

Moral Foundation, Mere Horizon

by

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ABSTRACT

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This thesis is concerned with clarifying the philosophical concept of horizon. What I will arrive at in this study is a concept of horizon that is rooted in a multifarious understanding of self-consciousness. To support my findings I have revisited selected works by Bernard Lonergan S.J.,¹ who articulated a worldview, philosophy of subject, and an account of the *cognitional structure* within every individual human subject that proves the concept of horizon is one that is subjective, objective and more importantly intersubjective. With the aid of Lonergan's work, the concept of horizon has been clearly defined as the necessary field in which the subject operates to facilitate a radical transformation of the subject. It will be within this radical transformation that the subject will be motivated to persuade him/herself to do more, to want more, and ultimately opt for what is truly Good, the aim of expanding one's horizon.

¹ "S.J." refers to the Society of Jesus, a religious order of men within the Catholic denomination of Christianity dating to the sixteenth century A.D. The members of this order are referred to as Jesuits.

DEDICATION

For Gpa.

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My deepest gratitude to Jeff.

Always in appreciation of my husband.

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Introduction

0.1

An Outline of the Problem

The philosophical concept of horizon is not clear. While being dealt with by various philosophers, phenomenologists and theologians dating back as far as Aristotle, the concept still remains vague. Bernard Lonergan S.J., in the mid-twentieth century A.D., formulated a view and definition of the philosophical concept of horizon that may be understood as one of the most important conditions needed to facilitate a radical transformation of the human subject. It was noted by David Tracy in the mid 1970s that Lonergan considered the concept of horizon to be connected to the “process of raising and answering questions,” making knowledge something that is always in process.² Tracy also noted that Lonergan’s definition and use of the concept of horizon are both objective and subjective, with the subjective pole being conditioned by “intentionality-meaning” and the object pole being conditioned by the world that opens up to the subject.³ While Tracy provides a short exposition of Lonergan’s concept of horizon, he does not go beyond the main points above to incorporate the extent of Lonergan’s treatment of the philosophical concept of horizon. For this reason, this study will revisit selected works by Lonergan in order to outline the extent of his treatment on the concept of horizon, while more importantly, clarifying, expanding and enriching the concept. The clarity achieved through Lonergan’s articulation of the philosophical concept of horizon is a result of Lonergan’s ability

² David Tracy, *The Achievement of Bernard Lonergan* (New York: Herder and Herder, Inc, 1970), 9.

³ Tracy, 1970, 14.

to state that the concept of horizon is one that is subjective, objective and most importantly intersubjective. The works by Lonergan chosen in this study will invite the reader to return back to the works of preceding thinkers to see how we may re-read what they were attempting when grappling with the philosophical concept of horizon. Before discussing the philosophical literature, I will first illustrate how the concept of horizon finds itself in the everyday life of the human subject and for this reason makes the concept one worthy of becoming a philosophical problem.

There was a painting on display at the Musée national des beaux-arts du Québec (MNBAQ) by Jean Paul Lemieux (1904-1990) in 2015 titled “Julie et l’univers” (1965).⁴ When I first encountered this piece what captured my attention was the horizon painted in the landscape—where the earth meets the sky—which not only illustrated a general horizon, ‘Julie’s’ horizon, the painting’s horizon and Lemieux’s horizon but *my* horizon as well. More importantly, what is notable about this painting—and Lemieux’s pieces in general during the 1950s-1970s—is the ostensible solitude and mystery exuding from his human subjects and in this piece ‘Julie.’ A description of Lemieux as an artist by Michèle Grandbois describes Lemieux’s work as: “De l’insouciance à l’angoisse, en passant par la quête des horizons du monde,”⁵ which may be roughly translated as: “Recklessness to anxiety, through pursuit of the world’s horizons” or “Of heedlessness to the anguish, passing by the quest of the horizons of the world.” Regardless of which translation rests closer to the original intention, the general sentiment of this statement by Grandbois is exactly the reason I admire Lemieux and his

⁴ Image is located on page 7.

⁵ Michèle Grandbois, *Jean Paul Lemieux au Musée national des beaux-arts du Québec* (Québec, Canada: Bibliothèque nationale du Québec, 2007), 5.

existential art: every piece evokes a *collective* horizon—a limitation expressed through the bleak landscape—yet at the same time an allusion to a sense of boundless horizon hidden within the human subjects’ two-dimensional figure and vacant facial expression.

Indicative of Lemieux’s collection painted during the 1950s-1970s is that the viewer is lured into the world of his human subjects. While said subjects express a sense of wonder and mystery, they simultaneously produce a sense of anxiety and disillusionment caused by the *perception* of the subject as trapped within a foreign world that is the painting.⁶ In some respects, the only way for the viewer to be emancipated from the feelings of anxiety, mystery and disillusionment produced by the paintings is to either completely transpose oneself into the horizon of the subject or imagine a new field of vision. In short, Lemieux invites his viewer to shift the horizon of his human subjects, which in turn shifts and expands the horizon of the viewer. Lemieux’s minimalist approach expressed through: “une grande simplification de l’espace” and “un langage épuré” creates a special dialogue between the painted subject and the viewing subject, which sheds great light on the human condition.⁷ In other words, the above encounter with Lemieux’s work is nestled at the intersection of the ‘philosophy of the human subject’⁸ and the concept of horizon.

That stated, prior to launching my investigation, it is important to briefly note what is often thought of when referring to “horizon” in the twenty-first century. “Horizon” in its everyday use describes the line where the earth or water meets the sky, the edge of a black hole

⁶ Grandbois, 2007, 79.

⁷ Grandbois, 2007, 15; 79.

⁸ See Kenneth L. Schmitz, “Towards a Metaphysical Restoration of Natural Things,” in *An Etienne Gilson Tribute*, ed., O’Neil, Charles J. (Milwaukee, WI: Marquette University Press, 1959), 256. The concept of a ‘philosophy of the human subject’ discussed in this present study is inspired by this article.

known as the event-horizon, the vanishing point for a given viewer, or a line between two points: a “horizontal” line. In philosophical discourse, horizon is used to describe the limit of an individual’s knowledge. The philosophical concept of horizon, rather than focusing exclusively on an objective horizon, focuses by and large on a subjective horizon. As I recounted through my experience of Lemieux’s work, as well as the everyday uses of the word “horizon,” many understandings of horizon come into play where we conceive of a horizon as objective, as subjective, as moving or as static, and it is for this reason that my guiding question is: what is the philosophical concept of horizon? Lemieux’s conception of horizon through art becomes the collective consciousness of the horizon to be participated in and shared. Through an explication of the subject’s aesthetic experience, “all of the “higher” cognitive and perceptual activities aris[ing] from and...informed by sensation” provide a convincing demonstration of how a radical transformation of the self may work itself out in the world.⁹

As Saulius Geniusas writes in *The Origins of the Horizon in Husserl’s Phenomenology*: “horizon, as a philosophical notion, can be characterized as *what consciousness co-intends in such a way that what is co-intended determines the sense of appearing objectivities.*”¹⁰ Put another way, the philosophical concept of the horizon describes the way in which phenomena appear to the subject or more precisely, the way in which the subject delineates its range of experiences and thoughts based on what is perceived and intuited of a given object in the world. What the everyday use, aesthetic experience and philosophical notion of horizon articulated by Geniusas present are realms of experience articulated through a given individual subject’s field

⁹ Jeff Mitscherling, *Aesthetic Genesis: The Origin of Consciousness in the Intentional Being of Nature* (Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 2010), 1.

¹⁰ Saulius Geniusas, *The Origins of the Horizon in Husserl’s Phenomenology* (Volume 67. New York: Springer, 2012), 7. Emphasis is the author’s.

of vision perceived from a “particular vantage point” that simultaneously belong to both the world of objectivity and the world of subjectivity.¹¹ Yet neither of these explications of horizon reveals the origins of the horizon, the structure of the horizon, nor how the subject comes to appropriate a horizon. In addition, while Geniusas provides an accurate Husserlian definition of horizon, the meaning of this definition itself remains unclear and it fails to indicate how the philosophical concept of horizon initially emerges let alone how it discloses itself in the context of the subject. And as Geniusas explains, it was this very question of origin that motivated Edmund Husserl:

[T]o raise this question [what is the horizon?] is to inquire into the crystallization of the structures of experience. In short...the question of the origins of the horizon is the question of the origins of the horizon of *subjectivity*. [I]n Husserl’s phenomenology, *the world is claimed to be the rudimentary figure of the horizon*. But what could it mean to raise the question of the origins of the horizon in such a framework? It would mean nothing other than to inquire into the different senses of the *world’s pre-giveness*.¹² One of the central answers that stems from Husserl’s phenomenology suggests that *the horizon is a peculiar structure of experience*...the horizon depicts the capacity of consciousness to enwrap appearances within the structure of familiarity.¹³

As we read in Geniusas’ account, when questioning the origins of the horizon we begin with “the horizon of *subjectivity*.” Conversely, while Geniusas explicates Husserl’s understanding of horizon as a “*pre-giveness*” of the world, this suggests that there is an objective horizon already out there, and that this objective horizon when encountered discloses something to the subject which may then create a horizon of subjectivity. Herein lies the problem: where does the horizon ultimately belong? To the subject? To the object? To both? To describe the origins of the horizon as “already out there” given through the world’s basic structure, which then seeds the ground for a subjective horizon, does not clarify what is meant by the philosophical concept of horizon, or more basically, if preference is given to the subjective

¹¹ Hans-Georg Gadamer, *Truth and Method* (1975; repr., New York: Bloomsbury, 2013), 313.

¹² Geniusas, 2012, 9.

¹³ Geniusas, 2012, 8.

horizon, the objective horizon, neither or both. Rather than addressing this problem, Geniusas makes the claim that Husserl was the last philosopher to have “raised the question of the origins of the horizon *explicitly*,” and it is for this reason that the word “horizon” remains a philosophical problem.¹⁴ Granted Husserl may have been the first to focus on the phenomenological importance of the philosophical concept of horizon, but philosophical inquiry into the word “horizon” did continue post-Husserl with the works of Gadamer. Yet while Gadamer made important contributions to the philosophical concept of horizon, how we may precisely understand this concept remained unclear. I shall be demonstrating in this thesis that Bernard Lonergan’s work of the mid-twentieth century, still largely overlooked by philosophers (although applauded by Gadamer himself), faithfully recovers the phenomenological importance of the horizon and provides ample clarification of this philosophical concept. While works of art such as Lemieux’s may provide an enchanting visual of what Husserl attempted to verbalize, the most suitable explication of the philosophical concept of horizon may be found in the philosophy of Lonergan.

¹⁴ Geniusas, 2012, 9.



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¹⁵ Image courtesy of: <http://www.galerievalentin.com/canadian-art/jean-paul-lemieux/works/julie-et-l-univers-1965-15116.php>

0.2

Thesis Statement

The present study is concerned with clarifying the philosophical concept of horizon as it relates to the human subject. This study of horizon will address the limits of the knower in the world. What I will arrive at in this study is a horizon that may be understood as both conditioned and unconditioned by the human subject, yet nevertheless is ultimately rooted in a multifarious understanding of self-consciousness. Many questions emerged while researching this subject, such as: how does one know when a horizon is present in general? Or better yet, when does one know when a horizon has expanded for oneself? I hold that the philosophy of subject put forth by Bernard Lonergan finally adds much needed clarity to the philosophical concept of horizon. Lonergan's philosophy of subject—primarily articulated through his works *Insight: A Study of Human Understanding* and *Method in Theology*—outlines a *cognitional structure* found within every individual subject that defines the philosophical concept of horizon as one of the most important and necessary conditions of human subjectivity. The philosophical concept of horizon thus in turn becomes the necessary field in which the subject operates that facilitates the radical transformation of the subject into a moral being. This radical transformation into a moral being permits the ground for the subject to continue to persuade him/herself to do more, to want more and ultimately to opt for what is truly Good.

In applying Lonergan's analysis of the *cognitional structure* of the human subject to an understanding of the philosophical concept of horizon, we may understand how this necessary field in which the subject operates becomes responsible for the subject's ability to recognize and thereby engage in a self-reflexive process when experiencing, understanding, judging and

deciding. The subject's development of the ability to turn inward to notice when they *experience* experiencing and *experience* the moment when they are understanding, *allows the subject to witness the shifts in their consciousness, which in turn shifts their previous horizon toward a new horizon*. These “*shifts*” may be understood as a series of conscious conversions—moral, intellectual, religious and psychic¹⁶—which serve as reference frames for situating the philosophical concept of horizon by identifying the different processes of moving from one mode of being to another. The shifts through the series of conversions may at times prove elusive, as consciousness is not only encountered within the subject's own horizon but also within the horizon of another subject, as well as within the intended Objective horizon. This classifies the philosophical concept of horizon as something both subjective *and* objective; this will be dealt with in greater detail in what follows. In short, Bernard Lonergan's work, read in a post-Husserlian light, picks up the importance of the phenomenological concept of horizon and also addresses shortcomings in Gadamer's hermeneutical approach to the concept.

Chapter One will present a brief history of the concept of horizon. My chief source in this section is Saulius Geniusas, who has chronicled the concept from the Ancient to the Modern periods, pointing to its appearance in the works of several philosophers and theologians including: St. Thomas Aquinas, Isaak ben Salomon Israeli, Alanus of Lille, William of Auvergne, Albertus Magnus, Meister Eckhart, Leibniz and Kant among others.¹⁷ For the purposes of the present study, it is not necessary to discuss all of these thinkers. We shall

¹⁶ Psychic conversion will not be discussed in this thesis. “Psychic” conversion was later developed by Robert M. Doran. See “What Does Bernard Lonergan Mean by ‘Conversion?’” (Lecture presented at the University of St. Michael's College, University of Toronto, 2011), accessed April 7, 2018, <https://www.lonerganresource.com/lectures.php> and *Psychic Conversion and Theological Foundations: Towards a Reorientation of the Human Sciences* (Chico, CA: Scholars Press, 1981).

¹⁷ Much of the discussion on the Mediaeval concept of horizon in Geniusas' work is centered around Meister Eckhart and the *Book of Causes*. Through research it is held that the *Book of Causes* drew its inspiration from Proclus' *Elements of Theology*. See Proclus, *Elements of Theology*, trans., Thomas Taylor 1816, repr. (Middleton, DE: Kshetrabooks, 2017).

consider only some of those who are better known among philosophers: St. Thomas Aquinas, Leibniz, Kant and Hegel. Hegel's view makes its appearance in Chapter Two. My goal in this brief history is merely to supply context that will help the reader understand the importance of Lonergan's view of the philosophical concept of horizon. In Chapter One, I will also comment on the "horizon-problematic" that emerged through the subject-object polarity that contributed to the current lack of clarity surrounding the philosophical concept of horizon.¹⁸ This will lead to a discussion of how philosophers, starting with Friedrich Nietzsche and ending with Hans-Georg Gadamer, connected an understanding of the concept of horizon with the intentional acts of the subject encountering the world in the past and in the immediate present. In addition, it will be through my explication of Gadamer's hermeneutical approach to the philosophical concept of horizon in *Truth and Method* where the shortcomings in understanding what may be meant by the concept arise. To elaborate, Gadamer's discussion of horizon emphasizes the "particular vantage point" of the subject.¹⁹ This articulation of the subject's "particular vantage point" presents many questions on the distinct roles of objectivity, subjectivity, and historical consciousness within the philosophical concept of horizon as it relates to the subject. This lack of clearly delineating the roles of objectivity, subjectivity, and historical consciousness is what contributed to the lack of clarity in Gadamer's discussion of the philosophical concept of horizon.

Chapter Two is dedicated to clarifying the philosophical concept of horizon by using selected works from Lonergan. What Lonergan will contribute to the concept of horizon is a

¹⁸ For more on what is meant by the "subject-object polarity" in the context of the human subject and why the term is relevant to this present study, see Schmitz, "Towards," 1959, 246; 260.

