The Promise of Circularity in Husserl’s Phenomenological Investigations

by

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ABSTRACT

The Promise of Circularity in Husserl’s Phenomenological Investigations

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I argue that Husserl’s phenomenological method is distinguished by the strategy of circularity. I trace this strategy in Husserl’s early writings on logic and in both his early and his later writings on time consciousness. I conclude with a brief examination of works by Merleau-Ponty and Heidegger through the lens of Husserl’s circular strategy.

I suggest that circularity in Husserl’s phenomenology unfolds on two completing levels. The circularity on the first level describes terms in relation that are defined through their reference to each other: however, this relation between the two terms is not causal, for both terms remain self-enclosed. The second level of circularity indicates that the only possibility for the reciprocity or completion between two terms is through their self-encircling. The terms refer back and forth to each other precisely because they remain in a relational asymmetry. Husserl thus avoids a situation where he either fuses the terms in relation or prioritizes one over another. This is especially important for his re-articulation of the psychologistic – ideal-logical, whole – part, and now – just past polarities.
This unusual sort of circular argumentation provides Husserl with an equally unusual methodology for challenging psychologism, empiricism, neo-kantianism, formal ontology and certain philosophies of time. Husserl does not challenge psychologism, empiricism or neo-kantianism by immediately assuming a position of epistemological primacy over these philosophies. To the contrary, Husserl is able to philosophically challenge these positions by enacting a circularity that already underlies them. Husserl’s critical distance from these theories implies a methodological proximity which enables him to advance his phenomenological project with constant backward reference to the theories he challenges. Husserl’s circular philosophy transforms the themes it investigates and the theories it criticizes, transforming itself in that process.

This approach to Husserl simultaneously recognizes that Husserl’s relation with psychologism is one of overcoming-through-indebtedness, just as the relation of Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty to Husserl is the one of indebtedness-through-overcoming.
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I was inspired to pursue this project while I was an MA student at the New School for Social Research. During my studies at the New School I discovered the work of James Dodd, with whom I took several classes and who became my MA thesis advisor. By working with James, I discovered not only how to engage closely with Husserl’s major texts, but also how to appreciate the multilayeredness of Husserl’s methodology and philosophical reflections. Furthermore, I learned how to appreciate both Husserl’s originality and his unbreakable bond with other phenomenologists. James’ ability to point out the peculiar philosophical dynamics that is at play in Husserl’s encounter with other philosophers greatly inspired my PhD project.

I am also grateful that I was able to work with Nicolas de Warren while I was a student at the New School. De Warren’s lectures on Husserl, Merleau-Ponty and Marion were especially inspiring for me, as I was able to discover the importance of the indebtedness of methodological method to the themes this method investigates. While I was at the New School I attended sessions of the Husserl Seminar, which were organized by James and Nicolas. The scholarly exchange and analytical depth demonstrated at these seminars further shaped my understanding of Husserl’s phenomenology.

I pursued the study of circular strategy in Husserl’s phenomenological philosophy with Jay Lampert as my advisor upon the discovery of Jay’s book *Synthesis and Backward Reference in Husserl’s Logical Investigations*. Jay’s reflections upon Husserl’s
methodology are the main motivation for my doctoral project, especially as he observes Husserl’s philosophy as a peculiar interplay between backward and forward reference. I was influenced by the complexity of Jay’s method, as it both combines and transforms the traditions of phenomenology, German Idealism and contemporary French philosophy. Our philosophical exchange was crucial for the methodological maturation of my project, and for the further expansion of my philosophical interests. I consider myself incredibly lucky for having an opportunity to work with Jay and to articulate my ideas through our philosophical dialogue.

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Introduction

I this dissertation I suggest that Husserl’s phenomenological method should be observed as a peculiar type of circular strategy, which can be traced in his early and late writings. I propose that Husserl’s employment of the strategy of circularity is a result of his criticism of psychologism, empiricism, formal ontology and traditional philosophies of time. Husserl, in problematizing the notion of inner evidentiality in the psychologistic theory of logic, in criticizing the formal-ontological account of wholes and parts, and in challenging the concept of time-consciousness as a flow, discloses a vicious circle operating in all of them. Although my main focus remains on Husserl’s early writings such as Logical Investigations and On the Phenomenology of the Consciousness of Internal Time (1893-1917), I also address Husserl’s later reflections in The Bernau Manuscripts, as well as discussing, in my final chapter, the perseverance of what I refer to as Husserl’s strategy of circularity in more recent phenomenology, examining works by Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty.

Husserl, instead of simply attacking these features of psychologism, empiricism and formal ontology, and replacing them with epistemologically more efficient ways to resolve the problems with which these theories were occupied, repeats their circular reasoning under the lens of phenomenological analysis. He enacts the very circularity operating in these theories in order to disclose the inherent contradictions that are at play in their foundations. Husserl resolves the polarities of psychological and ideal-logical,
whole and part, and objective time flow and retention neither by prioritizing one term over the other, nor by subsuming one pole under the other. Husserl addresses these polarities by suggesting that the role of one term in the relation entirely relies on the persistence of the other term, precisely in the self-enclosure of that term. Husserl, instead of merely disengaging or rejecting psychologism and formal ontology, re-articulates their main positions, thereby maintaining a dialogue with them, so to speak, while re-enacting the most problematic places in their arguments. These most problematic moments are not, for Husserl, to be found in argumentative inconsistencies or gaps, but precisely in their seeming completeness and self-evidentiality which is reflected in a vicious circularity.

I suggest that circularity in Husserl’s phenomenological philosophy operates on two separate levels that are analytically intertwined. The first level implies the mutual referentiality between the terms in relation (e.g. whole – part, psychologistic – ideal- logical, now- retention, now-protention, protention-retention ), where the role of one term entirely relies on the role of the other term. Here we witness that one term in the relation achieves its fullness through the acknowledgment of the necessity for the completion of the other term. However, this complementarity immediately implies the necessity of a second level of circularity, where the mutual reliance of the terms in relation is necessitated through the self-enclosure of each of the terms. Only because both terms in the relation are individually self-enclosed are they able to participate mutually in their relation.

The completion of one moment calls for the limitation of that very moment, and thereby opens up a space for another moment to ‘step in.’ The relation between the terms in the polarities resembles less geometrical circle than a set of enclosing series that circle
back and forward with respect to each other. Their circularity is not the formal relation of their mutual causation. The terms in polarities are dependent on each other because they are firm in achieving their own independence.

Husserl employs circularity not as an expression of programmatic or systematic method, but as a peculiar strategy of response to the philosophical traditions with which he is conversing. His phenomenological method is, to recall Fink, “demanded and wrested by the problems”¹ it investigates. Husserl’s circularity, therefore, manifests itself within the context of the themes that he reactively explores. This is why the circularity between terms in a relation addresses exclusion (circularity in the relation between the pure science of logic and psychologism), complementarity (circularity in the relation between wholes and parts) and asymmetry (circularity between the now and its retention, and between retentions, protentions and retentions and protentions). It is, however, important to emphasize that these different modes of circularity are gathered around one underlying strategy: the progression within the realm of Husserl’s phenomenological analysis is mirrored against the argumentative regression of the theories that his phenomenology investigates. Phenomenological critical engagement with the theories that phenomenology attempts to criticize constitutes a realm of pure phenomenological investigation. To call upon and challenge Derrida’s position from *Speech and Phenomena*, it is precisely the ability of phenomenological concepts to stare at their death through their self-presence that defines the philosophical constitution of these concepts. This relation between phenomenological activity and the passivity of the theories it critically addresses is captured through the above-mentioned two levels of circularity.

¹ Fink, Eugen, ‘The Problem of Phenomenology of Edmund Husserl’ in *Apriori and World: European*
In Husserl’s response to psychologistic logic, the first level circularity manifests itself in the following manner: psychologistic logic establishes its self-evidentiality through the rejection of the possibility that logical laws form a realm that is independent from their mental confirmation. Conversely, the Ideal Science of logic is pure in its lawfulness because it is not contingent upon mental confirmation. The relation of mutual reference is made possible through mutual exclusion, which leads to the second level of circularity. The circularity on the second level is demonstrated, in the case of psychologism, through the position that logical laws are mentally grounded, because that is experientially evidential. The second level circularity is exhibited, in the case of the ideal science of logic, in the reflection that logical laws have regularity because they are ideal or pure in themselves.

Further, in Husserl’s analysis of the whole-parts relation, what seems to be the passivity of the parts of the whole, after their phenomenological re-articulation – their inability to be related through isolation and subsequent reconciliation – is reflected in the phenomenological activity of their participation in their essences. The progression of parts’ participation in their essences within the context of the whole to which they belong is designed as a reaction against the formal-ontological linearity of their mutual permeation or reconciliation. The specificity of the parts is unbreakably bound to the peculiarity of the whole to which they belong and vice versa. However, the parts relate to each other – whether they are independent or non-independent parts of that whole – by re-confirming their irrevocable specificity vis a vis each other.

In Husserl’s phenomenology of inner time consciousness, the progression of the flow of objective time is constantly phenomenologically re-articulated by the necessity of
its regression into retentions. The now and the just past are related through their
difference, where their persistent asymmetry constitutes the experience of time.
Furthermore, it is crucial for Husserl to emphasize not only the belonging in divergence
between the flow of the objective time and its phenomenological articulation, but also the
reciprocity of self-enclosure between retentions, protentions, and retentions and
protentions. The other level of circularity enables Husserl to bypass psychologistic and
empiricistic philosophies of time, where the temporal asymmetry between the now and its
retention is addressed by some overarching concept of their concurrence.

I closely trace Husserl’s circular strategy at three different stages of his corpus. In
Chapter 1 I focus on the relation between psychologism and the ideal science of logic,
problematizing the notion of phenomenological purification. I suggest that the
relationship between the ideal science of logic and psychologistic logic is not one of
mutual confrontation but one of argumentative complementarity. The purity of the ideal
science of logic manifests itself through the inspection of the seeming experiential
obviousness of ‘inner evidence’ in psychologism. The notion of self-sufficiency in the
ideal science of logic is employed in disclosing the self-repetition in the psychologistic
argument that the logical laws are mentally founded. Psychologistic certainty in the
mental grounding of logical laws rests entirely upon its own persistence. The circle of
the self-confirmation of ideal laws of logic, to the contrary, results precisely in revealing
the self-repetition operating in psychologism. However, the final aim of this
‘eccentricity’ is not to secure a new theoretical purity by excluding the psychologistic
concept of inner evidentiality. To the contrary, the pure science of logic is possible as a
‘theory’ of logic only through the constant critical inspection of the core arguments
offered in support of the psychologistic notion of inner evidence. The ideal laws, therefore, gain their purity only by exaggerating the inherent tautology that underlies the psychologist concept of inner evidence, or by ‘moving within’ its self-evidentiality. Although I pay attention to the thinkers Husserl criticizes, I closely follow his own reading of these thinkers, and what that reading means for the construction of his arguments. The analyses of Peter Varga in “Psychologism as Positive Herritage of Husserl’s Phenomenological Philosophy” concerning the argumentative similarities between Nelson, Lotze and Husserl are particularly important for this chapter.

In Chapter 2 I deal with the circularity in Husserl’s theory of whole and parts in the Third Logical Investigation. I pay special attention to his account of the relation between parts in the whole, according to which the parts’ participation in their essences defines their relation. I propose that the phenomenological contribution to the theory of whole and parts is accompanied with a phenomenological inspection of the problems surrounding the formal-ontological theory of whole and part. I pay close attention to Robert Sokolowski’s suggestion in “The Logic of Parts and Wholes in Husserl’s Investigations” that Husserl’s analysis of whole and parts defines the argumentative structure of Logical Investigations. However, I tend to see this relation as one among other themes in Logical Investigations that can be analyzed within the frame of Husserl’s strategy of circularity. I am especially inspired by Jay Lampert’s book Synthesis and Backward Reference in Husserl’s Logical Investigations, the text that remains the defining source of this project. I find Lampert’s reflection that the whole and part “are always in the process of being objectified in the passing-over” and that their
establishment rests on the “self-propelling interpretation of individuals-in-context”\(^2\) as an important illustration of Husserl’s circular strategy. The mutual definition of the terms in relation through their forward and backward reference points, in fact, to the radical transformation not only of formal ontology, but also of the prevalent understanding of phenomenology as an idealist theory of consciousness.

I turn to the strategy of circularity in Husserl’s phenomenology of time consciousness in Chapter 3, drawing from *On the Phenomenology of the Consciousness of Internal Time* (1893-1917) and *The Bernau Manuscripts*. I propose that Husserl’s constant attentiveness to the asymmetry between the now and the just past challenges the empiricist and psychologistic notion of time as a stream of consciousness. I locate circularity not only in the relation between objective time and its phenomenological articulation through retention and protention, but also in the relation between retentions and protentions. Nicolas de Warren’s reflections from *Husserl and the Promise of Time: Subjectivity in Transcendental Phenomenology* are crucial for this chapter, particularly for the suggestion that analysis of the problem of time demands the transformation of the very discourse of that analysis. This fits with my argument about Husserl’s permanent indebtedness to the themes he opens or the theories he analyzes, where Husserl’s phenomenology of time consciousness becomes an inquiry into the transformation of the dominant philosophies of time. This also implies that the phenomenological description of experience, through the constancy of its own self-investigation, becomes a peculiar kind of experience in itself. Particularly important in this regard are de Warren’s

suggestions that Husserl’s time diagrams are analytically significant precisely through their metaphoricity.

Finally, in Chapter 4 I explore the impact of Husserl’s circular strategy on the philosophies of Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty. By recalling Husserl’s indebtedness to the theories he investigates, I suggest that Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty, in their respective attempts to move beyond Husserl’s phenomenological project, in fact irrevocably come back to Husserl’s strategy of circularity. Just as Husserl’s proximity-in-criticism regarding psychologism resulted in a creation of an authentic philosophical practice, the post-phenomenological philosophy remains inadvertently indebted to Husserl’s phenomenology, precisely through its critical distance from it. By problematizing the notion of reflective distance in Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty through the lens of Husserl’s circularity, I disclose a peculiar vulnerability in their philosophies. I suggest that Heidegger’s turn of being, even though it is carefully designed through the forgetfulness of being in nihilism, tends to appear as a notion that is more primordial than its forgetfulness. This means that Heidegger often seems to be unable to resist the temptation of the search for a new authenticity, thereby replicating the metaphysical dualisms he is dismissing. The notion of depth, for Merleau-Ponty, is neither a result of a combination of dimensions nor an overpowering force that makes these dimensions possible. The depth is the first dimension precisely as it mirrors the struggle between the other two dimensions, according to Merleau-Ponty. However, I suggest that Merleau-Ponty’s language often suggests a peculiar kind of primordiality in the notion of depth. Even if the notions suggesting agency in depth vis a vis its components are metaphors, they still tend to set themselves in a relation of priority over their addressee, so to speak. I
suggest that both Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty tend to overlook that critical philosophical distance itself rests upon a bond with that which it sets itself above.
As regards my frank critique of the psychologistic logic and epistemology, I have to recall Goethe’s saying: There is nothing to which one is more severe than the errors that one has just abandoned.

(Edmund Husserl, Forward to the first edition of Logical Investigations)

We . . . require a special word when we wish to speak of propositions with which we are not acquainted, of which we don’t even know whether any thinking being has thought them . . . Since no other term was available, I allowed myself to choose the expression proposition \textit{in itself} or \textit{in the objective sense} to designate this concept. You must in every case first know whether a given combination of ideas constitutes a proposition before you can even raise the question of whether a certain being might \textit{assume} this proposition (make it his judgment).

(Bernard Bolzano, Letter to Franz Exner, 18. Dec. 1834.)

Introduction

In this chapter I focus on Husserl’s relationship with psychologism, and how his response to psychologistic logic informed his analysis of logical categories and their constitution. Husserl proposes, as an alternative to psychologistic logic, a groundwork for the analytical practice called the ideal science of logic. Husserl reflects upon psychologism as a theory of logical relations in terms of their mental correlates. He sees the alternative in an ideal science of logic that is focused on ideal lawfulness and the genesis of logical categories. The seemingly obvious and strict opposition between psychologism and the science of logic turns out being, I suggest, a more complicated relationship of concurrence and conceptual complementarity. Husserl’s criticism of psychologism develops as a careful problematizing of its philosophical justification, and
unfolds as a thorough investigation into the self-evidential moments in its theory. The firm ground of the ideal science of logic is achieved through its argumentative dependency on the psychologistic notion of self-evidentiality.

Husserl criticizes the psychologistic tradition in the Prolegomena to the *Logical Investigations* through the careful examination of the works of Mill, Sigwart, Stumpf, Herbart, Erdmann, Heymans and Lotze. Martin Kusch points out in *Psychologism: A Case Study in the Sociology of Philosophical Knowledge* that Husserl’s reflection upon logical psychologism was composed of both praise and harsh criticism of the authors he was conversing with:

To begin with, Husserl found words of praise even for those philosophers that he criticised harshly and at great length: Mill’s treatment of logic was ‘valuable’ ([1900] 1975:19); Drobisch was ‘excellent’ (trefflich) ([1900] 1975:50); Lange’s logic ‘wise’ (geistvoll) ([1900] 1975:101); Sigwart ‘important’ (bedeutend) ([1900] 1975:106, 138), ‘excellent’ (ausgezeichnet) ([1900] 1975:107) and displaying ‘so much acumen’ (Scharfsinn) ([1900] 1975:138); Heymans’ work was ‘interesting’ ([1900] 1975:116); Erdmann ‘excellent’, ‘of outstanding merit’ (verdient) ([1900] 1975:149) and ‘outstanding’ (hervorragend) ([1900] 1975:157). Husserl also referred to Brentano and Stumpf indirectly ‘as the men…to whom my scientific education owes most’ ([1900] 1975:7). Husserl even denied that ‘psychologism’ was meant as a term with negative connotations: ‘I am using the expressions “psychologist”, “psychologism”, etc. without any derogatory slant’ ([1900] 1975:64). And having chastised Erdmann’s ideas as ‘absurd’, Husserl went on to explain that ‘absurd’ too was used ‘without any slant’ ([1900] 1975:153). Furthermore, at one point Husserl presented his antipsychologism as a compromise formula between the earlier normative antipsychologism and psychological logic” ([1900] 1975:168)."[1].

I propose in this chapter that Husserl’s criticism of psychologism unfolds as the inflation and the radicalization of its accomplishments. I also suggest that, conversely, the philosophical success of the pure science of logic can only be measured against the background of its own hyperbolizing. The main distinction of Husserl’s relation to

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psychologism is reflected neither in the frontal dismissal of the psychologistic theories, nor in the mere replacement of psychologism with the theory of the ideal science of logic. The confrontation between the pure science of logic and logical psychologism cannot be seen as a mere confrontation between the victorious side and the defeated opponent. The reason why this wrestling cannot result in the brutal self-affirmation of the victor is that the ideal laws of logic gain their purity only through the illumination of the completeness of the psychologistic concept of self-evidentiality.\(^4\) The illumination of the main principles on which the concept of inner evidence, conceived as a mental investment, rests provides insight into the inherent betrayal of its obligatory and universal claim for truth. Husserl does not discover a particular problem in the argumentative structure of the psychologistic notion of inner evidence, but suggests that the ‘problem’ lies precisely in the seeming argumentative success of psychologism. Husserl’s understanding of the pure science of logic collapses the psychologistic distinction between logic as a theory of norms and logic as a normative-regulatory discipline.

Husserl’s examination of psychologistic logic is performed as a careful investigation into the concept of inner evidence, which can be fully re-articulated only through descriptive analysis. The psychological act of epistemological self-assurance culminates in mere compulsion and calls for the intervention of the pure science of logic. Conversely, the ‘theoretical’ purity of the ideal science of logic consists in the ‘practice’ of the critical examination of psychologistic inner-evidentiality.

I address this relation between pure science of logic and psychologism by tracing Husserl’s criticism of psychologistic logic. According to psychologistic logic, every

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logical operation is grounded in mental processes, and this is a self-evidential fact. The fact that logical operations are mentally founded is supported by experiential evidentiality. This means that because we have the capacity for psychological experience, logical laws must be grounded psychologically. The self-evidentiality of the psychologistic notion of inner evidence, as observed by Husserl, ends up in tautology. What seems to be sufficient psychologistic confirmation of the foundedness of logical laws on mental processes is revealed to be a mere self-repetition of its seeming experiential obviousness and it is exaggerated as such under the lens of Husserl’s ideal science of logic.

The psychologistic tautology is visible in the seeming obviousness of the mutual exclusion of contradictory modes of consciousness in one judgment. Husserl describes the psychologistic notion of inner evidentiality by suggesting that the “term ‘inner evidence’ stands for a mental character, well-known to everyone through his inner experience, a peculiar feeling which guarantees the truth of the judgment to which it attaches.”⁵ This inner experience, which is “well known to everyone,” is fortified by the seeming obviousness of the fact that “mutual exclusion enters into the definition of the correlative terms.”⁶ In other words, the affirmation of one term in a relation is provided through the exclusion of its opposing term. The indubitable authority of the feeling of certainty, or the lack thereof, which guarantees acquisition of knowledge of the inquired phenomenon, is what prevails. This feeling of certainty, however, makes possible the completion of the tautological motion, where psychological confirmation assumes the form of self-repetition. In other words, the structure of the psychologistic insight into the

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⁵ Ibid, 115.
⁶ Ibid, 57.
impossibility of two contradictory terms being joined in one observation – the weather is hot and cold – develops in the following manner: the weather cannot be cold and hot at the same time, as our mental capacity to confirm the unification between these two terms will not provide us with the tranquility of a final decision. Furthermore, that we experience as mental fulfillment in our recognition that two opposing terms in relation exclude each other points back to the state of affairs to which our mental confirmation or dismissal refers. In other words, it is not hot and cold, because we simply feel it cannot be otherwise. We feel satisfied with the argumentative structure of our insight that it is cold or hot outside simply because it is not hot or cold at the same time. The reason for this, of course, lies in the empiricist-psychologistic assumption that consciousness is a flow and a combinatory host to its components. We simply cannot feel hot and cold at the same time, as we reflect upon what is available to us in terms of the ready-made components of the reflective predisposition of our consciousness. These mutually exclusive components cannot co-exist in our consciousness, as the impossibility of the combination of the isolated parts determines the flow of consciousness. The flow of consciousness confirms itself by being able to make a selection between opposing terms, because it organizes the terms in relations in a way in which they do not exclude each other. In other words, the terms that are supposed to be self-evidently related within the mediation of consciousness are already experienced as isolated, so that the subsequent relation of either inclusion or exclusion of these terms can take place. A is B because it is not C. A is related to B only because of its non-C-ness, which means that B is defined through the fact that A and C are not related. A and C are not B at the same time because B is either A, if it is not C, or it is C, if it is not A.
In this chapter I propose two main components of the relation between pure the
science of logic and psychologism, namely two different modes in which tautology
(psychologistic logic) and circularity (pure science of logic) are related to exaggeration
and intensification. Both tautology and exaggeration (and, analogously, circularity and
intensification) should be treated as inherently connected, because they are manifested
only through their mutual reference. I shall describe these two different types of
circularities before I turn to the examination of Husserl’s text.

One could argue that psychologism justifies itself by openly promoting its
‘particularism’ over the ‘universality’ of logical laws. However, if we carefully approach
the argumentation employed by psychologism, we realize that it secures for itself a
peculiar position of ‘theoretical purity.’ The purification of logical laws from the claims
that these laws are not contingent upon mental processes is grounded in the
argumentative self-evidentiality of psychologism. Conversely, the pure science of logic
openly announces its purity apropos psychologism, while at the same time
acknowledging its argumentative indebtedness to it. The ideal science of logic is not
oblivious to the process of its constitution, which as a deliberate self-referentiality serves
as a mirror to the constitutive gaps in the seeming particularism or concretism found in
psychologistic logic or empiricism. The purification process in the ideal science of logic
is designed to address the problems involved in the distinction between pure and
contingent as it is found in both psychologistic logic and logical absolutism. The pure
science of logic is possible as a ‘theory’ of logic only through the ‘practice’ of inquiring
into the core arguments of the justification of the psychologistic notion of inner evidence.
Circularity-intensification (the ideal science of logic) and well as tautology-exaggeration (in psychologism), to sum up, provide an insight into two complementary processes:

1) The psychologistic attempt to secure the ground of logic through the exclusion of what it is to be purified of ends up in self-repetition, and the justification for this self-repetition is that it opens up the possibility for further clarification of the purification process by the ideal science of logic. The ideal science of logic suggests that the stark opposition between the realm of the contingent and the purified realm of logical laws as found in logical absolutism is merely replicated in psychologism under the guise of the mental foundation of logical laws. I propose that Husserl develops his analysis of the relation between psychologism and the ideal science of logic by insisting that what underlies psychologistic criticism of absolute logicism is a reversal of epistemological authority. Instead of the primacy of the universality of logical laws, psychologism advances the primacy of their dependency on mental processes. Psychologism thereby secures its anti-universalism through the insistence on the fact that the epistemological throne, which used to belong to the authority of universality, is now reserved for the psychologistic notion of inner evidence. I suggest that one sort of purification is merely being substituted for another: logicism practices the purification of logical processes through the purgation of mental correlates, while psychologism practices the purification of logical processes through the purgation of all of them that are not located in psychological processes. Psychologism ends up in self-repetition, and it turns its justificatory lack into a universal epistemic value. The
only philosophical justification of psychologism is in its calling upon its capacity to guarantee the certainty of inner evidence. Husserl paves the way into the realm of the ideal science of logic by pointing out the above-mentioned problems in psychologistic logic, and his investigation of the ideal science of logic starts through the delineation of the major argumentative flaws in psychologism. What appears to be the reason for the ultimate argumentative success of psychologism, namely the experiential evidentiality of its position, becomes the main target for Husserl. Husserl’s finding is that psychologistic self-justification is not only tautological but also proud of its self-referentiality. This makes the process of psychologistic justification dominantly cynical through its own self-exaggeration. It is not only that the claim “A (logical laws) is B (mental correlate)” is confirmed through the fact that B underlies our experience of logic, but also through the claim that B is B, or the psychological foundation of our experience of logic is always self-evidential. In other words, not only A is B because B is A, but B is A because B is B. Husserl’s pointing out of the mere reversal of the epistemological authority in psychologistic anti-absolutism is crucial for the design of his pure science of logic.

2) The ideal science of logic secures its legitimate position as a ‘science’ by demonstrating its impossibility to be external to what it criticizes. The possibility of the grounding of logical laws is found in the withdrawal of the pure science of logic from the battle between the universal objectivity of logical rules and the
non-universalist contingency of psychological laws. I propose that the ideal science of logic deliberately shapes itself as an inversion of psychologistic logic, particularly with regard to its justificatory self-referentiality. The grandiosity of its self-promotion as a science of purification is therefore an explicit demonstration of an irony, where its seeming resting at the privileged throne of ideal lawfulness is reflected in its capacity to intensify its own self-referentiality apropos the self-repetition of the concept of inner evidence. This means that Husserl reverses argumentative structure of psychologistic logic by exaggerating it. This exaggeration, however, arises through the pure science of logic’s becoming deliberately more self-referential than psychologism. Husserl, in designing the realm of the pure science of logic, starts from the argumentative position of the obvious self-referentiality of psychologism obvious: A (logical laws) is B (mental correlates), because B is B (mental foundation of logical laws is self-evidential). This means that Husserl starts with the claim that the ideal science of logic (D) is ideal because it is pure in itself, or D is D, which is why A (logical laws) is D (pure). The relation “A (logical laws) is D (pure science of logic)” is used for the insight that “D is D (ideal science of logic is pure in itself)”. However, this insight is used as an inversion of the psychologistic relation “B is B (psychologistic logic is self-evidential)”, with the aim of providing the following insight: “D is D” because “B is B”, or ideal logic is pure in itself, because psychologistic logic is inner-evidential. The ideal science of logic self-intensifies apropos the exaggeration of psychologistic logic. Husserl’s final aim is, of course,
to suggest the following: “A is A” (logical laws are lawful or pure in themselves) because “B is B” (psychologistic logic is inner-evidential).

The self-promotion of the ideal science of logic has a therapeutic effect on psychologistic logic. The circularity of the pure science of logic deliberately adopts the tautological form of psychologistic logic and subverts it by demonstrating that the resolution of logical self-justification is an activity of self-repetition. In other words, while the theoretical self-evidentiality of psychologistic logic ends up in the activity of an unaware self-repetition, the authority of the pure science of logic is secured in its deliberate theoretical contingency apropos the obviousness of psychologistic self-evidentiality. This is why Husserl states that the ability of truth to “retain its ideal being” is preceded by its inability to be psycho-physically realized. We observe in the passage below the peculiar relation of mutuality between the ideal science of logic and psychologism that is established precisely through their difference:

We do not of course doubt that to know truth and to utter it justifiably, presupposes proper seeing of it. Nor do we doubt that logic as a technology must look into the (p. 116) psychological conditions in which inner evidence illuminates our judgments. We may even go a further step in the direction of the conception we are refuting. While we seek to preserve the distinction between purely logical and methodological propositions, we expressly concede that the former have a relation to the psychological datum of inner evidence, that they in a sense state its psychological conditions. Such a relation, must, however be regarded as purely ideal and indirect. The pure laws of logic say absolutely nothing about inner evidence or its conditions... The propositions about inner evidence which arise in this manner keep their a priori character, and the conditions of inner evidence that they assert bear no trace of the psychological or the real. They are purely conceptual propositions, transformable, as in every like case, into statements about ideal incompatibilities or possibilities. ... (p. 117) Though we stress the ideality of the possibilities of evident judgment which can be derived from logical principles, and which we see to reveal their a priori validity in cases of apodeictic self-evidence, we do not deny their psychologistic utility. If we take a law that, out of two contradictory propositions, one is true and one is false, and deduce from it the truth that, one only out of every pair of possible contradictory judgments can have the character of inward evidence, we may note this to be a self-evidently correct deduction, if self evidence be defined as the experience in which the correctness of his judgment

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7 LI, vol.1, 117.
is brought home to a judging subject, the new proposition utters a truth about the compatibilities or incompatibilities of certain mental experiences. In this manner, however, every proposition of pure mathematics tells us something about possible or impossible happenings in the mental realm. No empirical enumeration or calculation, no mental act of algebraic transformation of geometrical construction, is possible which conflicts with the ideal laws of mathematics. These laws accordingly have a psychological use. We can read off from each of them a priori possibilities and impossibilities relating to certain sorts of mental acts, acts of counting, of additive and manipulative combination etc. These laws are not there made into psychological laws. Psychology, the natural science (p. 118) concerned with what we mentally live through, has to look into the natural conditions of our experience. In its field are specifically to be found the empirically real relationships of our mathematical and logical activities, whose ideal relations and laws make up an independent realm. This latter realm is set up in purely universal propositions, made up out of ‘concepts’ which are not class-concepts of mental acts, but ideal concepts of essence, each with its concrete foundation in such mental acts or in their objective correlates. . . The inward evidence of our judgments does not merely depend on such psychological conditions, conditions that one might also call external and empirical, since they are rooted not purely in the specific form and matter of our judgment, but in its empirical context in mental life: it depends also on ideal conditions.8

We can suggest that Husserl explicitly rejects psychologism as a failed theory of logic, which, as a discipline that deals with the peculiarities of mental states, has relevance within the realm of the natural sciences. It appears that Husserl straightforwardly dismisses psychologism for its logical inadequacy, thereby contrasting it with the purity of the ideal science of logic. The fact that psychologism cannot move beyond the realm of the “natural conditions of our experience”9 further emphasizes the absolute necessity of the ideal science of logic for the understanding of “purely conceptual propositions, transformable, as in every like case, into statements about ideal incompatibilities or possibilities.”10 The more psychologism proves its relevance for the natural sciences, the more the ideal science of logic seems to be untouched by it.

I suggest here that Husserl’s strong epistemological differentiation between the ideal science of logic and psychologism does not result in confrontation, but in

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8 Ibid, 119. Emphasis in bold is mine throughout the text of this dissertation.
9 Ibid.
10 Ibid.
substantial argumentative concurrence. That the logical concepts have their psychological utility, their empirical relevance, their “concrete foundation in such mental acts” already confirms the basic premise of psychologism, but this is now confirmed through a critical lens. Husserl’s suggestion is that, although logical concepts have their psychological foundation, their full epistemological scope is not actualized in this way. Their indebtedness to the mental realm testifies to the fact that this is only one part of the story, so to speak. While the ideal laws of logic have their psychological relevance, they are nevertheless not reducible to the realm of psychologism. The psychological utility of a priori logical principles does not impinge upon their ideality, but it does emphasize that their ideal component belongs to a realm that lies outside the jurisdiction of psychologism. Husserl thereby confronts the logical significance of psychologism by not dismissing the psychological relevance of logical laws. This is why it is possible for Husserl to suggest that propositions about inner evidence (a psychologistic term) retain simultaneously both their a priori character and their psychological relevance. Even though the propositions of pure mathematics “tell us something about possible or impossible happenings in the mental realm”, and even though a priori logical laws have the capacity to be relevant for the realm of psychology, that still does not render them exclusively psychological. I suggest that this situation does not illustrate the epistemological primacy of the ideal science of logic over psychologism, but it does complicate the process of epistemological prioritizing. Ideal science of logic can have its relevance for logic not despite, but \textit{because} of its relevance for psychology.

I take a step further in this analysis and suggest that the more self-evidential the laws of psychologistic logic are, the more they emphasize their ideal correlate. Husserl
rearticulates the psychologistic concept of inner evidentiality by pointing out that it achieves its possibility or impossibility in reference to the purity of its own logical background. As he explicitly states in the quote above,“empirically real relationships of our mathematical and logical activities” have their ideal relations and laws that “make up an independent realm.” In other words, because inward evidence can be re-articulated ideally, it remains complete in its psychologistic self-justification vis a vis its ideal correlate.

The less the ideal correlate of mental processes is concerned with psychologistic logic, the less it is interested in dismissing psychology. The ideal science of logic unfolds in its lawful purity while it looks back at the self-enclosure of psychologistic argumentation. Husserl even suggests that each concept that belongs to the realm of “purely universal propositions” has “its concrete foundation in mental acts or objective correlates.” One might wonder why Husserl would emphasize that “ideal concepts of essence” have their concrete foundation, or why ideal concepts would need any reference to a foundation that lies beyond their realm. I suggest that this is due to the fact that concepts of the ideal science of logic have their psychological correlate that they are able to reassert their ideal purity.

I further suggest that is not only the case that psychologism and the ideal science of logic unfold in a mutual disinterestedness, but that their mutual independence is argumentatively rooted in their complementarity. In other words, one term of this relationship calls for the other term, precisely because that term is complete in itself: just as ideal logical laws are not reducible to psychologism simply because of their
psychological component, so too can psychologistic logic can be re-articulated ideally because of its mental concreteness with reference to its ideal possibility.

Husserl states that the conditions of the possibility of inner evidence “bear no trace of the psychological or the real.”\(^{11}\) For Husserl, the “inward evidence of our judgments” depends not merely on psychological but also on ideal conditions. He further writes:

The laws of pure logic are truths rooted in the concept of truth, and in concepts essentially related to this concept. They state, in relation to possible acts of judgment, and on the basis of their mere form, the ideal conditions of the possibility or impossibility of their inner evidence. . . It is clear, for the rest, that the terms in question, and all such as function in purely logical contexts, must be equivocal; they must, on the one hand, stand for class-concepts of mental states such as belong in psychology, but, on the other hand, for generic concepts covering ideal singulars, which belong in a sphere of pure law.\(^{12}\)

Husserl does not disregard the psychologistic concept of inner evidence as a construct which is to be replaced by the authenticity of pure logical lawfulness. He recognizes that inward evidence is dependent on psychological conditions, as it “arises and perishes” in “natural conditions of the experiences” such as “concentration of interest, a certain mental freshness, practice etc.”\(^{13}\) However, this relationship of dependence is not a simple one, since inner evidence “depends also on ideal conditions.”\(^{14}\) The distinction between the inner evidentiality of psychologism and the ideality of the propositions of phenomenologically purified logic is preserved in the peculiar argumentative bond between the ideality of the pure science of logic and the experiential contingency of psychologism. Husserl, challenging the logicism of Leibniz, and recalling Hume, observes that it is not enough to merely draw a sharp distinction between “‘relations of ideas’ and ‘matters of fact’”, but that one “must clearly grasp

\(^{11}\) Ibid.
\(^{12}\) Ibid, pp. 119, 117.
\(^{13}\) Ibid, 119.
\(^{14}\) Ibid.
what the ideal is, both intrinsically and in its relation to the real, how this ideal stands to
the real, how it can be immanent in it and so come to knowledge.”\textsuperscript{15} It is not enough,
for Husserl, only to dwell within the realm of pure logic, as it is precisely its relation to
the experiential or real that defines its possibility of coming to knowledge. What I am
here examining is what is involved in the process of the ideal becoming epistemological,
the process of the ideal “standing to” the psychological as the motion standing—in-itself
and standing—against.

Husserl criticizes the empiricist suggestions that logical laws and their ideal
objects are “mere pointers to ‘thought economies’, verbal abbreviations whose true
content merely reduces to individual, singular experiences, mere presentations and
judgments concerning individual facts . . . .”\textsuperscript{16} Maintaining the ‘idealist’ position, Husserl
argues that the empiricist concept of non-ideal generality, as a reduction of the “ideal
unities to real singularities”,\textsuperscript{17} is “involved in hopeless absurdities,” and “that its
splintering of concepts into a range of singulars, without a concept to unify such a range
in our thought, cannot be thought.”\textsuperscript{18} Husserl explicitly suggests that the psychologistic-
empiricistic prioritizing of real singularities fails to recognize the universality of its own
alleged particularism. Psychologism thereby fails to see that it performs a peculiar sort of
generalization and it institutes the real on ‘the orphaned throne’ of the ideal.
Psychologism, in fact, reinforces the ideal-real division by insisting on the seeming
obviousness of inner evidentiality in the experience of truth and the primacy of inner
evidentiality over logical laws.

\textsuperscript{15} Ibid, 120.
\textsuperscript{16} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{17} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{18} Ibid.
Husserl’s second argument against psychologism focuses on the psychologistic notion of normalcy. Husserl suggests that the epistemic obviousness of the notion of normalcy tends to conceal rather than to reveal anything about the capacity of inner evidentiality to serve as the guarantor of the truth of logical judgments. He even mockingly observes that the recourse to normalcy will not supply the conditions for the inwardly evident coinciding with true judgments. It is important to notice here that the manner in which Husserl criticizes psychologism reveals his own conception of the ideal science of logic:

It is not the sort of mental character that simply lets itself be attached to any and every judgment of a certain class, i.e. the so called ‘true’ judgments, so that the phenomenological content of such a judgment, considered in and for itself, would be the same whether or not it had this character. . . Inner evidence is rather nothing but the ‘experience’ of truth. Truth is, of course, only experienced in the sense in which something ideal can be an experience in a real act. Otherwise put: Truth is an Idea, whose particular case is an actual experience in the inwardly evident judgment. The inwardly evident judgment is, however, an experience of primal givenness: the non-self-evident judgment stands to it much as the arbitrary positing of an object in imagination stands to its adequate perception. A thing adequately perceived is not a thing merely meant in some manner or other: it is a thing primarily given in our act, and as what we mean it, i.e. as itself given and grasped without residue. In like fashion what is self-evidently judged is not merely judged (meant in a judging, assertive, affirmative manner) but it is given in the judgment experience as itself present – present in the sense in which a state of affairs, meant in this or that manner, according to its kind, whether singular or general, empirical or ideal etc., can be ‘present’ . . . The experience of the agreement between meaning and what is itself present, meant, between the actual sense of an assertion and the self-given state of affairs, is inward evidence: the Idea of this agreement is truth, whose ideality is also its objectivity. It is not a chance fact that a propositional thought, occurring here and now, agrees with a given state of affairs: the agreement rather holds between a self-identical propositional meaning and a self-identical state of affairs.19

In this passage Husserl clearly stresses that the ideality of the phenomenological content of a true judgment not only persists “in and for itself”, regardless of whether the mental component is attached to it or not, but that the “in and for itself” of this ideality is, in fact, measured against the background of “mental character.” The apparent fixity of the

19 Ibid, 121.
ideal-phenomenological content of such a judgment is adequately confirmed by the certainty of inner evidence (or the lack thereof, where the accompanying feeling is one of uncertainty). Furthermore, the mental activity of inner evidence is a testimony to the constitution of phenomenological ideality, which prevails regardless of the possibility or impossibility of its mental articulation. Logical truth, therefore, can be experienced only insofar as any ideality can be reflected in the completion of a ‘real’ act. The apparent fixity of the ideal phenomenological content is reflected in the mobility of the self-assertion of its psychological counterpart.

We can take as an example the justification of the mathematical proposition 2x2=4. Usual justification of this equation would be that this proposition is valid for all subjects and in all times. This however does not mean that this proposition is valid beyond, above or despite our capacity to confirm it, but in a peculiar relation to our capacity for multiplying. We can say that the ideal assertion of the relation between the two terms unfolds in relation to our capacity to successfully or unsuccessfully conduct or realize this assertion. If the situation were the opposite, then the regular justification would turn into a vicious circle – the equation 2x2=4 is valid because it is valid. Husserl describes inward evidence in the following way:

And, as in the realm of perception, the unseen does not at all coincide with the non-existent, so lack of inward evidence does not amount to untruth. The experience of the agreement between meaning and what is itself present, meant, between the actual sense of assertion and the self-given state of affairs: the Idea of this agreement is truth, whose ideality is also its objectivity. It is not a chance that a propositional thought, occurring here and now, agrees with a given state of affairs: the agreement rather holds between a self-identical propositional meaning and a self-identical state of affairs. ‘Validity’ or ‘objectivity’, and their opposites, do not pertain to an assertion as a particular temporal experience, but to the assertion in specie, to the pure, self-identical assertion 2x2=4 etc.20

20 Ibid.
The idea of the agreement between propositions in themselves and the self-evidentiality of states of affairs is what is called truth. This however does not mean that the ideality of a proposition does not persist if its objective correlate is not established in an agreement with it (this is why Husserl writes about both objectivity or validity and its opposites). To the contrary, the ideal “sense of assertion” persists in a relation to its experiential validity. Validity and invalidity pertain to their respective ideal correlates, which are concerned with their ideally lawful realm precisely through a contradistinction to their objective correlates of the valid or invalid proposition. The fact that objectivity does not stand in the “idea of agreement” (i.e. truth) with its ideal correlate does not mean that the propositions in themselves are impossible – they are simply not in a relation of adequacy with their experiential correlates. The relation between ideality and objectivity is one of belonging in difference, where one term in the relation points to another term, with each term regarded individually standing independent of the other(s).

This is illustrated in Plato’s early dialogues, where the question “What is the essence of X?”, e.g. the true nature of friendship, love, justice, virtue, or whatever, is examined through intense verbal wrestling between Socrates and his interlocutors. It is not only that Socratic truth comes at the end of a dialogue, standing high above the struggle needed for its accomplishment, but this truth also stares back at the process of its own achievement, giving it a specific dialogical context. The Socratic strategy was precisely to challenge the knowledge claims of alleged experts in their fields (artists, soldiers, poets, politicians). The Socratic pursuit for universal truths proceeded through the demonstration that the ‘truth’ proposed by these alleged experts was in fact perspectival and self-perpetuating. Socrates’ ability to point out this perspectivalism was
a determining factor in the opening up of the realm of universality. Socrates’ irony lay not in his knowing the truth of the phenomenon to be investigated before he started a dialogue, but rather in his repeated claim of ignorance that motivated and guided the demonstration of the ignorance of his ‘expert’ interlocutors, thereby advancing the search for true knowledge.

In the next section of this Chapter I shall suggest the following relation: the more that psychological self-assertion assumes its indisputable fixity, the more it crystalizes itself as the constancy of its self-repetition in front of the “phenomenological-idealistic” mirror. In other words, the more that psychologism ignores its inability to provide what it promises, the more it tells us about the capacity of ideal logical laws to emphasize the reversal of the fixity-mobility polarity inherent to psychologism, but not recognized by it. An interesting illustration of this situation can be found in the movement of the spinning top. The spinning top is perceived as fixed or without motion precisely when its rotation around its axis achieves rapid acceleration. Its structural restlessness—the maintenance of its rotational inertia—provides the appearance of its positional motionlessness. We can suggest that psychologism dwells within the horizon of the visual impression left by the spinning top, whereas phenomenology, by disclosing the presence of rotational inertia, is concerned with the way in which both rotation and fixity co-constitute each other. Psychologism, while concerned with the epistemological obviousness of inner evidentiality (the fixity of the spinning top) remains indebted to the activity of the constant repetition of its argumentative obviousness (the rotational inertia of the spinning top). To the contrary, phenomenology achieves its theoretical legitimacy (the fixity of the spinning top) by acknowledging its analytic indebtedness to the inherent limitation of
the psychologistic argument about inner evidentiality (the way in which the rotational inertia and the impressional fixity of the spinning top constitute each other).

Husserl, therefore, collapses the difference between the fixity of the theory and the mobility of the practice not by simply abolishing them nor by prioritizing one over the other, but by insisting that their separation from each other can be performed only within the context of their mutual actualization.

If the ultimate ‘realization’ or completion of the concepts of evidence, grounding and regulation is possible, then these concepts have to assume the form of ideally lawful self-evidence or self-regulation. Conversely, the full capacity for self-regulation of ideal laws is reflected in their ‘insistence’ on the further clarification of the concept of regulation.

Tautology of inner evidence: psychologistic cynicism as a testimony to the ideality of logical laws

Husserl emphasizes that Mill defines the logical law of contradiction by referring to the “supposed facts of experience.”²¹ Mill, in response to Hamilton, suggests that the constancy of logical law is obvious in the fact that “the appearance of any positive mode of consciousness cannot occur without excluding a correlative negative mode: and that the negative mode cannot occur without excluding the correlative positive mode.”²² This obviousness rests on the existential condition of the “coexistence or succession of

²¹ Ibid, 57.
²² Ibid.
Logical laws, therefore, belong to the very facts that they are supposed govern, as long as these facts are truths. Logical laws are measured by the experience they are supposed to govern; in other words, that which grounds is explained by what is grounded by it. Husserl sarcastically observes the following: “A law would therefore ascribe a ‘coming and going’ to certain facts called truths, among which, as among others, the law would itself be found. The law would arise and perish in conformity with the law, a patent absurdity.” It is interesting, however, to notice that Mill is not disturbed by the explicit tautology of logical law. He is, in fact, convinced that the justification of logical law should be seen as an “inherent necessity of thought” and as “an original part of our mental constitution.” According to Mill, the universality of logical laws is guaranteed by “the native structure of our minds.” He supports this claim by suggesting that the “conditions of our experience deny us experience which would be required to alter them” even, or especially, in the case where the subject who asserts a logical proposition is not experientially specified. For Mill, everything that conflicts with the law of experience turns into a case of impossibility. Husserl quotes the following observation by Mill:

They may or may not be capable of alteration by experience, but the conditions of our experience deny to us the experience which would be required to alter them. Any assertion, therefore, which conflicts with one of these laws, any proposition, for instance, which asserts a contradiction, though it were on a subject wholly removed from the sphere of our experience, is to us unbelievable. The belief in such a proposition is in the present constitution of nature, impossible as a mental act.

