entered the field to conduct preliminary fieldwork, I was not fully aware of these blind spots in the literature and as a result, there were some areas that I did not explore when I began my fieldwork. One of the reasons that I did not give specific focus to more vulnerable groups is because those groups were largely invisible in the public spaces I visited during my preliminary scoping trip. In the Philippines, people with disabilities and the elderly often resided inside their homes. When I was just entering the field, I did not think it was appropriate for me to be interacting with potential respondents inside their homes. They would have never seen or met me before so I felt I should keep my interactions to more public spaces such as the barangay hall or the areas around the restaurants and shops. Only when I was conducting fieldwork and have built sufficient trust with respondents was I allowed to, and comfortable, entering their homes. It was then that I met people with disabilities who were often bedridden or restricted to moving within their homes with speciality railings and ramps made for them to move around easily. In terms of members of the LGBT community, despite the Philippines being viewed as being quite open to the LGBT community, stigma still exists on the ground and only one of my respondents self-identified as gay. I felt that given the sensitive nature of asking respondents for their sexual orientation, it was not a line of question I should pursue in my survey or interviews. I recognize these limitations in
my study and I do not purport to have an understanding of those vulnerable communities in my research.

A fifth limitation of my study is its heavy dependence on the interpretation of local research assistants. One of the main challenges that I faced in the field was language and communication. Lacking a command of Tagalog, the main language spoken in the Philippines, and Waray-Waray, the local dialect, I depended heavily on my research team to translate verbally and in writing throughout my time in the field. While I learned the basic words needed for conversation, I was in no way able to communicate well in Tagalog or Waray-Waray. But since English is also a commonly spoken in the Philippines and English words are often sprinkled throughout conversations, it was not impossible for me to follow along in interviews or for me to speak to respondents and be understood. A 2008 survey conducted by Social Weather Stations, a non-profit social research institution, found that 76% of Filipino adults that took part in the survey say they understand English.

My research assistants were responsible for conducting surveys and interviews, interpreting the answers and translating them into English for me to understand. Being highly aware that miscommunication and mistranslation can be a problem in the field, I took specific measures to ensure that those issues are minimalized. As a first measure, I put in a significant amount of time and energy to involve my research assistants in the understanding, design and piloting of the research. As I have detailed throughout this chapter, a strong effort was made to involve my research assistants and for them to feel as they are part of a team. The team went through extensive training on theory, literature and methods as well as length pilot testing before they went to the field. This effort was very fruitful because it resulted in very open communication between myself and my research team. This allowed for a great deal of troubleshooting to take place during the pilot testing phase and for issues to be easily communicated and resolved when
they arose in the field. In addition, the input of my research assistants helped to ensure that the questions and overall approach of the research methods fit the local cultural and social context.

The second measure I took was to continually reinforce the need to communication and ask questions. I explained to my team on many occasions that it was important to not make assumptions about what each of us knew and to communicate clearly about what we observed in the field and hear in our interviews. I also pushed for my research assistants to ask me any questions they have on theory or on the methods, reinforcing that I am open to their ideas and local knowledge. This push for openness in communication was very helpful when we were translating the surveys and interview guides as the research assistants were able make the instruments more accessible through the use of simple language and shorter phrases. The open communication, in addition to the long and in-depth training they went through gave me the confidence that my research assistants were able to make suggestions for changes to the questions that made them more relevant to the locals without losing sight of the objectives of the research project.

The third and most significant measure I undertook to ensure minimal issues with interpretation was the three-step review and verification process I had each research assistant undertake while they were inputting data. As noted earlier in this chapter, after each interview and recovery-gram was completed I asked the research assistants to input the data, then I would personally check over and verify that the inputted data matches the data on the interview guide and recovery-gram. Then the most important step was the follow up which required each research assistant to go over each interview and recovery-gram with me so I can ask questions and ensure that I understood what they inputted. These follow up meetings were crucial for me to get a clear understanding of the interview and recovery-gram data and to start observing patterns and trends among the respondents. To further limit any issues with interpretation, I spent great deal of time with the research team at the end of data collection to discuss and analyze the various trends and
patterns that emerged from the interviews and recovery-grams so that I could check that my interpretations of their translations and notes were correct.

5.5. Positionalities in the field

As an international development researcher, the significance of taking account of my own position(s) in relation to the research participants and research setting in terms of education, class, race, gender, culture and other factors while we were in the field was deeply embedded in our teachings (England, 1994; Merriam et al., 2001; Rose, 1997). In writing reflexively, I try to reveal my position(s) with the recognition that my account is not exhaustive or completely transparent. According to Anthias (2002, p. 501-502), “[P]ositionality refers to placement within a set of relations and practices that implicate identification and ‘performativity’ or action. It combines reference to social position (as a set of effectivities; as outcome) and social positioning (as a set of practices, actions and meanings; as process).” Social categories or positionalities clearly played out in the field and those will be covered extensively in the section below.

First, I recognize that writing reflexively does not mean that I can transparently reveal every implication of my research. Instead, it means that I am ready to explore the messiness of research and discuss my position, my biases and the way that my research assistants and I were perceived by the population we were conducting research with.

As an ethically Chinese woman, who was born in China but raised in Canada, I identify as being Chinese-Canadian. While I am a Canadian citizen, I still identify as being an immigrant. As a PhD candidate, I possess the positions of being highly education and a researcher but at the same time I am also still a student. Below, I explore some of the ways I perceived that ethnicity,
profession and gender may have positioned me in relation to the population of interest, despite the relational and contextual character of such positioning(s).

5.5.1. Conducting Research as an Filipina-passing Foreigner in the Philippines

The topic of my ethnicity was something mentioned and discussed by many of the respondents and those I encountered in the field. The role of ethnicity had different implications depending on the context. Given the Philippines history of colonialism, the population has been mixed with blood from Spain, China and the U.S. As a result, it is common in the Philippines to see people who may have biologically mixed blood but look “Filipina”, which are what women in the Philippines are refereed to. In fact, it is common for celebrities in the Philippines to be mixed and for that mix to be celebrated. For example, Miss Universe 2016 was won by Miss Philippines, Pia Wurtzbach, who is German and Filipino. In addition, like in most Asian countries, having foreign physical features, or lighter skin is something looked up to in Filipino society. As a result, I found that my ethnicity was always a central discussion topic. While I was aware that ethnicity would play an important role in my ability to gain access and conduct my research well, what I discovered while I was in the field was that the ethnicity that I was assumed to be changed as my skin tone changed in the field. Below I reflect on how my changing skin tone affected the assumptions about my ethnicity.

As an ethically Chinese woman from the southern China, my skin colour can go from a pale white tone to a darker tan tone. I noticed that as my skin got darker, I was more frequently believed or asked if I was Filipina. Generally, many people I have encountered in the field believe I am Filipina because I look Filipina and it’s highly unusual for a Chinese-Canadian researcher to be in the Philippines. Many of the other researchers I met in the field were ethnically Caucasian.
so researchers are often associated with being white. As such, many people I interacted with, surveyed and interviewed assumed I had an ethnic connection to the Philippines.

On my first and second trip to the Philippines, when I was mainly staying indoors to do interviews, I did not get much sun so I was quite fair. In my encounters with locals in stores, public transport vehicles or in the hotel, I was more commonly guessed to be Chinese than Filipina or a Chinese-Filipino mix. As a result, when I would walk through the mall or in a grocery store and I noticed people glancing at me, I assumed it was because I did not look Filipino or because I clearly did not fit in. This attention made me nervous that my otherness would create distance between myself and my respondents. But my concern was proven wrong when during a run to the grocery store on my second trip to the Philippines, I asked one of my research assistants why people were glancing at me and she said, “they are looking at you because they are trying to understand why you are so fair because most Filipina are not that light skinned.” To which I replied, “so they are not looking at me because they don’t think I look Filipino?” and she confirmed “they think you are Filipina but they are curious about why you are so fair.” From this, I learned that with my fairer skin, while more people assumed I was Chinese or Chinese-Filipina, I was still Filipina-passing to many locals. This was the first time that I came to realize that of my physical features, skin tone was a very important one when it came to people’s interest in and perception of me. Indeed, skin tone is an important symbol and social marker in Southeast Asia.

On my third trip, when I was doing interviews in the communities I was always out in the sun so I got a darker skin tone and as a result, I blended into the crowds easier and I knew this because drivers on public transport vehicles often spoke to me in Waray-Waray assuming I was a local. I also got stared at less when I was in public. Realizing that my skin tone played an important role in what people assumed my ethnicity was, I purposely did not ask my research respondents to introduce my backstory during the testing period of our research. They introduced me as a
researcher from Canada but did not reveal my ethnicity. When I asked my research assistants what ethnicity the respondents think I am, they said they assume I am a Filipina who grew up abroad and was coming home to do research on my homeland. In some of the testing interviews, it was clear that for some respondents the ambiguity of my ethnicity was a distraction to them because I did not clearly fit in a box. Locals are curious because if I was Filipina, why does my skin have a yellower tone as opposed to a browner tone that is seen on local Filipinos and why did I not speak Waray-Waray or Tagalog? Moreover, they could not reconcile why someone with no ethnic ties to the Philippines would be interested in studying it. Noticing that respondents were distracted and would quickly into the interview ask questions about my background and ethnicity, my research assistants and I strategized our interviews so that I would be introduced as a Chinese-Canadian research and that my background having grown up in China and immigrated to Canada would be shared.

This strategic introduction served four main purposes, the first was to address the questions of my ethnicity at the beginning so it would not be a distracting factor throughout and the second is to make me more relatable to the respondents by providing them with some explanation as to why I would be interested in studying the topic of migration and remittances. Often when it is explained that I was born and spent my early years in a developing country, it felt as if the respondents feel a lot more comfortable with me because they feel that I understand the conditions that they are in. They do not feel that I am judging them which they may feel from a Caucasian foreigner who does not have the lived experience of growing up and living in a developing country. For example, having grown up in a house that my father and his brothers built with their own hands, I understand the hardship that comes with building one’s own home from scratch and am thus also appreciative of the pain and hardship my respondents feel to have their home that they build torn apart by a storm. In addition, I also grew up in a village where everyone lives in close
quarters so I understand the significance that gossip within the village plays or how reliant you are on your neighbours for small everyday tasks, such as watching over children or lending small amounts of money to take the bus. My lived experiences in a village in China provide me with an understanding of their experiences and an appreciation of the hardship they are enduring that comes from a less distant place. In addition, explaining that I am an immigrant provides a strong explanation for why I am interested in the topic of remittances. Third, explaining my background at the beginning of the interview also helps to break the ice and engage the respondent so they feel it is a two-way process and not simply an extractive process whereby we ask questions and they answer. Often respondents have a few questions to ask me about my background which helps to get the conversation going. Last, explaining my background allows me to build trust and rapport with the respondents. Hearing me talk about my upbringing shows respondents that I am open and allowing them to ask me questions and answering them shows that I am transparent. By modeling openness and transparency in myself, I hope that it will make respondents want to do the same and share honestly and openly with me.

5.5.2. Conducting Research as an Unmarried then Married Woman

On my first trip to the Philippines, in March 2015, I was engaged but not married. I chose not to wear my engagement ring to the field because I did not want it to be lost or stolen nor did I want to appear wealthy. As such, I did not wear any rings on my fingers and would appear to most outsiders as single or unmarried. I felt that being a young woman, travelling alone without a visible symbol of marriage on me made me a target for questions about my relationship status by public vehicle drivers, locals and others I interacted with in the field. Questions about relationships are very common place in Filipino society, it is a common topic of discussion and gossip among
friends and it something that is regularly joked about. With the group of locals that I became friends with while I was in the field, it was common to ask each other about any “baby boys” or “baby girls,” which are slang for casual boyfriends and girlfriends. This experience made me realize that if I was getting unsolicited attention and questions from locals about my relationship status because I did not have a clear symbol of marriage on me, I may be getting these same questions from respondents when I interview them in the next phase of my research. As a result, when I returned to the field for the second time and I was married, I wore a ring on my left hand to signal my marital status. Interestingly, being married brought forward a different set of questions. Instead of being asked what my relationship status was, I was being asked where my husband was. Respondents and other people I encountered in the field would ask me if my husband was in the Philippines with me, what his job was and if I missed him. Some respondents were curious why a married woman was doing research, when they thought my role was to be home with my husband and having children. They showed this by expressing concerns about who was feeding my husband if I was here or asking when he was going to visit. It was also very common to ask me if I had children because I was married. When I responded that I did not have children and would not be having children until a few years later, many female respondents were surprised that I would wait so long after marriage to have children. In Filipino society, having children right after marriage is common and expected so my situation was very foreign to them.

Moreover, being married made me more relatable to my respondents, most of whom were females who were also married. Having this aspect in common made respondents more comfortable speaking with me and sharing their stories because they felt I could relate and understand their situation.

Overall, I felt that being married made me appear more mature to my respondents and as such I felt that they took me seriously. I also noticed this change among my research assistants
who may have seen me as more of a student when I was unmarried and more as a professional researcher when I was married. I felt this because they were committed to meeting deadlines and getting my research done faster so “I could be reunited with my husband”. Being married added a level of maturity that was equated with being serious and professional.

5.5.3. Positionality of My Research Team

I hired four local academics to make up my core research team. My team was composed of a research coordinator and three research assistants. I had a research coordinator that was an assistant professor of political science at the University of Philippines Visayas Tacloban. Her main job was to help me manage my research on the ground. She helped me with all aspects of the fieldwork from hiring research assistants to coordinating interviews. She job also entailed conducting research but mainly with regards to piloting research because her role as a research coordinator was more significant when we were on the ground doing surveys and interviews. The professor would be classified as upper class, given her income, her education, her profession and her concrete house. Her profession as a professor garnered a great deal of respect among barangay officials, NGO staff, OFW organization presidents as well as respondents as education is highly valued in the Philippines. This respect was very beneficial to my research as it meant that she would often get her phone calls answered or returned when contacting interviewees, whereas my research assistants who were only seen as students had to call back more frequently. As a result, the professor was the one responsible for coordinating most interviews.

My three research assistants I hired were all recent graduates from the University of Philippines Visayas Tacloban. They were all female and middle class based on their income, education level, profession and housing. I decided to hire only female research assistants because
my research contains sensitive questions about remittances and family relations which I felt may be better received by respondents when asked by women. Women would be seen as more approachable and understanding when issues of tensions between family members came through in the research.

5.5.4. Professionalism in the Field

When I was testing my surveys in a nearby community my research assistants informed me that they initially had a hard time convincing people to complete the survey because the students, dressed in their normal causal clothes (t-shirt and shorts), looked like students who were conducting this survey for homework as opposed to young professionals conducting research. As a result, our team discussed how the students could look more professional and mature. From our brainstorm, the research assistants noted that most professionals in the Philippines would wear a button-up shirt, often white or blue, and long pants that could be dress pants or jeans. But they agreed shorts and t-shirts were unprofessional and casual. They noted after that professional women often wear make-up to work, at least lipstick. As a result, the research assistants agreed that they should wear a button-up shirt or a professional looking blouse and long pants as well as some light make-up to the field. While most of the research assistants owned 1-2 professional button-up shirts, I took it upon myself to go on shopping with my research team to purchase 2 additional button-up shirts for each of them so they would have a change of clothing for the days they would be in the field. I paid for the clothing because I felt that it was important to show them that I was very invested in them as my research assistants. The shopping trip also acted as a good team building exercise. When they went to the field in their more professional clothes they found community members were much more willing to speak with them and take the survey seriously. I
also followed this same protocol, wearing a white or light blue button up shirt to the field, light make-up and long pants. This showed that the respondents were interested in being involved in a professional research project so we approached them in a professional manner, rather than opting for a more student-led community approach.

5.5.5. Reciprocity Towards My Research Team

While having a reciprocal relationship with my research team is a challenge given their contributions to my fieldwork will lead to the completion of my doctoral degree and my compensation for their labour will only provide funds for them temporarily, I made strong efforts to give back and add value to their lives financially and professionally. Financially, it was important for my research team to be well compensated for a variety of reasons. The first reason is simply that they should be paid what they are worth so there are no grievances or concerns that as a foreigner I had exploited their labour in any way. To find out what the current wage was for research assistants in Tacloban City, I consulted four academic that had, or were currently, doing research in Tacloban City after Haiyan. I was also advised that it is expected that there should be an additional allowance for cellphone charges, bus fare as well as food. While some researchers did not pay this additional allowance as they saw it as part of the wage they were paid, I did pay this allowance as I wanted to adhere to the local culture around compensation. The wage and contract for the research coordinator was negotiated over several meetings and we settled on a wage and contract that was satisfactory for both of us. Then the contract and wages of the three research assistants were created with the help of the research coordinator. In additional to the fair wage and the additional allowance, I also paid for team dinners almost every night after work. The second reason for ensuring my research team was well compensated was because new academics
were still entering the field at that time to conduct research on Haiyan, thus there was a risk that my research assistants would take up additional employment which would take them away from my project.

Professionally, I assisted my research team by co-authoring with them during and after my field work as well as providing the anonymized data to them to write their own articles. Since 2016, I have published two academic journal articles with my research coordinator, Ladylyn Mangada, in Critical Asian Studies and in the Philippines Political Science Journal. At the time of writing, we currently have one more academic article under review with World Development Perspectives. I have also involved Ladylyn in the writing of four academic blog articles, one of which also involved Jessa, one of our research assistants. Another research assistant, Ara, had consulted me on several occasions and used the literature I provided to her to write and successfully publish an academic journal article on social capital after disasters. Thus, I have made extensive efforts to help my research team produce academic writing of a high quality to help advance their professional careers. A total of 7 journal articles or academic blogs resulted from my collaboration with my research team.

I also added value to my research team members by providing extensive training on the literature on remittances after disasters and social capital after disasters in addition to training on methods. I believe the training was not only significant to help ensure the team understood my research objectives clearly and could conduct the research well but it was also important in terms of giving the research team new knowledge and skills. Since I had learned a lot from them on topics of local knowledge and customs, I wanted to give knowledge back to them as well.

My three research assistants have also on many occasions asked me for advice on whether they should pursue graduate studies, where they should apply and what type of research they should pursue. They had mentioned to me that having my support and encouragement had been
very helpful in this process because they were unsure if they should apply. In the end, two of my research assistants applied successfully to Masters programs in the Philippines and one applied for and was successful in receiving a job with the government.

Thus, I believe I have made strong attempts at giving back and adding value to the lives of my research team financially and professionally.
CHAPTER SIX: REMITTANCES ARE A TIDE THAT DOES NOT LIFT ALL BOATS IN POST-DISASTER HAIYAN

6.1. Introduction

Many macroeconomic studies that employ large national or multi-national datasets have suggested that the inflow of remittances tend to increase in the aftermath of disasters (Yang, 2008; Naude & Bezuidenhout, 2014; Clarke & Wallsten, 2004; Bettin & Zazzaro, 2017; Ratha, 2006; Gupta, 2005; David, 2010; Mohapatra et al., 2012). The surge of remittances after Haiyan follows the same pattern. As noted earlier, the Inter-Agency Humanitarian Evaluation of the Typhoon Haiyan Response (Hanley et al., 2014, p. 19) reported that “the diaspora played possibly the most direct and important role for many affected communities. In a year-to-year comparison, remittances to the Philippines rose by $600 million in the first three months following Haiyan.” But who do those funds go to?

As discussed in the literature review, a small number of studies has begun to emerge that examines the uneven distribution of remittances to different households after disasters (Le Dé et al., 2015; Deshingkar & Aheeyar, 2006). Building on the existing literature on migration and remittances which has found that migration has historically privileged better-off groups and do not tend to benefit the poor (de Haas, 2005; Schiff, 1994; Mazzucato, Van Den Boom, & Nsowah-Nuamah, 2008; Taylor, Mora, Adams & Lopez-Feldman, 2005), Le Dé et al. (2015) and Deshingkar and Aheeyar (2006) found that remittance sent after disasters often exclude the poorest households and thus a “remittance gap” exists. Yet, the strong focus of the remittance and disaster literature on the surge of remittances after disasters, ignores the more significant questions regarding the distribution of this surge. Thus the main question being addressed in this chapter is: Who benefits, and who is excluded, from the surge of remittances that arrives after major disasters?
6.1.1. Objective

The objective of this chapter is to provide empirical evidence to demonstrate the breakdown of households that have access to migrants and those that were able to turn their access into remittances after Haiyan. To answer the question in this chapter a series of sub-questions will be addressed:

1) What is the breakdown of lower and middle income households?
2) Which households have access to migrants?
3) Which households receive regular remittances?
4) Are households that are receiving regular remittances getting more remittances after a disaster, or are households that previously only had access irregular remittances, suddenly able to receive remittances from their migrant because of the disaster?
5) Which households are getting larger amounts of remittances after Haiyan?
6) How were remittances used as an exclusionary criteria in humanitarian assessments and what are its effects?

6.1.2. Methods

The empirical data for this chapter is mainly drawn from the 500 short surveys that were conducted across three communities that were affected by Haiyan in Tacloban City. As described in the methodology chapter, 460 short surveys were conducted through systematic random sampling in three barangays and 40 surveys were completed through convenience sampling with the assistance of the three OFW organizations in those barangays. Data were also drawn from the 72 semi-structured interviews to bolster the survey data in areas that required more qualitative evidence.
Lastly, for one of the questions, recovery-gram data were drawn upon. As described in the methodology chapter, the recovery-gram is a participatory approach that records who and how those in the households’ social networks helped after Haiyan. The data from the 72 recovery-grams that were conducted will be used in this chapter.

6.1.3. Findings and Significance

The overall finding from this chapter that contribute to answering the main research question “Under what conditions are households able to turn access to migrants into remittances after major disasters” is the finding that middle income households have double the access to migrants than lower income households and that 6.2 times more middle income households received remittances after disaster than lower income households. Overall, lower income households have no to limited access to remittances with only three percent of lower income households reporting they receive regular remittances and five percent reporting they received remittances after Haiyan. While one can assume that middle income households would have more access as well as mobilization of remittances after disasters, the significance of the findings is the detailed empirical data that I collected to support this claim.

In general, my findings go against the current of many macro-economic studies on remittances after disasters. While the macro-economic studies are correct that remittances commonly increase after major sudden-onset disasters, my findings support other studies\(^\text{24}\) that caution against optimism that remittances play a significant role in post-disaster recovery. My findings show that remittances are not a rising tide that lifts all boats because the financial

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\(^{24}\) Bragg et al. 2017; Fagen 2006; Suleri and Savage 2006.
assistance is usually only sent once, immediately after the disaster, and not sustained in the long run. My analysis of 394 lower income and 106 middle income households found that middle income households have more than double the access to migrants than lower income households. Middle income households also have double the capacity to receive regular remittances than households in the lower income category. Overall, very few, only 3 percent, of lower income households receive regular remittances whereas 16 percent of middle income households receive regularly. In the case of remittances after disaster, my findings confirm that when it comes to which groups benefit and which groups are excluded from the surge of remittances after a disaster, a remittance gap does exist. My findings show that 6.2 times more middle income households received remittances after Haiyan than lower income households. As such, my data shows that middle income households have a much stronger ability to ‘mobilize’ remittances than lower income households. But my data does not support is the assumption that only households that are already receiving regular remittances are getting more after a disaster. In fact, my data show the opposite was true. Middle and lower income households often received remittances after disasters from irregular remittances senders as opposed to regular remittance senders. My findings also reveal that middle income households received almost double the amount of remittances on average than lower income households.

My findings on who benefits and who is excluded from the surge of remittances is important given the context that the macroeconomic literature on the surge of remittances often cannot capture micro-level details such as the income of the remittance-receiving households and their differing remittance-receiving patterns. Nor do these macroeconomic studies and their case study counterparts, capture the financial amounts of remittances that are received. I went to great lengths to create an in-depth and participatory methodology that would allow enough trust to be build and sufficient control to be given over to the participant for them to share the amount of
remittances they received from each social tie at each time period of their recovery. This level of
detail is rare in studies of remittances because actual amounts of remittances received is such
sensitive and private data. While I do not purport that my respondents reported the most accurate
amounts of remittances they received, I contribute data and a methodology that has made gains in
unearthing this sensitive data.

My findings are also significant because they contribute data and support for the remittance
gap that exists between middle and lower income households that is not often discussed in the
literature on remittances and disasters where all remittance-receiving households are treated the
same and categorized simply as remittance-receiving or non-remittance-receiving. My research
that digs into the difference between having access to migrants and mobilizing remittances sheds
lights onto all of the grey areas in between that require more research. Overall, my research
findings are significant because they draw more attention to the complexity of remittance receiving
dynamics and the social, cultural and economic intricacies of global households.

Lastly, my findings have significance to the humanitarian community because it cautions
against including receiving remittances as a exclusionary criteria in beneficiary selection forms.
My findings show a large numbers of lower income households are at risk of being wrongly
categorized as receiving remittances regularly and being less vulnerable when in fact they receive
irregular remittances of little significance.

6.1.4. Structure

The chapter is structured as follows. Empirical evidence will be presented for each sub-question
in this chapter. Following this is a discussion section that brings the empirical evidence together
with the literature to answer the main question of who benefits, and who is excluded, from the
surge of remittances that arrives after major disasters. Lastly, the limitations of the empirical evidence presented in this chapter will be outlined and areas for future research will be presented.

6.2. Results

6.2.1. What is the Breakdown of Lower and Middle Income Households?

Using the classification method described in the methodology chapter, the households that were surveyed were labeled as lower or middle income. Of the 500 households surveyed, 394 (79 percent) were classified as lower income while 106 (21 percent) were classified as middle income. The breakdown of the households in my study matches closely with the results of the Family Income and Expenditures Survey of National Statistics Office that classified 0.1 percent of Filipinos as upper class, 24.2 percent as middle class and 74.7 percent as lower class (Vilora et al. 2013). Figure 16 shows the breakdown in the form of a pie chart.
6.2.2. Which Households have Access to Migrants?

The first aim of this study is to understand which households have access to migrants and which households could turn that access into remittances. As mentioned in the theoretical framework chapter, there is a difference between having access to a resource through a tie and being able to actually receive resources from that tie. Thus, having access to a migrant does not mean the migrant will send remittances regularly or during times of disaster. To gather evidence on which households have access to migrants, the survey featured the question “Is anyone in your family a migrant or OFW?” Out of 394 households in the lower income category, 92 (23 percent) reported having access to migrants and 302 (77 percent) reported having no access to migrants. For the 106 middle income households, 60 (57 percent) reported having access to migrants and 46 (43 percent)
reported having no access to migrants. Table 8 provides a breakdown of the different number of households in each category with access to migrants.