¹⁹ Gadamer, 2013, 313.

worldview that places the subject in a unique position to take possession of the horizon, making a case for the conceiving of the horizon as something objective, subjective and, more importantly, intersubjective. This will require a discussion of Lonergan's philosophy of the subject that will elucidate the many ways in which any given individual subject may find itself in the world, which in turn discloses the *cognitional structure* of the subject and reveals how we may arrive at a more precise understanding of the philosophical concept of horizon. To reiterate, Lonergan's philosophy of subject, his analysis of the *cognitional structure* of the subject and his worldview all pay testimony to the philosophical concept of horizon as a condition that is at the same time objective, subjective and intersubjective. To conceive of the philosophical concept of horizon as something that is objective, subjective, and intersubjective clarifies what is meant by the concept as being the necessary condition in which the subject operates that ultimately becomes the grounds for the expansion of its horizon and its radical transformation from one mode of being to another.

Concluding remarks will be given at the close of this study that will reiterate how Lonergan, read in a post-Husserlian light, continues the phenomenological importance of the philosophical concept of horizon, thus challenging Geniusas' original claim. Lonergan's multidimensional conception of horizon transforms the traditional approach to horizon from a vague limit to a novelty-seeking transformative field within which the subject operates. Lonergan's approach then renders Geniusas' claim of Husserl as the last philosopher to treat the philosophical concept of horizon with serious importance as wrong, or, at minimum, ill informed.

Chapter One:

The Problem of the Philosophical Concept of Horizon

1.1

From the Mediaeval to the Modern Concept of Horizon

While an historical account of the concept of horizon could perhaps find its roots with the pre-Socratics, I will make reference to the concept of horizon only as it appears as something distinct within Christian Mediaeval philosophy, Modernity and with the emergence of the existential philosophers. A good place to start is with Saulius Geniusas' work *The Origins of the Horizon in Husserl's Phenomenology*, which offers a history of the concept of horizon in general before launching into Husserl's contribution. According to Geniusas, this history begins with the Neo-Platonic problem of emanation and in Medieval philosophy, until the thirteenth century, with the task of determining the location of the soul with regard to time and eternity. Mediaeval thinkers were occupied with the human soul's place in the universe, which led to a twofold notion of horizon with an understanding articulated through time and eternity or through the spiritual and the material.²⁰

The task of obtaining a better understanding of how the soul could find itself at the borderline between time and eternity remained the motivating force behind the employment of the notion of the horizon in the works of Isaak ben Salomon Israeli, Alanus of Lille, William of Auvergne, as well as Albertus Magnus. ... In this context, the horizon was for the most part conceived as a circle to which two hemispheres belong. The hemispheres in question were either those of time and eternity, or those of spiritual and material nature.²¹

²⁰ Geniusas, 2012, 3.

²¹ Geniusas, 2012, 3.

Christian Mediaeval philosophers and theologians, while concerning their inquiry of the concept of horizon through time and eternity, also became very concerned with an inquiry into the nature of *esse*. This inquiry into the nature of *esse* transformed the inquiry into the concept of horizon into one that would not only be objective but anthropological as well. Admittedly the word “horizon” is not used as widely with the Mediaeval thinkers as it is in Husserl, nevertheless when we turn to the works of St. Thomas Aquinas we find a preoccupation with the anthropological horizon, the world-horizon, and the horizon of Being itself. According to Geniusas, St. Thomas Aquinas:

[W]as the first to give the notion of the horizon a specifically *anthropological* meaning. For Aquinas, it was no longer just the soul, but *the human being as a whole* that found itself within a specific horizon: being composed of the spiritual and physical nature, the human being was said to have the *limits* of both natures in itself. One could thus say that in Medieval philosophy the notion of the horizon had both a *metaphysical* as well as an *anthropological* meaning.²²

The anthropological concept of horizon ushered in by St. Thomas opened up the historical thinker to a living understanding or organic notion of horizon—one that made the subject of history move and self-reflect. Philosopher and theologian Bernard Lonergan dedicated much of his earlier work to St. Thomas Aquinas and also noted the very subjective-anthropological nature of his inquiry into the nature of Being. Lonergan notes that the Trinitarian theory of St. Thomas was very much contextualized by the psychological, something that was removed shortly thereafter by succeeding theologians and philosophers.²³ The psychological Lonergan mentions, as it pertains to St. Thomas, is occupied with understanding the ‘I,’ in both the material and the spiritual worlds. The anthropological concept of horizon by St. Thomas is

²² Geniusas, 2012, 3.

²³ Bernard Lonergan, “Understanding and Being,” in *Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan*, Vol 5. Toronto, Canada: University of Toronto Press, 1990), 294.

one that is revisited by Lonergan roughly seven centuries later, where we find a horizon not only capable of movement through space and time but one that will remedy the static and compartmentalized notion of the horizon put forth by thinkers such as Immanuel Kant.

What Kant contributed to the concept of horizon was to compartmentalize the notion that set limits on human knowing. Kant divided the operations of the understanding into categories as he saw them operating in our cognition of the world. There was the individual's horizon, the child's and the adult's horizon, the practical horizon, the aesthetical horizon, the logical horizon, the religious horizon, and those of opinions and of the sciences. Kant's subjectivization of the different horizons also permitted inquiry in the breadth of human knowing.²⁴ On the one hand, while Kant's categorization of the horizon produces an inorganic static horizon, on the other hand, it does make way for philosophical reflection on what the horizon may actually be, which is why Geniusas notes: "horizon could be said to have its origins in Kant's works."²⁵ Furthermore, Geniusas notes that Kant was responding to the objective horizon put forth by Leibniz concerning the distinctions between an objective horizon and a subjective horizon, which is why we still witness a polarized horizon within Modernity.²⁶ Yet as complex as the above articulations of the concept of horizon are, we still have an elusive understanding of the philosophical concept of horizon and a subject bound to its situation.

What may be said about the notion of horizon formulated in Modernity is that it produced a genuine turn to the human subject, making way for a focus on "subjectivity *qua* human." This focus recovered the Ancient and Mediaeval dance between the subject-object polarity, and

²⁴ Geniusas, 2012, 4.

²⁵ Geniusas, 2012, 4.

²⁶ See Geniusas, 2012, 4.

permitted a serious inquiry into what it means to be a human being making meaning in the world.

According to Geniusas:

Such an “epistemological turn” in the horizon-problematic meant that it was no longer possible to speak of the human being *finding itself* within a predetermined cosmological horizon. It was no longer a question of determining the place of the human soul, or the human being, within a metaphysical framework... rather than *finding itself* in the predetermined ontological horizon, the human being *has* its own horizon of knowledge. The horizon thereby became a matter of *reflection and self-determination*.²⁷

Within this, the Modern inquiry into the notion of horizon halted the organic horizon of St. Thomas. In addition, the concept of “*reflection and self-determination*” is one that arguably took stronger root and greater importance with Lonergan’s conception of the horizon through his philosophy of subject and account of the *cognitional structure* of the human subject than it did with Leibniz and Kant. It is for that reason the works of Lonergan on the notion of horizon provide a solution to the horizon-problematic. Moreover, it would be dishonest to suggest that Lonergan’s philosophizing of the depth psychology produced during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries that produced a sound understanding of the philosophical horizon was without aid. The uncovering of the historical horizon by Friedrich Nietzsche, together with Edmund Husserl’s analysis of the phenomenological horizon and Martin Heidegger’s analysis of *Dasein*, contributed overwhelmingly to Lonergan’s ability to articulate precisely how we may enrich our understanding of the philosophical concept of horizon.

²⁷ Geniusas, 2012, 3. Author’s emphasis.

1.2

On the Philosophical Concept of Horizon and the Problem Therein

The arrival of a philosophical concept of horizon and the problem emergent within—as distinct from that which had been posited during the Mediaeval and Modern periods—is worth noting. As an important aside, I will carry out this inquiry not according to the chronology of how the philosophers appear in history, but by the way in which their ideas posit an understanding that uncovers the problem of defining the philosophical concept of horizon. I start the discussion with Edmund Husserl and Martin Heidegger.

1.2.1 Edmund Husserl

Husserl begins with the “I and My World About Me,” the first sensory experience of the world by the human subject. This experience is intuitive and sets the “*field of perception*.”²⁸ Recall Geniusas’ quote about Husserl’s understanding of the origins of the philosophical concept of horizon, in which he points out how Husserl holds “*the world...to be the rudimentary figure of the horizon*.”²⁹ What Husserl establishes is the *familiar*, the *known*, the immediate surrounding of the human subject. The *familiar* brings about an “attention” to the vast space, which constantly contains “co-perceived surroundings.” To “co-perceive” involves knowledge of objects that show themselves in the environment of what is immediately perceived.³⁰ For example, while I am intentionally typing on this computer, my immediate attention is directed towards the words I am writing, the computer itself, the table it is on, the chair I am sitting on,

²⁸ Edmund Husserl, *Ideas: General Introduction to Pure Phenomenology*, trans. W. R. Boyce Gibson (London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd, 1931), 101.

²⁹ Geniusas, 2012, 8. Emphasis is the author’s.

³⁰ Husserl, *Ideas*, 1931, 101.

the cup of water I drink occasionally, the books I refer to; yet there also are the bookshelves surrounding me, my front and backyard, the things in the basement, the outside that is Stone Rd., the constant traffic of people in my community etc., all of which are now “co-perceived” along with the computer, the chair etc. However while all my perceived objects will give me an “immediate environment” in the *present-now*, there still exists a “misty” ring of *indeterminacy* around my “immediate environment” that I may never fully exhaust. Together, the immediate and indeterminate produce a *temporal horizon* of my conscious “now” while simultaneously producing a zone of indeterminate infiniteness: “the misty horizon that can never be completely outlined,” but is always there.³¹

In other words Husserl maintains that the infinite amount of data contained in the future, together with the infinite amount of data held in the memory of the past, will produce a two-fold horizon for the subject. This two-fold horizon is the temporal present—my immediate objects in the “now”—and the infinite past and future—a world both known and unknown, both alive in the present and “unalive” in the past and future.³² In addition, in his *Ideas of Phenomenology*, Husserl speaks of the concept of horizon in general: “the *relation between cognition and its object*, but in the *reduced* sense, according to which we are dealing not with human cognition, but with cognition in general.”³³ In short, Husserl’s understanding of the philosophical concept of horizon is conditioned by time-consciousness, duration, change, experience and intentionality.

³¹ Husserl, *Ideas*, 1931, 102.

³² Husserl, *Ideas*, 1931, 102.

³³ Edmund Husserl, *The Idea of Phenomenology*, trans. William P. Alston and George Nakhnikian, (1907. Netherlands: Martinus Nijhoff, the Hague, 1964), 60. Husserl’s emphasis.

What Husserl offers to the understanding of the philosophical concept of horizon as it stands in relation to the subject is a horizon that is bound by perception and practicality but also filled with value—values already given within the objects that then “furnish” the human subject with the data to perceive said objects as either beautiful and pleasant or disagreeable and hard on the eye.³⁴ This already-valued is a concept Martin Heidegger incorporates in his notion of ‘worldhood’ and the *ready-to-hand*. In addition, while Heidegger will also make use of depth psychology in order to develop further his own concept of horizon, the definition still remains vague and puts forth a rather pessimistic view of the subject, living towards death, until we arrive at Lonergan’s contribution.

1.2.2 Martin Heidegger

Heidegger’s understanding of the philosophical concept of horizon begins with a reinterpretation of *Being*. This reinterpretation is an attempt to rupture the way *Being* was employed and understood after the Greek philosophers until the twentieth century. To elaborate, after the Ancient philosophers the concept of *Being* began to abandon the importance of the human subject. Once the notion of *Being* was held to be unconditioned, that is Being itself did not need a human mind or any subject for that matter to validate its existence, essence or truth, the notion itself detached from the human subject leaving a neglected, displaced subject incapable of disclosing truth regarding its *being* through its experience in the world.³⁵ In other words, what the human subject experienced was irrelevant to the truth of Being. This view of Being became problematic, especially for Heidegger, therefore, what Heidegger set out to do in his earlier work

³⁴ Husserl, *Ideas*, 1931, 103.

³⁵ Bernard Lonergan S.J., *The Subject* (Milwaukee, WI: Marquette University Press, 1968), 3. Also see Kenneth L. Schmitz “Part I. Being,” in *The Texture of Being: Essays in First Philosophy* (Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 2007), 3-131, for a further discussion on the reconciliation of the “being of the ancients with the subjectivity of the moderns.”

Sein und Zeit was to revisit the question of *Being* in order to posit: “Being is always the Being of an entity.”³⁶ And for Heidegger, while an entity may be human or non-human, the entity that is of his focus is called *Dasein*. *Dasein* is a general *being-there* that belongs to the human subject—in everyday German, *Dasein* simply translates to ‘existence’—and is always understood “in terms of its existence...[and] possibilities” in the world.³⁷ For Heidegger the constitution of *Dasein* is *care* understood in three ways: *thrownness* into-the-world; as *ahead-of-itself*, *i.e.* towards-something; and as always *being-alongside* with “things ready-to-hand within-the-world.”³⁸ Heidegger holds that before any discussion of the structure of *Being* may be carried out, insofar as that *Being* is the entity referred to as *Dasein*, “the horizon for the question of Being” must be clarified.³⁹ This horizon for Heidegger will contain the “*phenomenon of the world*” and it is being present—or *being-there*—in said ‘world’ that will set the parameters for the subject’s horizon.⁴⁰ Thus we see Heidegger start out with a position of the philosophical concept of horizon similar to that of Husserl, where the subject conditions the horizon while the *pregivenness* of the world sets the limits. For Heidegger there will be no timeless, unchanged account for that which *is*, as that which *is*, is always transforming through relationships with *things* in a world with an already-given meaning.

Recall Husserl’s position on the values already gifted in objects for the subject to receive effortlessly. With the concept of horizon that Husserl asserts, an understanding of *pure phenomenological data* involving the abstraction of the “givenness of essences” and the

³⁶ Martin Heidegger, *Being and Time*, translated by John Macquarrie & Edward Robinson (New York: Harper & Row, 1962), H.9.

³⁷ Heidegger, *Being*, 1962, H.13.

³⁸ Heidegger, *Being*, 1962, H.192-3.

³⁹ Heidegger, *Being*, 1962, H.45.

⁴⁰ Heidegger, *Being*, 1962, H.87.

“universalizing of appearances” in everything is present. The horizon for Husserl of the “universalizing of appearances and essences” will thus become the infinite “range of vision,” which makes the temporal horizon an endless unfolding of the individual horizon wherever the subject moves throughout space and time.⁴¹ Husserl will give a temporal and infinite horizon to every object. When the subject encounters a given object, there is an expansion of the field of vision for the subject in a constantly ongoing process. It is for this reason that Husserl’s understanding of the philosophical concept of horizon will posit no “system,” *i.e.* there will be no systematic teleological unfolding of events for the subject, just an infinite amount of data to be perceived intentionally and subconsciously.⁴² Heidegger, however, while departing from this general, universal understanding of the philosophical concept of horizon, still falls prey to the subject-object polarity found in Husserl in order to posit a concept horizon that is conditioned by time and within a kind of system.

More importantly, the preamble on the first page of the translation of *Being and Time* states: “Our provisional aim is the Interpretation of *time* as the possible horizon for any understanding whatsoever of Being.”⁴³ What is most revealing about the above statement is the footnote explicating the notion of horizon in the English translation. Translators John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson define what Heidegger intends by horizon as: “something which we can neither widen nor go beyond, but which provides the limits for certain intellectual activities performed ‘within’ it.”⁴⁴ It is here that the reader is provided with the boundaries of the entire

⁴¹ Husserl, *Ideas*, 1931, 103; Husserl, *The Idea*, 53.

⁴² Edmund Husserl, *Phenomenology and the Crisis of Philosophy*, trans. Quentin Lauer (New York: Harper & Row, 1965), 75. See footnote 8 and *The Basic Problems of Phenomenology (1910-1911)* by Husserl.

⁴³ Heidegger, *Being*, 1962, H.1.