23 Ibid, 55.
24 Ibid.
25 Ibid.
26 Ibid.
27 Ibid.
28 Ibid, 57.
The logical impossibility for two contradictory propositions to be part of one proposition relies purely on experiential self-evidence. Furthermore, Mill calls upon the firmness of the constitution of nature and natural laws, whose indubitable character rules out any possible criticism. The psychologistic reliance on the indubitable character of our natural constitution consistently leads either into a circle, “if the principles of proof used to justify the principles of proof were the same as the latter”, or into a regress, “if the principles of proof themselves required further proof.”29 Empiricist logic discloses two components of its justification: “the correctness of the [psychologistic] theory presupposes the irrationality of its premises” and “the correctness of the premises [presupposes] the irrationality of the theory (or thesis).”30 This logic sustains the lack of ideal, non-empirical grounding precisely through its inductively consistent tautology. This means that the logical conditions of our experience are informed by the obviousness of the very experience these laws are supposed to regulate.

Empiricist logic, by repeating its psychological referentiality, unwillingly stresses the importance of the ‘objectivity’ of the science of logic. Husserl emphasizes that the empiricist unawareness of the incompleteness of its principle of self-evidence is possible because “the equivalent normative transformation, is confused with psychologicial assertions.”31 This confusion is most directly manifested in the psychologistic inability to differentiate between the inexistence of judgment and its lawful irregularity.32 Psychologism betrays the claim for the validity of its self-evidence by constantly repeating its justification. Since it is experientially evident that we cannot experience two

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29 Ibid, 60.
31 Ibid, 61.
32 Ibid.
contradictory situations at the same time, or in one judgment, it has to be that this is what defines the logical formulation of this particular experiential situation.

Husserl notices “the grave ambiguity in the word ‘impossibility’” which points both to a unity excluded by objective law and to a subjective incapacity\textsuperscript{33} to unify the contradictory statements. This ambiguity not only is a sign of the weakness of psychologism, but it also suggests that psychologistic logic is able to secure its logical validity only through the perpetual repetition of its justification. Psychologistic logic, paradoxically, by destroying “the possibility of the rational justification of mediate knowledge” (i.e., the universality of the laws of logic), institutes a peculiar kind of mediating knowledge, which is “the product of various validating connections.”\textsuperscript{34}

Psychologism thereby installs through its own programmatic particularism, a new sort of logical ‘universality’. It therefore does not reject “the principle of validation” as such by rejecting the universalist validation of logical laws. This is why Husserl suggests that psychologistic logic, through its own consistency of self-repetition, also admits not only “that there is a logic, but [that it] itself helps to construct it.”\textsuperscript{35} Psychologistic programmatic particularism culminates in the instantiation of a new sort of ‘universalism of the particular’ or ‘universal perspectivalism’, and psychologism fails to live up to its own expectations. In other words, the more determinately we are ready to admit that the validity of logical laws is secured through psychological experience, the more safely we can guarantee their lawfulness or purity. This perspectivalism, whose non-universalist universalism must end in tautology, as Husserl suggests, is made obvious in the following passage:

\textsuperscript{33} Ibid, 63.
\textsuperscript{34} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{35} Ibid, 59.
Whatever pairs of opposed acts of belief we may select, whether belonging to one or to several individuals, whether coexisting in the same time-stretch or separated by time-stretches, it holds strictly, and absolutely, and without exception, that not both members of each such pair are correct, or in accordance with truth. **I do not think that even an empiricist could question the validity of this norm.**

The last sentence might strike us as an unnecessary and slightly odd addition to the reflection above. It seems that Husserl still feels a need to address psychologistic concerns. We might wonder why it should even be important to consider what would be accepted or rejected by psychologists if we have already agreed that they cannot fulfill the promise of self-evidentiality. Husserl, however, regards the major problem in psychologism to lie in its tendency to take pride in its unacknowledged universal perspectivalism, rather than in its inability to secure its validity on universal grounds. Husserl suggests that even the empiricist, in her desire to thematically secure the universality of logic, indirectly discloses the problem in her notion of self-evidence. Husserl observes that “there is no route of escape from the demand for definition and proof by an appeal to the ‘self-confidence of reason’”, and he suggests that as soon as the “thought content” of the logical laws is “seen as psychological, their original sense, to which our insight into them attaches, has been wholly altered.”

Exact laws have, as we saw, been turned into vague, empirical generalities: if their range of indefiniteness is duly noted, they may claim validity, but they are quite removed from self-evidence. Following their natural thought-trends, thought without a clear consciousness of them, psychological theorists of knowledge no doubt at first understand the laws in question in an objective sense – before, that is, their arts of philosophical interpretation are brought into play. Then they make the mistake of thinking that they can appeal to the self-evidence attaching to the properly interpreted formulae, a self-evidence guaranteeing their absolute validity, even when subsequent reflection has imposed wholly new senses on the logical formulae in question.

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36 Ibid, 59.
37 Ibid, 61.
38 Ibid.
Husserl ironically suggests that as long as psychologists stay within the silence and the ‘modesty’ of their capacity for “philosophical interpretation”, as long as they “follow their natural thought-trends” without any aspirations to provide the ultimate ground for the laws of logic, they are not committing any major fault. Psychologism is not mistaken if it simply confirms its own authority as a non-logical discipline, because it legitimately stays within the confines of its own discipline. However, as soon as psychologism interprets its own ground within the imperative of the universality of non-universal self-evidence, it will necessitate the ongoing process of self-repetition. Once psychologism identifies the logical incompatibility of the contradictory judgments in one proposition with the psychological-existential impossibility of these judgments, it interprets the logical operation through the lens of psychological lawfulness. We can argue that this is an obvious case of self-exaggeration, because the same psychologistic characterizations which are found in the premises are evoked in the conclusion. The psychologistic inability to leave this circle is reflected in its self-perpetuation, the process of which is very carefully described by Husserl:

I cannot believe that contradictories coexist: try as hard as I will, my attempt shivers itself upon an unconquerable, felt resistance. This incapacity for belief is arguably an inwardly existent experience: I see belief in contradictories to be impossible for me, as for any being that I must think of by analogy with myself . . . Experience shows that, once we have passed judgment on an issue, the attempt to give up the conviction now flooding us, and to embrace some opposed alternative, is vain, even if new thought-motives come up, retrospective doubts arise, old convictions at variance with our present ones haunt us, we are often assailed by an obscure ‘feeling’ of upsurging, embattled thought-masses. The ‘vain’ attempt, the ‘felt resistance’ etc., are individual experiences, limited as to person and time, bound up with definite, if not exactly specifiable circumstances. How could they provide inner evidence for a universal law which transcends persons and times? One ought not to confuse the assertoric inner evidence for the existence of a single experience, with the apodeictic inner evidence for the holding of a general law. Can the evidence for the existence of a feeling, which we interpreted as one of incapacity, provide the insight that what we now in fact do not bring off will be for ever denied us by law? One should note how impossible it is to specify the circumstances which play so essential a role in this situation.39

39 Ibid, 63.
The intensification of the tension in psychological self-assurance confirms that the process of self-justification is a circular movement, whose particularism is crystalized (or even exaggerated) in its claim for universal validity. Husserl’s usage of the word “often” in “we are often assailed in the by an obscure ‘feeling’ of upsurging, embattled thought-masses” is made in direct reference to Lange. According to Lange, when a statement and its contradiction relate to the same object, we start to experience a feeling of doubt. Lange describes this doubt as a clear indication of error, which, even if disturbed, “springs once more from the familiar round of associated ideas, and lives on for as long as repeated assaults do not finally lay it down.” These repeated assaults, which elicit repeated acts of self-assurance, are rooted in and confirmed by experience. Lange describes the pulsation of self-assurance as the self-maintenance of the living organism.

Psychological law, which is for Lange a destructive principle of natural progress, is “the sharp edge by which, in the course of experience, untenable combinations of ideas are destroyed while more tenable combinations survive.” The alleged objectivity of psychologistic self-confirmation, Lange openly admits, does not even need to thematize itself, but it explicitly rests on its ‘non-reflective’ execution. However, the mere self-execution of psychologistic logical laws, a process commended by Lange, is for Husserl the source of the problem. The alleged ‘logical objectivity’, according to Husserl, is not secured by the self-unfolding of psychological laws – it is merely opened up, serving as a testimony to the inescapable perspectivalism of the alleged psychologistic objectivity.

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40 Ibid. 65.
41 Ibid.
42 Lange suggests that the mode of action of psychologistic justification is “objective, and it need not first be brought to consciousness in order to act” (ibid).
Lange’s ‘confession’ above is not an ironical insight into the inability of psychologistic logic to secure the universality it promises. Quite the contrary: it is a statement of the psychologistic promotion of its own lack as a virtue. Husserl explicitly writes that it is possible “that multiplied testing by examples has engendered a lively empirical judgment to this effect, but the inner evidence that this always and necessarily happens we do not possess at all.”43

We should, however, briefly consider Lange’s notion of inner or inward evidence in his famous essay “The Standpoint of the Ideal” (from the History of Materialism) before we delve more deeply into Husserl’s criticism. Lange, in this essay, carefully separates between the certainty of scientific reasoning and the inner evidentiality of religious experience, thereby complicating the notion of inner evidence. However, even though the notion of inward evidence in religious experience is distinguished from scientific-empirical self-evidentiality, it appears that it resembles the method of self-confirmation that we find in scientific investigation. Lange, in the search for the “form of the spiritual process”44 in religious practice and experience, suggests that the scientific search for harmony “between the necessary factors of knowledge, which are independent of our will”45 shares the same source with “the speculative mind of man”, which is a reflection of the human capacity for “free synthesis.”46 Lange observes that the speculative mind “still strives, like empirical research, after a unitary exhibition of data in their connection, but it lacks the guiding compulsion of the principles of experience.”47

He distinguishes between scientific reasoning based on empirical observations and

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43 Ibid, 63.
46 Ibid.
speculative thinking, however, only to relate them in a peculiar way. The striving for a unitary and harmonious picture of the world that one finds in speculative reasoning is contrasted to the analytic rigor of scientific reasoning. Lange observes that, although the “optimism” of speculative reasoning is always successfully challenged by the “pessimism” of scientific pursuit, the latter cannot unfold without “the natural ideal of the world which we carry with us.” Scientific pessimism is capable of distorting the world picture only in contrast to the harmonious unity of speculative optimism, observes Lange. The optimistic philosopher “praises the harmony which he himself introduced into [the world]” not only regardless of, but also in contrast to, the disharmony that is concealed by the world as it is observed through the lens of scientific investigations. The lawfulness that is prevalent in natural sciences is both contrasted to and complemented by the ideal regularities of “inward experience.” The rigor of scientific pessimism dissolves the harmonious picture of the world, however, without affecting the ideal framework that underlies that picture. Lange describes the relationship between pessimism and optimism in the following manner:

[Pessimism] cannot do away with the act that our mind is so constituted as ever anew to produce within itself a harmonious picture of the world: that here as everywhere it places its ideal beside and above reality, and recreates itself from the struggles and necessities of life by rising it thought to a world of all perfections . . . for even in the notion of the thing, that stands out as a unity from the infinite coherency of existence, there lies that subjective factor which, as a constituent part of our human reality, is quite in place, but beyond it only helps to fill up, on the analogy of our reality, the gap for that which is absolutely inconceivable, but which must at the same time be assumed (p. 69) . . . Let us accustom ourselves, then, to attribute a higher worth than hitherto to the principle of the creative idea in itself, and apart from any correspondence with historical and scientific knowledge, but also without any falsification of them.

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48 Ibid.
49 Ibid.
50 Ibid.
51 Ibid, 69.
52 Ibid, 72.
53 Ibid.
The first and the last sentences of this passage from Lange echo Husserl’s sensitivity for the mutual enclosure of the terms in relations, particularly within the context of the epistemological struggle between the ideal science of logic and psychologism. The terms are suggested to be not only “without any correspondence”, but also without any tendency to replace or compete with each other. What remains unclear in Lange’s analysis throughout this essay, however, is whether the relation between speculative and scientific, ideal and real, spiritual and empirical is one of interchangeability, complete replacement or co-existence. The penultimate sentence in the passage above suggests that, even though the realms of spiritual and scientific pursuit are strongly distinguished by the peculiarities of their respective practices, they seem to compete with each other for a position of primacy. This means that, although the areas of religious (and, more broadly, speculative) and scientific experience are carefully separated, they either spring from the same underlying ideality or are considered to be above each other. The language of the struggle for primacy between the scientific and the religious is especially visible in Lange’s analysis of the importance of inner evidence for the development of religious ideas.\footnote{Ibid, 71.}\footnote{Ibid, 72} Lange suggests that religious doctrines are praised more highly than any other knowledge because they do not “rest upon greater \textit{certainty}, but upon a greater \textit{value}, against which neither logic, nor touch of the hand, nor sight of the eye can avail, because for it the idea, as form and essence of the constitution of the soul, may be a more powerful object of longing, than the most real matter.”\footnote{Ibid, 72} Lange observes that the “trustworthiness of religious truths,” “the periphrastic expressions or confusions of an exalted mind for the stronger impulse of the heart towards the living
source of edification,

is contrasted to the “sober knowledge which enriches the understanding with small change.”

For this reason, the “really pious mind” has always valued “inward experience as an evidence of faith.”

If we compare this analysis with Lange’s reflections upon logic we realize that the peculiarity of both psychologistic logic and religious experience is demonstrated by their ability to exclude and replace absolute logicism and scientific investigation. Clearly, Lange’s emphasis on the uniqueness of religious experience does not reduce this experience to the epistemological values that underlie the world of the natural sciences. However, Lange proposes that religious speculation should be treated with the same or with even deeper respect than the knowledge we attain through the natural sciences.

To return to Husserl’s criticism of psychologism, we notice that the “grave ambiguity in the word ‘impossibility’” when speaking of mutually exclusive judgments participating in one proposition is emphasized even more by the proponents of psychologistic logic. The psychologistic logicians support the self-evidentiality of the principle of contradiction by suggesting that the validity of this principle is to be found in the instinctive and immediate experience

of the impossibility of two mutually contradictory judgments. Heymans, in the passage quoted by Husserl, suggests that any justification of the self-evidentiality of the principle of contradiction that fails to acknowledge the necessity that instinctive experience will encounter the problem of circularity: “If one seeks to show, independently of this fact [the instinctive experience], that only the non-contradiction may be asserted, one finds repeatedly that the proof

56 Ibid.
57 Ibid.
58 Ibid.
59 Ibid, 71.
always presupposes what it has to prove.”
Heymans not only proclaims that psychologistic naturalism fortifies its ‘universality’ exclusively in the necessity of its tautology, but he also suggests that the universality of logical laws is to be ‘located’ in the particularism of psychologistic self-justification. The logical ideality of the law of contradiction (in psychologism) is reflected in the mental tendency of “nisus,” i.e., the natural effort of thought to move towards non-contradictory combination:

The thought that is directed to truth no doubt strives to achieve thought combinations that are free from contradiction, but the value of these non-contradictory thought-combinations again plainly resides in the circumstance that the non-contradictory alone can be asserted.

If we take this quotation “more seriously than it takes itself,” we realize that it resembles the form of Husserl’s criticism of psychologism. The only difference between Heymans and Husserl is that the former applauds what the latter finds dubious. Husserl, in a footnote to the passage just quoted, recalls Sigwart’s suggestion in Logische Studien that the factual suppression of contradiction is the only source of the ideality of logical rules. Husserl most certainly agrees with the form of Sigwart’s reflection, but he inverts the roles: the ideality of logical rules illuminates the factuality of the psychologistic definition of the principle of contradiction. This means that while psychologistic factuality serves as a ground for the possibility of logical laws through the demonstration of its own particularism, the psychologistic self-enclosure is, for Husserl, a way of further opening up of the question of logical lawfulness, not its conclusion.

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60 Ibid.
61 Ibid.
62 Ibid.
63 This is the expression used by Slavoj Žižek in an interview about Laibach, in the movie Predictions of Fire by Michael Benson, 1995.
Self-repetition in the construction of the psychologistic argument for self-evidence is apparent in the concept of “irrefragable necessity.”\textsuperscript{64} Husserl suggests that the “felt compulsion”, which is obviously the result of one’s “irrefragable necessity” to hold the conclusion true if the premises are conceded, is, however, occasioned in the cases of both true and false syllogisms. Husserl maintains that this compulsion, “once it is felt,” is “always the same.”\textsuperscript{65} The self-repetition of the psychologistic self-evidence of felt compulsion in the completion of the syllogism results in its own non-reflected exaggeration, while it simultaneously initiates the ideal ‘purification’ of the notion of self-evidence:

This felt irrefragability so little proves real irrefragability that it may yield to the force of new reasons, even in the sense of correctly drawn conclusions recognized as such. It should therefore not be confused with the genuine logical necessity that pertains to every syllogistic inference, which means, and can mean, nothing beyond the insightfully knowledgeable (though not actually known by each judging person) validity of the syllogism, with its governance by idea law. . . Circumstances which cannot be specified exactly, such as certain ‘concentration of attention’, a certain ‘mental freshness’, a certain ‘preparedness’ etc., are favorable conditions for the emergence of a logical act of inference. The circumstance of conditions (in the strict sense), from which the inferential act of judgment follows with causal necessity, are entirely hidden from us . . . Syllogistic formulae do not have the empirical content men attribute to them: their true sense is plainest when we state them in the equivalent form of ideal incompatibilities, e.g. it is universally the case that two propositions having the forms ‘All M’s are X’ and ‘No P is M’ are not true unless the proposition having the form ‘Some X are not P” is also true. And so in every case. Nothing is here said about a consciousness or the acts and circumstances of its judgments.\textsuperscript{66}

Psychologism is incapable of thematically addressing the most important component of its self-justification, namely its experientially favorable conditions, while entrenching itself behind the notion of inner evidentiality. Whether we focus on the vivacity of tanxiety or on relief in the (in)compatibility of syllogisms, we observe that these psychological states can only repeat their own unfolding, precisely ‘in the face’ of

\textsuperscript{64} Ibid, 73.
\textsuperscript{65} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{66} Ibid, pp. 73-74.
ideal laws. The process of self-betrayal of the psychologistic search for the ultimate evidentiality, which is manifested in its own execution, can be paralleled with Levinas’ observation below:

**Being is not only itself, it escapes itself. Here is a person who is what he is;** but he does not make us forget, does not absorb, cover over entirely the objects he holds and the way he holds them, his gestures, limbs, gaze, thought, skin, which escape from under the identity of his substance, which like a torn sack is unable to contain them. **Thus a person bears on his face, alongside of its being with which he coincides, its own caricature, its picturesqueness.** The picturesque is always to some extent a caricature.  

Levinas points out that the path of grasping of one’s essence is betrayed by the endurance of that path. One’s coinciding with one’s own being already means one’s own exaggeration in the attempt to thematize this coincidence. This exaggeration, however, can turn only into cynicism once the impossibility of its thematizing is recognized, but it is nevertheless pursued under the pressure of that very impossibility.

To return to psychologistic cynicism, we realize that the psychologistic notion of inner evidence capitalizes on the falsity of the division between the purity of the logical laws and the contingency of what is regulated by these laws. Psychologism is entirely disillusioned with the ‘objectivity’ of the pure science of logic, and it insists on the constitutiveness of experience for the principle of self-evidence. However, its insistence on the importance of experience does not rid psychologism of the very same problems surrounding the question of epistemological primacy, that it ascribes to absolute logicism. To the contrary, the new source of theoretical purity is firmly fixed in the openly acknowledged psychological foundation of the pure science of logic. Psychologism promotes an inverted ideality of logical laws by carefully preserving the falsity of the

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division between logic and experience. In psychologism, the particular enjoys primacy over the universal, but it suffers from the inability to acknowledge its limitation and indebtedness to its other, thereby exercising the same sort of exclusivism it ascribes to logical absolutism. It safeguards the authority of logical laws by locating it in the world of mental phenomena. Husserl, to the contrary, by descriptively illuminating the psychologistic cynicism, supplies the opportunity for experience of the ideal laws, and successfully transforms the division between logical absolutism and psychologism. The realm of the ideal science of logic is opened up through its tedious ‘practice’ of the illumination of the psychologistic tautology. The ideal logical laws are not superior to psychologism, but they are inextricably connected to it as an exercise in its correction.

**Circularity of ideal laws – the irony of purification as a testimony to the self-assurance of inner evidence**

In this section I trace the strategy of circularity employed by Husserl in his justification of the ideal science of logic. As explained above, psychologistic logic strengthens its inherent particularism, according to Husserl, by failing to transparently incorporate this particularism into its justification. The particularism of the psychological grounding of logical laws is important for psychologism as long as it remains the inverted universality of logical absolutism. Husserl’s ideal science of logic, to the contrary, secures the ‘universality’ of its ground through the explicit demonstration of its ‘particularization’, thereby exhibiting its deep indebtedness to psychologism. The ideal science of logic is constantly engaged in the regulation and critical inspection of the available theories of logic (particularly psychologistic logic) that were current in
Husserl’s day. When I speak of the ‘regulation’ engaged in by Husserl’s ideal science of Logic, I mean its capacity to constantly inspect and point out the moments where psychologistic logic assumes the position of pure theory of logic by calling upon the certainty of its naturalistic background. The ideal science of logic is at the same time regulating, or “governing,” the “theoretical connections” that it is itself establishing:

This science would have the unique peculiarity of itself qua form, underlying the content of its laws; the elements and theoretical connections of which it, as a systematic unity of truths, consists, are governed by the very laws which form part of its theoretical content.\(^68\)

The circularity of the ideal science of logic is not a mere psychologistic tautology, where self-repetition becomes a side-effect of the psychologistic tendency to merely subvert the universality of pure logic. Even if psychologistic particularism is acknowledged and cynically accorded positive value, the switching of the roles of psychological and abstract-logical, by means of which the obvious disadvantage of psychologistic justification is turned to its advantage, is clearly not recognized: since it is experientially absurd to look for the universality of logical laws outside the laws of psychology, the psychological laws are selected as the only remaining choice. However, the ‘obviousness’ of the self-repetition is never further explored.

For Husserl, on the other hand, the value of the ground of logical laws consists in their withdrawal from any attempt to confront psychologism. This frontal attack on psychologism would lead towards the mere exchange of the positioning of the psychologism and the ideal science of logic with respect to the grounding of logical laws. Husserl reactivates potential for self-examination that never fully came to the fore in psychologism. The self-activity of the ideal science of logic is neither an undesired side-effect nor a cynicism of self-evidentiality, because it is realized in a constancy of its

\(^{68}\) Ibid, 107.
‘staring at the face’ of psychologistic self-sufficiency. The tautology that is employed in
the psychologistic justification is transformed into the circular dynamics of the realm of
ideal lawfulness. The circular motion in the justification of the pure science of logic
exaggerates the constitutive role of perspectivalism in the psychologistic grounding of the
logical laws.

In the section 39 of *Logical Investigations*, Husserl criticizes Sigwart for
anthropologism in his definition of logical incompatibility. The anthropological-relativistic hypothesis is that there cannot be truth if its source is not confirmed through
the mere evidentiality of the common human constitution. Husserl pushes this thesis, and
suggests that what it states is that there would be no truth if there were no human
constitution. This means that this hypothesis is ideally-logically subverted by its own
propositional appearance, because its thesis has the following form: “There is a truth that
there is no truth.” Husserl suggests that the logical form of this proposition, as a negation
of a valid statement, is one of falsehood, and not one of absurdity.\(^{69}\) However, if we
follow the anthropologistic-relativistic argumentation, we observe that the absurdity of the
hypothesis, the existential impossibility of truth, formulates the proposition of the thesis.
The result is that the “absurdity taints the whole hypothetical statement, since it connects
an antecedent having a coherent (‘logically possible’) sense with an absurd (‘logically
impossible’) consequent.”\(^{70}\) The skeptic, precisely because she insists on the self-
evidentiality of the anthropomorphic ground of truth, ends up in the tautology discussed
in the previous section:

The notion that the non-existence of a certain constitution should be based on this very
constitution, is a flat contradiction: that the truth-conditioning, and therefore existent constitution

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\(^{69}\) Ibid, 80.

\(^{70}\) Ibid.
should condition the truth (among other truths) of its own non-existence. The absurdity is not greatly lessened if we substitute existence for non-existence, and apply our arguments, not to an imaginary species from a relativistic standpoint is possible, but to our human species. Our contradiction then vanishes, but not the absurdity associated with it. . . . The truth that such a constitution and such laws subsist must then have its real explanation in the fact of this subsistence: the principles of our explanation must be identical with such laws – again mere nonsense. Our constitution would be causa sui in respect of laws, which would cause themselves in virtue of themselves etc. 71

Husserl transforms this psychologistic tautology into the circularity of the ideal laws by insisting on the ambiguity of the notion of the truth judgment. The logical ideality of judgment, by recalling its own purity, simply rules out the possibility where the truth is dependent on the differences between the agents of judgment. The truth for one species does not mean as same as the truth of that species, but it implies that a certain species (e.g. human) has an access “to the circle of truth.” 72 The circle of truth is defined as the absolute authority to which one might or might not have access, not vice versa. Husserl’s circularly provides the definition of the ideality of truth, while he simultaneously exaggerates the ‘reality’ that reflects this circularity: “what is true is absolutely, intrinsically true: truth is one and the same, whether men, or non-men, angels or gods apprehend and judge it.” 73 Furthermore, Husserl emphasizes that the ideal unity of truth is unbreakably “set over against the real multiplicity of races, individuals and experiences.” 74

Sigwart suggests, in his treatment of the ideality of logical truth, that even if we agree that knowing something as it is in itself is impossible without the existence of the producer of the idea of truth, we still have to possess a “consciousness of necessity.” 75

71 Ibid, 81.
72 Ibid, 79.
73 Ibid.
74 Ibid.
75 Ibid, 85.
This consciousness of necessity does not have to be hosted by any actually existing subject, but it can be asserted by “all other thinking beings, even purely hypothetical ones, endowed with the same nature as ourselves.” Husserl, ironically, turns this reflection upside down, and proposes the following:

**If** there are no intelligent beings, if the natural order excludes them, if they are, in a real sense, impossible – or if there are no beings capable of knowing certain classes of truths – then such **ideal possibilities remain without fulfilling actuality**. The apprehension, knowledge, bringing to consciousness of truth (or of certain classes of truths), is nowhere ever realized. Each truth, however, remains in itself what it is, it retains its ideal being; it does not hang somewhere in the void, but is a case of validity in the timeless realm of Ideas.

This passage is preceded by Husserl’s reflection that the idea of truth is given in the act of ideation based upon intuition. We witness from Husserl’s observation that the activity of ideality is performed as a certain demobilization of the activity of the consciousness of inner evidentiality. This does not mean that inner evidence is simply put out of play, but it is exaggerated in its own separation from the universality it replaces with its own self-evidentiality: “we are evidently clear as to truth’s unity and identity over against the dispersed multitude of concrete, compared cases of inwardly evident judgment.” If we cannot consider ideal propositions within the context of the agent who can experientially confirm or actualize them, then we should see them through the lens of ideal lawfulness. The propositions are in this case simply without any ‘fulfilling actuality’. This means that even though the agent of thinking is presumably ruled out, the logical statements persist in their ideal possibility. The seeming existential impossibility of the reconciliation of two conflicting statements merely exemplifies a situation where the logical laws have no psycho-physical or existential ‘realization’. The actualization of

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76 Ibid.
77 Ibid, 86.
78 Ibid.
79 Ibid.
the judgment is not dismissed or ruled out as a psychological impossibility, because this actualization of the judgment is not categorically thematized within the frame of the ideal science of logic. However, the psycho-physical impossibility is reflected, so to speak, in an ideal-logical incompatibility. This also indicates that existential impossibility does not have the conceptual power to impose itself as ideal incompatibility. The circular grounding of the ideality of logical truth ends up in an exaggeration of the psychologistic notion of inner evidence suggesting the following: the fact that the truth of the proposition is ideal, because it is what it is, is entirely proportional to the fact that the inner evidence is not what it claims to be, because of what it is.

We can suggest that the self-activity of the logical law does not only critically relate itself to the self-evidentiality of the psychological processes, but it also stares at what it criticizes, so to speak. The source of Sigwart’s confidence, the appeal to the consciousness of necessity, is even more emphasized as it is pointed at by the fulfilling actuality of the ideal logical laws (or the lack thereof). According to Husserl, ideal meaning can be fulfilled or not, which means that, in the case of fulfilling actuality, the relation between meaning intention and meaning fulfillment is one of logical compatibility. The relation between meaning intention and meaning fulfillment is one of incompatibility in the case where the ideal meaning is not actualized. This insight radically challenges the notions of existential possibility (where the correspondence between meaning intention and meaning fulfillment is psychologically confirmed) and existential impossibility (the psychological impossibility for the two contradictory judgments to ‘exist’ in one judgment).
The intuition of the ideality of truth proceeds in its unbridgeable difference from the necessity of inner evidence. We can even suggest that the self-activity of the ideal is measured by the full accomplishment of the self-evidentiality of the psychologistically real. When Husserl suggests that the logical concept can be meant but not “produced” by our thought, he most certainly does not dismiss Sigwart’s view of the universal as something inward that depends “on the inner power of our thought.” Husserl does not challenge Sigwart’s claim about the necessity of inner evidence, simply because the psychologistic concept of truth is not an ideal one. The “what” of the psychological content, the ideality of the concept itself, further emphasizes that the “conceptual presentation as a subjective act” has “this or that psychological content.” We observe that the persistence of the circularity of logical truth strengthens its difference from tautology by openly recognizing the disciplinary importance of psychologism. Psychologism, to the contrary, unwillingly necessitates the importance of the ideal science of logic by insisting on the self-sufficiency of its own tautology.

We can follow Andre de Muralt in *The Idea of Phenomenology: Husserlian Exemplarism* and suggest that the realm of the ideal in fact exemplifies the realm of facticity (and vice versa) through its own persistence. For example, in the analyses of the relationship between fact and essence (in reference to Husserl’s *Ideas I*) de Muralt suggests that both fact and eidos stand in a relationship of fissure, which is at the same time a relationship of their radical community. This relationship is developmental,

80 Ibid, 87.
81 Ibid.
82 Ibid.
83 This community, however, is embodied in the fact that “essence involves no factual element”[Andre de Muralt, *The Idea of Phenomenology: Husserlian Exemplarism*, Trans. Garry L. Breckon (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1974), 33].
because facticity ‘reaches’ its fullness in the process of its asymptotic progression towards the eidos. Conversely, the absoluteness of the essence (as a measure of facticity) is completed through its predisposition to be a measure of facts.\(^{84}\)

Further, de Muralt insists that the traditional logic and the transcendental logic are directly exemplified through each other. Their relationship is not to be found in their mutual confirmation, reflection, reconciliation or causal dependency. To the contrary, the absolute completion of one realm is visible and accessible to us only through the ‘intensification’ of another:

He [Husserl] motivates transcendental logic as the intentional telos of traditional logic; and conversely, traditional logic is motivated as the factical example is motivated, in the last analysis, by the ideal exemplar, as the embryonic form is justified in the full-blown form. . . It is therefore to be expected that Husserlian logic would integrate this first logic. On the one hand, it does so by maintaining traditional logic within its proper limits and consequentially retaining what is valid in it. On the other hand, it does so by taking it as point of departure for a constitutive exemplary criticism which is intended to elucidate the latent intentional sense of its immanent structures and to show its necessary outcome in a transcendental logic.\(^{85}\)

It is needless to say that purification of the realm of transcendental logic is already implied by the rigorous delineation of its formal-logical counterpart. The ultimate perfection of traditional logic calls for the crisis of its own expansion, which is embodied in the possibility of the ideal. Conversely, the transcendental-logical ideal, because it is destined to be purified, constantly regards its contingent counterpart. Therefore, only because ideal and factual, or pure and contingent, are necessarily limited in the endlessness of their expansion, are they able to mutually ‘ground’ each other.

We can also recall Jean Luc Marion’s recent treatment of the phenomenological

\(^{84}\) De Muralt further writes: “There is no measure without something being measured, and the eidos turns out to be the measure of the individual thing. Continuity is thus reestablished, but in the reverse direction. Whereas the fact was just seen to refer to the eidos as its essential type, here the eidos measures the fact. Thus it is important to define the points of view from which the fissure appears and from which unity is reestablished” (ibid, 34).

\(^{85}\) Ibid, 102.
reduction in his talk “The Question of Reduction” delivered at the King’s University College, London, Ontario in April, 2015. Marion critically addresses Henry’s attack on his concept of givenness, which, according to Henry, reinforces the subject-object dichotomy. For Henry, Marion’s play of the call and response is an “empty formalism” for the following reasons: “the binary pair call/response, which replaces the classic dichotomy of subject/object [...] only reverses the relation of thought in both cases as a creation of personality, that is to say as a keeping safe. Far from escaping the Call of Being and its implicit phenomenology, the structure of the call returns to itself and receives precisely the ‘structure’ that is its own, namely, the opposition to Ek-stasis” (pp. 14-15). Henry offers the following alternative: “what characterizes the achievement of life [l’atteinte de la vie] is that it anticipates [devance] every response and does not await [attend] any of them” (p. 15). Henry explicitly states that there is not time for response “that would give us time to assume or reject the destiny of being”, because there is no call. As Marion suggests, this position rests on the assumption that an ecstasy, as a peculiar concept of Henry’s material phenomenology, which is a gap, “separates the call from the response . . . for the call must remain unanswered, as the response must reject the call” (p. 17). Marion, however, tackles Henry’s criticism, suggesting that Henry simply takes for granted that there is a temporal gap between the initiation of the call and the instantaneous or delayed response. He confronts Henry by suggesting that the relationship between response and call cannot be conceived chronologically (thus, within the ecstatic gap of intentionality), because “response comes from the call because, phenomenally speaking, it precedes it” (p. 17). This insight is, in fact, crucial for Marion’s own re-articulation of the concept of phenomenological reduction:
Present-day post-Husserlian developments in phenomenology (and some of them are indisputably successful) agree with other philosophical developments (and more often their aporias) in radically challenging that no Ego (or subject, etc.) can today still claim a transcendental posture and transcendental dignity. Thus, in absence of a transcendental Ego, it is necessary to renounce the reduction, which is itself and has always been assumed to be essentially transcendental. This critical orientation is in agreement with the conclusion of Henry concerning the principles of phenomenology: all of them presuppose in different ways the intentional ecstasy, the gap between the (transcendental) subject that is intentionally directed toward [visée] its object (objective) and thus the opening of the world that follows a phenomenality of exteriority. Thus understood, the objection focuses on the who of the reduction and the what of the reduction—the question becomes, who reduces what to what? Or still more precisely, it focuses on the relation of exteriority (and of unilateral domination) of the who to the what. Thus, insofar as we challenged the transcendentality of the Ego in general, or, more specifically, we opposed to it "life" (Henry), we also reject the reduction in presupposing a relation to it and, in fact, an unequal relation between two heterogeneous terms, a reducing agent, the other that is reduced. But this presupposition is not self-evident. It is necessary to challenge this by recognizing that the reduction is not accomplished in a one-sided and unequal relation, but always in a reciprocal and mutual relationship of its terms, that is, a relationship between its who and its what. . . Thus, notwithstanding all the differences, the actor of the reduction maintains the character of the reduced—here, the Gegebenheit, the givenness. He keeps it, or more exactly, he takes it up precisely in order to carry out the reduction: the who modifies itself in absolute givenness in order to be able to modify the what in relative givenness. The transcendentality remains, but it characterizes the Ego because, in reciprocal determination of the two terms as given, one is still given as an object, which, as object does not subsist only as known and, therefore, requires an essentially cognizing actor, and nothing more than this. This inequality or dissymmetry, however, does not impede the who from reducing the what by means of becoming itself (i.e., the who) determined by the reduction, which, in this case, is givenness.86

Marion emphasizes the reducer’s activity of ‘keeping’ or ‘taking up’ what is being reduced, since this activity points out the dynamics of phenomenological purification, where the purifier and the purified do not stand in a relationship of priority. Further, Marion emphasizes the relationship where both the ‘who’ and the ‘what’ of the reduction process are defined by it, not vice versa. This attitude clearly confronts the view according to which ‘what’ is being reduced is provided through phenomenological purification to the ‘who’, or a reducer.

To return now to Husserl, the ideal incompatibility of the judgment keeps firmly

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86 Jean Luc Marion, “The Question of Reduction”, pp. 28-29. This paper was presented at the conference “Breached Horizons: The Work of Jean-Luc Marion” at the King’s University College in London, Ontario on March 27-29, 2015. The paper was translated and edited by Steve Lofts and Antonio Calcagno.
Its heterogeneity with the psychological non-performability of the act of judgment, “even if the latter were to go with the former in all human cases, and the acceptance of absurdities were ruled out by natural laws.”\textsuperscript{87} It is crucial to mention that Husserl’s attack is directed not only to the psychologistic concept of inner evidentiality, but also to the anti-psychologistic position on the objectivity of truth. Husserl uses the notion of logical absolutism mostly in reference to the rationalist understanding of logic (such as in Leibniz, for example), and also to Kantian logical formalism as it is manifested in his \textit{Logic}. The strategic ‘cooperation’ between the ideality of logical laws and psychologistic inner evidentiality manifests itself through their heterogeneity. The mutuality between the self-regulation of the ideal and the tautology of the mental illuminates the contradiction in the seeming confrontation between logical absolutism and psychologism. Psychologism and logical absolutism come together, through their mutual refutation, in their unanimous agreement about the exclusionary nature of the process of purification. Husserl suggests that the purification of logic from the contingency of psychologism results in the dependence of the former on the latter, because the former accepts the internal-external, ideal-real or objective-subjective dualisms of the latter. In other words, the anti-psychologists’ notion of the ideal is confirmed through its formal generalization against psychologistic particularism. The problem for Husserl is that both psychologism and anti-psychologism secure the self-evidentiality of truth through its formal universality, without realizing that abstract generalization will always be conceptually indebted to what it excludes, namely to concrete particularization. The pure science of logic, to the contrary, achieves its epistemological difference from psychologism by openly acknowledging the necessity of its argumentative relation with it.

\textsuperscript{87} LI, vol.1, 93.
The ideal science of logic is not pure, so it can confront the contingent, but it is contingent, in its openly admitted relationship with psychologism, so it can achieve its purity. For the anti-psychologists, to the contrary, the main role of the science of logic, its “essence”88 as Husserl points out, is a normative one. The difference between the science of logic and psychologism lies in fact that the science of logic, contrary to psychologism, has a regulatory role. The purity of the science of logic is achieved through its relation to the experience from which it was instructed to stay away.

Husserl employs the method of descriptive analysis, where he entirely transforms the polarity: contingency of experience – purity of its regulation. Ideal laws are delivered by the very structure of experience, not beyond it or outside of it. Further, experience does not appear as merely contingent, because it urges the need for its ideal purification through its own unfolding, through the crystallization of the question of its own self-evidentiality. The so-called phenomenological description in Husserl’s early texts is the initial form of bracketing, where the bracketed term and the term that does the bracketing are treated beyond the process of the hierarchical prioritizing.

Husserl uses the example of the pure arithmetic law that the product of the sum and the difference of two numbers is the difference of their squares. If we consider this law in its normative-objective sense, this means that the law has the following form: “To arrive at the product of the sum and difference of two numbers, one should find the difference of their squares.”89 This poses a serious problem, because this proposition assumes the form of a rule for a proper thought operation, instead of a logical law.

Husserl draws a direct parallel with the anti-psychologistic definition of the ideal science

88 Ibid, 102.
89 Ibid.
of logic, which, being a law of thought, fails to differentiate between the “proper content”
of the logical laws and “their practical application.”90 The science of logic becomes the
“methodology of the specifically human acquisition of knowledge”91 whether it is being
treated as the science of the rules of correct judgment or as the science of the justification
of meaningful possibility.

The pure science of logic, to the contrary, must abandon the falsity of the dualism
anti-psychologism – psychologism by not merely ignoring what it is supposed to be
purified from. Husserl wonders, already in dealing with the anti-psychologists’ view of
logic as a normative discipline, whether it is possible to see ideal logic’s normative
capacities as a reflection of “the specific meaning content which gives them [logical
laws] a natural right to regulate our thought.”92 He inverts the position where logic gains
its universality through the inner evidentiality of its capacity to regulate thoughts, and
suggests that the self-evidence of logic as a regulatory power, by its own necessity, points
to a type of universality which is entirely distinct from it:

That science which deals with all sciences in respect of their form, should *eo ipso* deal with
itself, may sound paradoxical, but involves no inner conflict. The simplest example will make
this clear. The law of contradiction governs all truth, and since it is itself truth, governs
itself. To realize what such self-government means one needs only apply the law of contradiction
to itself: the resultant proposition is an obvious truism, having none of the marks of the
remarkable or the questionable. This is invariably the case where pure logic is used to regulate
itself.93

The ideal science of logic does not appear prior to psychology in order to regulate
it, but it regulates itself so it can point out the self-defeat of psychologism in its pursuit
for subverted (or non-universal) universality. The pure science of logic secures its own

90 Ibid.
91 Ibid, 103.
92 Ibid, 102.
93 Ibid, 104.
realm not through the safety of its universal-objective ‘fixity’ (in contrast to the psychologistic ‘flux’), but through the deliberate dynamics of its self-repetition. The pure science of logic, through the constancy of its self-encircling, transforms the absolutist-logical notion of the eternity of logical laws into their a-temporality. Husserl explicitly suggests that the eternity of logical laws means that the judgments bounded by them are “without regard to time and circumstances.”94 If we treat eternity outside the context of the objective time flow (therefore ‘atemporally’), we easily avoid using the terminology generated within the psychologistic concreteness – absolutist-logical universality. The constancy of the circularity of logical laws is not affected whatsoever by the fact that the ideality of logical laws can be psychologistically re-articulated. Husserl sarcastically remarks that the “relation to mental creatures plainly puts no restriction upon universality: norms for judgments bind judging beings, not stones.”95 The logical absolutists see the above-mentioned eternity as opposed to the temporality of psychologism, because they see the logical laws as “intrinsically and essentially prescriptive.”96 The purity of logical laws, however, can be applied normatively, but this normativity cannot be used as a tool for the interpretation of these laws. Furthermore, the logical laws can be normative because their self-referential ‘ideality’ makes them destined to regulate the realm of ‘reality’. Husserl draws an important distinction between the formal-logical approach to logical laws and their pure-ideal counterpart: the former focuses on the prescriptive nature of logical laws, whereas the latter focuses on the specific content of these laws:

To the extent that formal logicians, I their talk of normative laws, were concerned with this purely

94 Ibid, 93.
95 Ibid.
96 Ibid, 106.
conceptual, *a priori* character, their arguments hit on a point that was undoubtedly correct. But they overlooked the theoretical character of the laws of pure logic, they failed to recognize the difference between theoretical laws *destined by their content* to the regulation of cognition, and normative laws which are intrinsically and essentially prescriptive. . . The repugnancy consists basically in the fact that propositions relating to mere form (i.e. the conceptual elements of scientific theory as such) were to be deduced from propositions having a wholly heterogeneous content. In the case of primitive principles like the law of contradiction, the *modus ponens* etc., this repugnancy would plainly amount to a circle in so far as the deduction of these principles would involve steps that presupposed them – not in the form of premises, but in the form of deductive principles upon whose validity the sense and validity of the deduction depends. One could, in this respect, speak of *reflective circle*, as against the usual, direct *circulus in demonstrando*, where premises and conclusion overlap. Of all sciences only pure logic escapes such objections, since its premises are homogenous in respect of their objects with the conclusions they establish. Pure logic further escapes circularity in that, in a given deduction, it never proves principles that every deduction presupposes, but that _it simply lays them down_ as axioms at the summit of all its deductions. Pure logic therefore, has the extraordinarily difficult task of analytically ascending to such axioms as are indispensable starting-point of deduction, and are also irreducible to one another without a direct or a reflective circle, and then constructing and arranging a deduction for the theorems of logic – of which the rules of the syllogism form a small part – so that at each step, not only the _premises_, but also _the principles of our deductive transitions_, are neither among our axioms, or among previously proven theorems.  

The extraordinary difficulty of the ideal science of logic consists not so much in dismissing or ruling out both psychologism and formal logic, but in finding appropriate modes to challenge the above-mentioned approaches to logic, thereby fully disclosing their inherent circularity. The phenomenological bracketing of both psychologism and formal logic happens neither through the replication of nor through the expansion upon their methods, but through the continual demonstration of the difference between the ideal science of logic and its counterparts. This difference is, as Husserl suggests, already necessitated, but not taken in its full scope, by psychologism and formal logic. This is why Husserl suggests that the ideal laws of logic are “destined by their content” to have a relation of regulation to cognition, a relation that is already acknowledged, but not respected, so to speak, by psychologism. This process of the continual re-assertion of

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97 Ibid, pp. 106-107. For psychologists, to the contrary, the logical laws are normative because they claim their ideality only through their capacity to regulate what they are allegedly purified from.
phenomenological reduction, in its capacity to point out psychologistic tautology, is what I have been referring to as the circularity of the ideal science of logic. Husserl clearly critically engages with the notion of circular movement in argumentation. However, his employment of such phrases as the simple “laying down” of ideal laws, their ipseity and their self-regulation in the face of psychologistic self-reference, suggests that psychologistic staticism is fully revealed through the peculiar self-movement of the ideal science of logic.

