Governing Social Protection in Developing Countries through Community-Based Targeting Mechanisms: A Case Study of Nigeria’s “In Care of the People” Conditional Cash Transfer Programme

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ABSTRACT

GOVERNING SOCIAL PROTECTION IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES THROUGH COMMUNITY-BASED TARGETING MECHANISMS: A CASE STUDY OF NIGERIA’S “IN CARE OF THE PEOPLE” CONDITIONAL CASH TRANSFER PROGRAMME

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University of Guelph, 2017

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In light of the inability of many bureaucracies in developing countries to effectively ensure transparency and accountability in the governance of social protection programmes, the participation of communities in the implementation of social protection programmes has increased in the past three decades. While community participation can take different forms, the use of community-based targeting methods and mechanisms (CBTMs) as participatory mechanisms for governing social protection programmes is increasingly common. However, despite the increasing use of CBTMs, particularly CBTMs that are designed as hybrids that allow both state and non-state actors and institutions to participate in the governance of social protection programmes, few studies have specifically examined how CBTMs improve or impede transparency and accountability. To this end, this dissertation examines how the CBTM that was utilized in the implementation of Nigeria’s “In Care of the People” Conditional Cash Transfer (CCT) programme in three communities in Oyo state, southwest, Nigeria, improved or impeded transparency and accountability in the governance of the programme. It is based on an interpretive analysis of qualitative and quantitative data collected during six months of fieldwork.
in Nigeria in 2013. The finding from the study of COPE’s CBTM reveals that because of the novelty of the CBTM and the final selection of beneficiaries by community leaders and officials in public spaces, transparency was improved in the implementation of the programme. However, considering that there were no alternative sources of information beyond state officials, transparency was impeded in COPE’s implementation. In addition, due to the weak administrative and technical capacity of the state institutions charged with the responsibility of implementing the programme, accountability was weak in COPE’s CBTM. This affected the operation of the accountability structures in practice, and impeded how state and non-state actors were accountable to one another. Hence, this dissertation concludes that while CBTMs can help to improve transparency and accountability in the governance of social protection programmes in developing countries, there is a need to ensure that community members and state institutions have the necessary resources that they need to effectively engage with each one another.
For Abiola.
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<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>BIG</td>
<td>Basic Income Guarantee</td>
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<tr>
<td>CBT</td>
<td>Community-Based Targeting</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CBTM</td>
<td>Community-Based Targeting Mechanism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CCT</td>
<td>Conditional Cash Transfers</td>
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<tr>
<td>CDA</td>
<td>Community Development Association</td>
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<tr>
<td>CDC</td>
<td>Community Development Council</td>
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<tr>
<td>COPE</td>
<td>In Care of the People</td>
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<td>CSAC</td>
<td>Community Social Assistance Committee</td>
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<tr>
<td>CSO</td>
<td>Civil Society Organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DFID</td>
<td>Department for International Development</td>
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<tr>
<td>DRG</td>
<td>Debt Relief Gains</td>
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<tr>
<td>EFCC</td>
<td>Economic and Financial Crimes Commission</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FOI</td>
<td>Freedom of Information Act</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HCDI</td>
<td>Human Capital Development Index</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ICP</td>
<td>Independent Corrupt Practices and Other Related Offences Commission</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IFI</td>
<td>International Finance Institutions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ILO</td>
<td>International Labour Organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IMF</td>
<td>International Monetary Fund</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LGAC</td>
<td>Local Government Assessment Committee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MDA</td>
<td>Ministries, Departments, and Agencies</td>
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<td>MDGs</td>
<td>Millennium Development Goals</td>
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<tr>
<td>MICS</td>
<td>Multiple Indicator Cluster Survey</td>
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<tr>
<td>NAPEP</td>
<td>National Poverty Eradication Programme</td>
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<tr>
<td>NBS</td>
<td>National Bureau of Statistics</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NEEDS</td>
<td>National Economic Empowerment and Development Strategy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NGO</td>
<td>Non-Governmental Organization</td>
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<tr>
<td>OSSAP-MDGs</td>
<td>Office of the Senior Special Assistant to the President on the Millennium Development Goals</td>
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<tr>
<td>PLWHA</td>
<td>People Living with HIV/AIDS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PRAI</td>
<td>Poverty Reduction Accelerator Investment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PRSP</td>
<td>Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper</td>
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<tr>
<td>SDGs</td>
<td>Sustainable Development Goals</td>
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<td>SMEDAN</td>
<td>Small and Medium Enterprises and Development Agency of Nigeria</td>
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<tr>
<td>SPF</td>
<td>Social Protection Floor</td>
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<tr>
<td>SRM</td>
<td>Social Risks Management</td>
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<td>SSAC</td>
<td>State Social Assistance Committee</td>
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<tr>
<td>TI</td>
<td>Transparency International</td>
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<tr>
<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNDP</td>
<td>United Nations Development Programme</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNICEF</td>
<td>United Nations Children Fund</td>
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<tr>
<td>VVF</td>
<td>Vesicle Vagina Fistula</td>
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Chapter One
Introduction

1.0 Background and Purpose of Study
Since the turn of the twenty-first century, various environmental, social, economic and political crises in many developing countries – including but not limited to the negative effects of climate change and the impact of the food, fuel and financial crises on the world’s poorest people – have increased the need for social protection (de Haan 2011; McCord 2010). Broadly defined as policies and programmes that are aimed at reducing poverty and addressing the vulnerabilities and risks of poor individuals, households, and communities, social protection is now considered as an important policy agenda by many governments and international development agencies. However, the inability of government institutions in some developing countries to effectively implement social protection programmes has led to calls for more participatory governance mechanisms that allow both state and non-state actors and institutions to exercise authority in the implementation of social protection programmes. This is particularly important in order to ensure transparency and accountability in the governance of social protection programmes for the benefit of the poor. Put differently, to ensure that the benefits of social protection programmes reach the poor, effective participatory governance mechanisms are now recognized as important for the success of social protection programmes in many developing countries (Bassett et al. 2012; Conning and Kevane 2002).

In addition, the limited financial resources available for social protection programmes in developing countries demand that the available resources are allocated and utilized effectively in ways that ensure transparency and accountability amongst state and non-state actors and institutions. Indeed, given the limited resources available to many governments and donor agencies in developing countries, rather than introduce social protection programmes that
universally cover all those in need of assistance, many programmes in developing countries currently target the poorest and most vulnerable categories of people such as women, children, the elderly, and the disabled, amongst others. In other words, unlike universal programmes that allow greater coverage of poor people, targeting the most vulnerable members of the population is now common (Devereux 2016; Hoddinott 2007). However, targeting in many low and low-middle income countries is sometimes done using community-based targeting methods and mechanisms (CBTMs), which allow community members to participate in the implementation of social protection programmes. Yet, while community-based targeting as a method simply refers to the involvement of community organizations, authorities, or agents, such as local leaders, civil society or non-governmental organizations, in the selection of beneficiaries of social protection programmes (Coady et al. 2004), community-based targeting mechanisms refer to the involvement of community agents in the selection of beneficiaries and in other aspects of implementation like delivery, monitoring and evaluation of social protection programmes (Yusuf 2010; Conning and Kevane 2002).

Although CBTMs are a form of community participation that engage community agents in the implementation of social protection programmes, they differ from general community participation in development projects that provide benefits to the whole community in the form of public goods such as roads, schools, clinics, and so on. This is because the benefits in targeted programmes like cash or in-kind transfers are based on individual circumstances and accrue to the individual and not the community as a whole (Conning and Kevane 2002). Considering that transparency in social protection programmes requires openness and access to information, and that accountability requires that different state and non-state actors are answerable to one another and the beneficiaries, some proponents of CBTMs as participatory governance mechanisms
maintain that the “best” implementation outcomes will occur within CBTMs that are designed as hybrid systems or models (Yusuf 2010; Conning and Kevane 2002). Hybrid CBTMs are defined as those that do not leave the implementation of programmes entirely to members of the community, but that also involve state and other non-state actors and institutions in implementation of programmes. Essentially, the hybrid CBTM refers to the partnership between community members or agents and government bureaucracies and officials in the implementation of social protection programmes like identifying beneficiaries and performing other functions such as monitoring and evaluation. As Conning and Kevane (2002: 388) explain,

The best community targeting outcomes are likely to be achieved within hybrid systems which allow for significant local community agent discretion but also stipulate clear rules and targeting guidelines and which keep local agents accountable through external auditing and evaluation, and institutions such as mandatory public meetings, and competition amongst groups for contracts and elected office.

Indeed, to avoid some of the possible downsides of community participation such as corruption and elite capture, some proponents of CBTMs argue that community agents should not be solely in charge of the implementation of programmes (Yusuf 2010; Conning and Kevane 2002). For this reason, it is also argued that hybrid CBTMs should as much as possible include the following elements: involve a broad diversity of community agents in order to ensure that no single agent monopolises the responsibilities of the programme; utilise “semi-formal or informal village councils” or other organizations like CSOs, NGOs, school boards, churches or mosques; and where there is a possibility that weaker groups or individuals may be excluded from the process, CBTMs should explicitly “use categorical targeting or quotas” (CBTMs) (Conning and Kevane 2002: 387-388). But while different countries and social protection programmes currently utilize hybrid CBTMs based on some of the elements suggested by their proponents,
evidence of how CBTMs contribute to transparency and accountability in social protection programmes remain inconclusive.

Even though some studies have focused on the use of hybrid CBTMs in the implementation of social protection programmes, including their use in the distribution of humanitarian assistance in conflict and disaster zones (Young and Maxwell 2013; Maxwell et al. 2010), food aid and nutrition programmes (Gilligan et al. 2005; Chinsinga 2005; Marchione 2005), social cash transfers (Schuring 2014; Handa et al. 2012), and waiver fee programmes (Ridde et al. 2010a, 2010b), the main focus of many of these studies has been on CBT as methods and not on CBT as mechanisms. Moreover, while the use of CBTMs to implement Conditional Cash Transfers (CCT) programmes is on the rise, especially in African countries, studies of CBT as mechanisms for implementing CCTs are few in the academic literature (Garcia and Moore 2012). This is despite the popularity of CCTs as social protection programmes that provide cash transfers to poor households in many developing countries based on the fulfillment of certain conditions such as sending their children to school and/or attending health clinics regularly (Fiszbien and Schady 2009). Consequently, in light of the current gaps and debates in the literature on the governance of social protection programmes through CBTMs, and the lack of studies on their use in implementing CCTs, this dissertation seeks to make a significant contribution to the literature on CBT as a mechanism based on the examination of the CBTM that is utilized in the implementation of Nigeria’s “In Care of the People” CCT programme.

On the COPE programme, after the Federal Government of Nigeria (FGN) secured an $18 billion debt relief and $12 billion debt buy-back deal from the World Bank and the Paris club in 2005, the COPE CCT programme was introduced into Nigeria in 2007, and was funded with the Debt Relief Gains (DRG) (State Partnership for Accountability, Responsiveness and
Capability 2013; Okonjo-Iweala 2012). But as part of the conditions to secure the debt relief, Nigeria was expected to provide justifications on the spending plan for the annual DRG savings of $1 billion, which was previously allocated to servicing the debt. Specifically, the country needed to come up with justifications of how the funds would be spent on poverty reduction programmes, including social protection programmes to demonstrate Nigeria’s efforts to achieve the Millennium Development Goals. Hence, as a way of demonstrating its commitment to spending the debt relief gains on pro-poor policies and programmes, the Nigerian government, in consultation with the World Bank, created the COPE CCT programme. However, to facilitate the achievement of the MDGs and manage the $1 billion debt relief savings, the Federal Government of Nigeria established the Office of the Senior Special Assistant to the President on the MDGs (OSSAP-MDGs) in 2005. The OSSAP-MDGs was required to work with MDAs and governments at all levels (federal, state and local government) and collaborate with international development organizations. But for the implementation of COPE, in particular, the government mandated another government agency, the National Poverty Eradication Programme (NAPEP), to work with the OSSAP-MDGs. Prior to the creation of the OSSAP-MDGs in 2005, NAPEP was the major agency in Nigeria responsible for coordinating poverty eradication programmes across the country. Thus, the OSSAP-MDGs provides the funds for NAPEP to serve as the main government implementing agency for COPE.

Notably, unlike the previous social programmes implemented in Nigeria through government agencies like NAPEP, COPE was designed and implemented as a national programme that uses CBTMs, which require the collaboration of state and non-state actors and institutions. Based on stipulated guidelines by the Nigerian Federal Government, government actors and institutions and a diverse array of community agents were assigned different
responsibilities for the implementation of the programme as part of the CBTM. Community or village committees known as Community Social Assistance Committees (CSACs) were established at the community level to work with government officials from NAPEP, the participating states and local governments. According to the guidelines for COPE, the CSAC in each community should comprise community agents such as the village head, the leading Pastor or Imam, a school head and the community development leader (NAPEP 2007a). During the implementation of the programme in different states, women leaders, community health care workers, and youth leaders were also included as members of CSACs. The community agents serve as members of CSACs and are responsible for identifying and selecting beneficiaries and monitoring and evaluating the programme in partnership with the government officials. In addition, NGOs and CSOs were also assigned certain duties by the government agencies as external auditors to ensure transparency and accountability in the payment, monitoring, and evaluation of the programme.

Furthermore, the targeting approach used in COPE involves geographic and categorical targeting of states, local governments, communities, and households. Within states, COPE mainly targets poor local governments, communities and households with children of school age that are headed by females, the aged/elderly, physically challenged persons, or persons belonging to special vulnerable groups such as victims of Vesicle Vagina Fistula (VVF) or People Living with HIV and AIDS (PLWHAs) (NAPEP 2007a). The two objectives of COPE are “to reduce vulnerability of the core poor in the society against existing socioeconomic risks” and “to reduce intergenerational poverty” (NAPEP 2007a: 5). In terms of income transfers, each participating household receives a Basic Income Guarantee (BIG) ranging from N1500 Nigerian Naira per

1At the state level, State Social Assistance Committees (SSACs) were also established in each state. The SSACs are responsible for selecting participating local governments where the communities are located while CSACs select eligible households within the community in collaboration with NAPEP officials.
child to a maximum of N5000 (US $33) for a maximum of four children or more children per month. Monthly transfers are made on the conditions that children attain 80 percent school attendance and also take part in government sponsored immunisation programmes. An additional N7000 known as the Poverty Reduction Accelerator Investment (PRAI) is put aside every month on behalf of every household and a total of N84000 (US $560) is given to the household as investment fund after 12 months when households exit the programme.

Based on the guidelines for the programme outlined above, this dissertation examines how authority is exercised by community agents and government officials in the implementation of the COPE CCT as a social protection programme in Nigeria. Through an analyses of how information was disseminated amongst the various state and non-state actors and institutions, including beneficiaries, the dissertation examines how transparency was improved or impeded in the implementation of the programme, and the participation of community members as agents in the decision-making processes necessary for implementing the programme at the community level. It also examines how accountability was impeded or improved in relation to answerability and application of sanctions amongst different state and non-state actors and institutions. Combined, the dissertation provides an in-depth case study analysis about the implementation of the COPE CCT through a CBTM that is designed as a hybrid model. In addition, and amongst other things, the dissertation examines how marginalized categories of the poor, especially women, were included in the COPE CCT programme, which unlike previous social programmes in Nigeria, not only recognized women as beneficiaries, but also as community leaders and agents. As such, while recognizing the role of women as leaders and the main target group of beneficiaries in COPE, the dissertation provides important and relevant discussions surrounding the participation of women in COPE, especially in relation to their role as members of the

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2The exchange rate was approximately US $1 to N150 when the programme was introduced in 2007.
community/village committees that were established as part of the CBTM used to implement the programme in Oyo State, one of Nigeria’s 36 federating states. The following sub-subsections outline the research questions, aim, and objectives of the study, the breakdown of chapters and the main argument of this dissertation.

1.2. Research Questions, Aim and Objectives of Study

The main research question of this dissertation is;

*How do CBTMs improve or impede transparency and accountability in the governance of social protection programmes in developing countries?*

In order to answer the question above, the dissertation asks the following subquestions;

*What are the factors that improved or impeded transparency in the implementation of the COPE CCT programme through the CBTM in Oyo state, south-west, Nigeria?*

*How was accountability improved or impeded through the CBTM in the implementation of Nigeria’s COPE CCT programme in Oyo state?*

The main aim of this study is;

To examine how CBTMs improve or impede transparency and accountability in the governance of social protection programmes in developing countries.