⁴⁴ Heidegger, *Being*, 1962, H.1.

corpus of *Being and Time*: “time [is] the transcendental horizon for the question of Being.”⁴⁵ To unpack Heidegger’s concept of horizon further, on the one hand horizon has a collective understanding as something fixed. On the other hand, there is an understanding of horizon that shifts due to a modification of the world around the subject; I will return to the latter shortly. To elaborate on the former, what fixes the collective horizon, *i.e.* what provides the limit for all intellectual activities, is death. Therefore there will be no nuanced intellectual activities to be encountered beyond what has already been established and given in the world. Heidegger states:

Death is the possibility of the absolute impossibility of Dasein. Thus death reveals itself as that *possibility which is one’s ownmost, which is non-relational, and which is not to be outstripped*. As such, death is something distinctively impending...based on the fact that Dasein is essentially disclosed to itself...in Being-toward-death.⁴⁶ Our analysis of death remains purely ‘this-worldly’ in so far as it [death] interprets that phenomenon merely in the way in which it *enters into* any particular Dasein as a possibility of its Being.⁴⁷

Death for Heidegger is the very essence of temporality and temporality sets the parameters of the horizon. Therefore horizon is *Dasein’s*, *i.e.* it belongs to Being qua *Dasein*. Death is the only experience *Dasein* is not responsible for “procuring” yet it is an experience every *Dasein* must carry out, which paradoxically ends *Dasein’s* experience in the world as *Dasein*.⁴⁸ This existential problem for *Dasein* reveals an anthropological horizon that exists within an incomplete *closed* system, where *wholeness* is found in one way, yet never achieved due to Heidegger’s philosophical concept of horizon as bounded and fixed. This will differ from Hegel’s system, for example, where while it is also a *closed* system wholeness may still be achieved. This idea of a *closed* system will reveal itself as problematic when considering Lonergan’s position on the philosophical concept of horizon. (Lonergan addresses the notion of a

⁴⁵ Heidegger, *Being*, 1962, H. 39.

⁴⁶ Heidegger, *Being*, 1962, H. 251. Emphasis Heidegger’s.

⁴⁷ Heidegger, *Being*, 1962, H. 248. Emphasis Heidegger’s.

⁴⁸ Heidegger, *Being*, 1962, H. 236.

closed system and subsequently remedies the boundaries placed on the philosophical concept of horizon by Heidegger through his philosophy of subject and his analysis of the *cognitional structure* of the human subject, which we shall unpack further on in this thesis.) Heidegger's understanding of *time* as *the* possible horizon, together with his analytic of *Being*—which is coexistent with time—postulates a great limited horizon of death that engulfs the potentiality of a flexible horizon to be cultivated by the human subject in the 'now'.⁴⁹ Therefore the ultimate goal for Heidegger's human subject is to achieve an authentic state of *being*, which comes about through "anxiety in the face of death." Anxiety discloses the very real fact that "Dasein exists as thrown Being *towards* its end."⁵⁰ There appears to be a temporary state of authenticity achieved through anxiety. For example, if we take this understanding and apply it to the painting "Julie and I'univers" we considered at the start of this work, the anxiety expressed in Lemieux's human subject reveals that everything "ready-to-hand sinks away, and so, in general, do entities within-the-world."⁵¹ Michèle Grandbois' description of Lemieux's work in general as "De l'insouciance à l'angoisse, en passant par la quête des horizons du monde," speaks to the horizon painted as mood, and the mood understood as anxiety makes Heidegger's anthropology of death adroit. In other words: "the 'world' can offer nothing more, and neither can the Dasein-with of Others."⁵² This explains why 'Julie' expresses such solitude and angst. For 'Julie' there is no solace in the world of the painting: 'Julie' while distanced from others still does not experience a *wholeness*; only death will liberate her, but a death she will never know as she exists in the painting yet a

⁴⁹ Martin Heidegger, *On Time and Being*, trans. Joan Stambaugh (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1972), 2-3.

⁵⁰ Heidegger, *Being*, 1962, H. 251.

⁵¹ Heidegger, *Being*, 1962, H. 187.

⁵² Heidegger, *Being*, 1962, H. 187.

death she must experience in the imminent future. This produces a genuine anxiety in the face of the possibility of the impossibility of *Dasein*.

The return to the human subject witnessed in Heidegger's horizon places a microscope on the human subject long enough to see that death is the most genuine horizon that brings about a truly new and authentic field of vision. Death is the one experience the human subject has no knowledge of, yet is the only experience the human subject *truly ever owns and will experience*. This is what ultimately surfaces when I sit with Lemieux's painting 'Julie et l'univers:' anxiety, solitude, wonder, *my horizon*, my impending death. On the contrary, there is a bright side that grounds the human subject. The human condition in our 'modern plus' society makes the distancing of oneself attractive; however this is duplicitous as the twenty-first century witnesses the human subject engulfed by a profound destructive solipsism that neglects the reality that human beings are social beings and are ultimately made for relationship. Through relationships a collective understanding is created through language and memory. This is where Gadamer will deliver a strong historical argument for the way to self-knowledge. At the heart of Gadamer's concept of *horizon* is a subjective intention that both prescribes and limits the human subject's understanding of self, "historical alterity" and the world in general.⁵³ This will be addressed shortly.

Taking a step back, I am providing a gross oversimplification of a very complex dynamic set of relationships put forward by Heidegger: in addition, for brevity, I am leaving out much of Heidegger's philosophy that unpacks the condition of the human subject. Nevertheless, it is my

⁵³ Gadamer, 2013, 313.

contention that while Heidegger will emancipate the human subject from its dogmatic scholastic slumber, his human subject is then immediately forced towards the bleak reality of death as the only possibility, which is one's own—yet a possibility that is incapable of being fully *experienced* as oneself in the world. Simply put, the whole quest towards authenticity for Heidegger is ostensibly bound to a worldview that grows skeptical of the human condition, which is in constant orientation towards the temporal horizon of death. Heidegger's conception of horizon still does not fully explain what may be understood by horizon, as there is the horizon of time, death, the world and the subject. This leads me to ask: What are the reference frames Heidegger possesses in shaping his philosophical concept of horizon?

Heidegger's concept of horizon articulates the human subject in such a way that it has much to explore, understand and expand upon in the world in order to achieve a fuller understanding of itself. While for the collective—as in not the individual but the group—the horizon is conditioned by time and confined by death. For the individual who finds him or herself *thrown* into existence, death is still its ultimate horizon, however he or she must first navigate the world primarily through language and relationships. Discourse thus becomes the mode of communication, as discursive language is the business of the human subject: through this form of language intelligibility is expressed, disclosed, understood, and shared. This understanding of human relationships for Heidegger places his philosophical concept of horizon as bound to “states-of-mind and understanding.”⁵⁴ Heidegger's concept of horizon will be capable of shifting for the individual through language, as this is where the subject is most vulnerable to “falling prey” to the *public* “they.” The *public* makes up the “phenomenal *horizon*”

⁵⁴ Heidegger, *Being*, 1962, H. 160-2.

of everydayness and includes what Heidegger refers to as: *idle talk*, *curiosity*, *ambiguity* and *anxiety*.⁵⁵ The conversations of the everyday: gossip about the “one” never present, the ever menacing “one” who is always removed yet experiences everything no one wants to experience, and the *idle* talk of everyday which seeks to “dissolve” the subject into the other, all attempt to strip the subject of *wholeness* and authenticity and subsequently bounds its individual horizon.

While Heidegger understands that *being-with* is unavoidable—*being-with* is constitutive to the subject—what Heidegger ultimately intends to carry out is an “individualization” of his subject through *anxiety*, which has the characteristic of a distinct disclosure of the whole self that structures and modifies what may be termed the phenomenal horizon. The phenomenal horizon becomes a *state-of-mind* and Heidegger’s discussion of the individual’s horizon becomes one of mood—*anxiety*, which reorganizes the subject to be *ahead-of-itself* opening up the ‘possibility of impossibility’: death.⁵⁶ The individual’s horizon discussed by Heidegger—while giving the appearance of being a cascading event for the individual renegotiating relationships in the world—has with it a return to the very real fact that the only thing *Dasein* (the subject) has to look forward to is its own death: the ultimate horizon conditioned by time. In my estimation, the philosophical concept of horizon by Heidegger sees the subject lacking rationality. Heidegger’s philosophical concept of horizon operates within an arguably closed system, where it is difficult to separate what belongs to the individual, what belongs to the collective, what belongs to the subject and what belongs to the object. This difficulty is what contributes to a lack of clarity within Heidegger’s concept of horizon. Despite Heidegger’s arguably closed system, when

⁵⁵ Heidegger, *Being*, 1962, H. 166-7.

⁵⁶ Heidegger, *Being*, 1962, H. 189-92.

unpacking what may be considered his philosophical concept of horizon, what he does contribute, along with Husserl, is an indispensable in-depth understanding of consciousness when discussing horizon.

Heidegger's advancement of the philosophical concept of horizon recognizes the power of language and conversation. The state-of-mind coupled with discourse utilizes depth psychology in a way that centers on the subject and calls forth the complexities of its realms of knowing. Similar to Heidegger in terms of language but contrary by way of the importance of history, Hans-Georg Gadamer will posit a conception of horizon that opens up Heidegger's subject but incorporates the role of history and the power of transposing oneself into the past by remaining in the present. This in turn will open the door for Lonergan's solution to the problem of clarifying the philosophical concept of horizon by illustrating the importance of positing a dynamic universe.

Whereas Heidegger discusses the philosophical concept of horizon as mood, Gadamer, a student of Heidegger, transforms Heidegger's *state-of-mind* and describes horizon through the concept of "situation:"

Every finite present has its limitations. We define the concept of "situation" by saying that it represents a standpoint that limits the possibility of vision. Hence essential to the concept of situation is the concept of "*horizon*". The horizon is the range of vision that includes everything that can be seen from a particular vantage point. Applying this to the thinking mind, we speak of narrowness of horizon, of possible expansion of horizon, of the opening up of new horizons, and so forth. Since Nietzsche and Husserl, the word has been used in philosophy to characterize the way in which thought is tied to its finite determinacy, and the way one's range of vision if gradually expanded. A person who has no horizon does not see far enough and hence over-values what is nearest to him. On the other hand, "to have a horizon" means not being limited to what is nearby but being able to see beyond it.⁵⁷

⁵⁷ Gadamer, 2013, 313.

1.2.3 Hans-Georg Gadamer

Horizon—generally speaking—is derived from concrete experiences to be abstracted into a “universal horizon consciousness.”⁵⁸ What is witnessed with Gadamer that was lacking in Heidegger is an organic horizon: one that originated with St. Thomas Aquinas and not only denotes the limitations of the present but also speaks positively of what lies beyond “one’s field of vision.”⁵⁹ Gadamer’s understanding of horizon finds root in Husserl, while arguably being shaped by Heidegger. Commenting on Husserl, Gadamer believed that what Husserl intended by the philosophical concept of horizon is: “something that moves with one and invites one to advance further.”⁶⁰ A horizon is thus flexible and becomes a way of discussing one’s ‘standpoint’ or “situation.” Arguably one area where Heidegger conditions Gadamer’s notion of horizon is with the discussion of “situation.” Heidegger describes a “situation” as: “an overtone of a signification that is spatial...on the basis of which existence always determines its ‘location’.”⁶¹ A “situation” then for Gadamer becomes the circumstance in which the human subject finds him or herself. When existing in the present, the subject is incapable of “standing outside” of their “situation.” Where Gadamer will depart from Heidegger is that a “situation” is ultimately inexhaustible, as the subject is never capable of fully illuminating it.⁶² For Gadamer, a “situation” will be hermeneutical, *i.e.* conditioned by tradition, in essence conditioned by history. Gadamer states that: “all self-knowledge arises from what is historically pregiven,”⁶³ whereas for Heidegger a “situation” is arguably determined and present-at-hand therefore not connected to

⁵⁸ Gadamer, 2013, 247.

⁵⁹ Gadamer, 2013, 313.

⁶⁰ Gadamer, 2013, 313.

⁶¹ Heidegger, *Being*, 1962, H. 299.

⁶² Gadamer, 2013, 312.

⁶³ Gadamer, 2013, 313.

the same sense of history as read in Gadamer. This will position Gadamer's concept of horizon as historical and in turn become a way for the subject to participate in an *open world process*—a process Lonergan will expound throughout his metaphysics.

According to Gadamer an historical horizon requires historical consciousness. Once again we read a horizon bound to the notion of consciousness; however Gadamer believed that all knowledge of self is historically conditioned and as a result understanding the past is a great undertaking for Gadamer's subject. The historical past is known to the present in two ways: inanimate artefacts and animate text. It is within texts that we encounter Gadamer's second condition of his philosophical concept of horizon, language. Language is expressed not only through a piece of writing but also through conversation. A conversation may be through an immediate back-and-forth dialogue or through history by tradition-from-tradition. When Gadamer describes what is disclosed through conversation, a multifarious concept of horizon emerges: the horizon of the speaker/writer, the horizon of the hearer/reader and the universal horizon that discloses the human condition.⁶⁴ What the reader is left with in Gadamer's conception of horizon is the positive notion that a horizon is incapable of being *fixed*:

But now it is important to avoid the error of thinking that the horizon of the present consists of a fixed set of opinions and valuations, and that the otherness of the past can be foregrounded from it as from a fixed ground. In fact the horizon of the present is continually in the process of being formed because we are continually having to test all our prejudices. An important part of this testing occurs in encountering the past and in understanding the tradition from which we come. Hence the horizon of the present cannot be formed without the past. There is no more an isolated horizon of the present in itself than there are historical horizons which have to be acquired. *Rather, understanding is always the fusion of these horizons supposedly existing by themselves.*⁶⁵

Gadamer posits that different levels of horizons are contained within a person and that it is persons who set in motion the horizons that move with us, thus no person can have a “truly

⁶⁴ Gadamer, 2013, 314.

⁶⁵ Gadamer, 2013, 316-317. Emphasis Gadamer's.

closed horizon.”⁶⁶ Historical consciousness then is something reflected by the subject’s capacity for awareness—an awareness of transposing the self within the tradition of another to reveal one, great “single historical horizon.” This single horizon will bring together various pasts that contribute to its movement on the measure of time.⁶⁷ Let us consider the collective narratives found throughout religion and use early Christianity as an example. When the early ‘Christians’ or Nazarenes in the first century A.D. were considered followers of Jesus, who was Jewish, Jesus tells them: “no prophet is accepted in the prophet’s home town” (Luke: 4:24, NRSV). In this example, Christianity has become one single horizon recognized in the twenty-first century only through the transposing of one narrative into the other, from tradition to tradition. Only after the “prophet” was recognized not only in their hometown but also in other people’s towns throughout time was it possible for a “single historical horizon” known as Christianity to arise. It is here that Gadamer’s philosophical concept of horizon may be understood as a kind of ‘universalism,’ entailing the achievement of a higher collective viewpoint.⁶⁸

While Gadamer’s historical and linguistic reflections give the concept of horizon further depth, this does not however provide greater clarity to what may be meant by a philosophical concept of horizon. The philosophical concept of horizon that was slowly becoming something distinct with Heidegger becomes more vague with Gadamer. Gadamer’s focus on the historical horizon does not provide further clarity to what may be intended by a philosophical concept of horizon, as the fusion of subjective, objective as well as past and present horizons makes way for confusion on what precisely a horizon is responsible for, what its purpose is and why it must be

⁶⁶ Gadamer, 2013, 315.

⁶⁷ Gadamer, 2013, 315.

⁶⁸ Gadamer, 2013, 316.

something of focus for the subject. Similarly when considering Friedrich Nietzsche's view of history, we will read that a historical understanding of horizon may prove problematic, as Nietzsche was very skeptical of the role of history in providing an accurate understanding of the subject.

1.2.4 Friedrich Nietzsche

Nietzsche's view of the abuse of history is connected with his understanding of happiness and freedom.⁶⁹ For Nietzsche the subject is weighed down by its past and thus is suffering from a historical affliction of the past. If the subject is to live freely and unhindered by the past, the subject must "break up and dissolve a part of the past."⁷⁰ Much of this understanding of history and the subject's role therein is found in Nietzsche's essay *On the Advantage and Disadvantage of History for Life*, where he names three types of history: *monumental*, *antiquarian* and *critical*. It is within the *critical* species of history that we read of a subject "obsessively immersed in the task of freeing [him/herself] entirely from the chain of" great achievements noted as continuing the "power of human creativity," and the fear of seeking novelty as a result of a strict sense of historicity.⁷¹ For example, Nietzsche criticized dogmatic metaphysics for the chains it placed on the ever-developing subject's ability to know *itself* in *its* present condition. It is Nietzsche's contention that the subject must have its own horizon in order to be joyful, prosperous and constantly creating *its* world.⁷² While Gadamer's philosophical concept of horizon has a continuity of consciousness made possible by the subject's ability to transpose itself to past

⁶⁹ Friedrich Nietzsche, "History," in *The Philosophy of Nietzsche*, ed. Geoffrey Clive (New York: New American Library, 1965), 221.