Table 8: Number of Households with Access to Migrants

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Access to Migrants</th>
<th>Lower Income (n = 394)</th>
<th>Middle Income (n = 106)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Access to Migrants</td>
<td>92 (23%)</td>
<td>60 (57%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No Access to Migrants</td>
<td>302 (77%)</td>
<td>46 (43%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

While the literature on remittances suggests that access to migrants implies a greater capacity to deal with disasters (Savage & Harvey, 2007; Le Dé et al., 2014; Le Dé et al., 2015; Mohapatra et al., 2012), deciphering the difference between having access to migrants and having the ability to receive remittances is significant to understanding that capacity. I interrogate that difference in this study in three ways. The first is to compare households that have access to regular remittances with households that have irregular access to remittances. The second is to assess how many households with access to migrants were able to receive remittances after Typhoon Haiyan for post-disaster recovery. The last is to examine which households are getting larger amount of remittances after Haiyan.

6.2.3. Which Households Receive Regular Remittances?

Consistent with the literature on the distribution of remittances (Le Dé et al., 2015), initial fieldwork found that while many households receive irregular remittances for special occasions or emergencies (often in small amounts, e.g. US$5 to US$20), fewer households receive regular remittances. Moreover, even when remittances were regular, the frequency of remitting was highly varied. Some households received remittances monthly, others quarterly and others regularly but
only for specific expenses such as utilities and groceries. The regularity of remittances, or lack thereof, helped account for the large discrepancy between the two income groups. But such micro, household level details are rarely studied.

Included in my survey were two questions that help to answer the question of which households receive regular remittances: 1) “Is anyone in your family a migrant or OFW?” and 2) “Does your household receive regular remittances from migrants?”

Out of the 92 lower income households with access to migrants, only 13 households (14 percent) reported receiving regular remittances. This percentage is double for middle income households which had 17 (28 percent) of the 60 households with access to migrants reporting the receipt of regular remittances. While the absolute numbers of households that received regular remittances is similar for middle and lower income households, the percentage that do receive it regularly are more commonly found in the middle income category. Similarly, it is important to note that while the absolute difference between the number of households in the middle and lower income categories that receive regular remittances is only four, given the notable difference between the population sizes of lower income households \( (n=92) \) and middle income households \( (n=60) \), it is more useful to look at the percentages in this situation. Another way to look at these numbers is to focus on the percentage of households that do not receive regular remittances. Of the 92 lower income households with access to migrants, 79 (86 percent) do not receive regular remittances. Of the 60 middle income households with access to migrants, 43 (72 percent) do not receive regular remittances. Thus, for both lower and middle income households surveyed, the majority do not receive regular remittances. Table 9 provides a breakdown.
Table 9: Number of Households with Access to Migrants that Receive Regular Remittances

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Lower Income (n = 92)</th>
<th>Middle Income (n = 60)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Receive Regular Remittances</td>
<td>13 (14%)</td>
<td>17 (28%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Do Not Receive Regular Remittances</td>
<td>79 (86%)</td>
<td>43 (72%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

However, the drastic differences in remittance receiving patterns are more clear when the percentage of regular remittance receiving households are examined as a percentage of all the lower or middle income households surveyed. Figure 17 and 18, illustrate the breakdown of the study group in terms of migrant access and regularity of remittances. The figures first present a pie chart of the percentage of households that have access to migrants and those that do not, next the percentage of households that have access to migrants is broken down in a bar graph to show what percentage of the total number of lower or middle income households surveyed received regular remittances and what percentage did not. Comparing these two graphs highlights a significant finding that of the 394 lower income households surveyed, only three percent received regular remittances. This is seven times less than the 21 percent of middle income households that receive regular remittances of the 106 households surveyed. These findings are important given the context that the macroeconomic literature on the surge of remittances often cannot capture micro-level details such as the income of the remittance-receiving households and their differing remittance-receiving patterns. The macroeconomic studies also often fail to investigate the factors affecting remittance-sending patterns such as the occupation of migrant, the country they work in and the relation of the migrant to the household. These factors and more will be examined and discuss in chapter seven.
Figure 17: Remittance Receiving Patterns of Lower Income Households

- Lower Income, No Access to Migrants: 77%
- Lower Income, Access to Migrants: 23%
- Lower Income, Received Regular Remittances: 3%
- Lower Income, Do Not Receive Regular Remittances: 20%

Figure 18: Remittance Receiving Patterns of Middle Income Households

- Middle Income, No Access to Migrants: 43%
- Middle Income, Access to Migrants: 57%
- Middle Income, Received Regular Remittances: 21%
- Middle Income, Do Not Receive Regular Remittances: 36%
6.2.4. Are Households that are Receiving Regular Remittances Getting More Remittances After a Disaster, or are Households that Previously Only had Access Irregular Remittances, Suddenly Able to Receive Remittances From Their Migrant Because of the Disaster?

While remittances are observed to increase after major disasters (Yang & Choi 2005; Mohapatra et al., 2012; Fagen, 2006), little attention has been paid to how the increased funds are distributed and what types of households benefit from this bump. More specifically, my study was interested in asking the following questions: are households that are receiving regular remittances getting more remittances after a disaster, or are households that previously only had access irregular remittances, suddenly able to receive remittances from their migrant because of the disaster? One would assume that a mega-disaster such as Typhoon Haiyan would galvanize households’ migrant ties to send remittances as forms of financial assistance, but my findings show this only happened for a small percentage of households.

Included in my survey were three questions that help to answer the question of which households received remittances after Haiyan, those who already received regular remittances or those that received irregular remittances? The three survey questions were 1) “Is anyone in your family a migrant or OFW?”, 2) “Does your household receive regular remittances from migrants?” and 3) Did your household receive any financial assistance for Yolanda from family, relatives and friends outside Tacloban?”. Data in this section will also draw from answers to the semi-structured interview question: “How did your migrant/OFW assist your after Yolanda? Were you able to send more funds? With the follow up questions if the migrant/ OFW support for Yolanda came just once, why was this the case?

Of the 60 middle income households that identified as having access to migrants, just over half, 33 of the households (55 percent) were able to receive remittances after the disaster. The
remaining 27 households (45 percent) did not receive any remittances from their family and relatives abroad after Haiyan. The disparity between access to migrant ties and the ability to mobilize it into remittances is significantly bigger for lower income households. Of the 92 lower income households with access to migrants, only 19 households (21 percent) received remittances after Haiyan, while 73 households (79 percent) did not. Table 10 provides a breakdown of remittances for post-Haiyan recovery among those with access to migrants.

Table 10: Number of Households with Access to Migrants that Received Remittances After Haiyan

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Lower Income (n = 92)</th>
<th>Middle Income (n = 60)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Received Remittances After Haiyan</td>
<td>19 (21%)</td>
<td>33 (55%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Did Not Receive Remittances After Haiyan</td>
<td>73 (79%)</td>
<td>27 (45%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Similar to the comparison of regular and irregular remittance receiving patterns above in section 6.2.3., the difference in the ability of households to receive remittances after disasters are more clear when the situation is examined as a percentage of all the lower or middle income households surveyed. Figure 19 and 20, illustrate the breakdown of all the households surveyed in terms of access to migrants and ability to receive remittances after Haiyan. The figures first present a pie chart of the percentage of households that have access to migrants and those that do not, next the percentage of households that have access to migrants is broken down in a bar graph to show what percentage of the lower or middle income surveyed received remittances after Haiyan and what percentage did not. When these numbers are looked at as a percentage of all of the lower income and middle income households surveyed, the difference between the two groups become
more apparent. Of the 394 lower income households surveyed, only 19 households (5 percent) received remittances after Haiyan. This is six times less than the 33 middle income households (31 percent) that received remittances after Haiyan of the 106 households surveyed.

This difference between the percentage of households that received remittances after Haiyan and those that received regular remittances is also important to highlight. For lower income households, the percentage of households that received remittances after Haiyan is 5 percent and those that received regular remittances is 3 percent. Therefore, the number of households that received remittances after Haiyan is only 2 percent more than those that receive regular remittances. But for the middle income households, the difference between the two situations is 10 percent with 21 percent of households receiving regular remittances and 31 percent receiving remittances after Haiyan. Thus, a greater percentage of middle income households were able to receive remittances after Haiyan that was different than those that sent them remittances than lower income households. Many factors contribute to explaining this discrepancy such as the job of the migrant, the country they work in and the relation of the household to the migrant. The reasons the lower income households are unable to receive remittances in the same degree as middle income households will be examined in the next chapter.
Figure 19: Percentage of Lower Income Households that Received Remittances After Haiyan

- Lower Income, No Access to Migrants: 77%
- Lower Income, Access to Migrants: 23%
- Lower Income, Received Remittances After Haiyan: 5%
- Lower Income, Did Not Receive Remittances After Haiyan: 18%

Figure 20: Percentage of Middle Income Households that Received Remittances After Haiyan

- Middle Income, No Access to Migrants: 43%
- Middle Income, Access to Migrants: 57%
- Middle Income, Received Remittances After Haiyan: 31%
- Middle Income, Did Not Receive Remittances After Haiyan: 26%
To answer the question “are households that are receiving regular remittances getting more remittances after a disaster, or are households that previously only had access irregular remittances, suddenly able to receive remittances from their migrant because of the disaster? I compared the households that received remittance after Haiyan and those that received regular remittances. This comparison yielded three interesting findings which will be explored in the next section.

6.2.4.1. Irregular Remittance Senders, Not Regular Remittance Senders, the Common Sender of Remittances After Haiyan

Of the 19 lower income households that received remittances after Haiyan, 4 households received remittances from migrants that they received regular remittances from and 15 households received remittances from immediate family and relatives abroad that did not previously give them regular remittances. For the 33 middle income households, 13 households received remittances after Haiyan from migrants that send them regular remittances and 20 were from immediate family and relatives abroad that did not previously send them regular remittances (See Table 11 for breakdown). Or put differently, 9 lower income households and 4 middle income households did not receive any remittances from their migrant or family and relatives abroad that usually send them regular remittances. Thus, it is not only households that are already receiving regular remittances that are getting more after a disaster.
Table 11: Number of Households with Access to Migrants that Received Remittances After Haiyan from Migrants that Send Regular Remittances

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Lower Income (n = 19)</th>
<th>Middle Income (n = 33)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Received Remittances from Migrants that Send Regular Remittances</td>
<td>4 (21%)</td>
<td>13 (39%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Received Remittances for Family and Relatives Abroad that Send Irregular Remittances</td>
<td>15 (79%)</td>
<td>20 (61%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

This finding may appear counterintuitive at first because it means that affected households were not able to receive remittances after Haiyan from ties that they regularly receive remittances from. But when the complexity of remittance relationships is taken into consideration combined with an understanding of the financial limitations faced by migrants, then the results are more understandable. Two main reasons emerged from examining the semi-structured interview data for why regular remittance senders did not send more after Haiyan. The first explanation is that remittance senders did not have any additional funds to contribute in addition to the regular remittances that are already sent. Several respondent noted that their OFWs did not occupy high paying jobs, instead they had low paying jobs as domestic helpers, so the monthly remittances they sent were already a large burden on them. One respondent noted bluntly, “my sister's job does not pay her a lot”. As a result, sending additional remittances after Haiyan on top of the regular remittances they already send is difficult to achieve on such a low income. Other migrants are constrained by the financial obligations they have to their own immediate families in their host country. One older gentlemen who was a senior citizen in a lower income household, mentioned that he had three children that worked abroad who send him remittances regularly, once a year. He did not receive additional remittances from his children after Haiyan and when asked why, he
defended his children’s lack of additional remittances after Haiyan by saying, “it is not their role anymore, they have their own families abroad to take care of”.

Another explanation for why regular remittance receivers did not send more funds after Haiyan is that the agreement or process for remittance sending is already strongly established between the senders and receivers. A response from one of the lower income households for why their son did not send more assistance after Haiyan in addition to the regular remittances they received was, “My son only sends us 500 PHP a month to cover our monthly utility bills. He does not send us more and the money has to be spent on utilities”. As such, regular remittance senders who already have an established agreement on how much remittance to send and what the funds should be spent on, may not want to disrupt the agreement they have with remittance receivers by sending irregular remittances for post-disaster recovery. Introducing irregularity in this form may contribute to more requests for emergency funds by the receiver in the future which the sender cannot account for.

Data from semi-structured interviews show that for some households, the regular remittances they received are sometimes arranged such that the migrant would send funds to one member of a family, such as the mother, and that member is responsible for allocating the funds to different members of the family. For example, one respondent said, “my mother receives the money and distributes a portion to me, but the amount sent is very little because it is from my sister’s allowance from her husband”. Another respondent said “we receive 15,000-20,000 PHP monthly but is distributed to the other members of the family who have their own families”. After Haiyan, one respondent shared, “My brother usually sends the remittances to my mother and my mother just gave us money after Yolanda. Also, I don't usually ask money from my brother but my brother is a generous man so he sends me money when I request it”. What can be drawn from these responses is an understanding that the relationship between migrant and those who receive
remittances are sometimes indirect and facilitated by another family member. The existence of a main receiver of remittances, or a distributor of remittances, has caused some issues for some households. Several respondents shared stories of discrepancies over the amount of remittances a migrant promised would be sent and the amount the distributor of remittances ended up giving to them in the end. One respondent noted that his brother had pledged each of his siblings 5000 PHP immediately after Haiyan but when the money was distributed to him, he only received 3000 PHP. When asked where the remaining 2000 PHP was, he suspected that the money is with his brother’s wife who was responsible for distributing the funds. He said that his brother’s wife did not like him and as a result, he felt that must have been the reason he got only 3000 PHP as opposed to the 5000 PHP promised. When asked if he confronted his brother about the discrepancy, the respondent said, he didn’t bother because it will only affect the future distribution of remittances so he said it was best to keep quiet. In some cases, the amount of funds distributed to each family member is dictated by the migrant but other times, the main receiver of the remittances is the one who decides the amounts. Several respondents shared that regular remittances are sent to their mother and the mother decides how much to allocated to each member according to the needs of that family member each month. When asked if the main receiver of remittances changes, a respondent noted that, “the person [main remittance receiver] needs to be very trusted because if they do not do a good job of distributing the funds or they make family members unhappy, the migrant will change them for someone else, like a sister”. When asked if the main remittance receiver for their household has changed before, they nodded that it has changed several times over the years and that this is normal practice as it is hard for one person to manage the expectations and demands of the migrant as well as the multiple members of the household that receive the remittances.
Taking in the complexity of remittance distribution at the household level, respondents share that when migrants decide whether to send additional funds after Haiyan they need to consider that they often need to send additional funds to the whole network of individuals they regularly send remittances to. Thus, sometimes, it is not a matter of just sending one household additional funds, but sending additional funds to multiple households. As such, a few respondents suspected that some migrants may choose to not send any additional remittances at all after Haiyan to lessen the financial burden and the social complications.

6.2.4.2. Households Who Only had Access to Migrants Before Haiyan were Able to Receive Remittances After the Disaster

A second interesting finding from comparing the households that received remittances after Haiyan and those that received regular remittances is that the disaster did provide opportunity for some households that previously only had access to migrants to be able to receive remittances after Haiyan. 15 (79 percent) of the 19 lower income households that received remittances after Haiyan, received the funds from family and relatives abroad that did not normally give them regular remittances. The percentages were slightly less for middle income households where 20 (61 percent) households received remittances after Haiyan from family and relatives abroad that did not normally give them regular remittances. As such, most lower income and middle income households that received remittances after Haiyan received it from family and relatives abroad that did not normally give them regular remittances. However, this claim should not be exaggerated because within the context of all of the lower income households surveyed (394 households), only four percent (15 households) were able to turn their access to migrants into remittances from irregular remittance senders. This number is much higher for middle income households, where of
all of the middle income households surveyed (106 households), 19 percent (20 households) were able to turn their access to migrants into remittances from irregular remittance senders. Thus, almost five times more middle income households were able to turn their access to migrants into remittances from irregular remittance senders than lower income households.

Data from semi-structured interviews, shed light on why some of those family members and relatives abroad sent funds after Haiyan, even though they do not send remittances regularly. Many respondents who were contacted by distant relatives believed the relatives reached out because “they just wanted to help us after the devastation brought on by Yolanda”, or they “thought that we badly needed every help we could get”. A respondent said she believes her cousin in the Middle East helped “due to the things or pictures or videos she saw on television, she pitied us”.

Similarly, another respondent speculated that his relatives reached out because “they saw how tragic our lives were after the typhoon on the news or television and since we're family, it's kind of a moral obligation.” While some respondents saw the assistance as an obligation, others were caught by surprise. As one respondent noted, “My two nieces who work abroad sent us money once for the emergency after Yolanda and so far, it was the only time that they sent money. My nieces only sent money once because that was an emergency and that in normal situations, we are just expecting our son’s help.” Another respondent explained that while her migrant relative did not send any funds immediately after Haiyan, they reached out many months after to send 10,000 PHP for the education of her child. But the funds only came once because the education and graduation fees were only required to be paid once but it was not funds they were ever expecting to have received.
6.2.4.3. Most Remittances that Were Sent Immediately After Haiyan was “One-shot”

Last, the finding that most lower income and middle income households that received remittances after Haiyan received it from family and relatives abroad that did not normally give them regular remittances, needs to be put into the context that much of this assistance that came from irregular remittance senders only came once, immediately after the disaster. Respondents overwhelmingly described new assistance from family abroad as “one-shot” assistance to help meet urgent recovery needs such as food and shelter. Of the 15 lower income households that received remittances from irregular remittance senders after Haiyan, 10 provided explanations that the assistance was “one-shot”. Of the 20 middle income households, 13 described assistance as “one-shot”.

While many did not give explanations for why the assistance was “one-shot” in the survey, semi-structured interview data provided several explanations for why the assistance was only sent once. An interview follow up question asked “If OFW/migrant support for Yolanda came just once, why was this the case?”. Of the 19 valid responses, the two main explanations households provided were 1) the migrant has their own families to care for so can only extend help once, and 2) the migrant has a small income and does not have extra to contribute. One respondent shared, “Kausa la ka beses nahatag/nabulig kay mayda hira mga pamilya na.” [They only sent once because they have families of their own.] A respondent in the lower income category, noted his nephew in Taiwan, “has his own family. His family is also living in poverty so he has to prioritize his family more than us and we understand”. Others note that for some, their own families were sometimes more severely affected than their own. One respondent shared how her niece almost drowned during Haiyan and was in a critical condition after Haiyan so her brother in law could only send remittances to them once as the other funds needed to be sent to his daughter for hospital bills. The significance of prioritizing the migrant’s immediate family as a reason for the “one-shot”
assistance was a common sentiment shared by respondents. The other common answer was that
the migrant had a small income. A respondent shared that her niece in the United States did not
have a stable job and thus could not send more remittances than once. Another respondent shared
that their son just did not have extra to send. Other reasons respondents gave for why remittance
was only sent once after Haiyan included that the funds were only meant for emergencies, the
migrant was already sending regular remittances, the households were not close so it did not
warrant more frequent remittances and that the remittances were meant to cover one-time fees such
as bills.

While respondents often expressed disappointment over the singular nature of the
remittances after Haiyan, others who have a larger view of the humanitarian system were not
surprised. When I interviewed Baroness Valerie Amos\textsuperscript{25}, the UN Under-Secretary-General for
Humanitarian Affairs and Emergency Relief Coordinator from 2010 to 2015, about the role of
migrant remittances in post-Haiyan recovery, I asked her what her thoughts were on the IASC
Inter-Agency Humanitarian Evaluation of the Typhoon Haiyan Response’s observation that “the
diaspora played possibly the most direct and important role for many affected communities. In a
year-to-year comparison, remittances to the Philippines rose by $600 million in the first three
months following Haiyan”. Baroness Valerie Amos said,

What I experienced was a diaspora from all over the world. Filipinos all over the world
responded. They all felt affected by it. They raised money and sent a lot of resources back to
the Philippines. I view diaspora help as a type of ‘one-off humanitarian response’. A type of
crisis response from Filipinos which resulted in a huge spike when you look at remittances
before and after. I see this pattern as very similar to the pattern of giving across countries in
the world when an international disaster strikes such as the Haiti earthquake. You see that
there is an immediate global response then it dies down.

\textsuperscript{25} Expert interview with Baroness Valerie Amos on the phone, July 31, 2017.
Making the comparison between the rise and fall of countries committing humanitarian assistance to the rise and fall of remittances after a disaster, Baroness Valerie Amos argues that remittances from diaspora should be treated as a ‘one-off humanitarian response’.

6.2.5. Which Households are Getting Larger Amounts of Remittances After Haiyan?

In an attempt to capture the amount of remittances that households received after Haiyan, I asked my interviewees in the recovery-gram, “How much financial assistance was provided?” For the purposes of the recovery-gram, the term financial assistance was used to mean “remittances” because there were questions about non-financial assistances so it felt more natural to differentiate the assistance as financial and non-financial assistance as opposed to remittances and non-financial assistance. Lower Income Migrant households received an average of $275.40 USD per household and Middle Income Migrant received an average of $479.35 USD per household. Middle Income Migrant households received 1.74 times more funds than Lower Income Migrant. Thus, it appears Middle Income Migrant households are in the most optimal position for benefiting from remittances after disasters. Whereas, Lower Income No Migrant households are the ones that have very limited access to remittances. Figure 21 provides a chart outlining the average amount of total remittances received by each category of households after Haiyan from 2013 to 2017.
It is important to note that the self-reported amounts of remittances that households received are not completely reliable as it is commonly understood that households may not report or underreport the amount of assistance they have received. Some do not report because they simply do not want to share financial information with people, others may not report because they do not trust us as outside researchers. Some households may underreport because they may be concerned that my research team and I are somehow linked to the INGOs that provide assistance so they do not want to give the impression that they have received a large amount of financial help. These limitations will be further explored later in this chapter. However, it is important to note that I made a significant effort to create strategies that would make respondents comfortable speaking about remittances. I invested a great deal of time into developing the recovery-gram which
involved many layers of testing and that in the end, only on very few occasions did respondents not give us a dollar amount when discussion remittances they received after Haiyan.

6.2.6. How were Remittances Used as an Exclusionary Criteria in Humanitarian Assessments and What are its Affects?

The difference in the number of households that have access to migrants versus the number of households that receive regular remittances is more important to understand during times of disaster when beneficiary selection is being partially based on assumptions that having access to migrants is the same as receiving regular remittances as seen in the UN Shelter Cluster Philippines’ Shelter Prioritization Socio-Economic Assessment Tool26 as well as other NGO beneficiary selection forms. As noted in the introduction, Typhoon Haiyan marked the first time that remittances were formally introduced into the beneficiary prioritization and selection process. Through my fieldwork, I came across four international NGOs that had the remittance question on their beneficiary selection forms. When one NGO staff27 was asked what the rationale behind why the remittance question was on their beneficiary selection form, they said, “I’m not sure, we just copied the UN Shelter Cluster’s questions.” Indeed, a look at the wording “Do you receive any financial support from relative nationally or internationally” on this NGO’s beneficiary selection form, is very similar to the one found in the UN Shelter Cluster prioritization Tool, “Not in receipt of overseas remittances/financial support for [sic] from relatives nationally or internationally”. Figure 22 shows the Economic Situation section of the UN Shelter Cluster Philippines’ Shelter Prioritization Socio-Economic Assessment Tool that has the remittance question.

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27 Expert interview with NGO staff in Tacloban City, February 6, 2017.
The shelter prioritization tool was created by the UN Shelter Cluster Philippines as a template for beneficiary prioritization for all NGOs engaged in the shelter cluster. The shelter prioritization tool is a series of questions that was developed to help the over 70 shelter partner organizations to prioritize their beneficiaries for shelter assistance. Depending on the respondents’ answers to certain questions they are allocated points. One of the criteria states “not in receipt of overseas remittances/financial support for [sic] from relatives nationally or internationally”. Evaluators are instructed to assign a score of five if the answer to that question is yes.

While the question appears straight-forward, its implications are not. The question does not interrogate how much remittances a household receives or how regularly, what income their migrant connection has, or where she/he lives. Instead, the question assumes households that received remittances were less vulnerable than those that did not receive remittances. This overlooks the reality that remittances are unevenly experiences and hence the impacts are fragmented depending on the various circumstances of the family.
The framing of this question as a yes-or-no does not present respondents with the opportunity to explain their particular situation. For example, many lower income households in my study with access to remittances only reported receiving irregular remittances during special occasions such as birthdays or during emergencies and usually in small amounts. During the semi-structure interviews, some respondents were asked as a follow-up question if NGOs asked them the remittance question in their beneficiary selection forms or assessment interviews, some respondents said yes. But when asked if they were able to explain much of their remittance receiving patterns to the NGO staff, such as how often they received remittances or how much they received, the respondents generally, said “no, there was no time”. One respondent recalled, “I do not remember how they asked me or what exactly they asked me but they did ask me if I received remittances and I said yes. Then they quickly moved to the next question because there were many questions on the survey.” When asked how she feels about giving a short, yes or no answer, to such a complicated question, she let out a chuckle and said,

I had no time to think! There were so many NGOs coming to my door and they all had many questions so I just answered without thinking. I did not have time to think if the answer was correct or if it would mean I did not get assistance, I just answered!

The environment on the ground and the context in which these beneficiary assessments take place is really important to note. Having followed some NGO staff around while they conducted beneficiary assessments in my preliminary fieldwork, I can understand how a respondent may feel pressured to not think too much before they answer. The NGO staff I was with had a clip board with their assessment form which is usually composed of several pages filled completely with questions. From the perspective of a respondent looking at it, it can look overwhelming as it shows the many questions they must answer while the NGO staff is standing in front of them at their doorstep.
All three respondents that had recalled being asked, noted that they did say “yes” to receiving remittances even though they only received small amounts. Because this was not a question in the interview guide, I was only able to collect anecdotal evidence. I followed up by asking the three respondents if they understood that if they said yes, they would be deducted five points out of 100. A respondent reacted by asking “Even if I was only receiving 500 pesos (US$10) for my birthday from my nephew abroad?” and I let her know that according to the UN Shelter Cluster Prioritization Tool rules, the 500 pesos would count as remittances. Another respondent asked why such a question was on the UN Shelter Cluster form and I explained that according to the advisors that created the form, it was to exclude households that received regular monthly remittances of higher amounts such as 1000 to 5000 pesos (US$20 to US$100), from receiving shelter assistance as those households are seen as less vulnerable than households that did not receive remittances. All three respondents said they did not understand the implications of the question. How well the respondents understood the meaning and implication of a question about remittances from abroad is significant because it has implications for humanitarian practice and policy for future disasters.