The objectives of the study are as follows;

To understand the factors that impeded or improved transparency in the implementation of COPE.

To ascertain how accountability was improved or impeded in the implementation of COPE.
1.3. Breakdown of Chapters

This dissertation is organized into eight chapters, including this introduction and a concluding chapter. While the subsequent chapters address different aspects that contribute to the overall aim of the dissertation, this introductory chapter mainly highlights what the dissertation is about. Chapter 2 provides a necessary clarification of the various concepts used in this dissertation such as social protection, poverty, vulnerability, risks, governance, transparency, and accountability. In view of the different definitions of social protection in the literature, the chapter clarifies and conceptualizes social protection as used in this dissertation as social assistance programmes that are designed and implemented for poor individuals, households and communities to address their poverty, vulnerabilities, and risks. Poverty in this dissertation is defined as a multidimensional phenomenon that entails inadequate access to basic social and economic resources such as access to quality basic education, healthcare, water and sanitation, and adequate income. The chapter notes that the inadequacies caused by lack of access to these basic social and economic requirements make poor people vulnerable to a myriad of socioeconomic risks from birth to death.

Likewise, recognizing the widespread acknowledgement that governance connotes the exercise of authority beyond the traditional confines of governmental actors and institutions, governance is conceptualized as involving the exercise of authority by state and non-state actors and institutions through transparent and accountable processes, institutions and mechanisms in the overall interest of the public. For the purpose of this dissertation, transparency refers to openness in decision-making processes as well as the availability and accessibility of information as necessary, and accountability entails answerability through effective checks and balances.
Chapter 2 ends with a discussion on the theoretical and analytical frameworks adopted in this study.

Chapters 3 and 4 explore two distinct but interrelated literature on governance and social protection respectively. Chapter 3 reviews the governance literature as applied to the field of international development. The different formulations of governance that scholars and leading international development agencies have contributed to the discourse of governance in international development are reviewed. In relation to the focus of this dissertation, the various formulations of governance as “good governance,” “good enough governance,” “better governance,” and “enhanced governance” are reviewed to ascertain their unique and/or shared elements. Here, transparency and accountability are identified as core elements of governance. However, the review also serves as a means of identifying the current gaps and debates in the literature that are relevant to this study, not least as they relate to arguments for and against community participation in governance. In particular, a major gap in the governance literature relates to controversies on how to ensure the effective participation of community members such as women leaders as non-state actors in the exercise of authority over public affairs. The chapter also contains an overview of governance and development in the African and Nigerian contexts. This is done to provide a much needed contextual background for understanding the analysis in the dissertation. The chapter provides important details on poverty in Nigeria, with special reference to the multidimensional nature of poverty, the role of NAPEP in coordinating poverty eradication programmes, and the gendered patterns of poverty, especially its effects on women in Nigeria.

Chapter 4 reviews the social protection literature. Amongst other things, the review identifies the two dominant approaches that currently influence the design and implementation of
social protection programmes in developing countries. These are the social risks management and rights-based approaches. The chapter also examines the debates about “targeting” in the design and implementation of social protection programmes in recent years. In addition, while the chapter reviews the different kinds of targeting methods often used in social protection, the emphasis is placed on community-based targeting as both a method and a mechanism. The chapter identifies some current gaps and debates in the literature on CBTMs as they relate to transparency and accountability in the implementation of social protection programmes. The chapter also reviews the origin of CCTs as social protection programmes that originated in Latin America (LA), and shows some of the challenges of implementing CCTs in the LA context. But in view of the proliferation of CCTs across the world during the past two decades, and the role of leading donors such as the World Bank in the spread of CCTs across the globe, the chapter also discusses the process through which CCTs have spread to Africa through the World Bank’s Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers.

Consequently, the reviews in chapters 3 and 4 collectively identify important gaps in the literature. They also provide necessary contextual backgrounds for understanding governance and social protection in Africa generally, and Nigeria specifically. While the gaps in the social protection literature generally relate to whether or not community participation allows social protection benefits to reach the poor, the identified gaps in the governance literature relate to the effects of corruption and bad governance on national development and social protection on the African continent. Yet, between them, the debate over the role of patrimonialism and neopatrimonialism in fostering or hindering development and social protection at the community level in many African countries is examined. This is done in light of the debates about the
genuineness of community participation under the aegis of neoliberal inspired governance reforms that seek to engage non-state actors and institutions at the community level.

Chapter 5 provides details of the research design and methodology of this dissertation. The in-depth case study research design and the mixed methodology approach used in this study are discussed. The quantitative and qualitative data collection techniques, which comprise one-on-one interviews, household surveys, and archival research, are explained. Justifications for the research design and methodological choices made are also explained where necessary. These include decisions on the selection of cases and participants for the study. Data analysis for this study was mainly done using interpretive (thematic) analysis, in tandem with the conceptual and analytical frameworks adopted for the study. The household survey was analyzed using the Statistical Package for the Social Sciences (SPSS) software to generate frequency distribution tables for displaying results of the quantitative data used in this study. The chapter also discusses the limitations of this study and some of the challenges encountered in the course of conducting the fieldwork for this dissertation.

Chapters 6 and 7 are the substantive analytical chapters of this dissertation. The two chapters provide answers to the two sub-questions of this dissertation. Chapter 6 focuses on transparency, and chapter 7 focuses on accountability. Chapter 6 focuses on the first sub-question and contributes to answering the main research question. Following the presentation of data relating to transparency in COPE, the chapter identifies and provides an analysis of the factors that impeded or improved transparency in the implementation of COPE in the three communities of the study. Based on the multi-subjective perspectives and experiences of the community members, beneficiaries, non-beneficiaries, state, and non-state officials, the processes and mechanisms set-up to promote transparency are analyzed to understand what
factors impeded or improved transparency during the implementation of COPE. Based on the processes and mechanisms designed to promote transparency as stated in the programme document, the operational guidelines, and what occurred in practice, the analysis focuses on the participation of state and non-state actors and institutions in the implementation of COPE through the CBTM."

Chapter 7 examines how accountability was impeded or improved in the implementation of COPE. While also contributing to answering the main research question, the chapter builds on the discussion and analysis in chapter 6, and addresses the second sub-question of this dissertation. Following the presentation of data, the analysis focuses on how the checks and balances structures established to promote accountability in COPE operated in practice, and how the various state and non-state actors and institutions engaged with the structures. Specifically, the analysis examines how the checks and balances structures of COPE contributed to ensuring that various state and non-state actors and institutions were answerable to one another. The chapter also notes how the decentralized structures of the state institutions contributed to the operation of the checks and balances between and amongst various state and non-state institutions from the national to sub-national levels. Chapter 8 concludes this dissertation. The chapter provides a recap of the main issues addressed in the dissertation and succinctly summarizes the main findings. To situate the dissertation’s contribution to the literature on governance and social protection, the chapter begins with a broad overview of the rationale for the study, and to provide a concise answer to the main research question based on the finding of this study, the chapter combines the answers to the sub-questions presented in chapters 6 and 7. This is followed by a brief discussion of the implications of the findings for the theory and
practice of social protection in developing countries such as Nigeria, and offers suggestions for future studies.

1.4. Summary of Findings and Main Argument

In relation to factors that improved transparency in COPE through the CBTM, the study found that the inclusion of community agents or members in decision-making processes for selecting beneficiaries, and the open selection of beneficiaries in places of communal significance, improved transparency in the implementation of COPE. The study also found that the availability of, and access to, information on the programme was unidirectional from state officials to community members. In addition, the study found that information was not provided in alternative understandable forms and media beyond the verbal communication from officials to community members. These factors impeded transparency in the programme. The lack of access to alternative sources of information beyond the officials created a situation where community members had to rely on what the officials explained, and in the absence of alternate forms of information, the community members ability to effectively engage with the programme was impeded.

On accountability, the study found that the checks and balances structures created to ensure answerability amongst state and non-state actors and institutions were weak in practice. This impeded accountability in the programme. This is despite the efforts of some state and non-state actors and institutions to fulfill their assigned responsibilities. In particular, the study found that the CBTM did not improve accountability between various state and non-state actors and institutions to the community members. Rather community members were more accountable to the other actors and institutions. This weakened the accountability that the CBTM was supposed to provide in the implementation of the programme. It was also found that the weak operation of
the checks and balances in the implementation of COPE are traceable to the weak administrative and technical capacity of state actors and institutions and the absence of any grievance mechanisms for the communities to express their views on the programme.

Quite significantly, beyond the immediate findings on transparency and accountability, this study found that the decision-making space opened by the CBTM in Nigeria prevented potential elite capture of programme benefits, which often times occur in Nigeria. The participation of a diversity of community agents in the implementation of COPE as part of the CBTM ensured that no single agent was responsible for making decisions on who gets chosen to benefit from the programme. Tellingly, the study found that the inclusion of some women leaders as community agents in decision-making processes contributed to some of the positive outcomes recorded in the implementation of COPE in Oyo State, especially in relation to the recognition of women as leaders and not just beneficiaries. Together, the social capital of the women leaders, that is, the reciprocal relationship of trust amongst women and the other community agents and members, helped to achieve significant outcomes in COPE. This is despite the drawbacks that impeded the overall governance of the programme. But considering Nigeria is often regarded as a country that is plagued by systemic corruption and extensive patrimonial and neo-patrimonial networks, the prevention of elite capture of the programme through the CBTM is noteworthy.

Consequently, based on the findings of this study, this dissertation argues that although the CBTM contributed to the governance of COPE in Oyo state by including state and non-state actors and institutions in the implementation of the programme, transparency was not sufficiently improved and accountability was largely impeded in the implementation of the programme. Specifically, with respect to transparency, the dissertation argues that despite the fact that the
CBTM helped in opening up hitherto closed-off decision-making spaces to community members, the unidirectional flow of information impeded the achievement of greater transparency. Hence, the dissertation posits that for transparency to be improved through the CBTM, information should be made available and accessible to communities in alternative and more understandable forms such as printed manuals in local languages, local newspapers and radio stations. Similarly, on accountability, the dissertation argues that the weak operation of the checks and balances mainly reflect the failures of state actors and institutions to fulfill their assigned responsibilities. The absence of any grievance mechanism for citizens and communities to seek redress against the state, its actors, and institutions as well as other non-state actors and institutions, impeded accountability in the implementation of the programme. The dissertation nevertheless maintains that the weakness of the checks and balances in COPE relates to the poor foundation upon which the programme was founded in Nigeria, not least because of the weak and poor capacity of state institutions at all levels of government: local, state, and federal.
Chapter Two
Conceptual Clarification, Theoretical and Analytical Framework

2.0. Chapter Overview
Considering the relevance of key concepts like “social protection” and “governance” to this study, this chapter clarifies what they mean in this dissertation. In the discourse on social protection, concepts such as poverty, vulnerability and risks are used extensively, and understanding their meaning in relation to this study is necessary. Similarly, although the use of governance as a concept has grown over the past three decades, its use remains highly debated in some respects, even though concepts such as transparency and accountability are now closely associated with it. Hence, as central themes in this study, a clarification of the meaning of governance, transparency, and accountability is imperative. To establish the links between governance and social protection in this dissertation, an understanding of the theoretical and analytical frameworks is crucial. The chapter proceeds as follows.

First, in light of the different interpretations and definitions that are often used by scholars and policymakers, a conceptual clarification of social protection is provided. The adopted definition for this dissertation specifies the core elements of social protection, noting the important differences in the use of the concept in developed and developing countries. Second, following the clarification of social protection, the interrelated concepts of poverty, vulnerability and risk that most times underpin conceptualizations of social protection are clarified. Third, governance as a concept is clarified. This is done in view of the many definitions of the term, and its general application across disciplines. As central themes or elements in the definition of governance as used in this dissertation, transparency and accountability are also clarified and operationalized for analytical purposes. Fourth, the theoretical framework that guides this study is discussed as a precursor for situating the general thrust of this dissertation’s contributions to
scholarly debates on governance and social protection, and the analytical framework for this
dissertation is specified in light of the theoretical framework adopted for the study. The chapter
ends with a summary of the main issues discussed.

2.1. Social Protection

Like most other concepts in the social sciences and humanities, “social protection” is a contested
concept. While the concept is generally defined as programmes and policies designed to assist
very poor individuals, households, and communities in addressing their poverty, specific
definitions vary amongst practitioners and scholars (Elkins 2013; Midgley 2013; de Haan 2011;
Gross 2007; Standing 2007; Norton et. al. 2001). Although the various definitions of social
protection in the literature often reflect the need for public interventions in reducing poverty
amongst the poor, most definitions of social protection also include the need to address the
vulnerabilities and risks that the poor are expose to and experience. As such, social protection is
often defined as public interventions, actions, policies, programmes, or instruments aimed at
addressing poverty, vulnerabilities and risks amongst persons considered poor. But the
definitions of poverty, vulnerability and risks in this context are equally subject to varying
degrees of different conceptualizations.

For instance, debates about how to define poverty remains rife in the social sciences, not
least because of disagreements over the widespread use of income as the main indicator for
defining and measuring it. The primacy of income as a major indicator of poverty is reflected in
the use of per capital income as a basic economic indicator of the wealth of individuals in many
countries. Yet, to the detriment of other social indicators of poverty, the use of income as a
measure of poverty places emphasis on the economic aspects of poverty. Thus, the focus on
income has been subject to numerous criticisms by scholars who maintain there is a need to
include other indicators when defining and measuring poverty (Wisor 2012; Dixon and Macarov 1998). For Novak (1996: 48), “what should be observed in poverty investigation is primarily the way of life of the poor in terms of social characteristics such as gender, age, education, race, etc., and secondarily the lifestyle and feeling of deprivation.” The main issue that is contested is not the use of income per se, but that income should not be used as the only measure of poverty. The narrow definition of poverty as lack of adequate income does not do justice to the concept as a multidimensional phenomenon. In other words, the inadequacies of the “income-centric” approach require emphasising the “multidimensional understanding of poverty,” and the factors that help to maintain and sustain it (Sneyd 2011: 5). For instance, as some scholars maintain, multidimensional poverty, especially in relation to the effects on women, is sometimes caused by a lack of access to education and ownership of productive assets like land that often constitute structural barriers leading to the “feminisation of poverty,” that is, the disproportionate representation of women amongst the poor in many developing countries (Herzog 2011; Kabeer 2008; Chant 2007; Razavi and Hassim 2006).

Consequently, as part of an emerging discourse on social protection as public interventions, definitions of poverty now tend to emphasize its multidimensional characteristics, beyond narrow definitions like the lack of adequate income. As such, recognizing poverty as a multidimensional phenomenon has given rise to emphasis on the various kinds of social and economic risks that poor individuals, households, and communities often experience from time to time, hence, the inclusion of “risks” in many definitions of social protection. Social and economic risks can range from potential childhood underdevelopment to illness, unemployment, old age, disability, and so on. These can cut across intergenerational and class divides, which cause many people to sometimes experience additional risks over the course of their lifetime.
(Esping-Andersen 1999: 40-43). But how to manage these risks can be challenging for developing and developed countries alike. For instance, although the welfare state, alongside the family and the market, is considered the main source of managing risks in developed countries, variations exist within the developed countries with respect to which institutions or mechanisms take precedence in risk management; the state, markets, and/or the family (Esping-Andersen 1999: 33). But within developing countries, states, markets, and families, do not necessarily possess the capacities to effectively manage the risks that many people face.