Husserl avoids repeating the problem of psychologistic particularist universality by suggesting that the deliberate self-regulation of logical laws is the only mode of logical regulation. The purity of the logical law ‘of two contradictory judgments, one is true and one is false’ does not rule out that its utterance has the form of a psychological assertion through judgment. However, the purity of logical law consists in its capacity to regulate the content of thoughts, not the thoughts themselves. The ideality of law, in other words, is confirmed through the ideality of meanings over which this law has jurisdiction. The activity of self-regulation of logical laws, their unfolding in accordance with themselves, comes prior to what they are supposed to regulate. The thought contents, to clarify further, are nothing but the capacity of this law to transform itself further into different sets of ideal propositions. The mutuality between the circularity of ideal laws and the fixity of inward evidence is the source of the permanent separation of the domains of psychologism and the ideal science of logic:

Though we stress the ideality of the possibilities of evident judgement which can be derived from logical principles, and which we see to reveal their a priori validity in cases of apodeictic self-evidence, we do not deny their psychological utility. The inward evidence of our judgements does not merely depend on such psychological conditions, conditions that one might also call external and empirical, since they are rooted not purely in the specific form and matter of our

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98 Ibid, 113.
judgement, but in its empirical context in mental life: it depends also on ideal conditions. Each truth stands as an ideal unit over against an endless, unbounded possibility of correct statements which have its form and its matter in common. Each actual judgement, which belongs to this ideal manifold, will fulfil, either in its mere form or in its matter, the ideal conditions for its own possible inward evidence. The laws of pure logic are truths rooted in the concept of truth, and in concepts essentially related to this concept. They state, in relation to possible acts of judgement, and on the basis of their mere form, the ideal conditions of the possibility or impossibility of their inner evidence.\(^99\)

We can extend Husserl’s analysis above and suggest that the dependence of the inward evidence of our judgments on psychological conditions (e.g.”a certain mental freshness”, “concentration of interest”\(^100\)) is, in fact, a peculiar form of its dependence on the ideal laws. The equivocity in the definition of inward evidence is substantiated in the intensity of the self-relation of the concept of truth to itself. As mentioned earlier in this Chapter, the purity of logical law does not consist in its attempt to secure its universality in its exclusion of psychologistic particularism. To the contrary, the ideal logical laws secure their purity by performing their own particularism, which is reflected in the consistency of their circularity in the face of the alleged universality of inner evidence. The ideal conditions of the “possibility or impossibility” of inner evidence are delivered in relation to possible acts of judgments, not prior to these acts. Further, this is precisely how the ideal science of logic calls for the fundamental transformation of the terms in relations such as: inner-outer, pure-contingent, and universal-particular. This relation between phenomenology and psychologism has the form of a peculiar kind of mutuality. As Husserl explicitly states: “while we seek to preserve the distinction between purely logical and methodological propositions, we expressly concede that the former have a relation to the psychological datum of inner evidence, that they in a sense state its

\(^{99}\) Ibid, pp. 118-119
\(^{100}\) Ibid.
psychological conditions.””¹⁰¹ Truth stands as an ideal unit, but this ‘ideal standing in itself’ is ‘expressed’ as an “unbounded possibility of correct statements which have its form and its matter in common.””¹⁰²

The circularity of ideal logical laws does not have the appearance of tautological fallacy, where the premises are contained in the conclusion. Husserl differentiates the circularity of the ideal science of logic from the mere self-referentiality of the anti-psychologistic logic. He acknowledges the possible objection of the psychologists to the anti-psychologist: “Since logic itself must proceed logically, it would itself commit the same circle, would itself have to establish the validity of rules that it presupposes.””¹⁰³ The ideal science of logic for Husserl, by being the content it regulates, avoids the psychologistic dualism between the purity of the form and the contingency of the matter regulated by it. Husserl, in addressing this problem, strongly differentiates between reasoning in accordance to the logical rules and reasoning from the logical rules.¹⁰⁴ The seeming circularity of the ideal science of logic consists in its refusal to assume a hierarchically-causally prior position to psychologism. The psychologistic notion of inner evidence is not a consequent of its anti-psychologistic premise, but it is, consciously or not, always mirrored by the purity of the logical laws. The pure science of logic, therefore, does not come prior to psychologism but establishes itself ‘simultaneously’ with it through psychologists’ search for self-evidentiality. The ideal logical laws are not the “marvelous magic ” of ideality, “distilled by the hollow formularies hawked about by

¹⁰¹ Ibid, 117.
¹⁰² Ibid, 119.
¹⁰³ Ibid, 44.
¹⁰⁴ Ibid.
The pure theory of logic unfolds itself beyond the division between theory – norm, which is adamantly endorsed both by both logical absolutists and psychologists. The activity of the normative discipline, which never loses sight of the necessity of the re-evaluation of its own theoretical ground, bears witness to the power of the ideal science of logic. The division between logic as a mere theory (Husserl’s reference mostly to the logical absolutism of Kant and Leibniz) and logic as a technology of thinking (the tradition of logical psychologism) is collapsed through the mutual actualization of both poles. The activity of logic as technology of thinking subverts itself into its own tautology in the face of the ideality it promises. The only activity that remains is that of the ideal science of logic, which prevents the possibility of its absolute-logical fixation through the constancy of its self-regulation. Husserl uses the example of the difference between normative and practical ethics to illustrate the futility of the theory-practice divide:

All the propositions, which have to do with making practical realization possible, do not effect the sphere of the pure norms of ethical valuation. If these norms, or the theoretical knowledge underlying them, were to fall away, ethics would vanish altogether. If the former propositions were to drop out, there would be no possibility of ethical practice (or no possibility of a technology of ethical conduct).106

We infer that just as the ‘practice’ is fully illuminated as an unavoidable self-repetition through the purity of the ‘theory’, so too would the theory fail to achieve its purity, were its purification not performed as its self-activity. This self-activity of the pure science of logic condenses itself in the exaggeration of psychologistic logic. The concept of practice is, therefore, not questionable as long as it exhibits itself as practice of a theory.

105 Ibid, 32.
106 Ibid.
Husserl’s challenge to the Self-assurance of Reason

The persistence of the critical relation of pure science of logic towards psychologism, as the exaggeration of the latter through the self-regulation of the former, secures, in fact, the fixity of its epistemological position. The emphasis on the conscious particularism of the logical claim for universality clearly remains a pivotal concern for Husserl in the 1905-1907 lectures on Logic. The purified epistemology openly states its reservation regarding the formalism of the polarity between truthfulness and falsity, and introduces itself as a self-performance:

In this investigation, I naturally constantly realize cognitions. It is indeed obvious and grounded in the essence of knowledge that knowledge is needed to shed light on the essence of knowledge. We already recently said that it would be nonsense to see some limitation of human knowledge in this, since any, even divine, knowledge can only determine the universal essence of knowledge in acts of knowledge, and that consequently any theory of knowledge, even knowledge <of the> Absolute Spirit, is self-referential. . . Of course, the acts of cognition, the acts of presenting, of judging, of conceptual fixing and determining in which the investigation itself operates, in which it itself is constituted, and which are not objects for it, are performed cognitive acts, not critically analyzed and tested. . . Reflection is one of the absolutely evident basic facts of knowledge, and the absolute certainty of the existence of actual phenomena of reflection provides the field and everything we need for the solution of the problems. Implied in the nature of the problem is that it must be realized purely within the sphere of absolutely, indubitable givens, of givens that must be shown and seen as absolute there.107

The expression ‘the constant realization of knowledge’ can be also read as the constant performance of knowledge: “In dieser Untersuchung vollziehe ich natürlich immerfort Erkenntnisse.”108 The knowledge that sheds light on knowledge is possible only as an activity, or as the constancy of the acts of knowledge (vollzogene Erkenntnisakte).

The acts of cognition are literally carried out. These acts, however, must be performed,

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108 Edmund Husserl, Einleitung in die Logik und Erkenntnistheorie: Vorlesungen 1906/07 (Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff Publischer, 1984), 199. For this purpose the better translation of the word Erkenntnis would be cognition, not knowledge, especially as it captures the notion of mobility, not finality, that is indicated in the understanding of the knowledge or cognition as a performance.
not simply analytically fixed and analyzed. The phenomena of reflection are actual because their givenness arises only within, and as, the act of their showing themselves. We can certainly endorse Peter Varga’s attempt in “Psychologism as Positive Herritage of Husserl’s Phenomenological Philosophy” to locate the similarity between Nelson and Husserl in their ability to establish the “recognition of the necessary self-referential character (Rückbeziehung) and circularity of any justification.”\(^{109}\) However, the final result of the insight into the circularity of any justification is significantly different in these authors. While Nelson’s depiction of circularity remains within the realm of the careful psychological delineation of the self-assurance of reason, Husserl’s circularity of the ideal science of logic, is ‘secured’ through the process of its self-regulation.

Peter Varga also suggests in that same essay that the notion of Selbstvertrauen der Vernunft (self-assurance or self-reliance of reason) in Lotze and Nelson resembles Husserl’s treatment of circularity:

However, what is more important for our purposes is the circularity that Lotze is trying to counter with resorting to the Selbstvertrauen der Vernunft. In both cases this is an inherent structure that involves presuppositions: the justification of our knowledge presupposes the knowledge itself, and the basis for the refutation of scepticism is always contained in what scepticism doubts. By introducing the Selbstvertrauen der Vernunft, Lotze intends to cut through these circularities. . . Husserl rejects the principle of Selbstvertrauen der Vernunft. It is clear from what we have learnt about his knowledge of this principle above and it is also consistent with his opinion of Lotze’s epistemology: Just like his relation to Bolzano, Husserl claims that he had learnt much from Lotze, but he always despised Lotze’s Epistemology . . . \textbf{However, it is one thing to reject a notion and it is another to solve the underlying philosophical challenge that the rejected notion was supposed to resolve. Thus Husserl has to address the problem of the circular presuppositions. This issue is quite pressing for Husserl, as exactly before he involved (and then rejected) the “Hypothese des berechtigten ‘Selbstvertrauen der Vernunft’“, he had to face a regress endangering his phenomenological investigation. . . Nelson’s earnest attempts to work out the foundational implications of the notion of Selbstvertrauen der Vernunft could have contributed to the methodology of Husserl’s phenomenology. A particular example of the methodological implications that could have been relevant for Husserl’s phenomenology is Nelson’s recognition of the necessary self-referential character (Rückbeziehung) and circularity of any justification – which is exactly the context that first led Husserl to consider the notion of the

\(^{109}\) Andras Varga, “Psychology as Positive Herritage of Husserl’s Phenomenological Philosophy” in \textit{Studia Pheanomenologica X}: 126.
Varga acknowledges the differences between these thinkers in their understanding of circularity, but he notes that they bear a similarity to Husserl either in their reaction against skepticism (Lotze) or in their insistence on the epistemological status of the Selbstvertrauen der Vernunft (Nelson). He observes that for Leonard Nelson, who was Husserl’s contemporary and a proponent of the psychologistic justification of logical laws, Husserl was yet another stern anti-psychologist. Nelson describes both Husserl’s and Frege’s criticisms of psychologism as “examples of the ‘dogmatic premises’ in the antipsychologistic arguments.” He sees a major problem in Husserl’s inability to discern make a ‘modal difference’ between psychologistic and logical judgments, and he proposes the following solution to this problem: the fact that logical laws can be justified psychologistically does not mean that they should be exclusively justified in that way. Nelson suggests that logical laws are not grounded on psychologistic premises, but they are derived through from deduction from logical principles. He calls the deduction of these principles a psychological deduction, and justifies it with the power of reason to assure itself (Selbstvertrauen der Vernunft).


Nelson writes the following: “Dies Selbstvertrauen der Vernunft ist das allgemeine Prinzip, das die psychologischen Ableitungen aus der Theorie der Vernunft zur kritischen Deduktionen macht, d. h. das es uns ermöglicht, in der inneren Erfahrung einen Leitfaden für die systematische Begründung der Philosophie zu finden” (ibid, 115).
psychologism through the careful differentiation of the jurisdiction of logical deduction from psychologistic justification, although he does still claim that the self-assurance of reason lies in the background of the ideality of logical laws. Husserl, for Nelson, remains caught up in anti-psychologistic formalism when he criticizes the psychological foundation of logical laws as being circular. The formal fallacy of psychologism, according to anti-psychologists, maintains that if logical laws are based on psychological conditions, then they bear the properties of psychological laws. The fact that logical laws are grounded in the Selbstvertrauen der Vernunft concerns a principle that needs no further legitimation. The Selbstvertrauen der Vernunft, Nelson suggests, “figuriert also nur als Obersatz in der logischen Form der Deduktion.” We have to secure its subsets, Nelson suggests, in other possible ways.

Nelson accuses Husserl of being a craftsman of theory-less description, although he acknowledges that the text of Logical Investigations is different from the Prolegomena and that it brings Husserl into proximity with psychologism. He believes that Husserl reduces the critique of logical absolutism to a mere description, where each phenomenological statement is “already an application of the founding principles on the mere material of inner perception.” Varga observes that Nelson identifies Husserl’s notion of categorial intuition with intellectual intuition. However, if we take a look at the

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114 Ibid.
116 Ibid.
117 Ibid, 122.
118 Ibid. This is the full text of Nelson’s observation: “. . . ob eine solche Einschränkung überhaupt durchführbar ist, ob nicht vielmehr jeder Satz der Phänomenologie bereits eine Anwendung der zu ‘fundierenden’ Gesetze auf das bloße Material der inneren Wahrnehmung einschließt, und dies um so mehr, wenn die Phänomenologie nicht nur eine ‘Betrachtung’, sondern auch eine ‘Analyse’, ‘Vergleichung’ und ‘Unterscheidung’ der Erkenntnisakte enthalten soll.”
Sixth Logical Investigation, we see that Husserl not only differentiates between sensuous and categorial intuition, but also recognizes no relation of epistemological hierarchy between them. Husserl maintains that categorial intuition merely documents what is obtained by sensuous intuition. Husserl’s stark differentiation between sensuous and categorial intuition calls attention to the distance between the phenomenological definition of categorial intuition and its psychologistic counterpart:

*Where general thoughts find fulfilment in intuition, certain new acts are built on our percepts and other appearances of like order, acts related quite differently to our appearing object from the intuitions which constitute it. This difference in mode of relation is expressed by the perspicuous turn of phrase employed above: that the intuited object is not here itself the thing meant, but serves only as an elucidatory example of our true general meaning. But if expressive acts conform to these differences, their significative intention will not move towards what is to be intuitively presented, but towards what is universal, what is merely documented in intuition. Where this new intention is adequately fulfilled by an underlying intuition, it reveals its own objective possibility (or the possibility or 'reality' of the universal)*119

It is important to notice that even the word ‘reality’ is placed within quotation marks, and the reality of the universal counts as the ‘universality’ of the psychologistic mental reality. If Husserl had followed Nelson, Varga remarks, he would not have accused him of working with (psychological) premise and (logical) conclusion. Nelson’s Husserl would be able to guarantee the integrity of logical laws by grounding them logically; this grounding would have been secured through inner perception of a “purely intellectual nature.”120 Varga suggests that although Nelson dismisses Husserl’s notion of categorial intuition, Nelson’s notion of psychologistic deduction seems to resemble what he criticizes in Husserl. This similarity with Husserl can be located even in Nelson’s observation:

Was Husserl von der psychologischen Kritik noch trennt, ist lediglich der Umstand, daß bei ihm der Begriff der Deduktion fehlt und daß ihm infolgedessen in Ermangelung einer dem Beweis

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120 Ibid, 121.
Although we can see the formal similarity between Nelson’s psychological
deduction and Husserl’s ‘mere calling upon internal perception’ (all the dubiousness of
this term aside), we should notice nevertheless that Husserl’s calling upon the mereness
of internal perception comes precisely as the unfolding of a psychologistic lack in its
own foundation. Varga points out that Nelson should regard phenomenological
circularity not as a problem, but as a process, and one that resembles Nelson’s own
conception of the self-assurance of reason. He even suggests that “Nelson’s theory could
have contributed to a methodological problem that Husserl himself faced” had not
Husserl misunderstood it.

Although both Husserl and Nelson clearly indicate the importance of circularity,
they have in mind two substantially different processes. Nelson’s self-assurance of reason
operates in a manner that disallows description or analysis by both naïve descriptive
psychologism and abstract anti-psychologism. Husserl’s circularity, on the other hand,
achieves its full power only as a self-regulating activity that unfolds as the exaggeration
of psychologism. As I mentioned earlier, the circularity of the ideal science of logic
deliberately resembles the psychological tautology in order to disclose the inability of
psychologism to offer the universality it promises. The seemingly self-evidential security
of the psychologistic grounding of logical laws delivers the dynamics of the internal
struggle taking place within the purification process itself. What is purified is, by the

121 Ibid.
122 Varga makes the following remark on the similarity between Nelson and Husserl: “However, he has also
a profound remark coupled to this misunderstanding, namely that “every sentence of the phenomenology
already consist of an application of the laws that are supposed to be justified” (ibid, 122).
123 Ibid.
necessity of its own unfolding, already immersed in what is critically addressed by it. The inversion and the transformation of the roles of purity and contingency, movement and fixity, and even immanence and transcendence, are crucial not only for Husserl’s construction of phenomenological reduction, but also for some of the key concepts and strategies in the work of Levinas (the self-inversion of the notions of enjoyment and responsibility), Heidegger (the concept of being-towards-death as well as the inherently inverted structure of the forgetfulness of being), Patočka (the permeability of the eidostfacticity, I-thou, self-world poles), Merleau-Ponty (the transformation of the seer-visible polarity into the intertwinement of the poles).

Nelson defines psychological deduction as a reflexive activity of the self-assurance of reason, as a “direct knowledge of the pure reason.”\[124\] The peculiarity of psychological deduction is echoed in the justification of metaphysical principles, which can be neither proven (because then they wouldn’t be principles) or demonstrated (because then they wouldn’t be metaphysical).\[125\] The major difference between Husserl and Nelson lies precisely in Husserl’s open recognition of the responsive character of the circularity of ideal laws, which Nelson seems entirely to ignore. This is why Husserl, as Varga recalls, observes that the formality of Nelson’s argument has “a genuine philosophical shortcoming.”\[126\] It is interesting that Husserl locates Nelson’s major

\[124\] Ibid, 114.
\[125\] “Wie sollen wir aber die metaphysischen Grundsätze begründen? Beweisen können wir sie nicht; denn sonst wären sie keine Grundsätze. Sie können aber auch nicht demonstriert werden; denn sonst wäre sie nicht metaphysisch. Wir nennen ihre Begründungsweise Deduktion”(ibid).
\[126\] Ibid, 124. Varga quotes Husserl’s remarks on Nelson: “Allerdings zeigt sich N<elson> bisher nur als ein eminenter ‘logischer Kopf’, d.h. ausgezeichnet ist er in der formalen Stringenz seiner Beweisführungen, sowie im Aufspüren von Inconsequenzen, Aequivocationen, Widersprüchen auf Seiten der kritisierten Autoren. Seine Schwäche sehe ich in dem, was allen u<nd> im echten Sinne Originalität ausmacht, in der Intuition: es fehlt, bisher wenigstens, der habitus der sich an den Sachen selbst, s<o>z<u>s<agen> in directem Schauen u<nd> Analysieren bethätigen den Forschung. Vielleicht erklärt sich dieser Mangel aus der
weaknesses, besides his being a “logic-head,”\textsuperscript{127} in his lack of a “true sense of originality, of intuition.”\textsuperscript{128} According to Husserl, at the very least Nelson lacks habituality “towards the things themselves”\textsuperscript{129}, which is defined as a direct looking at the investigated phenomena. Although we can treat this observation merely as a figure of speech, it is indicative for the purpose of the argument introduced in this chapter that Husserl confronts Nelson’s sophisticated distinction-making formality with the capacity of phenomenological investigation to stare at what it critically analyzes.

Varga points out the importance of the concept of the self-assurance of reason already in the writings of Hermann Lotze. Lotze, as distinct from Nelson, does not develop a sophisticated conceptual network of justification of the self-assurance of reason, but he openly promotes its self-reference as a value. Varga emphasizes the academic lineage between Husserl and Lotze: Carl Stumpf, who was Husserl’s mentor, received his habilitation under Lotze. Varga also mentions the years Husserl spent at Göttingen, where Lotze taught. Varga believes in fact that Lotze’s arguments about the self-assurance of reason are similar to the circularity characterizing the arguments employed by Husserl. Varga also proposes that Lotze was the one who provided Husserl with “a form of epistemological foundational argument that is summarized by the phrase ‘Selbstvertrauen der Vernunft.’”\textsuperscript{130} For Lotze, the self-assurance of reason is designed as an anti-skeptical device and is rooted in the fact that “our knowledge always remains our subjective condition, which depends on the various ways of the nature of our reason and

\textsuperscript{127} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{128} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{129} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{130} Ibid, 106.
which is codetermined, for the most part, by the nature of the things that affect us.”\textsuperscript{131}

Varga quotes Lotze’s position on the self-assurance of reason from the article “Philosophy in the last Forty Years”, where Lotze states that reason’s motives for decision are “nothing but these same necessary principles upon which it is to decide.”\textsuperscript{132}

Lotze proudly concludes that “the confidence of reason in itself has inevitably lain at the basis of all philosophical investigations, \textbf{even of those which relate to the determination of its own truthfulness}.”\textsuperscript{133}

The pride that Lotze takes in the self-assurance, or in the inner evidence, of reason, is a result of his explicit confrontation with skepticism. Lotze states in the third book of his \textit{Logic} that the skepticism he is trying to refute “is not driven to doubt through any special cause residing in the nature of its subject-matter”, but it “simply looks upon the possibility of raising doubt as ground sufficient for actually raising it.”\textsuperscript{134} It seems as we can almost read into these lines Husserl’s own urge for the circularity of ideal logical laws, which he finds is lacking in inner evidence. Lotze’s insight into the inherent deafness of skepticism towards any possible demonstration by which it is challenged, seems to resemble Husserl’s observation of the tautology in psychologism, as described earlier in this Chapter. However, if we take a look at the reflection below, we realize that Lotze’s \textit{Selbstvertrauen der Vernunft} is missing what it unintentionally already proposes through its self-purification. It misses, namely, acknowledgment of the necessity of its relational indebtedness to skepticism:

For every argument which can be brought into the field against it [skepticism] \textbf{can only rest}

\begin{flushright}
\textsuperscript{131} Ibid, 109. \\
\textsuperscript{132} Ibid, 108. \\
\textsuperscript{133} Ibid, 109. \\
\end{flushright}
upon the self-evidence and necessity with which it is thought, and must belong therefore to that sphere of necessities of thought as to which the old barren question can always be renewed to infinity, whether after all things may not be in reality quite otherwise than thought makes them . . . In the presence of this skeptical disposition we should fall back for the purpose of science upon a principle from which in the ordinary affairs of life our opponent himself cannot escape and does not shrink, faith in reason. We should continue to regard a necessity of thought as true until through the conclusions which it itself produces it proves itself to be no such thing, and compels us to declare it a ‘show of being’ only, which in such case would be not entirely a vain show but an appearance standing in a definable relation to the truth with which it can no longer be identified. This attitude towards the skeptic is that with which we find observed in life, for through the world’s history this groundless skepticism has always reappeared from time to time, but as often as it has made its appearance men have simply turned their backs upon it.  

The skeptical tautology, precisely because of its persistence, is challenged by the self-assurance of reason. The Selbstvertrauen der Vernunft requires nothing but the mere presence of the skeptical disposition to fall back to itself. We almost seem to witness a similarity between Husserl’s own circularity and the reflection above. Varga insightfully observes that “the justification of our knowledge presupposes the knowledge itself, and the basis for the refutation of skepticism is always contained in what skepticism doubts.” It almost seems we can accept Varga’s claim regarding Husserl’s sensitivity for circular argumentation, which he inherited from Lotze. However, the remaining part of the quotation above suggests that Lotze’s notion of the self-assurance of reason has a tendency toward epistemological fixity, where the contingency of the skeptical position would be entirely annihilated. Lotze uses the temporal designation “until” in “We should continue to regard a necessity of thought as true until through the conclusions which it itself produces it proves itself to be no such thing”, thereby suggesting finality in the break between skeptical self-justification and the self-assurance of reason. The process of mutual necessitation between pure and contingent, which we witness in Husserl, is never

given importance in Lotze’s analyses, particularly because of the fact that the self-assurance of reason stands in a “definable relation to truth, with which it can no longer be identified." The purity of the self-assurance of reason is exhibited in its definite decision to dismiss the skeptical tautologies through the brute power of its self-confidence. To the contrary, Husserl’s enthusiasm about the self-regulation of the ideal science of logic is sparked by constant emphasis on the contingency of inner evidence. Husserl’s observation about the co-constitution of natural knowledge and epistemological knowledge exemplifies the inherent capacity of the ideal laws of logic to relate to what they ought to distance themselves from:

Certainly, needed too is reflection upon the investigation in terms of performed investigation. Besides the elucidation of natural knowledge, an elucidation of epistemological knowledge is needed too, deliberation as to whether it itself yields new cognitive occurrences and whether the elucidations of the first level already include everything permitting elucidation of occurrences on the second level.  

Varga, contrary to what we have claimed, sees the reflection above as a sign of Husserl’s concern that the phenomenological method itself can be endangered by circular regress. Husserl, as I mentioned earlier, acknowledges the importance of the psychologistic objections directed at the potential circularity of the pure science of logic. This passage is not the best example of that acknowledgment. Husserl is here suggesting that it is impossible for one to secure the theoretical elucidation of epistemological knowledge without being aware that the question of its importance and legitimacy is

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already necessitated by the elucidatory work within the constrains of the natural sciences. Varga notes that Husserl does not define the above-mentioned epistemological elucidation he promises, claiming that Husserl continues his investigation with “the familiar topic of the relationship between psychology and epistemology.”¹³⁹ I suggest, however, that the importance of circularity in the ideal science of logic can be fully grasped precisely through the investigation of the immanent mutuality obtaining between epistemological and psychological investigations. The passage Varga quoted is preceded by Husserl’s reflection that “the cognitive acts of epistemological investigation”¹⁴⁰ need a peculiar kind of elucidation. The “cognitions performed”¹⁴¹ (volzogene Erkenntnis) cannot be analyzed through the lens of “transcendent uncertainties.”¹⁴² To the contrary, this elucidation performs itself (“vollzieht sich”)¹⁴³ on the ‘principal’ experience (“principiell erlebten”)¹⁴⁴ and it is “constantly verified in this regard.”¹⁴⁵ We suggest that the success of verification of principial experience (or of experiencing through principles) is mirrored in the self-performing of its analytic steps. Epistemological self-investigation

¹³⁹ Andras Varga, “Psychology as Positive Herritage of Husserl’s Phenomenological Philosophy” in *Studia Phænomenologica X*: 112.
¹⁴¹ Ibid.
¹⁴² Ibid.
not only transforms science into phenomena, but it also transforms epistemological validity into an “apparent claim to validity.”

Bolzano’s propositions in themselves through the lens of Husserl’s truth in itself

The argumentative strategy we find in Bernard Bolzano’s definition of propositions in themselves in his *Theory of Science* closely resembles Husserl’s usage of circularity in his purification of the ideal science of logic. Bolzano suggests that the theory of science establishes itself through delineation of the “most important” scientific truths. The work of delineation is itself performed through the crystallization of knowledge in its truthfulness, having been previously divided into several areas and then combined in special books in the clearest manner possible. The classification of the purified domains of knowledge cannot be completed unless the further clarification of their propositions is undertaken. It is important to acknowledge that the re-articulation of scientific theories in treaties of the theory of science unfolds as a self-referentiality of the theory of science. Bolzano, for example, playfully observes that if logic is the doctrine of the rules which “our thinking must follow if we would find the truth”, then the ultimate goal of logic “is obviously no other than – discovery of the truth.” Theory of science defines the boundaries of the scientific endeavor only through its own capacity to indicate how the truths of science are to be divided. Further, Bolzano states that the order of the

146 Ibid.
148 Ibid.
149 Ibid, 7.
150 Ibid, 4.
arrangements of scientific truths, which is fully articulated by the theory of science, is prescribed by the existing scientific theories themselves.\footnote{Bolzano identifies theory of science with logic, whose major concern is to deal with propositions in themselves.} Bolzano identifies theory of science with logic, whose major concern is to deal with propositions in themselves.

Importantly, he defines the purity of logic in its constant opposition to the contingency of the mental agent of the logical propositions:

Similarly, it might very well be the proper task of logic to discover more than the laws of conceived truths (or true thoughts), namely the laws that hold for truths as such. If it were the case that the validity of logical rules extends not merely over propositions that are thought, but over all propositions, regardless of whether they have been thought by anyone, then the subject of logic would be too narrowly described. I hope to demonstrate in the sequel that this is indeed the case, and that the source of most errors in logic has been the lack of distinction between thought truths and truths in themselves, and between thought propositions and thought concepts on one hand, and propositions and concepts in themselves on the other.\footnote{It is impossible not to see the resemblance between Husserl’s and Brentano’s conceptions of the purity of logical laws, particularly in connection to Bolzano’s definition of propositions in themselves, as demonstrated in § 19 of his Wissenschaftslehre:}

It is impossible not to see the resemblance between Husserl’s and Brentano’s conceptions of the purity of logical laws, particularly in connection to Bolzano’s definition of propositions in themselves, as demonstrated in § 19 of his Wissenschaftslehre:

\footnote{Ibid, 3.}
\footnote{Ibid, 113.}
\footnote{Interesting reflections on the relationship between Husserl and Bolzano can be found in Arkadiusz Chrudzimski and Wolfgang Huemer, Phenomenology and Analysis: Essays on Central European Philosophy (Frankfurt: Ontos Verlag, 2004), Husserl’s Logical Investigations Reconsidered, ed. by Denis Fisette (Dordrecht, Boston, London: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 2003) and Sandra Lapointe, Bolzano’s Theoretical Philosophy (New York: Palgrave Macmillan Publishers ltd, 2011).}
A proposition in itself I call that particular entity which one must necessarily associate with the word ‘proposition’ if he wants to follow me in the above distinction. It is that very entity which one thinks of as being a proposition when one asks whether or not somebody has articulated it, or whether or not somebody has thought it. The same entity I mean by the word ‘proposition’ if, for brevity’s sake, I use it without the additional phrase ‘in itself.’ In other words, by proposition in itself I mean any assertion that something is or is not the case, regardless whether or not somebody has put it into words, and regardless even whether or not it has been thought. Just as one should think of a proposition as something which is proposed by somebody, he should not confound it with the idea which is present in the consciousness of a thinking being, nor with a belief or a judgment. For this reason one must not ascribe being (existence or reality) to propositions in themselves. Only the mental or asserted proposition, i.e. the thought of a proposition, likewise the judgment which contains a given proposition, has existence in the mind of the being that thinks the thought or makes the judgment. But the proposition in itself which constitutes the content of this thought or judgment does not have existence. It is therefore as absurd to say that a proposition has eternal being as it is to say that it originated at a certain moment and ceased at another.\(^{154}\)

The purity of a proposition in itself is reflected in its self-execution, regardless of whether that execution is demanded by the agent of thinking. Bolzano, like Husserl, does not doubt that the judgment or the proposition can be treated within the context of its mental ‘activation’. However, that does not mean that the proposition can be defined as psycho-physically existent. Furthermore, Bolzano, with an explicit sense of sarcasm, attacks anti-psychologistic absolutism by claiming that insistence on the ‘eternal presence’ of the proposition would be equally absurd.\(^{155}\)

\(^{154}\) These rules follow as corollaries. By the name scientia speculative [...] they only want to draw attention on the existence and the importance of these theoretical principles. (1837, §11, 45)”(Lapointe, p. 144).

\(^{155}\) As Rolf George notes in “Bolzano and the Problem of Psychologism” this was a “radical departure” from the philosophical tradition according to which the term ‘ideas’ was “earlier in order of cognition,” which also implies that the task of logic was to “track that knowledge of acquisition” [Rolf George, “Bolzano and the Problem of Psychologism” in Husserl’s Logical Investigations Reconsidered, ed. by Denis Fisette (Dordrecht, Boston, London: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 2003), 103]. This caused plenty of perplexities such as in the work of Lotze, who suggested that the judgments were the result of the mental act of combining names attached to sensations. The overall problem of this conception is that we have to assume that judgments are “introspectable mental occurrences”, and that propositions might be viewed as a collection of ideas (ibid). This would leave us with difficulties such as the question of how the constituents of propositions would respond to the constituents of the concept in question. As Rolf George notes, even if we accept that propositions are composed of ideas, we still have to make a clear distinction between propositions and compound concepts.
Bolzano addresses the relationship between the concept and things to which it
refers in more detail in § 19 of the *Theory of Science*. The alleged absurdity of the
proposition ‘What I now assert is false’ does not concern the ‘body’ of the proposition,
but its ‘idea’. It would be entirely false to claim that this proposition is its own subject,
for “the idea of it is the subject term of that proposition.”\(^\text{156}\)

Once we assert the
proposition ‘what I now assert is false’, we can determine its truth value, and claim it is
false, because it has the logical appearance of: ‘What I now assert I *declare* for false and
do *not* assert it.’ However, this does not mean that “I have to assert the proposition:
’What I now assert is true.’”\(^\text{157}\)

Bolzano states that he is not in a position to “give a brief
definition” of the concept of proposition ‘simply’ because he “is not certain at all how
this concept should be defined, and various attempted definitions given by others appear
to be deficient.”\(^\text{158}\)

He avoids the psychologistic puzzle of the principle of contradiction,
by apparently adopting the view of logical absolutism regarding the proposition in
itself. Bolzano suggests that “there always holds a certain relation” between ideas, but
only if they occur as “constituents of propositions.”\(^\text{159}\)

It is even more pertinent to state
that the converse simply cannot stand – namely, that two or more ideas, simply because
they stand in relation, can create a proposition. True, this cannot stand, ‘except’ if it was


\(^{157}\) Ibid., 23. Bolzano therefore concludes that “the contradictory of the sentence ‘What I now assert is – or I declare it for – false’ is not the sentence ‘What I now assert is true’, but ‘What I now assert, I assert’. But enough of such hairsplitting” (ibid).

\(^{158}\) Ibid., 26. We should recall the earlier quoted observation by Husserl of the difficulties (as a temptation of ‘brief thematization’) one is faced with when one establishes the distinction between the existential impossibility and ideal incompatibility of the conflicted statements: "Can the evidence for the existence of a feeling which we interpreted as one of incapacity, provide the insight that what we now in fact do not bring off will be forever denied us by law? One should note how impossible it is to specify the circumstances which play so essential role in the situation "*(LI vol. 1, 63).*

contextualized within the realm of ideal self-regulation of the concept of proposition in itself. Rolf George observes that although “subjective mental manifestation can grasp an abstract object, an idea in itself,” there does not need to be “any communality or resemblance”\textsuperscript{160} between the object and the the word that refers to it (or that grasps it). He suggests that:

Bolzano does not address the question how we find out that someone has grasped a proposition, but that it means. . . For him a subjective idea is part of mental proposition or at least could be such a part, and must have the character that goes with this role. He concentrates on the logical functions of ideas, thus avoiding certain classical mistakes. In particular the view that knowledge consist in the similarity or resemblance between our ideas and their objects is exposed as fallacious. Terms of propositions refer to their objects, they need not resemble them.\textsuperscript{161}

The psychologistic examination of the ‘problem’ of contradiction has its legitimacy, but this has no significance for Bolzano’s strategy of ‘absolute logicism.’ We can recall here Husserl’s insight into the heterogeneity of the notion of logical impossibility (as “an absurdity of an ideal content of judgment”) and the notion of psychological impossibility (as “the non-performability of the corresponding acts of judgment”).\textsuperscript{162} Husserl suggests that the \textit{a priori} ‘permanence’ of logical laws is reflected in their inability to be treated through psychologistic thought economy. Husserl’s insistence on the self-enclosedness of both realms is his way of avoiding the trap of empiricist-rationalist optimisms and skepticisms.

\textbf{Concluding remarks}

By reviewing the strategies Husserl deployed in designing the ideal


\textsuperscript{161} Ibid, pp. 104-106.

\textsuperscript{162} LI vol. 1, 93
science of logic I have demonstrated that Husserl’s phenomenological method, in his early writings, is argumentatively indebted to psychologism. I have suggested that the relationship between the ideal science of logic and psychologistic logic is characterized by two types of circularities: 1) the tautological circle of the inadvertent self-referentiality in psychologism, which is created by the psychologistic tendency to reverse the relation of priority in the polarity between the absolute and the psychological foundations of the science of logic, and 2) the deliberate circularity employed by the ideal science of logic in order to expose the self-referentiality of psychologism. The strategy of ‘withdrawal’ from a position of epistemological priority made it possible for the pure science of logic to challenge not only psychologistic logic but also absolute logicism.

Recognizing that Husserl’s methodology in responding to his contemporaries is in fact constitutive to the design of his phenomenological philosophy is crucial for understanding the ways in which Husserl accesses various philosophical issues. This will become particularly prominent in Husserl’s phenomenological investigation of the problem and the philosophies of time. In my next chapter, I propose that we should follow the strategy of the ideal purification in practice, so to speak. I suggest in Chapter 2 that Husserl’s philosophy of wholes and parts proceeds as a peculiar challenge to formal ontology, thereby preparing ground for the development of many themes in Husserl’s early work.
Chapter 2

Husserl’s investigation of foundationalism as an exercise in the self-enclosure of the terms in relation; The case of the Third Investigation

Introduction

In the Third Logical Investigation Husserl critically examines the relation between the parts and the whole as this relation is conceived within the traditions of empiricism and psychologism. Husserl firmly maintains that the whole cannot be a simple collection or a hierarchical combination of its parts. The relation between the parts belonging to a whole cannot be seen as their unification, where the parts are predestined to be either collected or combined under the banner of a higher categorial entity. The unity of related terms is expressed through the changes in the way in which parts relate to each other through their mutual participation in the definition of their respective essences. The character of the unifying power is determined through the change of the role of a part in its relation to its complement. The connection between parts is available to us only as their relational tension, which is ‘accumulated’ in the mutuality between the irrevocably self-enclosed parts. Fusion is therefore a modification in the unfolding of the relation between parts, where each ‘term in relation’ conditions another term through its own positional completion, while being conditioned by another term.

In my previous chapter, where I dealt with the issues raised in the Prolegomena, I
emphasized that the authority of a phenomenologically purified science of logic is proportional to the inability of the psychologistic concept of self-evidence to provide a sufficient justification for its foundation. The ability of truth to “retain its ideal being” is preceded by its inability to be psycho-physically realized. The psychologistic need for the ultimate realization of truth, through its justificatory completion, opens up the space for the purity of ideal law. This law, precisely because it is not psycho-physically or formally-ontologically realizable, remains, in its ideally lawful purity, what it is in itself. The ideal laws ‘secure’ their own ground by ‘moving within’ the self-evidentiality of psychologism’s concept of consciousness.

In this Chapter I suggest that Husserl extends the strategy of the self-unfolding of ideal laws from the Prolegomena to the whole-part and the founding-founded polarities. The persistent self-enclosure of the poles in the above-mentioned polarities is Husserl’s way of avoiding the isolation of the “terms in relation” and their reconciliation. Phenomenological analysis, which is enacted through the intensification of the fixity of the above-mentioned poles, is proportional to the inability of these poles to be self-evidentially isolated and subsequently reconciled through the process of their unification.

**Foundationilsm vs reconciliation**

Husserl deliberately contrasts the notion of unity as a “categorial predicate” with that of unity as reality in order to avoid the formal-ontological characterization of the whole-part relation. The ‘collective moment’ exists only as the peculiar mutual
positioning of the constitutive parts to which it refers. In the following sets of reflections, Husserl counters a concept of collection with a “mutual foundation”, and a unifying decision with the stroke of peculiarly intimate fusion:

This depends on the peculiarly intimate fusion of the different 'moments' of the concretum, their mutual 'penetration', which reveals itself in a mutual dependence as regard change and destruction. This fusion is not a fading into one another in the manner of the continuous, nor does it remove all separateness, but it is nonetheless a sort of peculiarly intimate mutual interconnection which must at a stroke set the whole complex of interpenetrating moments in relief, if only once a single discontinuous moment has provided the right conditions. . . The only true unifying factors, we may roundly say, are relations of 'foundation'.

The employment of the terms “stroke” and “the peculiar intimate interconnection” suggests that the notion of unity mirrors a specific context within which the parts are mutually self-encircled. In clarifying the peculiarity of the whole-part relationship, Husserl suggests that the whole is not just “a peculiar part, a 'moment of unity' that binds them [parts] together.” He observes that if the whole is conceived as a binding power or capacity, then the parts of this whole, as absolutely isolated, simply exist in it as mutually indifferent and are “given in space.” The moments of the whole, to the contrary, “require no chains and bonds to chain or knit them together, or to bring them to one another.” Furthermore, “all these expressions have in fact no sense at all. Where it makes nonsense to speak of isolation, the problem of overcoming such isolation is likewise nonsensical.” The “fusion” is completed once it is clear that the “relief achieved by the whole concretum has priority over the relief of the mutually separated moments of its content.”

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164 Ibid, pp. 16, 36-37. The emphasis in bold is mine throughout this text.  
165 Ibid, 37.  
166 Ibid, 36.  
167 Ibid.  
168 Ibid, 16.
demonstrated through the notion of a whole “in respect of . . . [its] founding members.”

Only the specific mode of the mutual self-achievement of the parts in relation necessitates the whole as a setting-in-relief:

The notion of what is non-independent, with its indirectly, generally characterized definitory lawfulness, points to many factually determined variable laws of essence. It is not a peculiarity of certain sorts of parts that they should only be parts in general, while it remains quite indifferent what they are conglomerated with, and into what sorts of connection they are fitted. . . The concept of non-independence accordingly amounts to that of ideal lawfulness in unified combinations. If a part stands in an ideally law-bound and not merely factual combination, it must lack independence; since such a law-bound combination merely means that a part whose pure essence is of one sort, can exist lawfully only in association with certain other parts of these or those suitable sorts.169

The ideally lawful peculiarity of the parts of the whole is not reflected in the simple fact that they are isolated magnitudes. The mutual foundation of the parts is exhibited within the context of the “sorts of the connection they are fitted.” It is only because of the inner necessity of its own initiation with respect to its complement that “the part stands in an ideally law-bound and not merely factual combination”, and, therefore, “it must lack independence.” It is important to point out the usage of the word “mere” in the first part of the quotation above. Husserl insists here that the specific mode in which one part is connected to its complement in unity re-articulates the essential characteristic of this part, in addition to defining the whole to which this part belongs. The essentiality of the part, as it is determined by its Genus, achieves full clarity only within the context of the connection it participates in. Furthermore, the part of the whole participates in its Genus only through its complementarity with the part, with which it is mutually crystalized in its ideal essence. Husserl even explicitly states that we cannot suggest changes in the Genera of quality and extension when we observe them in their

“mutual inseparability,”¹⁷⁰ as in the case of the non-independence of color and extension in the moment of the colored shape. Husserl insists that the relation between quality and extension is not used for the illustration of their formal-ontological definition, but he proposes that, to the contrary, “we shall rather make use of them to define inseparability or non-independence, or contrariwise, separability or independence.”¹⁷¹

Husserl dismisses the concept of mutual permeation of the parts belonging to a whole. Furthermore, it is not only that extension and quality do not impact or transform each other, but also the distinctive characteristics of both extension and quality are determined within the context of their specific relation. The ideal essentiality of the content which can be observed as separated from its surroundings is phenomenologically important merely because of its capacity to obtain its independence once it is confronted with its background. The formal-categorial specificity of an independent part, its belongingness to certain Genera, becomes ideally-phenomenologically re-articulated through the context of its belongingness to the whole of which this content is independent. In §4 of the Third Investigation (“Analyses of examples following Stumpf”), Husserl praises Stumpf’s “powerful observation” regarding changes in quality and extension, yet he challenges some of Stumpf’s conclusions. For example, Husserl disagrees with Stumpf’s claim that changes in quality cannot be isolated from changes in quantity, within their unity.¹⁷² Although Stumpf implicitly opens up the possibility where the Genera quality and quantity can no longer be treated outside of the peculiar context of their mutuality in their unity – as Stumpf writes, “they in some manner compose a total

¹⁷⁰ Ibid, 9.
¹⁷¹ Ibid.
¹⁷² Ibid, 8.
content”, he still preserves the idea according to which the analysis of the relationship between quality, quantity and their unity is rooted in the “prior” admittance of their separate formal-ontological profile. If this were true, the process of the unification of quality and quantity would still rest on the mediation of conceptually independent magnitudes. True, Stumpf proposes that quality and quantity can no longer be treated in their independent existence, but he does not explore the possibility according to which their unification may not be a subsequent resolution of their presumed isolation.

Husserl avoids the possibility of mutual causality (and permeation) between parts in relation by carefully isolating two levels of phenomenological differentiation: the formal-ontological level and the material-ontological level. He suggests a sharp difference between the ideal lawfulness of the relations of “Something, One, Object, Quality, Relation, Association, Plurality, Number, Order, Ordinal Number, Whole, Part, Magnitude etc ” and the ideality of the relations between concepts which “express genuine content,” such as House, Tree, Color, Tone, Space etc. For Husserl color is non-independent in relation to the shape of the colored surface, not because it is conditioned by the formal category of the shape, but because it is ‘synthetically’ founded on the shape by means of its “very content.” Although Husserl explicitly states that the

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173 Ibid.
174 Ibid, 19.
175 Ibid, 20. This is the full text of Husserl’s clarification of a difference between independent parts and non-independent moments. Husserl clearly makes a difference between the inner content of the independent and the inner content of the dependent part in relation to the whole to which they (do not) belong: “Though color is ‘unthinkable’ without something coloured, the existence of the latter, and more definitely that of a space, is not ‘analytically’ founded on the notion of colour.

The following discussion clears up the essence of the difference.

A part as such cannot exist at all without a whole whose part it is. On the other hand we say, with an eye to independent parts: A part often can exist without a whole whose part it is. Obviously this involves no contradiction. What we mean is that, if the part is treated in respect of its internal content, its own essence, then a thing having this same content can exist without a whole in which it exists; it can exist by itself, not associated with anything else, and will not then be a part. Change in, or complete elimination of associations, does not here affect the part’s own, peculiarly qualified content, and does not eliminate its
essences of sense quality and extension in a general fashion fix the “law-governed inherence that a non-independent ‘moment’ may have to a whole,” he nevertheless insists that each of these categories is contained “in its own manner in the essential unity of visual sensation.” He suggests that we cannot clarify what this manner is, but we can only emphasize that the ability of the “generic feature of being a sensory ‘moment’” to yield “the specific feature of being a sensory quality” cannot be further explained without the inclusion of the concept of quality. We cannot simply assume that some parts can be “parts in general” without seeing them within the context of what they are “conglomerated with.” The part is ideally bound to another part not through factual combination, but through the mereness of the manner in which “a part whose pure essence is of one sort, can exist lawfully only in association with certain other parts of these or those suitable sorts.” Proportionally to the fact that the mutual foundation between two non-independent parts ‘points backward’ to the essential character of the Genera to which each of these parts belongs, the fixed categorial position of these parts ‘points forward’ to the peculiarity of the ‘essential unity’ of the related parts. Furthermore, the parts, seen through the prism of this essential unity, reinforce and rearticulate the manner in which they belong to the essence of their own Genera. This enables Husserl to avoid the difficulties in the above-mentioned Stumpfian observation existence: only its relations fall away, the fact that it is part. The contrary holds of other sorts of parts: without any association, as non-parts, they are unthinkable, in virtue of their very content. These impossibilities or possibilites are rooted in the essential specificity of the contents. The case is quite different in regard to the analytic triviality that a part as such cannot exist without a whole whose part it is. It would be a ‘contradiction’, i.e. a ‘formal’, ‘analytical’ absurdity, to call X a part when there was no whole belonging to X. Here the inner content of the part is irrelevant, the underlying ‘formal’ lawfulness of our case has nothing in common with the material lawfulness of our above cases, and can accordingly not disturb them” (ibid).