⁷⁰ Jeff Mitscherling, "The Historical Consciousness of Man," *History of European Ideas*, 11 (1989): 736.

⁷¹ Mitscherling, "The Historical," 1989, 734-736. Also see Friedrich Nietzsche, *On the Advantage and Disadvantage of History for Life*, Translated by Peter Preuss (Indianapolis, IN: Hackett, 1980) for a complete explication of the different species of history.

⁷² Nietzsche, "History," 1965, 221.

periods through historical literature and dialogue, Nietzsche will detest this burden and reinforce the need for the subject to shed *its* historical self.⁷³ Nietzsche held that the “historical sense...destroys the living thing, be it [the subject], or a people or a system.”⁷⁴

According to Nietzsche, taking history too seriously demystifies a culture and does violence to a given culture’s collective memory by providing “no break” in the horizon.⁷⁵ Take for example Stanley Kubrick’s *2001: A Space Odyssey*.⁷⁶ When interpreted metaphorically, the history of humanity is delineated by the appearance of a black monolith, which represents a ‘separation’ of one historical horizon from another. The black monolith allows the historical myths of human and non-human primates to be contained within their individual horizons, that is the traditions, cultural norms, languages, etc., are distinctly displayed from one time period to another. The black monolith, for the viewer, prevents an assimilation of what is distinctly non-human from what is distinctly human and also what is distinctly belonging to one time period from another. For Nietzsche, a separation (as opposed to the conflation) of the historical horizon is necessary, as during the shift from one distinct horizon to another, creativity enters the world and the subject is capable of appropriating a “superhistorical” viewpoint. The black monolith—as a representation of a ‘break’ in the horizon—also appears to initiate creativity and novelty in the world around it.⁷⁷ For Nietzsche, a “superhistorical” subject recognizes the greatness of the

⁷³ Nietzsche, “History,” 1965, 219.

⁷⁴ Nietzsche, “History,” 1965, 220.

⁷⁵ Nietzsche, “History,” 1965, 220-1.

⁷⁶ *2001: A Space Odyssey*, DVD, directed by Stanley Kubrick (Burbank, CA, Warner Bros., 1968).

⁷⁷ The black monolith as a physical representation of novelty and new beginnings is illustrated more explicitly in the sequel film *2010: The Year We Make Contact*, whereas in the original film the black monolith may be interpreted as a metaphorical symbol of novelty.

past in order to reorganize their stance in the present, without a complete dissolution into the past.⁷⁸

Nietzsche's understanding of the wild "beast" who grazes "unhistorical" and the historically conscious subject with a parochial horizon due to the weight of the past, fails to grasp what Gadamer points out: if undertaken correctly, the subject will never lose sight of its present when acquiring the historical horizon of the past. In Gadamer's defense, he held that there must always be a "guard against overhastily assimilating the past."⁷⁹ Gadamer held that "to be historically means that knowledge of oneself can never be complete," thus on one hand, what Gadamer contributes to the discussion of the philosophical concept of horizon through history is an *open world process*, where the subject's self knowledge is inexhaustible.⁸⁰ On the other hand, Gadamer's concept of horizon appears to be bound to the past in a Hegelian-like system that discloses the 'whole of world history' through each culture and epoch of peoples.⁸¹ (Again, this is something Lonergan addresses, which will be discussed shortly.) It is in this criticism that I welcome Nietzsche's grand refutation of too much attention directed towards history in understanding the philosophical concept of horizon. Nietzsche's contribution keeps the concept of the horizon honest by reminding the subject to never 'lose itself.' This criticism of Nietzsche on the overuse of history is also noted by Geniusas:

[I]n Friedrich Nietzsche's... writings, the notion of the horizon figures in the context of their reflections on history and culture. According to the position that Nietzsche defended in his *Use and Abuse of History*, it is the blindness to the actual historical horizons one inhabits that has given rise to the alarming consequences, which stem from the objectivism of modern historical science. As Hans-Georg Gadamer was later to observe, it was Nietzsche who first disclosed to us

⁷⁸ Nietzsche, "History," 1965, 222-3.

⁷⁹ Gadamer, 2013, 316.

⁸⁰ Gadamer, 2013, 313.

⁸¹ Hegel, *The Philosophy of History*, translated by Leo Rauch (Indianapolis, IN: Hackett Publishing Company, 1988), 75.

that the methodological orientation of historical sciences gives rise to a disturbing weakness of evaluation.⁸²

Using history in order to appropriate examples of greatness and to learn from moments of shortcomings creates a positive contribution to the discussion of horizon. The purpose of this digression into Nietzsche's understanding of history and how it pertains to the philosophical concept of horizon was to demonstrate how Gadamer actually makes the concept less clear than it was before. While Gadamer's understanding of the philosophical concept of horizon does place great importance on self-awareness and self-appropriation, the call for a clear definition of the concept of horizon first posited by Husserl is still not given.⁸³

Worth noting about the thinkers above is that self-consciousness appears to be the thread woven into the drapery that is the philosophical concept of horizon. In addition, the rupture of a timeless, objectified horizon ushered in with Heidegger's concept of horizon advanced the understanding of the concept greatly. While Heidegger only directly mentions the word "horizon" a few times throughout his magnum opus, what may be pieced together as his conception of horizon is expressed throughout his entire *Analytic of Dasein*, which binds *Dasein's* horizon with time and its quest for authenticity in the world. Conversely Hans-Georg Gadamer in *Truth and Method* posits a conception of a forever-shifting horizon that is linguistically and historically conditioned through dialogue. What will eventually occur with Heidegger and Gadamer are two very different human subjects that are also harmonious as they both set out to achieve a similar goal: a reorganization of the subject towards a more authentic self. But what exactly this "authentic self" looks like or better yet, what the goal of the authentic

⁸² Geniusas, 2012, 4.

⁸³ Gadamer, 2013, 315.

self is, is not stated. While the contribution from Gadamer, Nietzsche, Heidegger and Husserl to the philosophical concept of horizon is rich, the lack of clarity in the concept remains in the fact that everything contains a horizon—animate and inanimate objects alike. Moreover, the importance of understanding the role of horizon as it pertains to the subject is also not clearly stated. A horizon contained in animate and inanimate objects alike leaves the philosophical concept to shift according to object and subject as well as fuse together depending on perspective, space and time. As I shall now demonstrate, the work of Lonergan helps to clarify what may be meant by the philosophical concept of horizon, permitting us to return to the works of his predecessors in order to read them in a new light.

Chapter Two:

A Solution to the Problem

In Chapter One I briefly reviewed the origins of the philosophical concept of horizon—its emergence as something objective, anthropological, psychological, phenomenological and/or subjective. The goal of this discussion was to point to the problem of the lack of clarity in this concept. Geniusas holds that this problem may be attributed to the fact that in post-Husserlian thought the question of the origins of horizon and any real analysis of the philosophical concept of horizon as a whole have simply not been pursued:

Husserl is the *first* philosopher to have raised the question of the origins of the horizon *explicitly*, and in the context of the horizon-problematic, he granted this question preeminent significance. Yet surprisingly, Husserl is also the *last* philosopher to have problematized the horizon by raising such a concern. As we will see, the question of origins has almost completely disappeared from the landscape of philosophy in post-Husserlian thought. Starting with the second-generation phenomenologists and hermeneuticists, this question has, on a number of fronts, been interpreted as an *illegitimate* question, which severely constrains Husserl's concrete investigations.⁸⁴

As I chronicled the philosophical concept of horizon through the works of Heidegger and Gadamer for example— to which Geniusas' reference to the “second-generation of phenomenologist and hermeneuticists” may apply—we read that the philosophical concept of horizon struggled to clarify its position as something objective, subjective and/or intersubjective and this led to a lack of clarity with what may be precisely understood by the concept as a whole as it pertains to the human subject. This is not, however—as Geniusas points out—due to a lack of taking the question of the origin of the horizon seriously; it is a result of not casting the net of

⁸⁴ Geniusas, 2012, 9-10.

thinkers treating the topic wide enough. It is here that I reintroduce Bernard Lonergan S.J. (1904-1984).

Bernard Joseph Francis Lonergan was an economist, philosopher, professor and above all, a theologian and Jesuit priest. While his intellectual quests spanned many fields (biology, economics, epistemology, history, mathematics, etc), what guided his inquiries was a general concern for “the underlying dynamic patterns of questioning whereby new discoveries are generated and previous contents are transcended.”⁸⁵ To unpack what may be understood by the “underlying dynamic patterns of questioning” Lonergan produced many works on topics ranging from metaphysics and theology to psychology and economics. As a result Lonergan was a prolific writer during the mid-to-late twentieth century and his *Collected Works* (consisting of 25 volumes) are currently being reproduced by the University of Toronto Press for the Lonergan Research Institute located at Regis College, Toronto School of Theology at the University of Toronto.⁸⁶ His most notable works (and the ones of main concern for this study) are his magnum opus *Insight: A Study of Human Understanding* as well as *Method in Theology*. In both these works (as well as in some subsidiary works), we read of a worldview, a philosophy of the human subject and an analysis of the *cognitional structure* of the human subject that shed considerable light on the human condition and human knowing. More importantly for the purposes of this thesis, Lonergan’s commentary on the human condition makes an indispensable contribution in defining the philosophical concept of horizon as *the necessary field in which the subject operates that facilitates the radical transformation of the subject into a moral being*. This radical

⁸⁵ Matthew L. Lamb, ed., *Creativity and Method: Essays in Honor of Bernard Lonergan, S.J.* (Milwaukee, WI: Marquette University Press, 1981), viii.

⁸⁶ See Bernard Lonergan Estate, 2018, “Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan,” *The Lonergan Research Institute @ Regis College*, <http://www.lonerganresearch.org/about-us/collected-works-of-bernard-lonergan/>.

transformation provides the grounds for the subject to continue to persuade him/herself to opt for what is truly the Good—the goal of a forever-expanding horizon. It is through the works of Lonergan (when read in a post-Husserlian light), that I contend we have a richer, more precise definition of the philosophical concept of horizon, which in turn addresses the problem posed at the onset of this study.

2.1

On the Worldview of Bernard Lonergan S.J.

The first three chapters of Lonergan’s *Insight* lay out his worldview. This worldview is a *non-systematic world process* distinguished from a *systematic world process*.⁸⁷ To comment on the latter, a *systematic world process* has its value in the “expression of a single idea,” a “set of unified insights,” and reversibility; however, such a world process revisits the same ideas and does not present new ones.⁸⁸ For example in a *systematic world process* the scientifically held position before c.1950 AD claimed that human DNA remained the same and there were no known instances of it ever changing or being affected by internal or external sources. This position was not challenged and held to be a universal truth, as it was held within a *systematic* worldview. Conversely in a *non-systematic world process* other variables outside the ones considered for a specific outcome are taken into account. This permits data from other non-conventional sources and not just ones that yield predictable results as within a *systematic world process*. To continue with my DNA example, the onset of the study of epigenetics in the late

⁸⁷ Bernard Lonergan, *Insight: A Study of Human Understanding* (1957; repr., Toronto, Canada: University of Toronto Press, 2013), 71. A *systematic world process* is defined as “the whole of a systematic process and its every event possess but a single intelligibility that corresponds to a single insight or single set of unified insights [where] any situation can be deduced from any other without an explicit consideration of intervening situations, and the empirical investigation of such a process is marked not only by a notable facility in ascertaining and checking abundant and significant data but also by a supreme moment when all data fall into a single perspective, sweeping deductions become possible, and subsequent exact predictions regularly are fulfilled.”

⁸⁸ Lonergan, *Insight*, 2013, 71; 75.

twentieth and early twenty-first centuries found that data once not considered (such as environmental factors, diet, and stress) contributed to manipulating the human DNA structure over the course of a lifetime, thus rendering it capable of change. This inclusion and acknowledgement of other variables in a *non-systematic world process* is necessary for there to be an ever-unfolding “womb of novelty”⁸⁹ in the world, which is a very important component for the unfolding activity of human knowing and shifting horizons occurring from successive viewpoints. To elaborate, Lonergan’s *non-systematic world process* states: “there will be no single insight, or single set of unified insights, that masters at once the whole process and all its events...because different parts of the process are understood differently, there can be no single combination of selected laws that holds for the whole process.”⁹⁰

The randomness within a *non-systematic world process* will yield many different unrelated insights or sets of insights that albeit do not have intelligibility as an aggregate, yet nevertheless present new data to be pursued.⁹¹ What is intended by there being “no single combination of selected laws that holds for the whole process” is that one may not be able to determine, based on inductive reasoning, that a law derived from a series of experimentations will always hold for future outcomes. Lonergan’s explication of the data presented in a *non-systematic process* is a necessary tool in understanding how new ideas emerge as well as how horizons are expanded for the subject. To briefly digress, within Lonergan’s hermeneutical circle the entire whole—*i.e.* all the knowledge that can ever be attainable—will not ever be entirely gained by one individual subject. This is a critical point in Lonergan’s worldview, as the subject

⁸⁹ Lonergan, *Insight*, 2013, 75.

⁹⁰ Lonergan, *Insight*, 2013, 72. An “insight” is defined as “the supervening act of understanding,” the ‘a-ha’ moment when something is understood.

⁹¹ Lonergan, *Insight*, 2013, 72.

in a *non-systematic world process* is free to re-discover the natural world and re-explore the speculative sciences unhindered, while still adhering to the canon of parsimony, explanation and statistical residue, thereby making room for an ever unfolding novelty.⁹² This freedom rests in contradistinction to what we find in the Modern philosophers like Hegel, for example, while being nestled in a Darwinian worldview. When discussing the concept of horizon that emerged with the Modern philosophers, I mentioned that it was static yet brought considerable attention to the subject; this attention however did not disclose a clear understanding of the philosophical concept of horizon. This becomes even more obvious when we contrast Lonergan's worldview with Hegel's view of "world history."

What Hegel and Lonergan share is that novelty rests with the knower in the world, i.e. the subject. However, the unfolding Spirit and Idea in Hegel's "world history" as *time* and *space*, respectively, brings the close of one epoch while opening up another, thereby connecting the epochs, people, individuals, states, etc.⁹³ In Hegel's system novelty may be witnessed when 'seeing' the whole of "world history" as its successions play out, and while being a very complicated system, "world history" appears to *disclose* itself to the *times* of the people living in *their* particular epoch. In short, this system is closed. Hegel's system declares that the human knower may obtain the whole of human knowing and understanding in its lifetime by looking over the course of history. By contrast a Lonerganian system states the impossibility of the human knower to grasp the whole or even to "cast a glance" at the whole.⁹⁴ For this reason, Lonergan's world system is open and thus becomes the fertile ground for new expanding

⁹² Lonergan, *Insight*, 2013, 105-9.

⁹³ Hegel, 1988, 75.

⁹⁴ Hegel, 1988, 75.

horizons. Lonergan's case for an unfolding open world process where novelty is permitted calls for a dynamic universe, one concretely articulated by Charles Darwin in the mid-nineteenth century. Therefore what I have arrived at is the nexus of Hegel's "World History" and Darwin's dynamic biological anthropology as it stands in relation to Lonergan's discussion of horizon. When we consider the dynamic universe offered by Lonergan's worldview, we may begin to witness how the philosophical concept of horizon may be defined as *the necessary field in which the subject operates that facilitates the radical transformation of the subject*. Lonergan's worldview becomes a preferred point of view when contrasted with a Hegelian worldview. A Lonerganian worldview does not culminate in a *world process* directed towards full knowledge of an 'Absolute Spirit,' which produces a *closed system*. Rather Lonergan discloses a knowing that reveals moments in a *non-systematic world process* that is indeterminate, transcendent and unconditioned, thus arguing for an *open system* with a finite subject and a forever expanding horizon directed towards a "fuller realization of being."⁹⁵ I will return shortly to Lonergan's notion of being as it relates to the subject and the philosophical concept of horizon.