Indeed, in some developing countries where market mechanisms are not well developed, where families are not sufficiently capable of managing the various social and economic risks of their members, and where the state itself is unable to manage such risks, reliance or dependence on foreign assistance has become the norm (Cerami 2013: 3). The failure to manage social and economic risks makes many individuals, households, and communities vulnerable to poverty. While vulnerability is defined differently across disciplines and sub-disciplines, including economics, sociology, environmental science and so on, it is often used to generally refer to the probability that individuals, households, and communities are likely to fall (further) into poverty in future when unforeseen events or shocks occur (Elkins 2013; Holzman and Jorgensen 2001). At the same time, although vulnerability can be explained in relation to social risks, Brunori and O’Reilly (2010) relate it to “shocks” at the macro and the micro levels. At the macro level, vulnerability can refer to “countries or regions that are likely to experience frequent external shocks and that have poor resilience and limited capacity to react to shocks” (Brunori and O’Reilly 2010: 4). These shocks may arise due to a range of events like changes in climatic conditions, HIV/AIDS epidemic, or even financial crisis and fluctuations in prices. At the micro

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3For example, within economics, the food security, asset based, sustainable livelihoods and poverty dynamics literatures differ on their use of the concept (see, for instance, Alwang et al. 2001).
level, vulnerability refers to “idiosyncratic” and “covariate” shocks that affect communities, households and individuals (Brunori and O’Reilly 2010: 4). While covariate shocks are events whose impacts cut across entire communities or states, idiosyncratic shocks refer to events whose impacts are limited to individual households and not shared across communities (Klasen and Waibel 2013: 20). In relation to social protection, vulnerability mainly refers to the “relationship between poverty, risk, and efforts to manage risk” in the present and future (Alwang et al. 2001: 1). For instance, the vulnerability of poor elderly persons to hunger can be addressed through social pensions (Ellis et al. 2009).

Put together, when defining social protection, scholars tend to note the relationship between poverty, risks, and vulnerability. To this end, while scholars like Norton et al. (2001: 7) define social protection as “public actions taken in response to levels of vulnerability, risk and deprivation which are deemed socially unacceptable within a given policy or society,” others like Holzman and Jorgensen (2001: 530) define social protection as “public interventions to (i) assist individuals, households, and communities [to] better manage risks and (ii) provide support to the chronically poor.” Although these definitions are framed differently, they point in the same direction of protecting the poor. In recent years, given that the various environmental, social, economic and political crises in the past three decades have caused many people to fall into poverty, especially in many developing countries where social protection systems are inadequate, specific reference to the poor within the social protection literature also tend to refer to poor children, women, the elderly, and the disabled amongst others (Holmes and Jones 2013; Roelen and Sabates-Wheeler 2012; UNICEF 2009).

Yet, considering the various ways in which social protection is conceptualized amongst development scholars and practitioners, debates on how to define social protection remains
largely unresolved. However, as Brunori and O’Reilly (2010: 3) observe, three major conceptual approaches often influence how social protection is conceived or defined in many developing countries. These are the rights-based approach, the risks-based approach, and the pro-poor economic growth approach. The rights-based approach defines social protection as a human right, and follows the tradition of organizations such as the International Labour Organization (ILO) and United Nations (UN) agencies. The risks-based approach defines social protection as social risks management (SRM), and follows the approach of the World Bank in particular. The pro-poor economic growth approach defines social protection as promoting economic growth, and follows the approach of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) (Brunori and O’Reilly 2010: 3). These approaches also reflect much of the conceptualizations that most scholars adopt in discussing social protection.

Essentially, while proponents of risks-based approaches argue that it is the “best answer to increasing unstable scenarios when it comes to poverty alleviation,” proponents of rights-based approaches maintain that social protection policies and programmes should consider or treat “citizens as right-holders” and “states as duty-bearers,” (Brunori and O’Reilly 2010: 3). On their part, proponents of pro-poor economic growth believe that social protection is “an efficient ingredient in pro-poor economic growth,” and it should be used to foster inclusive economic growth. But in reality, Brunori and O’Reilly (2010: 3-4) explain that,

These three, partly overlapping, approaches lead to a range of SP [Social Protection] operational definitions that present some heterogeneity, but many substantial similarities. The states’ duty to provide SP implies the choice of a set of policies capable of effectively guaranteeing SP for all. Similarly, the SRM approach necessitates a number of practices and policies to handle risk, just as pro-poor growth is efficiently met when a set of policies and private actions combat the failures that reduce well-being and dampen economic growth. The implementation of these theoretical SP definitions calls for the clarification of what the objectives of SP are, which actions and programmes best deliver SP, and who should play a role in designing and implementing them.
Indeed, clarifying the objectives of social protection programmes is crucial to its conceptualization. But notwithstanding the conceptual approach adopted by scholars and practitioners, the objectives of social protection programmes most times reflect the need to address poverty, vulnerability and risks. However, the objectives of social protection programmes are mostly based on whether they seek to provide social insurance or social assistance for the poor. To be clear, while social assistance programmes tend to offer payments to support poor households and individuals, using mostly non-contributory tax-financed programmes, social insurance programmes mainly aim to secure the poor against adverse risks through contributory programmes (European Report on Development 2010:1). Some notable social insurance programmes include contributory pension schemes, health insurance, unemployment insurance, disability insurance, and work injury insurance programmes. Social assistance programmes include child support grants, school-feeding programmes, public works/workfare programmes, employment guarantee schemes, cash transfer programmes/income guarantee schemes, emergency relief, social pensions and other old-age benefits (ERD 2010: 33).

Although a combination of social insurance and social assistance programmes are identifiable in some developing countries, social insurance programmes are more prominent in developed countries, where contributory and statutory social security systems are functional (Midgley 2013; Nino-Zarazua et al. 2012). But in many developing countries, social protection programmes are mainly non-contributory social assistance rather than social insurance (Barrientos 2014). This is because most poor people are not covered by social insurance policies and programmes. As Barrientos (2014: 189) explains, social assistance in many developing countries is “not understood simply as a policy instrument compensating or mitigating poverty,
but rather as part of a strategy to reduce and eventually eradicate poverty and improve equity.” Barrientos (2014) further explains that since the turn of the century, the introduction of non-contributory social assistance programmes in developing countries has produced two discernable approaches to social assistance. The first relates to a “social policy/public finance approach” that provides poor and vulnerable individuals and households with transfers to overcome their present situation. The second approach relates to the “development approach” that seeks to address development concerns through policies that address “the human development, governance, the environment, and empowerment” needs of poor people (Barrientos 2014: 191-192).

From the above, it is clear that while social protection policies and programmes abound across the globe, the imperative of providing social assistance to the poor and vulnerable in developing countries has increased in the past two decades. Given this dissertation’s focus on the social assistance objectives of social protection programmes, it adopts Barrientos’ conceptualization of social protection as “a range of programs and policies addressing poverty and vulnerability” mainly through social assistance (Barrientos 2014: 189). This definition allows for understanding Conditional Cash Transfer (CCT) programmes as non-contributory social assistance programmes in this dissertation. Designed to help poor and vulnerable individuals and households overcome their poverty and vulnerabilities through human capital development, CCTs now operate in many developing countries. However, when addressing the poverty, vulnerabilities, and risks of poor individuals, households and communities, a combination of both the developmental and social policy/public finance approaches to social assistance in developing countries are considered necessary. Hence, as used in this dissertation, social assistance refers to a combination of both approaches.
To be clear, this dissertation conceptualizes poverty as a multidimensional phenomenon and adopts the broader definition of poverty, which goes beyond the focus on income. The meaning of poverty in this dissertation includes the inability of households and individuals to access basic social amenities such as good health care and educational services. Also, given that CCTs are often designed with conditions requiring access to basic health and educational services, it is imperative for governments and donors to support the provision of these services where and when needed. Consequently, the conceptualization of poverty as a multidimensional phenomenon in this dissertation incorporates the social and economic understanding of poverty as a lack of adequate resources to access the basic necessities of life, which in this case includes access to basic education and health care services. Likewise, considering that vulnerability is intrinsically related to poverty and the management of risks, it is conceptualized here as exposures or proneness to the myriad of social and economic risks that social protection programmes seek to address, including the human capital development of individual household members. Stated differently, it refers to vulnerabilities to social and economic risks that affect the development of the human capital of poor individuals, households, and communities in developing countries. Since CCTs are often designed and implemented with the objectives of addressing the socioeconomic risks and intergenerational transmission of poverty that are caused by poor human capital development in particular, when providing social protection to the poor, it is important that social protection in developing countries utilise a combination of the developmental and social/public policy approaches to social assistance.

2.2. Governance

In a broad sense, “governance” entails the exercise of authority by state and non-state actors. But unlike “government,” which connotes the exercise of authority by state actors only, many
scholars and practitioners consider the inclusion of non-state actors in the exercise of authority over state affairs to be a defining feature of governance (Ilyin 2013). Thus, Rhodes (2007: 1246) states that governance can refer to “a new process of governing; or a changed condition of ordered rule;” or “the new method by which society is governed” (emphases in original). The understanding that governance involves new processes, methods, and changes for exercising authority over the affairs of the public recognizes the imperative of subjecting state actions to the greater involvement of non-state actors such as civil society groups, NGOs, citizens, community organizations and other important actors. However, these actors can work through a myriad of networks and mechanisms that allow non-state actors like citizens and interests groups to collaborate with, or independently perform, oversight functions with other state actors or non-state actors. In other words, governance involves the interaction between numerous processes, networks, mechanisms, actors, and institutions in the overall interest of the public (Hill and Lynn 2004; Hyden 2002; de Alcantara 1998).

Notably, however, in the past three decades, the application of governance as a concept that connotes changes in how authority is exercise by state and non-state actors in the interest of the public has been on the rise. This is partly because as Levi-Faur (2012: 7) notes, the “rise of governance coincided with the widespread consensus that ours is (again) an era of change, of shifts, and even of transformation and paradigm change” in at least three different directions; upward, downward, and horizontal. While the upward shift is to the regional, national, transnational, intergovernmental, and global arena; the downward shift is to the local arena, the regions, and the metropolitan area; and the horizontal shift is to the private and civil spaces of authority (Levi-Faur 2012: 7). These shifts can simply be interpreted as representing changes in the exercise of authority at the sub-national, national, and international levels, where
considerably amounts of state and non-state institutions, processes, and mechanisms now exist in various public domains. Nonetheless, regardless of which direction the shift occurs, certain core elements such as transparency and accountability have also become the defining features of governance (Fukuyama 2016; Diamond 2004; Grindle 2004).

On the one hand, as a central element in the discourse on governance, transparency refers to openness in the exercise of authority over public affairs by state and non-state actors and institutions. But openness requires access to adequate information in understandable forms for all actors, which makes it imperative that various state actors should not only be aware of the necessary information on any issue, but should also have access to information needed to ensure transparency in governance (McGee and Gaventa 2011; Chakrabarty and Bhattachaya’s 2008). On the other hand, accountability refers to holding various actors responsibility for their actions and inactions (Adamolekun 2010). But for accountability to hold, it requires effective systems of checks and balances for different actors to hold one another accountable. The application of necessary sanctions and rewards also helps to improve accountability in governance. Combined, while not entirely discussed as part of accountability, transparency is regularly stated as a very important aspect of accountability (Vij 2011; Fox 2010; Jayal 2008). Hence, governance is defined in this dissertation as the exercise of authority by state and non-state actors through transparent and accountable processes, institutions and mechanisms in the overall interest of the public.

This definition recognizes the importance of engaging state and non-state actors in the exercise of authority in the general interest of the public, particularly in relation to the governance of social protection through community-based targeting mechanisms (CBTMs) and the inclusion of marginalized groups such as women in governance. It notes that ensuring
transparency and accountability are important in the governance of social protection programmes through CBTMs. As such, the dissertation adopts Chakrabarty and Bhattachaya’s (2008: 8) explanation that transparency requires that “decisions taken and their enforcement are done in a manner that follows rules and regulations,” which in turn ensures that “information is freely available and directly accessible to those who will be affected by such decisions and their enforcement,” and that “enough information is provided and that it is provided in easily understandable forms and media.” Similarly, the meaning of accountability in this dissertation follows Brinkerhoff’s (2006: 268) interpretation that “accountability involves the power of one actor to make demands upon another to provide information about, or justification for, his/her actions; and the compulsion of the actor to those demands to respond.” According to Brinkerhoff (2008: 270-271), for accountability to hold, it is crucial for actors and institutions to be answerable to one another and uphold necessary sanctions; that is, “being accountable means having the obligation to answer questions regarding decisions or actions,” and uphold sanctions for illegal or inappropriate actions where necessary.

2.3. Theoretical and Analytical Framework

While it eludes any single definition or explanation, Chhotray and Stoker (2009: 3) note that “governance theory is about the practice of collective decision-making.” Governance theory is also seen by some scholars as important for assisting the study of various phenomena within and across disciplines. For instance, Peters (2012) argues that governance theory can contribute to political science in at least four ways. One, it can be used as a basis for making general comparisons, meaning governance approaches may be applied to the study of how various societies govern themselves. This is based on the fact that, for the purpose of making collective decisions, all human societies inherently tend to find various means of organizing themselves
into governance systems. Two, in order to make a coherent whole in the sub-discipline, governance theory can be used to link different fields and issues in comparative politics. This hinges on the fact that, to a large extent, various dimensions in political science, including but not limited to institutions, processes or theoretical approaches, focus on governance. Third, in political science and related social science disciplines, governance theory may serve as a bridging approach between comparative politics and other fields. Fourth, in a bid to improve the overall quality of lives for citizens, governance theory can help political science link different normative and empirical questions. In this context, the need to advance the course of improving the quality of life for many citizens requires establishing important linkages between the theory and practice of governance.

However, in reality, contributions to governance theory have mainly occurred through various, albeit overlapping, sub-theories of governance that currently exist (Bevir 2011; Hill and Lynn 2004; Richardson 1974). Hence, Bevir (2011: 1) notes that “governance refers to theories and issues of social coordination and the nature of all patterns of rule,” especially in relation to the various “new theories and practices of governing and the dilemmas to which they give rise.” Such new theories and practices include but are not limited to multilevel governance (Marks 1993; Bache and Flinders 2004), network governance (Rhodes 1997, 2007; Peters and Pierre 1998), participatory governance (Speer 2010; Fung and Wright 2003) and so on. But regardless of which specific aspect of governance one chooses to contribute to, Stoker (1998: 18) suggests it is imperative for scholars to consider the following propositions;

1. Governance refers to a set of institutions and actors that are drawn from but also beyond government.
2. Governance identifies the blurring of boundaries and responsibilities for tackling social and economic issues.

3. Governance identifies the power dependence involved in the relationships between institutions involved in collective action.

4. Governance is about autonomous self-governing networks of actors.

5. Governance recognizes the capacity to get things done which does not rest on the power of government to command or use its authority. It sees government as able to use new tools and techniques to steer and guide.

Although these propositions are not exhaustive of the possible means of engaging with governance theory generally, they largely cover much of the various aspects of governance that scholars tend to focus their contributions. But Stoker (1998) also notes that the propositions should be understood as complementary rather than competitive or contradictory, and that each of the propositions comes with at least one major dilemma. The first proposition involves the dilemma of showcasing the separation between complex governance mechanisms for making decisions, and the norms for justifying government. The second proposition involves the dilemma of dealing with the fact that when responsibilities are blurred, it is easy to avoid blame. The third proposition involves the dilemma of dealing with the unanticipated consequences of government activities. The fourth proposition highlights the difficulties associated with accountability, given the existence of several self-governing networks. The fifth proposition involves the possibility of governance failures, even in situations where governments are flexible.

Therefore, in theorizing about governance, the centrality of collectively making decisions cannot be overemphasized. However, within the practice of governance, it is equally important to
acknowledge that various dilemmas can arise. Indeed, engagements between state and non-state actors and institutions can sometimes produce varying degrees of negative and/or positive outcomes for a number of reasons such as having limited access to the necessary information and the absence of effective systems of checks and balances. Yet, developing mechanisms that can accommodate several interests can also be challenging, especially in situations where actors have unequal access to information or where power imbalances amongst actors makes achieving accountability difficult. Although this dissertation recognizes that these challenges can occur in various governance mechanisms, it particularly examines these issues within the context of community-based targeting mechanisms that involve state and non-state actors and institutions in the implementation of social protection programmes in developing countries. For this reason, by demonstrating how community participation improves or impedes transparency and accountability in the implementation of social protection programmes in developing countries, the dissertation specifically seeks to make a contribution to the discourse on governance through participatory governance as a subset of governance theory.