As some of my respondents shared, the chaotic environment after Haiyan and the frequency in which NGO staff were doing assessments, made it so they could not think about the implications of the questions they were being asked. Therefore, such ambiguous criteria for beneficiary prioritization can cause households to state that they do receive remittance from abroad but do not provide the context that the amount of remittances is very small and the frequency in which they receive it is irregular.

From an interview with an advisor involved in the creation of the Shelter Prioritization Tool\textsuperscript{28}, it was clear the intent of the remittance question was to target households that received

\textsuperscript{28} Expert Interview, advisor for Shelter Prioritization Tool, July 3, 2017.
regular remittances and were thus perceived to be better off and less vulnerable as a result of their ability to receive financial resources from their migrant. When asked why the remittance question was included in the prioritization form, the advisor responded:

We were trying to capture something simply. So many people receive remittances. There is a lot of support from the overseas. How do you measure it? Are you going to be asking people for their bank statements? It was really more a prompt to get people to think of some informal questions. You cannot ask some people how much they get from their families. Some people got a lot, some people got a little and some people didn’t getting any. So not receiving remittances can actually be a source of vulnerability.

While this response demonstrates some understanding around the complexity of remittances, when pressed further on whether the beneficiary prioritization tool saw a difference between regular remittance receivers and irregular remittance receivers? The advisor said,

There was no difference, we didn’t drill down. We just thought it was too hard to drill down…This is not an assessment so the nitty gritty of that is not relevant.

Thus, regular remittance receivers were treated the same as irregular remittance receivers for the purposes of the beneficiary prioritization form. Next, when asked if there were any concerns that remittance receivers might actually be receiving very little help from relatives abroad? the advisor said, “No. With so many overseas workers in the Philippines it seemed reasonable to have a question on it”.

Lastly, when asked if the advisor was aware of how many overseas workers were sent from the regions affected by Typhoon Haiyan, the advisor said “No, the people in the government were asked to check on that”. As a result, the advisor was surprised to find that given Typhoon Haiyan struck the second poorest region in the Philippines, the Eastern Visayas was not known to be a larger exporter of overseas workers. This was relevant local information that the advisor was not aware of when the beneficiary form was being created and subsequently distributed to the over 70 shelter partner organizations. Figure 23 is a chart produced by the Philippines Statistics Authority that compares the distribution of OFWs by Region in 2012 and
2013. The red “Region 8” label was added by me to easily show where the region Tacloban is in was. The figure was produced from data from the 2012 and 2013 Survey on Overseas Filipinos conducted by the Philippines Statistics Authority.

According to the Philippine Statistics Authority, the number of Overseas Filipino Workers (OFWs), Filipinos who are employed in foreign countries through a contract for a definite period with the obligation to return home, was estimated at 2.3 million in 2013 (PSA 2013). The largest number of OFWs came from CALABARZON\(^29\), comprising 18.4 percent of total OFWs. Whereas, Eastern Visayas, the region most heavily affected by Haiyan and where Tacloban City is located, made up 1.6 percent of total OFWs (PSA 2013). The only region with a smaller distribution of OFWs was Caraga at 1.5 percent (PSA 2013).

**Figure 23: Distribution of OFWs by Region in 2012 and 2013** (Source: Philippines Statistics Authority 2013)

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\(^{29}\) CALABARZON or Region IV-A is an administrative region of the Philippines that is made up of five provinces: Cavites, Laguna, Batangas, Rizal and Quezon, and one highly urbanized city, Lucena. The name of the region is an acronym of its five provinces.
As such, from the interview with the advisor who made the beneficiary prioritization form and an examination of the prioritization tool itself, the remittance question appears to have been targeted at excluding regular remittance receivers who were seen as less vulnerable than households that did not receive remittances. Applying that exclusionary criteria to those that I surveyed, means the question was targeted to exclude the three percent of lower income households and the 21 percent of middle income households that received regular remittances. However, since the question\textsuperscript{30} did not specifically ask about regular remittances but remittances in general, the 90 lower income households (20 percent) and 43 middle income households (36 percent) that do not get regular remittances, but receive remittances irregularly, are at risk of being wrongly labelled and evaluated by humanitarian actors as better off and less vulnerable. The humanitarian implications of the results from this chapter will be elaborated on in the discussion section.

Accounting for the multiple assessments that respondents endure immediately after a disaster with the complexity of the question on remittances, it was not surprising that the question of remittances was removed from the UN Shelter Beneficiary Prioritization Tool during the Nepal Earthquake. The advisor\textsuperscript{31} who was also involved in the adaptation of the Prioritization Tool explained to me, “it was removed because it was a politically charged issues in Nepal amongst the partners. So people couldn’t agree to keep it in”. While she expressed that local organizations in the Philippines also pushed back on including the question of remittances on the Prioritization Tool because it was too political, the external advisors eventually won the argument to include it. This was not the case in Nepal, where the local partners stood firm that such a question was too political and should not be included.

\textsuperscript{30} The Shelter Prioritization Tool asks if the household is “Not in receipt of overseas remittances/financial support for [sic] from relatives nationally or internationally”

\textsuperscript{31} Expert Interview, advisor for Shelter Prioritization Tool, July 3, 2017.
Given the concerns that were brought up by local aid workers in the Philippines as well as Nepal, one may believe that the practice of including remittances as an exclusionary criteria would end or at least be questioned. But that has not been the case. Instead, the beneficiary selection and prioritization criteria is now embedded as a template for future disaster responses and programming. The International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (2015) has now developed minimal standard commitments to gender and diversity in emergency programming where the prioritisation tool used for Typhoon Haiyan is included as a template for beneficiary selection and prioritization. In this version, instead of “Not in receipt of overseas remittances/financial support for [sic] from relatives nationally or internationally”, it says “The household is not in receipt of financial support from relatives” which is even more ambiguous than before and remittances would still fall under this criteria. Another interesting point is that in this disclaimer for the template it states “All statements marked with an asterisk (*) will have to be considered carefully as they are heavily context-specific and relative. These statements should be either re-written or omitted”. And given how contentious the remittance question was in the Philippines and Nepal, and how much remittance flows different from region to region, one would think that this question would receive an asterisk, but it does not. While other questions in the tool are flagged for extra attention and local context, the question on financial support from relatives is not. As one of the biggest humanitarian organizations responding to disasters and crises in the world, the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies’ (2015) minimal standard commitments “establish a core set of practical actions to be undertaken by Red Cross Red Crescent emergency responders” and have a significant impact on disaster response around the world.
6.3. Discussion

My findings confirm established research that migration has historically privileged better-off groups and do not tend to benefit the poor (de Haas, 2005; Schiff, 1994; Mazzucato, Van Den Boom, and Nsowah-Nuamah, 2008; Taylor et al., 2005). My data found that out of 394 households in the lower income category, 92 (23 percent) reported having access to migrants and 302 (77 percent) reported having no access to migrants. For the 106 middle income households, 60 (57 percent) reported having access to migrants and 46 (43 percent) reported having no access to migrants. Thus, the majority of lower income households do not have access to migrants and 34 percent more middle income households have access to remittances than lower income households. Moreover, my data supports Le Dé et al.’s (2015) findings that poorer households are less likely to receive regular remittances. Of the 394 lower income households in my study, only 12 households (3 percent) received regular remittances. The number is seven times higher for middle income households where 22 households (21 percent) of the 106 households surveyed received regular remittances.

My findings also confirm that when it comes to which groups benefit and which groups are excluded from the surge of remittances after a disaster, a remittance gap does exist. While 31 percent (34 households) of middle income households received remittances after Haiyan, only 5 percent (20 households) of lower income households received remittances after Haiyan. As such, 29 percent more middle income households received remittances than lower income households, or, 6.2 times more middle income households received remittances after Haiyan than lower income households.

My finding also reveal a remittance gap when it comes to which households have the ability to mobilize remittances. As I discussed in the theoretical chapter, Lin (2008) explains that having
access to a tie does not mean that you can receive, or in his words ‘mobilize’ resources from that tie. My data shows that middle income households have a much stronger ability to ‘mobilize’ remittances than lower income households. Of the 60 middle income households that identified as having access to migrants, just over half (33 households) were able to receive remittances after the disaster. The disparity between access to migrant ties and the ability to turn it into remittances is significantly bigger for lower income households. Of the 92 lower income households with access to migrants, only one-fifth (19 households) received remittances after Haiyan. The majority of those lower income households with access to remittances (79 percent) were not able to ‘mobilize’ remittances after Haiyan. This remittance gap between access to migrants and the mobilization of remittances is important to keep in mind because it provides evidence to support that just because a household has a migrant abroad does not mean they receive remittances. Respondents with access to migrants commonly expressed a sense of frustration over how households with migrants and OFWs are often assumed to be rich or better-off by their neighbours, a claim they feel overlooks the context of their situations and those of the migrants’. This sentiment was captured well by the quote highlighted earlier by a respondent, “The salary they receive is low because they are only domestic helpers not professionals. Not all who works overseas have high paying salary”. This was a misconception many respondents were eager to dispel. As discussed in the chapter above, it appears that international organizations and humanitarian actors can also operate under the same assumption that households that receive remittances are automatically well off. But this common assumption has much more significant implications when it is held by humanitarian actors who have the power to decide who gets assistance and who does not. This topic will be explored in depth in later in this section. What my data does not support is the assumption that only households that are already receiving regular remittances are getting more after a disaster. In fact, my data show the opposite
was true. Of the 19 lower income households that received remittances after Haiyan, 4 households received remittances from migrants that they received regular remittances from and 15 households received remittances from migrants that did not previously send them regular remittances. For the 33 middle income households, 13 households received remittances after Haiyan from migrants that send them regular remittances and 20 were from migrants that did not. Or put differently, 9 lower income households and 4 middle income households did not receive any remittances from their migrant or family and relatives abroad that usually send them regular remittances.

My study found two main reasons emerged from examining the semi-structure interview data for why regular remittance senders did not send more after Haiyan. The first is because remittance senders did not have any additional funds to contribute on top of regular remittances. The second is because the agreement or process for remittance sending is already strongly established between the senders and receivers. These findings are in line with research conducted by Bragg et al. (2007) which showed that while it is commonly assumed that the greater humanitarian needs owing to a disaster would lead to more remittance sending, this is not how it works in reality. As Bragg et al. (2017, p. 15) pointed out “Previous research was probably based on a very logical assumption that greater humanitarian needs owing to a disaster would lead to more remittance sending”. But given that the remittance senders financial situations remain stable, additional funds are difficult to arrange. A large disaster simply does not change the economic conditions of the migrants and therefore additional funds are often unavailable for post-disaster recovery purposes. Put bluntly, employers often do not react to mega disasters in the home country of the migrant by giving the migrants promotions or additional income. Thus, their financial situation remains constant while larger financial pressures are placed on them as a result of the disaster.
As mentioned earlier, Bragg et al.’s (2017) macroeconomic study of 18 major disasters in 12 countries found that remittances traditionally increase in the first quarter of the disaster but drops back down to regular levels in other quarters in the same year. For Typhoon Haiyan, Bragg’s team found that the data on the Philippines showed that the average annual increase from 2000 to 2013 was 10.84 percent. But in 2013, the year Haiyan struck, remittances only increased by 7.34 percent. As such, remittances were actually 3.5 percent less than the average annual increase.

Similarly, Suleri and Savage (2007) found while remittances to northern Pakistan after a 2005 earthquake increased immediately after the disaster, the actual overall contribution actually declined. In Indonesia and Thailand, the limitations of diaspora support were also evident after the Indian Ocean Tsunami (IOM, 2007). In Indonesia, while remittances were of major importance in the immediate response, individual donations dwindled over time and the diaspora played a lesser role in reconstruction. Similarly in Thailand, the diaspora response focused on initial humanitarian assistance and dwindled as the communities moved into the reconstruction phase. These studies suggest that remittance senders rush to help their kin immediately after a disaster but since their own financial situation was not changed by the disaster, their initial increase in funds is offset by a later decrease. Whether remittances decline after an initial increase after a disaster was not investigated in my research due to it emerging as a result of fieldwork but should be an area for future research.

What my data does tell me with regards to changes in remittance sending behaviour after disasters is that new assistance from family abroad was overwhelmingly described by respondents as “one-shot” assistance to help meet urgent recovery needs such as food and shelter. Of the 15 lower income households that received remittances from irregular remittance senders after Haiyan, 10 provided explanations that the assistance was “one-shot”. Of the 20 middle income households, 13 described assistance as “one-shot”. While many did not give explanations for why the assistance
was “one-shot” in the survey, semi-structured interview data provided two main explanations for why the assistance was only sent once: 1) the migrant has their own families to care for so can only extend help once, and 2) the migrant has a small income and does not have extra to contribute. While respondents often expressed disappointment over the singular nature of the remittances after Haiyan, Baroness Valerie Amos characterized diaspora remittances after disaster as a type of ‘one-off humanitarian response’ that also rises and falls similar to the pattern of giving by countries after an international disaster.

My data indicate, Lower Income Migrant households received an average of $275.40 USD per household and Middle Income Migrant received an average of $479.35 USD per household. Middle Income Migrant households received 1.74 times more funds than Lower Income Migrant. Thus, it appears Middle Income Migrant households are in the most optimal position for benefiting from remittances after disasters. Whereas, Lower Income Migrant households receive much less remittances from a financial perspective. While this finding is not surprising, such micro-level financial data on remittances after Haiyan is rare in a field that is focused more on macroeconomic studies from national and multi-national data sets.

Moreover, to offer some perspective, $275.40 USD is equal to approximately 15,000 PHP which is equal to the monthly income of the head of the household of a lower class households according to Ong’s classification (2015, p. 190). While the amount does not look significant in absolute numbers, a comparison between the average monthly income of a minimum wage worker in the United States and that of the lower class in the Philippines can offer some perspective. The annual earnings for a full-time minimum wage worker in the United States is $15,080 USD at the current federal minimum wage of $7.25 USD (Center for Poverty Research, 2018). Which means the average monthly income is $1256.67 USD which is almost five times more than the monthly income of a lower class household head in the Philippines. Thus, while $275.40 USD may not
initially look like a significant amount, in the context of lower income households, such an amount of money is significant. In chapter seven, I will share empirical data on how helpful remittances were seen to contribute to the recovery of households.

With middle income households receiving almost double the amount of remittances on average than lower income households, the remittance gap is clear again. $479.35 USD is equal to approximately 25,000 PHP which is the lower range of the monthly income of the head of the household of a middle class households which is from 15,000 to 50,000 PHP. Thus, while the amount that middle income households received was not as significant as a month’s salary like it was for lower income households, their ability to receive a much higher volume of remittances should be noted.

The findings on who benefits and who is excluded from the surge of remittances is important given the context that the macroeconomic literature on the surge of remittances often cannot capture micro-level details such as the income of the remittance-receiving households and their differing remittance-receiving patterns.

My findings also have significant humanitarian implications. As noted earlier, some humanitarian organizations and humanitarian actors hold the assumption that households that receive remittances are better off and thus less vulnerable to households that do not receive remittances. And that the Philippines overall receives a significant amount of remittances and therefore, those in Eastern Visayas, the second poorest region in the Philippines, would also receive a significant amount of remittances. I discuss the humanitarian implications of these assumptions and how they had an effect during the formal humanitarian response after Haiyan.

To begin, it is important to note that in the case of the prioritization tool, theory was very different than practice. Despite the UN Shelter Cluster Philippines’ original intent of having a simple beneficiary prioritization tool to help the over 70 shelter partner organizations prioritize
their beneficiaries for shelter assistance, in practice the simplicity was a source of some problems. The complicated transnational dynamics of migrant households and the remittances that are sent regularly and after disasters cannot be distilled down to a simple, yes-or-no question. Forcing an answer to such a complex question in the midst of rapid assessment surveys after a mega-disaster risks yielding inaccurate answers to which the distribution of life-changing shelter assistance is determined. Moreover, while the introductory notes of the Shelter Prioritization Tool (2013) clearly states “This is a beneficiary prioritization tool. It is not a households assessment or a needs assessment tool”, NGOs I met in the field were using the questions in the tool within their beneficiary selection and needs assessment forms.

Moreover, my interview with the advisor that contributed to the development of the Shelter Prioritization Tool showed a clear lack of understanding of the general remittance literature, the literature on remittances after disasters as well as the local migration and remittance context. These beneficiary prioritization forms cannot simply be made by external humanitarian actors and must be created in consultation with local NGO staff and affected communities. As noted earlier, the remittance question was taken out of the Shelter Prioritization Tool for the Nepal Earthquake because local NGO staff heavily warned the UN Shelter Cluster advisors that such a question would be too political. Despite the same challenges being raised in the Philippines after Haiyan, the concerns of the local advisors were not taken as seriously and the remittance question remained leading to the possibility of the wrongful exclusion of some vulnerable households.

As my findings show, of the 92 lower income households with access to migrants, only one-fifth (19 households) received remittances after Haiyan. The majority of those lower income households with access to remittances (79 percent) were not able to ‘mobilize’ remittances after Haiyan. Thus, as I noted earlier, applying that exclusionary criteria to those that I surveyed, means the question was targeted to exclude the three percent of lower income households and the 21
percent of middle income households that received regular remittances. However, since the question did not specifically ask about regular remittances but remittances in general, the 90 lower income households (20 percent) and 43 middle income households (36 percent) that do not get regular remittances, but receive remittances irregularly, are at risk of being wrongly labelled and evaluated by humanitarian actors as better off and less vulnerable. This points to the need for a stronger understanding of the remittance receiving patterns of local households. Moreover, without further clarification, NGOs are determining if households are deserving of assistance based on assumptions about a household’s remittance-receiving patterns, which we have shown can be quite irregular.

Therefore, more research is needed to further explore who benefits and who is excluded from the surge of remittances after Haiyan. This question needs to be asked of for more disasters in the future so a comparative analysis can be completed. These studies can help humanitarian actors and NGOs base their selection of beneficiaries on empirical evidence as opposed to misrepresentations and assumptions about remittances.

6.4. Limitations and Future Research

As noted earlier in this chapter, a limitation of this study and the empirical data presented in this chapter, is that the self-reported amounts of remittances that households received are not completely reliable. It is commonly understood that households may not report or underreport the amount of remittances they have received because they simply do not want to share financial information with people or they do not trust to disclose this information to outsiders. Some households may underreport because they may be concerned that my research team and I are somehow linked to institutions that distribute relief such as INGOs and the local government so
they do not want to give the impression that they have received a lot of help from abroad. As I discussed in the limitations section in Chapter Five, there are very few ways that one can ask someone about their remittances that does not involve an invasion of privacy. Asking respondents for their bank statements or remittance slips is unethical and likely ineffective as many lower income households do not bank formally. As a result, self-reported amounts of remittances are not completely reliable, but it was the only course of action available when researching such a sensitive topic.

Another limitation of this study and the empirical data presented in this chapter, is the absence of the sender’s perspective. As discussion in Chapter Five, I had to make a choice early on in my PhD, on whether to study the perspective of the remittance receivers or remittance senders because I did not have the capacity to study both. I chose to study remittance receivers because most of the literature on remittances in post-disaster recovery and remittances focused on remittance receivers and studying remittance receivers had the benefit of a singular location of study. Thus, while there were many benefits to studying just remittance receivers, the downside was that throughout the thesis, and in this chapter, the senders’ side was absent except through what receivers tell me about the senders.

As such, in some of the sections where I present data on reasons why respondents thought migrants may not have remitted, they were presented from the remittance receivers perspective and not that of the sender. This limited the strength of my arguments and I acknowledge that I do not know what migrants thinks and the reasons behind their actions. My research only allowed me to go as far as to report on what the respondents on the ground suspect was the migrants’ reasons for not sending remittances after Haiyan or why they only sent remittance once after the disaster.

As such, the limitations I experienced, provides more support for Bragg et al. (2017, p.15) suggestion that “it might be useful for future research to gauge whether remittances are in fact
more dependent on the sender’s financial ability (including the varying macroeconomic conditions of the country where the migrant senders reside) and less on the conditions of the receiver.

While my research looks at who benefits and who is excluded from the surge of remittances after disasters in one case, more research is needed to further explore this question. This question needs to be asked of for more disasters in the future so a comparative analysis can be completed. These studies can help humanitarian actors and NGOs base their selection of beneficiaries on empirical evidence as opposed to misrepresentations and assumptions about remittances.

6.5. Conclusion

While remittances do commonly increase after major sudden-onset disasters, my findings support other studies that caution against the optimistic view that remittances play a significant role in post-disaster recovery as the financial assistance is usually only sent once, immediately after the disaster, and not sustained in the long run (Bragg et al., 2017; Fagen, 2006; Suleri & Savage 2006). My analysis found middle income households have more than double the access to migrants than lower income households. Middle income households also have double the capacity to receive regular remittances with 28 percent of middle income households receiving regularly compared to 14 percent in the lower income category. Overall, very few, only 3 percent, in the lower income category receive regular remittances whereas 16 percent of middle income households receive regularly. After Haiyan, my findings show that 6.2 times more middle income households received remittances than lower income households. As such, my data shows that middle income households have a much stronger ability to ‘mobilize’ remittances after disasters than lower income households. My findings also reveal that middle income households received almost double the amount of remittances on average than lower income households after disasters.
As a result of the clear limitations that lower income households have at receiving regular remittances as well as remittances after a disaster, my study cautions against including receiving remittances as an exclusionary criteria in beneficiary selection forms. My findings show a large numbers of lower income households, 20 percent in my sample, are at risk of being wrongly categorized as receiving remittances regularly and being less vulnerable when in fact they receive irregular remittances of little significance.
7.1. Introduction

As mentioned throughout this dissertation, migration is an inherently selective process. For the most part, high-skilled labour migration remains a privilege for those in the higher income categories who have the financial, social and cultural capital required to acquire the prerequisites for skilled migration. As Funkhouser (1992) notes, wealthier and larger households are more likely to send family members abroad for work. Prerequisites such as graduate degrees or medical training are expensive to obtain and comes with the high opportunity cost of spending several years studying as opposed to earning an income. In addition to educational costs, there are also high visa application costs as well as agency fees. For example, a skilled worker visa to Australia cost PHP143,500 or US$2885,\(^{32}\) which is just a bit less than the annual income of someone in the lower income category which makes PHP180,000 or less a year (Ong, 2015, p. 63). The high costs associated with skilled labour migration have traditionally precluded those in lower income categories from working abroad. Therefore, while migration has become a means to diversify livelihoods, reduce risk, and increase household income, middle and lower income households do not experience these benefits in the same way, or at all.

This reality was reflected in the empirical evidence presented in the earlier chapter, where survey data showed that lower income households had less access to migrants and a much lower capacity to receive remittances from those ties in the face of disaster. As mentioned earlier survey data gathered from the question “Is anyone in your family a migrant or OFW?” found that lower income households have limited access to migrants to begin with. Out of 394 households in the

\(^{32}\) Australian Government, 2016.
lower income category, the majority of households, 302 (77 percent), reported having no access to migrants. For the 106 middle income households, a bit less than half, 46 households (43 percent), reported having no access to migrants. And when asked “Did your household receive any financial assistance for Yolanda from family, relatives and friends outside Tacloban?” Of the 60 middle income households that identified as having access to migrants, just over half, 33 of the households (55 percent) received remittances after the disaster. The remaining 27 households (45 percent) did not receive any remittances from their family and relatives abroad after Haiyan. The disparity between access to migrant ties and the ability to receive remittances after Haiyan is significantly bigger for lower income households. Of the 92 lower income households with access to migrants, only 19 households (21 percent) received remittances after Haiyan, while 73 households (79 percent) did not. The next logical question is, why did these households not receive remittances after Haiyan? Thus, the sub-question of this chapter, is what are the factors that affect the ability of households to turn their access to migrants into remittances after major disasters?

Given that the income category of the household is a significant factor in the households’ ability to turn their access to migrants into remittances after Haiyan, it has an impact on the five other factors that emerged from fieldwork such that, income category alone is not easy to untangle from the other factors. The income category of the household affects who and how many migrants are sent aboard from different households, what the occupations of the migrant is, and the country the migrant is living or working in. Thus, those three factors will be examined with the recognition that the income category of the households plays a significant role. The other two factors, intra-family issues and cultural norms such as utang na loob (debt of forgiveness) will be discussed more generally. As such, relation to the migrant, occupation of the migrant and the country the migrant is living or working in will be treated as main factors while intra-family issues and cultural norms will be treated as secondary factors.
7.1.1. Objectives

The objective of this chapter is to provide empirical evidence to demonstrate the various factors that affect the ability of households to turn their access to migrants into remittances after Typhoon Haiyan. While the previous chapter looked at who benefits, and who is excluded from the surge of remittances after disasters, this chapter follows logically by examining the reasons why some households are excluded from receiving remittances after disasters. To answer the question in this chapter a series of sub-questions will be addressed:

1) How does the relation that the migrant abroad has to the household affect their ability to turn their access to migrants into remittances after Haiyan?

2) How does the occupation of the migrant affect the ability of the household to turn their access to migrants into remittances after Haiyan?

3) How does the country that the migrant is living or working in affect the ability of the household to turn their access to migrants into remittances after Haiyan?

4) How do intra-family issues such as poor family relations or a lack of communication with relatives affect the ability of the household to turn their access to migrants into remittances after Haiyan?

5) How do cultural norms such as utang na loob (debt of gratitude) affect the ability of the household to turn their access to migrants into remittances after Haiyan?
7.1.2. Methods

The empirical data for this chapter is mainly drawn from the 500 short surveys that were conducted across all three communities. As described in the methodology chapter, 460 short surveys were conducted through systematic random sampling in three barangays and 40 surveys were completed through convenience sampling with the assistance of three OFW organizations. Data is also drawn from the 72 semi-structured interviews to bolster the survey data in areas that required more qualitative evidence. Lastly, for one of the questions, recovery-gram data was drawn upon. As described in the methodology chapter, the recovery-gram is a participatory approach that records who and how those in the households’ social networks helped after Haiyan. The data from the 72 recovery-grams that were conducted will be used in this chapter.

7.1.3. Findings and Significance

The overall finding from this chapter that contribute to answering the main research question “Under what conditions are households able to turn access to migrants into remittances after major disasters” is that middle income households with multiple skilled migrants in Western countries who are immediate family members have the conditions to turn access to migrants into remittances after disasters compared to lower income households.