177 Ibid.
178 Ibid.
179 Ibid.
according to which quality and quantity condition or change each other. Husserl offers an observation, which extends beyond the reconciliatory dialectical solution to the relation of the prior isolated moments in the relationship. I call this strategy the sharpening or the intensification of the moments in a relation, where their unity is the manifestation of the phenomenologically isolated tension between them. This tension is the reflection of the mutual self-encircling of the related parts, where their definition as parts of the whole gives the importance to the fixity of their initial categorial profile. Furthermore, the part’s participation in the essence of its Genus is fully articulated only though the persistence of the complementary part of the whole in its participation in the essence of its own Genus. According to Husserl, the formal-ontological analysis of the relation between parts cannot sufficiently clarify the process of mutual foundation, which requires the investigation of the manner in which the “genuine content”180 of the related part is fully expressed. The self-evidentiality of the formal-ontological analysis is fully achieved only so it can necessitate the pursuit of the material-ontological investigation.

We can, for example, observe the role of the white color in the petunia flower, which swings on the summer breeze, while it contributes, with the variety of its movements and shades, to the overall diversity of the colors and the shapes in the bouquet. If we focus on the relationship between the white color and the shape of the flower, we observe that the participation of the whiteness (of the petal) in the Genus of the white color is unbreakably bound to the way in which the petal bends. We immediately conclude that the petal is the whitest in the segment that bends most sharply, and that the edges of the petal which are bulged inward exemplify the white color in its purest form. The shape of the parts of the petal, which are remote from the center of the

180 Ibid, 19.
flower, tend to manifest a straight surface, which is accompanied with the decrease in its whiteness. The increase in the mutual proximity of the parts, e.g. the obviousness of the ‘fusion’ between the bending and the coloration of the petal, evokes the purity of their Generic essences and demonstrates that their relation of unity is neither a combination, collection nor a mutual permeation between them. The ‘closer’ the parts seem to each other, the greater is the distinction between them with regards to their essential profiles and vice versa; the further they are from each other by the generality of their definition, the stronger is their bond within the specificity of the manner in which they belong to the whole. The increase in the ‘height’ of parts’ universal essentiality is proportional to the decrease in the ‘length’ of the distance between them within the specificity of their union. The focus of the ‘horizontal’ investigations of the agreements, disagreements or the blurring of the distinctions between the parts of the whole is replaced by an emphasis on the increase or the decrease in the intensity of the participation of the parts in their essence within the context of the union to which they belong.

Husserl importantly observes that the mutual necessitation of the increase of the parts’ belongingness to their essences is visible not only through their association but also through their exclusion. He remarks that two different colors are mutually founded through their exclusion if they cover “an identical piece of surface”, and they “cannot do so completely.”\textsuperscript{181} He further suggests that “To each essential, law-bound exclusion of a determinate characterization, there corresponds a positive law-bound requirement of a corresponding characterization and vice versa.”\textsuperscript{182} We witness here that the ‘movement’ across the (vertical) ladder of the parts’ participation in their essences is reflected in the

\hspace{1cm} \textsuperscript{181} Ibid, 18.
\hspace{1cm} \textsuperscript{182} Ibid.
persistent ‘fixity’ or the inactivity of the parts in their (horizontal) encounter. The mutual inactivity, which illustrates the essential impermeability of the parts of the whole, is reflected in the inability of the parts to enter into relation (whether of mutual inclusion or exclusion) by effecting their mutual transformation. Their mutual inability to effect changes in each other on the horizontal level is best illustrated by the concept of their mutual self-encircling, where the increase in their vertical movement is proportional to the rigidifying of the fixity of their positions or roles in the whole to which they belong.

We can conclude that the white color in the petal, in fact, **bends** because it exhibits pure whiteness only if it is complemented with the bent shape of the petal. The purity of the shape of the bent petal is necessarily accompanied with the lack of any shade in the white color, and conversely, the remoteness of the purity of white is fully illuminated through the straightening (or bulging inward) of the shape of the petal. However, Husserl emphasizes that just as the changes in the vertical ladder of the essences of related parts describe their relation, so too the participation of the parts in their essences cannot be disentangled from the peculiarity of the context of their relation. This observation most directly avoids both prioritization of the fusion without consideration of its parts and the analysis of the parts in their essences outside of the context of their relation.

**Phenomenological inversion of the concepts of movement and fixity in the whole-part problematic**

Husserl performs a fundamental inversion of the concepts of movement and contact, at least in the way these concepts had been framed by the traditional...
interpretation of the relation of part and whole. The ‘movements’ or the activities of the parts in relation, their mutual intentionality and the categorial fixity of their whole, are inverted in phenomenological analysis. Husserl’s persistent ‘sharpening’ of the terms in relation with regard to their formal-ontological definition creates the effect of ‘inactivity’. The strengthening of this peculiar philosophical pointillism is proportional to the limitation in the self-evidentiality of the formal-ontological profiling. However, this pointilism does not appear as the primordial, more authentic analysis which expands itself at the limits of the formal-ontological categories, as the process which waits at the end, or which grounds the coming into being of these categories. To the contrary, this pointilism unfolds as the exaggeration of the inherent limitation that is manifested in the self-evidentiality of the completion of these categories. This process implies that the application as an expansion upon the logical category is its own most explicit finitude, and the self-evidentiality of its execution opens up the gaps in its seemingly unquestionable ground.

This pointillism is further strengthened by the distinction between the respective dependence and non-dependence by the distinction of the various parts belonging to the whole through the distinction of the nature of the parts of the whole, namely whether they are non-independent or dependent. Thus the “pure Species” of non-independent objects, write Husserl, “are governed by a law of essence to the effect that they only exist as parts of more inclusive wholes of a certain appropriate species.”183 The ideality of non-independent objects is established through the role these objects play in the whole of which they are parts. Further, the whole of the non-independent parts gains its categorial

183 Ibid,12. Husserl’s caution about the word existence is clearly evident here. This also recalls the non-psychologist nature of the ideal lawfulness, as it is introduced in the Prolegomena of LI.
predicate only with regard to its contents, which are mutually founded. The unity of the contents, which are founded on each other (whether one-sidedly or reciprocally), is a “much more intimate unity since less mediated unity.”\textsuperscript{184} This intimacy is manifested in the predestination of the non-independent object to be ‘non-independent of’ something. Therefore, the ideal essence of the non-independent moment is ‘available’ only because of the presence of other moments. The non-independent moment\textsuperscript{185} “is not merely an actual part, but its essence, its pure Species, predestines it to partial being.”\textsuperscript{186} This is why the color in the colored thing can exist “in general, and purely as such only as a ‘moment.’”\textsuperscript{187} The colored thing does not impose itself as a separate entity which unifies isolated moments of color and quality, but its unifying character is exemplified in the fact “that the existence of certain sorts of contents conditions the mere co-existence of contents of certain coordinated sorts.”\textsuperscript{188}

Although the independent parts or pieces are not mutually founded, because they “‘found’ new contents themselves”, and they “‘found them together,”\textsuperscript{189} the novelty of this unifying content can be estimated only “in respect of its founding members.”\textsuperscript{190} Just as the whole is just a simple addition of its isolated moments, where the significance of the part is exclusively transferred to the role of the whole, so too is the independent part not explicated outside of the context of its independence – namely in the peculiarity of its

\begin{footnotes}
\item[184] Ibid, 37.
\item[185] Husserl makes a clear distinction between independent parts, calling them pieces, and non-independent one , calling them moments in the section § 17.
\item[186] Ibid, 12.
\item[187] Ibid.
\item[188] Ibid, 36.
\item[189] Ibid.
\item[190] Ibid, 37. This unifying content in the case of the independent parts “engenders unity since it is ‘founded’ on many members separate in themselves.”
\end{footnotes}
relationship with the parts with which it is immediately or mediately associated. Husserl therefore writes the following:

The intuitively unseparated content forms a whole with other coexistent contents, but it is not cut off in this manner within the whole; it is not merely bound up with its associates, but blends with them. Independent contents in our previous sense, which are what they are no matter what goes on around them, need not have the quite different independence of separateness.¹⁹¹

Having a characteristic of the “independence of separateness” is precisely what distinguishes parts’ (pieces in this case) participation in their Genera in the context of their mutual independence to the whole to which they belong. Husserl gives the example of the tone in the melody, which is, through its individual participation in the “unified tone-sequence,”¹⁹² an independent piece of the melody. The tone is, however, immediately associated with other tones of the melody, whereas its specific quality and intensity is a mediate part of the same whole. The procedure according to which we make these distinctions is not reflected in “some arbitrary, or some psychologically compulsive preference for a certain order of division,”¹⁹³ but is rooted in the manner in which the independent parts (with their non-independent moments) participate in their essence by founding their unity as a new content (and vice versa, the peculiar novelty of the unity is emphasized in the manner in which independent parts participate in their essence).

Husserl observes that, in the case of the melody, “the tone, in itself, is a prior part in the whole melody, and its quality a later, mediate part.”¹⁹⁴ It is important to notice that Husserl places special emphasis on the in-itselfness of the tone, whose self-confirming ‘staticism’ is designed so it can combat the ‘mobility’ of “some arbitrary, or some

¹⁹¹ Ibid, 14.
¹⁹³ Ibid.
¹⁹⁴ Ibid.
psychologically compulsive preference” for unification. The in-itselfness of the tone in the melody illuminates the “objective situation” of the foundation between the independent parts of the whole, which is its non-mediated relation to the other tones in the melody. However, the “objective foundation” changes in the example of the physical whole of the parts, where the “intrinsic prerogative” of the whole is not violated by our selection of the order of the division of the whole. Husserl observes that the foundational profile of the extended whole is reflected in the fact that “there is no division which is intrinsically primary” and that “there is also no progress determined by the thing’s nature to a new division or grade in division.”\textsuperscript{195} We can (dis)assemble the bookshelf, by (dis)attaching its parts, without being concerned about the order of the procedure, because the parts of the bookshelf (the frame, shelves, the caps) are equally remote from, or attached to, its whole; they, and their mechanically attachable parts, are all equally independent in their belongingness to the bookshelf, and the change of the order of their assemblage will not effect the constitution of the bookshelf. There is nothing in the essence of the specific shelf (or its part – e.g. the plastic connectors at its edge) which will make it prior to, or contextually more significant than, the other shelf or any other part of the bookshelf. The randomness, as the lack of intrinsic primariness of the order of the (dis)assemblage of the bookshelf, is precisely what constitutes its “intrinsic prerogative.” We can propose that there is integrity of this particular whole, the bookshelf, only if we assume the intrinsic randomness of the order of its assemblage. Conversely, the Generic character of the parts of the bookshelf is singled out in their ability to participate in the randomness of this specific whole.

\textsuperscript{195} Ibid.
Only once we point out the nature of the ideal laws which govern the relation between the parts of the whole, and thereby determine its character, can we suggest that the fixed one-directionality of the whole is ‘completed’ through the one-directional finitude or the dependency of its parts. This characterization of the whole, however, clearly necessitates reflection upon the nature of the connection between its parts. The unifying character of the whole is possible, because parts achieve their essential profile in the particularity of the manner in which they belong to the whole. Husserl emphasizes that not in spite of but because of the diversity of the mutual foundation between the pieces (whether the foundation is expressed in fixed or in random order), this foundation has “its essential ground.” He further writes with regard to the fixed order of the foundational relation:

Pieces are essentially mediate or remote parts of a whole whose ‘pieces’ they are, if combinatory forms unite them with other ‘pieces’ into wholes which in their turn constitute wholes of higher order by way of novel form. . . There is, in their case, a fixed order of ‘foundations’, in which what is founded at one level serves to ‘found’ the level next above, and in such a manner, that at each level new forms, only reachable at that level, are involved. The essential ground of the foundational relation is manifested in the fixity of the order of the foundational immediacy of the parts in question. Their order is not randomly selected, because their essence within the context of their ‘fusion’ implies that the way they participate in the whole is determined by the participation of this whole (of the first order) to the whole of the higher (second) order. Furthermore, the whole of the higher order solidifies itself because of the peculiar position of the parts which are immediate to other parts. Husserl illustrates this proposition with reference to the fragmentation of the aesthetic unity of a star shape which is built out of star shapes, which are in turn

196 Ibid, 40.
197 Ibid.
198 Ibid. Emphasis in bold is mine.
composed of stretches and these stretches of points. The ideal ground of the aesthetic unity provides the context according to which points are in a relationship with other points only so they can found a certain stretch, which is related to other stretches so they can found the new content of the star shape, etc. Husserl importantly avoids the linearity of a simple progression or pyramidal gradation (which is framed by a distant goal at the end of the process) of the ‘sequencing’ of the pieces by emphasizing that the manner in which “what is founded at one level serves to ‘found’ the level next above”, is “only reachable at that level.” The sequencing of the levels does not order or direct its parts, but this sequencing is possible, as such, only because the essential profile of the level in the sequence “serves to found” the next level.

We witness here again the dynamics of the opposition to the flow of a simple pyramidal sequencing. The strategy of the ‘pointillistic’ in-itself-ness of the pieces of the whole is even further developed in the relationship between the moments and its pieces in a relation to the whole to which they belong. The independent parts (pieces) of the non-independent parts (moments) of the whole are more remote from that whole than the non-independent parts, because their need for the supplement is satisfied in the non-independent part. The specific piece-ness of the part of the non-independent part reflects the “law of supplementation” which “points to a whole which, in virtue of a new law of supplementation is, and must be, a part of a more comprehensive whole.” 199 This suggests that the specific belongingness of the piece of the moment of the whole to the whole is only possible because of its remoteness.

It is clear that the same strategy of phenomenological analysis is applied in the delineation of both non-independent and independent parts. Just as the non-independent

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199 Ibid, 41.
part gains its essence through the context of its immediate belongingness to the whole, so too does the independent part participate in its Genus through its more remote belongingness to the whole, or as Husserl observes:

Since they are not, as independent objects, ‘founded’ on one another, it remains their lot to ‘founded’ new contents themselves, and to ‘founded’ them together; it is only virtue of this situation that these latter are thought of as unifying contents in respect of their founding members. But the contents ‘founded’ on one another (whether one-sidedly or reciprocally) likewise have unity, and a much more intimate unity since less mediated unity. Such ‘intimacy’ consists simply in the fact that unity is here not engendered by a novel content, which again only engenders unity since it is ‘founded’ on many members separate in themselves. . . We shall be entitled to say of each range of contents united in this manner that it has unity, though the predicate thus attributed to it is no ‘real’ one, though there is no constituent called ‘unity’ anywhere in our whole which can be prised out. Unity is in fact a categorial predicate.

The parts become members of the unity by ‘recalling’ their Generic profile. Further, they are able to recall this profile only within the context of their unity, where the unity does not remain immune to the self-confirmation of the essential character of its parts. Husserl directly challenges any sort of prioritizing by emphasizing that, since parts belong to the whole of the independent parts, it is their share, “it remains their lot”, to found new contents both themselves and together. It is important to notice that Husserl breaks with the notion of the active role of the fusion between parts, “the peculiar part, a ‘moment of unity’ that bind them [parts] together,” by accentuating the ‘passivity’ contained in the construct of ‘parts’ capacity to found new contents. The ‘activity’ of founding is a mere side effect of parts’ participation in its essence as an independent part of that particular whole. Parts do not simply produce the whole, because their positional profile, their Generic essence, defines them as parts which found novel contents together. Husserl’s insistence on the active passivity of the parts is sharpened through his emphasis that parts found new contents both “themselves” and “together.” This distinction is

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200 Ibid, 37.
201 Ibid.
important because parts ‘cooperate’ in such foundational activity only through their positional definition, through the increase-decrease relationship of their participation in their essence. Conversely, this ‘activation’ of the ‘inactivity’ of the parts does not result in the strengthening of the activity of the whole, but in the deprivation of the whole of any sort of definition which does not reflect the foundational tendencies of its parts; it therefore results in the ‘passivization’ of the ‘activity’ of the whole. In other words, the only activity of the whole is to suggest the constant self-activity of its parts, whose active passivity defines the whole. Husserl explicitly states that the whole “in the full and proper sense is, in general, a combination determined by the lowest Genera of the parts.” 202 This is why the formal-ontological definition of the whole needs to “correspond to each material unity,” 203 where only “the material specificity of the ‘founding’ contents and consequently of the ‘founded’ types of contents” 204 determines the law which governs this whole. Further, the determination of the whole through the ‘material specificity’ of its contents provides it with definiteness, “which gives the whole this unity.” 205 The whole can be seen as a ‘real unity’ only through the ‘reality’ of its definiteness, and not through the separate existence of any “constituent called unity.” 206 Only the relationship of mutual foundationalism between parts (whether it is reciprocal or not) has the significance of “a categorial predicate,” 207 and only this categoriality can fully define the nature of the unity. 208

202 Ibid, 38.
203 Ibid.
204 Ibid, 39.
205 Ibid.
206 Ibid, 37.
207 Ibid.
208 Husserl writes the following: “Here we must note that, on our doctrine, the Idea of unity or the Idea of the whole is based on the idea of ‘Founding’, and the latter Idea upon the Idea of Pure Law; the Form of a
We can illustrate foundational mutuality between self-encircling independent parts by reference to the fusion of a pool player and her cue. When we initially observe the player operating her cue, we encounter the assemblage between the player’s skills and the inanimate instrument she uses to play the game. The player’s ability to utilize the specific qualities of the cue appears to be visible only through the execution of a successful shot, which is planned before the establishment of the contact between player and her instrument. The player praises or curses (usually in disbelief) either her own abilities (such as focus, level of preparedness, intoxication etc.) or the qualities of the cue (its weight, shape, amount of chalk at its tip, etc.) according to the success or failure of the shot she intended to perform. However, the success or failure of the shot depends on the dynamics of the fusion between the player and the cue. The player usually examines the length, weight, density, smoothness, cap of the cue before she starts to adapt herself to its usage. It usually takes a few games, or even a few different cues, for the average player to get accustomed to her cue. The average player usually starts to encounter the immediacy of the inanimate body of the cue through her clumsiness, hesitation, success or failure, therefore re-confirming the instrumental alterity of the cue to her own body. However, the alterity of the cue, which causes the initial stumbling of the player, becomes the source of her success in the game. The specific characteristic of the cue in the persistence of its inanimate nature ‘opens up’ the opportunity for the player to fully exhibit her own capacity to utilize the qualities of this cue. The player’s exploration of the characteristics of the cue, usually during the execution of the most difficult shots, extends the realm of the differences between her and the cue. For example, the shots that

Law is further as such categorical – a law is not thinglike, not therefore perceptible – and that to this extent the notion of a Founded Whole is a categorical notion”(ibid, 39).
demand spins and the exploitation of difficult angular constellations at the occasion of the hits directed at the balls with the intention of their placement in the holes at the sides of the table tend to be especially demanding. In these moments, not only the player’s skill and practice, but also the cue’s intrinsic characteristics, decide the successfulness of the shot. The intimate coordination between player and her instrument creates the effect where both the player and the observers of the game can easily assume that the player and cue are part of one body, or that the player ‘was born to play with this particular cue.’ Their fusion into one body becomes possible only due to the re-assertion of their essential differences, which are mutually pointed out by the necessity of their characteristics-in-play. This necessitates that the fluidity of their fusion expresses itself as their capacity to resist each other. Just as the condensation of the essential characteristics of the white color and the shape of the petal of a petunia flower initiate the ‘bending of the white color’, so too do the mutual ‘amalgamation’ of the player and her cue in the smoothness of their fusion create the effect where the cue becomes an extension of the body of the player.

Husserl’s strategy of foundationalism in the wholes of independent and non-independent parts can be illustrated through the example of the simple spinning top, which is set in motion through the twisting of the stem by the movements of the hand. The introduction of movement to the spinning top through the application of external force exemplifies the whole-part relationship as it is understood in the context of formal-ontological lawfulness. The figure of the top exemplifies the fixed order of its components, and this figure is set in motion as a simple union which orders its parts. The top is entirely dependent on external power for its activation, which provides a
gyroscopic effect. However, once the spinning top achieves angular momentum, it relies on the product of its rotational inertia and rotational velocity. Once it is set in motion by the external force, the spinning top’s structure is ‘re-articulated’ through its ability to rely on the peculiarity of its components for the achievement of its self-movement. The duration of the self-movement of the spinning top is not only determined by the specific relation between the rotational inertia and rotational velocity, as if they were factors externally introduced to it. To the contrary, the top’s capacity for movement is nothing but the expression of the ‘cooperation’ between the rotational inertia and rotational velocity of this specific top. Further, once the inertia and velocity achieve certain proportion in their product, the angular momentum will lessen, causing the increase in the precession of the spinning top. The spinning top will finally lose its ability to move itself while inscribing circles on the flat surface. The ‘leaning’ of the rotational velocity and inertia on each other in their capacity to be pieces of the angular momentum is what defines the unity of the spinning top. The horizontal and vertical components of the top are not just ordered, but they give a context to this order, by ordering, in themselves and through themselves, as parts of the whole figure, the movement of the top as a whole.

It is important to recall again Husserl’s observation that “we can give no answer ” to the question of “what differentiates the generic feature of being a sensory ‘moment’ so as to yield the specific feature of being a sensory quality.”\textsuperscript{209} We cannot define this manner of the mutual foundation; it simply “cannot be further described.”\textsuperscript{210} However, the mutual ‘essentialization’ of the parts, their participation in their essences within their union, is what defines this union in the first place. We observe the process of the

\textsuperscript{209} Ibid, 18.
\textsuperscript{210} Ibid.
positioning of the parts of the whole in their essential distinctions, which results in the appearance of the tension. Furthermore, this tension, the reflection of the formal-ontological impermeability of the parts in relation is what makes the operation of their ‘unification’, its activity, possible. The seeming formal-ontological contradiction of the unity, as seen in the separateness of the union which ‘endows’ its parts with a context, becomes the source of the agency of the foundationalism. Foundationalism is therefore not (just) a process on behalf of the unity, but it is also a structure of the mutual necessitation of the parts’ participation in their essences.

The dynamics of deprivation in the reconciliatory capacity of Ratio: Examining the vivacity of Kracauer’s Mass Ornament

The above-mentioned silence, the impossibility of an answer to the question of what characterizes a sensory moment that yields sensory quality, is not only overlooked through the formal-ontological conceptualization of unity, but it is deliberately ignored by it. The ‘epoch’ of the mass ornament according to Siegfried Kracauer is marked through its own ignoring of the question of its grounding, precisely through the banality of its execution. In his essay “The Mass Ornament” Kracauer explores the loss of individuality in Weimar Republic through the seemingly liberating effect of a subject’s participation in the mass spectacles, such as military parades, stadium speeches and extravagant dance performances.

Kracauer’s main target in this essay is the strategy of abstraction that shapes the capitalist mode of production. He expands upon Marx’s position on the difference
between surplus and use value, suggesting that the production and consumption of values became “the side effects in the service of the production process.”\textsuperscript{211} The increase in profit perpetuates the division between the owners of the means of production and the labor power, by depriving both poles of this division of their agency. Both community and personality vanish when “what is demanded is calculability,” where the individual becomes important only as “a tiny piece of the mass.”\textsuperscript{212} The root of the mass de-personalization is located in the increasing abstraction of economic and scientific production. Being initially inspired by the process of demythologization, the “abstractness”\textsuperscript{213} becomes, through its instrumentalization, a purpose in itself, replicating and multiplying the ‘non-rational’ aspect of the externality of ‘nature’, which it is supposed to demystify. Rationality, by becoming a pure instrument for the promotion of the self-preservation principle, subverts itself by destroying its ability for reflection. Abstract rationality perpetuates the reason-nature distinction by openly turning itself into its opposite, or into the brute force of non-reflective execution.\textsuperscript{214} It is, however, important to notice that the seeming proximity between nature and reason through their pure equation, in fact, perpetuates and strengthens their ‘difference’. Reason and nature in their unity, under the banner of ‘abstract rationality’, are treated as self-evidently isolated concepts, which is further enforced through their reversibility in the unity of abstract rationality. The instrumental reversibility between reason and nature strengthens

\textsuperscript{211} Ibid, 78.
\textsuperscript{212} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{213} Ibid, 81.
\textsuperscript{214} Kracauer points out that the more “abstractness consolidates itself, however, the more man is left behind, ungo
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der
e en by reason. If his thought midway likes a detour into the abstract, thereby preventing the true contents of knowledge from breaking through, man will once again be rendered subject to the forces of nature. Instead of suppressing these forces, the thinking that has lost its way provokes their rebellion itself by disregarding the very reason that alone could confront such forces and make them submit. It is a mere consequence of the unhampered expansion of capitalism’s power that the dark forces of nature continue to rebel ever more threateningly. thereby preventing the advent of the man of reason” (pp. 82-83).
the confrontation-reconciliation dualism between parts, because it formally obscures their confrontation. ‘Instrumental reason’ (to recall Max Horkheimer), by permuting nature and reason, seemingly alleviates the pressure of their direct confrontation. However, although the fixity of the initial position of terms in relation is exchanged for their permutation, the relation of conflict is very carefully preserved.

The unity conceived by instrumental reason is opposite to Husserl’s treatment of the mutual necessitation of the terms in relation with respect to their essentiality in their union. Abstract rationality (or Horkheimer’s instrumental reason), the formal-conceptual isolation of terms in relation, necessitates their transformation, where the nature of their mutuality is seen through the inversion of their positions within their unity. Even if we perform the permutation between reason and nature, we are still reinforcing the rigidity of their initial isolation and the need for their, also categorically isolated, unifying moment. This would correspond to the concept of unity, which introduces itself as “the apparently plain truth”, according to which “wherever two contents form a real unity, there must be a peculiar part, a ‘moment of unity’, that binds them together.”

We would end up in this case, according to Husserl, in the indefinite complication of the relations between the parts, where the foundationalist concept of unity wouldn’t be separated from the formal-ontological. In this sense we would literally come up with the new unifying moment not only between parts, but also between each isolated part and the unity, etc. For example if U is the moment of unity between B and A, then U1 is the moment of unity between U and A (or U2 between U and B), U1.1 between U1 and U, U1.2 between U2 and U, “and so on in infinitum.”

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215 *LI*, 37.
216 Ibid.
To come back to Kracauer, the efficiency of abstract rationality overpowers every particular distinction and quality of either individual personality or communities, where humans become mere attributes of the higher order of efficiency. Kracauer suggests that the mass figures, which embody the abstract rationality, are “composed of elements that are mere building blocks and nothing more,” and that people become “the fractions of figure” only “as parts of a mass, and not as individuals who believe themselves to be formed from within.” He further observes the following:

Rather the girl-units drill in order to produce an immense number of parallel lines. The goal being to train the broadest mass of people in order to create a pattern of undreamed-of dimensions. The end result is the ornament, whose closure is brought about by emptying all the substantial constructs of their contents. **Although the masses give rise to the ornament, they are not involved in thinking it through.** As linear as it may be, there is no line that extend from the small sections of the mass to the entire figure. The ornament resembles aerial photographs of landscapes and cities in that it does not emerge out of the interior of the given conditions, but rather appears above them. The more the coherence of the figure is relinquished in favor of mere linearity, the more distant it becomes from the immanent consciousness of those constituting it.

The significance of the participation of the masses in the mass ornament is proportional to their contextual irrelevance, where the unity and its parts are isolated moments whose relation is abstracted from their own specificity. Just as parts are merely collectible magnitudes for the unity, so too is their union exclusively an ordering capacity, which secures its isolation from the context of the relation of its parts. The full capacity of the human being who participates in the mass ornament as its mere part never comes to the fore, because her corporeity, her ‘organic naturality’, is abstractly emphasized, so it can be utilized within the ‘liveliness’ of the mass ornament. Kracauer uses the example of Tiller Girls dancing groups, whose female members’ distinction is

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218 Ibid.
219 Ibid, 77.
important as long as it perpetuates the movement of the mass figure they create. The humanness of the dancers – and in this case the emphasis is on their femininity – is important in its physical concreteness, in the uniqueness of their bodies (particularly legs), as long as they sustain the abstraction of the dancing formation. Paradoxically, the more it becomes apparent that, in spite of the regularity of general pattern of the movement of the figure, the dancers move within the ‘confines’ and the capacities of their own body qualities, the stronger will be the submission of their uniqueness to the successful establishment of the mass ornament. The dancers usually swing their legs either to the right or to the left, while ‘chaining’ themselves to each other through the intertwining of their hands. The result is the creation of a geometric figure, whose pattern relies on the pace of the dancers’ movements. Dancers’ legs appear to be more free and emphasized, while their torsos are sequenced as building blocks for the center piece of the figure they create. The ‘naturality’ of the parts of the figure (usually the legs of the dancers) is abstractly isolated and emphasized, which is proportional to the accentuation of the mere ‘corporeity’ of the figure of the mass ornament, and therefore to the banality of its execution. In this sense, both the organic aspect of the human beings and its abstract ordering are equally deprived of their full capacity, and are therefore being equally abstracted from.\textsuperscript{220} This is why both the ‘rationality’ of the pattern of the mass ornament and the ‘irrational’ corporeity of its components reinforce the nature-reason rift through fusion, which accomplishes itself through the linearity of the utilization of its components. Kracauer calls this self-perpetuating unity \textit{Ratio}, and describes it in the following way:

In spite of the \textbf{rationality} of the mass pattern, such patterns simultaneously give rise to the

\textsuperscript{220} Ibid, 84.
natural in its impenetrability. Certainly man as an organic being has disappeared from these ornaments, but that does not suffice to bring man's basis to the fore; on the contrary, the remaining little mass particle cuts itself off from this basis just as any general formal concept does. Admittedly, it is the legs of the Tiller Girls that swing in perfect parallel, not the natural unity of their bodies, and it is also true that the thousands of people in the stadium form one single star. But this star does not shine, and the legs of the Tiller Girls are an abstract designation of their bodies. . . The Ratio that gives rise to the ornament is strong enough to invoke the mass and to expunge all life from the figures constituting it. It is too weak to find the human beings within the mass and to render the figures in the ornament transparent to knowledge. Because this Ratio flees from reason and takes refuge in the abstract, uncontrolled nature proliferates under the guise of rational expression and uses abstract signs to display itself.  

We can also suggest that it is not in spite of, but precisely because of the rationality of the mass patterns (as seen in its capacity for a merely abstractive utilization of its components) that the nature of the components appears “in its impenetrability.” Furthermore, it is important to pay attention to Kracauer’s emphasis on the lack of shining in the mass-constructed stars, and the fact the operational mereness of the legs of the dancers in the mass-figure is abstracted from their corporeity. Both cases illustrate the situation where both the whole and its parts are treated as purely isolated moments. The ‘voice’ of this treatment, its articulate noise prevents us from comprehending the inescapability of Husserlian silence in answer to the question of what is being ‘added’ to the sensory moment “so as to yield the specific feature of being a sensory quality” in the union of the extended quality. The combination of the parts is possible because the essentiality of the founding part necessitates the essentiality of the founded one. The mutual foundation of parts, which ‘equally’ participate in their essence, is what constitutes their union. The ‘silence’ of the mutual self-encircling of the parts of the whole which produces the ‘voice’ of their articulation should be seen as a tension which is released in the smoothness of the unification of the parts, conceived as the separate

221 Ibid.  
222 Ibid.  
moments in the process of their, equally isolated, unification. What appears as the initial articulation of the whole-part relationship, which rests on the isolation of parts as moments in unity, disarticulates itself in the moment of its ultimate self-evidentiality. The only way we can point out the inherent self-disarticulation of the formal-ontological articulation of the unification is to move within the formality of the categories, and trace their self-evidentiality back to its foundations. Kracauer, similarly, suggests that the identification of the “superficial shallowness” of Ratio “leads directly through the center of the mass ornament, not away from it.”

Lampert-Sokolowski debate

Robert Sokolowski, in “The Logic of Parts and Wholes in Husserl’s Investigations”, describes the strategy of foundationalism and suggests that the necessary rules which “govern” the blending between whole and parts “are possible because parts and wholes in general can be blended in certain ways.” Sokolowski, in describing Husserl’s definition of moments as parts which are “inseparable from one another and from their wholes,” writes that pieces are parts “that do not permeate one another and hence are separable from their wholes.” The concept of moment implies the following foundationalism: “Each part, by virtue of what it is, contains within itself a rule dictating the necessary progression of supplements that it must possess, the necessary

226 Ibid, 539.
series of horizons, within which it must rest.” Sokolowski’s delineation of Husserl’s strategy of self-enclosure is also visible in his description of Husserl’s distinction between mediate and immediate. He concludes that color is a “closer moment to a material thing than brightness is (brightness is farther) because color belongs to its whole through the mediation of fewer parts than brightness needs.” Sokolowski, however, proposes that the whole-parts dynamic underlies the composition and methodology of the entirety of LI. Sokolowski, for example, notices that Husserl never distinguishes intentionality (the Fifth Investigation) into acts and sensations, material and quality, partial and complete acts etc. so that he can eventually separate any of these pieces or stages from one another and from “consciousness.” Although he importantly traces the similarity between the foundationalism of the Third Investigation and the phenomenological analysis employed in other investigations, he tends to interpret the latter through the lens of the former. Further, he gives priority to the whole-moment over the whole-pieces dynamic, failing to realize that Husserl gives equal importance to and employs the same strategy in the analysis of the concepts of pieces and moments.

Therefore, we can suggest that just as non-independent parts through an ideally law-bound combination “must lack independence,” so too must independent parts be independent because they are not ideally bound to the above-mentioned combination. We might follow Sokolowski in his observation that the concepts of categorical intentionalities and the ‘thing in itself’ cannot be instantiated as purely separate and

\[\text{\textsuperscript{227}}\text{Ibid.}\]
\[\text{\textsuperscript{228}}\text{Ibid, 540.}\]
\[\text{\textsuperscript{229}}\text{LI, vol. 2, 18. Let us recall here Husserl’s above-mentioned diagnosis about independent parts. He states that, “since they are not, as independent objects, ‘founded’ on one another, it remains their lot to ‘found’ new contents themselves, and to ‘found’ them together; it is only in virtue of this situation that these latter are thought of as unifying contents in respect of their ‘founding’ members” (ibid, 37).}\]
isolated from each other and from the overall context in which they appear (especially from the relations, as well as the processes into which they are immersed).\textsuperscript{230} However, we should be particularly hesitant to accept the claim that, when thinking about profiles and objects, we have to rely on “moments and whole,” instead of focusing on the schema “pieces and whole.” Overall, Sokolowski makes a misstep because, instead of recognizing the peculiarity of Husserl’s ‘pointillist’ strategy which is established at every analytical level of \textit{LI} and in accordance with the operational specificity of these levels, he imposes the whole-moments dynamics as a thematic-analytic unit on the whole body of the \textit{LI}. Therefore, he not only fails to recognize the significance of circular strategy in each analytical step in \textit{LI}, but he also blurs and weakens the peculiar shape of this strategy at the level of the whole-parts dynamic. We can, of course, agree with Sokolowski that the objectivity of a priori statements “make[s] up the complex meaning,” and that “we do not need to understand them first and then try to see if they are true or not; the very understanding of them is perception of their truth.”\textsuperscript{231} However, we can hardly connect the insight into the peculiarity of the phenomenological analysis in the Sixth Investigation with the claim that “all such self-evident statements, whether positive or negative, are instances of part-whole logic.”\textsuperscript{232} I would rather suggest the reverse: the whole-parts dynamic is one of six different stages of the problematizing of the concept of self-evidentiality. We can ask ourselves: why does Sokolowski’s claim (about the Fifth and Sixth Investigations) that “intentions are not ‘pieces’ of the stream of consciousness

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\item[230] Sokolowski suggests that if we accept this kind of rigid division between thing and its profiles, both will appear as “too substantial” and as “pieces that are separable at least in thought, from one another”[Robert Sokolowski, “The Logic of Parts and Wholes in Husserl’s Investigations,” \textit{Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, 28 (1968): 544]. He further writes that “The series of faces that a thing presents phenomenologically is a series of moments; profiles cannot be disengaged from things” (ibid).
\item[231] Ibid, 551.
\item[232] Ibid.
\end{itemize}
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that could be separated from the sensory cushion in which they are found,” need to conclude with the reflection that intentions “are moments that must be supplemented by sensible data?”

The major problem of Sokolowski’s insight above is reflected in the reduction of the peculiar phenomenological investigations down to the problems of ontological foundationalism. Husserl remarkably addresses the specificity of the relation form-content, part-whole, categorical-sensuous, precisely through a radical re-articulation as an overcoming of these polarities within the context of their origination. For Husserl, the process of cooperation, unification and abstraction can only come into being through the persistent sharpening of the participation of the parts in relation in their essence. Had we thematically ascribed the process of self-encircling exclusively to only one of the available analytical themes in LI, we would then completely fail to grasp the full effects of every particular stage in LI, and would miss the opportunity to understand the significance, origins and therefore, modes of Husserl’s circular methodology.

Jay Lampert finds the strategy employed by Sokolowski in the delineation of whole-parts dynamics highly questionable. In Chapter 3 of Synthesis and Backward Reference in Husserl’s Logical Investigations, Lampert critically explores Sokolowski’s statement about the scientific objectivity of the (a priori) law-governed blending between parts. He suggests that Sokolowski never finds constructs such as staticism, containment and dictation of rules, givenness of parts, progression of supplementation, immediacy of scientific knowledge, etc., problematic, or at least he does not see them as open-ended and ‘self-transformative.’ For Lampert, the progression towards supplementation is nothing but the referring or progression ‘back’ towards “a priori categories that must

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233 Ibid, 543.
have been prior.” This is why he easily avoids traps such as privileging the moments-whole over pieces-whole relationship and openly suggests that when Husserl defines non-independence positively and “independence only negatively, this is not because independent objects do not need to have their relations to other objects accounted for, but is rather because the independence of an object is in a certain way dependent on relations of dependency, even though the non-independent object negates such relation.”

Lampert points out that both independent and non-independent parts equally participate in their essence only within the peculiarity of their mutual (whether reciprocal or one-sided) foundationalism. It is clear that the mode of this foundationalism is different between independent and non-independent parts, precisely because of the difference of the ‘journey’ they undertake on the path between their essential profile and the context of their relation. This is the reason why we cannot prioritize one type of foundationalism over another, as much as we cannot allow the possibility for the parts of the whole to be ‘externally’ or ‘internally’ combined or divided:

Husserl’s arguments for the objectivity of wholes and parts thus involve a certain rejection of wholes and parts. Wholes are objectively real just because a whole is nothing more than parts’ demands for mutual supplementation. Parts are objectively real just because the ultimate

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235 In discussing the ‘diversity of foundational relations’ Husserl proposes that the predisposition for fragmentation (as a ‘piecing’ of the whole) belongs to the parts of the parts of the whole, where the mediacy reaches a special level of significance:

“This mediacy is no longer inessential, as is that of second-level ‘pieces’ in the division of the stretch, but is an essential mediacy, to be characterized in terms of the formal nature of the relationship. Obviously similar reasons place ‘pieces’ of non-independent ‘moments’ which pertain directly to the whole, further from the whole than the ‘moments’ are: this at least is the case if the rule holds that we found valid in the field of intuition, that such ‘pieces’ can have their immediate foundation only in a ‘piece’ of the whole. The wider proposition also can be formally expressed: Abstract parts are further from the whole, are in essence mediate parts, if their need for supplement is satisfied in the sphere of a mere part.” *(LI, 41.)*

He determines parts of the parts of the whole as ‘secondary’ parts, as parts which more distant from the whole than the primary parts. A more formal description of this argument would have the following appearance: X is part of Y which is constitutive part of M, and only because it is a secondary part in this inferential 'sequencing', it is more distant from the whole than the primary part Y. In a sense, X is more distant from M because it is the more distant part, and that is its only 'justification'.

236 Ibid, 75.
indivisible parts, which compose objects are nothing more than the backward-referents of complexes which are already mediated. Hence if the term “whole” were to mean “closed unity” and part were to mean “indivisible unit”, then whole and part would at best be hypothetical targets of combination and division; but if “whole” means “system of reciprocal supplementations” and “part” means “presupposed content lying in-between borders”, then whole and part are always in the process of being objectified in the passing-over and settings-in-relief carried out in the self-propelling interpretation of individuals-in-context. 237

However, I also want to emphasize that the dynamics of the backward reference fully illuminates the banality of the staticism which is built into the formality of the separation between part and whole. Further, the dynamic of the self-transformation of whole and parts re-emphasizes the rigidity of their positions and, in this way, problematizes its own application outside above-mentioned emphasizing. Overall, what I want to suggest is that just as we have to criticize Sokolowski’s blind acceptance of the fixity of wholes and parts, so too must we be cautious about the ‘direction’ or ‘result’ implied in the dynamism of self-transformation of these categories. I suggest that Lampert’s dynamism must be seen within the context of its capacity to illuminate the staticism of the “hypothetical targets of combination and division.”

Concluding remarks

The novelty of this chapter was to “put in practice” Husserl’s reactive and circular strategy as it was employed in his reflections upon psychologism in Prolegomena. What becomes more explicit in this chapter is the connection between the way in which phenomenological practice unfolds as an independent realm of philosophical investigation and how this unfolding is reflected in the argumentative conflicts that underlie the formal-ontological understanding of the whole-part problematic. What Husserl merely describes in Prolegomena, he directly puts into practice in his Third Logical Investigation.

237 Ibid, 85.
Husserl’s circular strategy first comes clearly into play in his transformation of the notions of the movement and the fixity of the parts within the whole, as these are understood within the formal-ontological analysis of the whole – parts problematic. The formal-ontological isolation and the subsequent reconciliation of the parts in the whole are mirrored in the increase and the decrease of parts’ participation in their essences. This gives the impression that the ‘dynamics’ in the formal-ontological account of the relation of the parts in the whole is transformed into a phenomenological staticism. It seems that after the phenomenological response to the philosophies of the whole-part relation, the movement between parts tends to petrify. In other words, the relation between parts becomes a mere expression of their self-enclosure through phenomenological reduction. Conversely, the ‘dynamics’ of the phenomenological investigation, i.e., the formation of the whole through the self-intensification of the parts, is continually measured against the ‘staticism’ of formal-ontological analysis. This means that the notions of the isolation of the parts and their reconciliation, their fixity and their movement within the particular whole, not only become interchangeable or transformed, but they also lose their analytical significance. This transformation of the phenomenological method by the theme it deals with or through its employment becomes especially prominent in Husserl’s phenomenology of time consciousness, which we shall turn to in the next chapter.
Chapter 3

Husserl's Bracketing of the Philosophy of Time: The Question of Time as a Phenomenological Experience

Introduction: modification vs. simultaneity in Husserl’s encounter with his historical interlocutors

In the previous chapter I suggested that Husserl’s phenomenology of wholes and parts in the Third Logical Investigation is developed as a response to the philosophical traditions of formal ontology and psychologistic logic. The whole, for Husserl, is neither a mere mediator, nor the collection of its parts, but is established through a modification of the way in which parts participate in their own essences. This creates the impression of staticism within the formal-ontological understanding of the relation between parts, where the parts are merely added to each other, mutually permeated or subsumed under a higher categorial entity. The “decrease” in the formal-ontological “activity” between parts, which comes as a result of Husserl’s resistance to thematize the parts within the frame of their isolation and reconciliation, is measured by the “increase” in the phenomenological profiling of the parts’ participation in their essences. However, the phenomenological movement cannot be disentangled from the formal-ontological inactivity, because the former is designed only as the pointing out of the latter. Furthermore, the phenomenological self-enclosure of the parts in relation is nothing but the exaggeration of self-evidentiality in the formal-ontological definition of the relation between parts. It is not only that the tension or staticism obtained on the formal-ontological front necessitates the relief or dynamics on the level of phenomenological
analysis, but the “vertical activity” of the parts within the phenomenological analysis makes sense only if it is mirrored against the “horizontal passivity” of the part-whole relation within the frame of formal ontology. Further, the terms horizontal and vertical, activity and passivity are entirely re-articulated and transformed in Husserl’s analysis of wholes and parts. The amalgamation of shape and color, such as in the white petal of the flower, is not a simple collection of initially isolated parts. The white color ‘bends’ because its peculiar density (the lack of shading in the white color) is related to the bent shape of the petal. The color assumes a certain shape (the white petal) in the following way: the fact that the shape of the petal is complemented with the lack of shading in the white (and vice versa) defines their unity, which, in its turn, stands only as a confirmation of the inalienable distinctions of its parts. The parts are assembled into the whole not by giving up on their essential distinctions, but by insisting on them within the peculiarity of the whole to which they belong. The ‘movement’ of the contact between the parts is transformed in Husserl’s analysis into the ‘staticism’ of the self-enclosure or self-intensification of the parts, and vice versa: the self-enclosure of the parts is formally-ontologically reflected as their permeation.

In this chapter, I suggest that Husserl’s phenomenology of time unfolds as a reaction against the dominant philosophies of time, according to which the experience of time can be treated only within the categories of objectivity, subjectivity or their interlacing. In the dominant theories of time that Husserl traverses, the temporal flow is reflected in the fact that past, present and future are seen either as their (objective) sequencing or as the subjective recording of that sequencing. For Husserl, the (horizontal) progression on the level of the objective time-flow of now-points is by the necessity of its
own fluency accompanied by the (vertical) layering of the just-past moments.

Conversely, the progression obtained within the mutual leaning of retentions or just-pasts, where every new just-past also retains the previous just-pasts “pertaining to the beginning point”, points out that the objective flow of time cannot unfold as the mere collection or simultaneity of the temporal moments. Husserl’s notion of retention, or the primary memory, provides an account of the bond between the now as point in objective time and the capacity of the now to recede into being just past. For Husserl, the main problem of time concerns not merely a combination of past, present and future, but the independence of the components of time and their formation within a temporal unity. The main problem, that is to say, concerns the manner in which the independence from each other of the components of time is made possible through their mutuality in the unfolding of the unity of time, and how the unity of the components of time in the temporal flow is guaranteed through the disclosure of their independence and their asymmetry, which is preserved by this independence. Husserl suggests that the relationship between two different times cannot be one of mere simultaneity but must also be one of non-reciprocity. If we acknowledge this unity in the rift between the components of time, or the unity as the rift, we can follow Husserl’s observation that “to every time an earlier and a later time belong”. Furthermore, Husserl’s phenomenological analysis of objective time does not subsume or overpower objective time, but it unfolds only insofar as it clings on it. The passage below clarifies the importance of the constant asymmetry

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239 Ibid, 10.
240 Ibid.
between objective time and its phenomenological articulation, as it is constituted within the “a priori temporal laws”:

Naturally, I mean by this laws of the following obvious sort: that the fixed temporal order is a two-dimensional infinite series, that two different times can never be simultaneous, that their relation is a nonreciprocal one, that transitivity obtains, that to every time an earlier and a later time belong, and so on.241

In the first part of this chapter I provide a close reading of Husserl’s notion of retention and explore why Husserl does not prioritize the just past over the now, but suggests instead that their belonging to each other must be accounted for in the investigation of the experience of time. I expand upon this analysis by locating the three types of circularities developed in Husserl’s phenomenology of time. The first circularity concerns the confrontation between the objective time flow and its phenomenological articulation. I propose that the self-sufficient progression-regression on the vertical retention-protention axis (the dynamics between just now’s and will be’s) is inextricably bound to the sequencing of the nows on the horizontal axis of the objective time flow. This means that the phenomenological re-articulation of time does not unfold beyond or above the objective time flow, dismissing it, but unfolds precisely due to it, or in the face of it: the phenomenological analysis of time, I argue, emphasizes the self-sufficiency of objective time. The determinacy of objective time is, however, given a peculiar meaning as it is modified through the dynamics of the increase-decrease within the phenomenological reflection.