Consequently, the dissertation specifically relates the theoretical understanding of governance as a participatory experience involving the exercise of authority by state and non-state actors through transparent and accountable processes, institutions and mechanisms in the overall interest of the public. Here, the interest of the public relates to ensuring that the poor receive the benefits allocated to them through social protection programmes. It notes that the practice of collective decision-making is a central participatory process that requires the involvement of several state and non-state actors with assigned responsibilities to assist in the implementation of social protection programmes within specific geographical locations. These actors include citizens living in local community/village settings, government officials at the
national and sub-national levels, and representatives of NGOs and CSOs involved in some aspect of decision-making within the CBTMs. Hence, this dissertation recognizes that government officials, NGO/CSO staff and selected community members, including women leaders, can share responsibilities in the implementation of social protection programmes. It also recognizes that both state and non-state actors can influence the outcome of social and economic programmes, either positively or negatively. In this case, the dissertation notes that the activities or involvement of various actors in the CBTMs can improve or impede transparency and accountability in the governance of social protection programmes in developing countries.

Specifically, the dissertation uses the hybrid CBTM as the analytical framework to examine how the exercise of authority by the CSACs and other state and non-state officials impeded or improved transparency and accountability in the implementation of COPE. For transparency, the analysis focuses on how the interactions between government officials and community agents working through CSACs impeded or improved; (i) the decision-making process for selecting eligible households, and (ii) the availability of, and access to, relevant information, for the various stakeholders, including beneficiaries. For accountability, the analysis focuses on how COPE’s CBTM impeded or improved the checks and balance mechanisms for ensuring that actors and institutions are answerable to one another. The adopted of these focal areas are based on the conceptualization and operationalization of governance in this dissertation as discussed above. It should be noted that in the case of COPE, the hybrid CBTM required that state officials from the national and subnational governments should work with Community Social Assistance Committees (CSACs), which comprise selected community members and local NGOs/CSO representatives, in the implementation of the programme. As explained in the
introductory chapter of this dissertation, this formed the framework for the hybrid CBTM in Nigeria.

2.4. Chapter Summary

In closing, it is necessary to emphasise that the discussion in this chapter mainly represents an important effort to clarify key concepts such as social protection, governance, poverty, vulnerability, risks, transparency and accountability, and present the theoretical and analytical framework that is applied in this dissertation. Nonetheless, despite their seemingly varied and independent usages, important connections exist between these various concepts, which links them to the theoretical and analytical frameworks used in this dissertation. Simply put, given that most social protection programmes are designed to assist poor and vulnerable families in addressing their poverty and socioeconomic risks, the imperative of having well-governed programmes that ensure the benefits get to those in need is important. As such, to ensure that benefits reach the intended beneficiaries, it is crucial that social protection programmes are implemented through transparent and accountable processes and mechanisms involving state and non-state actors, including the women representatives, and institutions in the exercise of authority for the benefit of the general public.

As discussed in the paragraphs above, the varying definitions of social protection and the interrelated concepts of poverty, vulnerability and risks, and their definitions for the purposes of this study, were clarified. This was followed by discussions of the definitions of governance, transparency and accountability as used in this dissertation. The theoretical and analytical frameworks of this dissertation were subsequently discussed. But to further contextualise the connections between the concepts, theoretical and analytical frameworks discussed in this chapter, the next two chapters provide necessary reviews of important extant debates and gaps in
the literatures on governance and social protection respectively. The reviews of the two separate but interrelated literatures are done to ensure a better understanding of the main issues that continue to influence the theory and practice of governance and social protection, both individually and collectively. To this end, the next chapter begins by focusing on the governance literature in relation to international development, while the subsequent chapter focuses on the social protection literature.
Chapter Three

Governance: A Literature Review

3.0. Chapter Overview

This chapter is a review of the governance literature in relation to the field of international development. It provides relevant background knowledge for the subsequent analyses in this dissertation vis-à-vis the focus on the governance of social protection programmes through community-based targeting mechanisms. As substantive elements in different conceptualizations of governance in the theory and practice of international development, the review examines how transparency and accountability have evolved. It also provides a background for understanding the discourse on governance in relation to Africa’s developmental challenges, not least in view of the widespread belief that corruption and bad governance are the banes of development in many African countries. In particular, the review examines how these issues affect the evolution of participatory governance in the Nigerian context, especially in relation to the challenges of creating transparent and accountable participatory mechanisms whereby state and non-state actors and institutions can collaborate in development and poverty reduction programmes in the overall interest of the public.

This review proceeds as follows. It begins with an examination of the different conceptualizations of governance in relation to development, and highlights some of the gaps in the practice of governance as a concept in international development. With a view to illustrate how the discourse on governance and development has evolved in the past three decades, the review specifically examines the various conceptualizations of governance as “good” governance (World Bank 1997, 1994, 1992), “good enough” governance (Grindle 2004), “enhanced” governance (Chibba 2009), and “better” governance (Unsworth 2006). This is done to particularly show how the discourse on governance and development has evolved to include a
focus on participatory governance. Hence, while highlighting the centrality of transparency and accountability as main elements of governance, the review shows how debates on participatory governance have evolved from the discourses on participatory democracy and participatory development since the 1960s. This is followed by a specific review of two main scholarly debates that highlight two major gaps in the scholarly literature on participatory governance and development in the African context. These are (i) the limits to using patrimonialism/neopatrimonialism as an overarching analytical lens, and (ii) the imperative of identifying how state and non-state actors and institutions can genuinely engage one another through transparent and accountable participatory mechanisms. The first debate examines how discussions on patrimonialism/neopatrimonialism shape the discourse on governance and development in Africa, and the second debate examines arguments on governance reforms relating to community participation in development since the introduction of neoliberal Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAPs) in the 1980s and 1990s in African countries.

In addition, to provide an in-depth background on the political and socioeconomic context in which participatory governance and development takes place in Africa, the review also includes a discussion of the Nigerian experience with governance and development, especially in relation to the challenges of achieving transparency and accountability in the governance of social programmes. This is illustrated through a broad discussion of the role of the National Poverty Eradication Programme (NAPEP) as the main poverty eradication agency in Nigeria with the responsibility of coordinating poverty reduction programmes, and the challenges of NAPEP regarding transparency and accountability. Furthermore, in view of the structural barriers that cause the feminisation of poverty in the Nigerian context, a brief discussion on gender and poverty is provided to demonstrate the challenges of women in Nigeria generally,
and poor rural women in particular. This includes a discussion on how the exclusion of women from decision-making processes at all levels of authority is conditioned by discriminatory cultural and religious views and practices are conditioned by the prevalence of patriarchy. The review ends with a summary of major issues raised in the chapter.

3.1. Governance in International Development: Good Governance, the World Bank, and Its Critics

Whether one speaks of neo-classical and neo-liberal development theories that privilege market institutions ahead of the state in the allocation of resources, or about structural theories that privilege the state ahead of market forces, the twists and turns in development theories in the past century have had remarkable impacts on the practice of development (cf. Pieterse 2010; Leys 1996; Somjee 1991). In particular, given the retrenchment of state institutions from development within the past 40 years, the impact of neo-liberal ideas on the theory and practice of development at the local and international levels cannot be overemphasised. However, in recent years, the inability of market forces to guarantee prosperity for many of the world’s citizens has led to acknowledgements of the roles that states can play in social and economic development in the 21st century (Haque 1999; Peet and Hartwick 2009). Consequently, the impasse between the failures of states and markets on the one hand, and the recognition that neither is solely able to sustainably foster prosperity and social protection for many of the world’s poorest people on the other hand, has increased the calls for synthensized arrangements that can help improve the condition of life for many people across the globe.

However, bad governance is considered a common problem that contributes to the failures of states and markets in advancing development in many countries of the world. Hence, since the late 1980s, calls for “good governance” by many scholars, practitioners, and international development agencies have increased because of the imperative of improving the
quality of governance in order to achieve social and economic development in many countries of the global south (Harris 2014). Yet, despite the widespread acknowledgement that good governance is necessary for development, there are different views about how good governance should be conceptualized, and what its constitutive elements should be. But the imperative of promoting good governance through more transparent and accountable institutions and mechanisms is deemed necessary to overcome bad governance and corruption, which Diamond (2004: 224) considers the “bane of development.” As Diamond (2004: 222) explains, “The deepest root cause of development failure is not a lack of resources or international isolation. Rather, it is a lack of good governance – the inability or unwillingness to apply public resources effectively to generate public goods.”

For Diamond (2004), to achieve good governance in developing countries, the following six dimensions of good governance must be addressed. First, the state must possess the bureaucratic and administrative capacity to provide public goods to citizens. Second, the state must also be committed to the provision of the necessary public goods such as physical infrastructure (roads, schools, markets, and so on). Third, there must be transparency and accountability in the public service. Fourth, the rule of law must be strictly adhered to within democratic systems. Fifth, the public should be able to participate and hold dialogue with state institutions through different mechanisms. Sixth, it is necessary to maintain a high degree of social capital “in the form of networks and associations that draw people together in relations of trust, reciprocity, and voluntary cooperation for common ends” (Diamond 2004: 223).

Essentially, for Diamond (2004: 223), transparency, which is closely intertwined with accountability, relates to the “openness of state business to the scrutiny of other state actors and of the public.” For Diamond, “Governing agents are more likely to be responsible and “good”
when they are answerable for their conduct to society in general and other specific institutions that monitor their behaviour and can impose sanctions upon them” (2004: 223). But for the six interrelated dimensions of good governance to produce development, Diamond (2004) argues there has to be a “comprehensive system of accountability” that allows for (i) effective horizontal accountability amongst government institutions, (ii) vibrant vertical accountability amongst citizens, civil society organizations, and government institutions and actors, and (iii) external accountability between aid agencies or donors and states.

As Diamond (2004) explains, horizontal accountability entails the means through which governmental institutions such as anti-corruption agencies, public audits, Ombudsman, parliamentary oversight committees, and so on, hold political and government actors answerable to the public. Ensuring the rule of law and freedom of information is vital to the effective operation of horizontal accountability. Vertical accountability refers to the means through which the citizens, the mass media, civil society and non-governmental organizations ensure that all public office holders are answerable to the public through regular elections and other means of monitoring the actions of state actors and institutions. External accountability involves the means that international donor agencies ensure that governments comply with the conditions of good governance in ways that allow development to take place. For Diamond (2004), it is important that external actors exert the necessary scrutiny of governments, especially in situations where there is a need to ensure that governance reforms are done to promote market liberalization and free market economies.

While Diamond’s (2004) contribution to the discourse on good governance, especially on the need for a comprehensive system of accountability, may allow states to transcend the challenges of bad governance, his arguments privileges neoliberal market-based governance
reforms that often times overlook the real needs of states and citizens in the developing world. Thus, Diamond does not take into consideration the damages of the market driven good governance reforms that massively degraded the capacity of many bureaucracies in developing countries after the introduction of SAPs in the 1980s and 1990s (cf. Hirschman 2000). In addition, although Diamond (2004) recognizes the need for the participation of citizens and non-state actors such as CSOs and NGOs in ensuring vertical accountability of the government, his analysis fails to adequately articulate how citizens can effectively ensure that external agencies such as the World Bank, which has been very influential in promoting the good governance agenda, are equally subject to public scrutiny. Indeed, while Diamond’s (2004) call for external accountability can be read as a means of ensuring governments are accountable to the development agencies, how external agencies are to be held accountable by the governments and the general public is not addressed. Yet, the evolution of the good governance agenda, particularly in relation to the need for transparency and accountability, has been advanced by the World Bank since the late 1980s and early 1990s. As Harriss (2014: 44-45) explains,

Both the evidence of state failure in some parts of the world and the experience of the failure of structural adjustment brought renewed attention to the role of the state. The World Bank published a significant paper on good government in 1992, highlighting the importance of transparency and accountability, as well as sound macro-economic and public sector management.

Considering its influential role in promoting market-based approaches to development, the World Bank’s embrace of good governance as the new ethos in the discourse of development continues to receive considerable attention within the field of international development. Although the World Bank’s good governance agenda now recognizes some role for the state in development, a recognition that is sometimes interpreted as a signal for a new era of “post-Washington consensus” in which the World Bank softens its market fundamentalist ideology
(Stiglitz 1998), it continues to advocate market based reforms in many developing countries. Notably, in privileging market forces ahead of state institutions, the World Bank’s approach to development in the late 1970s and 1980s was dominated by a set of policies known popularly as the “Washington consensus” (see, Rodrik 2005). But the publication of the 1997 World Development Report, *The State in a Changing World* (World Bank 1997), is sometimes considered a blueprint for defining the World Bank’s recognition of the role of the state in development (Harriss 2014). Yet, some scholars argue that the World Bank’s turn to governance begun in 1989 with the publication of *Sub-Saharan Africa, From Crises to Sustainable Growth: A Long-Term Perspective*, which identified Africa’s “crises of governance” as the cause of development failures on the continent. As Jerome (2004: 206) notes, the crises of governance, as identified in the World Bank’s 1989 publication, refers to the problems of “extensive personalization of power, the denial of fundamental human rights, widespread corruption, and the prevalence of unelected and unaccountable government.” Since the late 1980s, the World Bank has promoted various governance initiatives to address these issues.

While it is often mentioned that its mandate bars it from interfering in the politics of its client countries, the World Bank’s embrace of “governance” allows it to attach political conditions to its loans and other assistance “without explicitly talking about politics” (Chhotray and Stoker 2009: 102). For the World Bank (1992: 3), governance refers to the “manner in which power is exercised in the management of a country’s economic and social resources for development.” Three distinct aspects underpin the World Bank’s governance agenda; “(i) the form of political regime; (ii) the process by which authority is exercised in the management of a country’s economic and social resources for development; and (iii) the capacity of governments to design, formulate, and implement policies and discharge functions” (World Bank 1994: xiv).
These largely constitute the World Bank’s “good governance” agenda, and they have become the normative framework in which the World Bank’s approach to governance is expressed (World Bank 1997, 1994, 1992). But as Peters (2012) explains, the World Bank’s conception of “good governance” mainly revolves around issues of controlling corruption in developing countries. It is based on the assumption that if “government is capable of performing its tasks without significant levels of corruption then it is likely to perform those tasks more efficiently and also it will create trust within the population” (Peters 2012: 26). However, notwithstanding the World Bank’s prominent influence in shaping the discourse of governance in development, criticisms of its approach to governance have been advanced on both conceptual and empirical grounds.

To begin with, the World Bank’s definition of governance and its accompanying emphasis on “good governance” is sometimes criticized as focusing mostly on economic issues that reinforce the World Bank’s neoliberal approach to development. As Moore (1993) observes, the World Bank’s (1992) definition of governance is very “loose” because it allows the World Bank to simply focus on the procedural dimensions without effectively dealing with more “contentious” political issues that have more significance for development in the long run. Furthermore, as Ray (1998: 68) argues that the World Bank’s approach and understanding of the role of governance in development considers governance as “synonymous with sound development management” in a neo-classical/neo-liberal economic sense. For Ray (1998: 68), the World Bank’s concept of good governance consequently “repeats the classical neo-liberal argument that state spending is unproductive and that it crowds out wealth creating activity of rational, individual entrepreneurs.” In this sense, Ray (1998: 68) maintains that “the role of the state is to enable the private sector to lead economic activity – state activity, in other words, should be market friendly.” Thus, it is argued that while still allowing market forces to define the
direction of development and the allocation of resources, the World Bank’s attempt to define the role of the state in development simply provides avenues for the state to facilitate private enterprise. This, according to some scholars, raises the question of how much of a change has occurred in the World Bank’s neoliberal approaches as couched in its “good governance” agenda (Craig and Porter 2006; Ray 1998; Moore 1993).

Furthermore, concerning the operationalization of “good governance” and the World Governance Indicators (WGI) used by the World Bank in measuring governance, scholars like Andrews (2008), Arndt (2008), and Langbein and Knack (2010) have criticized. The WGI was developed by researchers at the World Bank for measuring governance based on six dimensions: voice and accountability; political stability and absence of violence; government effectiveness; regulatory quality; rule of law; and control of corruption. As the critics point out, while the WGI is popular amongst scholars and practitioners outside the World Bank, the indicators and the measurements carried out to derive the ratings for various countries are opaque, and often fail to specify what exactly is being measured. In the end, Langbein and Knack (2009) maintain that the six dimensions and their measurements provide very little information on the actual “quality of governance” for the various countries included in the WGI ratings. For Arndt (2008) the lack of specificity in the WGI hinders the ability of the World Bank to provide sound advice to developing countries. The inadequacies of the WGI, according to Arndt (2008), requires that more qualitative research on governance should be conducted to improve its ability to better inform the kind of advice that the World Bank can offer on governance.