While the findings of the previous chapter firmly established that middle income households have much greater access and mobilization of remittances after disasters, this chapters’ findings demonstrate the various factors this access and mobilization. Applying Lin’s (2008, p. 51) network theory of social capital which argued that having access to a tie does not mean that you can receive, or ‘mobilize’ resources from that tie, in addition to income, I found that there
were three main factors and two secondary factors that affect a household’s ability to turn their access to migrants into remittances after disasters. The main factors were the income of the household, the relation that the migrant abroad has to the household, the occupation of the migrant, the county that the migrant is living or working and the secondary factors were intra-family issues and cultural norms such as utang na loob (debt of gratitude).

My findings in this chapter, support the established literature on migration, which argues that the selective nature of migration means the direct benefits of remittances do not tend to benefit the poorest members of society (de Haas, 2005; Schiff, 1994). The majority of Middle Income Migrant households have migrants working in skilled labour jobs in Western countries while the majority of Lower Income Migrant households have migrants working in unskilled labour jobs in the Middle East or Asia. For both middle income and lower income households, many of their migrants were relatives but middle income households were more likely to have multiple migrants that were immediate family members than lower income households. These findings also supports and contributes more empirical data to the third stream of literature on remittances and disasters that looks at the unequal distribution of remittances among different households after disasters.

Where my findings are significant are around the secondary factors that affect a household’s ability to turn their access to migrants into remittances after disasters. As Wong (2006) pointed out, intra-family politics around remittances are an important factor to consider in remittance relationships and that remittances are highly contested and negotiated between remittance senders and receivers. The findings from my semi-structured interviews and recovery-grams revealed this dynamic nature in full force. But often macroeconomic studies have purposefully overlooked the hard to measure and intangible complexities of these non-economic factors by focusing just on the economic and measurable financial aspects of remittances. Shedding light on the intra-family politics as well as cultural norms that are at the centre of
remittance relationships helps to unpack some of the reasons why some households can turn their access to migrants into remittances after disasters and other households cannot.

7.1.4. Structure

The chapter explores the six factors that affect the ability of households to turn access to migrants into remittances after Typhoon Haiyan, that emerged from the fieldwork: 1) the household’s relation to the migrant, 2) the occupation of the migrant, 3) the country that the migrant is living or working in 4) intra-family issues, and 5) cultural norms. Following this is a discussion section that brings the empirical evidence together with the literature to answer the main question of what are the factors that affect a household’s ability to turn access to migrants into remittances after disasters. Lastly, the limitations of the empirical evidence presented in this chapter will be outlined and areas for future research will be presented.

7.2. Results

7.2.1. How Does the Relation that the Migrant Abroad has to the Household Affect Their Ability to Turn Their Access to Migrants into Remittances After Haiyan?

While empirical evidence from Chapter Six has shown us that income is indeed a significant factor in the households’ ability to turn their access to migrants into remittances after Haiyan, a question I want to address in this chapter is, the impact of income categories on which family member and how many members households in different categories can send. As mentioned previously, migration is an inherently selection process and wealthier households are more likely to send family members abroad for work. Comparing lower and middle income households on the survey...
question: What relation does the migrant/OFW have to you? I found that of the 92 lower income households with access to migrants, 41 of the households had migrants that were immediate family members (children, parents or siblings), the other 51 migrants were relatives. For the 60 middle income households that had migrants, 29 of the households had migrants that were immediate family members and 31 that were relatives. Percentage wise, 45 percent of lower income households had migrants that were immediate family members and 48 percent of middle income households had migrants that were immediate family members. While the difference in percentage is not significant, the number and proportion of households that had multiple migrants were more common in middle income households than lower income. Of the 92 lower income households only 4 households had multiple migrants. In 3 cases, the migrants were relatives and in one case siblings. Of the 3 cases, 1 household had 3 migrants and the other 2 had 2 migrants. Of the 60 middle income households 9 had multiple migrants. In 3 cases, the migrants were all immediate family members, in 3 cases it was siblings and relatives and in the 3 cases it was just relatives. Seen from this perspective, only 4 percent of lower income households had more than one migrant while 15 percent of middle income households had more than one migrant. Moreover, in the case of middle income households, 3 of the 9 households that had multiple migrants had 3 migrants. And for middle income households, they were more likely to have multiple migrants that were immediate family members than lower income households.

Breaking down the data from this survey question even further, I found that for both lower and middle income households, most migrants are relatives – 55 percent for lower income and 52 percent for middle income households. Next, siblings make up approximately 30 percent, followed by children at approximately 15 percent. Then there are a few parents and only 1 lower income household had a spouse abroad. Table 12 provides a breakdown.
Table 12: Households with Access to Remittances and their Relations to Migrant Abroad

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Lower Income (n = 92)</th>
<th>Middle Income (n = 60)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Relatives</td>
<td>51 (55%)</td>
<td>33 (56%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Siblings</td>
<td>26 (28%)</td>
<td>19 (32%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Children</td>
<td>13 (14%)</td>
<td>10 (17%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Parents</td>
<td>2 (2%)</td>
<td>2 (3%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spouses</td>
<td>1 (1%)</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

To triangulate the finding that very few households had migrants that were spouses, I asked two OFW presidents and a retired OFW why so few migrants abroad were spouses. The three individuals provided three possible explanations. One OFW president thinks generally there are fewer spouses that work abroad because it is often the children, who are younger and more attractive to employers, that leave. When asked for possible explanations for why that number might be as low as one, he hypothesized that sometimes when people are applying for jobs abroad they put that they are single, as opposed to married, because some employers prefer to hire unmarried workers. The OFW president explained that some employers prefer their workers to not have many or any dependents so they will take less vacation to visit them back home. The OFW president shared, “Single people are preferred for work. The contracts are often a minimum of 2 years so if you are single, there is a higher chance of being hired because they will think you will stay in the job for a long time and not leave”. For this reason, the OFW president speculates that some respondents whose migrant may have lied about their marital status could have not reported that their spouse was abroad in our survey and instead told us another that another family member was abroad. He speculates that they may have done this out of a fear that information collected in my survey may be shared with government officials. At the same time, another OFW president, when asked the same question in a separate interview, about why there may be so few spouses
abroad, also said that some employs preferred to hire people who were unmarried. But she does not think that people would lie about it because she knows many people within the OFW organization whom were married, and wrote that they were married, and were still employed. Her point suggests that while it is true that some employers prefer single employees, the preference is not so strong that married people do not get jobs abroad, indeed many of them do. One further conversation with a former OFW, provides yet another possible explanation. The former OFW who worked in many countries over his long career as an OFW shared that another possibility that there were few spouses abroad is because some other employers have a practice of hiring married couples. He cited that in the Middle East, some households like to hire a married couple to work domestically in their homes. The wife would be a maid and the husband would be the driver. The thinking behind this is that the husband and wife could be trusted to work well together and trust each other. Thus, the married couple is treated as one unit. In this case, both the husband and wife would be abroad which means there would be no spouses to remain home at all. This finding and the limitation pointed out by the OFW president’s suspicion that some respondents may have lied will be explored in the limited section of this chapter.

To get a better understanding of how the relation to the migrants affect remittance sending behaviours, I correlated answers from the survey question, “Does your household receive regular remittances from migrants?” with data from the previous question “What relation does the migrant have to you?” Analyzing these two questions, shows that the makeup of the relation to migrants start to change when looking at which family members send regular remittances. For the 13 lower income households that receive regular remittances, 6 households cited children as the source of remittances. The most common source, children, was followed by relatives (4 households), siblings (2 households) then parent (1 household). No lower or middle income households cited ‘spouse’ as a source of regular remittances. This correlates with the finding earlier that only one
household cited ‘spouse’ as the migrant abroad. The numbers were quite different for middle income households. For the 17 middle income households that receive regular remittances, siblings was the most common source (7 households). This was followed by relatives and children which both had 5 households cite them as sources. As such, while lower income households mainly received regular remittances from their children, middle income households mainly received from their siblings. Table 13 provides a breakdown.

Table 13: Which Family Members Send Regular Remittance

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Lower Income (n = 13)</th>
<th>Middle Income (n = 17)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Relatives</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Siblings</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Children</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Parents</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spouses</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The numbers change again when I look at who sent remittances after Haiyan. Answers to the survey question, “Did your household receive any financial assistance for Yolanda from family, relatives and friends outside Tacloban?” revealed that for the 19 lower income households that received remittances after disasters, they came mainly from relatives (10 households), followed by siblings (5 households), children (3 households) and parents (1 household). For the 33 middle income households that received remittances after Haiyan, the most common source was siblings (16 households), followed by relatives (14 households), children (7 households) then parents (1 household). For middle income households, some households receive remittances after Haiyan from multiple migrants thus there were 38 migrants that sent remittances to 33 middle income
households after Haiyan. For both categories, spouses were not listed as a source of remittances after Haiyan. See Table 14 for a breakdown.

Table 14: Which Family Members Sent Remittances After Haiyan

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Lower Income (n = 19)</th>
<th>Middle Income (n = 33)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Relatives</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Siblings</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Children</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Parents</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spouses</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Comparing the relation of migrants who send regular remittances and the relation of migrants that sent remittances after Haiyan, some differences emerge. For lower income households, while children are the primary source of regular remittances, relatives were the leading source of remittances after Haiyan. As discussed in chapter six, two explanations for this which emerged from semi-structured interview data were, 1) remittance senders did not have any additional funds to contribute in addition to the regular remittances that are already sent, and 2) regular remittance senders may not want to disrupt the established agreement or process they already have with remittance receivers by sending irregular remittances after disasters. These two issues are especially sensitive for remittance senders who are children because they are often socially required to send back more funds to cover the daily needs of their parents. The data shows that relatives and siblings were the main sources of remittances after Haiyan for lower income households. After Haiyan, 6 migrants who were relatives and 3 migrants who were siblings, but do not send regular remittances, contributed remittances to lower income households. As discussed in chapter six, respondents felt that these family members contributed one-time remittances after
Haiyan because they felt some responsibility to help the family after seeing the devastation of the typhoon on the news. At the same time, 3 households that received regular remittances from their children, did not receive remittances after Haiyan. Thus, it seems that during a time when the regular remittance sending children of lower income households lacked the capacity to remit for post-disaster recovery, those that had that capacity (relatives and siblings) because they normally did not remit, stepped in to contribute.

A similar pattern is observed in the middle income households where more relatives (8 households) and siblings (9 households) sent remittances after Haiyan than those that send regular remittances. One households also reported not receiving remittances after Haiyan from their child who send them regular remittances. While the absolute numbers of households in these cases are low, the focus is on the patterns that emerged. The discussion section will discuss the patterns that emerged from this study with those of larger macroeconomics studies.

While it is important to examine why some households were able to receive more remittances from their family and relatives abroad, it is equally, if not more, important to understand why some households were not able to receive any remittances from abroad. Of the 92 lower income households with access to migrants, 73 (79 percent) did not receive any remittances after Haiyan from their families and relatives abroad. This number was less for 60 middle income households with access to migrants, with 27 (45 percent) households citing they did not receive any remittances from abroad.

In the survey, following the question, “Did your household receive any financial assistance for Yolanda from family, relatives and friends outside Tacloban?” was often a follow up question if the respondent answered no. For households that answered no, the follow up question of “why do you think no assistance was sent?” to get at the reason behind the lack of assistance. Due to the fact that this question might elicit some embarrassment or uneasiness from the respondent, most
respondents did not provide further reasoning for why assistance did not come from overseas and the research team was coached not to press the respondent further. Complication around asking sensitive questions like this will be discussed in the limitation section of this chapter. While most respondents did not answer, an analysis of the 16 responses from lower income households and two from middle income households can contribute to shedding some light on this issue. Please note that the answers to this question are different from the question asked in chapter 6 regarding why remittances after Haiyan were only sent once, but the answers were similar as the questions were similar. Also keep in mind that similar to that question and throughout this whole dissertation, migrants and remittance-senders, were not interviewed so the perspectives are from what households on the ground and remittance-receiving households suspect are the reasons behind migrant decisions. Another limitation that will be discussed later in this chapter.

The two middle income households that provided further justification for why remittances were not sent after Haiyan, noted that the reason they suspect they did not get any remittances was due to “lack of contact” with their family and relatives abroad. Of the 16 responses from lower income households, six categories of answers could be distinguished. The most common reason, cited by 6 respondents, was “the migrant has their own family” to mean that the respondents recognizes that the migrant has significant family responsibilities already so they suspect the migrants do not have additional funds to send. As such, many lower income respondents were understanding that their migrant relatives now carry the burden of supporting their immediate family members back home with only meagre earnings abroad. As one respondent from a lower income households explains, “Kay it ira suweldo ha abroad gutiay la kay mga domestici helper la hira diri man mga professional. Diri tanan na trabaho ha abroad dako it kita.” [“The salary they receive is low because they are only domestic helpers not professionals. Not all who works overseas have high paying salary”]. This reason was commonly applied to relatives or children,
often in an understanding manner. The second most common reason for lack of assistance, cited by five respondents, was that in-kind assistance was provided. This was often in the form of used clothes, food and, for one household, a generator set. While some households expressed resentment for being only sent used clothing after such a significant disaster, they appreciated that someone was still sent. It is important to note that while in-kind assistance is also considered a form of remittances, the focus of this dissertation is solely on financial remittances. This will be discussed in the limitations section. Next, four respondents cited that the migrant’s own immediate family was also heavily affected by Haiyan. Some also noted that there were deaths in those families so it was very understandable that no assistance could be provided. The fourth most common suspected reason was the fear of remittance dependency which was cited by 2 respondents. Remittance dependency is a strong concern of the diaspora community. Thus, the respondents suspected that sending remittances to relatives in need may establish a dependence and remittance sending pattern that is not desired by the migrant. The next two reasons were only mentioned once but still contribute to understanding why remittances were not sent. One respondent was dumbfounded because she was contacted by a relative who was a migrant working abroad. She was expecting this relative to offer assistance because she had made the effort to call but no assistance was offered. Instead, at the end of the call, the relative stated “the help from the NGO is arriving, so don’t worry”. The respondent felt that stating that NGO assistance was coming was the relatives’ excuse to not send remittances. The last reason was because the relative abroad married a foreigner and so she was a housewife and did not have their own income. As one respondent note: ‘Take relative nana asana hin toga London Pero war nipa trabaho so diri hiya makeable pa.’ [My relative married someone from London but she does not have a job so she cannot help yet.] Thus, the respondent shared that she understood why her relative could not remit because she did not have authority over her husband’s funds. As such, relation to migrant and the
intricacies of intra-family politics played a role in a households’ ability to receive remittances during times of disaster. More on intra-family politics will be discussed later in this chapter.

7.2.2. How Does the Occupation of the Migrant Affect the Ability of the Household to Turn Their Access to Migrants into Remittances After Haiyan?

To understand what occupations migrants had abroad, the question “What job does the migrant have?: Unskilled labour (domestic helper, construction worker), skilled and technical job (nurse, teacher, caregiver), seafarer or other?” was included in the survey. Of the 60 middle income households that have access to migrants, 22 households (37 percent) reported that the migrant in their network was working in skilled labour jobs and 23 households (38 percent) were in unskilled labour. The high percentage of migrants in skilled labour is reflective of the higher level of education possessed by the middle income households which allows them to pursue jobs such as doctors, nurses and engineers. This is very different than the division of jobs among the 92 lower income households with access to migrants, where only 18 households (20 percent) had migrants in their network that worked in skilled labour jobs and 43 households (47 percent) had migrants that work in unskilled labour. This reflects the reality that those in the lower income category have less education and therefore less access to skilled labour migration. Figure 24 compares the percentages of migrants working in various occupations overseas.
7.2.3. *How Does the Country that the Migrant is Living or Working Affect the Ability of the Household to Turn Access to Migrants into Remittances After Haiyan?*

To understand which countries the migrants were living or working in, the question “What country does the migrant work?: Western countries, Asia, Middle East, Africa or Other?” was included in the survey. Of the 92 lower income households with access to migrants, 42 household (46 percent) reported their migrant live in Western countries, 30 households (33 percent) work in the Middle East, 13 households (13 percent) live in Asia, 5 households (5 percent) work as seafarers, 0 households live in Africa and 5 households (5 percent) did not know where their migrant resides abroad. Of the 60 middle income households with access to migrants, 39 household (65 percent) reported their migrants lived in Western countries, 8 households (13 percent) work in the Middle East, 8 households (13 percent) live in Asia, 4 households (7 percent) work as seafarers, 1
household (2 percent) lives in Africa and 1 household (2 percent) did not know where their migrant resides abroad.

Comparing the percentage of migrants in each region shows that a majority of the migrants connected to middle income households live or work in Western countries with smaller numbers working in Middle East, Asia and as seafarers. For lower income households, the main region where their migrants reside or work overseas is also in Western countries but the percentage of households that reported their migrant lives there is 19 percent lower than middle income households. Instead, there are 20% more migrants connected to lower income households working in the Middle East than middle income households. The percentage of migrants working in Asia and as seafarers is similar for lower income and middle income households. Figure 25 provides a regional breakdown of where migrants live or work overseas.

**Figure 25: Regional Breakdown of Where Migrants Live or Work Overseas**
7.2.4. *How do Intra-family Issues such as Poor Family Relations or a Lack of Communication with Relatives Affect the Ability of Household to Turn their Access to Migrants into Remittances After Haiyan?*

As the section on relation to migrant briefly discussed, survey data showed that intra-family issues affected the ability of households to turn access to migrants into remittances after Haiyan. Data from the 72 recovery-grams provide more empirical evidence on this topic. A question that was asked in the recovery-gram while respondents were conducting the name generator component of the exercise was, “Can you think of any others who you know that lives abroad? Did you ask them for assistance? If not, why not?” While many respondents did not answer the questions, for those that did, the empirical evidence is often quite rich so this section will focus on highlighting several of the experiences shared by the respondents. Similar to what was stated earlier, the accounts I will be sharing below are from the perspective of households on the ground and remittance-receiving households. I did not interview migrants in this study and I do not purport to know the perspective of the migrants and remittance-senders themselves, just what remittance-receiving households think about migrants. A common response to the question of why households did not ask for assistance from migrants was intra-family issues such as poor family relations or a lack of communication with relatives abroad.

For example, one lower income household’s experience stood out because the migrant had three siblings aboard but no one sent remittances to help due to poor family relations. While I heard many stories of disappointment over family members and relatives not helping, this respondent’s story stood out because it illuminated that no matter how much one is suffering after Haiyan, it is not guaranteed that family members, even immediate ones, will help. This respondent, Robert, is a construction worker, who is married and has four children. His household was

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33 Robert is a pseudonym.
classified as Lower Income Migrant in my study due to this low income as a construction worker with casual work. He lives in a small house which was completely damaged by the storm surge. Figure 26 is an image of his house three years after Haiyan. As a construction worker, he was able to rebuild the house himself with shelter kits provided by NGOs and scrap materials he founds after the storm. From the photo, it can be seen that his house is quite small and stands on stilts over an area of the barangay that is prone to flooding. His small house is where all 6 members of his family sleep.

**Figure 26: Rebuilt Home of Lower Income Migrant Households** (Source: Author)
Robert described how frightening the storm surge was and how all his family members were carried away by the current and injured during the storm. His wife was particularly affected because the trauma and stress of the typhoon caused her to suffer a stroke soon after Haiyan which paralyzed one side of her body. As a result, she has limited mobility and is unable to work or leave the house. When I asked Robert, “Did you receive assistance for Yolanda from family and friends outside Tacloban? Any from abroad?”, he said no. Then I asked, “Do you have an OFW or migrants abroad” to which he replied, “Yes, I have three siblings working abroad. One is an electrician in Dubai, one is a domestic worker in Dubai and one is a domestic helper in Qatar”. When I asked why the three siblings did not provide their family with any assistance after Haiyan, particularly given that their house was destroyed and her wife suffered a stroke Robert explained, "Nag tisting ako pag aro hin bulig han akon kabugtuan nga adto ha gawas pero kay waray man, waray ko na hiton mahihimo. Diri ko man hira pwede piriton nga buligan ako. Mas maupay nala ngane ada it iba nga tawo, bisan dri mo kadugo, nabulig haim." [“I tried asking for help from my siblings working abroad but they didn't help and I can't do anything about it. I can't force them to help me. Other people are better because even you are not blood-related they are very willing to help”]. When asked if he knew any specific reason why assistance was withheld, Robert elaborated that he thinks there are three possible explanations for why his siblings did not help: 1) the siblings have their own families in Tacloban that they needed to support, 2) his siblings did not have a good relationship with him, and 3) the spouses of his siblings did not want the respondent to develop any remittance dependence and come to expect regular assistance. Robert believes the third explanation was the most likely because the siblings had previously sent remittances to their mother, which his mother would redistribute to him and others in the family, and the spouses of the siblings had frequently complained about that obligation. Thus, when their mother died a few years ago, the remittances stopped and the remittances were not redirected to any other family
members like their father or the respondent. While discussing this, the respondent was visibly upset that his own brothers and sisters had not assisted him in his family’s time of need, even after he had directly asked them for help. While several respondents have described receiving phone calls from close relatives abroad who asked if the family was okay but did not proceed to offer any assistance, this was the only case among my 72 respondents where help from an immediate family member was so severely withheld, it demonstrates that such cases do exist. It highlights that while disasters provide opportunities for new assistance to come in, it is also an opportunity to see who decides to withhold assistance even during times of extreme need. In this case, this respondent believes intra-family issues was the main reason for why he did not receive any remittances after Haiyan.

Intra-family issues are often particularly negative when the person whom the household does not have good relations with is the person responsible for distributing the remittances from the migrant. As mentioned in chapter six, it is common practice for remittances from migrants to be sent to a main remittances receiver who is responsible for distributing the remittances among the family members. Two respondents shared such stories during the recovery-gram exercise. One respondent shared that while he was promised remittances by his brother, the brother’s wife who was responsible for distribution did not give him anything because the wife and him do not get along and have often argued with each other in the past. Another respondent shared that while his brother had promised her and her sister remittances after Haiyan, since the funds were sent to her sister, she never received them because her sister and her had a falling out.

Another form of intra-family issue that was reported was lack of communication. One respondent mentioned that because she is younger she does not communicate with her older relatives. So when Haiyan came, even though she has relatives abroad, she was not able to ask for help because she did not usually communicate with them. She shared, “Diri gud hira nakila ha
“akon kay akon la Tatay ira kilala.” [They do not know me. It is only my father that they are familiar with.] This sentiment was shared by a few other younger respondents who just started their own families and have thus left their parents’ home. They felt that they did not receive remittances after Haiyan and could not ask for help because they are out of touch with their relatives abroad who were often much older than them. Others commented on how relatives reached out to them on the phone or on facebook after the typhoon after not speaking for a while but did not end up offering help at the end of the conversation.

7.2.5. How do Cultural Norms such as Utang na Loob (Debt of Gratitude) Affect the Ability of Household to Turn Their Access to Migrants into Remittances After Haiyan?

Another significant theme that emerged from the recovery-gram question, “Can you think of any others who you know that lives abroad? Did you ask them for assistance? If not, why not?”, was the role of cultural norms. Two dominant cultural norms that were expressed by respondents were that it was shameful to ask for assistance and similarly that one should not collect an "utang na loob" (debt of gratitude) if they cannot pay it back. Building on the concerns expressed in the earlier section that a lack of communication was the reason some respondents did not request for help, some respondents shared that a lack of communication combined with the sense of shame that came with asking for help stopped them from seeking assistance. One respondent shared candidly, “Makaarowod pangaro hit mga urupod labi na waray gud communication namon”. [It’s shameful to ask for assistance from relatives abroad especially that we do not have communication for a long time]. Several respondents noted that it was shameful to ask for help because help should be offered so if it is not offered, they should not ask for it. Respondents who expressed this commonly linked it with a fear of rejection. For some, their reaction to the question of “why didn’t you ask for assistance?” was quite visceral. I recalled several respondents responding to the
question with a simple, “What if they say no!” accompanied with a shocked look on their face, as if they are imagining how they would feel being rejected by their relatives. And the respondents are right to express this concern, as Robert’s story above illustrated, migrants can and have said no and the hurt feelings that comes with such rejection have a strong negative impact on someone and their relationship with the migrant, like it did on Robert.

Another commonly referred to cultural norm is “utang na loob” (debt of gratitude). As described in the literature review, "utang na loob" is the Filipino norm of reciprocity whereby if someone has extended assistance to you, you cannot refuse to help when they ask for assistance in return. "Utang na loob" was also commonly expressed by the households surveyed as a reason why some households did not ask their relatives abroad for assistance because they felt they would never repay that debt if they were ever asked to reciprocate the assistance. One respondent joked that owing a "utang na loob" to someone is like “turning yourself into a 7-Eleven for them because you would need to be open to return the favour 24/7, 365 days a year”. While this was a joke, what the respondent meant was that, culturally, you are expected to reciprocate the assistance any time that it is asked in return.

To understand reciprocity a bit more, these two questions were included in the semi-structured interviews, “Do you or someone in your household have a reciprocal (give and take) relationship with the migrant/OFW or their family? (For example, Do you help the migrant take care of anyone or anything when they are away?” and the follow up question, “If you have a reciprocal relationship, how do you help the migrant or their family?”). Of the 18 households in the Lower Income Migrant category, 8 did not provide a response. 5 households said no, 3 said yes, and 2 said a small amount. Of the three households that said yes, one respondent shared, “My sister [migrant abroad] help us willingly because most of her children stays with us when they are away
so the money they send is also a way of helping their children as well”. After Haiyan, this respondent received 30,000 PHP from her sister for the rebuilding of her house.

Another respondent said, “I am helping her mother in Tacloban in any way that I can because she is like a sister to me, like we share food and she does the same thing for me” when speaking about her relative who is abroad. This relative sent them 1000 PHP after Haiyan as well as money for groceries. Similarly, another respondent shared,

The mother of my wife used to take care of her cousins who are now abroad when they were just kids so as their second mother and as a symbol of gratitude, they would send gift certificates and presents like chocolates. They sent money [after Haiyan] which they usually don't when we don't ask for it. But we didn't ask financial help from them they just did.

For this respondent, “utang na loob” (debt of gratitude) was directly cited as a reason why the household benefits from remittances after Haiyan. This highlights that while for some households, “utang na loob” is a reason they did not ask for assistance, for others it was the reason they received remittances after Haiyan. Two households that cited they have a small reciprocal relationship with the migrant discussed how their families interact and help each other sometimes. They both got small amounts of remittances after Haiyan. Of the 5 households that said “no”, they do not have a reciprocal relationship with the migrant, only one received remittances after Haiyan, 500 PHP.