I locate the second type of circularity in Husserl’s discovery of the second continuity of temporal objects. Husserl does not end his analysis with the observation that objective time and its retentional modification diverge (continuity 1), but he suggests that

241 Ibid.
the seeming layering of retentions on the vertical retention-protention axis needs to be rearticulated with regard to the entirety of the temporal object (continuity 2).\textsuperscript{242}

The vantage point of the last tone in the melody – or of any tone in the melody that is being intended – suggests that the retention of the now, its just-past, is also the retention of the previous retention.\textsuperscript{243} This does not mean that these retentions are being piled up on the axis vertical to the horizontal axis of the objective time flow, but that they are being observed within the unity of the temporal object. The continuity 2 stands as Husserl’s strong resistance to conceive the relations on the line of retentional unfolding as a layering or a mere collection or fusion of retentions (which would somewhat resemble Stumpf’s, Stern’s or Brentano’s philosophies of time). Husserl’s phenomenology of time closely follows the development on the objective time flow, and it responds to it accordingly. Retentions are being contrasted with each other, revived in their peculiarity, so to speak, not just repeated in a relation to their succeeding retentions. The mutual self-encircling of retentions fully re-articulates the transitional flow between the time points on the line of the objective time flow.

The theme of transition between protentional sequences in the Bernau Manuscripts points to a third type of circularity, where the flow on the horizontal line of objective time is articulated as its fragmentation through the sequencing of protentions. Protention involves not only the capacity to protend the now point and its protentions, but also capacity for the retention of the protention. The protentions ‘transition’ from one to

\textsuperscript{242}The metaphors “vertical” line of protention and “horizontal” line of the objective time passage refer to Husserl’s 1905 inner time consciousness diagrams. The full picture can be found on page 35, Figure 1. Temporal object is the concept employed by Husserl in the reference of to co-composition of the sequencing of the now points and their retention within the e.g. completion of the melody.

\textsuperscript{243}The unfolding of the graphical divergence between the sequencing of the now tones of the objective time flow and its retention does not capture the relation between retentions on the vertical line, which is addressed by the continuity 2.
another within the peculiar sequencing of temporal phases because they both protend and retain previous protentions, as they are “recalled” in their capacity to protend. Protentions’ capacity to protend is re-emphasized through their capacity to retain previous protentions. This means that protentions, as they retain previous protentions, articulate the process of temporal transition between protentions into the process of self-enclosure of protentions apropos each other and apropos the now point. The example would be the expectation we develop just before the start of the flute concert. Once the concert starts and we are able either to fulfill or to disappoint our expectations about the performer, whose play we were frantically hoping to witness. In the case of the fulfillment of our expectations, we enthusiastically look at the immediate past, celebrating our previous expectations while our new expectations from the performer are suddenly opened up. The previous expectations fade away in the light of new ones, precisely in their difference from what we started to anticipate.

I conclude this chapter by proposing that the consciousness of internal time appears as the analytic “space” which hosts the tension between objective time and its phenomenological articulation.

Husserl suggests that duration of the object, as framed within the objective temporal flow, is phenomenologically expressed in its alteration. This means that experientially sensed “synchrony” is not “simply equivalent to objective simultaneity”, because the “sensed equality of temporal intervals, given phenomenologically, is not straightaway objective quality of temporal intervals”. The “absolute temporal datum” is not in fact the “immediately being-experienced of objective time”, but it unfolds

\[244\] Ibid, 8.
\[245\] Ibid.
only as the peculiar relationship between objective time and its phenomenological articulation. This means that the different temporal moments or points (past and present, for example) in objective time cannot be experienced in their mere fusion as reconciliation or amalgamation without recognizing their belonging in difference. The analysis of temporal experience needs to consider that any formulation of the relation between different points in one temporal flow cannot disregard the tension that endures between these components. Even if we call the relation between temporal components mediation, we still have to acknowledge that temporal duration implies the modification of the temporal components within the temporal context to which they belong. Further, this modification does not rule out the specificity of any moment in time, but it makes this specificity visible only within the relation between these moments. For example, when we observe the object, we notice changes in its content over time. We accidentally drop the pen on the floor, and we suddenly turn our attention away from the coffee cup on the table in order to pick up the pen. However, when we turn back to the cup, we see that that the ‘same cup’ is still on the table. Although we experience the same object, we experience two different temporal contents of that object. Husserl uses this complementarity between the unity of the object and the temporal separation of its content to point out that the persistence of the object in time “is precisely not constituted in the ‘primary’ contents but in the apprehension characters and in the laws belonging to the essence of these characters”.

The temporal content of the object not only unfolds within the objective time-flow, but it is also constituted as the development of the apprehension characters, which both complete and complement the objective time-flow. The phenomenology of time is focused on the fact that “data in ‘objective time’ are

\[\textit{Ibid.}\]
meant in these experiences” of objective time. Not only are the components of objective time experientially defined by their phenomenological modification, but the phenomenology of time is possible only insofar as it is a modification of objective time.

In “The Lectures on the Consciousness of Internal Time from the Year 1905”, Husserl critically addresses the traditional philosophies of time, most notably those of Aristotle, Augustine and Locke. However, Husserl importantly challenges Brentano’s account of phantasy, or original association. For Aristotle time is the measure of movement “in respect of the before and after, and is continuous since it is an attribute of what is continuous.” Aristotle observes that “that which is in time necessarily involves that there is a time when it is”, meaning that time measures movement of things. The now is not only the limit point between past and future, a dividing point of time, but it is also “the termination of both parts, and their unity”. Although the dividing and the uniting are different in essence they remain, through the frame of time, “the same thing and in the same reference.” He suggests that everything that moves is in time for the “distinction of faster and slower exists in reference to all change”. Just as motion is constancy of succession, so too is time. The constancy of time is made possible by the now, whose substratum is constantly the same, because it “determines time in so far as time involves before and after.” Although time involves division and unity, it manifests itself as the constancy of change, and its relation to what it measures remains fixed. What is counted by time is defined by it, because time is that which counts.

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247 Ibid. Emphasis in bold is mine.
249 Ibid, 374.
250 Ibid, 375.
251 Ibid.
252 Ibid, 377.
253 Ibid, 371.
Augustine, on the other hand, emphasizes the subjective aspect of the experience of time. He follows Aristotle’s insight that time measures the motion of the body. However, it is the subject, the I, that measures motion, for “I do not see when its movement begins, and if its movement continues after I have ceased to watch, so that I do not see when it ends, I am not able to measure it, except perhaps from the time when I began to watch until the time when I cease watching.”\textsuperscript{254} Augustine opens up the question of time as an eminently subjective experience by famously pointing out the discrepancy between the fixity of the now vis à vis past and future. He depicts the tension built into the unity of the present, past and future by suggesting that past and future simply cannot be, since the “past no longer is and the future is not yet.”\textsuperscript{255} Furthermore, if the present was permanent, then it would never turn into past, and it would be considered an eternity. However, if present constantly turns into past, then we cannot describe it as something that is: “how can we say that even the present \textit{is}, when the reason why it \textit{is} is that that it is not to be? In other words, we cannot rightly say that time \textit{is}, except by reason of its impending state of \textit{not being}.”\textsuperscript{256} The burning question is: what is being measured then, if the components of time cannot be isolated on their own and fixed as such? We cannot measure time if it is not yet, if it has passed or if it has no duration, but we do still have the capacity to measure it. Augustine’s ecstatic answer is that only the mind is able to witness the unity of time in its disarticulation, because the impressions imprinted on mind can be measured even though the entity that has left the impression has moved to the past. The “riddle of time” is therefore resolved by mind’s or consciousness’ ability to measure it.

\textsuperscript{255} Ibid, 264.
\textsuperscript{256} Ibid. These words are italicized in Augustine’s text.
For Locke and the empiricists, consciousness as the collection of its impressions, ideas, and the seeming obviousness of the application of the former to the latter, remain the crucial factors in understanding the problem of time. Time, in fact, is a paradigmatic illustration of Locke’s understanding of consciousness as a stream, a collector and a processor of its content. That consciousness as such is a stream is experientially obvious because consciousness is unable to stay fixed only on one idea for a long time, without noticing the change in ideas and the “shift in their succession”.\textsuperscript{257} Locke calls upon the seeming obviousness of the experience of the train of ideas and the ability of consciousness to reiterate this obviousness through reflection upon the succession of ideas. The reflection of consciousness on the “appearances of several ideas one after another in our minds”\textsuperscript{258} Locke calls succession, whereas the distance between any parts of that succession or “between the appearance of any two ideas in our mind, is what we call duration”.\textsuperscript{259} The consideration and measuring of duration as composed of different periods is what Locke calls time. Just as consciousness appears as a fixed category in its treatment of the collection and succession of ideas, so too does it confirm its certainty in its ability to locate the “least portion”\textsuperscript{260} of either duration or extension:

Though on both sides, both in addition and division, either of space or duration, when the idea under consideration becomes very big, or very small, its precise bulk becomes very obscure and confused; \textit{and it is the number of its repeated additions, or divisions, that alone remains clear and distinct, as will easily appear to anyone}, who will let his thoughts loose in the vast expansion of space, or divisibility of matter. Every part of duration is duration too; and every part of extension is extension, both of them capable of addition or division \textit{in infinitum}. But the least portion of either of them, \textit{whereof we have clear and distinct ideas}, may perhaps be fittest to be considered by us, as the simple ideas of that kind, out of which our complex modes of space, extension, and duration, are made up, and \textit{into which they can again be distinctly resolved}.\textsuperscript{261}

\textsuperscript{258} Ibid, 79.
\textsuperscript{259} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{260} Ibid, 84.
\textsuperscript{261} Ibid, pp. 83-84. Emphasis in bold is mine.
It is important to mention that the capacity of consciousness to add, subtract, combine and divide its content is confirmed through its experiential obviousness. Similarly, it is experientially obvious that we have to have a clear and distinct idea of the smallest unit of division, the tiniest portion of the collection of ideas, that is, as much and as long as we are capable of having ideas to begin with. However, the seeming experiential contingency has the purpose of strengthening and confirming the purity of consciousness, where the tension between collection and parts, duration and rest, ideas and the reflection upon them, is easily resolved through the predestination of the above terms in relation to the stream of consciousness. Thus, consciousness is a mere naming of the experiential self-evidentiality of succession, division and unification of the train of ideas. However, the latter are the obvious testament to the power of the former.

Husserl’s phenomenology of time makes explicit the relation which implicitly underlies above-mentioned philosophies of time: whether time is understood as inextricably bound to the stream of consciousness or as an objective count of changes in motion, both of these positions necessitate each other precisely through their self-affirmation and apparent mutual exclusion. Furthermore, most importantly, both of these positions seem to be eminently self-referential at the core of their arguments. Husserl’s phenomenology of time tends to relate ‘objectivist’ and ‘subjectivist’ accounts of time by transforming their confrontational position toward each other. Furthermore, this transformation is made possible precisely through Husserl’s insistence that both of the above-mentioned accounts of time are distinct through their connection, and are not related after their initial isolation.
Brentano, to whom Husserl owes his own formulation of the phenomenology of time, challenges the empiricist and the psychologistic view according to which reflection upon sensation secures the temporal flow. According to Husserl, Brentano maintains that the cessation of an individual tone in a melody does not imply its disappearance.\textsuperscript{262} The tones are not merely combined in the whole of their simultaneity, which would imply that the succession of tones would consist in a mere sequencing of the tones and empty intervals between them. Brentano importantly discovers that each representation of a tone “belonging to this series reproduces the content of the one preceding, but in such a way that it always affixes the moment of the past to the new representation”.\textsuperscript{263} Husserl suggests that Brentano importantly takes into account that the temporal continuity of presentations is “fastened by nature to every given representation.”\textsuperscript{264} This means that the non-reciprocity between the points in time is not absorbed into the reconciliatory combination of the temporal flow, but that the temporal unity\textsuperscript{265} is, in fact, made possible by reassertion of the point of time within the context of its mutuality with another point. The endurance of the sensation caused by the external stimulus is not the same as the sensation of that duration. Brentano successfully rules out empiricist reduction to the basic component of the temporal sensation and the reflection upon it by considering the modification of the sensations in the representation of their succession. The earlier sensation of a tone that has been sounded is not somehow preserved in its endurance without being articulated within the peculiarity of its relationship with the tone that is

\textsuperscript{262} Brentano’s writing on time are mostly available via lecture notes of his students. Nicolas De Warren provides a good historical account of this problem in \textit{Husserl and the Promise of Time: Subjectivity in Transcendental Phenomenology}.


\textsuperscript{264} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{265} Ibid, 12.
sounding now. If the tone that has sounded were merely preserved ‘just as it has been’, while the new tones are arriving, “we would have a simultaneous sum of tones in our representation but not a succession of tones”\(^\text{266}\). Temporal unity is not characterized by the endurance of a tone and its combination with other tones, but by the modification of that tone in an original association, which Brentano characterizes as phantasy. Original association as phantasy is a transposition of points in time, where expectation is the representation of the future “out of the past.”\(^\text{267}\) The temporal determinations do not determine but essentially alter the temporal object, which is why the past and the future are described as irreal. However, the present, or “now”, is the only real component of time, which still does not determine. For example, the application of the now moment does not in any way contribute to the definition of the object to which it is applied. Husserl observes that the supervening of temporal determination, where the reality of the now is turned into the irreality of past and future, unfolds in the following way:

For it is altogether evident and obvious that everything that is, in consequence of the fact that it is, will have been; and that, from the perspective of the future, everything that is, in consequence of the fact that it is, is something that has been.

Nicolas de Warren observes that one of the lasting impacts of Brentano’s analysis of time is that the object in the past (or the secondary object) is sensed as earlier than the sensation in the now, thereby producing the consciousness of duration, even though it does not exist as a real sensation or the primary object.\(^\text{269}\) The original association or phantasy facilitates that the object in the past does not simply cease to exist (so it can later be simply added to or combined with the now moment), but it is constituted as the

\(^{266}\) Ibid, 13.
\(^{267}\) Ibid.
\(^{268}\) Ibid, 14.
object once sensed as present. This rearticulation of the empiricist notion of the time flow is defined as the modification or the alteration of the temporal object and it is described by de Warren in the following manner:

Along with the actual content of presentation, earlier sensed content (e.g., earlier notes in a melody) are still contained within the grasp of consciousness, albeit in a modified manner. A note as just-past is retained in a modified manner since it is no longer actually given, whereas the note actually heard as now is given in an unmodified manner. This modified content of what has just been perceived attaches itself by way of an original association (or proteraesthesia) to the perception (aesthesis) of the actual content in the now, and thereby produces, or adds, the dimension of the past (Vergangenheit) to the experienced dimension of the present.270

Brentano’s account of mutuality through modification in the real and the irreal temporal determinations directly confronts the notion of simultaneity which had been haunting empiricist philosophies of time. Temporal experience is constituted not as an avoidance but as a recognition of the compositional asymmetry between the components of time. Husserl, however, still perceives Brentano’s philosophy of time as psychologistic, because Brentano does not provide a sufficient exposition of the difference between phantasy as perception and phantasy as a temporal experience, or to word it differently, between phantasy and the perception of time. If we follow Brentano and accept that phantasy addresses the mutuality-in-difference or the belonging-in-drifting-apart between the past, the future (both being irreal) and the present (which is real), then we can also follow Husserl and ask a legitimate question about the difference between a phantasy of the present and a phantasy “in which we are conscious of something temporal that belongs to the more remote past”.271 Husserl believes that Brentano encounters difficulties because he does not differentiate between presentations

270 Ibid, 82.
(e.g. of time and sensuous contents)\textsuperscript{272} “apart from their primary contents”, \textsuperscript{273} and he suggests the following:

Following Brentano’s doctrine that representing as such admits of no differentiations, that there is no difference, apart from their primary contents, between representations as representations, the only possibility remaining is that phantasms and more phantasms, qualitatively the same in content although diminishing in fullness and intensity, continuously attach themselves to the primary contents of the perception. \textit{Parallel to this process, phantasy adds a new moment, the temporal}. These explanation are unsatisfactory in various respects. We find temporal succession and duration, not only in the primary contents but also in the apprehended objects and the apprehending act. An analysis of time restricted to one stratum is not sufficient; it must rather follow all the strata of constitution.\textsuperscript{274}

Husserl’s major criticism is that phantasy in Brentano, as the defining term of temporal experience, follows the notion of presentational foundationalism, according to which the term mental phenomenon refers to both presentations and the phenomena based upon presentations.\textsuperscript{275} Mental phenomena have the characteristic of intentional in-existence, with intentionality described as a relation between the act and the content of consciousness. Husserl finds this description of the intentional act in Brentano far too psychologistic, because Brentano’s intentional relation between the act and the object of consciousness still bears strong resemblance to the Lockean notion of consciousness as collector and processor of its content. Husserl challenges Brentano’s notion of

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{272} Brentano famously ascribes to mental phenomena the exclusive character of “intentional in-existence”\cite{Brentano(1995)}.
  \item \textsuperscript{273} In the following quotation, he explicates the definition of the ultimate presentational foundedness:
  \begin{quote}
  “For this purpose we make use of a definition we used earlier when we said that the term 'mental phenomena' applies to presentation as well as to all the phenomena which are based upon presentations. It is hardly necessary to mention again that by 'presentation' we do not mean that which is presented, but rather the presenting of it. This act of presentation forms the foundation not merely of the act of judging, but also of desiring and of every mental act” (Ibid, 80).
  \end{quote}
  Brentano avoids the empiricist distinction mental – physical by differentiating between act and object of the consciousness in the mental phenomena. Mental phenomena are able to participate in the inner sphere, where every act of thinking, desiring and feeling is awarded by its corresponding presentation (ibid, 87).
  \item \textsuperscript{275} Ibid, 18. Emphasis in bold is mine.
\end{itemize}
intentionality for the first time in the Fifth Logical Investigation, where he defines
intentional essence as a process of the relation between the act-matter and the act-quality.
Intentional essence is Husserl’s way out of the empiricist polarity: act of consciousness
vs its objects, because it avoids conceptually isolating and juxtaposing the “activity” of
consciousness and the “passivity” of its addressee. Husserl observes the following:

A wholly new determination of some other sort must be added to the fully differentiated
intention. The meaning of each presentation will then consist of Presentative Intention
compounded with Content, two generically different ideal unities woven together in unity.
Returning to our old terms we must say: If we hold it obvious, as we did above, that intentions of
all sorts must be differentiated in like manner, we must again opt for an essential distinction
between act-quality and act-matter. We cannot maintain the view that what we called 'matter' is
identical with the intentional essence of an underlying presentation, and that this in its turn is
identical with mere quality of presentation . . . That a presentation refers to a certain object in
a certain manner, is not due to its acting on some external, independent object, 'directing'
itself to it in some literal sense, or doing something to it or with it, as a hand writes with a
pen. It is due to nothing that stays outside of the presentation but to its own inner peculiarity alone. This last holds on any view but, on the present view, given presentation
presents this object in this manner in view of its peculiarly differentiated presentational
quality.276

Husserl does not offer some new, more sophisticated way to reinstate the dualism
intention-content, but he suggests a further clarification of what content and intention
stand for, and how they stand. The separation and the conflation of intending act and
intended object are surmounted through the peculiarity of the manner in which object’s
presentational quality is specified.277 Therefore, the worst possible conclusion might be to

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276 Husserl, LII vol 2, pp. 132-133. Emphasis in bold is mine.
277 Guided by this kind of reflection on intentional essence, Husserl opposes the psychologicist calling
upon the self-evidentiality of evidence or a priori insights. This psychologicist self-assuredness, precisely
because of its steadfast conviction in its ability to leave the empiricism-rationalism aside, is never in a
position to leave “the ground of internal experience (Erfahrung) and psychology”(LI, vol. 2, 136). For
Husserl, it is of utmost importance for one to make a “phenomenological inspection” (ibid.) of intentional
essence instead of insisting on the self-evidentiality of ‘inner essence’. Husserl makes the following remark:
“Phenomenological intuition, however, as often stressed, fundamentally excludes all psychological
apperception and real (reale) assertion of existence, all positing of psycho-physical nature with its actual
things, bodies and persons, including one's own empirical ego, as well as all that transcends pure
consciousness. This exclusion is achieved eo ipso, since the phenomenological inspection of essence, in its
turning of immanent ideation upon our inner intuitions, only turns its ideating gaze on what is proper to
the real (reellen) or intentional being of the experiences inspected, and only brings to an adequate focus the
grasp the parts and the modes of the unity (whether presentations or presentations of presentations) in a manner in which the former are just purely added to the latter. If the former were the case, then we would have the pure sequencing of parts, which would end up in the self-evidentiality of their collection. Husserl suggests that, to the contrary, only a special type of “transitional experience mediates or rather connects two distinct members.”

These members are “in this fulfilling unit of response (which has the phenomenological character of a moment of union) the two acts [which] are not merely successive but mutually related in the most intimate unity.” This is the reason why judgment cannot just be “intrinsically an acceptance” of the result of succession of a “previously given mere presentation[s]: it is accepting assertive only in a context of fulfillment.”

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specific mode of experience, which such individual experiences exemplify, and the a priori ideal laws which relate to them. It is of the greatest importance to be quite clear on this matter”(Ibid, 136).

278 L1 vol. 2, 141.

279 Ibid. Husserl also writes the following: “Supervenient assent is not an act-quality supervening upon a prior act of mere presentation: what analysis really discovers is first mere presentation (which here includes the interrelated acts of mere entertainment, putting the question and consideration) passing over by way of fulfillment into a judgment of like material”. (ibid, 142), emphasis in bold is mine).

280 Ibid. Husserl’s observation has as its target Brentano’s understanding of judgment. Although Brentano opens up the discussion of the intentionality process by suggesting that the “fusion as a unification of several things . . . still points to a certain duality in the unity” [Franz Brentano, Psychology From an Empirical Standpoint, trans. Antos C. Rancurello , D.B. Terrell and Linda McAlister (London, New York: Routledge, 1995), 89], he, at least terminologically, remains close the empiricism by proposing that the “inner perception” in addition to having a special object, has “its immediate, infallible self-evidence”(ibid, 88-89). Brentano wants to avoid the empiricist conflation between consciousness as an activity and the passivity of its object (or even between the impression and the application of the ideas on them), by suggesting that the mental phenomena, in a difference to physical phenomena, include the objects in themselves, but not in the same way. This is why in presentation “something is presented, in judgment something is affirmed or denied, in love loved, in hate hated, in desire desired and so on”(ibid.), and why, in the long run, physical phenomena are not capable of exhibiting anything similar. In a word, only “mental phenomena contain an object intentionally within themselves”(ibid 89). For Brentano both presentation and judgment are defined by this relationship of intentionality, and the only difference is that judgments are founded on the presentations. Brentano differentiates the primary (presentation as such) and secondary object of the mental act (presentation of that presentation, its cognition and feeling toward it). Brentano to defines judgment as a peculiar containment of presentation in the following manner:

“This object is present in consciousness in a twofold way, first as an object of presentation, then as an object held to be true or denied, just as when someone desires an object, the object is immanent both as presented and as desired at the same time . . . If a certain kind of union or relationship between two properties were thought, this thought would be a judgment, while very thought which had no such
Husserl extends his criticism of the presentational foundationalism in phantasy by observing that Brentano merely replaces one type of the presentation structure with another – in this case phantasy with the perception of time – thereby failing to provide an account where the asymmetry between the past and present is fully addressed. De Warren suggests that Brentano’s separation between memory and present cannot preserve the “transcendence of the past vis-à-vis the present”, because “memory already presupposes (as Brentano’s analysis makes apparent) the original temporality of the unity of (immediate) past and present.” The reason for this is that the unity of the one stream of consciousness identifies the relationship between consciousness and the primary as well as between consciousness and the secondary object of time with the immediate past and present. This implies the simultaneity of both objects in the same act of consciousness, which is ruled out by Husserl. According to Husserl the asymmetry between just past and present is what defines the time consciousness of the temporal object, not vice-versa. If we closely follow what Brentano introduces here, it appears that consciousness is the collector of different temporal objects. This means that, according to Brentano, retention can be analytically addressed through “irreality” of the past and future as phantasms, but this does not leave us with any alternative vis a vis non-simultaneous “reality” of the present. As de Warren points out, Brentano leaves open the cognitive problem of the perception of time according to which the perception of

relationship as its content would have to be called mere presentation.” (ibid, pp. 201-205). Husserl asks if a mere presentation is a simple constituent of judgment where judgment is simply “superadded” (LI, vol. 2, 140) to the former, thereby supervening the mere presentation as such. For Husserl, it is questionable indeed whether this new act (of judgment) “really contains the old act whole and entire in itself”, and whether it “simply grows out of the old one through the association of the note of belief”(ibid)”(pp. 10-12).


282 Ibid, 89.
succession depends both on a momentary act of consciousness, and on “the persistence of retaining of past content in the present, in the form of phantasms”. 283

**On the invention of retention in Husserl**

Husserl is explicit that Brentano’s philosophy, built on the notion of phantasy, is based on the assumption that the act of knowing “embraces its objects timelessly”. 284 This means that any thematizing of temporal passage, distance, asymmetry between now, just-past, past and future rests on the fixity of the indivisible time point, which, according to Husserl, is based on Brentano’s notion of foundational representationalism. The parts of the temporal experience form the unity of this experience only if they “come together in the unity of the momentary intuition.” 285 The term “momentary intuition” resembles the empiricist position that the description of the sequencing of the tones in a melody cannot explain the timeless reflection upon them. If we draw an analogy to the Lockean account of time, we realize that the timeless reflection, in this instance, remains a separate entity that overarches its components in a manner of the instantaneous mental sensation of the endurance of time. Although Husserl introduces his phenomenological analysis of inner time consciousness by decisively stating that the sensation sensed as enduring is fundamentally different from the enduring of sensation, he explicitly challenges those “who wish to trace the representation of duration and succession back to the fact of the duration and succession of psychic acts”. 286 Brentano, according to

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283 Ibid, 91.
285 Ibid.
286 Ibid, 12.
Husserl, repeats the empiricist mistake by merely imposing the temporal moment “on the other elements of content” such as intensity, quality, etc. Even though the past and the future, as “irreal”, endure temporal modifications, it appears that the present moment (as something real), which becomes just present or just now, is simply “continuously held in consciousness” as past. However, if the past moment endures as past, it is merely added to the present within the context of the presentational foundation of phantasy. The past within the framework of originary consciousness is not given in its relation to present as that which has just past, but it is simply defined as the past present which is preserved in the unity of the momentary intuition of time. Although the original association recognizes the important distinction between now and just now, it seems that the recognition of this difference is overshadowed by the capacity of phantasy to simply add the new moment to the now, or the just-past. The relation between now and just-past is accounted for only insofar as it describes the power of phantasy to provide the founding-founded distinction in its difference from the other types or representations. The descriptive exposition of the unique character of phantasy vis a vis other representations re-emphasizes that all mental phenomena are based on representations. Husserl suggests that phantasy simply adds the just past moment to the now point, thereby echoing the foundational relation of the act of consciousness to the object of consciousness, the relation that can be found in the definition of other types of representations. However, phantasy does not fulfill what it promises, namely to provide an understanding of the constitutive asymmetry between past and present. Husserl suggests that the past, as present, which fades away or shades off, in Brentano’s definition of phantasy, “must at

287 Ibid, 18.
the same time be present.”\textsuperscript{288} The past, defined as the shaded off present, is added to the present moment in the momentary intuition of time. Husserl writes the following: Nonetheless, if a content that is perfectly like \( A \) is constantly in consciousness, even with a new moment, then \( A \) is precisely not past but enduring. Consequently it is present now and present constantly, and present together with the new moment "past"-past and present at once. - But how in that case do we know that an \( A \) existed earlier, that it already existed before the existence of the present \( A \)? Where do we get the idea of the past? The being-present of an \( A \) in consciousness through the annexation of a new moment, even if we call that new moment the moment of the past, is incapable of explaining the transcending consciousness: \( A \) is past. \textbf{It is not able to furnish the slightest representation of the fact that what I now have in consciousness as \( A \) with its new character is identical with something that is not in consciousness now but that did exist.} - What, then, are the moments of original association that are now being experienced?\textsuperscript{289}

The transcending consciousness thematizes the mutuality between the present and the just past, where the former is related to latter not by losing what makes it different from, and, in fact, even directly opposite to the latter. The past cannot be subsumed under or absorbed by the present with the help of a mediator, even if this mediator is named as phantasy. Husserl suggests that Brentano’s analysis, although a pioneering attempt at the differentiation between the primary contents and the act characters of consciousness, necessitates that the past \( A \), which endures through the time consciousness, exists simultaneously with the present moment. The past and the present moments “are there now, enclosed with the same consciousness of object”.\textsuperscript{290} Alternatively, we can define the temporal moments as signs; however that would lead only to a new terminological adventure, in which the complexity of the asymmetry between past and present would not have been addressed. According to Husserl, it is not that the past and the present are registered within the unity of time consciousness, because they are irreconcilably different; to the contrary, precisely because now and just now are irreparably different.

\textsuperscript{288} Ibid, 18.
\textsuperscript{289} Ibid, 19.
\textsuperscript{290} Ibid.
within the peculiar context of the time passage, the unity of time consciousness is capable of expressing the peculiar temporal passage in question. This insight becomes important in Husserl’s rejection of Stern’s *Psychische Präsenzzeit*, according to which successive tones yield a melody “because the succession of psychic events is united ‘at once’ into a total formation.” Stern importantly challenges the (empiricist) assumption that reflective comparison between now and just past occurs because these moments exist side by side. However, he concludes that the “whole content of consciousness unrolling in the presence-time becomes the foundation equally for the resulting apprehensions of equality and difference.” Husserl explicitly inverts this insight and suggests that the “resulting apprehensions of equality and difference” are the only possible foundation for time consciousness. Stern’s notion of unification, in fact, leaves unaddressed the tension between objective time and its shading off through retention. It is precisely this tension that yields the possibility for their union, because of the unbridgeable difference between the former and the latter.

Husserl’s criticism of Stern’s theory has the same motivation and components as his criticism of Brentano. Husserl’s position is not rooted in a mere rejection of Brentano’s philosophy of time, but in a careful accentuation of the similarities in and the differences between his phenomenology of time and Brentano’s account of time. As mentioned above, Husserl clearly recognizes Brentano’s contribution to his philosophy of time, but still insists that Brentano does not expand upon the important insight into the asymmetry between the now and the just now:

The attempt to treat what is past as something nonreal and nonexistent is also highly questionable. A supervening psychic moment cannot create irreality nor can it dismiss present

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291 Ibid, 22.
292 Ibid, 23.
existence. In fact, the whole domain of original association is a present and real experience. To this domain belongs the entire series of original temporal moments produced by original association, together with the rest of the moments belonging to the temporal object. We therefore see that an analysis of time-consciousness is useless that seeks to make the intuitive extent of time intelligible merely by means of new moments shaded off continuously, which are somehow patched or fused onto the moments of content that constitute the object localized in time. Briefly stated: The temporal form is neither a temporal content itself nor a complex of new contents that somehow attach themselves to the temporal.\textsuperscript{293}

This criticism is crucial for the formation of Husserl’s own account of time consciousness, because it suggests that the phenomenology of time cannot start as a mere rejection of objective time. Husserl stipulates that the phenomenological analysis of time does not come before or above the objective account of time, but is enacted only through its continual hanging on to the obviousness of the latter. Husserl remarks, while criticizing Stern, that objective time is not only inextricable from its retentions into the past, but the latter also points back to the former: “Since objective temporality always becomes constituted phenomenologically and stands before us in appearance as an objectivity or as a moment of an objectivity only through this constitution, a phenomenological analysis of time cannot clarify the constitution of time without considering the constitution of temporal objects”.\textsuperscript{294}

The constitution of the temporal object implies that the temporal object is not defined as the unity of the object in time, where an enduring tone in a melody is simply isolated and made into an object of observation. To the contrary, the temporal object becomes a legitimate subject of analysis only if the tone is considered in its duration. The melody is construed neither through the mutual exclusion of tones (if the sounding of one tone simply replaces another, then the different tones would sound at different times) nor

\textsuperscript{293} Ibid, pp. 19-20.
\textsuperscript{294} Ibid, 24.
through their simultaneity (where the tones are collected under the mediation of the representational capacity, e.g. phantasy). The unfolding of the melody, for Husserl, in an important way combines and transcends both of the above-mentioned aspects: the tones enter the relation of simultaneity, precisely because of the lack of the capability to enter that relationship. This means that the tone is given as now, as long as it keeps receding into the past, or as Husserl puts it: “I am conscious of it [the tone] as now, ‘as long as’ any of its phases is intended as now”.\textsuperscript{295} The intending of the now implies, conversely, that this intending is complemented with the continuity of the immediately past phases which “accumulate” as fading-away nows as they stand in a relation to the now. When the final point in the melody, as a whole, is reached, this last tone as the now point is “accompanied”, or rather burdened, so to speak, by the elapsed duration of the whole melody.

We can, of course, object to Husserl’s observation and suggest that his analysis still replicates the positions of the authors he was criticizing. Most explicitly, it seems that Husserl still operates with notions such as “intending of the nows”, “flow of consciousness” and “objective time” as they are found independently of each other and described in their subsequent contact. Objective time seems to be something that is simply presupposed, and as such, available for articulation by the stream of consciousness or its specifically intended acts. It is true that Husserl emphasizes the conceptual asymmetry between the now and the just past that was not explicit or even visible in the works of his predecessors. However, even though we witness that the tension between the objective time flow and its retention is captured in a detailed and persistent manner, we can still suggest that the notion of “intending the now” resembles

\textsuperscript{295} Ibid, 26.
much of Stern’s “total formation” or Brentano’s presentational foundationalism, expressed through the notion of phantasy. However, if we follow Husserl’s phenomenological description we do not only witness that the one instance is not simply reconciled, unified with or subsumed under another, but that both notions the now and the just-now, are defined, in themselves, through a relation of asymmetry to each other.

Husserl importantly suggests that to thematize the givenness of the tone does not mean to reject its objectivity, but to point out the manner in which this objectivity is given. Husserl suggests that the phenomenological investigation of objective time presupposes the same duration (although it does not describe it) that is found in objective time, with the difference that the phenomenologically articulated duration is “present duration actually building itself up and then is past, ‘elapsed’ duration, duration that is still intended or that is produced in recollection ‘as if’ it were new”.296 The usage of the quotation marks around the words “as if” and “as long as” in the above quotations indicates that Husserl brackets, but does not reject, the analyses inherent to the description of objective time. Husserl, importantly, distances himself from the concepts of the prevailing philosophies of time, while he preserves them in order to disclose their inability to address the difference in the unity between now and just past. Husserl’s distancing in this case exemplifies the strategy of bracketing, or reduction, where reducer and what is being reduced are not necessarily in a relation of confrontation or prioritizing. This is also the reason why the “throughout” is bracketed in the observation that “‘throughout’ this whole flow of consciousness one and the same tone is intended.”297 The throughoutness here is the sequence of the clinging of the retention to the now,

296 Ibid.
297 Ibid.
which is presupposed by the retention, where the present tone “endures” only if it is articulated through its retention. This “tension” between now and just now which underscores the “relief” of the temporal flow, becomes the secondary past, or memory, once the tone, at the end of melody, literally starts to stand before the observer as something passed or dead, to use Husserl’s reference. The experience of the whole melody is measured by the different stages at which now “stands” opposite to just now. These stages are characterized as modifications and identified with the modification of the whole melody:

The modification of the whole extent, then, is analogous to or essentially identical with the modification that the elapsed part of the duration undergoes in the transition of consciousness to ever new productions during the time that the tone is actually present.

The unfolding of the unity of the melody – in stark opposition to Stern’s total formation that unifies the succession of psychic events all at once – is a series of different tensions between the self-evidentiality of every new now and its recession into the immediate past. Thus, Husserl does not simply assume that consciousness hosts the now moment, but that the intending of now happens as long as now is recognized in contradistinction to its retentions. Conversely, the retentions are not simply added to or subsumed under the now points. To the contrary, their formation, as the present duration that is “building itself up and then is past”, is persistently mirrored against the self-evidentiality of the now point. This is why Husserl cautiously brackets the possibility that the immediate pasts coexist with nows “as if” they were merely re-animated former nows.

This discussion recalls our reflections from the first chapter, where we suggest

\[Ibid.\]

\[Ibid.\]
that the purity of the ideal science of logic is “secured” through its continual disclosure that psychologistic inner evidentiality is a testimony to the tautological circle of its self-justification. The self-evidentiality of the fact that mental acts accompany logical processes is rooted in its own seeming obviousness. The purity of the ideal science of logic is not based on the mere rejection of the psychologistic notion of inner evidence, but on the exaggeration of the fact that its justification ends in tautology. Similarly, the phenomenological analysis of inner time consciousness unfolds as the recognition of the sequencing of the components of objective time (e.g. the tones in melody) which are, in the obviousness of their progression, always accompanied by the phenomenological discovery that the now point is retained as just past. Husserl, therefore, emphasizes in his criticism of Brentano that the reality of the present cannot be simply replaced or re-articulated through its mere gluing to the irreality of phantasy. This gluing needs to happen as the recognition that reality does not have any significance without irreality, by which it cannot be simply measured or indexed.

We observe the moment of joy when we see a dear person after many months or years. The feeling of excitement is so intense that we usually tell ourselves that we never want this feeling to stop. The excitement caused by the immediate acquisition of the now-moment is inextricably connected to the moment when the now turns into just-past. We say to ourselves we never want this feeling to cease to exist because we experience that the incredible moment of joy has receded into an immediate past. The joyful now becomes the anxious moment, because the just now became determinate and irreversible just-past precisely in its joyfulness. Furthermore, what is gained in this experience is the tendency for the preservation of something dear and pleasant that is gone, and that
“pokes” us through the futility of our attempt to recreate it. The determinacy of the joyful moment that became just past intensifies our desire to affix this moment to the now, to keep it present or alive, so to say. However, our inability to get over the pleasant now that irrevocably became unpleasant just past serves as a testimony to the fact that now and just past are inextricably related in the peculiarity of this specific temporal experience.

Conversely, when we become aware of, and therefore intend, a moment of sudden pain inflicted on our body – e.g. when we burn our hand by exposing it too close to a source of heat – we immediately realize that this moment, although enduring in its painful excitation, is, in fact, just past. The sharpness of pain, in its opposition to the experience of joy that succeeds it, invites or rather intensifies our understanding that the pain is just past (and, therefore, everything will be fine). The tranquility of the alleviated pain of the now moment announces that the unbearable pain irrevocably became just past, and is defined by its just-past-ness. The intensity of the pain, not despite but because of its seeming endlessness, becomes prominent by being (just-now) pleasantly determined as a just past that leans on the now moment.

We observe that, although inversely proportional, both pleasant and painful experiences depict the Husserlian meaning of modification in its opposition to the simultaneity of past and just now. Just as the “objective flow of time” unfolds through the continuity of its retentional registration, so too does retentional development continually point back, precisely in the obviousness of its progression, to the self-evidentiality of objective time. When Husserl says that the now moment is intended as now, he means that the process of intending the now points is construed to make clear that every new now is contrasted with the receding of the previous nows, which accompany, as intended
retentions, this particular now moment. The further we move from the now, which is, we have to be reminded, always presupposed, but not described, by phenomenological analysis, the greater is “the fusion and compression that manifests itself.”\textsuperscript{300} The temporal object literally contracts\textsuperscript{301} itself in the compressed retentions, as the phenomenological articulation accompanies the flow of objective time. The unity of the temporal object is obvious only through the continuity of the confrontation as a co-composition between now and just-past, where even though we observe the “multiplicity” of the appearing modes of object, the modes of its running off into retentions, we are sure that we are talking about one and the same object of temporal experience to which the retentions point back. Furthermore, the sameness of the object, as the unity of its appearances, becomes possible because of “the persistency” of the retentional accumulation to “point back” at what it recedes from. Husserl importantly observes:

Every temporal being "appears" in some running-off mode that changes continuously, and in this change the "object in its mode of running off" is always and ever a different object. And yet we continue to say that the object and each point of its time and this time itself are one and the same. We will not be able to term this appearance - the “object in its mode of running off” - "consciousness" (any more than we will give the name "consciousness" to the spatial phenomenon, the body in its way of appearing from this side or that, from near or far). The "consciousness," the "experience," is related to its object by means of an appearance in which precisely the "object in its way of appearing" ["Objekt im Wie"] stands before us. Obviously we must recognize our references to intentionality as ambiguous, depending on whether we have in view the relation of the appearance to what appears or the relation of consciousness, on the one hand, to "what appears in its way of appearing" and, on the other hand, to what appears simpliciter.\textsuperscript{302}

It is interesting that the capacity of an object to “stand before us”, its seeming capacity to erect itself, points, in fact, to an increase in the contraction of its

\textsuperscript{300} Ibid, 28.
\textsuperscript{301} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{302} Ibid.
accompanying modes of appearing. The text directly suggests that object firmly stands in the way of its appearing, that it confronts the ever-increasing advance of its appearances. The object, one might say, literally stands in the way of the increasing appearances, and the unity of its temporal experience is formed as a recognition of this “confrontation”.

We can follow Husserl in his tendency to bracket expressions such as “as long as” or “throughout,” and suggest that the expression “yet” in the second sentence of the quotation above is used only as a metaphor which illustrates the identity in difference between the temporal unity of the object and its “fragmentation” through the sets of continuous confrontations between nows and just pasts. The various transformations of the object in its modes of running-off do not go beyond or above the object from which they recede, but point back to that object not in spite of but because of their variety and enlargement.

**Two types of circularity in Husserl’s analysis of retention and double continuity in ITC: towards the vivacity of Husserl’s time diagrams**

It remains decisive that Husserl preserves the above-mentioned ambiguity in the reference to the intentionality in time consciousness, where “what appears in its way of appearing” and “what appears simpliciter” cannot be treated apart from each other. The mutuality between objective and phenomenological time is illustrated by Husserl’s characterization of the unity of temporal experience as a continuity of the running-off phenomenon, where the running-off is described as the relation between now and just-

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303 See page 21.
now. The components of the “continuity of constant changes”\textsuperscript{304} cannot be abstracted from the temporal unity and observed in their isolation from it, precisely because these components are also the phases of the running-off continuity. In other words, the phases of the running off continuity can be observed only as parts of the encounter between the now and the just-past. The continuity, which disperses itself into its phases of the now – just-past tensions, is immutable only through the persistence of its particular running-off stages. The temporal unity of the continuity of changes is, Husserl insists, inseparable through its dissociation into the phases of running-off. This observation challenges the position that the same phase can be simply recalled or repeated, thereby appearing two times during the same temporal experience, e.g. the melody. Repetition of the same tone, for Husserl, is not ruled out, but it is constantly experienced through the asymmetry built in its co-constitution with its immediate past. Furthermore, the retention that accompanies the repeated just-now does not simply pile itself up on the previous retentions, but it is re-articulated in its difference from it, and, in this difference, in a reference to the unity of temporal object.