Moving beyond the World Bank, the number of reforms within the good governance agenda of many donor agencies has also been criticized for being too much and onerous for developing countries to implement. Therefore, some critics argue that the good governance
agenda is unrealistic in practice. Instead, a conceptualization of “good enough governance” has been put forward. A major proponent of the good enough governance agenda in development is Merilee Grindle. According to Grindle (2004: 524), the “good governance agenda is overwhelming. It has evolved in part through research when scholars have found links between particular kinds of policies and institutional arrangements associated with growth or poverty reduction, or when analysis indicates that factors such as corruption and instability constrain development.” For these reasons, Grindle (2004) maintains that the result of the good governance agenda has been a conflation of what is, and what is not, essential for development in the short, medium and long terms. Consequently, Grindle (2004) argues that rather than have a long list of things about what developing countries should do to fulfill the numerous conditions of good governance, it is imperative and more practicable to pursue a good enough governance agenda (Grindle 2004). The “good enough governance” agenda refers to “a condition of minimally acceptable government performance and civil society engagement that does not significantly hinder economic and political development, and that permits poverty reduction initiatives to go forward” (Grindle 2004: 526). To achieve this, Grindle (2004) recommends that (i) the objective of the good governance agenda needs to be reformulated; (ii) both contemporary and historical analysis should be used to prune down on what “must be done,” that is, the important priorities for countries to develop; (iii) important connections should be established in order to reduce poverty; (iv) lessons of what works “well enough” should be incorporated; (v) priorities should be strategically assessed; and (vi) while alternatives should be thought about, the public sector should remain a priority area for effecting necessary changes.

Yet, despite the attempt of Grindle to reduce the list of items on the good governance agenda of donor agencies in developing countries, and replace it with the good enough agenda,
the latter itself does not adequately provide a realistic list of specific kinds of governance reforms that are suitable for different political and economic contexts where development and governance reforms actually take place. Indeed, as Grindle (2011: 200) recognizes, the “Good enough governance as a concept is not sufficient for guiding practice.” Moreover, as Chibba (2009) notes, while the good governance agenda generally remains highly technocratic and donor driven, Grindle’s (2004) argument in support of a good enough governance agenda specifically suffers the following four limitations; (i) it implicitly accepts a neoliberal agenda and donor led governance reforms process in developing countries, (ii) it fails to incorporate the role of values and cultural norms that are needed in specific social, political, and economic contexts, (iii) it treats governance mainly as a technocratic and operational issue, and (iv) it misjudges what kinds of reforms are necessary, and how far such reforms should go. Consequently, Chibba (2009) argues that in order to overcome the limitations of the good and good enough governance agenda, an “enhanced governance” agenda should replace the two. As Chibba (2009) explains, enhanced governance denotes “any and all endeavours to improve governance, including ‘good governance’ and ‘good enough governance’.” For Chibba (2009: 88), five key issues define the enhanced governance agenda. These are (i) broad-based interventions and reform, (ii) monitoring and evaluation and measurement of governance indicators, (iii) development performance and aid effectiveness, (iv) decentralization, and (v) economic policy formulation and management.

However, although Chibba’s (2009) argument in support of an enhanced governance agenda that focuses on the above issues places emphasis on the political and economic contexts, his analysis also did not go beyond an excessive focus on public sector reforms. In other words, while the enhanced governance agenda rightly criticized the good and good enough agenda for being too technocratic and ignoring the role of the political, social, cultural, and economic
contexts in which governance reforms occur, it did not go beyond the focus on public sector reforms. That is, while it recognizes the need for public engagements with the citizens, it fails to adequately articulate specific avenues for the citizens and CSOs to effectively engage with governments in developing countries. More so, it does not acknowledge the imperative of bringing formal and informal institutions of state and non-state actors and institutions together in ways that foster participation, transparency and accountability. In this context, Unsworth’s (2006) criticism that donors have failed to engage with informal accountability mechanisms in developing countries has produced what is referred to as the “better governance” agenda.

At the core of the argument for “better governance” in development is the emphasis on the role of informal institutions. As Unsworth (2006: 20) notes, without paying attention to the informal institutions that often underpin the formal institutions, attempts by the international development community to improve governance in developing countries have focused mainly on capacity building within formal institutions. As Unsworth (2006: 20) argues, “Unconventional arrangements that provide the right political signals, or that bring public and private actors together around common interests, reinforced by informal relations of accountability, may offer the best available solution for the time being.” Put together, Unsworth’s (2006) call for a synthesis in governance between formal and informal institutions reaffirms a growing tendency towards the imperative of participatory governance. While the different debates about governance recognize that bad governance is inimical to development and poverty reduction, the evolution of these debates since the 1980s has gradually grown to acknowledge the imperative of moving beyond the focus on governance reforms within the public sector.

Notably, although some scholars and donor agencies acknowledge the need to provide avenues for the general public to participate in the exercise of authority over public affairs, how
to ensure that governance reforms promote participation of state and non-state actors and institutions still remains a challenge in many developing countries, where governance reforms are still focused mainly on the formal public sector. The imperative of engaging the different political, social, cultural, and economic contexts in which the poor live, and the need to ensure that marginalized groups of people like women also participate in making decisions that directly affect them, necessitates having participatory mechanisms through which state and non-state actors and institutions can work together in the overall interest of the public. Yet, how to establish and implement transparent and accountable mechanisms that allow state actors and institutions such as government officials and public sector agencies and non-state actors like citizens, the mass media, NGOs and CSOs to exercise authority in the interest of the public equally remains a challenge in many developing countries.

Nevertheless, efforts to ensure that such mechanisms are established and implemented have increased since the 1980s, sometimes as part of governance reforms aimed at decentralizing governmental functions to local communities and the people for purposes of poverty reduction and community development. The next section reviews some of these efforts to build participatory governance mechanisms involving state and non-state actors in the exercise of authority in development and poverty reduction, and the scholarly debates surrounding them. The section highlights how the discourse on participatory governance within development as evolved, and identifies existing gaps in relation to debates about participatory governance mechanisms, including but not limited to debates about participatory mechanisms in decentralized local governance contexts, and the roles that local actors such as CSOs and citizens play in ensuring transparency and accountability.
3.2. Participatory Governance: The Transparency and Accountability Gaps

Considering that the idea of “participation” applies to a wide range of discourses on democracy and development, participatory governance is now considered the latest definition of a shift in the application of participation to both democracy and development. But while debates relating to “participatory democracy” and “participatory development” remain, the new shift to “participatory governance” is considered the result of two generations of debates that started in the early 1960s (Alstchler and Corrales 2013). Within the first generation debates, Alstchler and Corrales (2013) argue that the calls for participatory democracy began in the 1960s when some of its advocates started highlighting the failures of the representative institutions of liberal democracies to truly represent the wishes of the people. For these advocates, owing to the failures to include citizens in the decision-making processes of governments, they argued that liberal democracies “needed to renew themselves with innovative participatory forums through which citizens could express [their] views, demand inclusion, and participate in solving their own problems” (Alstcher and Corrales 2013: 10). Although Alstcher and Corrales (2013) note that the support for participatory democracy waxed in the 1960s and 1970s, they add that it began to wane in the 1980s in western countries, even as arguments in favour of participatory approaches to development were on the rise in developing countries.

Popularized by the works of Paulo Freire (1970) and Robert Chambers (1983), who amongst other scholars championed more inclusive bottom-up approaches to development, participatory approaches to development soon began to be embraced by scholars and development practitioners. Alstcher and Corrales (2013) state that arguments in favour of the local people leading the process of identifying solutions to their own problems and becoming major actors in the implementation of development planning, design and implementation, were
soon translated into practice in various places across the developing world. However, while advocates of participatory development maintain it was the way to solve most development problems, critics soon highlighted the susceptibility of participatory development approaches to elite capture, co-optation, state neglect, and other possible downsides of participation such as corruption (Alstcher and Corrales 2013: 10-11). Hence, given some of the weaknesses of the participatory development approach, and the imperative to find solutions to such weaknesses, new ways of dealing with these weaknesses led to a second generation of arguments that marked a new emphasis on participatory governance (Alstcher and Corrales 2013). For Alstcher and Corrales (2013: 12), participatory governance refers to initiatives led by the government with the intent “to solve practical, public problems (such as education provision) by facilitating the participation of ordinary citizens in local forums with decision-making authority.” The emphasis here is the existence of mechanisms established by governments that allow citizens and state officials to work together. Furthermore, Alstcher and Corrales (2013: 12) maintain participatory governance “explicitly invites citizen input in government outputs.”

It is crucial to note that the shift to participatory governance continued the previous theoretical debates on participatory democracy and participatory development. While this shift coincides with the turn to governance, albeit the emphasis on the need for good governance, advocates of participatory governance mechanisms argue it allows citizens to be engaged in the governance of public affairs, and for them to be involved in solving their own problems through more transparent and accountable mechanisms (Green 2010; Edwards 2008; Fung and Wright 2001). Indeed, some scholars consider participatory governance as the “essence” of governance itself (Chhotray and Stoker 2009: 179). As Chhotray and Stoker (2009) explain,

Participatory governance is fundamentally about transformative power. It is about opening up decision-making processes conventionally dominated by hierarchical
and top-down state structures to new state actors. It follows the demonstrated lack of effectiveness of these conventional methods in a changing and complex social context within a globalising world. In this sense, participatory governance is not a type of governance, but the essence of governance itself, since governance without participation would be etymologically anomalous. This being the case, the quest for a synergetic arrangement of power wherein actors from state and society (the former refers to the official state apparatus) can harmonise their capabilities, defines participatory governance.

Although participatory governance mechanisms can take place within different political contexts, support for local participation in development and poverty reduction has increased as part of demands for decentralized governance, both within and beyond governmental structures. Indeed, according to Speer (2010: 2379), “participatory governance is stated to increase local government responsiveness and accountability.” Thus, reference to “decentralization” – that is, the transfers of powers to local political or administrative units – sometimes features in discussions about the role of participatory governance mechanisms in development and poverty reduction in many developing countries. Since the 1980s, governance reforms in many developing countries have included efforts to decentralize governmental powers to lower units of government, and different forms of decentralization such as devolution, deconcentration, and delegation have occurred in many countries. To be clear, while devolution refers to a form of decentralization involving the transfer of considerable amounts of decision-making powers to sub-national units like local governments authorities; deconcentration involves the transfer of administrative responsibilities from a central unit to field offices; and delegation involves the transfer of responsibilities to semi-autonomous parastatals, corporations, establishments, or government agencies (McGuire 2010; Gboyega 1998). In practice, the various forms of decentralization can be combined and/or operated alongside one another, especially in countries with federal systems of government, where local devolution is sometimes constitutionally
sanctioned, and where deconcentration and delegation of governmental functions are part of the public administration system.

Furthermore, as part of efforts to encourage participatory governance mechanisms and the involvement of non-state actors and institutions, decentralization reforms now place emphasis on decentralizing governance beyond the confines of governmental institutions. In other words, beyond focusing on how local governments can enhance accountability within decentralized governmental structures, decentralized governance mechanisms that involve citizens and communities as main actors in local development and poverty reduction programmes are now popular (Cheema and Rondinelli 2007). In Cheema and Rondinelli’s (2007: 6) words, “decentralization now encompasses not only the transfer of power, authority, and responsibility within government, but also the sharing of authority, and responsibility for public policy within society.” Likewise, Olowu and Wunch (2004) argue that following decades of decentralization reforms that begun in the 1980s, the focus on “local governance” that allows greater participation of citizens in the exercise of authority in public affairs has become more prominent. In this sense, local governance refers to the existence of functional “local systems of collective action that manage a locality’s public affairs and are accountable to local residents” (Olowu and Wunch 2004:1). As Johnson (2002: 14) explains,

Perhaps the strongest argument in favour of democratic decentralisation is the idea that the establishment of strong and accountable systems of governance will encourage a more equitable distribution of state-provided resources which can be directed towards poor and vulnerable groups. An underlying hypothesis here is that democratic participation will yield strong mechanisms of accountability, which in turn, will improve the distribution of benefits to groups that are traditionally marginalized by market and state.

Along this line, arguments for participatory governance mechanisms are sometimes also linked to participatory democracy. For instance, Fischer (2012: 457) maintains “Participatory
governance is a variant and subset of governance theory that puts emphasis on democratic engagement, in particular through deliberative practices.” This can empower citizens to be more involved, that is, participatory governance can improve citizens’ and communities’ competence and build their capacity in a way that allows them to contribute effectively to the equitable delivery of services (Fisher 2012). Likewise, for Fung and Wright (2001), participatory governance can empower citizens and communities if the mechanisms for participation allow for deliberative processes that ensure openness and accountability between state and non-state actors. Consequently, Speer (2010: 2379) maintains “the most frequently cited reasons for promoting the implementation of participatory governance mechanisms in developing countries are that it improves public service delivery, that it empowers citizens and that it deepens democracy.”

However, despite the increasing turn to decentralized participatory governance as a means of improving participation of non-state actors and institutions in development and poverty reduction, gaps and debates about how participatory governance mechanisms can improve transparency and accountability remain within the literature. Issues relating to what the role of state and non-state actors and institutions should be, and how to ensure that marginalized groups like women are adequately and effectively represented, remain unresolved. More so, how to curtail official corruption and prevent the capture of participatory governance mechanisms at the local and community levels by powerful actors remains a challenge in many countries, not least given that various factors often influence the outcomes of decentralized participatory governance mechanisms. For instance, in Johnson et al.’s (2005) study of decentralized governance and poverty reduction programmes in two Indian states, Andra Pradesh (AP) and Madhya Pradesh (MP), the nature of local politics was a key factor. Essentially, Johnson et al. (2005) note that the
nature of politics in each of the two states studied and the kinds of decentralization determined the outcomes of the social programmes implemented. As they put it, “although the government of AP did not devolve power to the extent that proponents of decentralization would have liked, its populist approach to certain forms of poverty reduction empowered the poor in ways that the more ambitious decentralization agenda in MP did not” (Johnson et al. 2005: 937). They further note that in MP, the decentralized governance mechanisms did not challenge the authorities of the village chiefs and other powerful bodies.

Like Johnson et al. (2006), Blunt and Turner (2005) reach a similar conclusion in their analysis of Cambodia’s decentralized governance experience with regard to the role played by the “commune councils” in community development programmes in post-conflict Cambodia. For them, the political environment characterised by competing interests of political parties and the ideological motivations of donors with respect to “popular participation and political pluralism,” all combined to undermine the effectiveness of the development and poverty reduction efforts (Blunt and Turner 2005: 75). Furthermore, critics of participatory governance argue that decentralized governance and community participation, especially those conducted under the aegis of neoliberal inspired governance reforms in particular, are not the necessary panaceas for solving issues such as corruption and elite capture, neither are they the avenues for improving transparency and accountability at the local level. According to Veron et al. (2006: 1936),

Democratic decentralization is no panacea for reducing corruption even when local communities are formally included in implementing and monitoring policies, programs and schemes. As economic and political interests vary within communities, some factions are ready to build a nexus with bureaucrats and politicians and become willing participants in corruption networks. The impact of participatory decentralization is therefore ambiguous.

Veron et al.’s (2006) observation stem primarily from their empirical studies of the Employment Assurance Scheme (EAS) in rural West Bengal, India. The study was conducted to ascertain the
strength of the link between democratic decentralization and community monitoring and participation in the implementation of the EAS as a social programme. For them, both “upward” and “downward” accountability towards political officials and parties at the top levels of government and the communities at the bottom, are crucial for the implementation of programmes. In their analysis, if vertical accountability is weak, horizontal accountability stand the risk of failing as community actors become “accomplices” in various kinds of decentralized corruption networks. They challenged the claims of decentralized governance as an integral part of the agenda of “good governance,” which aims to reduce corruption through transparency and accountability at the community level. Similarly, Hickey (2009: 474) notes that the appropriation of ideas relating to “participation,” “good governance” and “ownership” by international development agencies often involves co-opting actors that support certain ideas rather than others. For Rose (2003: 47), this creates a situation whereby avenues for “genuine participation” that allows citizens to “take part in real decision-making and governance” are substituted for “pseudo-participation” that ensures citizens only accept preconceived ideas and solutions.