Of the 18 households in the Middle Income Migrant category, 5 did not provide a response to the question of “Do you or someone in your household have a reciprocal (give and take) relationship with the migrant/OFW or their family?”, 11 households said no, 1 said yes, and 1 said a small amount. The respondent that said yes shared, “I am his sister so we always give him moral support and communicates with him so that he won't feel alone in Saudi”. She received a small amount of remittances from her brother after Haiyan. The respondent that cited she had a small reciprocal relationship said, “We talk and communicate with my sister in Japan but because she
does not come back to the Philippines often its harder to have a reciprocal relationship”. This respondent received no help from her sister after Haiyan. Of the 11 households that said they did not have a reciprocal relationship, 4 said they did not receive remittances after Haiyan and 7 said yes. Of the households that did receive remittances, one household shared they received 20,000 PHP from her aunt and another received 10,000 PHP from her sister.

The empirical evidence presented in this section provide a glimpse into the role that cultural norms such as “utang na loob” can play in affecting a households ability to turn their access to migrants into remittances after Haiyan. While it was not the intent of the study to research this topic deeply, it was a theme that emerged from the fieldwork and one that should be a topic of future study. This will be discussed further in the limitations and future research section later in this chapter.

7.3. Discussion

As discussed in the introduction, the optimism and potential that social capital and remittances have for post-disaster recovery, have made them popular concepts in the development literature and humanitarian policy because they both specify resources, types of capital, to be tapped and strategically used by individuals and groups to meet their needs. But this optimism ignores the insights that have emerged from prior research with regards to 1) the selectivity and heterogeneity of the impact of migrant and remittances on development and 2) the inequality in social capital. Research has continued to identify migration as a selective process which means the direct benefits of remittances are also selective and do not tend to benefit the poorest members of society (de Haas 2005; Schiff 1994). Similarly, there is research about the inequality in social capital or the extent to which social capital is unequally distributed across social groups in a community (Lin
The findings in this chapter contribute empirical evidence to support the first point that, migration is an inherently selective and uneven process which contributes to an uneven distribution of remittances across different income groups after Haiyan. My study looked at the three main factors and two secondary factors that affect the ability of households to turn their access to migrants into remittances after Haiyan: 1) the relation of the migrant, 2) the occupation of the migrant, 3) the country the migrant lives or works in, 4) intra-family issues, and 5) cultural norms. As stated earlier, given that the income category of the household is a significant factor in the households’ ability to turn their access to migrants into remittances after Haiyan, it is examined alongside the three main factors.

My findings demonstrate that for both lower and middle income households, most migrants are relatives – 55 percent for lower income and 52 percent for middle income households. Next, siblings make up approximately 30 percent, followed by children at approximately 15 percent. Then there are a few parents and only 1 lower income household had a spouse abroad. But what is different between the two groups is which migrants send regular remittances. Despite relatives making up more than half of the migrants that lower and middle income households have, the common sources of regular remittances are not relatives. For the 13 lower income households that receive regular remittances, children (6 households) were the most common source of remittances. Next was relatives (4 households), siblings (2 households) then parent (1 household). The numbers and rankings were quite different for middle income households. For the 17 middle income households that receive regular remittances, siblings was the most common source (7 households), then relatives (5 households) and children (5 households). As such, while lower income households mainly received regular remittances from their children, middle income households mainly received from their siblings.
These findings align in some ways with the patterns of assistance found in the Philippines. As noted earlier, Valerio (2002) explains that assistance is often provided according to the closeness of ties and that priority is given to lineal relatives (i.e. spouse, children, parents and siblings), followed by collateral relatives (i.e. uncles, aunts, cousins, nephews, and nieces). This explains why lineal relatives like children and siblings were more commonly found to be the sources of regular remittances. While collateral relatives, uncles, aunts, cousins, nephews, and nieces, or referenced as just relatives in my study, were less likely to be the source of regular remittances.

However, children were not a main source of remittances after Haiyan for lower income households. Of the 19 lower income households that received remittances after disasters, they came mainly from relatives (10 households), followed by siblings (5 households), children (3 households) and parents (1 household). In fact, three households that received regular remittances from their children, did not receive remittances after Haiyan. While the ranking changed for lower income households, they remained the same for middle income households. For the 33 middle income households that received remittances after Haiyan, the most common source was siblings (16 households), followed by relatives (14 households), children (7 households) then parents (1 household). One middle income household also reported not receiving remittances after Haiyan from their child who send them regular remittances. As discussed in the earlier chapter, the two main reasons that emerged for why regular remittance senders did not send more after Haiyan was because remittance senders did not have any additional funds to contribute on top of regular remittances and because the process for remittance sending was already strongly established between the senders and receivers. The finding that regular remittance sending children were not able to send more remittances after Haiyan give more support for Bragg et al.’s (2017) argument that given that the remittance sender’s financial situations remain stable, additional funds are
difficult to arrange. It also sheds light on the nuances that are not often captured in macroeconomic studies that simply document the surge of remittances without a look at who is sending the funds after disasters and in this case, who is not. While I recognize the numbers are small, it was still surprising to hear that it was children who sent regular remittances that did not send more remittances after Haiyan. It was surprising because they are logically the first source of additional funds that one would think of given their cultural responsibility to care for their parents. But in the case of lower income households and taking into consideration the other factors that were examined in this chapter such as the occupant of the migrant and where the migrant works, it becomes more clear why finding additional funds when lower income migrants are often working low skilled jobs in regions with lower wages such as Middle East and Asia, is difficult.

Another interesting finding is that while less children sent remittances after Haiyan, more relatives and siblings sent funds. After Haiyan, 6 migrants who were relatives and 3 migrants who were siblings, but do not send regular remittances, contributed remittances to lower income households. As discussed in chapter six, respondents felt that these family members contributed one-time remittances after Haiyan because they felt some responsibility to help the family after seeing the devastation of the typhoon on the news. This evidence suggests that during a time when the regular remittance-sending children of lower income households lacked the capacity to remit after disasters, those that had that capacity (relatives and siblings) because they normally did not remit, stepped in to contribute. This practice is consistent with other studies on kinship networks and local social support networks which shows that kin are the most common source of informal aid after disasters (Drabek & Boggs, 1968; Drabek et al., 1975; Dynes, 2006; Casagrande et al., 2015). Oracion’s (2015, p. 48) study on kinship networks and resilience to flooding in riverside communities in the Philippines finds “the downstream households are highest among those that extended assistance to relatives during flooding because they are less vulnerable and more
economically stable than the midstream households.” Oracion (2015) finds that the variation of the impact of flooding among the different riverside households allowed non-affected kin or those who experienced less damage to aid relatives in desperate need. The same logic seems to have been applied to migrants who sent remittances after Haiyan. The migrants who were geographically distant and economically stable felt a need to send funds home with an awareness that such help was desperately needed.\(^{34}\)

Another interesting finding is that friends were not reported by any households as a source of remittances. This is not surprising when considering that sending financial assistance is often something that is considered the responsibility of family but in the event of a disaster it may seem acceptable for friends to also send funds. As noted earlier, according to Advincula-Lopez (2005, p. 71) many Filipinos still find it challenging to go beyond the household as a unit of mutual assistance. Its challenging for Filipinos to prioritize the needs of those outside their household.

Looking at the other factors that affect the ability of households to turn their access to migrants into remittances after Haiyan, the occupant of the migrant and where the migrant works, one can see that the changing global demand for Filipino workers was reflected in my findings. In the early 1970s, middle- and lower- skilled Filipino workers were mainly going to the Middle East, then the 1990s saw an increase in demand for professional workers such as nurses and caregivers to labour-importing economies in Asia and Western countries. But as of 2006, there has been a substantial decline in migrant professionals as the demand shifts to low skilled labour in the Middle East and Asia (ADB, 2009). Using data from the Philippines Overseas Employment Administration (POEA), Ang et al. (2009) find that since 2006, there has been a substantial decline in the professional category of migration. Instead, there has been an increase in demand for unskilled labor following the construction boom in the Middle East and parts of China as well as

\(^{34}\) See Chapter Six for reasons respondent gave for why one-shot assistance was sent by migrants after Haiyan.
a surge in demand for domestic workers. Ang et al. (2009) point out that lower salaried services and construction workers are currently supporting the sustained level of remittance inflows. The consequences of these new realities are observed in Tacloban City where over forty percent of middle income and lower income households with access to migrants have migrants that work in unskilled labour jobs. 6 (7 percent) lower income households with access to migrants reported the occupation of their migrant as housewives under ‘other’ because the migrant was married to a foreigner.

The realities of the global labour market contribute to dispelling the myth that all families who have migrants that work abroad are better off and less vulnerable. It also gives evidence to support Lin’s (1999; 2001; 2008) network theory of social capital which pushes for the differentiation between resources that can be “accessed” and those that can be “mobilized” as my study shows, while many households in both the lower and middle income have access to migrants, many cannot “mobilize” resources from those migrants.

Some of the other factors that explain why some households cannot “mobilize” resources from migrants were intra-family issues and cultural norms. Respondents cited poor family relations and lack of communications with relatives abroad as reasons they believe they did not receive remittances after Haiyan. Wong (2006, p. 368) has identified “intra-family politics around remittances” as an important factor to consider in remittance relationships. Wong (2006, p. 376) argues that remittances are highly contested and negotiated between remittance senders and the receivers. Wong’s (2006, p. 368) research on female Ghanaian remittance senders in Toronto found migrants often struggle to reconcile competing demands in transnational spaces. Similar to findings in Thailand and Cuba (Curran, 1995; Blue, 2004), Wong (2006) found that recipients viewed remittance as a right and family obligation. As such, the inability to send remittances often resulted in a strong sense of shame (McKay, 2004). Helweg’s (1983) research on Punjabi families
revealed that remittances families whose children did not remit experienced shame because remittances contribute to the honor of the kin group (Helweg, 1983). At the same time, my findings showed that feelings of shame were what kept respondents from asking their relatives abroad for remittances after Haiyan. Some felt it was shameful to ask for help when it is not offered. Others did not ask because they had a fear of rejection. There was also the cultural norm of *utang na loob* (debt of gratitude) which some households felt they should not take on if they cannot pay back the debt in the future. *Utang na loob* is a factor because as Advincula-Lopez (2005: 66) explains, when families and friends receive remittances as reciprocity transactions, they feel a “heightened sense of gratitude or indebtedness to the migrant worker of his family”. Advincula-Lopez (2005, p. 66) elaborates that in the process, “the migrant worker or his family are able to accumulate "chits," which they could later use when they find themselves in need of help or assistance”.

These findings highlight another aspect that Wong (2006) draws attention to in her work, that transnational families and transnational relationships are fraught with tensions, sacrifices and emotional costs which are often not recognized in the literature (Wong, 2006). For Wong (2006, p. 369) “Remittances are not only about monetary transactions, as the literature emphasizes; they are also about how social relations are embedded in emotional ones, which counters prevalent conceptualizations of their commercial use.” Similarly, as mentioned earlier, Advincula-Lopez (2005, p. 63) argues that the allocation of remittances is not a purely economic decision because it is constrained by the social relations maintained by migrant workers to their immediate and extended families and manifests the concept of social embeddedness. This focus on social embeddedness helped to explain how behaviour and institutions are constrained by ongoing social relations (Granovetter, 1985) and allows for seemingly non-rational behaviours to be appreciated better by considering the situational constraints faced by the decision-maker. These are constraints are many as I have highlighted throughout this chapter.
My findings also highlight the tendency for remittance scholars to employ an idealistic and generally positive depiction of transnational families within their research to eliminate the complications brought on by the many non-economic costs associated with migration. While this study also falls into the trap of not covering the emotional and non-economic costs of migration, my data support that such intra-family politics affects the ability of households to turn their access to migrants into remittances after disasters. The in-depth look at Robert’s story sheds some light into the tensions that are found within transnational relationships. It also brought attention to the shame associated with asking and not getting assistance. These harder to study elements of transnational relationships and the role they play in post-disaster recovery merits more research.

7.4. Limitations and Future Research

Given the sensitive nature of both speaking about remittances and speaking about complicated transnational relationships, it was understandable that some respondents were not the most forthcoming with their answers to some of the more delicate questions. As noted earlier, some respondents were reluctant to answer the question, “why do you think no assistance was sent?” when households disclosed that they did have access to migrants but they did not sent remittances. While I invested a significant amount of time and testing on questions about remittances, in terms of who sent them, if they were regular or irregular and how much was sent. I did not foresee that I also needed to find strategies to make respondents feel comfortable sharing information that could elicit negative emotions such as shame and embarrassment. The question “why do you think no assistance was sent?” felt like a natural follow-up question to “Did your household receive any financial assistance for Yolanda from family, relatives and friends outside Tacloban?”, but what was missing was recognizing the very human reactions that respondents would have recalling why
their family members did not help them after a disaster. This issue did not emerge during the testing phase because respondents in that phase of research either said they did not have any migrants abroad that did not give them remittances or they said there were but they did not ask. But once this issue came up during the data collection phase of the study, I instructed the team to not prioritize this question if it is clear the respondent is not comfortable. They were instructed to ask the question but because the question might elicit some embarrassment or uneasiness from the respondent, if the respondent does not give an answer or seems uncomfortable, the research team was coached not to press the respondent further.

Another limitation of the findings in this chapter is that once again the perspective of remittance-senders was not represented. Thus, the perspectives are from what households on the ground and remittance-receiving households suspect are the reasons behind migrant decisions.

Another aspect that I do not study is non-financial remittances. Earlier in the chapter, there was a mention that some households received in-kind assistance from abroad such as used clothing, food, and medicine. While in-kind assistance is also considered a form of remittances, the focus of this dissertation is solely on financial remittances. I did not consider non-financial remittances because I felt it would be overwhelming for respondents to need to recall not only the financial remittances they received but also the non-financial remittances they received in detail. Moreover, I felt that studying non-financial remittances opens the door to the broader literature on social remittances which would greatly broaden the scope of my research. As such, I decided to narrowly focus on financial remittances to capture one aspect deeply.

As mentioned earlier, there is a need for future research on the role that cultural norms such as “utang na loob” can play in affecting a household’s ability to turn their access to migrants into remittances after Haiyan. While it was not the intent of the study to research this topic deeply, it was a theme that emerged from the fieldwork and one that should be a topic of future study.
Another theme that emerged was how intra-family politics affect the ability of households to turn their access to migrants into remittances after disasters. While my research did not intend to examine the tensions that are found within transnational relationships, it was a strong theme that emerged in my fieldwork and there needs to be more focus in future research on the harder to study elements of transnational relationships and the role they play in post-disaster recovery.

7.5. Conclusion

As Lin (2008: 51) has argued, having access to a tie does not mean that you can receive, or in his words ‘mobilize’ resources from that tie. Applying Lin’s (2008) network theory of social capital to access to migrants and remittances after disaster, I found that there were many factors that affected a households’ ability to turn their access to migrants into remittances after Haiyan. This chapter explored six of those factors: the income of the household, the relation that the migrant abroad has to the household, the occupation of the migrant, the county that the migrant is living or working, intra-family issues such as poor family relations or a lack of communication with relatives, and cultural norms such as utang na loob (debt of gratitude). My data support the established literature on migration, which argues that the selective nature of migration means the direct benefits of remittances do not tend to benefit the poorest members of society (de Haas, 2005; Schiff, 1994). The majority of Middle Income Migrant households have migrants working in skilled labour jobs in Western countries while the majority of Lower Income Migrant households have migrants working in unskilled labour jobs in the Middle East or Asia. For both middle income and lower income households, many of their migrants were relatives but middle income households were more likely to have multiple migrants that were immediate family members than
lower income households. Intra-family issues and cultural norms were other factors that affected the ability of the household to turn access to migrants into remittances after Haiyan.
CHAPTER EIGHT: SOCIAL CAPITAL AFTER DISASTERS

8.1. Introduction

As a result of the optimism and potential that social capital and remittances have for post-disaster recovery, they have become popular concepts in humanitarian and development policy and literature because they both specify resources, types of capital, to be tapped and strategically used by individuals and groups to meet their needs. But this optimism ignores the insights that have emerged from prior research with regards to 1) the selectivity and heterogeneity of the impact of migrant and remittances on development and 2) the inequality in social capital. The findings from my research support the argument that the selective nature of migration means the direct benefits of remittances do not tend to benefit the poorest members of society (de Haas, 2005; Schiff, 1994). This chapter is focused on the second aspect with regards to the inequality in social capital or the extent to which social capital is unequally distributed across social groups in a community (Lin, 2000).

As noted in the literature review, the conditions under which community members help each other has been a topic of interest for a long time because the social support that community members provide is a principal way by which people and households get resources (Wellman and Wortley 1990). Ties with community members and relatives provide social support that make up much of the social capital people use to deal with daily life, seize opportunities and reduce uncertainty (Wellman & Wortley, 1990). They also underpin the informal arrangements that are vital for a household’s survival, expansion and reproduction (Pahl & Spencer, 2004). These ties are especially significant in times of disaster.

Studies consistently show that people rely on their social network to survive and recovery from disasters (Aldrich, 2012; Dynes, 2006; Elliot et al., 2010; Bankoff, 2003, 2007; Casagrande
et al., 2015; Bracamonte, 2015; Fafchamps & Lund, 2003). Studies have found that disaster-affected communities are often the first to respond in emergencies (IFRC, 2014; IIED, 2011) and kin are the most common source of informal aid after disasters (Drabek et al., 1975; Dynes, 2006; Casagrande et al., 2015).

As such, the role of social capital in post-disaster recovery has become an increasingly popular area of research. Due to the recent emergence of interest in this subfield, scholars who have begun to research this area have often looked at social capital as divided into three categories: bonding, bridging and linking social capital (Aldrich, 2012; Chamlee-Wright, 2010; Meyer, 2013; Reininger et al., 2013). While literature on social capital often does not explicitly state that the three forms of social capital are mutually exclusive, there is rarely a discussion of any overlap between the three types. Once again, bonding, bridging and linking are generally understood as (Woolcock 2000 as cited in Nakagawa and Shaw 2004, p. 10):

- “Bonding social capital” refers to ties among people who tend to be closely connected, such as immediate family members, neighbours, close friends, and business associates sharing similar demographic characteristics
- Bridging social capital denotes ties among people from different ethnic, geographical, and occupational backgrounds who have similar economic status and political influence
- Linking social capital are the ties among people in positions of influence in formal organizations, such as schools, agricultural extension offices, the police or local or national government entities

While these three categories do a great job of capturing the major types of social capital and illuminating the differences between them, they do not capture the types of social capital that are significant or emerge under the more complicated situations such as recovering after a mega
disaster. Moreover, as mentioned earlier, Enns, Malinick and Matthews (2008) observed that little attention has been given to the impact of location on social ties. Indeed, a defining characteristic of disasters is that they trigger need for assistance from outside the affected area. As such, a key issue that may be overlooked in times of disaster is the balance of ties that are located geographically closer or farther away and their ability to assist affected households as the disaster unfolds locally (Elliot et al., 2010).

Elliot et al. (2010) are among one of the first to conceptualize a new type of social capital that is more heavily relied upon during times of disaster and crises than everyday life. They call strong ties that live geographically far, bonding ties that bridge space. Elliot et al. (2010, p. 629) argue that during a disaster “it may be that the most useful spatial “bridges” for such translocal support are actually “bonding” sources of social capital (e.g. a family member or close friend to whom one is socially close but spatially distant).” This conceptualization helps to reconcile two prominent but previously disconnected findings in research on social support and disaster. The first is Drabek et al.’s (1975) finding that kin remain the most common source of informal aid after disasters. The second is that social support, including remittances, after disasters typically comes from personal ties positioned outside one’s core network (Beggs et al., 1996; Haines, Hurlbert & Beggs, 1996; Hurlbert, Haines & Beggs, 2000). A spatial view of social capital allows us to see that the two findings come together to demonstrate that a common source of supportive social capital are ties who are personally close but geographical distant. Or as Elliot et al. (2010, p. 629) state “the most useful form of social capital during disaster and displacement may be bonding ties that bridge space”. While Elliot et al. (2010) do not make this further connection in their paper; bonding ties that bridge space are exactly what migrants are. This is where migrant remittances and social capital intersect and the main focus of my research.
As discussed earlier, there are two major factors that are of significance during times of disasters, the inability of a household’s local network to assistance at the same level as non-disaster times and the triggering of assistance from outside the affected community. This means that the onset of the disaster, brings in new actors such as relatives that have previously been out of touch, it allows for the entrance of new networks such as the company of a relative that is fundraising for the disaster and it presents new opportunities such as leaving Tacloban to stay with relatives in Manila.

As reviewed in the literature on social capital in the Philippines, rich bonding social capital among family and friends is pervasive in Philippine society but most Filipinos lack bridging and linking capital (Abad, 2005; Porio & See, 2017). These studies on social capital confirm decades old findings about the strength of kinship and friendship ties in Filipino society (Pal, 1966; Carroll, 1968; Morais, 1981). Exchanges of assistance within kinship and friendship networks are often seen as acts of duty, love and care (Eadie and Su 2018).

Given that social capital is considered such a core driver of post-disaster recovery among the literature (Aldrich, 2012; Meyer, 2013; Dynes, 2006; Elliot et al., 2010; Gaillard, 2015), a logical question to explore in this study is how does social capital affect the ability of households to turn their access to migrants into remittances after major disasters? This chapter explores the types of social capital that households have and the types of social capital that emerge when households and their local networks are severely affected by a mega disaster and they must rely on outside connections for assistance in their recovery. Through my fieldwork, I collected empirical evidence that supported the theoretical idea of bonding ties that bridge space out forward by Elliot et al. (2010). In addition, I discovered a new analytical category, bonding ties that link, that was prominent among my respondents. While linking social capital is defined as ties between the community and people in positions of influence in formal organizations, such as schools,
churches, the police or local or national government entities, I found that often people in positions of power were related or very close friends to the respondents, therefore bringing elements of bonding ties. For the ties that have bonding as well as linking aspects, they belong in a new category of ties called, bonding ties that link. The creation and empirical support for more analytical categories of social capital ties is one of the most significant contributions of this study.

8.1.1. Objectives

The objective of this chapter is to provide empirical evidence to explore how social capital affects the ability of households to turn access to migrants into remittances after Typhoon Haiyan. While the previous chapters looked at who benefits, and who is excluded from the surge of remittances after disasters and what factors affect the ability of households to turn their access to migrants into remittances after major disasters, this chapter follows logically by examining how social capital affects the ability of households to turn access to migrants into remittances after disasters. To answer the question in this chapter a series of sub-questions will be addressed:

1) What were the average number of bonding, bridging and linking ties that households had?
2) What assistance did households receive from migrant ties? And who sent them?
3) How helpful was the assistance from the migrant abroad the household’s recovery?
4) Did connections to new social ties or networks emerge after Haiyan?
5) Did households re-connect to old social ties or networks after Haiyan?
8.1.2. Methods

The empirical data for this chapter is mainly drawn from the 72 semi-structured interview and 72 recovery-grams. While the recovery-gram was discussed in the methodology and selection chapter, a quick summary of the method is helpful to understand the empirical data that will be presented in this chapter. The goal of the recovery-gram is to map the social network of households to understand the type of financial and non-financial assistance they received, the types of social capital they had and how the possession or lack of social capital possessed by certain households affected their ability to turn their access to migrants into remittances after Haiyan. A recovery-gram is my adaptation of a participant-aided sociogram. A sociogram is a graphic representation of social links that a person has. As discussed in the methodology and selection chapter, the participant-aided approach was developed by Hogan et al. (2007) to create a visual depiction of a participant’s personal social network during an interview. The approach builds on the well-known name generator technique for creating social networks of individuals (Wellman, 1979). The recovery-gram was developed through rigorous testing in the field to overcome the challenges of asking sensitive questions about money and remittances. I created the recovery-gram as a hands-on approach for respondents to tell their story of recovery in a way that allows them to control their own narrative and disclose financial information as they wish. The recovery-gram allows interviewers and respondents to visually depict how and when their networks have contributed financial and non-financial resources to their recovery process. The hands-on approach and visualization allows both the interviewer and respondent to see concrete representations of they are discussing (Hogan et al. 2007, p. 117). This systematic and participatory approach to analyzing social networks and post-disaster recovery is a creative and engaging way for respondents to document how they mobilized resources (financial and non-financial) from their different social
networks for post-disaster recovery. This method contributes a novel approach to asking questions about sensitive topics such as money and remittances, as the participatory approach allows respondents to feel comfortable and in charge of the information that they choose to disclose. The result is rich data on the respondent’s basic social network, the financial and non-financial resources the household received from their social capital ties, the timing of the assistance they received and the importance of the ties for recovery.

There are two steps to completing the recovery-gram: 1) the social capital name generator and 2) the recovery-gram. Name generators are used to identify people in an individual’s social network, or in our case a household’s social network. The respondents are presented with a name generator display board which has three columns of post-its on it. The three columns are for respondents to write down their “A. Very Close Ties”, “B. Somewhat Close Ties” and “C. Organizational Assistance”. Very close ties are defined as: "People with whom you discuss important matters, with whom you regularly keep in touch, or who are there for you when you need help" (Hogan et al., 2007, p. 123). Somewhat close ties are defined as: "People who are more than casual acquaintances but not very close" (Hogan et al., 2007, p. 123). These definitions are clearly stated in the titles in the social capital name generator sheet. For an image of the social capital name generator, please refer back to Figure 10.

Very close ties and somewhat close ties are also commonly known as strong ties and weak ties and for the purposes of this study, very close ties are generally bonding ties and somewhat close ties are bridging ties. Very close ties are defined as: "People with whom you discuss important matters, with whom you regularly keep in touch, or who are there for you when you need help" (Hogan et al., 2007, p. 123). Somewhat close ties are defined as: "People who are more than casual acquaintances but not very close" (Hogan et al., 2007, p. 123). These definitions are
clearly stated in the title. The reason the columns are not labeled as bonding and bridging ties is because locals would not understand what bonding and bridging ties mean, however, they would understand very close and somewhat close ties. While there is a chance that very close ties can sometimes be bridging ties, and somewhat close ties can be bonding ties, there is a lower chance of the two being mixed up because very close ties are typically bonding ties and somewhat close ties are bridging ties. However, to ensure that there is as little error as possible, the research team and I triangulate the column the ties is placed under with the relation of the tie to the respondent so if a bridging tie is put under the very close tie column, it would be corrected in data entry. Similarly, for the purposes of this study, organizational ties are linking ties. Given the locals would not be able to understand linking ties easily, I used organization ties as the label because it was easy to understand. Thus, through the social capital name generator, I could figure out how many bonding, bridging and linking ties each household had.