The phases of the unity of temporal experience indeed differ individually (Husserl brackets the word “individually”), and in this differentiation these phases form the whole of the running-off. The more the just-now phases solidify themselves as the retention of the now-point, the more apparent becomes their reference to the now-point, or the source-point,\textsuperscript{305} as Husserl remarks. We suggest that the just-now of the whole duration solidifies against the now point (e.g. the last tone in a melody), which is already self-enclosed, as the presupposed point in objective time. However, this last stage of the

\textsuperscript{304} Ibid, 29.
\textsuperscript{305} Ibid. 30.
running-off does not, in fact, amalgamate or fuse the preceding stages of the now – just-now tension. To the contrary, the last stage of the running-off whole underlies the series of the now – just-past relations that was accomplished at each particular stage of the temporal unity (e.g. melody). The last tone of the melody, the last now accompanied by the just-past, merely emphasizes that the progress of the melody was reflected in the self-encircling between every now point in the melody and its accompanying retention. What progresses, according to Husserl, is not the linear sequencing or accumulation of the now tones in the objective time of the melody, but the mutual self-differentiation of every now and just-past. The melody is the whole of the self-enclosures between now and just-pasts, where both members of the constellation are related to each other by pointing back to their own specificity vis a vis the other term in relation. Husserl opposes the linearity of the progression of the tones in melody on the line AE by insisting that this progression is accompanied by the “regression” on the line AA’. This means that now is not simply preceded by past (or succeeded by future), but that it unfolds itself precisely as it solidifies itself into the past. However, Husserl’s opposition to the progression on the line AE is not its dismissal, but its re-articulation with the (increase of the) retentions on the line AA’. This means that the temporal experience is achieved through the “unfolding” of the line EA’. Furthermore, the “progression” of the line EA’ does nothing but point out the unbridgeable difference between AE and AA’. The line EA’ does not connect the lines AE and AA’, but serves to indicate that the inability of their fusion makes the temporal experience possible.
Husserl’s description of the above diagram brackets the terms that indicate the progressions upwards and downwards, as he carefully attempts to avoid the use of terms such as blending, simultaneity, addition or fusion. The spatial representation of a diagram is rather an expression of the tension between nows and just-pasts than a description of the space that is somehow filled with retentions that are moving “downwards”. The use of the term downward progression is there to indicate that the horizontal sequencing of objective time constantly unfolds as the progression of retentions. The only relation between AE and AA’ is that of divergence which is “registered” or expressed on the line

\[\text{AE} \rightarrow \text{The series of now points} \]
\[\text{AA'} \rightarrow \text{Sinking into the past} \]
\[\text{EA'} \rightarrow \text{Continuum of phrases} \]
\[\text{(the now point with the horizon of the past)} \]

\[\text{E} \rightarrow \text{The series of nows perhaps filled with other objects} \]

\[\text{P} \]

\[\text{A'} \]

\[\text{A} \]

\[\text{E} \]

\[\text{AE} \]

\[\text{AA'} \]

\[\text{E} \rightarrow \text{The series of nows perhaps filled with other objects} \]

\[\text{P} \]

Note that there is a symbol “p” at the bottom of the vertical line that ends in the point P. However, due to the technical difficulties I had problems marking that letter on a diagram.
In the steady progression of the running-off modes we then find the remarkable circumstance that each later running-off phase is itself a continuity, a continuity that constantly expands, a continuity of pasts. To the continuity of running-off modes of the object's duration, we contrast the continuity of running-off modes belonging to each point of the duration. This second continuity is obviously included in the first, the continuity of running-off modes of the object's duration. The running-off continuity of an enduring object is therefore a continuum whose phases are the continua of the running-off modes belonging to the different time-points of the duration of the object. If we proceed along the concrete continuity, we move forward in a process of constant modifications; and in this process, the running-off-mode - that is, the running-off of the time-points in question - changes continuously. Since a new now is always entering on the scene, the now changes into a past; and as it does so, the whole running-off continuity of pasts belonging to the preceding point moves "downwards" uniformly into the depths of the past. In our diagram, the continuous series of ordinates illustrates the running-off modes of the enduring object. They grow from A (one point) into a determinate extent, which has the last now as its final point. Then the series of running-off modes that no longer include a now (that is, a now belonging to this duration) begins; the duration is no longer actually present but past, and continuously sinking deeper into the past. The diagram therefore gives a complete picture of the double continuity of running-off modes.307

The divergence between the line of nows and their retention is articulated through the notion of double continuity: 1) the unfolding of the tensions between now and just-past of the enduring object (e.g. the melody), which “culminates” in the last tone of the melody, namely the now-E and its retention, the just-past-E’, and 2) the unfolding of the tensions between every single now and its just past, which proceeds-recedes through the enduring of the temporal object EE’, as seen from the perspective of the second continuity, serves as a vantage point for the re-articulation anew of all the nows – just-pasts tensions. However, as much as EE’ is “reached” through the unfolding of the retentions of nows into just-pasts (continuity 1), starting with AA’, so too is the perspective of EE’ nothing but the articulation anew of the tension between every single now and its retention (continuity 2), now seen from the perspective of the concluding

tone in the melody. The second continuity emphasizes the struggle that is actually
happening in the first continuity, where the “time flow” is the continuity of the tension
between now and just-pasts within the entirety of the temporal object (e.g. melody).
These tensions appear to form the unity of the duration of the temporal object as they are
seen from the perspective of the last tone and its retentional adumbration. However, it is
not only that the last tone’s now recedes into its just-past E’, but E’ expresses the whole
series of nows that recede “anew” into just-pasts, so to speak. The diagram should be
observed by taking into account continuities 1) and 2) which point at each other through
their own accomplishment: the initial diverging between nows and their retention, once
observed from the point E and its retention E’, “becomes”, at same time, re-articulation
of the tension between A and its recession into A’, P and its recession into P’, etc.
Husserl not only refuses to regard the temporal flow as a mere sequencing or simultaneity
by emphasizing the role of retention, but he also suggests that the objective time-flow is
its own fading away through retention, whose layering, conversely, points back to the
flux of objective time. Therefore it is not only that the proceeding of objective time,
through the course of the flow of nows, recedes into just pasts, but, further, that the
divergence between AA’ and AE circles back on itself, so to speak, through the vantage
point EE’.

We therefore observe two types of circular moves: A) the self-enclosure of
objective time vis a vis its retention (and vice versa) and B) circling back and forth
between continuities 1) and 2). The circling back in continuity 2 is nothing but the
naming of the melody as the continual “layering” of the now-just past tension on the level
of every single tone of that particular melody. This is why Husserl suggests that, indeed,
the unfolding of nows, which follow up the primal impression or the source point of the enduring of the temporal object, “continually relieves the one that has passed over into modification.” However, our intentionality can be switched to the peculiar retention, which is a part of the whole of the completed melody, which “happens” when the retention is of the now of the melody or “something actually existing.” This tone is actually existing only as the retention of the tone of the melody that has been. The first intentionality of the unfolding of the melody (continuity 1) accompanied with its just now is thematized as a whole of the temporal object (continuity 2). Conversely, the second intentionality is there so it can illuminate the first one. Husserl describes this double intentionality in the following manner:

A ray of meaning can be directed towards the now: towards the retention; but it can also be directed towards what is retentionally intended: towards the past tone. Every actually present now of consciousness, however, is subject to the law of modification. It changes into retention of retention and does so continuously. Accordingly, a fixed continuum of retention arises in such a way that each later point is retention for is every earlier point. And each retention is already a continuum. The tone begins and "it" steadily continues. The tone-now changes into a tone-having-been; the impressional consciousness, constantly flowing, passes over into ever new retentional consciousness. **Going along the flow or with it, we have a continuous series of retentions pertaining to the beginning-point.** Beyond that, however, each earlier point of this series is adumbrated in its turn as a now in the sense of retention. Thus a continuity of retentional modifications attaches itself to each of these retentions and this continuity itself is again an actually present point that is retentionally adumbrated. This does not lead to a simple infinite regress, since each retention is in itself continuous modification that carries within, so to speak, the heritage of the past in the form of a series of adumbrations. **But it is not the case here that in the horizontal direction of the flow each earlier retention is simply replaced by a new one, even if continuously.** Rather, each later retention is not only continual modification that has arisen from primal impression; each is also continual modification of all earlier continuous modifications of that same initial point.

The horizontal flow of objective time is not adumbrated by retention in a way that every later tone is simply added to or pasted on the earlier one with its own retentional

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309 Ibid.
310 Ibid.
unfolding. Once we look at the melody as a whole, we notice that each now in the melody, as adumbrated by its retention, also modifies the preceding now and its retention by virtue of its participation in the melody. The melody is nothing but this double modificational continuity: the one on the level of now – just-now of the melody as a whole, and the one on the level of the now – just-now of every tone in the whole of the melody. Melody, so to speak, “flows” as its own disarticulation by the necessity of its unfolding through the irreconcilable divergence of the impressional and the retentional flow. However, this disarticulation proceeds only if it is articulated as a reciprocity between tones in their now – just-past tension within that peculiar melody. What seems to be fracturing of the experience of time (continuity 1), namely the diverging of objective time and its retentional registering – that is, the flow of time being broken down into “now–just now” gaps – in fact produces a fluency on the level of the phenomenological articulation of temporal experience (continuity 2). The phenomenological account of time, conversely, unfolds as a continual pointing back at the impossibility of the isolation, simultaneity or fusion of the moments in time. Time does not just flow as the addition of temporal moments, even if temporal duration implies continuity in the fragmentation of every now into just past, but it needs to be thematized as a fragmentation intrinsic to the particular temporal experience. Temporal experience is articulated in such a way that every tension that appears between every single now and just past is thematically brought up within the entirety of the temporal object, e.g. the melody. While the flow of the melody is accompanied with its retentional adumbration, what makes the temporal experience of the particular object as a whole possible is precisely the understanding that “each earlier point of this series is adumbrated in its turn as a now in the sense of
The fragmentation of the "flow" of the melody requires that the time fragments now–just now makes sense only within the duration of the temporal object. To use the language of the Third Investigation, the whole is possible as a peculiar tension between the parts’ mutual participation in their essences as much as the peculiarity of parts is possible insofar as parts are the members of the peculiar whole. The now–just-past tension of the earlier points in the melody is articulated through the second intentionality (continuity 2), in its own turn, in its own peculiar position as it is brought to light within the continuity of the melody. The divergence of AE and AA’ and its "beyond" through the second intentionality not only point back at each other through their own proceeding, but are also repeated, encircled in their own inalienable specificity vis a vis each other. Husserl importantly suggests that it is not the case that every retention that accompanies every new now on the horizontal flow of objective time is simply replaced by the retention that succeeds it. The case is precisely the opposite: “each later retention is not only continual modification that has arisen from primal impression; each is also continual modification of all earlier continuous modifications of that same initial point”. Husserl famously uses the example of the comet tail that accompanies its head in its cosmic journey. The tail, in its dispersive coherency, serves as an excellent illustration, because it depicts the state of affairs where the “continuity of the phases that attached itself to the actual “now” was nothing other than such a retention or continuity of retentions.”

We can expand upon the comet example with the example of the trace that the jet plane leaves behind. The further ahead the plane is and the faster it moves, the wider is

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311 Ibid.
312 Ibid, 31.
313 Ibid, 32.
the trace it leaves. The trace is not a mere consequence or side effect of the movement of
the plane. To the contrary, the trace constantly unfolds in the direction opposite to that of
the plane, persisting in its left-behindness. It not only seems that the plane cannot
escape the trace, despite its acceleration, but it also becomes apparent that the cloudy
trace, in its own solidification, “contributes” to the advance of the plane. The acceleration
of the plane is literally “measured” by the dispersion and the density of the cloudy trace.
Not only is the direction of the plane visible by the cloudy trace it leaves, but the trace
indicates the advance of the plane through its own density or enlargement. Further, the
faster the airplane travels, the more persistent is the cloudy trace it leaves in its
“tendency” to accompany the airplane. The velocity of the plane is measured by its
inability to escape the “chase” of its trace, while the persistence of the trace in its
“reaching out“ for the airplane is defined by its inability to “finally” grasp the plane. The
strict opposition of the direction of the airplane and its trace suggests the inextricable
belonging in difference between the former and the latter, as the impossibility of their
permeation or amalgamation defines their relation.

Husserl states that just as the now phase is “conceivable only as the limit of a
continuity of retentions”, so too every retentional stage “is, itself, conceivable only as a
point belonging to such a continuum”.314 The continuity of the retention in its divergence-
from-as-the-pointing-back to the now-point manifests itself not as an addition,
combination or even layering of retentional stages, but as the re-articulation of the
modification of every single retentional stage. The “expansion” of the retentional flow is
nothing but the exposure of the unbridgeable now – just-past tension relations at every
single “point” of the temporal “flow”. This means that terms such as “temporal flow” and

314 Ibid, 35.
“the point in a temporal experience” stop making any sense by “becoming” an articulation of the specificity of “every single” now-just past tension. Moreover, we can even suggest that notions such as flow and point can make sense only through the articulation of the above-mentioned tensions. The retention that belongs to the now can only be a part of (i.e. to articulate it and be articulated by it) the series of continuously modified retentions. Conversely, only as a series of continuous modifications, as “necessarily something sunken”, the retention “permits an evident recollection that traces it back to a now that is given once again.”

Figure 2.

\[^{315}\text{Ibid.}\]
The relation between P and AP on the 1905 diagram (Figure 1), becomes more directly graphically addressed by Husserl in *Die Bernauer Manuskripte ueber das Zeitbewusstsein (1917/1918)*. De Warren uses the version of Husserl’s diagrams from the Bernau manuscripts to offer his own interpretation of double intentionality (Figure 2), to which we will shortly return. The novelty of Figure 2 is that it indicates more clearly the retaining of retentions, which is complemented by the progression of protentions. The retention (for example E\textsuperscript{23}) of the now point (for example E\textsubscript{2}), which is registered on lines E\textsubscript{3}E\textsubscript{1}\textsuperscript{3} and E\textsubscript{4}E\textsubscript{1}\textsuperscript{4}, is also as retained by E\textsuperscript{34}, while it retains E\textsubscript{1}\textsuperscript{4}. This diagonal movement downwards becomes fully effective, so to speak, once it is contrasted with the linear progression of the sequencing of now points on the line E\textsubscript{1}-E\textsubscript{4} (continuity 1).
Furthermore, what becomes more visible on this diagram is that the surfaces E1E2E1², E2E3E1³E1² and E3E4E1⁴E1³ are not merely added to each other. We notice that, once we observe these surfaces from the vantage point of E4E4’, these surfaces are articulated anew, so to speak, apropos the tension between nows and their just-pasts within the surface E1E4E1⁴ (continuity 2).

If we take a look at the Figure 1 again, it becomes clear that the progressive divergence between lines AE and AA’ (continuity 1) is rearticulated, not recorded, on line EA’. If section PAp (Figure 1) would have framed the relationship between AE and AA’, then we would have talked about mere synthesis, combination, or the Stumpfian or Herbartian fusion of tones (or of the now and the just past). However, the mere addition of the tones, or their collection under the foundational power of either phantasy or Präsenzzeit is, as noted earlier, strictly rejected by Husserl. This is why line PAp (Figure 1) or line E2E1² (Figure 2) is literally a metaphor, used to illustrate that E2 is retained on the line E3E1³ as E2³, while, itself, retaining E1³. E2E1² is an illustration of

316 It is important to note that Stumpf, for example, challenges the notion according to which tonal fusion can be illustrated through spatial metaphor. According to Stumpf, fusion is not a mere sum of its parts, but a peculiar kind of a whole. He rejects the notion of sequencing, preferring the notion of simultaneity, as much as he challenges the view that fusion is “a third tonal quality in addition to or instead of the other two” [Carl Stumpf, “The Psychology of Tone” in The Classical Psychologists: Selections Illustrating Psychology from Anaxagoras to Wundt, ed. Benjamin Rand (Boston, New York, Chicago: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1913), 621]. He even suggests that understanding the problem of tonal fusion implies understanding the way we access it: “The concepts here too must be adapted to the observations. Only a contradiction is a priori an impossibility. But that the two tones are at the same time one, is not affirmed”(ibid, 622). Stumpf challenges Herbart’s psychologism, suggesting that fusion is not merely a psychological phenomenon, but involves physiological aspects of perception as well. He would rather use admittedly objectionable notions such as blend (Schmelz) or coalescence (Schmalz) than falling, rising or overflowing (the terms employed by Herbart). For the lack of a better term fusion, for Stumpf, can be described as a specific energy: “The specific energies, which lie at the foundation of fusion, have only this peculiarity, that they are not aroused by means of isolated stimuli, but by the concurrence of two stimuli. For this reason, we can call them specific energies of a higher rank, or still better, specific synergies”(Ibid, 631). The problem with this interpretation is that fusion between two tones is observed within the context of prioritizing one epistemological frame over another. In other words, instead of being concerned with the investigation of the essential asymmetry between the now and the immediate past, the tension that underlies the experience of time, Stumpf focuses on the selection of a concept that can host this tension. We observe a similar problem in Stern’s search for total formation that unites the succession of psychic events.
the bracketing of the notions of fusion or simultaneity between now and just now, where E2E1² is used in such a way as to illustrate the essential membership of both E1 and E2 in line E3E1³. The retentions E1³ and E2³ are possible not only as the members of the one retentional flow E3E1³, but also through the context in which E2³ is not only the retention of E2, but also the retention of E1³ (which is, in itself, a retention of E1). The full retentional potential of E2, E3, En as introduced on the lines E3E1³ or EnE1ⁿ is achieved through continuity 2, which is designed, again, to dispel the notion that line EA’ (Figure 1) or the line E3E1³ (or E4E1⁴), (Figure 2), is a mere recording of the progression of retentions. Line EA’ is, again, only the expression of the divergence of AE and AA’, which is fully articulated through continuity 2; it is therefore not a formula of a reconciliation or even a fusion of AE and AA’. Continuity 2 emphasizes that the retention of any new now tone is also retention of the retention of any preceding now tone within the entirety of the experienced temporal object (i.e. melody). 317 Continuity 2, as perceived from the vantage point EE’ (Figure 1) or EnEnⁿ (Figure 2), stresses that E3E2³ is not a mere segment added to the segment E2³ E1³, but that the latter is retained by the

317 De Warren observes the whole process in the following manner: “With the subsequent arrival of now-phase E3, now-phase E2 as well as now-phase E1 are both displaced into the immediate past, relative not only to now-phase E3, but just as importantly, relative to each other as past. Both now-phases (E1, E2) are still continuously running-off relative to an ever renewed, yet different, now-phase. The earlier of the two now-phases (now-phase E1) does not cease to run-off once its immediate proximity to the actual now-phase has been displaced by the running-off of another now-phase. From the vantage-point of now-phase E3, the continuous running-off of now phase E1 is further removed relative to the running-off of now-phase E2. That is to say: as the third and final note of a three-note melody enters in the perceptual grasp of consciousness, I am still conscious of the earlier notes E1 and E2 as running-off, and, in this manner, apprehend the sequence of three notes in a determinate order of temporal succession. The melody as a whole is perceptually grasped in the living present. Yet, the earlier notes (E1, E2) are not heard as equally just-past relative to the final note E3. Rather, note E1 is given to me as having just been (heard) earlier than note E2, which in turn, is still given to me as just having been (heard) earlier than note E3. The original sequence among earlier now-phases remains preserved in the consciousness of the immediate past. Earlier now-phases, in their continued mode of running-off, become sedimentated, or layered, upon each other, thus giving depth and distance to the consciousness of the past” [Nicolas de Warren, Husserl and the Promise of Time: Subjectivity in Transcendental Phenomenology (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011), 124].
former. Moreover, the notion of the addable segment cannot be applied to section E2E1², as that section is not shown within the perspective of continuity 2. In other words, section E2E1², as observed within the temporal object framed by the divergence of E1E3 and E1E1³, is not a part of the temporal experience, because the point E1², as a mere abstraction, is not lived-through, so to speak. The segment E2E1² can be observed only within the unity of the temporal object designated by the divergence of E1E2 and E1E1² (continuity 1) and expressed by phase continuum E2E1² (continuity 2), and not within continuum E1En.

De Warren captures the meaning of segments E2E1², E2'E1³ as mere though useful abstractions in Husserl’s depiction of the continuity 2:

Each of these now-phases, taken in abstraction from the continuous temporal progression of the time-object as a whole, is a momentary slice or cross-section (Querschnitt) of the time-object’s duration. Despite such terms as “now-point,” “now-phase,” and “momentary now-phase,” each momentary now-phase is in fact not experienced as a point without temporal breadth, though this does not preclude the useful abstraction of considering each now-phase as a point for the purpose of analysis. As Husserl remarks: “Each perceptual phase has intentional reference to an extended section of the temporal object, and not merely to a now-point necessarily given in it and simultaneous with it” (Hua X, 232 [240]). Indeed, each momentary phase encompasses an intentional relation to an earlier now-phase in its mode of running-off as well as to an imminent now-phase yet to come; each now-phase is situated within a perceptual horizon, or “time-halo” (Zeithof), of before and after.³¹⁸

The first continuity, the divergence of E1En and E1En (or stretch-continuum), is important, because it emphasizes the unavoidable recession of the now points into the just pasts. However, in order to avoid designing time consciousness as a mere collection of retentional layers (even if these layers increase persistently against the objective flow of time), Husserl introduces the second continuity, the phase-continuum, which is, itself, a phenomenological articulation of the initial divergence between objective time and its

³¹⁸ Ibid, 122.
recession into the immediate past (continuity 1). Husserl needs to preserve both
continuities in their completeness and mutual difference, because, through the figures of
the two continuities, Husserl is able to tackle the challenges posed by the empiricist and
the psychologistic accounts of time. The reason for this is that Husserl cannot perform the
bracketing of objective time only by stressing that it stretches itself into the immediate
past once it progresses from one now point to the next. We also need to observe the
temporal object in its entirety and look back at the initiation of the temporal object. The
temporal flow is not only immediately disarticulated in its retentional fragmentation, but
the retentional fragmentation of the temporal object also needs to point back at its
counterpart, to the composition of the temporal object in the objective flow of time, in
order to disclose the face of its opponent. The reason why Husserl accepts without much
hesitation the notion of the entirety of the melody is that he wants to fully bracket the
unity of the temporal object as conceived within the frame of the objective flow of time.
This does not mean a complete rejection of the objective flow of time, but its thorough
confrontation with its retentional modifications. As de Warren suggests,
phenomenological philosophy “neither accepts – naively – problems from the past
without question nor claims to discover – naively – entirely new problems without
historical precedence. Instead, old problems are sought out in new ways – given renewed
life – through the methodological operations of suspension and reduction, both of which
facilitate the transposition of established philosophical concerns into an uniquely
phenomenological register of analysis, predicated as much on the ‘seeing of things
themselves’ as on the seeing of the problems themselves, clearly and distinctly, as
exhibited in the phenomenon under question.”

319 We can add that the “seeing of the

problems themselves” necessitates the “seeing of things themselves”, as much as, conversely, the latter is there so it can stare back at the former.

The reactive strategy of bracketing in Husserl’s time diagrams is even more visible in its peculiar relation to the flow of objective time, through the introduction of protention. The diagram in Figure 2 illustrates the notion of protention, which is just briefly mentioned by Husserl in the 1905 lectures. Protentions are defined as something which “emptily constitute what is coming as coming [the temporal object originally], that catch it and bring it toward fulfillment.”\footnote{Hua X, 53[54].} If we observe Figure 2, we note that line E2E3’ in a peculiar way “pulls back” the progression on the line of the objective time flow E2E3. This pulling back of the flow of objective time illustrates something that is counterintuitive to the notion of the progression of objective time on the line past-present-future (E1E2E3). The immediate future, as opened by now, is pulled back by its protending to the determinate indeterminacy of the halo (Husserl’s term mostly used in his later writings). The anticipatory halo stands against the progression of the objective time flow in its potential to be fulfilled. The immediate future is not simply pasted to the now, but it unfolds as its protention into its anticipatory possibility. This possibility is there despite the capacity of the now-point to be fulfilled. The now point, in a way, betrays itself, through its own unfolding into the immediate will-be, into the anticipatory potential it necessitates through its own actuality. The potentiality of fulfillment is therefore contrasted with the actuality of now. Moreover, if we come back to the now – just-past tension, we realize that the now point E1 is being “pulled forward” to the immediate past of E1\textsuperscript{2}. We can say that the burden of retention pulls forward the progression on line E1E2 into the regression on line E2E1\textsuperscript{2}. The just-past solidifies itself
as the unavoidable destiny (or future) of the now to become just past or just now, so to speak, as much as the future establishes itself as a capacity of the now to become a fulfilled anticipation, to complete itself, to pass or to become past. We can actually see on the diagram in Figure 3 that retention stands more directly for the inversion of the immediate past, just as protention stands for the inversion of the immediate future:

**Figure 3.**

From the diagram above we can see that the lines E1E1² and E3E3’ are, in fact, curves literally made out of line E1E3. Furthermore, we can conclude that line
E1'E2E3' is nothing but the curving of line E1E2E3. The flow-break, the point-transition relation on the horizontal level, is contrasted with the dynamics of the increase-decrease relation on the vertical line of retention-protention.

The increase-decrease unfolding on the vertical protention-retention line makes sense only insofar as it points backward and forward to the horizontal line of the progression between past, present and future. Moreover, line E1E2E3 curves itself into E1'E2E3' by virtue of its own necessity of being straight, by unfolding itself into the linearity of its progression. Conversely, line E1'E2E3' establishes itself in its own ‘contraction’ only standing firmly against the linearity of the flow (or ‘release’) of the line E1E2E3.

Figure 3 illustrates the objective time flow, which, through its own linear unfolding, “circles back” on itself, as illuminated by the retention-protention axis. We can say that objective time literally moves forward by rotating itself backward through its phenomenological articulation. The more persistent is the flow of objective time in the seemingly immutable directionality of its progression, the more unavoidable is its, phenomenologically induced, circling back to its initial position. The more the flow of objective time exhibits itself as a movement of progression from one point in time to another, the more obvious it becomes that its moving-away brings it back to its starting point. This feature of objective time may be literally illustrated by reference to the hamster wheel, whose perpetual circling relies precisely on the unshaken persistence of the hamster to move forward. The hamster’s forward progression does not interfere with the circling of the wheel; to the contrary, the intensification of the former increases the movement of the latter. If we accept this intimate belonging in difference between
objective time and its retentional modification, as it is illustrated by the diagram above, we can follow de Warren and conclude that the time diagrams “should not primarily be seen as visual representations” but that these diagrams, “more significantly, . . . model the dynamic of time-constitution.”\textsuperscript{321} As de Warren observes, the “construction of the diagrams repeats in thinking the stages of the constitutive accomplishment of time-consciousness under description”\textsuperscript{322} This repetition in thinking of “the stages of the constitutive accomplishment of time-consciousness” is additionally expressed in two forms of circular continuities. As Husserl points out at the very beginning of his “Analysis of the Consciousness of Time”, we can both 1) make evident the statements that the immanent temporal object endures now, “that a certain part of the duration has elapsed; that the point of the tone’s duration grasped in the now (with its tone-content, of course) continuously sinks back into the past and that an ever new point of the duration enters into the now or is now” (continuity 1), and we can also, simultaneously, 2) talk about the way “in which we are ‘conscious’ of all such differences pertaining to the ‘appearing’ of the immanent tone and of its duration-content” (continuity 2).\textsuperscript{323}

We can suggest that the curve E3E3’, as being constantly mirrored by the curve E1E1\textsuperscript{2}, illustrates that the immediate future of the now is in its immediate past, so to speak. Furthermore, the past, as a now that is constantly fading away, condenses itself apropos the now precisely as the host of its anticipatory possibility. This situation is further clarified by the notion of a protention that becomes also the retention of a prior protention. The more the future of the now becomes unavoidable, the more irrevocably

\textsuperscript{322} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{323} Hua X, 27.
the now passes into the just past. We can, for example, observe the time flow in its mere linearity: for example, after we dribbled the ball, we made a short break, jumped and made a shot at the basket. We can also measure the time passage from the moment we started dribbling until the moment we scored (or missed the shot), especially as we were rushing to score before the game ended. If we decide that the now-point is the moment we make a jump, then, according to the structure of the objective time flow, the jump is preceded by the dribbling and succeeded by the (un)successful shot. However, as we are guided by the possibility of scoring, our every movement fades away into the immediate past, which, as such, becomes the fulfillment of the anticipatory tendency. The “extension” of anticipation, its indeterminate determinacy, is therefore measured by the determinacy of retention that constantly “pulls downwards” the now point. We feel that we are closer to our goal, precisely as we are constantly being burdened by the dribbling before our decisive jump. Our ability to finally jump is, in a way, defined through the emptying or fading away of our movement-forward into the past. Our anticipation achieves its contours through the fact that our every movement towards the basket solidifies itself in the immediate past, and therefore in unavoidable distance from our goal. The tension between now, just-past and about-to-happen culminates proportionally through the acceleration of the flow of objective time as measured by the clock. In other words, it seems that ‘time has stopped’, that we are ‘stuck in time’ precisely in ‘response’ to the inexorable ticking of the clock, announcing that the game is just about to end. In other words, as we are frantically trying to finish a certain operation, and suffering the pressure of a deadline both imminent and ominous, we feel that we are unavoidably slowing down, or drifting ever further away from our goal. The anxiety we feel does not
concern our inability to meet the assigned deadline, as much as it relates to our acknowledgment that there is a forever unbridgeable distance between that which is now and that which is yet to be, precisely in the seeming objective temporal proximity between where we are and where we are suppose to be.

On the third type of circularity in the Bernau Manuscripts: the problem of transition in the analysis of protention

The notion of protention is dealt with in more detail and with greater care in Husserl’s Bernau Manuscripts from the years 1917 and 1918 than in his 1905 ITC lectures. The reflections in the Bernau Manuscripts came after Husserl’s re-articulation of intentionality in Ideas I, so it is only to be expected that the analysis of the constitution of the temporal object within the context of objective time flow and its phenomenological articulation is framed within the noetic-noematic distinction. This means that the noematic temporal distinction of objectivity is now further elaborated with reference to its relation to the noetic temporalization of consciousness. ³²⁴ We will address in more detail the significance of the time-diagrams in the Bernau Manuscripts for Husserl’s

³²⁴ An excellent analysis of the place of Bernau Manuscripts in Husserl’s transcendental phenomenology is provided by Nicolas de Warren in the chapter 5 of The Promise of Time. Husserl’s turn is rooted in the re-articulation of the intentionality relation in the Fifth Investigation, which is conceived as a relation between act-quality and act-matter. The Fifth investigation challenges what Husserl sees as a psychologistic component in Brentano’s philosophy of presentational foundationalism. Namely, the intentionality as portrayed by Brentano, is defined as a relation between the act and the object of consciousness. In the Ideas I, however, Husserl’s focus is not only on the analysis of the intentional essence (the act-matter – act quality tension), which would fit with the description of the noetic pole of the intentional relation, but also on its relation to the noematic pole. The relation of intentionality does not only address the changes in the perspectives the noetic instance but also on the changes that the noematic instance endures during the time of the experience. For example, we can change our focus during the observation of a certain object, as much as the observed object can change during the experience within which it is addressed (can be differently exposed to the sun light for example).
phenomenology of time at the end of this chapter.\footnote{The English version of \textit{Die Bernauer Manuskripte über das Zeitbewusstsein (1917/1918)}, \textit{Hua XXXIII}, ed.by Rudolf Bernet and Dieter Lohmar (Dordrecht: Kluwer, 2001) used for the purpose of this chapter is originally provided by James Dodd for the seminar entitled “Husserl Seminar: The Problem of Time”, New School for Social Research, Spring 2010, and it is abbreviated as HS.}

Husserl suggests in The Bernau Manuscripts that, proportionally to the constant renewal of the “new core data”, the old data do not simply sink, but “a protentional consciousness ‘arises’ that moves forward to the new originary data and fulfills itself in them as their termination”.\footnote{HS, 2.} The pulling back of the objective time flow into retention is characterized as the arising of protention, which also illustrates the change of Husserl’s focus. Husserl’s capturing of the rift between the now and the just-past (and between retentions within the same temporal object, as observed under continuity 2) in the 1905 ITC lectures is aimed at the inversion of the linearity of the objective time flow depicted on the horizontal line EE1En. This means that the introduction of double intentionality, for example, served as Husserl’s attempt not only to avoid characterizing retentional modification as a mere layering or combination (which would dangerously resemble Stumpf, Brentano or Stern), but also to point out the unavoidable regression built into the progression of objective time.

Husserl’s focus in the Bernau Manuscripts is, however, on the depiction of the “movements” of emptying (retention) and fulfillment (protention) on the vertical axis, which illuminates the self-subversion of objective time even more thoroughly. Husserl suggests that the double intentionality noted in retention must be extended to protention as well. This means that, just as the retentiation of the originary data includes the retention of retentions or “the passage of retentional sequences \([-Ux]\)”\footnote{Ibid.} of the object x, so too is
this passage “projected into the protentional”\textsuperscript{328} process. The protention unfolds, just as retention does, in the constancy of its difference from the originary data (\textit{Urdaten}), precisely as it takes them “as terminating fulfillments” (\textit{als terminierende Erfüllungen aufnimmt}).\textsuperscript{329} This means that the realization of the now is constantly accompanied by its anticipatory halo, determinate (fulfilled) indeterminacy, precisely through its completion, or self-enclosure.

However, and this is where Husserl introduces continuity 2 in the analysis of protentions, protention is not only related to originary data “simply by going from point to point”, by extending the temporal passage E1En into the anticipatory possibility, but also by relating to the moments of lived experience, “thus again requiring their retentions and then also their protentions, which must then become the mediate protentions of those that come later”.\textsuperscript{330} The protention of the retention of retention(s) implies both “self-emptying and self-retentional-modifying” (\textit{Sich-Entfüllen und Sich-retentional-Wandeln}), because the protention of the temporal passage E2E3 (of the sequence E1E2E3) is also the protention of its retention E2\textsuperscript{E2} (which also retains E1\textsuperscript{E1} as depicted in figure 2). As Husserl observes, “every point of this sequence is thus not merely a retentional consciousness with respect to the sloping lines [\textit{die schrägen Geraden}] which lead back to the corresponding points of E1E2, but also a protentional consciousness with respect to the sloping lines which pass in a downward direction through the marked sequences of strips”.\textsuperscript{331} Protentional consciousness is literally “bound to the new emergence of the

\begin{flushright}
\textsuperscript{328} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{329} Ibid; Hua XXXIII, 21.
\textsuperscript{330} HS, 2.
\textsuperscript{331} Ibid, 3.
\end{flushright}
original data from E2, on through E3, E4...,”\textsuperscript{332} which is why it is not a consciousness of a single moment in the temporal object, “but a consciousness constantly directed in every moment in the same way to what emerges in the future, just as is the case with its supplementary part on the retentional side”\textsuperscript{333} The divergence of protention and retention vis a vis the base line E1En is carefully preserved, because the ahead-consciousness (\textit{Vorbewusstsein}) is “indeed directed to the fact that E2 E1\textsuperscript{2} will constantly sink down”.\textsuperscript{334}

Once the E3 in the E1E2E3 temporal sequence is reached, i.e. once that certain manner of givenness is established, the retentional “sinking back must set in”, just as “what is protentionally ‘expected,’ that is, the ‘fulfillment,’ continues on”.\textsuperscript{335} The protention, in response to the objective time-flow, is not only the protention of the time point on the base line, but it is also the protention of its receding retentions. The protention is, itself, also retention once it becomes real, or “reel”: “\textit{Ferner, ist eine der oberen Vertikalen reell geworden, so ist sie zugleich als Erfüllung eingetreten, und zugleich ist sie in Beziehung auf ihren parallelen Streifen, und zwar auf das Stück, den Zweig desselben, der das entsprechend vergangene obere Stück signierte, Retention, ebenso wie das für das untere Feld gilt}”.\textsuperscript{336} A protention becomes fulfillment, once it is reel, in proportion to the extent that it sinks into retention, but only in relation to its parallel sequences, including the segment “that had signaled the corresponding past upper segment”.\textsuperscript{337} This is possible simply as protention’s own accomplishment, which, once achieved as the “fulfillment” of the base line, sinks, to use Husserl’s term, into the

\textsuperscript{332} Ibid, 4.  
\textsuperscript{333} Ibid, 4.  
\textsuperscript{334} Ibid, 3.  
\textsuperscript{335} Ibid, 4.  
\textsuperscript{336} Hua XXXIII, 23.  
\textsuperscript{337} HS, 4.
consciousness of emptying, articulating anew the preceding retentions. The protention’s progression upwards on the vertical protention-retention axis is paralleled by its regression downwards, as it re-articulates its accompanying retentions, which develop exclusively in the opposite direction to the protentions.

Protention can be observed as retention of prior protentions as it sinks down the vertical axis $E_1^2E_2E_3'$ (Figures 2 & 3). Prior retentions and anticipated protentions are not pasted or glued to each other, but stand in relation to each other by securing their positions anew in distinction from and with respect to ongoing in retentional declension and protentional progression. Instead of melting or fusing with each other, the protentions and retentions of one temporal experience continuously encircle themselves with one another. This provides the conditions for the analysis within the frame of continuity 2, where the adherence of the phenomenology of time to the objective time flow becomes evident. For example, during the unfolding of the melody, the anticipated tone, once opened by the present tone, which immediately sinks into the past, becomes itself the past tone once fulfilled, thereby opening up a realm for the new anticipation to be fulfilled, and so on. The divergence, however, between the protention and retention vis a vis the base line $E_1E_n$ is still carefully preserved, but it is re-articulated within the entirety of the temporal object. As much as the retention of the final tone in a melody is not only retention of just-now of that tone, but also retention of retentions of the previous tones as they belong to that particular melody, so too the protention of that tone is both the protention of its protentions and the retention of its protentions.

I am leaving my office and rushing to catch the last bus. On my way to the bus station I realize that I left my cell phone in the office. I momentarily experience shock,
because I know very well that the doors of the building are automatically closed at 9:30 pm. I am especially disturbed by this state of affairs, as I use my cell phone as an alarm clock. As soon as I realize that my phone is missing, I immediately anticipate a scenario where I am going to wake up my roommate upon my arrival back home – it is 1:30 am – and ask him to wake me up before he goes to work. However, he recently started working at the grocery store, and his shifts are constantly changing, which means that he might not be home at all because of the night shift. If he’s not at home, I’ll have no option but to keep working at home the whole night, so I don’t have to be worried about being late for my job at the restaurant in the morning. However, I cannot do that, because my computer is too old to support the internet provider requirements at home, which causes it to freeze as soon as I start the device. I plan to go somewhere else, but I wonder where to go. Every place I can work at is closed by now in this town. What if I were somewhere else? I can perhaps go and work in the bar? That would be an option, though it might be too loud to work. In any case, I have to leave home at some point, so how do I stay awake? How do I wake up on time? I usually wake up early anyway, but how can I trust myself to be awake at 7:30 am, etc.? While all these anticipatory possibilities unfold in relation to each other, they also continuously relate to the fact that I just realized, when I irrevocably left the building, that I left my phone in the office. I checked my pockets and I couldn’t find it. How could I possibly forget something like that? I was just looking at it, I was just sitting in my office, and wondering how silly this old Blackberry phone is. Someone even made a joke few days ago telling me that if I show this phone to Justin Trudeau, I will immediately get my permanent residence, etc.

Yes, I just realized that I left my phone because just I checked my pockets. Why
shouldn’t I check them again? Suddenly, after I check them again, I realize that the phone is actually in one of my pockets, just buried beneath the two packs of cigarettes. I realize how lucky I am, and that now I don’t have to worry about waking my roommate back home or working somewhere else or relying on habit to wake up early in the morning. Now, I plan to go home, turn my alarm clock, and wake up in the morning for the shift at the restaurant. I am happy, but also worried that I will be losing precious time on completing my dissertation. What if I fail to meet the deadline? What will happen then? I have to start planning about how to make money to register for another semester. What about the school’s approval for the extension of my registration, etc.?

However, if we look at this temporal experience through the lens of continuity 2, we understand that the moment when I thought that I lost my phone and the moment when I found it articulate each other through the peculiarity of their own unfolding. The relief that I experience in the moment I find my phone in my pocket is literally measured or reflected against the anxiety of the previous realization that I’d just forgotten my phone. The anxiety related to the fact that I just forgot my phone fades away once I find the phone, thereby resulting in relief, precisely because of the unbearable weight of what had just happened – the endless anxiety of losing the phone and what that loss anticipates.

Let us briefly come back to the double-continuity analysis of retention. The linearity of objective time is being carefully followed by the introduction of continuity 2 in Husserl’s analysis of retention. This means that the temporal object is viewed in its entirety, because this view is necessitated by the sequencing of the objective time flow. The temporal object, i.e. the melody, reaches its completion as the linear progression from the first tone to the last tone ends. The linearity of progression of the melody was
accompanied by its recession into the immediate past(s), creating continuity 1. Husserl, as pointed out earlier, in order to avoid the mere collection or addition of retentions on line EA’ (Figure 1), re-addresses the whole process from the closing tone of the melody. This means that the retention of the last tone, by being a retention of the retention(s), emphasizes the peculiarity of the previous retention(s) in its own self-enclosure, “making it” circle back on itself, or to “self-empty” as Husserl describes this in the Bernau Manuscripts. Just as continuity 2 depicts the self-encircling of the retentions within the unity of the melody, so too, does the unity of the melody become fully available through this self-encircling of the retentions. However, we understand now this mutual relation between the unity of melody and its retention only within the perspective of continuity 2, where the self-encircling of retentions is made explicit. We can suggest that the Bernau Manuscripts even more strongly emphasize what was already visible in the 1905 ITC lectures, namely that there is a third circularity in place, in the addition to the two previously mentioned: A) the mutual relation of differentiation or self-enclosure that obtains between objective time and its retentional and protentional modifications, B) the circling back and forth between continuity 1 and continuity 2, and C) the self-encircling of protentions and retentions through their self-emptying and self-fulfillment vis a vis the entirety of the temporal object.

The introduction of continuity 2 into the analysis of protention is necessitated by the simple fact that, as the temporal object progressively unfolds on the horizontal line of objective time, the movement on the protention-retention vertical axis corresponds to it by modifying it protentionally-retentionally. The protentions unavoidably sink while mirroring the development on the line of the progression on the temporal sequence
parallel to it: “‘As a result’ of consecutive emergence, there arises, in a necessary immanent ‘causality,’ this re-formation (Umbildung) of intentionality, from one sidedness comes double-sidedness, and the new side becomes a type of mirror image of the original side.”\textsuperscript{338} It is important to notice Husserl’s use of the term “mirroring”, as it clearly points out that the composition of the phenomenological articulation rests on self-enclosures and not on the permeation between protentions. This mutual mirroring takes place in the relation between objective time and its phenomenological modification. The phenomenological re-articulation of the objective time flow along the retention-protention axis relies on the objective time-flow by hanging on to it or by taking it more seriously than it takes itself, as mentioned earlier in this chapter. The protention-retention increases-decreases by providing the opportunity for the progression of the objective time flow to “see its own reflection”. The inability of the objective time flow to address the inherent asymmetry between immediate past, immediate future and present through its own solidification is reflected in its “skewing” by phenomenological articulation. The adherence of the phenomenological articulation to the unfolding of objective time becomes crucial for insight into the self-encircling of protention and retention apropos each other:

Every point of the upper protentional sequence is directed in mediate intentionality to a point on the base series. Also thereby is every segment of a protentional upper sequence directed to a delimited segment of a later parallel upper sequence, found in the corresponding sloping strip. And that goes still further into the angle. Every such segment, we could say, “sinks”; the sinking is a constant self-fulfillment. But, in a certain sense, only that which lies above the EE is a self-“fulfilling,” what <lies> underneath is a self-“emptying,” although protentions are always “fulfilling” themselves there. Further, if one of the upper verticals becomes real (reel), it enters at the same time as fulfillment, and it is, in relation to its parallel sequences, at the same time

\textsuperscript{338} Ibid, 5. “‘Infolge des nacheinander Auftretens erwachst in notwendiger immanenter ‘Kausalität’ diese Umbildung der Intentionalität, aus der Einseitigkeit wird Doppelseitigkeit, und die neue Seite (wird) eine Art Spiegelbild der Urseite” (Hua, XXXIII, 24).
retention, including the segment or branch of the segment that had signaled the corresponding past upper segment, just as had been the case in the lower field . . . This anticipation is however motivated through the continuum of preceding retentions as a progressive continuum, and here this continuum, in the actualization of a running-off, is necessarily continuum of fulfillment, every phase constantly fulfilling and <motivating> for the succeeding protention, which is in turn fulfilled in the progression. That each phase is also retention of the previous is eo ipso given. For fulfillment contains in itself the retention of the preceding intention. The preceding as such is retained in a new consciousness of retention, and this consciousness is on the one hand characterized as in itself the fulfillment of the earlier, and on the other hand as in itself the retention of the earlier. Does this not pose a difficulty? The earlier <consciousness> is protention (that is intention “directed” to what comes later), and the next retention would also be retention of the earlier retention, which is simultaneously characterized as protention. This new emerging retention thus reproduces the earlier retention with its protentional tendency and at the same fulfills it, but in a way that through this fulfillment a protention continues on to the next phase. 339

The capacity of protention to be “at the same time” 1) the protention of the succeeding protentions, by simultaneously being measured by the progression or increase in its corresponding retentions, which are also retentions of preceding retentions and 2) the retention of the earlier temporal sequence, exemplifies the necessity for the introduction of continuity 2 in the discussion of retentions. Husserl emphasizes already in the first part of the quotation above that the development in the opposite direction between retention and protention unfolds in sections or sequences which are parallel to each other “at the same time”, i.e. within the time of the duration of the temporal object. It becomes visible, once again, that the past, present and future are not pasted to each other progressively, but are mutually re-articulated through their self-enclosure along the decrease-increase line. The unfolding of objective time on the horizontal line is pulled

forward to retention and backward to protention, as illustrated in Figure 3. However, the mutual self-encircling of protention and retention, as described in the Bernau Manuscripts, introduces the peculiar dynamics according to which retention and protention not only encircle one another, but also exchange places within the context of the mutually surrounding temporal sequences. The reason for the transformation of retention into protention is that the decrease-increase on the vertical protention-retention axis of every time sequence unfolds parallel to the same process within the temporal sequence that succeeds or precedes it. The “dynamics” on the vertical line of protention-retention is mirrored by the “fragmentation” or “staticism” on the horizontal line of the objective flow, as pointed out earlier, and as visually demonstrated below by Husserl in Figures 4, 5 and 6:

**Figure 4**

![Figure 4](image1)

**Figure 5**

![Figure 5](image2)

**Figure 6**

![Figure 6](image3)
Husserl observes in the quotation above that the point in the upper protentional sequence is “directed to a delimited segment of a later parallel upper sequence, found in the corresponding sloping strip.”\textsuperscript{340} It is directed to the later parallel protentional sequence, by constantly sinking in relation to it, precisely because it “fulfills” itself as protention. Furthermore, the protention is, at the time of its sinking vis a vis the later parallel sequence, a retention, in itself, of the past parallel sequence. The protention, within the necessity of the new temporal sequence to which it belongs and in contrast to its preceding sequence, retains the protention of the preceding sequence, while at the same time it opens new protention associated with it. This means that the earlier retention is reproduced with its protentional tendency, which is fulfilled by the new protention “but in a way that through this fulfillment a protention continues on to the next phase.”\textsuperscript{341} The increase in protention is therefore ongoing precisely in its relation to the rise of the self-emptying in its accompanying retentions.

Husserl observes that, in transition from one temporal sequence to another, the

\textsuperscript{340} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{341} HS, 4.
protentional-retentional modification is twofold: “on the one hand the modification in which the given consciousness as modification of a preceding consciousness continues to modify in this way, so that it becomes the consciousness of the just past consciousness and through that of the earlier consciousness (or consciousness of the just-just past, itself the past of its just-past)” and on the other hand it is a modification “which modifies the given consciousness as the protention of the future coming (whereby the given consciousness itself is the modification of the preceding in its direction towards itself as coming in the future), and thus modifies in such a way that it emerges as fulfilling (‘expected’), but as the ‘immediate fulfilling,’ through which the mediate intentionality further extends.”342 The protentional modification, as introduced here, serves as a complete transformation of the concept of transition as introduced on the horizontal line of the past-present-future sequencing, meaning that the “singular moment is in itself also the fulfillment of the earlier protention and the corresponding modification of the remaining unfulfilled moments of the same.”343

A protention “relates” to its preceding and succeeding protentions by its own tendency for self-fulfilling, while at the same time it ‘proceeds forward’ as a (retentional) self-emptying instance. The “transition” between the parallel modificational sequences is possible precisely because “protention is also as such constantly directed back, even if it is protention, thus directed forward.”344 The protentions-retentions are therefore not merely repeated in the process of the transition but are predisposed to be ‘constantly re-enacted’ because of their tendency for the simultaneity of self-fulfillment and self-emptying. The transition between protentional sequences is possible because of the

342 Ibid, 5.
343 Ibid, 6.
344 Ibid.
predestination of protention to be fulfillment of preceding protentions, completing thereby its own capacity for self-fulfillment. Moreover, protention, by performing this completion, determines itself to be self-emptying also vis a vis preceding protention. Husserl describes this process by symbolizing the protentional phases of the originary phenomenological process or phenomenological modification of the temporal object X as Ux. The word originary describes the relation between the continua 1 and 2, where the divergence between the vertical retention-protention line and the horizontal line of the objective time flow defines the “universal character” of time consciousness. Husserl defines the originary process “as a process of consciousness-continua, each of which is infinite on two sides, and one can even in this respect choose any given point of the process phase (of the continuum Ux) as a null point, and then have from there two opposing directions, both infinite.”