The "Darwinian World View" incorporated by Lonergan utilizes the probable as its main instrument of explanation, as explanation discloses "intelligibility immanent in data."⁹⁶ The search for intelligibility in a *non-systematic world process* appears to be probable only within the bounds of "statistical inquiry" and for brevity, statistical inquiry *investigates and finds intelligibility in what the classical neglects*. In other words the data left over from any form of inquiry becomes the starting position for new information. For example I may only take into

⁹⁵ Lonergan, *Insight*, 2013, 477.

⁹⁶ Lonergan, *Insight*, 2013, 155.

account the destination and amount of persons per car when researching the traffic on Highway 427. For this reason I would not take into account the colours or models of cars travelling on Highway 427 when wanting to research why that particular highway is busiest on Wednesdays from 2pm-5pm. However, such extra-statistical data may yield intelligibility later on producing new information about the drivers on the highway and subsequently making way for a new perspective of the 427. Moreover, and more importantly, the *non-systematic world process* provides the conditions or *moments* for the probability of future seriations.⁹⁷ According to Lonergan, what is *probable* will occur at some point on the measure of time and brings up the discussion of emergence and survival, which may be illustrated through the emergence of an ovum, zygote, honeybees or more generally through Darwin's *natural selection*. *Emergent probability* and subsequent survival thus rest in the realm of explanation when considering Darwin's observational data, where variation accounts for emergence and fitness accounts for survival amongst and within species. The canon of parsimony for Darwin's *natural selection* will later come into play with Gregor Mendel verifying the *how* the emergence or frequency occurred in the first place.

Furthermore, a "Darwinian World View" rests as the preferred direction in rupturing a determinist's worldview that only accounts for classical data, which does not present an ever-evolving flow of new information. In a deterministic worldview, there cannot be anything "new under the sun," which is problematic if we want to speak of the philosophical notion of horizon. Lonergan's worldview permits accountability for a dynamic cosmology articulated by not only Darwin himself but also other proponents of the oft stated: "the only constant in the universe is

⁹⁷ Lonergan, *Insight*, 2013, 143.

change.” Lonergan’s push for an *indeterminate* worldview over a determinant worldview opens up the many different human subjects that find themselves in the world. The different cases of subjects that Lonergan discloses reveal the cognitional faculties necessary for moving about in the world. When Lonergan discusses the many different kinds of human subjects—neglected, truncated, etc.—we read how the successful mastering of certain cognitional faculties depending on the subject is the grounds for how we begin to provide clarity to the philosophical concept of horizon. But first we must discuss Lonergan’s notion of being and how it connects to his articulation of different subjects and *cognitional structure* of the human being.

2.1.1 Lonergan’s Notion of Being

Lonergan’s *notion of being* is to be understood within the context of an *open world system*. His notion of *being* at its core is that of the unrestricted subject that discloses a tension between that which is limited and that which is transcendent. In other words, the *being* of the subject serves as the microcosm of the macrocosm that is the *non-systematic world process*—a *process* understood as a forever unfolding horizon of novelty directed towards a “fuller realization of being.”⁹⁸ While the dynamism of a *non-systematic world process* does not require the subject in order *to be*, when the subject—as a byproduct of this dynamic process—is accounted for, there is a deeper presence existing ‘after-the-physics:’ I speak of the *metaphysical* make-up of the subject, hence its discussion prior to unpacking the different subjects Lonergan puts forth.

It is important to note that any talk of *being* must not be “sterilized” or reduced to “an abstract concept,” which is an important point emphasized by historian, philosopher and

⁹⁸ Lonergan, *Insight*, 2013, 477.

theologian Etienne Gilson in *Being and Some Philosophers*.⁹⁹ Gilson separates *being* to be understood as both verb and noun: as a noun *being* is a signifier of something, as a verb, it is a signifier of action.¹⁰⁰ What Gilson contributes to Lonergan’s notion of *being* is a secondary understanding of *being* that must be known through the subject, and this subject must *exist* in the world.¹⁰¹ Similar to Lonergan, for Gilson there is an understanding of the concrete nature of *being* bound to history and therefore bound to the subject in the world. Moreover, Gilson holds that if *being* is “deprived of existence it [will] no longer account for itself.”¹⁰² This move away from conceptualism and “excessive abstractiveness”—as posited by Lonergan as well—will prevent dismissing “the concrete mode of understanding” located within *being*.¹⁰³ What Lonergan embarked upon (with the assistance of Gilson) is an understanding of *being* that is concrete and intellectual. Lonergan holds that understanding *being* first appears in *questioning* and thus points to the subject’s ability to “intelligently grasp” and “reasonably affirm.”¹⁰⁴ Quietly going beyond Descartes’ *cogito, ergo sum* Lonergan holds that to merely think is not enough; it is in the affirmation of correct judgments within knowing that the fullness of *being* may be participated in; therefore the *notion of being* is “the object of the pure desire to know” rooted in the subject.¹⁰⁵ This “pure desire to know” will be the moving force that draws out the philosophical concept of horizon.¹⁰⁶

⁹⁹ Etienne Gilson, *Being and Some Philosophers*, 2nd ed (Toronto, Canada: Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies.,1952), 213-4.

¹⁰⁰ Gilson, *Being*, 1952, 2-3.

¹⁰¹ Gilson, *Being*, 1952, 206. Emphasis my own.

¹⁰² Gilson, *Being*, 1952, 40.

¹⁰³ Lonergan, *The Subject*, 1968, 10-11.

¹⁰⁴ Lonergan, *Insight*, 2013, 385.

¹⁰⁵ Lonergan, *Insight*, 2013, 372.

¹⁰⁶ Important to note is that Lonergan was a Jesuit Priest, who will ultimately hold in the final chapter of *Insight* that the object of the unrestricted disinterested desire to know is God, thereby positing a universal, teleological unfolding for the human subject. While this fact of Lonergan’s position of the subject’s desire to know reveals such a teleology, for the purposes of this study, I only discuss the aspects that lead the subject to the desired moral mode of being, stopping short of the Beatific Vision as the unrestricted desire to know.

As the subject is a finite, or as Lonergan will state a *proportionate being*, the subject only ever experiences a “second order” of understanding *being*.¹⁰⁷ This elevates the word *notion*, by making *notion* operative in addressing *being* as well as the limitations and range of the subject’s horizon. For Lonergan, *notion* is understood as *unrestricted*, *spontaneous* and *all-pervasive*. As *unrestricted*, *notion* is all-inclusive, anticipatory, and wondrous inquiry. As *spontaneous*, *notion* is consistent, unchanging and in all things. Lastly, as *all-pervasive*, *notion* is the root of everything.¹⁰⁸ While all three articulations of *notion* are applicable to Lonergan’s understanding of *proportionate being*, what I am ultimately communicating through Lonergan’s notion of *being* in general is the grounds for the subject as it concerns what may be articulated as his philosophical concept of horizon. Both Lonergan’s *notion of being* and his philosophical concept of horizon reveal an *open-world process* through the limitations of the subject as well as the field in which such a *being* operates in order to expand their horizon, respectively. Lonergan’s *notion of being* highlights *how* the subject’s experience of the world has the goal of directing the subject towards an indeterminate ‘somewhere out there,’ all the while acknowledging that such an inquiry “is not the starting point but the end of inquiry” for the subject.¹⁰⁹ In other words, Lonergan is very careful not to go “beyond the limits of human experience” while discussing what may be known, grasped, and affirmed.¹¹⁰ This horizon as it pertains to the subject is best understood through the *principle of finality*, but not in a Heideggerian sense.

To elaborate, if a horizon may be understood as intimately linked to consciousness and the consciousness we speak of is that of the subject, when coupled with an understanding of

¹⁰⁷ Lonergan, *Insight*, 2013, 374.

¹⁰⁸ Lonergan, *Insight*, 2013, 375-77; 380.

¹⁰⁹ Lonergan, *Insight*, 2013, 440.

¹¹⁰ Lonergan, *Insight*, 2013, 416.

Lonergan's *notion of being* as an unrestricted, anticipatory underpinning, we arrive at a collective *pure desire to know in-process*, existing within a forever unfolding realm of possibility and novelty.¹¹¹ What thus emerges is a "tension between the finality of world process" and that finality belonging to the subject. Returning to the *principle of finality*, the *notion of being* as it relates to the subject witnesses the anticipation of human consciousness penetrating deeper into the world process. Succinctly put, there is an "upward but indeterminate directed dynamism towards ever fuller realization of being."¹¹² The active attention Lonergan places on the *being* of the subject is part of a movement he attributes to the earlier Modern philosophers to rupture objectivity and conceptualism:

In contemporary philosophy, there is a great emphasis on the subject, and this emphasis may easily be traced to the influence of Hegel, Kierkegaard, Nietzsche, Heidegger, Buber. This fact, however, points to a previous period of neglect. ... A subject may be needed to arrive at truth but, once truth is attained, one is beyond the subject and one has reached a realm that is non-spatial, atemporal, impersonal.¹¹³

During the Mediaeval era, the position on truth—as it was philosophized and theologized—held truth to be *objective*, transcendent, timeless and unchanging. The implications of such a static worldview were the objectification of truth and the belief that there was 'nothing new under the sun.' Now while truth is held as a universal—as well as one of the transcendentals, along with *bonum*, *pulchrum*, and *unum*—the great emphasis on the objectivity of truth disregarded the subject in order to rest in a realm that was "non-spatial, atemporal, impersonal" and *unconditioned*.¹¹⁴ According to Lonergan, for something to be *unconditioned* it must be a combination of: "a conditioned, the link between the conditioned and its conditions

¹¹¹ Lonergan, *Insight*, 2013, 475.

¹¹² Lonergan, *Insight*, 2013, 477.

¹¹³ Lonergan, *The Subject*, 1968, 2.

¹¹⁴ Lonergan, *The Subject*, 1968, 2-3.

and the fulfillment of the conditions.”¹¹⁵ The problem of viewing truth as an *objective*, *unconditioned* “atemporal” notion is that it will have no conditions needed in order for it to be obtained or reasoned to. However, if truth is to be understood as ontologically conditioned as well as the link between the subject and first things, *i.e. being*,¹¹⁶ then the only area for evaluation rests in its fulfillment, which may be an ongoing event carried out by the subject.

It is for this reason that Lonergan understood and articulated the *being* of the subject according to the five ways it finds itself in-the-world: *neglected*, *truncated*, *immanent*, *existential* and *alienated*. These five distinct ways an individual subject finds itself may be summarized as follows: the *Neglected* subject must allow truth to mature and grow within them before abstracting any kind of truth to an “absolute realm;”¹¹⁷ the *Truncated* subject possesses a lack of self-knowledge, “is unaware of [his or her] ignorance, [and] concludes that what [he or she] does not know does not exist;”¹¹⁸ the *truncated* subject is critical for Lonergan’s discussion of the philosophical concept of horizon; the *Existential* subject is “more basically...concerned...with becoming good or evil;”¹¹⁹ the *Alienated* subject “renounces authentic living and drifts into the now seductive and now harsh rhythms of his [or her] psyche and of nature” thus being alienated from him or herself;¹²⁰ and finally the *Immanentist* subject possesses “an intentional self-transcendence,” a “conversion, of a personal philosophic experience.”¹²¹ Important to note is that each subject may be found at various stages within one subject. For example, Lonergan holds

¹¹⁵ Lonergan, *Insight*, 2013, 343.

¹¹⁶ For thinkers like Martin Heidegger, the *being* of concern is always the *being* of the human subject, thus truth is first conditioned by the being of the inquirer.

¹¹⁷ Lonergan, *The Subject*, 1968, 3.

¹¹⁸ Lonergan, *The Subject*, 1968, 8.

¹¹⁹ Lonergan, *The Subject*, 1968, 29.

¹²⁰ Lonergan, *The Subject*, 1968, 32.

¹²¹ Lonergan, *The Subject*, 1968, 13; 18.

that the *neglected* and *truncated* subjects being found within one person results in not only a denouncing of the person's very subjectivity but also a categorical unawareness of a basic kind of human knowing: "The neglected subject does not know himself. The truncated subject not only does not know himself but also is unaware of his ignorance."¹²² Moreover, for the subject, "subjectivity *qua* human"¹²³ ruptures the subject-object polarity and refocuses knowing as an activity grounded in consciousness.¹²⁴ What Lonergan has discerned is the subject as the conduit in the "supervening act of understanding...that occurs easily and frequently," essential the act of an insight within the subject.¹²⁵ Such an insight as a "mental activity" is an essential component "in human knowledge" and the activity for setting in motion the subject's horizon.¹²⁶ When knowing is centered on the subject, knowing is no longer concerned about the origins of *knowledge regarding everything ever in the world* but is centered on the unlimited range for the capacity to inquire, hypothesize, question, etc. As Lonergan puts it: "the effort to know does not stop at any finite limit."¹²⁷

Putting into perspective Lonergan's subjects, the principal objective for each subject (or combination of subjects) is a radical transformation of the self.¹²⁸ The radical transformation of the self is facilitated by the field in which it operates and desires to operate in. This field is what we may refer to as a horizon. The philosophical concept of horizon then becomes the way in

¹²² Lonergan, *The Subject*, 1968, 8.

¹²³ Schmitz, "Towards," 1959, 246; 260.

¹²⁴ Lonergan, *Insight*, 2013, 347.

¹²⁵ Lonergan, *Insight*, 2013, 3. (This was noted earlier in footnote 88 to be the definition of an insight.)

¹²⁶ Lonergan, *Insight*, 2013, 4.

¹²⁷ Lonergan, "Understanding and Being," 1990, 147.

¹²⁸ Bernard Lonergan, *Method of Theology: Lecture 1, CD 301* (Recorded lecture at Regis College, University of Toronto, Toronto, Canada, July 9, 1962). The series of recorded lectures given by Lonergan is based on *Method in Theology* but is titled *Method of Theology* and should not be confused with his book. This particular lecture is concerned with explicating "the operations of the subject and the world of interiority...bringing together the world of common sense...and the world of theory. ... From these, the fundamental notions of the subject, its operations, the subject's horizon, the conversion of the subject...come to light." See description of the Lecture on CD jacket. The collection is stored at the Regis College Library and the Lonergan Research Institute at Regis College, Toronto School of Theology, University of Toronto.

which we begin to understand the path towards acquiring new habits—not only by way of skill but also cognitively, through an unhindered approach towards questioning and knowing. The act of constantly acquiring new skills thus facilitates the possibility for the expansion of one’s horizon, which in turn is ultimately supported in a *non-systematic world process*. Consciousness and self-consciousness then becomes a major preoccupation for Lonergan, as the role of consciousness is critical in the radical transformation of the subject.

Now I will turn to discussing the more pertinent parts of Lonergan’s account of the *cognitional structure* of the human subject as it relates to defining the philosophical concept of horizon as the necessary field in which the subject operates in order to facilitate a radical transformation of the subject. And recall that this radical transformation is crucial as it will permit the grounds for the subject to continue to persuade him/herself to do more, to want more and ultimately opt for what is truly Good, the point of expanding one’s horizon.