After the social capital name generator exercise was explained to the respondents, the interviewer asked the respondents to free call to provide the names of anyone that they feel very close to or somewhat close to or organizations or people in positions of power that provided them with assistance. When the respondent was finished free calling the names of their ties, I asked them to describe their relationship with each tie and if the tie provided any financial or non-financial assistance to the household for post-disaster recovery. Stickers were given to respondents to denote financial or non-financial assistance. Red was for financial assistance and green was for non-financial. After the dots were placed, they were also asked to put a star sticker for any ties that were migrants. At the end, each post-it will have a name, a letter to denote the relationship they have to the households (i.e. relative, friend etc), sticker for financial or non-financial help and if applicable, a star sticker for a migrant. After all of the ties have been discussed, the recovery-gram display was introduced.
The recovery-gram is in the shape of a three-ring bull’s eye. They are asked to imagine that this bull’s eye represents their recovery process. There are two important components of the recovery-gram: A) Importance of ties for recovery and B) Time. As described extensively in the methodology and selection chapter, respondents are asked to lift up the post-its from the social capital name generator and place them on the recovery-gram based on how important the assistance from the social capital tie was for the households’ recovery and what time the assistance was provided – 6 months, 1 year, 1.5 year, 2 years, 2.5 years or 3 years. These steps were repeated with each name on the name generator until there were no more post-its on the name generator page. For images on the completed recovery-gram and photos of respondents completing the name generator and recovery-gram in the field, see Figure 13 and Figure 15 in the methodology and selection chapter.

8.1.3. Findings and Significance

The overall finding from this chapter that contribute to answering the main research question “Under what conditions are households able to turn access to migrants into remittances after major disasters” is that Middle Income Migrant households with many bonding and linking ties have more of the conditions to turn access to migrants into remittances after disasters compared to Middle Income No Migrant and lower income households.

While the findings of the previous chapter firmly established that middle income households with multiple skilled migrants in Western countries who are immediate family members have much greater access and mobilization of remittances after disasters than lower income households, this chapters’ findings add that a higher number of bonding and linking ties
among Middle Income Migrant households give them the strongest ability to turn their access to migrants into remittances after disasters.

My findings in this chapter, support the long-established understanding in the literature on social capital in the Philippines, that people have rich bonding social capital among family and friends but most Filipinos lack bridging and linking capital. Indeed, the majority of the respondents across the four categories of households had bonding ties make up over 80 percent of their network. My findings also supported that remittances often came immediately after Haiyan and were seen as a flexible resource for affected households.

Where my findings depart from the literature is around the use of the three analytical categories to categorize the social ties that respondents had. The interesting aspect about the social networks of Middle Income Migrant households was that they had the largest portion of their network made up of bonding ties but they also had the highest number of linking ties on average and the unique crossover was that many of their linking ties were also bonding ties. But within the current understanding of bonding, bridging and linking ties found in the literature, there was no room for dynamic social ties such as the one observed in the field. As such, I found empirical evidence to support two more analytical categories: bonding ties that link and bonding ties that bridge space. Bonding ties that link are what I describe earlier and are essentially family members or relatives that are also in positions of power. Bonding ties that bridge space was a category conceptualized by Elliot et al. (2010) and describe migrants or other social ties that are emotionally close but geographically distant. These two additional analytical categories of social capital are significant to understanding the new connections and old ties that emerge in the aftermath of mega-disasters.
8.1.4. Structure

The chapter is structured as follows. Empirical evidence will be presented for each sub-question in this chapter. Following this is a discussion section that brings the empirical evidence together with the literature to answer the main question of how does social capital affect a household’s ability to turn their access to migrants into remittances after major disasters?

8.2. Results

8.2.1. What Were the Average Number of Bonding, Bridging, and Linking Ties That Households Had?

To understand the average number of bonding, bridging, and linking ties each category of households had, I asked respondents in the social capital name generator stage of the recovery-program exercise to “Please tell me who you consider to be someone that is very close to you, somewhat close to you and an organizational tie? As described in the methods above and in further detail in the methodology and selection chapter, in this study, very close ties are bonding ties, somewhat close ties are bridging ties and organizational ties are linking ties.

From this data, I found that Lower Income No Migrant households have an average of 8.9 bonding ties, Lower Income Migrant have 9.3 and Middle Income No Migrant have an average of 8.9 bonding ties. Middle Income Migrant are the only ones to have many more with an average of 11.5 bonding ties. Households in all four categories have an average of less than one bridging tie with Middle Income Migrant households only have 0.3 bridging ties on average and the highest being Lower Income Migrants and Lower Income No Migrants with an average of 0.9 bridging ties. For linking ties, households in all four categories have an average of less than 1.5 linking ties.
Middle Income Migrant households have the most at an average of 1.5 ties and Lower Income No Migrant have the least with an average of 1 linking tie. Figure 27 provides a comparative chart of the average number of ties per household.

**Figure 27: Average Number of Bonding, Bridging and Linking Ties per Household**

![Average Number of Bonding, Bridging and Linking Ties per Household](image)

Perhaps even more illuminating than the fact that most households have an average of less than 1 bridging tie per households and less than 1.5 linking ties per household is the number of households that have 0 bridging or linking ties. Table 15 highlights how many households in each category that has 0 bridging ties and how many have 0 linking ties.
Table 15: The Number of Households that have 0 Bridging Ties and 0 Linking Ties

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Lower Income No Migrant (n=18)</th>
<th>Lower Income Migrant (n=18)</th>
<th>Middle Income No Migrant (n=18)</th>
<th>Middle Income Migrant (n=18)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>No Bridging Ties</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No Linking Ties</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 15 shows that out of the 18 households that were interviewed in each of the four categories, 12 Lower Income No Migrant, 13 Middle Income No Migrant and 14 Middle Income Migrant households did not have any bridging ties. Lower Income Migrant households were the only category that had less than half of its households have bridging ties (7). While less households had 0 linking ties than bridging ties, out of the 18 households that were interviewed in each of the four categories, 10 Lower Income No Migrant, 8 Lower Income Migrant, 13 Middle Income No Migrant and 9 Middle Income Migrant households, did not have any linking ties. This helps to demonstrate how absent bridging and linking ties are among the households I interviewed and reinforces the dominance of bonding ties in Filipino society that has been long established in the literature. However, it is important to note that because the name generator is heavily dependent on self-reporting by respondents, the bridging and linking ties may exist, but the respondent did not or were not able to recall them. As outlined in Chapter Five and will be elaborated on in the limitations section in this chapter later, the method is susceptible to the respondent’s cognitive biases because it relies on the respondent to remember members of their network.

Another way to demonstrate the significance of bonding ties in the networks of Filipino households is through a network composition of households based on bonding, bridging and linking ties. As evidence in Figure 28, across the four categories of households, bonding ties make up more than 80 percent of a household’s stock of social capital with Middle Income Migrant
households having 87 percent of their network composed of bonding ties. Whereas bridging ties only make up two to eight percent of the different types of households’ networks and linking ties make up a bit more from nine to 11 percent.

**Figure 28: Network Composition of Households based on Bonding, Bridging and Linking Ties**

When looking at the network composition chart, the only real differences between the four types of households is the number of bridging ties as all of the categories have mainly bonding ties and approximately 10 percent linking ties, so the difference is that lower income households have eight percent bridging ties and middle income households have two to four percent. This means, the lower income households I interviewed have more connections to people from different ethnic, geographical, and occupational backgrounds who have similar economic status and political influence. From data from the social capital name generator exercise, these bridging ties were
mainly classmates who moved to a different city or friends who have a different occupational background. What is important to note is that, the middle income households also had connections to people who were in different occupational backgrounds and geographical locations, but many of them are family members which would classify them as bonding ties, not bridging ties. Currently, most studies on social capital treat the three types of social capital as mutually exclusive. When I asked Dr. Daniel Aldrich\textsuperscript{35} who used the three main types of social capital in his book *Building Resilience*, if family members who are migrants would count as a bonding or bridging tie, his response was that since bridging ties typically come through institutions like clubs, workplaces and schools, migrants would not count as bridging ties but bonding ties because the connection comes from kinship. Under the three way categorization of social capital, this is the accurate way to classify migrants, however, classifying migrants as bonding ties overlooks the unique position of migrants after disasters. Migrants are strong bonding ties that feel connected enough to the household to contribute assistance but are geographically far enough that they are not affected physically by the same disaster and are not usually under the same political, economic and social constraints as the affected household by being in a major city or different country all together. Under the current typology, researchers are unable to separate out which of the bonding ties are located geographically close and therefore likely equally affected by the mega disaster, or geographically far, like migrants, so able to assist and often with short notice given the advent of technology.

\textsuperscript{35} Email exchange with Daniel Aldrich on January 26\textsuperscript{th}, 2017.
8.2.2. *What Assistance Did Households Receive From Migrant Ties? And Who Sent Them?*

My interview featured a question that asked “Did you receive assistance for Yolanda from family or friends outside Tacloban? Any from abroad? If yes, who helped and what did you get?” Of the 72 households interviewed, 46 households (64 percent), said yes they received assistance from family or friends from outside Tacloban or abroad. When this number was broken down into the four types of households in this study, as seen in Table 16, there are differences that can be seen between lower income and middle income households as well as households with or without migrants. Overall, more middle income households with or without migrants received assistance for Haiyan from family or friends outside Tacloban or abroad than lower income households. For Lower Income No Migrant households, only four households received assistance for Haiyan from friends and family outside, whereas eight Middle Income No Migrant households received assistance. For households with migrants, almost all the households received assistance from outside. For Lower Income Migrant households, 15 reported receiving assistance from outside. For Middle Income Migrant households, the number was even higher with all the households in that category reporting that they received assistance from family or friends outside of Tacloban or abroad.

**Table 16: Answers to: “Did you receive assistance for Yolanda from family or friends outside Tacloban? Any from abroad? If yes, who helped and what did you get?”**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Yes</th>
<th>No</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Lower Income No Migrant (n = 18)</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lower Income Migrant (n = 18)</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Middle Income No Migrant (n = 18)</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Middle Income Migrant (n = 18)</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The abundance of assistance received by Middle Income Migrant households could be attributed to the higher number of households in that category that received assistance from both family and friends outside of Tacloban and abroad. Six Middle Income Migrant households received assistance from both family and friends outside of Tacloban and abroad whereas Middle Income No Migrant and Lower Income No Migrant did not have any households that had both and Lower Income Migrant only had one household that received assistance from both outside Tacloban and abroad (Table 17).

**Table 17: Number of Households that Received Assistance from Outside Tacloban, from Abroad or Both**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Household Category</th>
<th>Outside Tacloban</th>
<th>Abroad</th>
<th>Both</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Lower Income No Migrant (n = 4)</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lower Income Migrant (n = 15)</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Middle Income No Migrant (n = 8)</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Middle Income Migrant (n = 18)</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

There were also differences in the types of assistance that different households received from their bonding ties that bridge space (Table 18). Lower Income Migrant and Middle Income Migrant households received more financial assistance than non-financial assistance from their bonding ties that bridge space. All four households in the Lower Income No Migrant category that had bonding ties that bridge space received both remittances and non-financial assistance. But more households in the Middle Income No Migrant category received non-financial assistance than remittances. The notable finding is that of the 18 households in the Middle Income Migrant category that all had bonding ties that bridged space and successfully received assistance, 11 households received remittances and 5 households received both remittances and non-financial assistance which means only 2 households received solely non-financial assistance. This is higher
than the numbers in the Lower Income Migrant category where eight households received remittances, two received both and five received just non-financial assistance. Thus, more Middle Income Migrant households received remittances from their bonding ties that bridge space than households in the other categories.

Table 18: The Types of Assistance that was Received from Family and Friends Outside Tacloban and from Abroad

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Remittances</th>
<th>Non-Financial Assistance</th>
<th>Both</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Lower Income No Migrant (n = 4)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lower Income Migrant (n = 15)</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Middle Income No Migrant (n = 8)</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Middle Income Migrant (n = 18)</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

8.2.3. How Helpful Was the Assistance From the Migrant Abroad to the Household’s Recovery?

The helpfulness of the bonding ties that bridge space for the household’s recovery can be seen in the replies to the interview questions, “Overall, how helpful do you think your OFW/migrant abroad or support from people outside of Tacloban was to your household’s recovery from Yolanda?” Table 19 provides a breakdown of the answers.
Table 19: Answers to “Overall, how helpful do you think your migrant/OFW abroad or support from people outside of Tacloban was to your household’s recovery from Yolanda?”

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Very Helpful</th>
<th>Helpful</th>
<th>Somewhat Helpful</th>
<th>Not Helpful</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
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<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>12</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Middle Income No Migrant (n = 8)</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
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<tr>
<td>Middle Income Migrant (n = 18)</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

As Table 19 shows, the majority of households in the Lower Income Migrant (15) and Middle Income Migrant (18) categories that received assistance from bonding ties that bridge space said the assistance provided by those ties were very helpful. Only one respondent in the Lower Income Migrant category said the assistance was not helpful. This was because the migrant abroad had sent them a box of used clothing which did not fit the respondent’s family and was not useful. As the respondent explained, "An akon auntie na tikang UK an ginpadra mga sobra-sobra la na bado. Waray kagamite." (My aunt from the UK sent unusable used clothing - extra extra. It was of no use to us). The respondent explained that her aunt had married a foreigner in the UK and was thus not employed. As a result, she couldn’t send any remittances because she was reliant on her husband herself. Instead, she offered to send non-financial assistance but her choice of sending them her old clothing was described by the respondent as “insulting”. It was insulting because in the Philippines, old and used clothing, is only worn by the elderly or cut up to be made into rags for cleaning. In this case, the funds that were used to send the clothing would have probably been more helpful to the family than the clothing itself. Thus, in this case, the assistance that was given actually had a negative effect on the relationship between the respondent and her aunt and during the recovery-gram activity, the respondent was reluctant to give much recognition to her assistance. While this was only one situation, it does highlight that not all assistance that is
provided or sent after a major disaster is perceived as inherently good or beneficial by the household. This one respondent’s reluctance to talk about assistance that was negative points to the possibility that other respondents may have similarly tried to reserve their judgements on negative assistance. While this was not a main focus or question of the research, we will discuss this shortcoming at the end of the chapter. In addition, the discussion on assistance will continue in a later section that explores other cases where the assistance provided from abroad brought good as well as bad consequences.

But it is important to recognize that for most households interviewed in my study, the assistance from their bonding tie that bridges space was very helpful. Some respondents qualified their rating of helpfulness with comments and it demonstrated two unique elements that assistance from bonding ties that bridge space can bring: 1) the assistance can come immediately after the disaster when households need it the most and 2) the assistance can contribute to a diversity of areas such as buying basic needs, restarting livelihoods and filling in the gaps left by NGOs.

In general, most respondents who said the assistance was very helpful shared a similar sentiment as the one expressed by this Middle Income No Migrant households “It was very helpful and important because any help during that time was all important and gave a big help to my family”. Others added that immediately after the disaster they felt they had “nothing”, they “needed money” and ‘life was very hard” so any help that came right after the disaster was significant. This timeliness was mentioned by 11 households as a reason for why the assistance that came from bonding ties that bridge was very helpful. The ability to act quickly after a disaster is one of the distinct reasons often attributed to why bonding ties that bridge space are uniquely position to play a positive role in post-disaster recovery.

Not only was assistance from bonding ties that bridge space often quick and responsive, there was also a great deal of flexibility around how it was used so households can put the financial
assistance where affected households need it the most. A Lower Income Migrant respondent noted, the financial assistance from the migrant was used “for everyday expenses and served as capital to start my charcoal business again”. Another Lower Income Migrant household exclaimed, “Their financial help was very helpful because we are not able to receive help from NGOs and from the government”. Thus, the assistance from the bonding ties that bridge space helped with buying necessities, restarting livelihoods and filling in the gaps left by NGOs. This flexibility also meant that funds could be spent on culturally and socially relevant expenses like a delicious meal to celebrate Christmas. When a respondent was asked what the first month of recovery was like after Haiyan, she said, "Bongga an Christmas kay may lechon." (Christmas was extravagant because we had lechon). Lechon is the Filipino delicacy of roasted pig. In the Philippines, people who have lechon during their Christmas Eve meal are seen as well-off because lechon is very expensive. Due to the money that the respondent received from a lot of people and from cash for work, they could buy such expensive and culturally significant meal to bring joy to their family during an otherwise difficult time.

Moreover, not only did respondents overwhelmingly express that the assistance that came from bonding ties that bridge space was very helpful, five households elaborated on the idea that the remittances were helpful by expressing that the assistance, was not just helpful, but it played vital roles in their recovery. As one respondent noted, "We would be living in darkness if he did not send us money [for we could not pay our electric bills]." Another respondent described how the assistance from her boss who lived in another town, that was not affected by Haiyan, really benefited her recovery by giving her food and, most importantly, sustaining her livelihood. The respondent said, “if not for my boss, I might have stopped my business and will never get back to doing the balut [street food] business again”. Others credited their bonding ties that bridge space as playing a vital role in the reconstruction of their houses. As one respondent stressed, “If not for
her [migrant abroad], we would be lacking materials for the reconstruction of our house”. Three households discussed how the funds from their migrants contributed to the construction of a good or better home. One respondent noted, "Dako an bulig han akon bugto nga adto natrabaho ha America. Diri kami makakabalay utro kun waray hiya bumulig." (The help from my sister in America really helped us a lot. We will not be able to build a good house again if not for her). Another respondent used the funds sent from their migrant abroad to build a second floor to their house which is widely seen to make houses more resilient to future typhoons and floods as family members can escape to a higher level during future storm surges. One respondent got a significant amount of funds from their OFW son to contribute to the reconstruction of their house. Two years after Haiyan, the respondent’s son sent 100,000 PHP ($1865.00 USD) for the reconstruction of the house and the construction of a second floor. The respondent noted, “Without the 100,000 PHP support from my son, I would not have been able to put up the 2nd floor and feed the 7 children and grandchildren I have”. As such, funds from bonding ties that bridge space contributed to the construction of better and more resilient homes in the perspective of the interviewees. While the actual resilience of the new houses with their second floors will not be tested until the next mega storm, the fact that the additional remittance funds were put towards what the locals believed will help them better withstand future storms establishes a link between remittances and more resilient rebuilding after disasters. While my study did not set out to study this aspect, it points to a need for further research to explore the existence and strength of this link. I will discuss this further at the end of the chapter.
8.2.4. Did Connections to New Social Ties or Networks Emerge After Haiyan?

A finding that emerged from the social capital generator exercise of asking respondents to name very close ties, somewhat close ties, and organizational ties was that households often shared that they made connections to new networks and actors as a result of Haiyan. As noted earlier, a unique aspect of disasters is they trigger assistance from outside of the community. Disasters bring in new actors such as relatives that have previously been out of touch, it allows for the entrance of new networks such as the company of a relative that is fundraising for the disaster and it presents new opportunities such as leaving Tacloban to stay with relatives in Manila. I found three cases of new connections 1) introduction to international humanitarian actors, 2) connection to a new network of fundraisers abroad, and 3) reconnection to distance relatives.

An obvious new network of actors that gets introduced after a disaster are international humanitarian workers. As INGO and humanitarian staff establish relationships with locals in the communities they work in, they often get close with the local staff that is hired. In some cases, staff are hired from the same communities that the INGOs are distributing relief and assistance in. One of the respondents in my study was hired to work with an INGO that brought international volunteers to build new houses in her community. She became friends with the international volunteers that came. Through working together every day for several weeks or months, building houses outside, sharing meals, and spending free time together, the staff and the international volunteers became good friends. This introduced her to a new network of bridging ties which evolved to become more like bonding ties as their friendship grew strong over the many months they spent eating lunch together and sharing about each other’s lives. She explained that she had become so close with some of the volunteers that they had kept in touch with her via Facebook after they left the Philippines and some even sent her funds when her son got ill and she needed
money to pay the hospital bills. In completing such an act, these international volunteers fostered bonding ties that bridge space. As she shared this, she also exclaimed that meeting all these new people from abroad has really helped to change her life and she felt that her life now with her new connections was better than her life before Haiyan. Thus, for this respondent, the introduction to this new network of bonding ties that bridge space has made her recovery and her life better.

Similar to international humanitarian workers, households also got connected to informal fundraising networks abroad. Two cases of such a situation arose during the interviews. One respondent, an elderly woman whose daughter married a foreigner in the UK, shared her experience of being overwhelmed by the generosity of her son-in-law’s fundraising abroad and dissatisfied with the negative treatment she received from her neighbours regarding the distribution of goods. Three weeks after Haiyan, her son-in-law sent cash for her to buy an electric generator for her barangay after knowing that electricity was an issue after the typhoon. Happy with the news that the generator was extremely helpful, the son-in-law took it upon himself to reach out to his network of colleagues and friends in the UK and fundraised 16 boxes of relief goods, food and clothing for her barangay. The generator and the large amount of relief goods being sent from abroad put the elderly woman in a favourable position with the barangay captain who even allowed her to sleep in one of the rooms in the barangay hall as her home was damaged. However, this drastic change in her position within the community lead to her neighbours spreading negative gossip about her. She said, her neighbours accused her of “pretending to be rich even though she is not” because her son-in-law was sending so many relief goods. She said the neighbours also got envious of her because she suddenly had the capacity to help the barangay a lot and those in positions of power liked her. Over time, the gossiping and negative attention became so concerning that the elderly woman moved out of the barangay hall and back into her damaged home. She also asked the barangay captain to be responsible for the distribution of the boxes of relief goods
instead of her. She knew that there were not enough relief goods from her son-in-law for everyone in the barangay, so if she were the one distributing it, she would only attract more negative gossip. In the end, the elderly woman asked her son-in-law to stop sending relief because she was discouraged by the negative remarks of her neighbours and unable to handle the pressure of being responsible for equitably distributing the goods.

Similarly, in the second case, a respondent recalled being contacted on Facebook by a friend who was abroad who wanted to help fundraise for those affected. The friend wanted to fundraise with her friends abroad to buy three fishing boats to give away to fisherman who lost their boats in the storm. The respondent obliged and contacted a contractor to build the boats. The friend abroad fundraised enough money to buy three boats at the price of boats before Haiyan struck but due to the inflation of contractors’ wages due to their high demand after the storm, the funds raised were only enough for two boats. While the respondent’s new fundraising network abroad was not happy about this change in price they agreed to the price and sent the funds to the respondent. Once the respondent got the funds, he hired a contractor and started to pay him and soon one boat was complete but as the contractor moved to complete the second boat he stopped responding to phone calls and left the project because he was paid to work on other projects with higher pay. This left the respondent with one completed boat and one incomplete boat and very unhappy international friends who did not understand how such a thing could happen. In the end, the friendship between the respondent and his friend soured and the respondent was accused of stealing the funds raised.

These are examples of the ability of disasters to bring forward connections to new networks that provided funds and assistance. The cases from my fieldwork shed light on the ways that survivors can be connected to new networks of people as because of the typhoon and the potential for these new opportunities to come with positive as well as negative consequences.
8.2.5. Did Households Re-Connect to Old Social Ties or Networks After Haiyan?

Another finding that emerged from the social capital generator exercise of asking respondents to name very close ties, somewhat close ties, and organizational ties was that distant relatives used the typhoon as a catalyst to re-connect with their affected families back home. Many people who were contacted by distant relatives believed they reached out because “they just wanted to help us after the devastation brought on by Yolanda”, or they “thought that we badly needed every help we could get”. Another respondent speculated that his relatives reached out because “they saw how tragic our lives were after the typhoon on the news or television and since we're family, it's kind of a moral obligation”. While some respondents saw the assistance as an obligation, others were caught by surprise. As one respondent noted, “My two nieces who work abroad sent us money once for the emergency after Yolanda and so far, it was the only time that they sent money. My nieces only sent money once because that was an emergency and that in normal situations, we are just expecting our son’s help”. Another respondent explained that while her migrant relative did not send any funds immediately after Haiyan, they reached out to send 10,000 PHP for the education of her child after Haiyan. But the funds only came once because the education and graduation fees were only required to be paid once but it was not funds they were ever expecting to have received. This is similar to the survey findings described in Chapter Six, where of the 15 Lower Income Migrant households that received financial assistance from irregular remittance senders, 10 described the new assistance from distant family members as “one-shot”. Of the 20 Middle Income Migrant households that received new assistance, 13 described it as only coming once. These findings confirm that disasters create opportunities for the connection to new networks and the re-connection to old ties. Thus, bonding ties that bridge space need to be considered as a unique contributing factor when looking at the role of social capital in post-disaster recovery.
8.3. Discussion

The empirical evidence from this study explored in this chapter confirmed two findings generally known in the literature and makes three contributions to the current literature. This section discusses those confirmations and examines the significance of the four contributions to the literature.

As noted throughout this chapter, my findings support the long-established understanding in the literature on social capital in the Philippines, that people have rich bonding social capital among family and friends but most Filipinos lack bridging and linking capital (Abad, 2005; Porio & See, 2017; Pal, 1966; Carroll, 1968; Morais, 1981). Using the current typology of bonding, bridging and linking ties, my respondents across the four categories of households, had the majority of their network made up of bonding ties. On average across the categories, bonding ties make up more than 80% percent of a household’s stock of social capital with Middle Income Migrant households having 87 percent of their network composed on bonding ties. Whereas bridging ties only make up two to eight percent of the different types of households’ networks and linking ties make up a bit more from nine to 11 percent. In terms of number of ties, across the four categories, households have an average of 8.9 to 11.5 bonding ties but less than one bridging tie and less than 1.5 linking ties. Thus, using the current typology of social capital, my data from assessing the networks of 72 households confirms the long-standing understanding that Filipinos have many bonding ties but few bridging and linking ties.