The Ux is a protention which “relates to all the future U-sections” while it is also the protention of the upper points or the points above the base line E1En. However, and parallel with this, “each point of consciousness is ‘retention’ with respect to all the points of the earlier sequences”, while “on the other hand, only the points of the lower sequences are retentions,” where the lower sequence indicates the realm below the base line x of the Ux. Husserl describes the fundamentally ambiguous character of protentions and retentions, which develop their tendency towards reversibility within the context of the temporal object they re-articulate, precisely due to their persistence in distinction from each other. This persistence of protentions and retentions to participate in their essences – to borrow an expression from the Third Logical Investigation, the

345 Ibid, pp. 7-8
346 Ibid.
347 Ibid, 8.
constancy of their self-enclosure – necessitates the possibility of their “contact” and “exchange”. The phenomenological re-articulation of the process of transition within the objective time flow as its responsive indebtedness to that flow is described as follows by Husserl (and is illustrated by Figures 4 and 5):

The full clarification of the constitution of temporal objectivity, thus the relation of consciousness to it, where nevertheless this consciousness is thus related in a manifold ways, indicated a variety of different directions of reflection with respect to different mutually coordinated objectivities . . . The originary process is an infinite process, that is, a process that passes from the Ux –continua described above to ever more U, and in each phase Ux is the tendency of consciousness to a transition to a new phase, and every emerging phase is itself in accordance with the preceding tendency. And that continuously. Fulfillment here means “coming in the sense of a tendency.” And to be sure, tendency here is a mode of consciousness, and that which is coming, emerging in the sense of a tendency, is itself consciousness as something in consciousness, and is on its part in turn a tendency towards “something coming”. Here every phase is intention and fulfillment into the infinite. The originary process has this universal character as a process of consciousness-continua, each of which is infinite on two sides, and one can even in this respect choose any given point of the process phase (of the continuum Ux) as a null point, and then have from there two opposing directions, both infinite. That is, this does not concern the particular structure of Ux. Rather, it has to do with a fundamental peculiarity: namely that Ux passes over into Uy, and that every U passes in one direction into ever new U, in a way that cannot be reversed. The “eternal,” unstoppable process cannot be reversed, every Ux is in essence characterized against every Uy, as earlier or later, and this is an order which is just inviolable as that between individual numbers in the series of numbers, although here this has nothing to do with species, but with “individuals.”

The transition is necessitated by the “tendential” characteristic “already” built into the self-emptying of retention and self-fulfilling of protention. This means that as much as Ux irreversibly tends to pass over into Uy, so too Ux2 continuously passes over into Ux3, because it has passed Ux1. This is why, as described above, Ux, precisely by being Ux, is “already” a “tendency to a transition to a new phase”, which is, conversely, as an emerging phase, “itself in accordance with the preceding tendency”. This is why the transitional fulfillment means “coming in the sense of a tendency”, where tendency as such is defined as a peculiar mode of consciousness, not its mere attribute.

349 Ibid.
On objective time and its retentional modification, as they stare at each other: towards phenomenological method as a “performance”

We have seen above how Husserl’s conception of “double continuity” deepens our understanding of the manner in which the tension between the now and the just-past underlies our experience of temporal objects. Husserl’s description of this tension recalls his criticism of psychologism, empiricism and Brentano, where Husserl firmly rejects notions such as Präsenzzeit or phantasy as accurately indicating or describing the tension between the now and the just-past. What has just past and is primarily retained cannot be the product of any kind of image consciousness, because the now, Husserl suggests, cannot be pictorially represented and compared with a thing that is similar to it (the just-past). Furthermore, just as what has passed cannot “exist” anymore, neither can what is given in memory be a mere replica of the now, because it, itself, would be a perception of it, not a retention. This is why Husserl rejects the comparison between retention (primary memory) and perception:

It is fundamentally wrongheaded to argue: How, in the now, can I know of a not-now, since I cannot compare the not-now - which, of course, no longer exists – with the now (namely, with the memory image that I have on hand in the now)? . . . A comparing of what is no longer perceived but merely intended retentionally with something beyond it makes no sense whatsoever. Just as I see being-now in perception and enduring being in the extended perception as it becomes constituted, so I see the past in memory, insofar as the memory is primary memory. The past is given in primary memory, and givenness of the past is memory. Now if we again take up the question whether a retentional consciousness is conceivable that would not be the continuation of an impressional consciousness, we must say: Such a consciousness is impossible, for every retention intrinsically refers back to an impression. "Past" and "now" exclude one another. Identically the same thing can indeed be now and past, but only because it has endured between the past and the now.\footnote{Hua X, 36}
It is not only that terms such as “flow” and “stage” are re-examined by Husserl, but even the terms “past” and “now” are distinctly bracketed. Husserl suggests that retention refers back to the now impression neither by external assistance nor by its capacity to overpower the now point, but precisely by its own persistence to recede from the just-now. The reciprocal self-differentiation of retention and the now is not a mere sequencing or specific arrangement or ordering, which is why Husserl states that the retention of the now point A does not testify to the fact that A has preceded it. However, Husserl continues, “we do indeed assert it as evidence that A must have been perceived,”\textsuperscript{351} emphasizing both mutuality and struggle between the now and its retention within the continuity of the temporal object. Husserl, at the beginning of his analysis of double intentionality, preserves the now–just-past in-betweenness in order to avoid the philosophical debate about which comes first, objective time or subjective time (thereby avoiding both infinite regress and assertion of the primacy of objective time). He suggests that the now is seen as a “beginning, a source point, so to speak”\textsuperscript{352} of the running-off modes. This means that the now is located within the composition of temporal experience precisely in its continual confrontation with the continuity of the running-off modes. The retentions are not brought by the now, but they continually accumulate themselves against the fixity of its impressional persistence, emphasizing, through their own sedimentation, the now’s not just-pastness, so to speak.

De Warren suggests that it is even impossible to talk about the original impression and its retentions in their abstraction from each other. One cannot analyze the significance of original impression, de Warren remarks, “without considering its

\ \footnotesize \textsuperscript{351} Ibid, 35.  
\textsuperscript{352} Ibid, 30.
necessary transformation into primary memory". He further observes that "indeed, an original impression is itself an abstraction since an original impression is itself only given through its necessary transformation, or modification, into a consciousness of its running-off, or primary memory. In this manner, the axis of the original impression is ‘ecstatic,’ since, in Levinas’ insightful formulation, an original impression ‘throws its center of gravity outside itself’". We can even suggest that one’s throwing away of one’s center of gravity is manifested not only through the peculiar attitude of the original consciousness vis a vis retention (openness, as de Warren suggests) but also visa versa: the sedimentation of retention vis a vis the now point signifies its capacity to stare at its own limit, so to speak. De Warren sees “the activity” of the original impression as something that cannot be disentangled from its relation to retention, where it finds its own alterity. The passivity implicated by the term impression, de Warren observes, is “offset, however, by its further qualification as ‘original’ (Ur -), a predicate that infuses the meanings of ‘creative,’ ‘productive’ and ‘spontaneous’ into the ‘passivity’ of impression, and thus blends activity and passivity into a self-affection more properly described as medial in the sense of ‘opening itself ‘ or ‘self-showing’”. This self-affection of the original impression is, according to de Warren, “the event of subjectivity in its openness to that which is other than itself”. We can expand upon this reflection and suggest that the inherent openness of subjectivity towards its alterity in the above-mentioned self-showing is reflected in the solidification of both the nows and their retentions in their reciprocity through mutual difference. De Warren explicitly suggests

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354 Ibid.
355 Ibid, 128.
356 Ibid.
that the original impression is the “incessant impression of an original renewal, a repetition of original difference (or “in-betweenness”)”\textsuperscript{\textsuperscript{357}}. However, if we follow Husserl’s own analysis (also quoted by de Warren), we observe that time consciousness is distinguished as the self-affection of retention vis a vis the original impression. The original impression is responded to by the retention precisely in its being-there, in its complete incapability to relate itself to the retentional augmentation. What is emphasized, however, is that the augmentation of the level of retentional proceeding brings to light the objective flow of nows through its never-ending difference from it.

In Appendix I to the Analysis of Time Consciousness From the Years 1905 – 1910 Husserl starts with the observation of the relation between primal impression and its modification within a continuity that is not exclusively temporal. The linearity of the initial description of primal impression and its intensificational modification should not be understood as a mere preparatory illustration, but precisely as a depiction of the peculiar dynamics that underlies the tensions within the formation of time consciousness. Husserl contextualizes primal impression and its accompanying modification by describing the null point as the limit-moment from which, or against which, the modificational intensities (or retentions, in the case of temporal experience) “are spreading out”\textsuperscript{\textsuperscript{358}}. Although each intensity “is in itself what it is,”\textsuperscript{\textsuperscript{359}} in addition to the fact that “each new intensity is precisely a new intensity” (this distinction aims at the description of continuity 1), the intensities appear to be in a relation to each other (continuity 2), where “every intensity later in the series can be regarded as the result of

\textsuperscript{\textsuperscript{357}} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{\textsuperscript{358}} Hua X,106.
\textsuperscript{\textsuperscript{359}} Ibid.
operation."\(^{360}\) We observe the augmentation of the intensificational modifications – the “infinity of interpenetrating modifications”\(^{361}\) only within the context of the object of experience (e.g. the temporal object), “in virtue”\(^{362}\) of its continuity (e.g. continuity 2), so to speak. Each point of the continuity is not a simple sequence following the preceding point, its mere intensification, but “intensification of intensification of intensification, and so on in infinitum and infinitesimally.”\(^{363}\) However, in this case, as Husserl points out, “there is no beginning-point that can be taken as an intensity in itself”.\(^{364}\) To state this differently, only within the context of its ability to be contrasted with the constancy of the augmentation of the accompanying intensities is the original impression able to stand firmly beyond this self-perpetuating infinity of intensifications. The “standing-beyond” of the realm of the flow of objective time means standing against the phenomenological articulation of time. Starting from any point in a linear continuum, we can think of other points in that same continuum as being produced by that initial starting point.

Furthermore, the production of the points within the linear continuum consists in a continuous iteration of the components of that continuum, where every later point is produced as a modification of the earlier ones. Husserl insists, moreover, that this production of points in the time-constituting continuum is not a mere metaphor but it is used “authentically”:\(^{365}\)

\[\ldots\] while the use of the word “production” is a metaphor in the case of other continua, here it is used authentically. The time constituting continuum is a flow of continuous production of modifications of modifications. The modifications in the sense of iterations proceed from the

\(^{360}\) Ibid.
\(^{361}\) Ibid.
\(^{362}\) Ibid.
\(^{363}\) Ibid.
\(^{364}\) Ibid.
\(^{365}\) Ibid.
actually present now, the actual primal impression i; but they go forwards continuously and are not only modifications in relation to i but also, in succession, modifications of one another in the order in which they flow away. This is what characterizes continuous production. Modification continuously generates ever new modification. The primal impression is the absolute beginning of this production, the primal source, that from which everything else is continuously produced. But it itself is not produced: it does not arise as something produced but through genesis spontanea; it is primal generation. It does not spring from anything (it has no seed); it is primal creation. If it is said: A new now continuously forms on the now that becomes modified into a not-now, or a source quite suddenly engenders it or originates it, these are metaphors. It can only be said: Consciousness is nothing without impression. When something endures, then a passes over into xa', xa' into yx'a", and so on. But the production for which consciousness is responsible only reaches from a to a', from xa' to x'a"; the a, x, y, on the other hand, is nothing produced by consciousness. It is what is primally produced - the "new," that which has come into being alien to consciousness, that which has been received as what has been produced through consciousness’s own spontaneity. The peculiarity of this spontaneity of consciousness, however, is that it creates nothing “new” but only brings what has been primally generated to growth, to development. Of course, what from an empirical point of view we call becoming or production refers to objectivity, and that lies somewhere else altogether. Here it is a question of the spontaneity of consciousness; or put more carefully: of primal spontaneity of consciousness. . . each moment of origin helps to constitute a concrete duration, and it belongs to the constitution of a concrete duration that an actually present now corresponds to each of its points. The now, for its part, requires its own moment of origin for its constitution. These moments are continuously united in the succession: they “pass over onto one other continuously.” The transition is mediated “qualitatively” and also temporally: the quasi-temporal character is a continuous character.366

When Husserl remarks that consciousness is nothing but impression, he suggests that the constant augmentation of the retention of nows is nothing without its ability to point back at the objective flow of nows. This is why production through modificational iteration does not capture the now point, which persists, on its own, as something that exposes the retentional augmentation without being part of it. The activity of retentional modification is in fact nothing but the demonstration of its immanent passivity, or even its limitation in the face of objective time. Conversely, objective time through the obviousness of the succession of nows is constantly being pulled back, so to speak, by the “magneticism” of its own retention. Temporal experience needs to preserve, therefore, this “insolvable” asymmetry between objective time and its retention.

Temporality is therefore quasi temporal not only through the ambivalence between qualitative and temporal transitions between nows (which “pass over onto one another continuously”), but also through their mutual articulation. The notion of belongingness between the now and its retentional modification – as in: “it belongs to the constitution of a concrete duration that an actually present now corresponds to each of its points” – is not annulled, but is even more emphasized by the fact that the now “requires its own moment of origin for its constitution.” The authenticity of the production in retentional augmentation is reflected precisely in its ability not to produce anything new on the front of objective time, but to bring it to growth by “pulling it back” to its own solidification. Retentional modification “brings” the now, in fact, to its own retentional growth, thereby emphasizing that the now is already generated on its own terms. Retentional growth literally unfolds in the face of the objective sequencing of time, bearing witness to its own indebtedness, its own responsiveness, to it. We can say that the relationship between the now and its retention is inherently ambiguous, as belongingness in difference, precisely because retentional augmentation does not grow indifferent to objective time, but grows precisely in spite of it. The now-point comes “into being alien to consciousness” precisely through consciousness’s capacity for spontaneous self-production against it. We can also interpret Husserl’s suggestion that “consciousness is nothing without impression” by proposing that consciousness is nothing without its ability to resist the obviousness of the objective time-flow by its own self-production. Conversely, the infinitesimal modificational augmentation of retention is nothing if perceived outside its ability to protest against the uncanny persistence of the sequencing of objective time points. This is why Husserl says that it is a metaphor to

367 Ibid.
suggest that primal impression engenders or originates the retentional modifications.

We may consider the example of an athlete who runs a hundred meters attempting to set new world record. His intention is to meet a certain time-count – 9:57sec, for example – and in order to do that, he needs to get his body into shape. There is a whole culture of various sorts of trainings, dietetic requirements, and psycho-physical preparatory measures that an athlete may employ to do so. The athlete’s psycho-physicality, so to speak, becomes an instrument in itself for the achievement of a certain goal. We observe, however, that as much as the body is utilized for crossing of a certain distance within a certain time-frame, so too may it constitute an obstacle to the achievement of this goal. To state this point differently, we, as human beings, can run a hundred meters within a certain time-frame only with respect to our psycho-physical capacities. We cannot run as fast as cheetahs, for example, because the resistance of our bodies, its constitutional inertia for the particular distance over the peculiar time, is greater than that of the cheetah’s body.

The successful execution of the plan to cross a distance within a certain amount of time – to run ever more quickly in order to cross a hundred meters – not only depends on its realization, but is betrayed by it. Just as the body is utilized for the crossing of a certain time-line, so too, does the time-count stand as a limiting point against which the body solidifies itself. We have the impression that the athlete is flying once he reaches a certain velocity precisely because he’s touching the ground in a peculiar manner. The body is shaped in such a way that it can endure the pressure of crossing a hundred meter distance not only over 9:57 seconds, but also against these 9:57 seconds. We can say that nothing can prepare the psycho-physicality of an athlete to establish a new world record,
because the achievement of the world record shaped the body in a way in which it had not been shaped before. The transformation, the peculiar stretching out, of the psycho-physical composition of Bolt, Powell, Gatlin, Montgomery or Lewis literally bore the weight of the world record, thereby being shaped by this peculiar time that it took these athletes to cross the hundred meters distance. It literally took them this peculiar time to cross the hundred meters, because the time took away something from their bodies, shaping them in a particular way. They were not able to take their time, so to speak, because of the nature of their endeavor, as if they had been constantly warned about the unavoidable fact that they would be “achieved” or shaped by the endurance of their bodies for the time of the world record they would achieve. Such athletes cannot “take their time”, because they stare at its unreachable fixity; for them, the timeline persistently stands as something that is to be met in its impossibility to be met through its ever-faster motto. They cannot take time because they do not have it. They do not have time because they are constantly running out of it.

We observe that the time count stands as a measure of the irreconcilable relation between an athlete’s desire to run ever faster and the unavoidable persistence of its realization. The realization betrays its intention, where the fixity of the latter is exemplified through the augmentation, shaping or lagging-behindness of the former. We have the impression that the athlete moving at a certain velocity is almost flying in his attempt to meet the time count of the world record because he is, in fact, touching the ground in such a peculiar manner. The runner beats the record by setting a new one, thereby endlessly fixing the possibility of an ever-new record.

De Warren describes Husserl’s insight into the fact that the now always runs off
into its retention or immediate past, while it gives away “to a renewed, and different, now-phase, which, in turn, runs off”, as “the drama of the expiration and renewal of now phases” which “recurs continuously over the course of the time-object’s duration as a whole.”\textsuperscript{368} This drama is captured in the “in-betweeness” of the just now experience, which captures the ultimate unity in the unbridgeable difference between the now and the just-past, their “unity in difference.”\textsuperscript{369} De Warren’s reading of Husserl suggests that time consciousness as the consciousness of the original temporal difference “is itself awake” through its openness not to the peculiar object of experience but as a condition of the experience. Time consciousness is therefore nothing but the naming of the rift in the unity between objective time and its retentional modification, where both streams – the retentional flow and the objective flow – relate to each other through their common ability to persist in their self-enclosure (apropos each other). This readiness of the consciousness to name, or as de Warren puts it, to be open “for what is yet to come in the wake of a past that is still not beyond are grasp”, is what de Warren uses to recall Husserl’s characterization of the alive, or the “waking consciousness”: “the waking consciousness [das wache Bewusstsein], the waking life, is a living towards [Entgegenleben], a living from the now towards new now.”\textsuperscript{370} However, we have to be cautious here not to ascribe any sort of agency or even a “subjectivity” to time consciousness in its capacity to witness its own “compositional” struggle. Consciousness is alive not because of its capacity to endow something with life, but because of its ability to identify, or, more precisely, to articulate the vivacity of temporal experience, the

\textsuperscript{369} Ibid, 118. 
\textsuperscript{370} Ibid.
endless struggle between the fixity of objective time and its retentional distortion.

Consciousness is alive by virtue of such recognition. The consciousness of the vivacity of the struggle between objective time and its retentional articulation is, therefore, the coming to prominence of this vivacity itself. This vivacity is described by de Warren in the following manner:

As Husserl writes: “Sensations and ‘apprehending’ or apperceptive acts are experienced, but they do not appear as objects . . . Objects, on the other hand, appear and are perceived, but they are themselves not experienced” (Hua XIX.1, 399). This choice of the expression “lived experience” (Erlebnis) to characterize immanent sensations and acts of consciousness already implies a temporal form to immanent consciousness, even before Husserl has explicitly turned to consider the temporal constitution of consciousness as such. The verb Erleben (from which the noun Erlebnis is derived) means “to still be alive when something happens” or “to undergo an event,” and suggests the immediacy “with which something is grasped.” Both shades of meaning (immediacy and acquisition) are compressed in the English rendering of Erlebnis as “lived experience.” The reference to life (Leben) is at once significant and indefinite in the term Erlebnis, and undoubtedly contributed to its appeal for Husserl. . . Throughout, consciousness of the note is both a consciousness of continuity, a consciousness of a beginning to an end, and the consciousness of self-differentiating now-phases. The stable identity of the note stands in contrast to the manner in which the note is “given” in consciousness, which is always other than as just given (ein immer anderer), always in a new “now-phase” caught in a constant flux (in einem bestaendigen Flusse) in the mode of “running-off” (Hua X, 25 [26]). . . The unchanging form of temporal givenness, as now, in its changing now-phases is nothing other than the form of the time-object itself. The living present is thus characterized as both “standing” and “streaming.” Although all experience happens in the form of the now, it is impossible for experience to remain in the form of the now . . . During this early stage of analysis, Husserl remains guided by the “apprehension-content of apprehension” schema of intentionality and construes the constitutive interplay of changing temporal profiles and intended temporal form along the dynamic lines of the changing perspectives of one and same pole of identity.371

It is remarkable that de Warren defines Erleben, as it is used by Husserl, as to “still be alive when something happens”. The best example to illustrate this situation is the manner in which one person might respond to another person’s remark about a certain event in which she did not participate. The former might say: ‘you simply cannot understand it, because you haven’t been through it’(war, for example). The expression ‘to have been through something’ preserves and emphasizes both aspects of the experienced

event: the temporal participation in the objective time of a certain event and the personal transformation despite the temporal flow of that event. For example, a person was physically present during the Bosnian war during 1992-1995 and defined her personal integrity by not becoming part of the nationalist mainstream and the war-crime opportunism on which it rested. The people who related to the times of 1992-1995 by resisting the ‘historical changes’ literally compressed themselves against the ‘unavoidable changes’ of the time of transition from socialism to ‘democracy.’ They were shaped by the time, standing against the ideology of the ‘unavoidable flow of time’, ‘the flow of changes’, by not becoming part of the nationalist mainstream. The war/post-war narrative in the Balkans, which arose during the transition from the socialist-democratic to the democratic-nationalist reality, was rooted in the belief in the linearity of progress. The people who joined the mainstream became part of the self-perpetuating dynamics of the balancing out between the national interests of dominant ethnicities (Serbs, Bosniaks, Croats).

What seemed to be a legitimate transition from a one-party system to a multi-party democratic environment became a plurality of one-party mentalities. In other words, instead of the dominance of one party (the communist party), the societies in the Balkans were submerged in the sharp class divisions introduced by the nationalist programs. The one-directionality of the movement forward was embraced by the social and political elites, whose success depended upon the destruction of the institutions and the social relations that were “lagging behind” the changes. The war/post-war time was

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372 Important read about the self-defeating core of the “democratic” transition process in Yugoslavia can be located in Welcome to the Desert of Post-Socialism: Radical Politics After Yugoslavia, ed. Horvat and Štiks (New York: Verso, 2015). The paradoxes of the Dayton Peace Accords which became Bosnian Constitution is elegantly analyzed by Asim Mujkić in «We, the Citizens of Ethnopolis», Constellations 14(1): 112-128.
literally ‘the time’ of the nationalist elites who opportunistically destroyed everything that stood in the way of change. Even though they didn’t subsist or suffer through these times, the time of changes was literally theirs. However, this was their time, they owned it, because the time flow embodied their plans for social transformation, which they did not suffer, so to speak. To word it differently, they did not endure the hardships of war, as the war for them was just a symbolization of the time of their affirmation and success. For them, the war had passed as if it had never happened, as it did not happen to them. In other words, they had not even been through the war, as there was nothing to endure, nothing to ‘be through’ for them, except to blindly rely on the count of time, to be in touch with it, to have time on their side. Paradoxically, by leading the war, staying above the fray, the war-time elites have never fully “been through” it. Conversely, by persistently lagging behind the flow of the changes, the people who didn’t adjust themselves to the new circumstances experienced those changes far more complexly than their new leaders.

To come back to de Warren’s interpretation of the term erleben, “to still be alive when something happens”, directly captures the inherent asymmetry between the objective flow of time and its recession. The asymmetry is not a simple relation of disinterestedness between the now and the just past, but it is a manifestation of a constant wrestling between the former and the latter. The stable identity of the objective aspect of the temporal experience is ongoingly confronted by the persistence of its retentional modification, as much as the latter contributes to the temporal experience only as the running off of the former. The standing of “the stable identity of tone” (its objective time, its now-sequencing) is visible only against the perpetual flow it is directed against. The
constant betrayal of the “unchanging form of the temporal experience”, the now, through
the never-ending changes of the now into just-now is what defines the temporal
experience. The aliveness or vivacity of temporal experience is defined as the face-off
between the standing of the now and the streaming of its running-off modes. Husserl
emphasizes the tension that underlies the unity in difference between the now and the
just-past by observing that “it is the same tone that now sounds of which it is said in the
“later” flow of consciousness that it has been.”373 The sameness of the tone hosts the
tension, as much as the temporal experience unfolds as the struggle between the fixity of
objective time and “the manner in which it appears.”374 Husserl uses the metaphor of a
distance to stress this tension and points out that “each time-point is fixed, but it flies into
the distance for consciousness.”375 The fixity of objective time is countered with the
distancing of the retention, which is what makes it possible that “time-consciousness is
both a consciousness of proximity and a freedom of perspective, a consciousness of
distance within this proximity.”376

Husserl indicates in the Bernau Manuscripts that the intentionality of time
consciousness is constituted through the above-mentioned competing between the
objective time flow and its retention. Furthermore, the transition from one point in time to
another is clearly two-sided: 1) the sequencing on the line of the objective time flow as it
is mirrored through 2) the transition between retention and protention. The experience of
this two-sidedness, the witnessing of the tension between them, is a radical attempt at the
re-articulation of the notion of consciousness as a flow. Husserl suggests that what seems

373 Hua X, 25 [26].
374 Ibid, 27.
375 Ibid.
to be the experience of the temporal flow is nothing but the activity of “standing in the middle of an infinite process, and we pull out a phase that is a double branching of intentionalities, in which the originary datum only stands out as a moment of intentionality.” This standing in the middle of an infinite process is the recognition of the struggle between the now and its retentions and protentions, where temporal transition indicates the reversibility between retention and protention, precisely as they point at each other through their through their self-fulfillment or self-emptying. Our experience of the flow of time is nothing but the grasping of the above-mentioned struggle, where the only continuity is the continuation of the standing in the middle of that struggle. We can even say that what flows is our standing in the midst of the tension between the now and its retention-protention, or what stands is the flow of that tension:

For we do not begin with a course of originary data that are merely retentionally changing, in the wake of which come protentions and retentions of protentions. What we have as a beginning is only the beginning of observation, we continue to stand in the middle of an infinite process, and we pull out a phase that is a double branching of intentionalities, in which the originary datum only stands out as a moment of intentionality. The two different branches of the moment-consciousness in the originary process along with the limit point that thereby stands out. In addition: the full clarification of the constitution of temporal objectivity, thus the relation of consciousness to it, where nevertheless this consciousness is thus related in a manifold ways, indicating a variety of different directions of reflection with respect to different mutually coordinated objectivities.378

The manner in which consciousness is related to temporal objectivity, the “infinite process” of a phenomenological ‘enunciation’ of the objective time flow, is designed in such a way that it can counter the notion of infinity as an endessness sequence of differentiated moments of intentionality. Husserl, in fact, remarks in a footnote to this passage that a distinction needs to be made between the moments of intentionality and the

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377 HS, 7.
378 Ibid.
horizon of infinity, which is a “mere potentiality of possible collections.” Husserl warns that were we not to make this distinction we would end up having in every originary datum (Ux) “an actual infinity of moments”, which would also imply that the beginning of the temporal experience would manifest itself “as the eruption of a completely unexpected event.” This observation confirms that Husserl’s phenomenology of time constantly unfolds as a reaction against the understanding of time according to which time is observed either as the flow between points or as the point of the unification of the past, present and future.

As de Warren points out, Husserl, in order to address running off as a distancing of consciousness, constantly employs pairs of concepts such as distance – proximity and clarity – darkness. The concepts of distance and proximity are not a mere illustration of the inherent struggle within time consciousness, not even an expression of it, but they are this struggle, so to speak. The metaphors indicating identity in difference, mutuality of standing and streaming, the fixity of the now and its running off are primarily designed to combat the Lockean metaphor of consciousness as stream, as de Warren remarks. However, these concepts are designed as “self-transgressing” metaphors that do not have any other conceptual role except to point out the self-betrayal of the metaphors of the flow of consciousness and the count of objective time. These metaphors stand for their own limitation proportionally to their usage in their mutual isolation. Husserl neither rules out the consciousness of time nor prioritizes the time of consciousness over the consciousness of time, essentially proposing that “time consciousness can (and must) be

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379 Ibid.
380 Ibid. This is the full text of Husserl’s footnote: “The solution is not so easily arrived at. There must nevertheless be a distinction made between differentiated moments and the horizon of infinity, which is a mere potentiality of possible recollections. Otherwise we would have in every Ux an actual infinity of moments. And a beginning as the eruption of a completely unexpected event? This will not do” (ibid).
read from two directions at once, as the consciousness of time and as the time of consciousness." De Warren observes that Husserl “retains the basic characterization of consciousness as a stream or flow, yet purges it of any psychological or ‘naturalized’ meaning as exemplified in Locke and Brentano.” He further observes that Husserl intends to replace the metaphor of the train of thoughts, or the metaphor of time, with “concrete phenomenological description” securing the possibility of reaching to the things themselves (beyond metaphor). De Warren cautiously observes, however, that Husserl is faced with the ultimate dilemma: 1) to provide a conceptual account of the intuitive givenness of time consciousness without relying on the usage of metaphors, or 2) if metaphors cannot be dispensed with, to analyze time consciousness within the analytic frame where the employed metaphors are alive. We can expand upon this insight and suggest that it is not only that the metaphors cannot be dispensed with by reaching towards the things themselves through the phenomenological description: to the contrary, to reach towards the things themselves means nothing but to penetrate through the notion of consciousness as a flow by over-working it, or overemploying it. The analysis of time consciousness does not rest on the abandoning of the notion of the flow consciousness, but on its confrontation with the metaphor of retentional running off. To purge consciousness as a stream or flow from any psychological or ‘naturalized’ meaning means precisely to employ it, in its psychologistic portrayal, against the metaphor of running off. Both of the concepts are deliberately used as metaphors, however, only vis a vis each other in their fixity. Time-consciousness is both consciousness of time and the

381 Ibid, 106.
384 Ibid.
time of consciousness, where “this apparent circularity” is not only “lodged at the core of time-consciousness”, pointing at the question of whether “a non-circular account of time consciousness is possible”, but is also not merely “apparent.” Overemployment of the above-mentioned metaphors is where the phenomenological philosophy demonstrates that the “method is performance, and the performance of method is always situated in the midst of handling problems”. If we agree with de Warren that the phenomenological method needs to refashion itself through lines of inquiry “that both motivate it and challenge it,” then we can also suggest that phenomenological self-testing through its encounter with the prevailing philosophies of time constitutes its main philosophical motivation.

**Concluding remarks**

I have suggested in this chapter that Husserl’s circular strategy comes to prominence in Husserl’s analysis of time consciousness through the differentiation between two continuities: continuity 1, which is the divergence of the self-unfolding of the objective time flow and its phenomenological counterpart, and continuity 2, which is the re-articulation of the sedimentation of the retentions-protentions. The ‘progression’ on the horizontal line of the objective time flow between past, present and future is contrasted with the decrease-increase on the vertical line of protention-retention in continuity 1. However, the peculiar methodological novelty of Husserl’s phenomenology of time consciousness is that he here introduces continuity 2, suggesting that the retentions encircle themselves not only in relation to the now point, but also in relation to

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385 Ibid, 108.  
386 Ibid.
previous retentions. Further, another circularity appears in the relation between protentions and in the relation between protentions and retentions (in the moment when protention becomes retention of another protention).

What this means is that phenomenological analysis is not a mere reversal of the theories it responds to, but an exercise in constant introspection, caution and self-regulation. The continuity of the self-enclosures between retentions, protentions, and retentions and protentions is designed so that the development of phenomenological reduction on the axis protention-retention is not a mere sum of its parts, their sequencing or even layering. This means that the components on the retention-protention axis are constantly re-articulated, revived, so to speak, so they cannot construe anything more than the expression of the constancy of their self-encircling.

The above-mentioned phenomenological caution is particularly expressed through the baroque complexity of Husserl’s time diagrams from the 1905 “Lectures on the Phenomenology of the Consciousness of Internal Time” and especially from the Bernau Manuscripts. It is not only the case that the difference between the investigated (the problem of time) and the investigator (phenomenology of time consciousness) in these diagrams is obscured, but it is also the case that the above-mentioned positions become interchangeable. Metaphoricity of phenomenological language, the seriousness of its irony and the irony in its seriousness are most explicitly expressed through the ‘spatial representation’ of Husserl’s time diagrams, as de Warren points out.
Chapter 4

Phenomenological Vulnerability in Reversibility: On Nihilism and Depth in Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty

“Banality, like a plastic bottle, is indestructible!”
Danilo Kiš

Introduction

In the first three chapters of this thesis I have described and analyzed the circular argumentation found in Husserl’s response to psychologism (Chapter 1), in his account of the whole-part relationship (Chapter 2) and in his phenomenology of time consciousness (Chapter 3). I have suggested in the first chapter that Husserl’s establishment of the ideal science of logic problematizes, in its non-psychologistic ‘purity’, the completeness of the psychologistic notion of inward evidentiality, exposing the peculiarities of its argumentative self-reference. As I have argued, Husserl sets the conditions for phenomenological investigation not through the rejection of the arguments he attempts to critically address, but through a peculiar sort of repetition. The very expansion of the realm of ideal science continually emphasizes the inherent limitations built into the psychologistic argumentative architectonics. Husserl practically demonstrates this strategy through his analysis of the whole-part relationship, as a peculiar response to
formal ontology and psychologistic logic. The phenomenological “dynamism” of the parts’ participation in their essences is mirrored by their “inactivity” on the formal-ontological level. The phenomenological-analytic “dynamism” is not opposed to, but is, so to speak, expressed through and mirrored by formal-ontological “passivity”.

Similarly, in my analysis of Husserl’s phenomenology of time consciousness, I have suggested that the phenomenological analysis of the problem of time unfolds as a continual clinging to the unfolding of objective time. This means that the “horizontal” unfolding of objective time appears to be curbed through the “weight” of its own flow, as it is phenomenologically articulated through the “verticality” of the relation between protention and retention. Just as the flow of objective time suggests transition in the notion of temporal continuity (seen as a bridging of the gaps between conceptually isolated past, present and future), so too is the phenomenological analysis of time nothing more or less than the problematizing of that transition. What Husserl does through this strategy is provide a challenge to the prominent and dominant philosophies of time before him, particularly those of Aristotle, Augustine and Brentano. Husserl’s above-mentioned challenge, however, is not designed as a mere confrontation, but as an expansion upon the arguments presented by these philosophers. Husserl demonstrated that there is a peculiar kind of covert circularity already at work in these philosophies of time. This circularity is reflected in the fact that these philosophies, through their own fixity – whether psychologistic or objective-absolutistic – invite an interpretive position that is blatantly excluded in their accounts of time. I propose that Husserl’s exaggeration of the positions of his opponents not only reflects his awareness of the extent to which his phenomenology is indebted to the theories that are being responded to, but also renders
his phenomenology less vulnerable to the criticism of his contemporaries, post-phenomenologists and philosophers of deconstruction. Not only the ability but also the general intention of Husserl’s phenomenology to openly stare at its own death (to borrow Derrida’s terminology from *Speech and Phenomena*), thereby acknowledging its own argumentative vulnerability, turns Husserl’s phenomenology into a unique type of philosophical practice.

Husserl’s peculiar attentiveness to the theories he criticizes remains a defining moment in the design of his own arguments. By closely following the argumentative structure of contemporaries and immediate predecessors whom he criticized, by fully acknowledging their concerns, Husserl was able to move beyond their philosophical projects. I propose in this chapter that both Merleau-Ponty and Heidegger, precisely in distancing themselves from Husserl’s phenomenological philosophy, recall some of Husserl’s concerns and re-activate some of Husserl’s own philosophical strategies – most importantly, the strategy of circularity that I have been discussing in such detail in my preceding chapters. This is where I see my reading of Husserl’s circular strategy becoming crucial for the critical analysis of some of the main figures in contemporary phenomenological and post-phenomenological philosophy. In this chapter I argue that both Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty, despite their refusal to grant epistemological superiority to the philosophical traditions to which they respond, exhibit a peculiar kind of phenomenological vulnerability. This is especially visible, I claim, in their treatments of the notions of nihilism, reversibility and depth. Both Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty in their reflections upon nihilism, poetry (Rilke, Trakl, Hoelderlin) and painting (Cézanne) use metaphors suggesting gaps, distortion, exposure and vulnerability. The
characterizations of nihilism as oblivion of Being and stillness of pain are used by Heidegger as a means of problematizing the possibility of overcoming metaphysics and the safety of shieldedness. In Merleau-Ponty’s reading of Cézanne, the concept of depth is introduced as a peculiar magnifying lens exposing the weakness that underlies the Cartesian notion of space. Heidegger’s and Merleau-Ponty’s success in establishing the safety of distance from the phenomena they reflect upon crucially depends on their ability to problematize the very process of critical distancing. This means that the tireless effort of overcoming the notion of truth as correctness and the Cartesian understanding of space, through the possibility of the turning into its own self-celebration, risks perpetuating the position it attempts to overcome.

We have to ask here whether Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty remain attentive to their methodological indebtedness to what they critically address. I question whether Heidegger’s investigation into the essence of Being remains attentive to its promise that this investigation is unbreakably bound to the questioning of the essence nihilism. I suggest that the notion of the turn of Being tends to overshadow the forgetfulness of Being in nihilism, instead of seeing it as something that constitutes this notion.

I propose, by focusing on Heidegger’s response to Jünger and segments from Merleau-Ponty’s later writings, that both philosophers seem to secure the safety of critical distance with what they phenomenologically investigate, not despite, but because of their proximity to it. Even though the notions of the turn of being or depth seemingly constitute themselves beyond the asymmetry built into self-other or essence-appearance dualisms, they construe another notion of primordiality that cannot be challenged. In this Chapter, then, I shall trace Heidegger’s and Merleau-Ponty’s attempts to resist either
reconciling or prioritizing one of the poles over the other, by bringing out the inherent contradiction built into their isolation. This contradiction is brought to light not through the rejection of the above-mentioned dualisms, but through their transformation. The success of the phenomenological analysis these authors employ depends on the formal resistance to place their method above the terms their analysis transforms.

However, the inadvertent distance through thematic proximity demonstrates itself almost in proportion to the arduous work of these authors in avoiding to place themselves above the problems they wrestle with. I particularly pay close attention to Heidegger’s conceptual device of the “turn of being” in his response to Jünger’s reflections upon nihilism. I believe that Heidegger in the essay “On the Question of Being” at times neglects the role of the phrase “the turn of being”, whose philosophical success is measured precisely in its potential to point out the banality of nihilistic self-enclosure. Conversely, Heidegger seems to depict nihilistic dominance only as a prelude to the grand narrative of the turn of being. This prioritizing of one constituent of analysis over another threatens to damage Heidegger’s laborious effort to challenge Jünger’s optimism regarding the possibility of the crossing over the line of nihilism. The totality of nihilistic destruction necessitates political, theological, scientific, and artistic alternatives to it, according to Jünger. Heidegger, on the contrary, suggests that the alternative to nihilism, which remains blind to its fundamental complicity in it and to nihilism’s relevance for the essence of metaphysics, risks continuing nihilistic thinking. However, the notion of the turn of being is often given a peculiar kind of agency that extends beyond its backward reference to the oblivion of being in nihilism. In other words, the mirroring of a struggle between the phenomenological reducer and phenomenologically reduced appears to be a
peculiar kind of a struggle in itself. I treat in this chapter both Jünger’s and Heidegger’s accounts of nihilism within the scope of the question concerning phenomenological reduction. I also believe that the clarification of the notion of the alternative to nihilism, as this bears upon the problem of phenomenological methodology, is inextricably bound to socio-cultural reflection upon the problem of nihilism.

I extend this discussion in the final sections of this chapter with an analysis of Merleau-Ponty’s notions of global locality, vibration and voluminosity of depth. Even though depth as the “first dimension” is employed so it can merely exaggerate two other dimensions, thereby transforming them, it appears that the notion of depth is accorded a peculiar kind of agency that extends beyond its backward reference to the rift between two other dimensions.

**Heidegger’s exposure to nihilism**

Heidegger, in “Plato’s Doctrine of Truth,” suggests that Plato’s idea replaces the notion of truth as *aletheia*, where truth as disclosedness is transformed into truth as correctness. The idea in Plato becomes the yoke that holds together the thing seen and the act of seeing. The unhidden becomes accessible due to the illuminating power of idea for interpreting the essence. The idea, for Heidegger, shines in itself, and by being “concerned only with the shining of itself” secures the coming to presence of being. This change in the notion of truth introduces the radical transformation of unconcealment into a mere correspondence between thought and thing. The turning away from the

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shadow (of the cave) towards the light of the idea introduces the notion of correctness in the adequate seeing of the light of truth. Heidegger points out that truth in Plato, because it is both unhidden and correct seeing, contains ambiguity.

Robert Bernasconi, however, observes that Heidegger, in “The End of Philosophy and the Task of Thinking,” questions his earlier qualifications of truth in Plato by suggesting that *aletheia* as unconcealment was already “originally experienced only as *orthotes*, as correctness of representations and statements.”\(^{389}\) This means that the transformation of truth as a peculiar movement from unconcealment to correctness becomes questionable. Bernasconi proceeds with the explanation that the *lethe* in *aletheia* signifies the oblivion of Being, and that *aletheia* echoes that oblivion only at the end of metaphysics. He suggests that there is a certain kinship between *aletheia* as not-yet metaphysical (e.g. the one we find in the pre-Socratics) and as no-longer metaphysical, which is ascribed to the end of metaphysics. Bernasconi recalls Heidegger stressing that this kinship is possible because, when Parmenides says *aletheia*, “a-letehia is heard,”\(^{390}\) meaning that unconcealment introduces itself to us through the exposure of Being’s oblivion. These reflections lead directly to the problem and the ambiguity built into the overcoming of metaphysics, thereby emphasizing Heidegger’s suggestion that the overcoming of metaphysics is not its mere rejection. Bernasconi further observes that to be outside of metaphysics “is not only to situate oneself in opposition to metaphysics, it is to do so according to metaphysical distinction between the inside and the outside.”\(^{391}\)

The reference here is to Heidegger’s postscript to “What is Metaphysics,” where

\(^{391}\) Ibid, 25.
Heidegger suggests that the question pertaining to the essence of metaphysics must be considered both metaphysically and in terms of its ground. Heidegger concludes that “all such questions must remain ambiguous in an essential sense.” Heidegger’s resistance to the mere rejection of metaphysics delivers its own phenomenological ambiguity. I suggest here, to press Bernasconi’s observation above, that Heidegger runs into conceptual difficulties for being unable to address the problem of the overcoming of metaphysics by moving within and thereby radicalizing the “metaphysical distinction between the inside and the outside.” Even though the oblivion of Being in “On the Question of Being” is introduced not as a mere lack of being but as something that inherently belongs to being and defines itself as pointed at by it, this concept still operates in strict separation from Being.

The forgetfulness of being that opens up the possibility of the question of being anew can be illustrated through the phenomenon of the nuclear device. This device stands as a symbol of both immense technological achievement and the ultimate destruction of the possibility of that advancement. It is, to make a reference to Sloterdijk’s *Critique of Cynical Reason*, a perfectly ironical device, as it embodies the ultimate technological-scientific progress while at the same time calling it into question. Sloterdijk suggests that the nuclear bomb literally laughs at us in its seriousness. The irrationality of its destructive force is disclosed through its indisputable “technical rationality.” Sloterdijk suggests that the bomb, precisely through its ultimate cynicism, where a device for unconditional protection operates also as a vehicle for global destruction, invites reflection about our existential and anthropological condition:

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392 Ibid.
The bomb has long since ceased to be a means to an end, for it is the boundless means that exceeds every possible end. However, since it can no longer be a means to an end, it must become a medium of self-experience. It is a anthropological event, an extreme objectification of the spirit of power that works behind the drive to self-preservation. Although we built it to "defend" ourselves it has, in fact, yielded for us a defenselessness without parallel. It is a consummation of the human in its "evil" aspect. We cannot get any more evil, intelligent, or defensive. The bomb is really the only Buddha that Western reason could understand. Its calm and its irony are infinite. It makes no difference to it how it fulfills its mission, whether in mute waiting or as firecloud; for it, the change of aggregate circumstances has no relevance. As with Buddha, everything that could be said is said through its mere existence. The bomb is not one bit more evil than reality and not one bit more destructive than we are. It is merely our unfolding, a material representation of our essence. Confronted by such a machine, strategic considerations are not appropriate but a heightened attentiveness is. The bomb demands of us neither struggle nor resignation, but self-experience. We are it. In it, the Western "subject" is consummated. Our most extreme armament makes us defenseless to the point of weakness, weak to the point of reason, reasonable to the point of fear. The only question that remains is whether we choose the external path or the inner path – whether insight will come from critical reflection or from the fireballs over the earth.

The irony-cynicism of the nuclear bomb simultaneously demands alternatives to it and opens up an investigation into the nature of these alternatives. The concrete political or social alternatives to nuclear armament won’t fully address the problem of the development of (nuclear) technology, if they do not understand the “anthropological” question that this technology raises. “Heightened attentiveness” to the bomb also implies heightened attentiveness to our self-experience, where one cannot come at the cost of another. In other words, the notion of alternative defeats itself if it does not recognize that it establishes itself not only against but also due to its counterpart. If an alternative forgets its indebtedness to what it is trying to reject, it risks perpetuating the same exclusionary core of the pure-contingent, self-other polarities that is built into the principle of self-preservation.

The essay “On the Question of Being” is designed as a conversation with Ernst Jünger. Heidegger observes that nihilism, as portrayed by Jünger in the book The Worker

and the essay “Over the Line,” stands for total mobilization, where, through the figure of
the worker, all that is actual achieves a “total work-like character.” This total
mobilization has a planetary tendency, and it demonstrates itself through the ultimate
rationalization of thinking or the technification of life. As the “unconditional will for
will,” nihilism wills homelessness. Heidegger observes that “in order to catch sight of
nihilism in the phase of its consummation, we must accompany its movement in
action.” Heidegger asks whether being, which, as he says, still shimmers in nihilism,
can be thematized independently of the consummation of nihilism. He observes that the
new turn of being raises the question of crossing the line of nihilism in the form of
thinking about this line but not necessarily going beyond it. The turn of being unfolds as
the realization that the essence of nihilism consists in the oblivion of being, and only as
this oblivion (not as a mere lack) does it appear as nothing. Even though the turn of being
is used as a tool for the illumination and further problematizing of the limitation of
nihilism through its obviousness, the concept designed to trace the movement of nihilism
in action turns into a peculiar kind of movement. Heidegger suggests that the essence of
nihilism cannot be grasped as if it were lying before us as a “propositional statement
waiting to be seized.” He implicitly raises the question about the possibility of the
realm that is ‘placed’ beyond or at the end of the insight into the inherent limitation of
metaphysics. Heidegger is asking here whether there is a distinction or even asymmetry
between the finding that metaphysics is predestined to think in propositional statements
and the realm of thinking that extends beyond the mereness of this insight? Heidegger’s

396 Ibid, 293.
397 Ibid, 294.
398 Ibid, 310.
question addresses his own method: if one’s inability to inquire into the essence of nihilism within the metaphysical tradition necessarily “points toward a realm that demands a different saying,” then would it be possible to suggest that the realm of different saying becomes accessible only as it makes explicit the inability of metaphysics to inquire into the essence of nihilism? Furthermore, we ask if it would be phenomenologically fruitful to distinguish between these two processes, without being attentive to the ambiguity of that distinguishing.