2.2

Lonergan’s Account of the Cognitional Structure of the Human Subject

Lonergan describes the cognitive faculties of the subject as the dynamic structure in human knowing. Human knowing consists of acts of understanding or insights categorized in the realm of common sense and that of theory.¹²⁹ Lonergan outlines the pattern of basic operations undertaken by the cognitive faculties of a given individual subject that involves “distinct and

¹²⁹ Lonergan’s definition of ‘common sense’ spans two chapters within *Insight*. For brevity what may be deduced from his definition is: “common sense is concerned with the relations of things to us.” Lonergan, *Insight*, 2013, 204. “Common sense...never aspires to universally valid knowledge, and it never attempts exhaustive communication. ...For common sense not merely says what it means; it says it to someone; it begins by exploring the other fellow’s intelligence.” Lonergan, *Insight*, 200-1. Theory, simply put, is concerned with objects as they relate to one another and aspires to universally valid knowledge. This is an over-simplification of what Lonergan entails by ‘theory,’ yet is good enough for the scope of this study. For more, see chapters 1-5 in *Insight*.

irreducible activities.”¹³⁰ These basic, distinct, and irreducible operations are smelling, hearing, tasting, seeing, conceiving, speaking, weighing the evidence, understanding, imagining, inquiring, reflecting, judging and so on.¹³¹ The agent of these operations is known as the subject. These basic operations also consist of different modes of intending, as the data they collect and the insights they yield organize in different ways to exist either in categories or in a transcendental way.¹³² By categories Lonergan intends it in the Aristotelian way—determinate questions that yield determinate answers; by transcendental, Lonergan intends questions that may not have answers, are *a priori*, and move the subject from ignorance to knowledge.¹³³ In addition, these basic operations are transitive. Through any given set of operations, the subject becomes aware of a given object.¹³⁴ The transitive element is primarily a result of the agent—the subject—actively referring to the operations, like ‘I see,’ ‘I smelled,’ ‘I will inquire,’ as well as operating consciously through these operations.¹³⁵ These basic operations also require introspection, understood as “the process of objectifying the contents of consciousness.”¹³⁶ What Lonergan intends by objectifying the subjective experience is to move beyond the data derived from the senses in order to reflect, judge, inquire and have insights about what was given through the sensory experience. For example, if I encounter a frog, I may see that it is a hue of green, feels a bit cold and slimy, smells like a swamp and makes a particular sound. What Lonergan then expects the subject to do is move past this initial sensory experience to reflect on the frog by posing questions like: Where did this frog come from? Why does it smell the way it does? Why

¹³⁰ Bernard Lonergan S.J. "Cognitive Structure," *Collection*, ed., Frederick E. Crowe and Robert M. Doran (Toronto, Canada: University of Toronto Press, 1967), 206.

¹³¹ Lonergan, *Method in*, 2013, 6.

¹³² Lonergan, *Method in*, 2013, 10-11.

¹³³ Lonergan, *Method in*, 2013, 11.

¹³⁴ Lonergan, *Method in*, 2013, 7.

¹³⁵ Lonergan, *Method in*, 2013, 7.

¹³⁶ Lonergan, *Method in*, 2013, 8.

is it green? What actions is this frog capable of? What can I do with this frog? Will this frog hurt me? Why am I holding this frog? Are there more frogs? Why is it called ‘frog’? Why does it exist? This would be objectifying the contents of what was retrieved by sense data to begin the process of moving one’s understanding of the frog from the realm of common sense to the realm of theory, where the image of the frog—derived from common sense—is not needed. Knowledge of the frog and how it relates to the subject now moves to inquiry of how the frog relates to other objects. Ultimately one will arrive at asking oneself fundamental questions: what am I doing? What am I trying to do?

Lastly, Lonergan holds that the basic operations exist on four levels: *empirical*, *intellectual*, *rational* and *responsible*, which are all intentional and conscious.¹³⁷ On this

Lonergan states:

On all four levels, we are aware of ourselves but, as we mount from level to level, it is a fuller self of which we are aware and the awareness itself is different. As empirically conscious, we do not seem to differ from the higher animals. ... The data of sense provoke inquiry, inquiry leads to understanding, understanding expresses itself in language. ... As intelligent, the subject seeks insights and, as insights accumulate, [the subject] reveals them in [its] behaviour, [its] speech, [its] grasp of situations, [its] mastery of theoretic domains. ... [As rational, the subject] incarnates detachment and disinterestedness, gives [it]self over to criteria of truth and certitude, makes [its] sole concern the determination of what is or is not so; and now, as the self, so also the awareness of self resides in the incarnation, that self-surrender, that single-minded concern for truth. ... [As responsible, subjects] emerge as persons, meet on another in a common concern for values, seek to abolish organization of human living on the basis of competing egoisms and to replace it by an organization on the basis of [the subject’s] perceptiveness and intelligence, [its] reasonableness and [its] responsible exercise of freedom.¹³⁸

Important to note is that no one activity rests in isolation from the other and while one may see an image or touch an object, there is still needed the act of understanding of what has been seen and/or touched. However, not even understanding the experiences of the five sense is

¹³⁷ Lonergan, *Method in*, 2013, 9.

¹³⁸ Lonergan, *Method in*, 2013, 9-10.

something distinctly human. It will be the act of judging as the apex of human cognitive activity that culminates what Lonergan defines as human knowing.¹³⁹ Conversely, while Lonergan emphasizes that judging will be what signifies the *human* in human knowing, to carry out this activity alone—judging—without the acts of understanding or experiencing is not sufficient enough to constitute human knowing. Ultimately, Lonergan’s cognitive structure may not be reduced to a single set of operations: “[i]nvariably, one has to regard an instance of human knowing, not as this or that operation, but as a whole whose parts are operations. It is a structure and, indeed a materially dynamic structure.”¹⁴⁰ Lonergan also makes an important distinction between consciousness and self-knowledge. Consciousness is the experiencing of the basic operations, where self-knowledge is the subject’s “reduplicated” structure of experiencing: the subject *experiences* their experiencing and *experiences* their understanding and judging. In short the subject is aware of the cognitive structure of their knowing.¹⁴¹ These different cognitive activities are not all equal as experiencing is the simple act of opening one’s eyes, or listening to a sound, or touching an object where understanding involves active learning. It is within understanding that the subject gains insights and it is within insights that the subject’s horizon may be moved. For Lonergan, active learning involves the authentic want to analyze the elementary and compound nature of a given object or subject, and more importantly, the awareness of when acts of understanding are taking place during the process.¹⁴² Lonergan uses

¹³⁹ Lonergan, "Cognitional Structure," 1967, 206.

¹⁴⁰ Lonergan, "Cognitional Structure," 1967, 207.

¹⁴¹ Lonergan, "Cognitional Structure," 1967, 208.

¹⁴² Lonergan, "Cognitional Structure," 1967, 209.

the example of Archimedes wanting to know if lesser metals had been added to the gold crown of King Hiero.¹⁴³

Loneragan's analysis of the *cognitional structure* of the human subject found within his *cognitional theory* is quite lengthy and dense. The goal of the brief account I have offered here is merely to explicate how Lonergan constructs the basic cognitive faculties of the subject, which provides the grounds for how the subject's horizon will emerge. We read that it is through the basic experience of the world through sense data that the subject comes to possess data to be objectified. This is quite similar to Husserl's understanding of horizon, where "*the world is claimed to be the rudimentary figure of the horizon.*" But where Lonergan departs from this understanding is by articulating the horizon as something subjective, objective and intersubjective.

2.2.1 *Cognitional Structure* as the Grounds for Expanding Horizons

Loneragan's account of the *cognitional structure* of the human subject points to how the everyday habits of the subject arise: the acquisition of habits is then correlative to the effective execution of the basic cognitional operations. According to Lonergan, the everydayness in which habits are acquired may be understood in terms of: matters of skill, apprehension, appetite, willing, and choosing. This field of habit is fixed unless further development is achieved:

The operations are connected with the subject...we all have acquired habits, and whatever is simply a matter of using our acquired habits is something that we do with facility, with pleasure and promptly...once you have the habit...[and] so our acquired habits give to all of us a field in which we operate with the greatest ease and joy and pleasure; however we don't get outside that field without further development. We have to affect further differentiations in our operations, further combinations of differentiated operations...to enlarge our little worlds—the world that corresponds to our acquired habit. [However] the more we become prisoners of our past

¹⁴³ Lonergan, *Insight*, 2013, 27.

achievement...we don't acquire further habits, we become crystallized...and so we arrive at the notion of horizon, which is a fundamental notion particularly in existentialist thought.¹⁴⁴

For Lonergan, the connection between the cognitive operations and habits is essential for the subject to move beyond itself and develop further. The patterns that crystallize a subject's horizon are structured by past achievements. This structure conditions as well as limits further development.¹⁴⁵ Thus it becomes imperative that the subject take the time to learn new skills in order to acquire new habits. Only in the constant acquisition of new habits does the subject break free from its previous self and move into a new field of vision, and this movement may not only be a small step in an opinion, but a radical reorganization of the subject.¹⁴⁶ This is how the subject develops. Development for Lonergan will be on the level of consciousness and is correlative to the subject's ability to experience, understand, judge, decide, imagine, perceive, reflect—basically carry out the basic operations of its cognitive structure.¹⁴⁷ This is something that will be done with joy and ease, once that habit of carrying out the operations is mastered. The ability of the subject to become aware of their cognitional operations, *i.e.* grow aware of when *insights* are achieved in the everyday or through the acquired habits, will also make way for levels of conversion necessary in moving the subject into new horizons. These conversions consist of a *moral*, *intellectual* and *religious* conversion. A *moral* conversion is intended to shift one's decisions about things from mere satisfaction to decisions mediated by value—there is a categorical option for what is truly good. An *intellectual* conversion, which intends “a radical clarification” where the subject must not only *see* (sensory perception) but must experience, understand, judge and believe. Lastly there is a *religious* conversion. While Lonergan was a

¹⁴⁴ Lonergan, *Method of*, 1962.

¹⁴⁵ Lonergan, *Method in*, 2013, 237.

¹⁴⁶ Lonergan, *Method of*, 1962.

¹⁴⁷ Lonergan, *Method in*, 2013, 6-9.

Jesuit priest and theologian and must always be understood in the context of his Roman Catholic faith, in a general sense Lonergan intends a *religious* conversion to be “a total being-in-love as the efficacious ground of all self-transcendence.”¹⁴⁸ All three conversions will be discussed in more detail in the next section on Lonergan’s concept of horizon.

Again, in no way is my account of Lonergan’s philosophy of habit an exhaustive one. What the above achieves is the connection made between the subject, its *cognitional structure* and habits—habits being necessary in moving the subject from one mode of being to another. It is within this discussion of habits that Lonergan launches into his notion of what may be considered a clear understanding of the philosophical concept of horizon.

2.3

The Philosophical Concept of Horizon According to Lonergan

Lonergan’s concept of horizon begins with a general definition: “the field of one’s interests and knowledge...its range may be extended or contracted; its interests may be ruled by self-interest or, to a greater or lesser extent, by values, by what really is worth while.”¹⁴⁹ The expansion or contraction of one’s horizon is an ongoing development. This ongoing development is crucial for the subject; what governs the motivation for one’s interests is ruled by either self-interest or values and these interests and values are formed by one’s community and they play out within one’s community, be it global or local. For this reason we may preliminarily conclude that Lonergan’s concept of horizon will be exclusively neither subjective nor objective but both. It will be objective as it involves the interaction with the world around; it will be subjective, as it

¹⁴⁸ Lonergan, *Method in*, 2013, 238-41.

¹⁴⁹ Bernard Lonergan, “Philosophical and Theological Papers 1965-1980,” in *Collected Works*, eds, Robert C. Croken and Robert M. Doran (Toronto, Canada: University of Toronto Press, 2004), 425-6.

will also involve the personal development of the subject into a moral being governed by a value system. More importantly, Lonergan's concept of horizon will also be intersubjective, as the moral development of the subject involves the day-to-day interaction with other subjects in a deliberate and spontaneous way, making this interaction a vital process in the formation of an individual and community value system. The ethical development of the subject is the pinnacle of Lonergan's philosophical concept of horizon. The ethical being is one that possesses a scale of values that provides the foundation for how one will interact with the world, with others, with themselves, and above all, decides what will be considered worthwhile to seek out in the world. The ethical subject aims to categorically opt for what is truly Good and a community of ethical subjects will structure what is defined as "the human good"¹⁵⁰ in a way that will successfully function (rather than malfunction) as a set of cooperative relationships in a given community.¹⁵¹

2.3.1 Lonergan's Conception of the Ethical Subject

Lonergan's concept of ethics attempts to produce a method paralleling that of his metaphysics and concerns the concrete and the practical. Lonergan holds that ethics is rooted in "the dynamic structure of rational self-consciousness."¹⁵² A rational self-conscious subject is one that continues to be ever aware of their basic operations of experiencing, understanding, judging and deciding, in essence becoming master of their cognitional structure. The "dynamic structure" is a

¹⁵⁰ Lonergan, *Method in*, 2013, 48-52. Lonergan defines The Human Good as both the individual and the social and attempts to combine the two. This Good consists of eighteen terms that are separated into three groups: 1) Individuals in their potentialities and actuations, 2) Cooperating groups, and 3) Ends. Individual Potentiality consists of: capacity, need, plasticity, perfectibility, liberty. Individual Actuation consists of: operation, development, skill, orientation, conversion. Cooperating groups are in the realm of the social and consists of: cooperation, institution, role, task, personal relations. And finally Ends consists of: particular good, good of order, terminal value. All terms correspond with one another as individuals, while meeting their own needs also cooperate to meet the needs of one another. What may be understood of the Human Good is "as the community develops its institutions to facilitate cooperation, so individuals develop skills to fulfill the roles and platform the tasks set by the institutional framework."

¹⁵¹ Lonergan, *Method in*, 2013, 49.

¹⁵² Lonergan, *Insight*, 2013, 627.

non-systematic world process¹⁵³ where the presence of the concrete, the spiritual, intelligent, intelligible, conscious, self-consciousness and rational self-conscious produces the emergence of the responsibility of one's own emergence; that is "the possibility of ethics is envisaged from the viewpoint of freedom and responsibility."¹⁵⁴ Freedom and responsibility are connected to Lonergan's philosophical concept of horizon as both freedom and responsibility require the individual subject to persuade itself to become the kind of chooser that categorically chooses the Good, decides to live in accord with the Good, and bears the corresponding responsibility that comes with opting for what is truly Good. Above all else, the operation of deciding is a choice and what is chosen will become the value structure for the individual subject. Lonergan states:

By my free acts I am making myself. The series of my choices gives me the character I have. One can say that all [subjects] have the same nature, and that it is in virtue of matter that all [subjects] are distinct individuals. But there is also a personal differentiation of one [subject] from another, and that personal differentiation of one [subject] from another is the cumulative product of each [subject's] own free choices.¹⁵⁵

It is here that we encounter what Lonergan intends by his notion of *Originating Value*, *i.e.* choices that modify "our habitual willingness, our effective orientation in the universe." The subject's orientation in the universe will be primarily governed by the extent and range of its horizon and its ability to choose and decide what is ultimately Good within the field circumscribed by that horizon. Within the notion of *Originating Value* there is also the subordinate *terminal value* (an end) where the object of a "possible choice" originating in the rational self-consciousness expresses itself through what is ultimately chosen.¹⁵⁶ To spell it out more clearly, the decision-making process of the subject must lead to a specific course of action.

¹⁵³ Recall this was outlined at the onset of Chapter Two where I discussed Lonergan's worldview. A *non-systematic world process* "is free to re-discover the natural world and re-explore the speculative sciences unhindered, while still adhering to the canon of parsimony, explanation and statistical residue, thus making room for an ever unfolding novelty." Extra-statistical data is always revisited in a *non-systematic world process*.

¹⁵⁴ Lonergan, *Insight*, 2013, 618.

¹⁵⁵ Lonergan, "Understanding and Being," 1990, 229.

¹⁵⁶ Lonergan, *Insight*, 2013, 624.

In this decision, the subject will determine the most reasonable course of action and in that decision the definition of *obligation* emerges.¹⁵⁷ This will be further clarified by an example below when I discuss Lonergan's series of conversions. *Obligation* also carries with it the emergence of the immanent intelligibility of the "unfolding of the detached and disinterested desire to know."¹⁵⁸ In Lonergan's understanding of horizon (to be discussed shortly), persuading oneself to want to know more will be crucial to the desire to expand one's horizon. Within the desire to expand one's horizon, there will emerge within the subject an unrestricted act of questioning that will reveal what Lonergan intends by a "detached and disinterested desire to know."¹⁵⁹ Despite the connection between Lonergan's ethical subject and his preliminary concept of horizon, what becomes problematic is that no understanding emerges of how that ethic is grounded beyond a rooting in the concepts of freedom and responsibility. What I have arrived at in Lonergan's ethic and its connection to horizon is a good starting point for discussing a practical approach to how the ethical subject orients itself in the universe considering the notions of *freedom*, *obligation*, and the Good. This discussion however, will remain problematic without addressing some kind of structure outlining how the ethical emerges within the horizon of a given subject in the first place.