A second finding that my data reveals is that an important benefit of remittances is it can come quickly after a disaster occurs and the funds can be spent in a flexible manner to meet the needs of the affected households. This responsiveness of remittances was mentioned by 11 households as a reason for why the assistance that came from bonding ties that bridge was very
helpful. The ability to act quickly after a disaster is one of the distinct reasons often attributed to why bonding ties that bridge space are well positioned to play a positive role in post-disaster recovery. Other studies on remittances and disasters have also found that remittances come quickly and are flexible (Swithern, 2014; Le Dé, 2015; Suleri & Savage, 2006; Le Dé et al., 2013). The 2014 Global Humanitarian Assistance Report noted that “As a means of financing that reaches households relatively directly (with the only intermediary being the money transfer system), remittances represent an immediate, flexible and often predictable source of income” (Swithern, 2014, p. 98). The case study of rural Samoa by Le Dé et al. (2015) found that remittances were available very quickly after cyclone Evan in 2012 with 72 percent of the 57 households interviewed receiving remittances within the first week. The participants in the focus groups cited the responsiveness of remittances as “an important aspect of successful coping” (Le Dé et al., 2015, p. 667). In terms of what remittances were spent on, Le Dé et al.’s (2013) review of the literature found that following a disaster, remittances may be spent on basic short-term needs such as food, clothing, emergency health and funerals. In another study, Le Dé et al. (2015) found that remittance-receiving households were observed to have easier access to food and health care. Thus, the findings from my study support previous findings that generally remittances reach households quickly and are a flexible resource.

My research also makes several new contributions. The first contribution from this chapter of my study is the creation of a new analytical categories, bonding ties that link, to add to the current typology of social capital. While my preliminary fieldwork was conducted using the current typology, it quickly became evident that bonding, bridging and linking ties alone did not capture the nuance and complexity of the ties that many households had with those in the network. As a heavily kin-based society, most networks were composed of bonding-based ties so ties that had elements of bridging, such as migrants abroad, or linking such as relatives that were barangay
officals, all defaulted to bonding ties. This is where Lin’s theoretical framework, a network theory of social capital, helped to explain the difference between access to a tie and the mobilization of a tie. As I discussed in the theoretical chapter, Lin explains that having access to a tie does not mean that you can receive, or in his words ‘mobilize’ resources from that tie. When applied to the categories of bonding, bridging and linking, it is helpful to see that the bridging and linking elements play the role of providing access to resources but it is the bonding element that changes the access to resources into the actual receiving of resources. As my findings show, while many households had linking ties, very few received assistance from those ties. Thus, having a linking tie alone does not provide much security in receiving resources. But those with bonding ties that linked often received resources from those ties. As my data show, of the 32 households that had linking ties, only 3 households received assistance from those linking ties or 9% of households. Of the 24 households that had bonding ties that link, 16 households received assistance from those ties or 67%. This drastic difference in the actual resources that are provided through linking ties versus bonding ties that link further illustrates the need to separate “access” to resources through a tie and the ability to receive or “mobilize” actual resources.

The second contribution from this chapter of my study is the further examination of Elliot et al.’s description of bonding ties that bridge space. While Elliott et al. (2010) conceptualized bonding ties that bridge space, they did not go as far to make the connection to migrants and remittances. My research found that bonding ties that bridge space exist and they are a unique factor that needs to be considered when looking at the role of social capital in post-disaster recovery. My respondents that had bonding ties that bridge space overwhelmingly praised the assistance from these ties as very helpful and vital to their recovery. Thus, my findings provide further evidence to support Elliot et al. (2010, p. 629) statement “the most useful form of social capital during disaster and displacement may be bonding ties that bridge space”.
The third contribution from this chapter of my study is that both income category and the existence of migrants should be examined when looking at the volume and significance of the financial assistance that households receive after disasters. In my study, Middle Income Migrant households received 1.74 times more funds than Lower Income Migrant households. Thus, the existence of a migrant alone is not sufficient to guarantee that the remittances that they send will be significant. While previous studies have focused on comparing remittance receiving households with non-remittance receiving households (Le Dé et al., 2015; Mohapatra et al., 2012), they do not consider the income of the households which my study has found plays a big role in determining the volume of remittances that got sent after Haiyan. Thus, my findings push future studies on remittances and disasters to consider the income category of the household as well as if the households receives remittance or not in their comparisons.

The fourth contribution of this chapter of my study is the methodological. My study shows the role that my adapted participatory-aided sociogram, the recovery-gram, plays in eliciting responses on sensitive topics (remittances, intra-family relations and politics) from people directly affected by a significant disaster. My study contributes a novel, systematic and participatory method to collecting data on how households utilize their social capital and social network after disasters. As noted in the introduction, this participatory method is significant because it contributes an alternative to surveys which is often the common approach used in macroeconomic studies on remittances and it helps to overcome the issues of desirability bias commonly found in survey research. The hands-on and participant-led approach is innovative because it is focused on giving the respondent the time and control over what information they reveal and when they reveal it. This is significant for a topic like remittances because it is not a common topic of discussion outside of the households. This topic is particularly sensitive and possibly political in post-disaster environments when NGOs and governments are using receiving remittances as an exclusionary
criteria to receiving aid. As such, the slow, respectful and participant-led approach of the recovery-gram helps to establish trust as well as give the respondent control over what information they want to reveal. Moreover, the low-tech and tactile nature of the method was very appropriate for low income households that were in my study because it was easy to understand and did not require a high-level of literacy. Respondents were often quite interested and immersed in the activity. This level of comfort contributed to their willingness to provide sensitive economic information on remittances as well as personal reflections which were sometimes painful memories of the disaster and intra-family conflicts that emerged after the disaster. The in-depth methodological approach also helped to get at some intangible and hardly measurable aspects of remittances and translational ties. As Le Dé (2015, p. 245) noted, “following disasters, remittances may strengthen the identity and ties existing amongst relatives at transnational level. While these impacts are intangible and hardly measurable, their significance to remitters and receivers should not be underestimated (Hammond, 2011). These elements are empowering and potentially increase people’s capacity to face future disasters”. As section 8.2.3 on “How helpful was the assistance from the migrant abroad to the household’s recovery?” highlighted, through the recovery-gram exercise and the in-depth discussion of remittances, social ties and recovery, respondents were able to share stories about such intangible and hardly measured aspects of remittances – how the vital role they played in the recovery of some households contributed to strengthening ties among relatives. These aspects would be really challenging to unearth via surveys as it takes time to build trust with respondents on the sensitive topics of money and relationships and even harder for the topic of relationships about money.
8.4. Limitations and Future Research

As I have discussed throughout this chapter, there are several limitations to this study. The three main limitations are, the name generator is susceptible to cognitive biases, my interviews did not account for the negative aspects of receiving remittances and the data in this chapter did not capture the sender’s perspective.

As outlined in Chapter Five, it is important to note that because the name generator is heavily dependent on self-reporting by respondents, the method is susceptible to the respondent’s cognitive biases because it relies on the respondent to remember members of their network. However, not surprisingly, research has found that individuals were usually good at recalling networks of individuals they have repeated interactions with but not good with recalling people they have infrequent interactions with (Freeman, Romney, & Freeman, 1987). Specific to my research, concerns of reliability surround people not being able to recall bridging and linking ties which are often people they have infrequent interactions with. In addition, there is also the challenge of social desireability bias because respondents may not want to name sources of funds from loan sharks, criminals or corrupt officials as people that are in their network or people that helped them after Haiyan.

Another limitation is the limited number of negative stories of receiving assistance from migrants because I did not ask such questions in my interview. When my interviews were tested, negative stories of respondents receiving assistance from their relatives abroad did not come up nor was it a focus of my study. As such, questions about assistance that may have been unwanted or negative were absent from my study. It was only after most of the interviews were done that stories of negative assistance emerged. While it was not a significant focus of my study, it does shed light that all assistance from abroad should not be viewed as positive which is the general
assumption within the literature. Remittances and assistance from abroad after a disaster have been characterized or taken for granted as inherently good and for the most part, this does hold true. But knowing that for some households, assistance from abroad can be negative or worst, insulting, is important to note and take into consideration for future studies of remittances and assistance after disasters. Given that aid more generally also creates envy and resentment among those denied or given little assistance, it is not surprising that households that do not receive the remittances they want from abroad can also have a negative response.

As discussion in Chapter Five, a major limitation of the whole study and of the findings from this chapter is the absence of the sender’s perspective. Given the limitations in time and resources in the PhD, I had to make a choice earlier on to study either the remittance receiver’s or the remittance sender’s perspective because I would not do both. I chose to study remittance receivers because most of the literature on remittances in post-disaster recovery and remittances generally was focused on remittance receivers and studying remittance receivers had the benefit of a singular location of study. If I studied remittance senders, it would mean trying to find senders from all over the world that sent remittances to Tacloban City which would be more time-consuming and costly. Thus, while there were many benefits to studying just remittance receivers, the downside was that throughout the thesis, the senders’ side will be absent except through what receivers tell me about the senders.

This points to the need for future research on the remittance sender’s perspective. As Bragg et al. (2017, p. 15) stated in their study of remittances as aid following major sudden-onset disasters “more research on the attributes of senders and their circumstances would provide valuable information to support the current discussion on the role of the diaspora in humanitarian action and partnerships”. Often in my interviews, households that have migrants but did not receive any assistance from them do not know why their relatives did not reach out or offer help. As many
respondents were too shy to ask for help or did not want to out of a fear of “utang na loob” (debt of gratitude), there was no information on why senders withheld their support. Similarly, when households did receive remittances after the disaster but it only came once, households often do not firmly know why the assistance came once. Many simply guessed that the assistance was one-shot because it was seen as emergency assistance. But many of these are simply guesses from the respondents because without the sender’s perspective it is not possible to understand why remittances were sent or withheld.

Further research is also needed to further explore another finding that emerged from my fieldwork, that disasters provide the opportunity for distant relatives to re-connect with affected households and for the formation of new connections to new networks. As mentioned earlier in this chapter, the second major factor that come into play during mega disasters that is not as significant during normal times, is that the crisis triggers assistance from outside the affected community leading to new actors and old connections being re-sparked. Through the interviews, two definite cases of connections to new networks emerged. In both cases, the disaster lead the respondent to be connected to new networks of fundraisers but both cases ended up with unforeseen negative consequences for the respondent. Thus, future research on these connections to new networks and the positive and negative consequences of their existence and assistance would be helpful in understanding these emergent actors in humanitarian assistance.

Last, a final finding that emerged from my fieldwork that warrants future research is the relationship between remittances and resilience. Among my respondents, three households discussed how the funds from their migrants contributed to the construction of a good or better house. It is very interesting that the additional remittance funds were put towards what the locals believed will help them better withstand future storms. This establishes a link between remittances
and more resilient rebuilding after disasters. While my study did not set out to study this aspect, it points to a need for further research to explore the existence and strength of this link.

8.5. Conclusion

While social capital and remittances are both great resources to have after disasters, my findings show that only those in the middle class with the access and the ability to receive remittances benefit significantly from remittances in their social network. Most in the lower class do not have access to migrants and those that do often have a limited ability to request the assistance of migrants in times of need. Moreover, my study found that there are more than three analytical categories of social capital ties (bonding, bridging and linking ties). My research found empirical evidence to support two more analytical categories: bonding ties that bridge space and bonding ties that link. My respondents reported on how Haiyan allowed them to make connections to new networks and actors such as humanitarian workers and informal fundraising networks. They also noted that many distant relatives used the typhoon as a catalyst to re-connect with their affected families back home. Thus, new social capital ties emerged after Haiyan and old social capital was re-activated as a result of the disaster. Lastly, Middle Class Migrant households are the best placed to benefit from remittances whereas Lower Class No Migrant households are the ones that have very limited access to migrants.
CHAPTER NINE: CONCLUSION

9.1. Conclusion

The objective of this thesis has been to shed new light on how middle income and lower income households access and mobilize remittances after disasters. The thesis’s specific objectives were to examine who benefits, and who is excluded, from the surge of remittances after major disasters; to examine the factors that affect the ability of households to turn their access to migrants into remittances after major disasters; and to examine how social capital affects the ability of households to turn their access to migrants into remittances after major disasters. The thesis’ main argument is that the income category of the household, the relation of the migrant abroad to the household, the occupations of the migrant, the country the migrant is living or working in and the social capital of the household are five main factors that affect a household’s ability to turn access to migrants into remittances after major disasters. After analyzing these five main factors across three disaster-affected communities, this thesis argues that middle income households with multiple skilled migrants in Western countries who are immediate family members and have many bonding and linking ties have the conditions to turn access to migrants into remittances after disasters compared to lower income households. Most lower income households have limited to no access to migrants and often do not have the conditions required to turn their limited access to migrants into remittances after a disaster.

The research contributes to different fields of knowledge and emphasizes social capital as a central resource for people affected by disasters, such as Typhoon Haiyan. The thesis underlines the significance of migrants and their remittances during a time when a households’ capacities are severely impacted and their physical, economic and human capital are damaged and possibly inaccessible. Moreover, during a mega disaster such as Haiyan, the core social network of those
geographically close are equally affected and households need to rely on weaker social ties outside their community for support. However, a strong emphasis was placed on applying Lin’s network theory of social capital which defines social capital as “resources embedded in one’s social networks, resources that can be accessed or mobilized through ties in the networks” to challenge and add depth to macroeconomic studies that have observed that remittances are often observed to increase after major disasters (Clarke & Wallsten, 2004; Weiss-Fagen & Bump, 2005; Yang, 2007; Mohapatra et al., 2012). Applying Lin’s network theory of social capital helped to differentiate that having access to a resource such as migrants and their remittances, does not mean that one has to means to mobilize it during a time of need.

My research first set out to understand who benefits, and who is excluded, from the surge of remittances after major disasters. My research uncovered that while remittances do commonly increase after major sudden-onset disasters, they do not play a significant role in post-disaster recovery for most households because the financial assistance is usually only sent once immediately after the disaster and not sustained in the long run (Bragg et al., 2017; Fagen, 2006; Suleri & Savage, 2006). My findings also suggest a significant remittance gap between middle income and lower income households in the context of access to remittances as well as the mobilization of remittances. My analysis found middle income households have more than double the access to migrants than lower income households. Middle income households also have double the capacity to receive regular remittances with 28 percent of middle income households receiving regularly compared to 14 percent in the lower income category. Overall, very few, only 3 percent of lower income households in my study received regular remittances whereas 16 percent of middle income households received regularly. As a result of the clear limitations that lower income households have at receiving remittances, my study cautions against including receiving remittances as a exclusionary criteria in beneficiary selection forms. My findings show a large
numbers of lower income households, 20 percent in my sample, are at risk of being wrongly categorized as receiving remittances regularly and being less vulnerable when in fact they receive irregular remittances of little significance.

Next, I explored what are the factors that affect the ability of households to turn their access to migrants into remittances after major disasters. Applying Lin’s (2008) network theory of social capital to access to migrants and remittances after disaster, my study found that there were many factors that affected a households’ ability to turn their access to migrants into remittances after Haiyan. My fieldwork revealed six of those factors: the income of the household, the relation that the migrant abroad has to the household, the occupation of the migrant, the county that the migrant is living or working, intra-family issues such as poor family relations or a lack of communication with relatives, and cultural norms such as utang na loob (debt of gratitude). My echoed previous literature on migration, which argues that the selective nature of migration means the direct benefits of remittances do not tend to benefit the poorest members of society (de Haas, 2005; Schiff, 1994). The majority of Middle Income Migrant households have migrants working in skilled labour jobs in Western countries while the majority of Lower Income Migrant households have migrants working in unskilled labour jobs in the Middle East or Asia. For both middle income and lower income households, many of their migrants were relatives but middle income households were more likely to have multiple migrants that were immediate family members than lower income households. Intra-family issues and cultural norms were other factors that affected the ability of the household to turn access to migrants into remittances after Haiyan.

Last, I asked how does social capital affects the ability of households to turn their access to migrants into remittances after major disasters. While social capital and remittances are both great resources to have after disasters, my analysis shows that only those in the middle class with the access and the ability to receive remittances benefit significantly from remittances in their
social network. Most in the lower class do not have access to migrants and those that do often have a limited ability to request the assistance of migrants in times of need. Moreover, my study found that there are more than three analytical categories of social capital ties (bonding, bridging and linking ties). My research has put forward empirical evidence to support two more analytical categories: bonding ties that bridge space and bonding ties that link. My respondents reported making connections to new networks and actors as a result of Haiyan such as humanitarian workers and informal fundraising networks. Respondents also shared that many distant relatives used the typhoon as a catalyst to re-connect with their affected families back home. Thus, Haiyan provided the opportunity for new social capital ties to form and old social capital ties to be re-activated. Lastly, my study found that Middle Class Migrant households are the best placed to benefit from remittances whereas Lower Class No Migrant households are the ones that have very limited access to migrants.

9.2. Contributions

The objective of this research was to begin patching the gaps that lies in the intersections of three bodies of literature of relatively recent scientific scholarship on 1) migration, remittances and development, 2) remittances after disasters, and 3) social capital after disasters. In doing so, I made a total of six contributions to the literature on social capital, remittances and post-disaster recovery.

Empirically, my study present micro-level primary data on the social capital and social networks of affected households and the financial and non-financial assistance that they could mobilize after disasters. This data is significant because social capital research often just look at the quantity of bonding, bridging and linking ties and does not investigate the types of assistance different types of social capital ties provide, or recognize the complexity of these relationships.
Also, there is the assumption in remittance research that access to a resources equals the mobilization of it and my research provides the empirical research to show that access to a resource does not equal the mobilization of that resource.

Next, my study presents empirical data on the dollar amount of remittances that households received after Haiyan and the frequency that households received remittances. This data contributed to understanding which households were getting larger amounts of remittances after Haiyan and why. This is significant because most studies on remittances are macroeconomic studies that utilize large multi-country data sets. These datasets often take a binary approach to remittance-receiving – you either receive remittances or you do not. Such a binary approach overlooks two significant factors, the frequency (regular or irregular) and amount (significant or minimal) of remittances that are sent which make a large difference to the everyday lives of households. This micro-level data on remittances is afforded more significance due to the sensitive nature of this topic which is why studies often are not successful in yielding answers to the amount of remittances received. My participatory approach allowed for respondents to feel comfortable disclosing dollar amount when discussing the remittances they received which is an important and novel contribution to the remittance literature.

In addition, my study contributes empirical data on the remittance receiving patterns over the longer term. Most research on remittances after disasters look at the flow of remittances in the short-term, usually immediately after the disaster or a year after. The study of remittance receiving patterns over a longer time frame makes a unique contribution to the current scholarship and makes for a case for why studying remittances over a longer time frame can be helpful to understand the dynamics that influence remittance receiving after disasters.

My study also makes a major theoretical contribute because it is the first to apply Lin’s (1999; 2001; 2008) network theory of social capital to studying the access and mobilization of
remittances after disasters. The application of Lin’s (2008, p. 51) network theory of social capital to the study of remittances during times of disaster was very helpful because it provided the theoretical tool to challenge the assumption held by humanitarian actors and some academics that households that have migrants abroad, or those that receive remittances, are less vulnerable to and recover faster from disasters. But this is based on the premise that all households that have access to migrants can convert that access into remittances after a disaster. Applying Lin’s networks theory of social capital, my findings demonstrate that there is a significant difference between access to migrants and mobilization of remittances after disasters and that these differences are often delineated along socio-economic lines. As such, this study contributed a nuanced theoretical approach to studying the access to migrants and the mobilization of remittances after disasters.

One of the most significant contributions of my study is the invention of an innovative participatory method called the ‘recovery-gram’. The recovery-gram is a novel method to collecting data on how households utilize their social capital and social network after disasters to receive financial and non-financial assistance. The recovery-gram’s systematic and participatory approach played a significant role in helping me gather sensitive data regarding remittances from people directly affected by disaster. This participatory method is important because it contributes an alternative to surveys which is often the common approach used in macroeconomic studies on remittances. The innovative approach also helps to overcome the issues of desirability bias commonly found in survey research because the hands-on and participant-led approach is focused on giving the respondent the time and control over what information they reveal and when they reveal it. The low-tech and tactile nature of the method is also beneficial for research in low income communities in developing countries as it is easy to understand and does not require a high-level of literacy.
Lastly, the study makes a humanitarian contribution because it adds to the emerging discussions in the humanitarian community about if, and how, to incorporate remittances into the humanitarian response process. Typhoon Haiyan marked the first-time remittances were formalized into the humanitarian response process when it was used as an exclusionary criterion for the UN Shelter Cluster Philippines’ Shelter Prioritization Tool. The findings from this study caution against including remittances as an exclusionary criterion because households who have access to migrants but could not mobilize them into remittances after Haiyan may be wrongly excluded from much needed humanitarian assistance. My study provides empirical evidence to support a more cautious approach to incorporating remittances into the humanitarian response process.

9.3. Limitations

As outlined in the methodology and selection chapter, there were five major limitations to this study. The first is the findings from this study are not generalizable. Instead, the basic patterns outlined are valuable for understanding the socio-economic inequalities that structure the access and mobilization of remittances. Because my study is only focused on three barangays in one city in the Philippines, the study is not representative of the remittance sending patterns of the over 2.4 million Filipino migrants that originate from all over the Philippines and communities affected by Typhoon Haiyan. A second limitation of my study is it relies on respondents to self-report the amount of remittances they received. These self-reported amounts are not completely reliable as it is commonly understood that households may not report or underreport the amount of remittances they have received. A third limitation of my study is the absence of the sender’s perspective. This was a choice that was made due to time and resource constraints. A fourth limitation if that it did
not sample explicitly on the basis of gender because gender was not a central focus of my study. My study also did not give specific focus to more vulnerable groups such as people with disabilities, elderly, widows or members of the LGBT community. A fifth limitation of my study is its heavy dependence on the interpretation of local research assistants. Lacking a command of Tagalog and Waray-Waray, I depended heavily on my research team to translate verbally and in writing throughout my time in the field.

9.4. Future Research

In view of the shortcomings mentioned above, I invite others to conduct future research on areas that I was unable to. Six major areas for future research emerged from my study. The first is the need for more comparative analysis of who benefits and who is excluded from the surge of remittance after disasters. While my study shed light on the situation in one city in the Philippines, this question needs to be asked of for more disasters in the future so a comparative analysis can be completed. These studies can help humanitarian actors and NGOs base their selection of beneficiaries on empirical evidence as opposed to misrepresentations and assumptions about remittances.

Second, there is a significant need for future research on the remittance sender’s perspective. As Bragg et al. (2017, p. 15) stated in their study of remittances as aid following major sudden-onset disasters “more research on the attributes of senders and their circumstances would provide valuable information to support the current discussion on the role of the diaspora in humanitarian action and partnerships”. Often in my interviews, households that have migrants but did not receive any assistance from them do not know why their relatives did not reach out or offer help. As many respondents were too shy to ask for help or did not want to out of a fear of “utang
"na loob" (debt of gratitude), there was no information on why senders withheld their support. Similarly, when households did receive remittances after the disaster but it only came once, households often do not firmly know why the assistance came once. Many simply guessed that the assistance was one-shot because it was seen as emergency assistance. But many of these are simply guesses from the respondents because without the sender’s perspective it is not possible to understand why remittances were sent or withheld.

Third, the experiences of vulnerable groups such as women, people with disabilities, the elderly, and the LGBT community need to be included in studies on remittances or disasters. For example, missing from many of these studies is a discussion of gender. As mentioned in the methodology chapter, while vulnerability, disasters and global migration are gendered processes, gender is rarely a focus of the literature on remittances and disasters. The gendered nature of migration and the gendered nature of the household are both important to understanding household decision making when it comes to remittances and the role of remittances in building resilience after disasters. While connecting and building trust with these vulnerable groups takes time and commitment, it is important research that can help provide more comprehensive understandings of the phenomena of remittances after disasters.

In addition, there is a need for future research on the role that cultural norms such as “utang na loob” can play in affecting a household’s ability to turn their access to migrants into remittances after disasters. While it was not the intent of the study to research this topic deeply, it was a theme that emerged from the fieldwork and one that should be a topic of future study. Similarly, more research is needed on how intra-family politics affect the ability of households to turn their access to migrants into remittances after disasters. While my research did not intend to examine the tensions that are found within transnational relationships, it was a strong theme that emerged in
my fieldwork and there needs to be more focus in future research on the harder to study elements of transnational relationships and the role they play in post-disaster recovery.

Next, further research is needed to better explore how disasters provide the opportunity for distant relatives to re-connect with affected households and for the formation of new connections to new networks. As mentioned earlier chapter eight, the second major factor that come into play during mega disasters that is not as significant during normal times, is that the crisis triggers assistance from outside the affected community leading to new actors and old connections being re-sparked. Future research on these connections to new networks and the positive and negative consequences of their existence and assistance would be helpful in understanding these emergent actors in humanitarian assistance.

Last, a final finding that emerged from my fieldwork that warrants future research is the relationship between remittances and resilience. Among my respondents, three households discussed how the funds from their migrants contributed to the construction of a good or better house. It is very interesting that the additional remittance funds were put towards what the locals believed will help them better withstand future storms. This establishes a link between remittances and more resilient rebuilding after disasters. While my study did not set out to study this aspect, it points to a need for further research to explore the existence and strength of this link.
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APPENDIX A: Short Survey

Q1 Barangay number
- Barangay A (1)
- Barangay B (2)
- Barangay C (3)

Q2 Purok number
- 1 (1)
- 2 (2)
- 3 (3)
- 4 (4)
- 5 (5)
- 6 (6)
- 7 (7)

Q3 Do you consent to participating in this short survey?
- Yes (1)
- No (2)

Q4 Name of respondent

Q5 Name of Head of the household

Q6 Gender of Head of household
- Male (1)
- Female (2)
- Other (3)

Q7 Are you a double-headed and single-headed household?
- Double-headed (1)
- Single-headed (2)

Q8 Household demographics (including respondent):
- ______ Number of adults (18 and above) currently living in your household (1)
- ______ Number of children (17 and below) currently living in your household (2)
- ______ Other members (3)
Q9 What are your sources of livelihood? (Name of livelihood and monthly income for each)
(Ano an iyo mga pakabuhi?)
_____ 1) Main source (1)
_____ 2) Second source (2)
_____ 3) Third source (3)

Q10 What is the monthly income of the Head of the household? (Pera it income/kita hit puno hit pamilya?)
☐ below 15,000 pesos (1)
☐ 15,001 to 50,000 pesos (2)
☐ Below 50,001 pesos (3)

Q11 What is the monthly income of the whole household? (Pera it binulan income/kit hit bug-os na panimalay?)
☐ A) Income under 40,000 pesos (1)
☐ B) Income between 40,000 to 59,999 peso (2)
☐ C) Income between 60,000 to 99,999 pesos (3)
☐ D) Income between 100,000 to 249,999 pesos (4)
☐ E) Income 250,000 and over (5)

Q12 What is the highest level of education completed by the Head of the household? (Ano it pinaka hitaas na nahuman pag eskwela hit puno hit pamilya?)
☐ No schooling completed (1)
☐ Elementary (2)
☐ High School (3)
☐ Vocational School (4)
☐ College (5)
☐ Graduate (Law, Masters, PhD) (6)

Q13 What is the profession of the Head of the household? (Ano it pakabuhi hit puno hit pamilya?)
☐ Unskilled labour (plumber, vendor, janitor, maid, tricycle, pedicab, carpenter, auto mechanic) (1) ____________________
☐ Skilled and technical job (nurse, call center agent, small business owner) (2) ____________________
☐ Highly skilled labour (business executive, big business owner, government worker, professionals) (5) ____________________
☐ Migrant/OFW (3) ____________________
☐ Other (4) ____________________
Q14 What was the direct loss or damage your household experienced from Yolanda?