In addition, neoliberalism inspired strands of decentralized participatory governance and community participation mechanisms spearheaded mainly by the World Bank have been challenged to be inconclusive with respect to the evidence that they advance transparency and accountability. For instance, through their examination of decentralized governance mechanisms for implementing poverty reduction programmes in Vietnam, Uganda, Pakistan and New Zealand, Craig and Porter (2006: 262) explain that,

...the notion that local voice, marketized social service solutions and locally owned, decentralized governance will deliver an adequate counterweight to locational and competitive disadvantage in a global economy is perverse...it is time to review what ‘civil society’ organizations, and client power mobilized through them really add to accountability in either voice or service delivery terms. This especially where what calls itself ‘civil society’ is in reality a plethora of
professional international and local elites occupying NGO positions, and aiding the fragmenting services and accountabilities.

While Craig and Porter’s (2006) observation on the (in)ability of local CSOs and the people at the local level to provide effective oversight in participatory programmes mirrors some of the findings on decentralized participatory mechanisms, the involvement of CSOs and NGOs in development and poverty reduction can sometimes be beneficial to the poor and vulnerable. Consequently, between and beyond the debates about decentralized participatory governance, critics and proponents of participatory governance recognize that although it is possible to advance transparency and accountability through participatory governance mechanisms, certain potential drawbacks are possible. Thus, the debate on whether participatory governance improves or impedes transparency and accountability remains inconclusive. Yet, as Malena (2009: 15) explains, “Participatory governance practices bring important benefits, but are also susceptible to some significant risks.” These risks include exposing hitherto underlying conflicts between state officials and citizens, encouraging lip service, elite capture, social exclusion of critics and co-optation of citizens, NGO and CSO actors (Malena 2009: 16-17).

Nonetheless, to tackle some of the risks associated with participatory governance mechanisms in promoting transparency and accountability, some social protection programmes now utilize Community Based Targeting Mechanisms (CBTMs). As reviewed in the next chapter, based on the participation of multiple actors and institutions, CBTMs are participatory governance mechanisms that seek to ensure transparency and accountability in social protection programmes. However, as mentioned above, it is important to pay attention to the specific contexts in which any participatory mechanism operates. Thus, before moving on to the next chapter to review the literature on social protection that CBTMs have grown to become a part of,
a review of the general discourse on governance in Africa, and specifically in the Nigerian context where CBTMs have been introduced, is necessary.

3.3. Participatory Governance in Africa: A Review of Some Key Debates

As mentioned earlier, for many scholars and international development practitioners, bad governance and corruption are at the heart of Africa’s social and economic development problems (Lewis 2008; Diamond 2004; Joseph 2003; World Bank 1989). Thus, various governance reforms seeking to end bad governance and corruption have been, and continue to be, implemented in Africa. But despite various reforms, effectively combating corruption at all levels is a major objective that many governance reform initiatives have not achieved on the continent (Fukuyama 2004). At the same time, the importance of including citizens in governance reforms that are aimed at fighting corruption and abuse of power continue to be echoed by different stakeholders, even as the various discourses on development and governance reforms in Africa tend to revolve around two interrelated scholarly debates.

The first debate relates to whether patrimonial and neopatrimonial forms of politics, which are considered prevalent in Africa, constitute catalysts or hindrances to development on the continent. Although it has several polemics within it, the debate has become a major reference point within the governance and development literature in Africa. Here, the main concern generally relates to what some scholars consider to be the prevalence of patron-client networks that impede development on the continent. The second debate relates specifically to how local community agents, including but not limited to community members, local elites, CSOs, and NGOs, can contribute to improving governance within putatively patrimonial systems in Africa. Here, the debate mainly reflects disagreements on the extent to which the proliferation

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4Within Africa itself, the transition from the Organization of African Unity (OAU) to the African Union (AU) and the establishment of the African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM) is interpreted as an attempt to transcend the governance conundrum at the continental and country levels (see, Adejumobi and Olukoshi 2008; Hope 2005).
of different kinds of neoliberal induced reforms and decentralized governance mechanisms can genuinely promote community participation. These two debates are further examined below.

The application of patrimonialism and neopatrimonialism as “exceptional lens on African politics” (Sneyd 2014: 22) is quite common in the literature. As Sneyd (2014: 22) succinctly puts it,

At its most straightforward…neopatrimonial rule in modern African nation-states is understood to be particularly pervasive within otherwise legal or rational administrative systems and bureaucratic institutions. Patrimonial practices in these systems or institutions are defined as activities that pervert formally or officially allocated powers. Where they occur, official actions are twisted away from the genuine public interest and privately appropriated. Put another way, distinctions between the public and the private break down as the personal agendas of heads of state and the government, ministers, elected representatives, permanent secretaries, regulators, and lesser functionaries infuse and distort their public duties.

To place the above quote in perspective, ardent proponents of neopatrimonial analyses of African politics such as Chabal and Daloz (1999), Daloz (2005, 2003), De Waal (2009), Olivier de Sardan (1999), Reno (2000) and Hyden (2006) argue that the neopatrimonial nature of African politics makes it particularly difficult to achieve any meaningful and sustainable governance reforms in Africa. Specifically, these scholars maintain that the prevalence of patron-client relationships between African “big men” serving as patrons, and the networks of clients that they have to maintain in order to achieve and retain power, creates a dysfunctional system within which meaningful development cannot take place. In Daloz’s (2003: 273) words,

The lack of unity observed in most sub-Saharan countries is much more related to vertical ethno-regional or factional cleavages than to formal roles. It is rather uncommon to find politicians or top bureaucrats who are not in some way businessmen at the same time (personally or through their entourage). Furthermore, considering that enrichment in Africa is primary based on politics, one rarely deals with the real “owners of capital.” Within the context of “rentier modes of production,” it is much more crucial to obtain resources in order to
partly redistribute them in particularistic manner – which is the key aspect to acquiring social legitimacy – than to give priority to economic investment.

In addition, for Chabal and Daloz (1999), the existence of corruption in Africa should be viewed in terms of its centrality to the practice of politics on the continent. For them, patron-clientelism defines the way “Africa works.” Other scholars like Hyden (2006) and Olivier de Sardan (1999) maintain that the logic behind corruption in Africa makes it more of a regular everyday practice than an aberration to the people. In what he refers to as the “economy of affection” around which African politics and governance revolve, Hyden (2006:73) explains that “The easiest way of describing the economy of affection is to suggest that it is constituted by personal investments in reciprocal relations with other individuals as a means of achieving goals that are seen as otherwise impossible to attain.” For Hyden, therefore, “Sought-after goods – whether materials or symbolic such as prestige and status – have a scarcity value, that is, they may be physically available, but not accessible to all, so people invest in relations with others to obtain them” (2006: 73). This kind of relationship also defines what Oliver de Sardan (1999: 26) refers to as the “moral economy of corruption in Africa,” whereby what looks immoral and corrupt to outsiders operates on a logic of reciprocity to participants working within a “moral economy” in which corruption is embedded in normal everyday practice amongst Africans.

Yet, as Sneyd (2014: 23) rightly notes, “Even the most trenchant critics of analyses that play up neopatrimonialism recognize that, at its best, contributions to this literature can offer much more than cynical Afro-pessimism.” Critics argue that although neopatrimonialism “has become the convenient, all-purpose, and ubiquitous moniker for African governance” within the past two decades (Mkandawire 2015: 563), neopatrimonial analyses of African politics and governance are flawed on many fronts (Wai 2012; Bach 2011; Erdman and Engel 2007; Pitcher et al. 2009). Aside from what some critics consider to be the conceptual flaws of the
neopatrimonial lens often deployed to explain African politics and governance, others maintain neopatrimonial analyses can equally be used to explain some of the successes of governance systems on the continent. For instance, while arguing that most scholars have misread Max Weber’s use of patrimonialism and neopatrimonialism, Pitcher et al. (2009) maintain that unlike what is often advanced as an entirely negative relationship between leaders and their followers, patrimonialism, and neopatrimonialism which is patrimonialism’s modern day variant, also involves positive reciprocal relationships of trust between the people and their leaders. Citing the example of Botswana, Pitcher et al. (2009) argue that the high levels of transparency and accountability in Botswana, and the positive development outcomes so far recorded in the country, illustrate the positive aspects of patrimonial relationships. For them, the positive reciprocal relationship between the citizens and the leaders of Botswana has helped to ensure that corruption is kept at a low level, and that development objectives are achieved within a democratic system governed by neopatrimonial exchanges of trust.

Following Pitcher et al. (2009), in his review of the various uses of neopatrimonial analyses to different parts of the world, Bach (2011: 289) finds that there is a negative bias against Africa in comparison to the other analyses of patrimonialism and neopatrimonialism elsewhere such as Asia or Latin America. As Bach (2011: 289) explains, “Neglected for all too long, the study of regulated or capped forms of African neopatrimonial rule has begun calls for fresh empirical and theoretical attention.” For Bach, this call has become particularly relevant in light of Pitcher et al.’s (2009) nuanced analysis of the experience of Botswana, “not least due to their provocative claim that ‘one of Africa’s success stories…may also be one of its most clearly ‘patrimonial’ and ‘neopatrimonial’ states’” (2011: 289). In addition, recognizing the limitations and debates surrounding the use of neopatrimonialism as an analytical lens for explaining
Africa’s governance and development challenges, Mkandawire (2015: 563) poignantly argues that,

The attribution of all African ills to neopatrimonialism simply undermines internally driven change by occluding the real problems: corruption, vertical and horizontal inequality, ethnic and gender discrimination, weak state capacity, wrong ideas, political chicanery, and the machinations of the many external actors who seek to exploit Africa in some form or the other….Neopatrimonialism is too blunt and too formulaic an instrument for understanding the great variety of African experience and the contradictory interests, ideologies, and motivations of social actors. The call, therefore, is for more concrete studies of the African continent and an approach that enjoys a healthier relationship with the empirical world than the procrustean concept of neopatrimonialism does.

Consequently, the search for analysis on how state and non-state actors interact in Africa, and what mechanisms can be implemented to ensure more positive developmental outcomes, continues (Hanlon 2012; Khan 2012; Kelsall 2011; Amuwo 2008; Cammack et al. 2007). This moves the debate into the realm of discussions relating to the second debate mentioned above about how citizens and communities can participate in the exercise of authority over public affairs in Africa. Tellingly, and from a historically perspective, community participation in development has always occurred within traditional African societies dominated by communitarianism (Midgley et al. 1985). However, the introduction of the modern state system during colonialism heralded the transfers of governmental power and authority into the hands of state officials whose control of state affairs also meant directing the course of development since colonial times. Yet, while communitarianism remains a core value in many communities in Africa today, it is worth noting that attempts to involve citizens and communities in governance in Africa increased following the introduction of the Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAPs) in the 1980s and 1990s. For instance, the establishment of Parent Teachers Associations (PTAs) or Community-Managed Schools (CMS) to oversee the management of primary and secondary
schools in partnership with government and school officials, allowed parents and community leaders to participate in the management of schools (Dauda 2006, 2004; Rose 2003). There has also been a rapid increase in the number of CSOs and NGOs since the 1980s as part of reforms to involve other non-state actors and institutions in the exercise of authority over public affairs in African countries. Since the 1980s, arguments relating to empowerment, better service delivery, equity, poverty reduction, transparency, and accountability, have been put forward as justifications for more inclusive participatory mechanisms in Africa.

These arguments have also moved in tandem with growing interests in decentralized local governance as a mechanism for improving participation of citizens and communities in public affairs in Africa (Wunch 2001; Jutting et al. 2004; Crook and Manor 2000; Crook 2003; Olowu 2003; Ribot 2002; Barker, 1970). Nonetheless, while some scholars argue that the inclusion of non-state actors and institutions through decentralized participatory governance mechanisms in Africa can help to improve governance at the local level, others maintain this may not be the case because of the induced nature of the participatory mechanisms being introduced. Specifically, concerns and questions abound on the genuineness of neoliberalism induced participatory mechanisms to facilitate greater transparency and accountability. For some observers, the rise of CSOs on the African continent in the wake of neoliberal market orthodoxy is questionable, as it often overlooks the pre-existing systems that undergird social formation. According to Kasfir (1998:1), the neoliberal approach to conceptualizing “civil society has been shaped to serve the goal of better governance, particularly democratic reform, rather than a deeper understanding of the relationship between social formations, the associations that represent them and the state.” Hence, Kasfir (1998) maintains that owing to their highly instrumental nature, the concept of civil society as organizations that can effect genuine democratic change is overemphasized.
Furthermore, corruption which is considered the bane of development in many African states is believed to also be rampant amongst CSOs and NGOs, as it is within governments and private institutions (Economic Commission for Africa 2009). Moreover, given the pervasive influence of the International Financial Institutions (IFIs) and their neoliberal good governance agenda in Africa (Abrahamsen 2001), Craig and Porter (2006) observe that attempts to include non-state actors as democratic agents was in line with what they refer to as the “inclusive neoliberalism” promoted by the IFIs since the late 1980s. As they argue, “while retaining core conservative neoliberal macroeconomic and pro-market policy settings, ‘inclusive’ neoliberalism adds ‘positive liberal’ approaches emphasizing ‘empowerment’ to enable participation (and ensure ‘inclusion’) of countries and people in global and local markets” (Craig and Porter 2006: 12). Citing the example of Uganda as a test case for neoliberal ideas from the late 1980s into the 2000s, Craig and Porter (2006: 158) discuss how President Yoweri Museveni aligned his “politics of revolutionary command” with various aspects of the neoliberal good governance agenda put forward by the IFIs. In the words of Craig and Porter (2006: 158),

Over the period 1986 to 2000 Museveni’s regime was able to manipulate global actors and norms to pursue his domestic designs by exploiting their anxieties about the need to limit political disorder and state collapse in poor countries, (and to avoid humanitarian disasters and hasty arrangements to write-off unpayable debt) and by presenting Uganda as a place where the post-structural adjustment appeal of local empowerment, accountability, and pro-poor service delivery might be played out.

Craig and Porter (2006: 158) further note that Museveni achieved his aim despite “sustaining a one-party state, an unjustified civil war with people in the north of his country, frequent breaching of IFI fiscal agreement about military spending, and large-scale predatory military adventures in the neighbouring country of Congo.” But as many governments seek to play along with the IFIs, the experience of Uganda is hardly unique on the African continent. The fact that
the current Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSPs), which are supposed to be home-grown poverty reduction programmes, tend to replicate various market-based policies prescribed by the IFIs, confirms this (see Brautigham 2010; O’Brien and Williams 2010; Clapham 1996). Nonetheless, two salient points should be noted in relation to the influence of neoliberalism and the capacities of African states to effectively engage societal forces such as civil society organizations and citizens.

The first salient point relates to the general impact of neoliberal reforms on the capacity of public institutions to engage societal forces such as civil society and citizens effectively in the overall interest of the public. In particular, considering that African states were deemed ineffective in the governance of public affairs by neoliberal reformers during the SAP era, the emphasis on market-based approaches produced some civil society groups that claim to be providers of services that may produce the accountability which African states lack. But without the requisite capacity to operate the checks and balances towards civil society and non-governmental organizations that are contracted to promote accountability in the public interest, such organizations may violate extant laws and go unpunished. Unfortunately, the growth of many neoliberal inspired civil society organizations in Africa since the 1980s has also negatively eroded the meaning of the concept of civil society as agents of progressive change in many African countries (Kasfir 1998).

To be sure, as neoliberal policymakers and advocates fervently promoted neoliberal reforms in the 1980s and 1990s, Eyoh (1996: 50) observes that “the rapid growth in the purchase of “civil society” as “master” concept around which the analysis and debate on the dynamics of politics in Africa” produced a “New Political Sociology for Africa” (NPSA) in which civil society organizations were promoted as the alternatives to state institutions. For Eyoh (1996: 50),
within the NPSA, “the interest in civil society resides in the assumption that its elaboration and institutionalisation are prerequisites for political systems founded on representation and accountability” as underpinned by the interplay of two factors:

First, are interpretations of the political significance to what has been apprehended as the dominant modalities of societal responses to economic crises and restructuration over the last two decades. These are “withdrawal” or “disengagement” of social forces from state-regulated economic and political networks through the mid-eighties, and the resurgence of popular movements which openly challenged authoritarian regimes in the late 1980s and early 1990s. Second, under the leadership of the World Bank, revisions of the underlying assumptions concerning the relations between processes of economic and political reform in the theory of structural adjustment programs (Eyoh 1996: 50).