Patrick Byrne provides a remedy to this problem that helps to place Lonergan's ethical subject properly within what may be understood as his philosophical concept of horizon. While Byrne holds that Lonergan's method for building an ethics is articulated through his conception

¹⁵⁷ Lonergan, *Insight*, 2013, 637.

¹⁵⁸ Lonergan, *Insight*, 2013, 638.

¹⁵⁹ What is meant by an "unrestricted disinterested desire to know," was explained in footnote 105. To reiterate Lonergan was a Jesuit Priest, who ultimately holds that the object of the unrestricted disinterested desire to know is God, thereby positing a teleology for the human subject. While this fact of Lonergan's position reveals such a teleology, for the purposes of this study, I only discuss the aspects that lead the subject to the desired moral mode of being, stopping short of the Beatific Vision as the unrestricted desire to know. When one is in possession of an "unrestricted disinterested desire to know," they will arrive at a desire to be transformed into a moral being prior to contemplating the ultimate object to be desired, God.

of freedom, Byrne ultimately holds that Lonergan neglects to disclose, “the compound structure of one’s knowing and doing,” which becomes problematic for fully understanding Lonergan’s ethics.¹⁶⁰ Byrne reminds the reader that in the “Introduction” to *Insight* Lonergan states:

Further, as metaphysics is derived from the known structure of one’s knowing, so an ethics results from knowledge of the compound structure of one’s knowing and doing; and as the metaphysics, so too the ethics prolongs the initial self-criticism into an explanation of the origin of all ethical positions and into a criterion for passing judgment on each of them.¹⁶¹

As Byrne correctly points out, Lonergan does not satisfactorily follow through with fully explicating how a “compound structure of one’s knowing” leads to the origin of all ethical positions.¹⁶² There is also a lack of connecting the “compound structure of knowing” to the *cognitional operations* of the subject. For Byrne this is crucial. While Lonergan is focused on laying out a methodology for human knowing and human thriving, rather than laying out a detailed methodology for human doing, Lonergan chooses to work out how one arrives at the ethical through an explication of the Good, the will, value and obligation.¹⁶³ This also proves a problem for connecting the ethical subject as the goal of navigating and expanding one’s horizon. While Byrne continues to articulate how Lonergan works out the ethical to be found in the notions of Good, freedom etc., an outstanding question emerged: how can such a methodological approach be thoroughly carried out if the foundational “compound structure” has not yet been addressed?¹⁶⁴ I focus on this question of Byrne as it will provide us with a profitable manner in which to address the question of the horizon.

¹⁶⁰ Patrick H. Byrne, *The Ethics of Discernment: Lonergan’s Foundations for Ethics* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2016), Lonergan, *Insight*, 23.

¹⁶¹ Lonergan, *Insight*, 2013, 23.

¹⁶² Byrne, 2016, 415.

¹⁶³ Byrne, 2016, 415.

¹⁶⁴ Byrne, 2016, 415-6.

When Byrne points to precisely where Lonergan’s framework may be located, he arrives at Lonergan’s claim that an ethic will be located in “the products of universal finality,” the End.¹⁶⁵ However, rather than parsing out this statement in the context of a groundwork for ethics, Lonergan will hold that such a groundwork is not possible, as the structure of it is woven into the very fabric of human knowing, which may be reduced to neither “sentences nor propositions nor judgments.”¹⁶⁶ Therefore such a structure as somewhat concealed or not fully disclosed will result in the subject deeming it universal; the structure will play out dialectically as the possible conclusions drawn out of such a structure may be determined by sensitive, personal and other “alien desires.”¹⁶⁷ Ultimately, in his treatment of searching for a groundwork, Byrne will point the reader towards Lonergan’s “Functional Specialties” as articulated in *Method in Theology*. Byrne holds that Lonergan’s Eight Functional Specialties—Research, Interpretation, History, Dialectic, Foundations, Doctrines, Systematics, and Communications—speak to values and actions that point towards the ultimate desire to produce “good work.”¹⁶⁸ Within carrying out each Functional Specialty, the unveiling of the *cognitional structure* will point categorically to an object of desire, which is a potential good, making a *choice* that is affirming a radical orientation towards the Good.¹⁶⁹ According to Lonergan, the specialized functions present “related and recurrent operations cumulatively advancing towards an ideal goal.”¹⁷⁰ This “ideal

¹⁶⁵ Lonergan, *Insight*, 2013, 626.

¹⁶⁶ Lonergan, *Insight*, 2013, 626-7.

¹⁶⁷ Lonergan, *Insight*, 2013, 626-7.

¹⁶⁸ Lonergan, *Method in*, 2013, 126. “Functional specialization distinguishes and separates successive stages in the process from data to results... It is to be noted that such functional specialties are intrinsically related to one another. They are successive parts of one and the same process. The earlier parts are incomplete without the later. The later presuppose the earlier and complement them. In brief, functional specialties are functionally interdependent. Such interdependence is of the greatest methodological interest. First, without any prejudice to unity, it divides and clarifies the process from data to results. Secondly, it provides an orderly link between field specialization, based on the division of data, and subject specialization, based on a classification of results. Thirdly, the unity of functional specialties will be found, I think, to overcome or, at least, counter-balance the endless divisions of field specialization.”

¹⁶⁹ See Lonergan, *Method in*, 2013, 125-45.

¹⁷⁰ Lonergan, *Method in*, 2013, 125.

goal” will point to a universal axiom where Lonergan’s philosophical concept of horizon becomes very important. While dictating the field in which a subject operates, the horizon also provides a framework for what may be understood by “the products of universal finality” and the “ideal goal.” While Byrne provides an important contribution to Lonergan’s conception of ethics, it is within Lonergan’s concept of horizon that the reader is given a fuller understanding of what may be meant by a universal finality and subsequently the importance of Lonergan’s articulation of an ethical subject rather than through Lonergan’s Functional Specialties.

2.3.2 Lonergan’s Concept of Horizon in General

As stated above, Lonergan first describes the horizon as a field encompassing a given subject’s interest. He expands on this as follows:

The *horizon*, [the subject’s] *horizon*...[is]the world, the totality of objects, with which [one] can promptly deal in virtue of [one’s] acquired habits. Whatever lies within that field [one] is master of it, [one] can do it at once and [one] enjoys doing it. But what’s beyond that field is something [one does not] advert to, it may be there but [one] do[es] [not] see it and it may be important but [one] couldn’t care less, it’s beyond [one’s] *horizon*. That *horizon* is an absolute. Intellect extends to ends and ends include absolutely everything. Will extends to the *bonum*...the adequate object of [one’s] intellect and will are unlimited but that lack of limitation regards basic potency, it doesn’t regard what I am able to do here and now, without acquiring any further skill, without coming to know anything more, learning anything more without being persuaded or persuading myself to do something I always avoiding doing. To do that I have to acquire new habits and to acquire new habits takes time. I have to take the time out to develop myself further.¹⁷¹

In this definition Lonergan expresses an understanding of horizon that is absolute, one where the intellect and the will of the subject come front and centre to address this absolute. What Lonergan is pointing to is that the horizon of the subject, in a metaphorical sense, represents the limits of one’s field of vision and field of operating. Yet the intellect and will are unlimited in their potential, thus insofar as the subject exercises their *intellect* to keep striving to

¹⁷¹ Lonergan, *Method of*, 1962.

know more and *will* to opt for what is truly good in all that is acted upon, a horizon does not have to be an absolute limit. Before outlining how a horizon is not an absolute limit, Lonergan explains what is meant by a horizon applied metaphorically to the subject:

As our field of vision, so too the scope of our knowledge, and the range of our interests are bounded. As fields of vision vary with one's standpoint, so too the scope of one's knowledge and range of interests vary with the period in which one lives, one's social background and milieu, one's education and personal development. So there has arisen a metaphorical or perhaps analogous meaning of the word horizon. In this sense what lies beyond one's horizon is simply outside the range of one's knowledge and interests: one neither knows nor cares. But what lies within one's horizon is in some measure, great or small, an object of interest and of knowledge.¹⁷²

When applied to the subject a metaphorical understanding of horizon marks the scope of what is knowable and attainable. This conception of horizon limits the subject in many ways and posits a *closed system* where nothing new under the sun may grow, as the subject may rely only on what is immediately available in their limited surrounding. This is where a *truncated* subject may find itself: a world where there is nothing to motivate her to want more, to do more or to become a good human being. A metaphorical understanding of horizon as it relates to the subject has the scope, range and interests of the subject fixed and bounded so that the subject is confined without the possibility of expansion and thus has the unfortunate fate of residing within a contracted horizon, which will stagnate the subject.¹⁷³ A contracted horizon will place the subject in an existential crisis where they will be limited in their ability to acquire new skills, new habits and above all be persuaded to develop their ethical self. What Lonergan astutely points out is the path of a *truncated* subject. Without a forever expanding field in which the subject may make a series of *choices* to opt for what is truly good, a lack of self-knowledge to be aware of one's own ignorance will result in a world where if there is something not known, then it will be held as non

¹⁷² Lonergan, *Method in*, 2013, 236.

¹⁷³ Lonergan, *Method of*, 1962.

existent.¹⁷⁴ This worldview arising from a *truncated* subject with a limited and contracted horizon is in danger of not acknowledging the experiences, expertise and knowledge of others that have made and continue to make contributions to the human fund of knowledge.¹⁷⁵ Without knowledge and acknowledgement of the developments outside of one's own experiences and beliefs, the *truncated* subject is at grave risk of stagnation. Basic developments—be it within the realm of day-to-day subsistence, division of labour and advancement within the sciences—will prove itself by a series of *choices* carried out by the subject; such an option is unavailable to the *truncated* subject. This unavailability will leave the *truncated* subject without the time to develop into a good human being because they will be doomed to spend their time and energy repeating the basic experiences and mistakes of their predecessors, relying only on their own body of work and experience. As a result of this danger, Lonergan emphasizes the importance of *belief*.

Belief is vital in order for a subject and their given community to appropriate a social, religious and cultural heritage.¹⁷⁶ *Belief* is not understood in a religious context here, but rather in the context of the subject's acceptance as true, the knowledge of basic facts that have been compiled by those who came before. Lonergan uses the example of cartographers, who trust the maps that were produced in the past to be a guide for compiling a more complete and accurate map of a given area in the present and future.¹⁷⁷ Without the system and continuation of *belief* the subject is bound to repeat, unnecessarily, an experience or experiment that has already proven to be fact and true. Therefore if a subject is without possession of a basic sense of *belief*, they run the risk of never having the time to learn something new and develop further. Such a

¹⁷⁴ Lonergan, *The Subject*, 1968, 8.

¹⁷⁵ Lonergan, *Method in*, 2013, 43.

¹⁷⁶ Lonergan, *Method in*, 2013, 42.

¹⁷⁷ Lonergan, *Method in*, 2013, 42.

subject will be burden with repeating basic tasks for survival, having to solely rely on their sense of judgment and thus be unaware of when an error has been made.¹⁷⁸ This *belief* does not exclude the scientific method applied to life where a given subject is welcome to question methods and conclusions if new data presents itself that calls into question something once held as fact, like the lack of neuroplasticity of the human brain. While Lonergan details the outcome of conceiving of the horizon in a metaphorical sense as one that is bounded and fixed, he immediately recognizes that such an understanding is not absolute:

[W]hile a horizon is not an absolute limit, still it's a *de facto* limit that's there until I take the time out to acquire a further skill, to learn something more...One can broaden one's horizon, enlarge one's horizon by dealing with new immediate objects, acquiring an interest in the arts for example...by operating on new mediated objects—objects that are mediated by imagination...or objects that are mediated by ordinary language...by further developments in one's theoretical knowledge...and through the mediation of the operations through which one deals with anything.¹⁷⁹

According to Lonergan one's horizon becomes flexible when the subject persuades itself to acquire something more in the world. This “more” comes primarily by way of acquiring new skills. Skill is defined as the adaptation of a new object or situation, and the more adaptations to objects and situations a subject engages in, the more different cognitive operations are at use, gradually developing a skill set to be utilized habitually.¹⁸⁰ As “skill begets mastery,” Lonergan does not intend the constant acquisition of skill to always be complicated, like learning to split an atom or building a motorcycle from scratch. What is intended is simply the constant use of not only one's sensory perception, but also one's imagination, language, and use of symbols.¹⁸¹ Thus the desire to enlarge one's horizon is correlative to the effective execution of *cognitional operations*, such as experiencing, understanding, judging, deciding, imagining, weighing the

¹⁷⁸ Lonergan, *Method in*, 2013, 42-3.

¹⁷⁹ Lonergan, *Method of*, 1962,

¹⁸⁰ Lonergan, *Method in*, 2013, 27.

¹⁸¹ Lonergan, *Method in*, 2013, 28.

evidence, etc. The effective execution of *cognitional operations* over time should cultivate the subject's ability to grow aware of when they are exercising their cognitional operations; that is grow aware of the moments when they are experiencing an object or understanding a concept, for example. It is within this process that the potential of acquiring new habits presents itself. Subsequently this awareness paves the path for levels of conversion necessary for moving the subject into new horizons and into new fields of operating that permit something new to enter the skill set and habitual nature of the subject. It is for this reason Lonergan states:

A horizontal exercise is a decision or choice that occurs within an established horizon. A vertical exercise is the set of judgments and decisions by which we move from one horizon to another. Now there may be a sequence of such vertical exercises of freedom, and in each case the new horizon, though notably deeper and broader and richer, nonetheless is consonant with the old and a development out of its potentialities. But it is also possible that the movement into a new horizon involves an about-face; it comes out of the old by repudiating characteristic features; it begins a new sequence that can keep revealing ever greater depth and breadth and wealth. Such an about-face and new beginning is what is meant by conversion.¹⁸²

As with Lonergan's explication of the ethical, we again encounter the concept of freedom. Freedom to choose is integral to Lonergan's concept of horizon. Freedom is a condition within the subject's horizon needed to permit the subject the ability to continue to choose situations and paths that continue to orient itself towards the Good, the "ideal goal." In addition, when Lonergan mentions "a sequence of vertical exercises" that brings about new horizons, this is where his series of conversions articulate what occurs within the subject that facilitates the "notably deeper and broader and richer" sense of being in the world that brings an "about-face." The notion of freedom, the power of *choice*, and the ability to deepen one's sense of being through conversion, are all important concepts involved in Lonergan's philosophical concept of horizon and it will be through a series of conversions that the subject truly exercises its ability to

¹⁸² Lonergan, *Method in*, 2013, 237-8.

learn something new, acquire skills necessary for broadening its horizon, as well as exercise its freedom to opt for what is truly Good.

2.3.3 Levels of Conversion

Conversions are of three kinds: *intellectual*, *religious* and *moral*—not in any particular order, yet there is an order of preference. All three conversions are connected yet are understood as independent events that take place at any point within the life of the subject. The three levels of conversions are not intended to be a teleological ladder of any sort; rather the conversions are a dynamic process, which may be achieved in its totality or part and parcel. Lonergan’s understanding of horizon is then nestled within a *non systematic dynamic worldview* where the hermeneutical circle states that everything may *not* be entirely knowable by the subject, and that therefore the world is always a “womb of novelty;”¹⁸³ this differs from a Hegelian worldview. An individual subject may only experience one type of conversion in its entire lifetime and another may experience all three. Important to note is that it is not necessary for all three conversions to be carried out within a given subject in order for said subject to expand its horizon. An *intellectual* conversion may be enough to move the subject from being a *truncated* subject to an *existential* subject, where by its own acts “the human subject makes [it]self what [it] is to be, and does so freely and responsibly.”¹⁸⁴ An *intellectual* conversion is defined as “a radical clarification and, consequently, the elimination of an exceedingly stubborn and misleading myth concerning reality, objectivity, and human knowledge.”¹⁸⁵ The experience of an *intellectual* conversion is made possible by the realization that one has poor habits that need to

¹⁸³ Lonergan, *Insight*, 2013, 75.

¹⁸⁴ Lonergan, *The Subject*, 1968, 19.