- Life of family member or close relative (namatyan hin kapamilya o uropod) (1)
  __________________
- House - Partial Damage (diri tanan ruba) (2)
- House - Total Damage (tanan ruba) (3)
- Vehicle - Car/motorbike (sarakyan) (4)
- Livelihood (Pakabuhi) (5) __________________
- Other (7) __________________

Q15 In your mind, what does recovery mean? (Para ha imo ano it pagi intindi hit pagbangon/pagmabaskug?)

Q16 Before Yolanda, what type of house did you live? (Bago mag Yolanda, anon klase an iyo balay / inuukyan?)

- Own (with land title) (kalugaringon/may titulo) (1)
- Own (without land title) (kalugaringon pero wa titulo) (2)
- Rent (paid) (na plete) (3)
- Informal settlement (government owned space) (4)
- Other (5) __________________

Q17 Before Yolanda, what is the construction material for most of the roof before Yolanda? (Bago mag Yolanda, ano an material han atop?)

- Concrete (cemento) (1)
- Congregated Galvanized Sheet (yero) (2)
- Nipa (pawod) (4)
- Combination of materials (7)
- Other (8) __________________

Q18 After Yolanda, what is the construction material for most of the roof? (Katapos han Yolanda, ano an material han atop?)

- Concrete (cemento) (1)
- Congregated Galvanized Sheet (yero) (2)
- Nipa (pawod) (8)
- Tarpaulin (4)
- Salvaged materials (6)
- Other (5) __________________
Q19 What kind of assistance did you receive for the reconstruction of your house? (Ano nga klase hin bulig an iyo nakarawat para han pagtukod hin nga balay?)

- None (7)
- Financial assistance from NGO (1)
- Shelter repair kit (2)
- New Core House from NGO (3)
- Labour from family members (4)
- Government assistance (5)
- Other (6) ____________________

Q20 To what degree has your household's shelter recovered? (Ano na an lebel han paka-ayad han iyo balay?)

- 0: No Recovery (waray pa maka recover) (1)
- 1-2: Low Recovery (guti pala) (2)
- 3: Intermediate Recovery (diri pa gud duro) (3)
- 4: Complete Recovery (nakabalik nah an dati na estado/condition bago mag Yolanda) (4)
- 5: Better Recovery - Better than pre-disaster conditions (Mas maupay pa na estado bago mag Yolanda) (5)

Q21 How did Yolanda affect your household's livelihood? (Paano naka-apekto an Yolanda ha pakabuji han panimalay?)

Q22 After Yolanda, what kind of assistance did your household receive for livelihood? (Katima han Yolanda, hin-o binulig ha iyo para makabalik o makatukod hin bag-o nga pakabuhi han panimalay?)

- None (4)
- Financial assistance from NGO (1)
- NGO program/training for livelihood (2)
- Government assistance (5)
- Assistance from family (3)
- Other (6) ____________________

Q23 To what degree has your household's livelihood recovered? (Ano na an lebel han paka-recover o pakabangon han iyo pakabuhi?)

- 0: No Recovery (waray pa maka recover) (1)
- 1-2: Low Recovery (guti pala) (2)
- 3: Intermediate Recovery (diri pa gud duro) (3)
- 4: Complete Recovery (nakabalik nah an dati na estado/condition bago mag Yolanda) (4)
- 5: Better Recovery - Better than pre-disaster conditions (Mas maupay pa na estado bago mag Yolanda) (5)
Q24 How much did your household spend on recovery after Yolanda? (Pera an iyo na gasto para maka bangon?)

______ Estimate the cost of repairing or rebuilding your shelter (Estimate han nagasto pag repair han iyo balay) (1)

______ Estimate the cost of regaining or starting a new livelihood (Estimate han nagasto pag balik/pagtikang han pakabuhi) (2)

Q25 Did your household receive any financial assistance for Yolanda from family, relatives and friends outside Tacloban? (Nakakarawat be kamo hin pinansyal nga bulig tikang ha iyo mga kapamilya, urupod, o kasangkayan nga naukoy ha gawas hit Tacloban?)

☐ No (10)
☐ Immediate family from outside Tacloban (5)
☐ Relatives from outside Tacloban (6)
☐ Friends from outside Tacloban (7)
☐ Immediate family from abroad (4)
☐ Relatives from abroad (8)
☐ Friends from abroad (9)

Q26 Is anyone in your immediate family a migrant or OFW? (Mayda ba ha imo pamilya adto na naukoy ha langyaw o nag trabaho ha iba na nasud?)

☐ Yes (1) ____________________
☐ No (4)

If No Is Selected, Then Skip To End of Block

Q27 What relation does the migrant or OFW have to you? (Ano tim relasyon hit nga imo kapamilya nga adto na naukoy ha langyaw o nag trabaho ha iba na nasud?)

☐ Spouse (Asawa) (4)
☐ Children (anak) (6)
☐ Parents (Kag-anak) (2)
☐ Siblings (Bugto) (3)
☐ Relatives (Urupod) (5)

Q28 What job does the migrant or OFW have? (Ano it trabahaho hit imo kapamilya nag naukoy na ha langyaw o nagtrabaho ha iba na nasud?)

☐ Unskilled labour (domestic helper, construction worker) (1) ____________________
☐ Skilled and technical job (nurse, teacher, caregiver) (2) ____________________
☐ Seafarer (3) ____________________
☐ Other (4) ____________________

Q29 What country does the migrant or OFW work? (Ano o hain nga bansa/nasud naukoy o nagtrabaho it imo kapamilya?)
Western countries (i.e. U.S., Canada, Europe, U.K., Australia) (1) _________________
Asia (i.e. Hong Kong, Singapore, Malaysia, Japan) (2) _________________
Middle East (i.e. Quatar, Saudi Arabia, UAE) (3) _________________
Africa (i.e. Nigeria, Tanzania, South Africa) (4) _________________
Other (5) _________________

Q30 Does your household currently (in the last 12 months) received money from migrants (remittances)? (it imo pamilya nakarawat ba hin bulig tikang ha gawas?)
☐ Yes (1)
☐ No (3)

If No Is Selected, Then Skip To End of Block

Q31 How much remittances does your household receive on a regular basis? (Pira an iyo nakakarawat kada pagpapadara tikang ha abroad?)

Q32 3 years after Yolanda, from 0 to 100%, how recovered is your households? (Tolo katuig katapos ni Yolanda, tikang 0-100, pagkita nimo pera na ka porsiento an im pamilya naka recover?)
______ Percent recovered (1)
Q33 What has been completely recovered since Yolanda? And When? (Ano imo na recover katima kan Yolanda ngan kakan-o?)

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<tr>
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<th>Within 6 months (1)</th>
<th>6 months-1 year (2)</th>
<th>1-1.5 years (3)</th>
<th>1.5-2 years (4)</th>
<th>2-2.5 years (5)</th>
<th>2.5-3 years (6)</th>
<th>Not yet recovered (7)</th>
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<td>Regular food supply (eksakto nga supply han pagkaon) (2)</td>
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<td>Water restored (tubig nabalik) (3)</td>
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<td>Electricity restored (kuryente nabalik) (4)</td>
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<td>Shelter repaired (balay na repair) (5)</td>
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<td>Livelihood restored (pakabuhi nahibalik) (6)</td>
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<td>Social Life restored (Nahibalik na an pakikiurusa/pakikitungo ha iba) (7)</td>
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<td>Children back to school (estudyante nakabalik pag eskwela) (8)</td>
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<td>Other (9)</td>
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Q34 Overall, to what degree has your household recovered? (Ha-kabug-usan, ano na an lebel han paka-recover o pakabangon han iyo panimalay?)

- 0: No Recovery (waray pa maka recover) (1)
- 1-2: Low Recovery (guti pala) (2)
- 3: Intermediate Recovery (diri pa gud duro) (3)
- 4: Complete Recovery (nakabalik nah an dati na estado/condition bago mag Yolanda) (4)
- 5: Better Recovery - Better than pre-disaster conditions (Mas maupay pa na estado bago mag Yolanda) (5)
Q35 Before Yolanda, how often did your household join together with others in the barangay to address a common issue? (Bag o mag Yolanda kapera kamo ka beses nakiusa o nabulig hit imo barangay pag solbar problema ha barangay?)
- Never (waray) (1)
- Once (kausa) (2)
- A couple of times (kadhua) (3)
- Frequently (pirmi) (4)

Q36 After Yolanda, did you witness forms of Bayanihan/Burubligay spirit in your barangy? (Katima han Yolanda, naka obserbar ba kamo nga nag-butubligay/bayanihan an mga tawo ha iyo barangay?)
- Yes (1)
- No (2)

If No Is Selected, Then Skip To End of Block

Q37 After Yolanda, what forms of Bayanihan/Burubligay spirit did you observe in your community? (Katima ni Yolanda anon a bayanihan an imo naobserbaran ha barangay?)

Q38 How long did the Bayanihan/Burubligay spirit last after Yolanda? (Ano kaiha han bayanihan dd ha barangay?)
- Less than a week (1)
- 1 week to 1 month (2)
- 1 month to 3 months (3)
- 3 months to 6 months (4)
- Over 6 months (5)

Q39 As a whole, do you believe: (Ha kabug-usan, natu-od ba kamo nga:)
- Most people in the brgy can be trusted (matatapuran an tawo) (1)
- Need to be very careful (kinahanglan maghirot) (2)
- Don’t know (di ak maaram) (3)

Q40 As a whole, do you agree or disagree that people here look out mainly for the welfare of their own families and they are not much concerned with barangay welfare? (Ha kabug-usan, pagkita niyo, an mga tawo dinhi nanginginiano la ha ira kalugaringon kaupayan han ira pamilya o nanginginiano hira para han loug-os nga barangay?)
- Strongly agree (dako na pag uyon) (1)
- Agree (nauyon) (2)
- Disagree nauyon) (3)
- Strongly disagree (dako na pagtipa) (4)
Q41 Thank you for completing our survey! Do you agree to be contacted for a follow up interview if your household is chosen for the next stage of the research? (Samat han imo oras ha amon. Ok la na makontak ka para hin otor pa na interview?)

- Yes (1)
- No (2)

Q42 What is your mobile number?

Q43 Upper Income, Middle Income or Lower Income from surveyor's observation and impression:

- Lower Income (Monthly income below 15,000 pesos, high school or elementary education, occupation as unskilled labour (vendor, plumber, maid), lives in semi-permanent and temporary homes, usually in slums or squatters' communities) (3)
- Middle Income (Monthly income 15,001 to 50,000 pesos, college-level education from state school, occupations in skilled and technical jobs (nurse, call center agent OFW), house in permanent or semi-permanent conditions in mixed neighbourhood) (2)
- Upper Income (Monthly income over 50,001 pesos, undergraduate from exclusive school, white collar occupation considered highly skilled such as business executives or professionals, permanent concrete house located in expensive neighbourhood) (1)

Q44 Degree of overall recovery from surveyor's observation and impression:

- 0 - No Recovery (1)
- 1-2 - Low Recovery (2)
- 3 - Intermediate Recovery (3)
- 4- Complete Recovery (Back to pre-Yolanda conditions) (4)
- 5- Better Recovery (Build back better, better than pre-Yolanda conditions) (5)

Q45 General Comments:

APPENDIX B: Interview Guide for Semi-Structured Interviews

Introduction Script: Hi Sir/Maam, my name is __________________. I am a research assistant for Yvonne Su a PhD student and researcher at the University of Guelph in Canada. I am a student at UP Tacloban College and I am here today to conduct an interview on how your household recovered from Typhoon Yolanda. We were here in November and conducted a short survey with you. This is the second part of the research. We will be asking you to expand and clarify some of the answers you gave previously so some questions we would have already asked you. But we will
also be asking you new questions about how Yolanda affected your household and how your family and assisted you after Yolanda. The research is for the completion of Yvonne’s doctoral dissertation. Your responses will be kept confidential and the information is used only for research purposes. It will not be shared with others. You are free to withdraw from the study at any time. The interview will take approximately one hour. Thank you for your cooperation.

Consent to participate: __________ Consent to record: ________________
Date: __________________________ Barangay: _______________________
Start time: ________________________ End time: _______________________

### Shelter, Household, Livelihood Before and After Yolanda from Short Surveys

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Before Yolanda</th>
<th>After Yolanda</th>
<th>New info from Interview</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Type of house:</td>
<td>Type of house:</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Construction material of roof:</td>
<td>Construction material of roof:</td>
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<td>How recovered is shelter:</td>
<td>How recovered is shelter:</td>
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<td>Main Livelihood:</td>
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<td>Third:</td>
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<tr>
<td>Class:</td>
<td>How recovered is livelihood?:</td>
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<tr>
<td>Migrant/OFW:</td>
<td>Overall recovery:</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### What has been completely recovered since Yolanda and when?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Feeling of safety:</th>
<th>Regular food supply:</th>
<th>Water restored:</th>
<th>Electricity:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Shelter repaired:</td>
<td>Livelihood restored:</td>
<td>Social life restored:</td>
<td>Children back at school:</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Other comments/notes from short survey:

### A) Households Information

**Note to Respondents:** Our research is interested in understanding recovery at the household level. So when answering questions please answer with the whole household in mind. First, we will start by asking you to tell us about your household. Who are the members of the household and what is their sex, age and marital status and education.
1. Please List everyone that lived in your household before Yolanda:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name (Ngaran)</th>
<th>Relationship (Relasyon)</th>
<th>Sex</th>
<th>Age</th>
<th>Marital Status (M, S, Sep, W, LP)</th>
<th>Occupation</th>
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<tbody>
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</table>

2. Did the number of people who lived in your household change since then? How?

**B) Timelines**

**Note to Respondents:** Now, we will move on to asking you to tell us your story and experience of Yolanda, according to the timeline, starting from a week before Yolanda, then when Yolanda struck, then one week, six months and 1-3 years.

3. Warning: How did you hear about Yolanda?  
   Radio, news, family, neighbours, barangay officials, facebook (social media)

4. Warning: What did you know about Yolanda before it struck?

5. Preparation: A few days before Yolanda, did your family do anything to prepare for Yolanda?  
   - No preparation at all  
   - Tie down the roof  
   - Store extra food and water
- waterproof goods
- pack emergency kit (candles/ flashlights/radio/food)
- make a plan
- prepare emergency money
- inspect house for repairs
- elevate appliances and furniture

6. Evacuation: During Yolanda, did your family evacuate?
   a. If yes, where?
   b. If no, why not?

- Never evacuated before
- Believed house could withstand Yolanda
- Did not understand the severity of typhoon
- Did not trust neighbours
- To prevent looting

7. Emergency Response: What was the first week after Yolanda like? How did you survive and cope? Did you have problems getting food? Were you able to eat 3 times a day or have complete meals? When did you resume regular meals?


9. Early Response: What was the first month (December 2013) after Yolanda like? Who assisted you? What were the problems that you had and how did you cope?


11. Response: What was month 2 to 6 (January to May 2014) after Yolanda like? Who assisted you, were your basic needs get restored at this time? Food, water, electricity? Or if not restored, how did you cope?

   - Food (eating 3 times a day and complete meals):
   - Potable Water:
   - Electricity Connection:
   - Feeling of safely:
   - Children back at school
     (Did children stop school to save money?):

12. Early Recovery: What was month 7 to 12 (June to November 2014) after Yolanda like? What type of shelter were you able to build at this point?

   - Tent
13. Early Recovery: Month 7 to 12 (June to November 2014) after Yolanda, what was your livelihood like at this point? What type of assistance did you receive at this time?

14. Early Recovery: What was 1-2 years (November 2014 – November 2015) after Yolanda like? What type of shelter were you able to build at this point? What was your livelihood like at this point? What type of assistance did you receive at this time?

15. Recovery: What was 2-3 year (November 2015 – November 2016) after Yolanda like? What is your life like now? What are the challenges and problems you still have now as a result of Yolanda?

C) Environmental Problems in the Barangay and House

Note to Respondent: Next, we will ask you some questions about environmental problems in your barangay and your house

16. Before Yolanda, to what degree did you feel you are exposed to risks such as typhoon, earthquakes, flooding or fire? Why do you say so? (Ugsa mag – Yolanda, anu nga lebel nimo mayayakan nga hirane ka ha mga kataradman sugad hit bagyo, linog, baha o sunog? Paano nimo na siring?)

17. After Yolanda, to what degree did you recognize that you are exposed/prone to natural hazards such as typhoon, earthquakes, flooding or fire? Why do you say so? (Kahuman han Yolanda, ha ano nga lebel nimo nayakan nga hirane ka ha mga natural nga kataradman parehas hit bagyo, linog, baha o sunog?)

18. Why do you think you are (or are not) prone to disastrous events? (Para ha imo, kay ano ka hirane (o diri hirane) ha mga natural nga kataradman?)

D) Recovery

Note to Respondent: Next, we will ask you some questions about the word recovery.

19. Have you heard of the word recovery before? If yes, where did you first hear the word?

20. Are you aware of the meaning of recovery? If yes, what does recovery mean to you and where did you get this understanding from? (capture definition in waray)

21. According to this meaning, would you say you are recovered? Why?

21a. If you are recovered, when did you feel completely recovered? (Month, year)

E) Savings and Loans
Note to Respondent: Next, we will move on to ask some questions about savings and loans

22. Saving and Loans: Did any organizations come to you barangay to offer loans? Did you avail? If yes, how much did you loan? If no, why not? 
   Yes / No

23. Saving and Loans: Before Yolanda, did you have any loans with banks, lenders or family? If yes, what did you use the money for?
   Yes / No

24. Savings and Loans: After Yolanda, did you have any loans with banks, lenders or family? If yes, what did you use the money for?
   Yes / No

25. Savings and Loans: Before Yolanda, did you have any savings?
   Yes / No

26. Savings and Loans: After Yolanda, did you use the savings for recovery? If yes, what did you use the money on?
   Yes / No

27. Savings and Loans: After Yolanda, did you have any savings?
   Yes / No

F) Assistance After Yolanda

28. Did you receive assistance for Yolanda from family or friends outside Tacloban? Any from abroad?
   a. If yes, who helped and what did you get?
   b. If yes, overall how helpful was support from people outside Tacloban to your recovery from Yolanda? (Very helpful, helpful, somewhat helpful, not so helpful)

29. Has your household ever received money from family members that have migrated outside of Tacloban to Cebu or Manila, or abroad? (This question is general and just to get a sense if they have any ties that send financial support previously)
   Yes / No

29a. Does your household receive remittances? Yes / No

G) OFW/Migrant

Note to Respondent: If respondent has OFW/migrant abroad please ask these questions

30. Please tell us about your OFW/migrant abroad:
   30a. What is their relation to you?

   30b. Where do they work?
30c. what is their job?

30d. how long have they worked as an OFW/migrant?

30e. Does the OFW/migrant abroad send remittances? Yes / No

30f. How often does the OFW/migrant abroad send remittances?

30g. How much is usually sent?

31. Compare to your local monthly household income, what is the size of the remittances? Big, medium or small?

32. How does your household use most of the remittances? Please rank from 1,2,3 etc based on priority of spending.

   Food consumption _____  Investment in livelihood _____
   Purchase of consumer goods _____  Improving housing _____
   Health care _____  School fees _____
   Repayment of debt _____  Bills _____
   Other (specify) __________________________

33. Was your OFW/migrant away during Yolanda? If yes, how did you communicate with them and send funds to you? Yes / No

33a. Was social media (facebook) used after Yolanda (within 1 year) to communicate what happened to you and your family to relatives and friends? Yes / No

34. How did your OFW/migrant assist you after Yolanda? Were they able to send more funds?
   a. Did this change their regular remittance pattern?
   b. If OFW/migrant support for Yolanda came just once, why was this the case?

34c. How was the funds sent by the OFW/migrant used? Please rank from 1,2,3 etc based on priority of spending.

   Food consumption _____  Investment in livelihood _____
   Purchase of consumer goods _____  Improving housing _____
   Health care _____  School fees _____
   Repayment of debt _____  Bills _____
   Other (specify) __________________________

35. Did your OFW/migrant come back to help after Yolanda?
   a. If yes, when and how?
   b. If no, why not?
36. Overall, how helpful do you think your OFW/migrant was to your household’s recovery from Yolanda? (Very helpful, helpful, somewhat helpful, not so helpful)

H) Barangay

Note to Respondents: Now we will ask you some questions about your barangay

37. Before Yolanda, was your household or the community consulted on disaster plans? Were you satisfied with the information that your household had on disasters or how to prepare for disasters?
   Yes / No

38. Before Yolanda, did your barangay practice Disaster Risk Reduction? *Make a disaster plan / early warning
   Yes / No

39. How did Yolanda affect your barangay? Were many houses destroyed, was the public barangay services interrupted, were there causalities?

40. After Yolanda, was your household or the community consulted on future plans for rebuilding and recovery?
   a. If yes, are you satisfied about the plans that are currently in place?
   b. If not, why not?
      Yes / No

41. After Yolanda, did the barangay practice Disaster Risk Reduction? Make a disaster plan / early warning
   Yes / No

42. What are the changes or improvements that Yolanda has done in your barangay? (This can be positive or negative changes)

43. What are the remaining problems in the barangay after Yolanda?
   • Political problems:
   • Economic problems:
   • Social problems:
   • Environmental problems:
   • Other:

44. How did the distribution of relief affect the community?

45. Did new people move into your barangay after Yolanda? What has been the impact of that?
   Yes / No

46. Did Yolanda change social relations within the barangay between neighbours?
   - Yes / No
46a. Did people come together more often?

47. Before Yolanda, did members of your household participate in the barangay activities?
   a. How frequently did members of your household attend barangay meetings?
   b. How often did members of your household join together to do group activities like clean up drive, basketball leagues, fiesta or religious activities?

48. After Yolanda, did members of your household participate in the barangay activities? Did anything change?

49. Before Yolanda, were you or someone in your household a member of any groups, organizations, or associations? (Farmers’/fishermen’s group, Cooperatives, Traders’ association, Trade union, Credit/finance group, Neighbourhood/village association, Civic group, NGO, religious group, Cultural associations, political group, Youth group, Women’s group, Parent group, School committee, senior citizens group, 4Ps, MCCT, Health committee, Sports groups, OFW beneficiaries group) Yes / No

50. After Yolanda, were you or someone in your household a member of any groups, organizations, or associations?
   Yes / No

I) Neighbour Relations

Note to Respondents: We only have a few questions left. Now we will ask you a few questions about neighbour relations.

51. Before Yolanda, how would you describe your household’s relations with your neighbours?

52. Did your household help your neighbours in the last year? If yes, how?
   Yes / No

53. Did Yolanda change social relations with your neighbours – immediately after Yolanda and now? Explain.
   Yes / No

J) Future

Note to Respondents: Now we will ask you some questions about the future.

54. What were the lessons learned from Yolanda?

55. Is your household prepared for the next big typhoon? Why?
   Yes / No
56. What would your household do differently now (preparation and recovery) compared to when Yolanda came?

**Note to Respondent:** Thank you Sir/Ma’am! We will now move on to a short activity where we map out your social network.

---

**APPENDIX C: Guide for Recovery-gram**

**Notes to Respondents:** Now we will move on to an activity where we map our your social network.

1. Please write the first names of those who you feel are very close to you and somewhat close to you. (*Isurat an mga ngaran han tawo (kapamilya o sangkay) nga close ha imo ngan diri gud close nga nakabulig ha imo han panahon han Yolanda.*)
1.1. You can put down your family members, your neighbours, your friends, your work colleagues, your friends from school, your friends from church – anyone you feel close or somewhat close to.

2. Can you think of anyone that helped you during Yolanda to add? (Mayda ka pa ba nahunahunaan na tawo na nag bulig ha imo han panahon han Yolanda.)

3. Now, what NGOs and INGOs or governmental organizations assisted you? Please put the name of the organizations on a different colour tag. What did these organizations provide to you and how useful from 1 to 4 – 1 being not very useful and 4 being very useful. (Isureat/elista na mga NOGO/INGO nga agensiya han gobierno na nagbulig ha imo. Tapos, ibutang kun anon a klse an bulig na nahtag ha imo. Ngan markahi o graduhi from 1 to 5, an 1 diri gud nakabulig ngan an 5 dako gud an pakabulig.)

4. Please put down a green dot if the organization provided non-financial help and a red dot if it provided financial help. (Kolore hin blue kun an bulig diri kwarts nga pula kun kwarta.)

5. Now we will go through each of your social ties to find out how they helped you and how helpful the assistance was to your recovery.

6. After you have labeled your organizational and network tags please place the tags within this recovery-gram based on 1) how helpful the relief or assistance was to you in terms of contributing to your recovery and also at what time did the relief come? (Ibalhin an mga tags didi han recovery gram)

7. Now we will go through each of your social ties to find out how they helped you and how helpful the assistance was to your recovery.

8. For those that helped continuously please draw an arrow from their post-it (noting when they first gave help) to where they stopped giving help. If the assistance was one-shot then there is no need to draw arrow.

9. Please identify the individuals that you provided assistance to if you did not mention it before. (Mayda k aba dinhi hini nag imo lista gin buligan?)

10. Please identify if you know anyone who is positions of power and authority. Do you know any: (Mayda ka kilala nga):

   1) barangay councillors, religious leaders, business owners, government workers, NGO leaders or staff

10.1. Did you ask any of them for assistance and did they provide you with assistance? (Na nagro k aba ha ira hin bulig?)

11. Please identify if you know anyone who is working or living outside of Tacloban City? (Mayda k aba kaurupdan/kasangkayan hini na mga lugar na trabaho?)

   1. In Manila
   2. In Cebu
3. In another country like Hong Kong, Singapore, Middle East, Canada, Australia, USA or any other country

11.1. Did you ask any of them for assistance and did they provide you with assistance? *(Na ngaro ka hin bulig ha ira?)*

**THANK YOU FOR YOUR TIME – SALAMAT!**