The importance of Eyoh’s (1996) apt characterization of the context in which neoliberal reforms engendered the proliferation of civil society organizations is reflected in the experience of many African countries during the 1980s and 1990s. Because rather than support genuine social forces to emerge and/or become more effective in the overall interest of the public, the neoliberal inspired political and economic reforms of the 1980s further weakened the ability of civil society groups to serve as genuine advocates of socioeconomic and democratic reforms in Africa (Kasfir 1998; Ake 1995). This leads to the second salient point on the impact of neoliberalism and state-society relationship in Africa; that is, the consequential effects of engaging professional civil society organizations as contractors to state institutions in the implementation of development and poverty reduction programmes on the evolution of social citizenship under neoliberal reforms.

Put differently, in light of already weakened state capacities, the neoliberal reforms of the 1980s and 1990s weakened the development of social citizenship. That is, without fostering the development of social contracts, which can be understood as duties and obligations between the citizens and the state, the emergence of neoliberal manufactured civil society groups was
detrimental to achieving better social outcomes for the people. As Aiyede (2016: 12) succinctly explains,

Two effects of neoliberal policies on the state and social conditions in Africa that are very critical for citizenship and civil society in Africa require restating. The first has to do with the promotion of the market as the most efficient allocator of resources and the demonization of the state as incapable of inducing the necessary changes in institutions and cultural habits necessary to drive productivity. The second is the idea that the responsibility to cater for basic needs of citizens is not a natural or essential responsibility of the state. The revolutionary effects of these on state-society relations can only be appreciated when it is realised that the opposite of this (sic) assumptions formed the basis for mobilizing the populace for independence. It marked a reversal of the evolving social citizenship that African states wriggled to achieve with limited results in the post-independence period.

Thus, in addition to demonising the state and its institutions while inducing civil society organizations that support and aid neoliberal ideas, the normative framework of the neoliberal reforms introduced since the 1980s negatively affected the evolution of social citizenship in many African countries. In other words, in line with promoting market forces ahead of state interventions in the governance of development and social protection, the decline in the state’s capacity to govern has also moved in tandem with the peoples’ inability to demand the basic needs of life from the state as part of the social contract that encouraged development before and after independence. Although the growth of various kinds of civil society groups is still on the rise in many African countries, it is necessary to add that there are strong and accountable organizations that remain committed to pursuing social justice on the continent for the people. Indeed, regardless of their contractual relationship with the state, there are organizations and individuals who are still committed to ensuring state and non-state institutions and actors are held accountable for their actions. But the negative effects of neoliberal reforms continue to be experienced at several levels, not least within communities where the poor and vulnerable reside.
Consequently, like the participation of CSOs and NGOs in development and poverty reduction programmes in Africa, mixed results continue to trail the participation of community members in the governance of public affairs such as the management of schools, healthcare centres, and other public services in African countries. For instance, in her assessment of School Committees in Malawi, Rose (2003) argues that rather than empower communities to promote transparency and accountability, the committees established to manage the schools mostly functioned ineffectively due to the top-down structures they still had to work with. For Rose (2003), this top-down strategy did not respond to the “demands by the communities for greater control,” but rather made them mediators between schools and communities without having any real decision-making powers. Although she acknowledges the variations in participatory outcomes across regions and villages in her study of school committees in Malawi, Rose (2003) notes that “pseudo-participation,” rather than genuine participation, was prevalent. To this end, Rose (2003: 62) suggests that even as they work towards strengthening the networks that already exist within the communities, for such committees to be “truly participatory, community members should themselves choose their roles, and would need the appropriate skills to carry out their work.”

Similarly, in the case of PTAs in Uganda, Dauda (2004) notes the dangers of eroding local accountability through the introduction of centralizing education policies for which the Uganda government was neither financially nor administratively capable of implementing. Furthermore, while noting the improvements in local accountability through citizens’ participation in local governance in Uganda and South Africa, Dauda (2006) argues for the strengthening of local community networks and political capacity for citizens to better engage with local state authorities. Put together, although some scholars agree that community
participation through the involvement of non-state actors can sometimes lead to improvements in accountability and transparency, the pervasive influence of neoliberalism induced forms of participation remains a problem. Moreover, how well the negative and corrupt aspects of patron-client relationships are being transcended on the African continent through numerous forms of participatory governance mechanisms remains debatable. These raise concerns over what possibilities exist in building genuinely participatory institutions whose involvement can help to improve the governance of the much-needed social protection programmes in places like Nigeria, where the culture of accountability and transparency in governance is considered to be largely absent. Given this dissertation’s focus on the governance of social protection in developing countries using the Nigerian experience, the next section examines Nigeria’s governance and socioeconomic problems.

3.4. Governance and Development in Nigeria: An Overview

According to Osaghae (1998), Nigeria is a “crippled giant.” This metaphor reflects the inability of Nigeria to take advantage of its enormous human and material resources for the rapid socioeconomic development of the country. For the same reason, Suberu (2004: 31) notes that Nigeria is sometimes referred to as the “single greatest developmental tragedy in the world today” and also “as the metaphor par excellence for a failed development experience.” Although Nigeria’s beleaguered development trajectory can be explained by the prevalence of systemic corruption and bad governance, poor economic management, the legacies of colonialism and protracted postcolonial military dictatorships also feature as specific factors that contribute to the country’s poor developmental outcomes (Adebanwi and Obadare 2010; Rotberg 2004). In fact, writing on the negative effects of corruption on democracy, development, and participatory governance in
Nigeria, Simbine (2011: 172) argues that, “It is obvious that democratic sustainability will be difficult for Nigeria to attain unless corruption is squarely addressed and significantly reduced.”

Considering Nigeria was ranked as the most corrupt country in the world in 1997 and 2000, and the fact that it was occupied the 136th position on a scale of 167 alongside Tajikistan and Comoros in 2015 by Transparency International (TI 2015, 2000, 1997), corruption has played, and continues to play, a very negative role in impeding Nigeria’s development in the past decades. Yet, the systemic nature of corruption in Nigeria makes it challenging to effectively fight the scourge, and even though some institutions such as the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC) and the Independent Corrupt Practices and Other Related Offences Commission (ICPC) have been established by the government since 1999, the level of corruption remains high.\footnote{The ICPC was established in 2000 and the EFCC in 2004.} However, notwithstanding some of the progress made in recent years by the anti-corruption agencies, the nature of corruption in Nigeria is still regarded as systemic by many observers, and the country continues to experience governance challenges at all levels.\footnote{Since assuming office, the new government has revamped the fight against corruption, and the anti-corruption agencies are currently investigating and/or prosecuting different public officers accused of corruptly enriching themselves under the past administration of President Goodluck Jonathan. A major corruption case is the alleged misappropriation of $2.1 billion by the former National Security Adviser to President Jonathan and top military and civilian officials from the former president’s People’s Democratic Party (PDP).}

Historically, Nigeria’s experience with colonialism created a complex web of interdependencies between domestic and external state and non-state actors (Balogun 2009; Falola 1996; Fadayomi 1991). Following its independence from Britain in 1960, the development of the country through massive public investment in education, health, and agriculture was considered a major objective by the government in the early days of independence. The first republic ended through a bloody coup d’état on 15 January 1966 when the military took over the control of the government. By the time the military returned to the
barracks, and a civilian government was reinstated in 1979, power had become more centralized in the hands of the federal government. The military returned to power in 1984 after four years of civilian rule, and democratic rule was not fully restored until 1999. But the prolonged years of military rule further concentrated powers in the hands of the federal government (Suberu 2009). The impact of this centralization of power in a federal system, despite the existence of the sub-national states and local governments, still remains till today. More so, during the period of military rule, successive military governments alienated much of the populace from exercising authority over public affairs.

In addition, amidst the rising incidences of corruption, the introduction of Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAPs) in 1986 deepened the problem of poverty and unemployment in Nigeria. Since then, corruption in Nigeria has become a systemic problem. Following the implementation of the SAPs, and partly in response to the possibility of losing their jobs in the name of public service rightsizing and downsizing reforms, many public servants began stealing from the public purse. Indeed, the periods of the 1980s and 1990s were turbulent times in Nigeria. Having lost faith in the Nigerian state, many individuals and groups turned towards self-help strategies for survival. Some unemployed youths turned to crime and other illicit activities in the quest to survive the challenges of the times. With millions of poor people without much hope or social protection from extreme poverty (Adejumobi 2011; Balogun 2009), the state of the nation in 1999 when President Olusegun Obasanjo was inaugurated as a civilian president is summarized in his inaugural speech as follows:

Nigeria is wonderfully endowed by the Almighty with human and other resources. It does no credit either to us or the entire black race if we fail in managing our resources for quick improvement in the quality of life of our people. Instead of progress and development, which we are entitled to expect from those who governed us, we experienced in the last decade and a half, a[nd] particularly in the
last regime but one, persistent deterioration in the quality of governance, leading to instability and the weakening of all public institutions (Obasanjo 1999).

Burdened with a debt overhang of approximately $30 billion and problems associated with systemic corruption (Okonjo-Iweala 2012), the task of ensuring successful governance reforms was quite daunting for the new government. However, during his 8 years in office, President Obasanjo pursued a neoliberal economic agenda that was reminiscent of the structural adjustment era. This is despite the fact that he was a staunch critic of SAPs prior to becoming the president (Adejumobi 2011). Although President Obasanjo’s government was able to secure a debt relief package for Nigeria from the World Bank and Paris group of debtors in 2005, many observers criticized his social and economic policies for having done little to help the poor (Adejumobi 2011). Moreover, despite recording high economic growth rates due to increases in the price of crude oil in the early to mid-2000s, the high growth rates did not translate into meaningful improvements in the standard of living of many Nigerians. Instead, amongst other problems, Nigeria, like many other African countries, is beset with the problem of high unemployment (Mills and Herbts 2012; Lewis 2008), even though it is now Africa’s largest economy.

As the different annual Human Development Reports (HDR) produced by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) show, evidence of Nigeria’s poor development records is reflected in its low ranking on various multidimensional indicators of poverty and development. Nigeria performs poorly on many of the human development indicators in the health and education sectors. For instance, in the 2015 UNDP HDR, Nigeria is ranked at number 152 out of 188 countries (UNDP 2015: 210). According to the UNDP HDR of 2015, life expectancy at birth in Nigeria is 52.9 years; mean years of schooling is 5.9 out of the expected 9 years; and per capita income is $5341. Out of a total population of 178.5 million people, the
report estimates that 88.4 million Nigerians are multidimensionally poor; 54.8 percent suffer from intense deprivation; and 30 percent experience “severe” multidimensional poverty as a reflection of their education, health, and living standards. In terms of percentage “contribution of deprivation to overall poverty,” the education, health, and living standard figures are 29.8, 29.8 and 40.4 percent respectively, and based on a purchasing power parity of $1.25 per day, the report also show that 62 percent of Nigerians are living below the income poverty line.

While the figures from the 2015 HDR provide insights into the nature of multidimensional poverty from a global comparative perspective, the indicators of poverty and development produced by Nigeria’s main statistics agency, the National Bureau of Statistics (NBS), also confirms the poor living conditions of many Nigerians. For instance, in its *Nigeria Poverty Profile* released in 2012, the NBS notes that the rate of absolute poverty in Nigeria for 2011 is 61.9 percent compared to 54.7 percent in 2004 (NBS 2012: 20). But when the six geopolitical zones are compared, the average poverty rates across the country are different; the poverty rate is 59.5 percent in the north-central geopolitical zone, 69 percent in the north-east, 70 percent for the north-west, 58.7 percent in the south-east, 55.9 percent in the south-south, and 49.8 percent in the south-west (NBS 2012: 23). More so, when the rates for each state across the country are examined, the NBS national poverty profiles differ by states as well; for instance, while Sokoto state in the north-west region has a poverty rate of 81.2 percent, the highest in the country, Lagos in the south-west has a poverty rate of 48.6 percent, the lowest in the country. In

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7The principal agency responsible for producing social and economic data in Nigeria is the National Bureau of Statistics (NBS). It came into being through the Statistics Act of 2007 (Federal Government of Nigeria 2007) following the merger of the Federal Office of Statistics (FOS) and the National Data Bank (NDB), which hitherto produced statistical information for the country. This was done by the government to concentrate the resources of the country on the NBS and promote its operations as a reliable source of socio-economic and development data for all tiers of government: federal, state and local.

8On literacy levels, the NBS *National Literacy Survey* of 2010 shows that the adult literacy rate in English language is 57.9 percent for the entire country; 65.1 percent for males and 50.6 percent for females; and an urban-rural differential of 73.6 and 49.5 percent respectively (NBS 2010: 20). When the adult literacy rates are examined across
addition, the poverty profile report clearly indicates higher poverty rates amongst rural areas and populations in comparison to poverty rates in the urban centres. The same applies to the unemployment rates.  

Tellingly, with special reference to the situation of vulnerable groups such as children, it should be added that Nigeria, with an estimated number of more than 10.2 million out-of-school children, has the highest numbers of out-of-school children in the world (British Council Nigeria 2012). The country also has very poor health indicators when it comes to infant and child mortality rates as contained in the 2013 NBS Multiple Indicator Cluster Survey (MICS). The MICS report shows that the child mortality rate is estimated at 158 per 1000 live births for under-five children and 97 per 1000 infant mortality (NBS 2013: iv). While the latter refers to the number of children who die before their first birthday, the former refers to the number of children who die before their fifth birthday. The NBS MICS report also indicates that the vaccination coverage for children against common diseases like poliomyelitis is 46.1 percent and tuberculosis is 61.7 percent, and that the number of children sleeping under any mosquito net, insecticide-treated or not, is 18.6 percent (NBS 2013: v).

Similarly, the NBS Annual Socio-Economic Report of 2011 indicates that the unemployment rate in Nigeria is 23.9 percent for people between ages 15 and 64, compared to 21.1 percent in 2010 and 19.7 percent in 2009 with the rural-urban differential of 25.6 percent unemployment rate for rural areas and 17.1 percent for urban areas (NBS 2011a: 10). The rate of unemployment also differs and varies according to the levels of education with 9.1 percent unemployment rate amongst people with a Doctorate, and 22.4 percent amongst those who have never acquired any formal education (NBS 2011a: 12). The unemployment rates for males and females are relatively the same at 23.5 and 24.3 percent respectively for 2011 (NBS 2011a: 12), even though the rates indicate that the female unemployment rate is slightly higher than that of males. 

The MICS was prepared by the NBS with technical and financial support from the United Nations Children Education Funds (UNICEF). It is “designed to measure progress towards the achievement of the MDGs,” following at least 100 internationally agreed indicators (NBS 2013: xvi).
In a nutshell, the increase in poverty in Nigeria during the past 50 years has produced an enormous amount of vulnerable and poor citizens who today are in desperate need of assistance to prevent them from sliding further into despair and hopelessness. While a number of social programmes have been introduced since the 1980s to stem the rising incidence of poverty, such programmes are often focused on short-term poverty alleviation. This is because as Balogun (2009: 127) explains, during the military era in particular, “if a government intervened in the social sector, it is more likely to be because of momentary pressures than because it was acting based on a comprehensive, forward-looking, and coherent policy.” For instance, the social and poverty eradication programmes that occasionally existed under the regimes of Generals Ibrahim Babangida (1985-1993) and Sani Abacha (1993-1998) were the pet projects put together by these heads of states and their wives. These include programmes like the Better Life for Rural Women, the Family Support Programme (FSP), the Family Economic Advancement Programme (FEAP) and Directorate of Food, Roads, and Rural Infrastructure (DFFRI) (Balogun 2009; Ogwumike 1995). More so, since independence, and following the introduction of the SAPs, various military and civilians governments have created different interventionist agencies with the objectives of reducing poverty and achieving rapid development.  