¹⁸⁵ Lonergan, *Method in*, 2013, 238.

be broken. Once poorly held habits are acknowledged and subsequently adjusted, the space for a fresh start by way of an *intellectual* conversion opens up the path for further development through various clarifications of wrongly held axioms.¹⁸⁶ An *intellectual* conversion moves the subject from drawing conclusions about the world based solely on their sensory experiences to one where their experiences are organized and understood in order to formulate concrete judgments and beliefs about the world. A subject's *intellectual* conversion places it in a position to experience the world mediated by meaning, where the collective experiences of the community are taken into account, and not just those of the individual.¹⁸⁷ I hold that Lonergan's *intellectual* conversion is a return to Husserl's understanding of intentionality, as it is all mediated by meaning. An *intellectual* conversion is also how a once *truncated* subject transforms into an *existential* subject that may now take accountability for the fact that there will be things that they know, things that they do not know, as well as unknown unknowns. This is a huge transformation, as a *truncated* subject does not acknowledge what is outside of their horizon, but an *existential* subject will acknowledge that just because a particular belief, truth or position it is not within their particular horizon, does not mean that it does not exist. This awareness that there is more than what is within an individual horizon provides the grounds for further questioning, permitting further grounds for a desire to know more and act towards doing more. This course of action will unfold a "detached and disinterested desire to know," that opens up a subject's horizon with the desire of continuous expansion.

¹⁸⁶ Lonergan, *Method in*, 2013, 239-40.

¹⁸⁷ Lonergan, *Method in*, 2013, 238.

On the one hand, an *intellectual* conversion is understood as “truth attained by cognitional self-transcendence,” a *religious* conversion on the other hand is understood as “a total being-in-love as the efficacious ground of all self-transcendence.”¹⁸⁸ This conversion is understood without reference to any particular faith group. “Being-in-love” is the operative predicate within a *religious* conversion, as this brings the subject into an inexhaustible field of vision that ruptures any general subject-object polarity such as we find, for example, in Husserl and Heidegger. The subject is no longer concerned with a horizon whose limit is what is experienced through sensory perception or solely in the intellectual reflection on what was experienced by the senses; there is now a complete reorganization of the self that desires only what is ultimately good, and every *choice* is thus orientated towards that which is most Good. An inexhaustible field of vision is only possible in what Lonergan considers an *open world process* filled with novelty and unlimited new situations. What an *open world process* intends is Lonergan’s *non-systematic* dynamic worldview, where the entirety of human knowing is not knowable by any one individual subject, making the universe always a “womb of novelty.”¹⁸⁹ The subject in an *open world process* possesses the potential to reorganize itself to desire what is most Good and to expand their individual horizon within a universe possessing a forever-expanding horizon.¹⁹⁰ Ultimately a *religious* conversion goes beyond what is *intellectual* and even *moral* as it involves an “other-worldly falling in love.”¹⁹¹ An “other-worldly falling in love” is without qualification, reservation or conditions, and it is accompanied by a feeling of self-transcendence. This self-transcendence permits the subject to open up its horizon to include that

¹⁸⁸ Lonergan, *Method in*, 2013, 238-41.

¹⁸⁹ Lonergan, *Insight*, 2013, 75.

¹⁹⁰ Lonergan, *Method in*, 2013, 235-6.

¹⁹¹ Lonergan, *Method in*, 2013, 240.

which is most mysterious, unknown and most sublime: for those of the Abrahamic tradition, this is God.¹⁹² In short a *religious* conversion creates an *immanentist* subject, who's "knowing involves an intentional self-transcendence."¹⁹³

While a *religious* conversion creates a horizon in which the subject is capable of incorporating a worldview that is beyond what is experienced in the concrete, it still does not move the subject into becoming a moral being. A *religious* conversion alone does not provide the motivation to want more or to do more. For example, one may have a horizon in which the field is a falling in love with that which is most mysterious and still not be cognizant of the reality of their day-to-day surroundings. In addition, a subject that has solely undergone a *religious* conversion may possess a worldview where they perceive as most important the truth of an other-worldly and as a result take no interest or care regarding the human subjects in and around their lives. This *neglected* subject is now functioning in a realm that is "non-spatial, atemporal, impersonal,"¹⁹⁴ and in grave danger of dismissing the importance of intersubjectivity and community life. It is for this reason that of the three conversions the one that is the most pertinent to Lonergan's philosophical concept of horizon as well as the most preferred to the subject in general is *moral* conversion.

Moral conversion is the stage where the subject moves from "mere satisfaction" to a world mediated by value—a non-negotiable option for the truly Good.¹⁹⁵ Lonergan's definition of value is of two kinds: a *transcendent* notion, which states that value is "what is intended in

¹⁹² Lonergan, *Method in*, 2013, 242.

¹⁹³ Lonergan, *The Subject*, 1968, 13.

¹⁹⁴ Lonergan, *The Subject*, 1968, 2.

¹⁹⁵ Lonergan, *Method in*, 2013, 240.

questions for deliberations” and value based on judgments that are simple and comparative.¹⁹⁶ A simple judgment of value affirms or denies if something is truly or apparently good; a comparative judgment of value compares “distinct instances of the truly good to affirm or deny that one is better or more important, or more urgent than the other.”¹⁹⁷ Thus the goal of a *moral* conversion is not moral perfection but *aim*. The goal of a *moral* conversion is to have the subject *aim* at continuously developing their knowledge of human interactions in order to continuously scrutinize what is to be most valued and preferred as situations arise.¹⁹⁸ At its core, a *moral* conversion expands a horizon so that the subject may *aim* to operate ethically with others. Within a horizon that has been morally conditioned, the subject must be willing to learn, appropriate, disagree, protest and be criticized by others in order to arrive at what is to be valued generally. It is here we encounter the importance of intersubjectivity within Lonergan’s philosophical concept of horizon as well as the importance of community life. As Lonergan states: “[A *moral* conversion] promotes the subject from cognitional to moral self-transcendence. It sets [the subject] on a new existential level of consciousness and establishes him as an originating value.”¹⁹⁹ The subject as an “originating value” makes choices that modify its habits, willingness and efficacy in the universe for the Good. A *moral* conversion motivates the subject to utilize their skills for and with other persons. Without a *moral* conversion the horizon of a given subject will not necessary be a field where the skill set and habits are exercised in such a way that the subject has a genuine desire for what is truly Good.

¹⁹⁶ Lonergan, *Method in*, 2013, 34-6.

¹⁹⁷ Lonergan, *Method in*, 2013, 26.

¹⁹⁸ Lonergan, *Method in*, 2013, 240.

¹⁹⁹ Lonergan, *Method in*, 2013, 242.

For example, a medical doctor in the process of a *moral* conversion will not only have to consider the Hippocratic Oath but will have to do so in a way that does not violate their conscience and put their patients in harm's way, while at the same time aiming to act as an ethical agent. For the sake of argument, say this doctor were asked to perform an abortion and belonged to a faith community that views abortion as a great evil. Due to the field which a *moral* conversion creates—one where “the subject must be willing to learn, appropriate, disagree, protest and be criticized by others in order to arrive at what is to be valued generally”—said doctor would be obliged to thoroughly evaluate the case and hear the perspectives of the woman and the man involved, accept the fact that their skills are to be utilized for and with other persons, all the while temporarily suspending their personal judgments. In the same vein, this doctor would also have to take into consideration the community of faith in which they belong where life is understood to begin at the moment of conception and thus must not be terminated at whim. Moreover, this doctor will also have to operate within their medical community, yet even if they object to the procedure as a result of a ‘conscience base objection,’²⁰⁰ may still be obliged to refer the patients to another practitioner to provide the service. Ultimately, the doctor will be obliged to bear the responsibility that their skill set is one that must be utilized for what is truly Good. This doctor would also have to be willing to be criticized by others for opting for what must be valued generally. So in the end, if this doctor chose not to perform this abortion solely because the unborn child was not wanted at that particular time, this would not be a case of a failed *moral* conversion, a contracted horizon or a horizon that is not willing to be expanded

²⁰⁰ A “conscience base objection” may be generally understood as a medical doctor objecting to provide certain services that run contrary to their ethical and/or religious beliefs. See Edmund D. Pellegrino, “Toward a Reconstruction of Medical Morality,” *The American Journal of Bioethics*, 6, no. 2, (August 2006): 65-71, accessed April 19, 2018, DOI: [10.1080/15265160500508601](https://doi.org/10.1080/15265160500508601) and Julian Savulescu, “Conscientious objection in medicine,” *British Medical Journal*, 332 (February 2006): 294-297, accessed April 19, 2018, <http://www.bmj.com/content/332/7536/294.abstract>.

as a result of the data presented by the patients. As a result of the doctor's decision, the doctor would be now be operating within a new field, where they are acting freely and responsibly for the right universal finality—i.e., human beings as ends in themselves, not as a means. By performing their duties as a doctor and evaluating the patient's medical request, the doctor has already placed him/herself in a position to be criticized by others (their faith community and their patients) and to re-evaluate what is to be valued generally (considering the values of the medical community, which at times considers life solely as a collection of cells up to a certain point)—a key element in undergoing a *moral* conversion. The goal of this example is to illustrate that the doctor's *moral* conversion was not intended to exemplify moral perfection, as future decisions carried out by the doctor may not have this outcome. The purpose of this example is to demonstrate that the *aim* of a *moral* conversion is to act in such a way that what is decided on may be considered as what should be valued generally, and in this case, it is life.

It is for this reason that a subject who has solely undergone an *intellectual* conversion may very well exercise its freedom to act on its own and do so responsibly but for the wrong “universal finality,” like utilizing human beings as a means rather than as an end. While an *intellectual* conversion radically clarifies the imperativeness of experiencing, understanding, judging and believing for the subject and is very much mediated by intentionality and meaning, similar to Husserl's initial understanding of horizon, it still leaves the subject navigating the world with no teleology in sight, thus no motivation to act ethically. Comparatively, a subject who has solely undergone a *religious* conversion may *neglect* their responsibilities of being an ethical actor in the world by not valuing the relationships with those in and around their life, as a result of only being concerned with a love for the “other-worldly.” Navigating the world and the

beings within that world provides the subject the grounds for improvement. A *moral* conversion provides the subject with a horizon that encourages the subject to do more and continuously grow. Above all, a *moral* conversion demands of the subject to develop further in order to continuously *aim* to always opt for what is truly Good—the universal finality of being in the world.

Furthermore, Etienne Gilson, mentioned earlier in this study, also found the concept and act of conversion to be of great importance to the human subject. Gilson’s understanding of conversion is through experience and contemplation with the goal of gaining wisdom. When the subject pursues *wisdom*, this process is disclosed in solitude “when speaking to [him/herself] in the quietness of [his/her] own meditation.” To contemplate is to make aware the inner workings of one’s own awareness and conscience; thus *wisdom* becomes a “personal affair” known only through one’s “own mind.”²⁰¹ This makes the mind of the subject important, as for Gilson, thoughts and/or ideas do not place themselves within a mind in an already orderly fashion: thoughts and/or ideas are conditioned by “a single life,” by “spiritual food,” and by the “laws of its own inner development.”²⁰² The structure of the individual subject that pursues what is good by way of *wisdom*, precipitates a growth of self-awareness that makes one’s own mind available to oneself. Gilson’s view of conversion is akin to Lonergan’s emphasis of self-awareness. Lonergan’s concept of horizon understood in light of his series of conversions brings a fuller understanding of what is meant by a horizon being the totality of one’s interests and knowledge governed by value and self-interest. The ability for a horizon to be expanded rests not only on the

²⁰¹ Etienne Gilson, *History of Philosophy and Philosophical Education* (Milwaukee, WI: Marquette University Press, 1948), 7-9.

²⁰² Gilson, *History*, 1948, 19-21.

intellectual development of the subject but also, more importantly, on the ethical development of the subject. Lonergan's philosophical concept of horizon has ethical being as one that possesses a scale of values that provides the foundation for how one will interact with the world, with others, with themselves, and ultimately will decide what will be considered worthwhile.

Lonergan's philosophical concept of horizon posits that if horizon is understood as an absolute limit, it is a result of the subject who is refusing to take responsibility over his or her own actions, thinking and living, thereby voluntarily operating within a contraction of their own horizon, not the universe's horizon.²⁰³ Similar to Heidegger, Lonergan's horizon flirts with depth psychology, where the inauthentic subject is one who refuses to take responsibility over his or her own actions, thinking and living, thus closing their horizon by shutting off their ability for self-examination.²⁰⁴ For Heidegger the inauthentic self fails to grasp the collective horizon responsible for disclosing the individual horizon—the path towards authenticity. Lonergan's philosophical concept of horizon however is subjective, objective as well as intersubjective, thus rather than viewing the collective as a means to an end like Heidegger, Lonergan emphasizes the importance of community life. A subject's horizon is correlative to its ability to undergo a series of conversions, and conversions become possible only when individual subjects interact with one another to negotiate and re-negotiate what must be valued generally in order to successfully function within a set of cooperative relationships in a given community;²⁰⁵ this contributes to the expansion of the individual subject's horizon.²⁰⁶ For this reason, Lonergan's philosophical concept of horizon, as explained through his worldview and his description of the *cognitional*

²⁰³ Lonergan, *Method of*, 1962.

²⁰⁴ Lonergan, *Method of*, 1962.

²⁰⁵ Lonergan, *Method in*, 2013, 49.

²⁰⁶ Lonergan, *Method in*, 2013, 235-6.

structure of the human subject carries with it a profound understanding of what may be understood as a horizon: *the necessary field in which the subject operates that facilitates its radical transformation into a moral being who continues to persuade itself to do more, to want more, and to continuously aim to categorically opt for what is truly Good.*

Conclusion

I will first acknowledge my inadequacy in doing justice to the thinkers discussed throughout this thesis. While limiting myself to only addressing the more pertinent points pertaining to the emergence of the philosophical concept of horizon, much of their material was left out that in the end might prove crucial to my topic. I will also note that there may very well be additional thinkers left out of this study, who may have directly or indirectly contributed to an understanding of the philosophical concept of horizon. Nevertheless, I offer my concluding remarks.

Lonergan's conception of horizon transforms the traditional approach to the concept read in the philosophers discussed in this study: Kant, Hegel, Husserl, Heidegger, Gadamer and Nietzsche. The vague limit that was understood to be the horizon of an individual subject morphed into a novelty-seeking transformative field within which the subject operates that is forever expanding. Revisiting the works of Lonergan has rendered Geniusas' claim of Husserl as the last philosopher to consider the philosophical concept of horizon as wrong. While both Husserl and Lonergan discuss a concept of horizon rooted in consciousness, Lonergan puts forth a concept that is heavily contingent on the human subject and under constant renegotiation. On the one hand, Husserl's worldview will be one that leaves all processes open to movement, novelty, interpretation and above all the existential experiences of the human subject. Lonergan, on the other hand, will have a similar dynamic world process but add another level by not only considering the world for the subject as a constant "womb for novelty" but also hold as the teleology for the subject a moral transformation to be persuaded to do more in order to

categorically opt for what is truly Good. This field differs from that of Husserl for rather than having the subject engage in an endless phenomenological encounter with the objects in the world, Lonergan's horizon has a goal.

The objective of this thesis is to provide clarity to the philosophical concept of horizon. This was achieved by focusing on the human subject to reveal that any clarity of the philosophical concept of horizon will depend on its articulation in what Lonergan considers a *non-systematic world process*, which brings with it an unhindered field of free discovery. It will be within this "unhindered field of free discovery" that the unfolding activity of human knowing is revealed making room for further conception of what may be further understood by horizon. Where our understanding of the philosophical concept of horizon will traverse next is one that is unrestricted, unlimited and disinterested:

Has our capacity to know, our desire to know, our range of possible vision, a horizon beyond which there is no question of our knowing? Or is there no horizon? In this sense of radical potency, radical teleology, radical finality, I think it can be shown that our knowing is unlimited. The mere fact that we make a hypothesis about a finite limit, any finite limit, to the range of possible questions reveals the unrestricted character of our knowing.²⁰⁷

²⁰⁷ Lonergan, "Understanding and Being," 1990, 147.

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