The turning of being, observes Heidegger, resides in the ultimate forgetfulness of being in nihilism. However, even though the term being is crossed out, the terminology of the turn, i.e., withdrawal, resistance, seems to point out something more than the crumbling of nihilism. Heidegger, in fact, establishes a stark difference between the philosophy of being and a metaphysical revolt against the thought that “moves within the oblivion of Being.”

Heidegger maintains that the oblivion of being is not addressed in its intertwinement with the question of the Being of beings but that the former is entirely overshadowed by what is made possible through it, namely access to thinking within the turn of Being. The ambiguity praised by Heidegger might end up in the trap of mere reversal or even of the reinforcement of metaphysical thinking. To illustrate the consequences of the mere reversal of the polarity—metaphysics, philosophy of being—we can reverse Adorno’s insight from Negative Dialectics and suggest that instead of abolishing hierarchy, Heidegger put the object on the abandoned throne of the subject. If the essence of nihilism “resides in the oblivion of being,” which implies that the desire to overcome nihilism as turning it into its essence becomes untenable, then the phrase “the recovery of metaphysics” signifies nothing more than the distancing from or, at best, a

399 Ibid, 319.
redundant exaggeration of the following statement: “We and our entire subsistence are still moving within the zone of nihilism, granted that the essence of nihilism indeed resides in the oblivion of being.”

**Conversation with Jünger and the initiation of the turn of Being**

We must recognize that, despite the major philosophical disagreements between Heidegger and Jünger about the overcoming of nihilism, Heidegger commends the analytical style we find in Jünger’s “Over the Line.” Jünger depicts nihilism not as a movement that is necessarily inspired by evil, chaos or decay, but as a planetary condition that is, in fact, immersed in propagating the good, order, and health. Furthermore, nihilism is, according to Jünger, at best a reductive mixture of the above-mentioned dichotomies. Just as nihilism “refashions order for its own purposes,” where “order is not only compatible with nihilism, but composes its style,” so too does it provide conditions where “as in the great sites of physical annihilation, sobriety, hygiene and strict order rule to the end.” The strength of nihilism is therefore not an occasional occurrence but something that is manifested as a “total spatial and temporal proximity of deprivation and liquidation.” Jünger even approximates Heidegger’s own care in the definition of the line of nihilism by suggesting that it is impossible to conduct a clear representation of nihilism, just as it is beyond human power to have an access to the

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400 Ibid, 318.
401 Jünger even suggests that evil appears as a “secondary phenomenon, like a fire in a theater or the sinking of a ship”[Timothy Sean Quinn, *Correspondence 1949-1975: Martin Heidegger and Ernst Jünger*, (London, New York: Rowman and Littlefield, 2016), 82].
402 Ibid, 76.
403 Ibid, 78.
404 Nihilism’s deviant orientation towards health is also demonstrated in its tendency not only to “normalize a higher degree of physical health,”(ibid) but also to exceeds it.
405 Ibid, 73.
Absolute, death, and Nothing. One can experience dying but not death itself, observes Jünger.

The obvious difference between Heidegger and Jünger comes to the fore in Jünger’s conservative optimism, which oscillates between political opportunism and an openly reactionary attitude. Jünger’s conservative hope is reflected in his view that the mere ability of an individual, not a collective, to witness the destructive force of nihilism already announces the possibility of safety on the other side of the line of nihilism. This passive activity, however, can be compared to the cynical laugher of the troublemaker in the back row of the classroom who finally seized an opportunity to witness teacher’s mistake. “Pain is the immense,” observes Jünger, “and nevertheless the form of the age is realized in the midst of the historical annihilation.”406 It is better, for Jünger, to have a barometer that measures the destruction of nihilism, than not have one and persist in the false notion of security. The hope comes as a result of the stubborn witnessing of the destruction of the world, which, as such witnessing, bears the potential for recovery. The situation of planetary destruction demands cynical opportunism rather than the futile heroism of direct resistance, which is imposed upon human beings by the drive for self-preservation. Reflection upon the destructive force of the nihilism of WWII and its aftermath in the Cold War is a guarantee of its overcoming and a call for action: “The catastrophes of the Second World War have made clear to many, even to the masses, an emptiness that they did not otherwise feel. That is the creative power of suffering, and such attempts at healing merit particular care and cultivation.”407 The process of nihilistic destruction cannot be ignored, and through one’s reflection it “demands [a] political

406 Ibid, 87.
attitude” even when “the political decision has been reduced and restricted only to the choice of patron.”

The political reason for Jünger’s conservative opportunism lies in his admission that the old conservative values promoted by church or state cannot be called upon in their traditional form. Yet neither can these values be given up. Their promotion demands insistence on the continuity of the difference between their purity and what Jünger sees as the contingency of the nihilistic reality. Further, their promotion demands self-inventiveness and a peculiar kind of opportunistic adaptability to the nihilistic surrounding. The problem with this attitude is that one who carries hope through the embrace of destruction still appears exempt from existential complicity in nihilism. Where, for Jünger, the hope is political, theological, artistic and scientific, for Heidegger the hope of philosophical inquiry is to be found precisely where all of these features are lacking. This means that the discussion of crossing over the line of nihilism in the search of hope needs a fundamental-ontological reconsideration. This reconsideration will also expand the discussion of nihilism from the period of WWII to the history of the unfolding of European metaphysics.

However, it is relevant to notice that Heidegger’s philosophical resistance to Jünger’s conservative optimism was paralleled precisely by his political support of the reactionary politics of National Socialism. If one suggests that Heidegger located his philosophical polarity: forgetfulness of being – turn of being in the political program of

408 Ibid, 95.
409 Thomas Sheehan in the essay “Nihilism and its Discontents” makes the following observation: “In Heidegger's view, the current age of technology follows from the fact that the being of entities has always been experienced as Anwesen, their "presence-onto" human being, all the way from archaic Greek φύσις through classical Greek οὐσία, right down to Jünger’s notion of production (GA 9, 400.20-22;P, 302 .35-36). Hence, planetary technology is not only inevitable but also unsurpassable-for it is empowered by the ontological nihil (the open), which cannot be overcome at all” [Raffoul, Pettigrew, Heidegger and Practical Philosophy, ed. Raffoul F. and Pettigrew (Albany: SUNY Press, 2002), 287].
Nazism, then one observes that the politically transformative potential of his reflections upon nihilism was lost. However, this is precisely reverse of how some of his Dadaist contemporaries (such as John Heartfield) viewed the relation between art and politics. They disclosed the fact that totalitarian political practices are at work in both “High Art” and popular culture by enacting these practices. Heartfield brought to the light inherent contradictions built into the social and political mainstream of the Weimar Republic by exaggerating exclusionary and totalitarian practices in the various disciplines of culture and everyday life.

In taking up Jünger’s reflection that the totalitarian character of work impacts “everything actual,” Heidegger sets in place a peculiar kind of “philosophical anthropology.” Moreover, the insight into the co-belonging of being and human in the notion of the “human being” becomes the only possible framework within which Heidegger’s fundamental ontology can be continued. Heidegger’s re-articulation of Jünger’s concerns about nihilism requires a rejection of the treatment of nihilism as an object of investigation within a particular discipline. This is why Heidegger rearticulates

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410 We can suggest that Heartfield’s 1980s equivalent are the artistic collective Neue Slowenische Kunst (NSK), whose work consists in the relentless disclosure of the totalitarian tendencies in the aesthetic representations of Liberal Capitalism and Communism. They literally enact fascist and totalitarian tendencies in order to transgress them. The NSK identification with totalitarian practices, in order to resist them, is precisely how this artistic collective avoids the problem of ironical distance. One of their biggest political intervention was when they won the nation-wide competition for the official poster of the Relay of Youth event in 1987. The Relay of Youth was the official celebration of Tito’s birthday, where the baton was carried throughout all the republics of Socialist Yugoslavia. The relay was supposed to symbolize youth and the constant renewal of the idea of self-sustainable socialism. The NSK collective won the competition with the poster that depicted a young man, holding the “baton of youth” in one hand and the Yugoslav flag with the dove at its tope, in another. The poster was, however, replica of the Nazi 1936 poster, except that the flag with swastika and eagle was replaced with the Yugoslav tri-colour with red star and dove. It goes without saying that the poster caused scandal, once the military and party officials discovered what they did (to themselves) by letting NSK win the competition. However, after the disintegration of Yugoslavia, NSK became state artists in the independent Slovenian state, which clearly complicates their role of a subversive art collective. Alexei Monroe provides a very interesting analysis of the work of NSK in Interrogation Machine.

Jünger’s notion of ‘over’ (über) in ‘over the line’ (über die Linie), emphasizing that über also means “about.” He suggests that if one wants think beyond or “over” the line of nihilism, one needs to investigate this line as it stands for the difference between nihilism and its alternative. This implies, again, that the question of the alternative to nihilism is inseparably bound to the question of the understanding of its essence. The investigation into the essence of nihilism necessarily leads to ontological investigation. However, just as the reflections about nihilism lead to the raising of the question of Being anew, so too does the question concerning the Being of beings require dealing with the ultimate consummation of nihilism. This is, in fact, why Heidegger insists that “the totalitarian character of work” that determines “everything actual”\(^\text{412}\) is determined by that very actuality. Heidegger observes that the relationship between the “totalitarian character of work” and the figure (Gestalt) of the worker is determined reciprocally and has the ‘shape’ of a circle. Moreover, this circularity cuts deep into propositional thinking, in relation to which it openly embraces its illogical character.\(^\text{413}\) The worker does not have a privileged position over the technology she utilizes, but is defined by that technology precisely through its utilization. The agent of the labour, the utilizer of the instrument, becomes an instrument herself, as much as an instrument becomes an agent. This circularity that Heidegger is pointing out is nothing else but the mirroring of the inability of thinking that is free from contradiction to address its own habitual complicity in nihilism. This means that thinking which makes use of self-other, subject-object, A=A distinctions remains incapable of reflecting upon the reversibility or the co-constitution of the poles in the above-mentioned polarities. Propositional thinking is, thereby, unable to

\(^{412}\) Ibid. 304.
\(^{413}\) Ibid, 302.
recognize itself as an oblivion of – and, through this oblivion, as a responsiveness to – the turn of being.

Heidegger not only suggests that Jünger discloses the totalitarian character of the position of the worker, but he also indicates that Jünger’s own interpretation belongs to this totalitarian character as well. This fundamental co-belonging of author and investigated phenomenon is seen precisely as a radical achievement and not as a deficiency. The possibility of the Gestalt of the worker is visible in the fact that it “becomes present again in what is shaped by its shaping.”

Metaphysical concepts are in essence other in kind insofar as that which they grasp and comprehend is in an originary sense the same as this very grasping. For this reason, it is much less a matter of indifference within the realm of fundamental words of thinking whether one forgets them or whether one persistently continues to use them unexamined, and above all to use them where we are supposed to step out of the zone in which the "concepts" to which you refer say what is authoritative, namely, in the zone of consummate nihilism.

This quote announces Heidegger’s decision to problematize the call of Being exclusively as its turn in a relation to its oblivion in the unfolding of European Metaphysics. The understanding of the peculiar gathering of metaphysics and what it is indebted to through its oblivion of it urges us to think about this gathering, without treating it as a specialized object or as a theme of metaphysical investigation. This new thinking about the line of nihilism, the line of simultaneous self-enclosure and the self-opening of metaphysics, needs to be constituted beyond the division: acknowledgment of the oblivion of being – continuation of its forgetfulness.

Conversely, thematizing the co-constitution of these two poles is possible as a dwelling within the permanence of their mutual isolation. This dwelling implies that the

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414 Ibid, 301.
415 Ibid, 304.
only way for us to re-articulate the line of division between these two poles is to illuminate them, as they are unchanged in their completeness. The thematic clarification in question is one of a methodological withdrawal, where “letting” the forgetfulness and its recognition as such “be” introduces a peculiar kind of phenomenological movement. The movement “across” the line is one of endurance within this line, where the difference between the departure before the line of nihilism and the arrival in the realm after that line ceases to make sense. Heidegger insists on the essential co-belongingness of what Thomas Sheehan describes as technological and essential nihilism. We can agree with Sheehan’s claim that Heidegger’s intention in this essay is to “annihilate nihilism,” but only as long as he is able to demonstrate the belongingness between “socio-political analysis” and fundamental ontology. This belongingness also implies their essential transformation as “disciplines.” Sheehan points out Heidegger’s suggestion that Jünger, while searching for the possibility of the crossing over the line of “technological nihilism,” implicitly raises the question of “essential nihilism.” Heidegger’s insight emphasizes even more strongly that the latter is accessed so that the fundamental reiteration of the former can be fully visible. The more Heidegger’s analysis of technological nihilism remains ironical-cynical, so to speak, the more it appears to be

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417 Ibid, p. 279. Sheehan concludes his essay on Heidegger’s problematizing of the line of nihilism, by suggesting that if “we remain at the superstructural level of philosophical discourse, we conclude that his error was not that he picked the wrong party for overcoming nihilism but that he thought nihilism, could be overcome at all” (ibid, 296). I agree with Sheehan’s conclusion, but for the different reasons than the ones presented by him. Sheehan suggests that the problem of Heidegger’s analysis lies in the fact that his philosophy “will not help one bit with changing the real powers that drive τέχνη today” (ibid.) regardless of what kind of light it sheds on the question of nihilism. My problematization of Heidegger’s reflection upon nihilism is quite the opposite and it concerns Heidegger’s success in maintaining the co-constitution between technological nihilism and its essence as an oblivion of being. The prominence of the latter precisely depends on the fact that the former necessitates the inability of “the changing the real powers that drive τέχνη today”. It is precisely the failure to endure in the above-mentioned co-constitution that makes possible for the reactionary alternatives to take place, as it is openly argumentatively visible, for example, in Jünger’s conservative optimism.
fundamental-ontological.

Jünger, according to Heidegger, remains trapped by the distinction between before and after with respect to the line of nihilism by suggesting that in nihilism “the princely appearance of the human being is missing.” Heidegger, slightly mockingly, observes that the *Gestalt* of the worker appears to be a newly discovered realm where the princely appearance of human being might still be concealed. However, if this is truly the case, then Heidegger must conclude that the “security” or safety of critical distance remains in question here. Crossing the line is therefore a ceaseless effort that must aim at transforming the language of conceptual safety occupied with the specific problem that can be efficiently located and critically eliminated. This means that in order to cross the line of nihilism, we need to cross the line of our own conceptual entrapment within our inability to raise the question of the essence of being. However, the question of the essence of being is raised because everything that is actual “begins to shimmer” in the wake of the turn of being, screaming with metaphysical entrapment. The turn of being is, for Heidegger, an accentuation of the fact that in nihilistic consummation, “the human being can come to the opinion that he now everywhere encounters only himself.”

This nihilistic nothingness bears the attributes of human self-encountering because the turn of being is visible in the acceleration of nihilistic self-consumption. It is the absence of

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419 We should not be especially surprised by Heidegger’s tone which combines open hostility with friendly attention to Jünger’s text if we consider Heidegger’s own confession in the interview to Danilo Pejović: « He [Jünger] read Pathmarks while the text was still in manuscript and yet he still wrote ‘Over the Line’. I am surprised that he does not see that one cannot cross the line as if one can walk over to the other side of the road, because that is not in one's power. One has to wait» (Pejović, *Sistem i Egzistencija*, (Zagreb: Zora, 1970), 124; translation is mine).
421 The phrase “the turn of being” is directly borrowed from Jünger [Timothy Sean Quinn, *Correspondence 1949-1975: Martin Heidegger and Ernst Jünger* (Albany: SUNY Press, 2002), 91].
being that confirms its presence through its ability to “prevail in a manner that is almost more oppressive for human beings.”

The determinate indeterminacy (to borrow Husserl’s term) of being is visible as its “withdrawal” and its “turning away” that “draw the human being away, suck into his endeavors and activities, and thus ultimately suck these activities up into their withdrawing wake.” The nothingness gains its defining attributes precisely because it is an echo of the voice of being that persists in its attempt to be heard. Moreover, if this persistence of being is not understood as it is echoed through the elemental lack of nihilism to recognize its call, then the notion of the turn of being continues to operate within the realm of metaphysics. Heidegger points out the constancy of the struggle between the recognition of the call of being and the response to or the neglect of that call:

We always say too little of "being itself" when, in saying "being," we omit its essential presencing in the direction of the human essence and thereby fail to see that this essence itself is part of "being." We also always say too little of the human being when, in saying "being" (not being human) we posit the human being as independent and then first bring what we have thus posited into a relation to "being." Yet we also always say too much when we mean being as the all-encompassing, and in so doing represent the human being only as one particular entity among others (such as plant and animal), and place them in relation to one another. For there already lies within the human essence the relation to that which - through a relation, a relating in the sense of needful usage [Brauchen] - is determined as "being" and so through this relation is removed from its supposed "self-independence". . . We would then have to relinquish the isolating and separating word "being" just as decisively as the name "human being." The question concerning the relation between the two revealed itself to be inadequate, because it never attains to the realm of what it seeks to ask after. In truth, we cannot then even [237] continue to say that "being" and "the human being" "are" the Same in the sense that they belong together; for when we say it in this way, we continue to let both subsist independently.
The uncanny activity of the turn of Being

Heidegger’s promise of criticism, which is a tedious delineation of the problems underlying the political and cultural alternative to nihilism, becomes an alternative in itself, where the oblivion of being seems to change places with the oblivion of metaphysics. This becomes prominent in Heidegger’s examination of the thoughtfulness of thinking which finds itself in open confrontation with the thinking whose standards are “alien to such thinking.” Heidegger suggests that the turn of being, in the metaphorical times to come, will provide insight into the essence of nihilism, which will “show itself more clearly in other ways and in brighter light.” The important question here is how reflection about the visibility of nihilism under a brighter light corresponds to the insight that the thinking that provides this light operates on standards that are alien to nihilism. Heidegger, it is true, states that being is not something independent from human being, something that is merely added to it on occasion. However, the distance between nihilism’s indebtedness to the turn of being and the nihilistic foreignness to the thought occupied with the essence of being becomes even larger in the following sets of reflections:

It looks as though thinking is continually led around or even chased around the Same as though in a magical circle, yet without ever being able to approach this Same. But perhaps the circle is a concealed spiral. Perhaps this spiral has in the meantime become more constricted. This means: the manner and way in which we are approaching the essence of nihilism are being transformed. Whatever is good in the "good definition" that you rightfully demand will prove its worth in our giving up the desire to define, to the extent that this desire must become fixed in propositional statements in which thinking dies out. Yet it remains a slight, because merely negative, gain if we learn to heed the fact that no information can be provided concerning the nothing or being or nihilism, concerning their essence or concerning the essential (verbal) unfolding of such essence

428 Ibid.
(nominal), that might lie ready before us in the form of propositional statements waiting to be seized.\footnote{429}

The first part of the quotation above clearly defines the line of nihilism through its indebtedness to the turn of being. The line of nihilism illuminated by the turn of being is precisely the self-encircling that, through the intensification of its own reiteration, seems to provide a peculiar kind of constriction, to borrow Heidegger’s phrase. What becomes problematic is the ending of the passage, where Heidegger accentuates the contrast between the non-propositionality of the language pertaining to the essence of being and the nihilistic language of metaphysics. This comes as an unnecessary move, since what defines nihilism is precisely its inability to think its essence beyond propositional statements. Furthermore, the essence of nihilism, as an opportunity for the rising of the turn of being, is announced in the persistence of circularity, where in the “withdrawing wake” of the turn of being “human being can come to the opinion that he now everywhere encounters only himself.”\footnote{430} The “withdrawing wake” of being actively accentuates the circularity in the self-perpetuation of nihilism. We observe that, just as nihilistic self-reiteration testifies to the turn of being, so too is the latter pointless in its shape and direction without its backward reference to the former. It is clear that Heidegger’s main intention is to issue a warning by suggesting that the definition of being cannot, under any circumstances, be treated outside of the context of its turning “towards” the line of nihilism. Heidegger even crosses out the word being, claiming that its purpose is to prevent the “almost ineradicable” habit of thematizing being as something that stands “somewhere on its own”\footnote{431} and then occasionally faces human

\footnote{429} Ibid, 310.  
\footnote{430} Ibid, 307.  
\footnote{431} Ibid, 310.
beings. We wonder, however, about the role of the turn of being if the eradication of the notion of being, as separated from its addressee, happens to be final and successful. Heidegger certainly differentiates between the time where being is taken in its metaphysical independence from its turn and the time where being, by dissolving itself into the turning, \[^{432}\text{Ibid.}\] “has returned and been taken up into its essence.”\[^{433}\] The question to be asked here is whether the distinction between these two times or ways of accessing the question of being presents a peculiar phenomenological problem.

If the call of being was constantly lurking in its oblivion in the progression of European metaphysics, then why is the open manifestation of the forgetfulness of being through its propositional interrogation suddenly alien to the turn of being? Furthermore, we can ask what constitutes the above-mentioned alienation, if not a separation between the self-sufficiency of being and the blindness of its addressee. These questions lead directly to the evaluation of Heidegger’s claim about the recovery of metaphysics, assuming that the irrecoverable thickening of the forgetfulness of being in nihilism echoes the very turn of being. Heidegger suggests that the recovery of metaphysics is inextricable from the insight into its nihilistic essence, which immediately implies the reverse relationship, namely that “the essence of nihilism is not nothing nihilistic, and that nothing is detracted from the ancient worthiness of metaphysics by the fact that its own essence shelters nihilism within it.”\[^{434}\] Heidegger, however, by further explicating the meaning of the recovery of metaphysics, differentiates between being as that “which the will to will had not yet seized”\[^{435}\] and the turn of being which emanates from the zone

\[^{432}\text{Ibid.}\] 
\[^{433}\text{Ibid.}\] 
\[^{434}\text{Ibid., 313.}\] 
\[^{435}\text{Ibid.}\]
of consummate nihilism “where the essence of metaphysics unfolds its most extreme possibilities and gathers itself in them.” He makes a puzzling move by describing the endangerment of being in the times of consummate nihilism as a “disappearance of what was previously present.” Heidegger wants to make clear that the disappearance of being is not the same as its vanishing, because being maintains itself in the era of the total domination of nihilism, as “a concealment that conceals itself.” This, of course, means that the call of being continues to be heard, not despite, but precisely because of its sudden and temporary withdrawal. The advancing withdrawal of being in times of the silence imposed upon it by nihilism, the times of its oblivion with a peculiar potential for disclosure, is an unavoidable part of its essence, and it awaits, as such, for “only the appropriate seeking” so it can finally unravel the true condition of its “untapped treasures.” Heidegger suggests that there were times, potentials and unexposed contents of the call of being that echoed through the primordial clearings unspoiled by the stubbornly ignorant invader, who underestimated being’s immeasurable strength and cunning potential for revenge. This time of the unspoiled disclosure of being, whether it is used as a mere metaphor or not, is different from the time of the active withdrawal of being, which remains sufficiently active to return and be “taken up into its essence,” despite its submission to the total domination of nihilism. Heidegger thus subverts the carefully developed ambiguity of the polarity: the forgetfulness of being – the turn of being, by suggesting its essential belongingness to the dance between concealment and

436 Ibid.
437 Ibid.
438 Ibid.
439 Ibid, 314.
440 Ibid.
441 Ibid.
disclosure.\textsuperscript{442} Furthermore, Heidegger’s usage of both metaphors: the authentic mode of
the existence of being before its occupation by nihilism and its stubborn activity in the
times of its surrender, indicates a peculiar kind of activity of being. The figure of
stubborn nihilistic blindness to the beauty of being, in this case, amplifies the effects of
being’s everlasting power and attraction (and not vice versa). Nihilistic helplessness
before the light of being determines its self-consumption, where the co-constitution of
forgetfulness and turn ceases to make any sense. The recovery of metaphysics, instead of
being a potent, multilayered metaphor designed for an incisive examination of the
philosophical tradition of modernity, appears to be the quest for the excavation of the
untapped treasures of long forgotten ways of thinking. The more original call of being,\textsuperscript{443}
which is commemorated by human being through her turning to her essence, seems to
dominate the very movement of this turn.

Heidegger damages the ambiguity between forgetfulness and the turn of being
precisely in order to confront the misconstrual of his notion of destruction among his
critics. The call of being, its return and taking up into its essence, disturbs Heidegger’s
insight into the metaphorical nature of the term “destruction,” whose sole purpose is to
emphasize an unbreakable bond between “originary experiences of being belonging to
metaphysics” and the “deconstructing [\textit{Abbau}] [of] representations that have become
commonplace and empty.”\textsuperscript{444} Overemphasis on the difference between the time of the
forgetfulness of being and the time that precedes this forgetfulness fundamentally betrays
the following insight into the kinship of being and nothing: “Being and nothing are not
given alongside one another. The one employs itself for the other in a kinship whose

\textsuperscript{442} The authentic relation between concealment and disclosure is reserved for the Presocratics.
\textsuperscript{443} Ibid, 311.
\textsuperscript{444} Ibid, 315.
essential fullness we have as yet scarcely pondered. . . We can easily say: There is a giving [es gibt]. Being no more “is” than nothing. But there is a giving of both.  

Heidegger is aware of the fragility of the ambiguous relation between the commemoration and forgetfulness of being, particularly while emphasizing that the turn to the essence of nihilism is not an attempt to renew the time of the authentic mode of being “in some contrived form.” The movement of turning back, as Heidegger points out, means nothing but pointing at the oblivion of being “from which metaphysics already received and retains its provenance.” The problem is that Heidegger in the next paragraph makes the following statement:

In accordance with this provenance, metaphysics as metaphysics remains prevented from ever experiencing its essence; for it is within a surpassing and for it that the being of beings shows itself to metaphysical representation. Appearing in this way, it expressly makes its claim upon metaphysical representation. No wonder metaphysical representation rebels against the thought that it moves within the oblivion of being.  

This observation raises the question of the phenomenological clarification of the difference between the oblivion of being and its inability to recognize itself as such oblivion. The metaphysical rebellion against thought that moves within the oblivion of being intensifies even more the obviousness of the turn of being. Heidegger leaves us to wonder how the consistent metaphysical blindness to its essence, as an oblivion of being, is at odds with its inability to recognize itself as such oblivion. Heidegger’s reflection that the unfolding of metaphysics is habitually ignorant of its indebtedness to being challenges the position that metaphysics testifies, through the consistency of its own forgetful unfolding, to the tenacity of the turn of being. If we accept that metaphysical unfolding does replace with “not” recognize itself as an oblivion of being, then we can
also ask who or what can enlighten this blindfolded passenger. Furthermore, we ask what
this process of enlightenment entails outside of the participation of the ignorance of
metaphysics. Even though Heidegger keeps re-asserting the importance of the ambiguity
of the phrase “Über die Linie,” which entails both going over and dwelling within the line
of nihilism, he poses a serious challenge to it by blurring the distinction between the
confrontation and the kinship between being and its forgetfulness. The ambiguity
between nihilism and its essence, where the confrontation between being and its
forgetfulness articulates a peculiar kind of kinship (and not vice versa), must be treated
not as an “expression of thinking but thinking itself, its course, its song.”

Heidegger, in fact, admits his own difficulties in maintaining this ambiguity by stating that the day may
come where one will “leave such saying in the realm of the mystery, as a supreme gift
and greatest danger, as something seldom successful and frequently unsuccessful.”

Ernst Tugendhat in “Heidegger’s Idea of Truth” problematizes Heidegger’s
notion of truth as a dynamic between concealedness and un concealment by observing
that, in the Heideggerian transformation of truth from the relation of correctness to the
relation of disclosure, the difference between truth and falsity becomes obscured. Falsity
appears just as another mode of the disclosure-concealment dynamics, where the
regulative understanding of truth in relation to certainty is left behind.

449 Ibid.
450 Ibid, 320. Ernst Tugendhat in “Heidegger’s Idea of Truth” suggests that the one who hypothetically
stands within the realm of clearing is obligated not only to look for the truth of beings, but also for the truth
of the interpretative horizons. We can add that the latter (the specialized investigation) and the former (the
ontological pursuit) inform and shape each other, and cannot be seen outside of their mutual
contextualization, which is why the destiny of Heidegger’s ‘fundamental ontology’ is to become
‘philosophical anthropology’. Tugendhat sees the above-mentioned mutuality as a philosophical
opportunity, as much as he observes in it a danger of its self-betrayal by its tendency for “giving a
preference to a new immediacy . . . be it immediacy of projection or the immediacy of destinering [Geschick]
of un concealedness” (The Heidegger Controversy, ed. Richard Wolin (Cambridge, London: MIT Press,
1998), 262.
We can, of course, challenge Tugendhat and suggest that in Heidegger’s later writings the emphasis is put on the addressee of the call of Being, and its formation, as it resonates that call. Heidegger’s later writings on language tend to problematize the primordiality of the call of Being from his early writings. As we see, for example, in his essay “Language”, where Heidegger reflects upon Trakl’s poem “A Winter Evening.” He carefully traces Trakl’s contrast between the peace of the house and the threat of the advancing visitors (the warmth of the household and the intruding cold of the snow) as they are preserved within the pain of the threshold. The contrast is not only carefully preserved, but the poem is nothing more than the naming of the belongingness of the inner and the outer through this contrast. The language of this poem illustrates the rifting nature of the calling into nearness, where the addressee of language remains at a distance that is acknowledged through the invitation for proximity. The call of language entwines with itself by emphasizing the belonging in contrast between things and world:

The calling here calls into a nearness. But even so the call does not wrest what it calls away from the remoteness, in which it is kept by the calling there. The calling calls into itself and therefore always here and there—here into presence, there into absence.

451 “A Winter Evening

Window with falling snow is arrayed.  
Long tolls the vespertine bell,  
The house is provided well,  
The table is for many laid.

Wandering ones, more than a few,  
Come to the door on darksome courses.  
Golden blooms the tree of graces  
Drawing up the earth's cool dew.

Wanderer quietly steps within;  
Pain has turned the threshold to stone.  
There lie, in limpid brightness shown,  
Upon the table bread and wine.  

452 Ibid, 196.
The belongingness between the world and the thing in language is not a subsequent adding of one term to another, but it is a mediation between them only insofar as “apportions, world and things, each to its own.” True, Heidegger names this mediation through difference as the dimension, and ascribes to it the ability to measure out things and the world. However, this ability of language to invite or to host the things and the world is brought by the distance in proximity between the world and the things. This motionless gathering of language, or the invitation into nearness of the things and the world, is nothing but the persistently silent recognition of their remoteness.

To return to Tugendhat, one of the major problems in Heidegger’s understanding of truth as disclosure lies not only in the unspecified relation between truth and untruth in the process of the disclosure of the world, but also in the clarity of the relation between the (un)disclosedness of the world in its relation to truth. Tugehndhat is still willing to give an interpretive chance to Heidegger, by observing that if the truth, as an unconcealment that is given through the disclosedness of Dasein or the clearing of Being, is not related to the disclosure of the world through “our determinate, substantive horizons,” then disclosedness cannot be related “to any specific conception of world.” Truth, therefore, cannot be only thematized within the confines of its specific horizon of inquiry (e.g. epistemology) and it implies the following ambiguity: 1) disclosedness due to its essence points towards the truth and 2) it can also obstruct the question of truth. This means, Tugendhat concludes, that one who hypothetically stands within the clearing is obligated not only to look for the truth of beings, but also for the

455 Ibid, 262.
truth of interpretative horizons. We can add that the latter (the specialized investigation) and the former (the ontological pursuit) inform and shape each other, and cannot be seen outside of their mutual contextualization, which is why the destiny of Heidegger’s ‘fundamental ontology’ is to become ‘philosophical anthropology’. Tugendhat sees the above-mentioned mutuality as a philosophical opportunity, just as he observes in it a danger of its self-betrayal by its tendency for “giving a preference to a new immediacy . . . be it immediacy of projection or the immediacy of destining [Geschick] of unconcealedness.”

Phenomenological vulnerability of reversibility in Merleau-Ponty

Merleau-Ponty, in the attempt to re-articulate the Cartesian mind-body, self-world, seer–visible polarities, suggests the possibility for their radical transformation. His solutions in “Eye and Mind” employ the notions of reversibility, mirroring and intertwining between the seer and the visible, self-radiation and self-movement of the body of the seer, and depth as the first dimension. It seems, at first, that Merleau-Ponty proposes a dynamics of limitation or even subversion of Cartesian dualisms through their permeation. Furthermore, this dynamics of the transformation of seer–visible polarity seems to have its own force, whose primordiality is even more emphasized through the pointing out of the rigidity of the above-mentioned dualisms. The seer abandons the directionality of his initial position by being “immersed in the visible by his own body.”

The activity of the seer is the reflection of her inability to distance herself from

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456 Ibid.
the corporeity of that very activity. We can, in fact, make a brief reference to Levinas here, and suggest that Merleau-Ponty captures Levinas’ position that thought as act always precedes thought as consciousness of an act: “What, in action, breaks forth as essential violence is the surplus of being over the thought that claims to contain it, the marvel of the idea of infinity.”

The reflective coherence of the seer’s activity is just another testimony to its blindness to the fact that the expansion of vision is always its own backward reference and therefore it is always its own self-expansion. The movement-towards is, therefore, a self-movement, where the decision of the mind to expand in one direction is reversed into the maturation of the vision of a thing which is moved. The seer is literally caught up by its own exposure to the visible, by the bruteness of its own stretching, where the “inheritance of the seer in the seen” is described as the “original solution still present within crystal, the undividedness of the sensing and the sensed.” The above-mentioned reversal is positioned as a cross-over, or the spark of the sensing-sensible and the body-world polarity that is constituted from the “same stuff.”

Merleau-Ponty insists on the “imminent visibility” of the image, where the imaginary does not simply resemble physical reality but stands as the “carnal obverse”, as “a diagram of the life of the actual” which is delivered through and by the very body of the bearer and receiver of the imaginary. The imaginary is not an occasion for reflection

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460 Ibid, 125
461 Ibid.
462 Ibid, 126.
but “it gives vision that which clothes it within, the imaginary texture of the real.” Merleau-Ponty famously refers to Cézanne’s Mont. Sainte-Victoire, suggesting that painters are being seen by what they depict. A painter’s activity is a testimony to her own inability to be nothing more (or less) than the articulation of her own contraction in front of what is intimately distanced from her. The act of painting is the reversal and subversion of the essence-appearance, imaginary-real, visible-invisible polarizations and is described by Merleau-Ponty as an “oneiric universe of carnal essences” and a “concentration of the universe.” To be seen in this sense means to understand the space beyond the Cartesian-coordinate universe.

The seer is not only simply conditioned and inversed by what she relates herself to; this relating is the reflection of seer’s self-relation, or her own self-movement. The seer therefore “radiates itself from a self” as much as the eye is “an instrument that moves itself, as means which invents its own end ends.” As Merleau-Ponty points out in the “The Intertwining – The Chiasm” chapter of the Visible and the Invisible, as the proximity between the seer and the visible is embodied in the distance between them, which has the shape of their thickening in their mutual encounter. The solidification of the seer is the manifestation of the concept of flesh, which is not an obstacle but the “means of communication” between the seer and the seen. The movement of the gaze is already caught up by the limitation of its own positionality, and it stagnates precisely in its progression. The activity is already passivity not only through the execution of the

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463 Ibid.
464 Ibid, 131
465 Ibid, 130.
466 Ibid, 124.
467 Ibid, 127.
circle of its own inversion (once it is recognized by itself as something that is encountered in its encountering with what is beyond it), but through the fortification of its own positionality. The dynamics of the circle of the visible, which, as the flesh, as the “thinkable by itself”, as “the ultimate notion”, traverses and animates “other bodies as well as my own,” is an instrument used to illuminate the constancy of the self-exhibition of the seer. The seer is nothing but the “coiling over of the visible upon the visible,” where the non-reflected self-circulation is the true light of the gaze of seer. The seer’s body is neither a vehicle nor an instrument of seer’s “coupling with the world”, but the constancy of its self-application as its clasping of other bodies.

Although we commonly think of intending as touching – Merleau Ponty uses the metaphor of the left hand touching the right hand while the right hand is touching other things – fusion as an ordered collection between the sensing and the sensible is never realized. The unification of the polarities unfolds as the intensification of these polarities, and it thereby solidifies itself as its own splitting apart:

For if these experiences never exactly overlap, if they slip away at the very moment they are about to rejoin, if there is always a "shift," a "spread," between them, this is precisely because my two hands are part of the same body, because it moves itself in the world, because I hear myself both from within and from without. I experience—and as often as I wish—the transition and the metamorphosis of the one experience into the other, and it is only as though the hinge between them, solid, unshakeable, remained irremediably hidden from me.

The movement of the above-mentioned “spread” between sensible and sentient can only be a “zero pressure between two solids that makes them adhere to one another,” and its acceleration is its ultimate slowing down. The unity is neither an

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469 Ibid, 140.
470 Ibid.
471 Ibid, 144.
472 Ibid, 148.
473 Ibid.
overlapping nor a collection, but a mirroring between seer and visible, where the position “I am a visible seer” also means the “reflexivity of the sensible.”

Just as the mutual reversibility between seer and visible subverts the one directionality of vision, so too does depth as a “global locality”, which is an exaggeration of the two dimensions, deliver a sense of vibration or even activity. Only because we are witnessing the persistence of the self-coiling of two competing dimensions are we able to see the depth a not as third, but as a first dimension:

But a first dimension that contains all the others is no longer a dimension, at least in the ordinary sense of a certain relationship according to which we make measurements. Depth thus understood is, rather, the experience of the reversibility of dimensions, of a global “locality” in which everything is in the same place at the same time, a locality from which height, width and depth are abstracted, a voluminosity we express in a word when we say that a thing is there.

It is important to notice the ambiguity in the word voluminosity, because it bears traces of Merleau-Ponty’s caution about regarding depth as a peculiar kind of agency. Depth is a vibration, an unifying activity, so to speak, only because of the persistence of the competing dimensions. The only possible activity, even if it is vibration, is already a locality, a place, a completion of movement as its petrification. He suggests that painting cannot provide the dualism: stillness – movement, as it cannot be reduced to the mereness of the vantage point of perspective. The perspectival understanding of painting operates on the premise that the central axis within the painting is also a point from which space can be extended in its three-dimensional universality. Movement can be located within this frame with the help of the coordinate system. Merleau-Ponty suggests further that the painting “has made itself a movement without displacement” which as a “vibration or

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475 Ibid, 140.
radiation” is an art of space and, as such, it lacks the “wherewithal to devise things that actually move.”\footnote{476} In a word, painting does not represent world, it is a constitutive part of it in its depiction of it.

Merleau-Ponty suggests that for the painter “watchwords of knowledge and action lose their meaning and force”\footnote{477} because he does not impose his vision upon something. The painter sees, according to Merleau-Ponty, only if this process of seeing contains an observation of “a series of appropriately mixed, instantaneous glimpses along with, if a living thing is involved, attitudes unstably suspended between a before and after.”\footnote{478}

However, although it is certain that the explicit transformation of the polarities is their only possible outcome, precisely because of their initial Cartesian fixity, it remains questionable whether this process is truly a reversal – therefore whether the analytical celebration of the self-transformation of the terms in relation refers back to, or recalls, the intensification of these poles. The danger of Merleau-Ponty’s comfort with transformation as a theme is embodied in the eventual analytic prioritizing of what is supposed to be the above-mentioned mere celebration:

This concentration of the visibles about one of them, or this bursting forth of the mass of the body toward the things, which makes a vibration of my skin become the sleek and the rough, makes me follow with my eyes the movements and the contours of the things themselves, this magical relation, this \textbf{pact between them and me} according to which I lend them my body in order that they inscribe upon it and give me their resemblance, this fold, this \textbf{central cavity} of the visible which is my vision, these two mirror arrangements of the seeing and the visible, the touching and the touched, form a \textbf{close bound system} that I count on, define a \textbf{vision in general} and a \textbf{constant style of visibility from which I cannot detach myself}, even when a particular vision turns out to be illusory, for I remain certain in that case that in looking closer I would have had the \textbf{true vision}, and that in any case, whether it be this one or another, \textbf{there is a true vision}. \textbf{The flesh (of the world or my own) is not contingency, chaos, but a texture that returns to itself}

\footnote{476} Ibid. 144\footnote{477} Ibid, 123.\footnote{478} Ibid.
and conforms to itself.\textsuperscript{479}

The impossible pact between the self-coiling of body and world is celebrated as a central cavity, vision in general, close bound system, an overpowering or over-gluing style of visibility, true vision etc. However, this celebration becomes even more problematic once the flesh as a reflection of the self-enclosure of the body and world turns into its own self-reference. The flesh thereby assumes the most prominent role of the agent, of the grounding force, which can be outdone only if this self-celebration transforms into its self-exaggeration.

The illustration of the railroad tracks (to return to “Eye and Mind”), which converge precisely \textbf{in order} to remain equidistant farther away,\textsuperscript{480} turns quickly into the “concretion of universal visibility”, “dehiscence of Being” or presence as a certain absence. Merleau-Ponty defines “dehiscence of Being” by suggesting that the painter depicts the world using perspective precisely in order for the world to be independent from the painter. Only in this constellation can the visible be understood as something that has the layer of invisible “in the strict sense”, which also means that it makes it “present as a certain absence.” Vision teach us, according to Merleau-Ponty, that the beings are simultaneously together and external to each other, or in a relational community through their exteriority to each other. However, this relation between agency of vision and its addressees, if Merleau-Ponty wants to remain faithful to his strategy, needs to be observed in reverse, meaning that the simultaneity between mutual exteriority and belongingness of beings informs or even creates vision. Merleau-Ponty needs to

remain attentive to the seer-visible reversibility and forward and backward reference
between the two them precisely in order to prevent the prioritizing of either of these poles
over the other. Therefore, it is not only that the vision is not one directional, seer-seen,
trajectory, but it is also the fact that the seer cannot be merely transformed by the visible.

I observe, further, that the dynamics suggested by expressions such as “a
nonconceptual presentation of universal Being” might betray their own purpose, even
if that purpose is not to perform any useful activity other than their own “commanding
and overseeing.” Merleau-Ponty defines the nonconceptual universality of Being in the
following way:

In this case "pure" being only shows through at the horizon, at a distance, which is not nothing,
which is not spread out by me, which is something, which therefore itself belongs to being,
which, between the "pure" being and myself, is the thickness of its being for me, of its being for
the others—and which finally makes what merits the name of being be not the horizon of "pure"
being but the system of perspectives that open into it, makes the integral being be not before me,
but at the intersection of my views and at the intersection of my views with those of the others, at
the intersection of my acts and at the intersection of my acts with those of the others, makes the
sensible world and the historical world be always intermundane spaces, since they are what,
beyond our views, renders them interdependent among themselves and interdependent with those
of the others.

Merleau-Ponty does not transform the notions of self and being through their
overemployment, so to speak, but their overemployment appears to be a specific theme or
concept, which, in itself, overpowers its components. Merleau-Ponty’s suggestion is the
one of the transformation of the terms in relations; however, the possible vulnerability
might appear precisely in the establishment of the polarity: transformation of the terms in
relations – terms in relations. We can most certainly follow de Warren’s suggestion that

482 Ibid,149.
Merleau-Ponty’s revitalization of philosophical thinking in *The Visible and the Invisible* “requires a rematerialization of its medium of expression that in turn cannot be achieved without a re-vitalization of a seeing, or ‘intuition’, imbricated within this novel way of speaking philosophically.” However, we can also suggest that Merleau-Ponty, in his attempt to demonstrate this novel philosophical activity, thereby avoiding falling under the suspicion “that philosophical discourse speaks without showing anything,” indeed finds himself “haunted by the ghosts of the discourse [he] seeks no longer to imitate.”

**Concluding remarks:**

In this chapter I have suggested that both Merleau-Ponty and Heidegger, through the development of the notions of depth and the turn of being through its forgetfulness, inadvertently resemble the Husserlian co-constitution of the individually self-enclosed terms in relation. However I also suggested that neither of these two thinkers was able to endure within the constancy of the backward and forward reference between phenomenological reducer and what is pheomenologically reduced.

I have traced in this chapter how Heidegger questioned the possibility of the overcoming of metaphysics by his insistence on the co-constitution of the forgetfulness of being in nihilism and the turn of being. The only way to overcome metaphysics, suggests Heidegger, is to take the question of its foundation seriously rather than to dismiss it as an expired product. This path of the raising of the question of what is metaphysics leads directly into the questioning of the one who raises this question. Heidegger applies the

485 Ibid.
486 Ibid.
same reasoning in dealing with the issue of nihilism, suggesting that if one wants to overcome it, one needs to realize its existential and philosophical complicity in it. However, by carefully analyzing Heidegger’s reflections in the “On the Question of Being” I suggest that Heidegger risks prioritizing the turn of being over its forgetfulness. One can wonder, however, if Heidegger’s unintended re-enactment of Jünger’s own problem – the search for an alternative to nihilism, while facing the philosophical nature of its questioning – might have been a sign of Heidegger’s openness to the possibility of his own vulnerability. That is, if we question the possibility of an alternative to nihilism, should we accept the possibility of our own fundamental-ontological temptation not to endure this questioning? In other words, what is entailed in the threat of hope being necessarily inverted through the hope of threat? Although one might suggest that Heidegger’s failure to adequately respond to Jünger is, in a far fetched manner, a deliberate and unavoidable methodological component of Heidegger’s analysis, one cannot fail to see that this leads to a lack of attentiveness in addressing the asymmetry between reducer and reduced in phenomenological reduction.

Similarly, despite the incredible effort to problematize the Cartesian elements in thinking about the philosophical importance of depth, Merleau-Ponty seems to open up the path for a new philosophical primordiality. I have argued in this chapter that Merleau-Ponty unexpectedly came at the verge of reproducing the relation of priority between his phenomenological concepts and their addressee, precisely through the seeming porosity of such concepts as “dehiscence of Being”, and depth as a vibration or “a nonconceptual presentation of universal Being.” I have suggested that it is precisely the deliberate self-referentialty and thematic looseness of these notions that turns them into their
philosophical opposite, causing them to replicate the very problems they tend to disclose in the tradition of Cartesian thinking.
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