Some of the programmes that have been introduced by military and civilian governments in the past 50 years include but are not limited to the Operation Feed the Nation (OFN), Free and Compulsory Primary Education (FCPE), Green Revolution, Family Support Programme, Poverty Alleviation Programme (PAP), Agricultural Development Programmes (ADP), Agricultural Credit Guarantee Scheme (ACGS), Strategic Grains Reserves Program (SGRP), Rural Electrification Scheme (RES), and Rural Banking Programme (RBP). However, most of the interventionist agencies created to eradicate or address the escalating poverty rates in Nigeria

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11For brief summaries of some of these programmes, see Ocheni and Nwankwo (2012).
tend not to outlast the administrations that introduced them, and often times become defunct soon after a new government takes over, which leads to the creation of new agencies. Hence, following its inauguration in 1999, the government of President Obasanjo created a new agency known as the Poverty Alleviation Programme (PAP) to tackle the rising incidence of poverty across Nigeria. But in 2001, owing to allegations of corruption, mismanagement, over-centralization, and poor coordination in the implementation of its programmes, the PAP was replaced with the National Poverty Eradication Programme (NAPEP) (Oshewolo 2010; Ugoh and Ukpere 2009). Interestingly, despite debates about abolishing it, NAPEP remains in existence. To this end, and given the focus of the study on the governance of social protection that NAPEP is partly responsible for in Nigeria, the next section provides a brief review of NAPEP’s role in poverty eradication in Nigeria. The review includes criticisms that are often leveled against the implementation of its programmes, especially in relation to the lack of transparency, accountability, and the inclusion of relevant stakeholders in the implementation of programmes at the local level.

3.5. Governing Poverty in Nigeria: A Brief Review of NAPEP

Due to the escalating levels of poverty in Nigeria, the government of President Olusegun Obasanjo created NAPEP in 2001 as the main anti-poverty agency of the government. According to NAPEP (2007b: 7), the agency “represents a mechanism for correcting the shortcomings of the past poverty eradication efforts while effectively refocusing the policy for fighting poverty in the country.” The functions of NAPEP are as follows: (i) to coordinate all poverty eradication efforts of the federation; (ii) monitor all poverty eradication activities of the federal government; (iii) maintain a comprehensive and detailed databank on all activities aimed at eradicating poverty in Nigeria; (iv) carry out impact assessment of all efforts to eradicate poverty in Nigeria
and suggest the necessary reviews and policies required to enhance effectiveness; and (v) to
directly intervene in key sectors of critical needs periodically by implementing scaled key
priority projects (NAPEP 2007b: 7). Given these functions, NAPEP serves as the main agency
responsible for collating and storing data on all poverty eradication programmes and activities in
Nigeria, and it is the “major institutional arrangement to ensure social protection for the
vulnerable groups such as the rural poor, women, youth, and children in Nigeria” (NAPEP
2007b: 7).

With respect to its institutional framework, NAPEP operates a decentralized
administrative structure with a national secretariat in Abuja, the Nigeria capital, and 36 state
secretariats with 774 local government offices across the federation. This structure allows
NAPEP to be present in all states and local governments as well as the federal capital territory,
Abuja. NAPEP is headed by a national coordinator who is appointed by the Nigerian president.
The national coordinator oversees the activities of the agency in collaboration with the state
 coordinators that oversee the activities of the agency at the state level. The national and state
 coordinators are expected to work with other ministries of government with poverty eradication
responsibilities such as the ministries of education, health, agriculture and labour ministries. This
is to ensure effective implementation of programmes while avoiding the duplication of functions
and programmes (NAPEP 2007b). NAPEP is also expected to work or partner with international
organizations and other non-state actors and institutions such as community and faith based
organizations, civil and non-governmental organizations, and community members in the
implementation of its intervention programmes.

Nonetheless, while NAPEP has so far remained the government agency in charge of
poverty eradication across the country, and despite having implemented many poverty
eradication programmes, some observers maintain that the impact of NAPEP’s intervention programmes has been quite low, even as the poverty levels continue to rise across Nigeria. In other words, even though NAPEP has implemented many poverty eradication programmes such as the general micro-credit schemes, including those targeted at women, skills acquisition, and economic empowerment schemes like the tricycle distribution programme for youths, empowerment programmes for framers, and rehabilitation of victims of Vesicle Vagina Fistula (NAPEP 2007), many Nigerians remain poor.  

Although NAPEP (2007c) maintains that its programmes have helped to reduce poverty in the country, critics argue that due to problems such as poor targeting mechanisms, programme inconsistency, exclusion of the relevant stakeholders at the local level, poor implementation and coordination, corruption and the lack of transparency and accountability, NAPEP has failed to improve the living conditions of many Nigerians (Oshewolo 2010; Ugoh and Ukpere 2009).

Specifically, on corruption and the lack of transparency and accountability, it is argued that NAPEP suffers from issues ranging from programme substitution, misrepresentation of its finances, and diversion and/or conversion of resources and funds to private uses, which combine to make the “programmes to serve as conduit pipes for draining national resources” (Ugoh and Ukpere 2009). In addition, given that such corruption occurs at all levels of government where some politicians, NAPEP staff, and some local elites connive to divert programme benefits to their supporters, the poor who are not close to the corridors of power are excluded, and do not have access to programmes that are supposed to be implemented for their benefits (Obikeze et al. 2015; Oladimeji and Said 2012). Indeed, across the 36 states spread across the six-geopolitical zones of the Nigerian federation, studies of NAPEP’s programmes reveal that the programmes

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12The tricycle programme, known popular as KEKE NAPEP programme, is arguably the most popular programme of the agency. It involves the distribution of tricycles to young people, mostly young men, based on low interest loans.
implemented by NAPEP are often plagued by a combination of the aforementioned problems. For instance, in a state wide study of NAPEP programmes in Yobe state, a state in northeastern Nigeria, Abbas (2016) notes that NAPEP’s programmes are often politicized, misaligned with government social and economic policies, and exclude many of the stakeholders, including beneficiaries in the planning and execution of programmes. According to Abbas (2016: 53), 88.1 percent of the 202 respondents surveyed in the study conducted to assess NAPEP’s performance in the state “confirmed that they have never at any time been consulted to make or implement the activities of NAPEP in their respective areas and communities.”

Similarly, Omoniyi (2013) identified corruption, political patronage, unrealistic objectives and goals, lack of adequate consideration for the socio-political setting, and the exclusion of rural communities as major factors that hindered the success of NAPEP’s programmes in Ado-Odo Ota local government area of Ogun state, southwest Nigeria. Furthermore, in a study involving six local governments in Ebonyi state, southeastern Nigeria, Onwe and Chibuzor (2015) report that corruption, poor coordination, excessive politicization, low coverage, and inadequate sensitization were factors that plaqued the implementation of NAPEP’s programmes in the local governments studied. These they maintain led to very low impact on the beneficiaries’ living condition and poverty eradication in the communities. Likewise, in their study of NAPEP’s provision of basic infrastructure and credit facilities in Giwa local government, Kaduna state, northwestern Nigeria, Yakubu and Abbass (2012) observe that while some respondents recognize the efforts of NAPEP in their local government, the coverage rates were reported to be low, and many people did not benefit from the programmes, even as others complained about the substandard quality of some of the facilities provided by NAPEP.
However, in Cross River state, south-south region of Nigeria, where Aboh and Onabe (2007) found that many respondents in their study of NAPEP’s performance acknowledged they had benefited from some of NAPEP’s programmes, the respondents added that there was inadequate support for them to become self-sufficient, especially once the programmes ended. Likewise, in Isiaka et al.’s (2015) study of NAPEP’s income improvement and empowerment programme for rural women in Kwara state, north-central Nigeria, they note that while some of the women respondents reported slight increments in their incomes after participating in the programmes, the level of incomes received were too low to make a longer lasting impact possible. The authors also noted that there is a need to curb corruption and incorporate the rural women more into decision-making processes in the implementation of the programmes. Put together, although NAPEP is beset with several problems as highlighted above, Oshewolo (2010) explains that the lack of an inclusive governance framework for coordinating poverty eradication programmes is a major problem of interventionist agencies like NAPEP. In Oshewolo’s words (2010: 271),

In this age of globalization, inter-sectoral governance system built on institutional interactions amongst sectors is becoming a therapy against the poverty scourge. The underdeveloped nature of these interactions in Nigeria has not helped in the fight against poverty. The uncoordinated collaborate efforts between the state, market, and civil society is hampering government interventionist programs. The previous policies on poverty alleviation in Nigeria has been dominantly designed and implemented by the state. Where inputs from other sectors were allowed, such were not properly coordinated for effective impacts on the poor population.

Oshewolo’s reference to the problem caused by the poor inter-sectoral governance of poverty reduction programmes in Nigeria is poignant for a number of reasons, including but not limited to the exclusion of relevant stakeholders such as CSOs and NGOs on one hand, and the marginalized poor, especially women, on the other hand. Although it is well acknowledged that there is poor inter-sectoral coordination within governmental agencies in Nigeria, the problem of
poor coordination is exacerbated by the crisis of intergovernmental relations within a federal system of government in Nigeria where power is mostly centralized at the federal level. Hence, given the challenges of coordination and centralization of power, implementing programmes within a decentralized federal system comprising 36 states and 774 local government areas poses additional challenges in light of weak governance systems at all levels. More so, as Adamolekun (2010: 133) argues, given Nigeria’s “prevailing level of institutional, social, political, and economic development, formal accountability mechanisms are likely to remain of limited effectiveness for several years in making governments accountable to their citizens.” Thus, Adamolekun (2010: 133) maintains that in order to promote accountability in Nigeria, there is a need for collaboration across public and private sectors, not only to fight corruption and demand freedom of information, but also to promote development and the participation of the people in governance.

In addition, amidst the weak governance systems, the lack of adequate resources at all levels compound the problem of implementation because different sections of the country are constantly demanding that the governments should provide beneficial poverty eradication programmes to them. Yet, without adequately addressing or meeting the needs of the poor, when such programmes are to be implemented, they are likely to be subject to the aforementioned problems of corruption and poor implementation. Thus, in order to hold governments at all levels accountable for the limited resources, the need to involve non-state actors and institutions like CSOs and NGOs in the implementation of programmes in Nigeria continue to be made by many observers. But like in African many countries, the rise of professional CSOs and NGOs as part of the neoliberal orthodoxy and inclusive neoliberal ideas about participation in the Nigerian
context has produced organizations that sometimes do not truly represent the interests of the poor.

In the Nigerian context, for instance, Obadare (2004) notes that as part of neoliberal reforms under the military governments of General Babangida and Sani Abacha between 1986 and 1998, “manufacturing civil society” organizations in Nigeria was a major feature of that period. Hence, he argues that, “In a broad sense, the 1980s marked a watershed in relations between the state in Nigeria and the gamut of associations” (Obadare 2004: 142). Hence, during the decades of military rule in Nigeria, the public space was closed-off to the participation of non-conforming citizens and organizations that sought to challenge and/or influence public policies in favour of the poor. Under the military, it was a common practice for the military dictators to knowingly engage in patron-clientelism as a way of gaining support across the country, and putting down dissent from those opposed to the military leaders or their supporters, was common. However, while the return of democracy to Nigeria in 1999 has not radically transformed the way government officials and institutions operate, it has allowed for many advocates of transparency and accountability in governance to call for increased reforms to public governance. More so, despite all the challenges that Nigeria currently faces, some observers argue that the country has made some remarkable improvements with respect to institutionalizing democratic rule and ensuring governance according to the rule of law, which many people hope will further allow genuine CSOs and NGOs to engage in advocacy on behalf of the poor.13

13For example, Posner and Young (2007: 126) note that the defeat of the third term ambition of President Obasanjo in 2006 was a watershed in Nigeria’s political history. This is because it prevented the President from unconstitutionally extending his tenure for another four years beyond the constitutionally mandated eight years that he completed in 2008, Posner and Young (2007) maintain that it was the manner in which the defeat took place that shows Nigeria is making progress democratically. The third term agenda was defeated through a democratic vote in the Nigerian Senate, and this was a significant achievement for a fledging democracy. For other observers, although elections in Nigeria are not perfect, remarkable improvements have been made in recent years (Kew 2010). It should
Consequently, although it is necessary to engage and coordinate poverty reduction programmes with the participation of CSOs and NGOs, how to ensure transparency and accountability amongst CSOs and NGOs remains a challenge in Nigeria, not least given the need to protect the poor and marginalized from further marginalization by powerful external state and non-state actors from the local to the international levels. Along this line, and with special reference to the marginalization of women from decision-making, as well as the imperative of addressing the feminisation of poverty in the Nigerian context, it is crucial to understand how the exclusion of women and their impoverishment occurs in Nigeria. The next section provides some details on how women are marginalized in Nigeria, and why despite efforts to target women in poverty eradication and social protection programmes such as COPE, many Nigerian women remain excluded from participation in matters that often times affect them the most, even though their contributions to national development and governance are undeniable.

3.6. Women, Poverty and Participatory Governance in Nigeria: A Synoptic Overview

To be sure, although many poor people remain marginalized and excluded from decision-making processes and public governance of any kind in Nigeria, the plight of women generally, and poor rural women in particular, is noteworthy. Despite bearing the major burdens of poverty in Nigeria, many women still face considerable challenges in decisions concerning their lives, even when the poverty statistics show that women in Nigeria disproportionately experience multidimensional poverty. For instance, in relation to child bearing, unequal gender relations affect women’s ability to make decisions relating to child bearing in Nigeria, where the fertility rate is 5.5 percent according to the National Population Commission (NPC 2013). More so, also be noted that for the first time in its history, Nigeria has so far experienced more than 16 years of unbroken democratic rule since it returned to civilian rule in 1999. The longest period of unbroken democratic rule in Nigeria was five years before the commencement of the current dispensation in 1999. Moreover, the 2015 general elections produced an opposition candidate as president for the first time in the country’s 56 years history.
while 45.1 percent deliver in formal health institutions, many women in Nigeria deliver in the absence of skilled attendants; it is estimated that only 48.7 percent of Nigerian women are likely to have a skilled attendant during delivery (NBS 2013). Given that there is a better chance of saving the lives of pregnant women when delivery is supervised by skilled personnel (NPC 2013: 20), Nigeria’s high maternal mortality rate of 630 per 100,000 births (UNDP 2013: 158) can be partly attributed to the low number of skilled personnel that are available during delivery in most parts of the country.

In addition, while the HIV/AIDS infection rates in 2010 was 55.65 percent for Nigerian women compared to 44.35 for Nigerian men, the National Bureau of Statistics’ gender statistics report of 2011 states that the higher rates of infection in women is because Nigerian “women are more vulnerable than men to contracting HIV due to biological, social, economic and cultural pressures” (NBS 2011b: 2). The report notes that “Unequal gender relations within and outside the family often limit the ability of women to protect themselves from HIV/AIDS” (NBS 2011b: 2). Indeed, as Ogunniyi and Dosunmu (2014: 323) note, “the culture of the society expects women to be responsible for child bearing and [to] take care of their children, thus young women often feel powerless protecting themselves against HIV infection.” Worse still, Nigerian women, more than their male counterparts, are more likely to be stigmatized and discriminated for being HIV positive, including at hospitals where they are registered as HIV/AIDS patients (Nwanna 2013). According to Nwanna (2013), women in rural areas are even more likely to be discriminated against than women in the urban centres, both in hospitals and within the labour market. In fact, despite having to bear the stigma associated with HIV/AIDS, the burden of responsibility of taking care of themselves and other family members only increases when
women are unable to find jobs or lose their jobs due to their status as persons living with HIV/AIDS (Nwanna 2013).

Furthermore, in the education sector, based on figures from 2010, it is estimated that more than 56 percent of illiterates in Nigeria are women (NBS 2011: 5). Amongst other factors, religious and cultural views that privilege the education of boys ahead of girls, especially in the northern parts of the country, affect the education of the girl-child. Instead of sending girls to school, some parents marry off their girls at very early ages; sometimes girls as young as 13 years old are sent off to marry much older men, thereby denying them the opportunity to be educated like their male counterparts (Ali-Akpajiak and Pyke 2003). Some of the victims of Vesico Vagina Fistula (VVF) in Nigeria are young girls who are married off at early ages, and who end up having complicated pregnancies and delivery as a result of the “incontinence of the bladder and bowel” (Ali-Akpajiak and Pyke 2003: 53). Often times, these girls are abandoned and subsequently divorced by their spouses. As Ali-Akpajiak and Pyke (2003: 53) explain, “VVF occurs because the pelvic bones have had insufficient time to develop to cope with child birth,” and the necessary corrective operations mostly require the consent of their spouses. But considering that 80-90 of percent of VVF victims are divorced and/or ostracized by their spouses and communities due to their VVF status, getting consent is challenging and impossible in many cases (Ali-Akpajiak and Pyke (2003). Consequently, because of the early marriage they were subjected to, these young girls are not only denied access to education, but are also left to carry the very heavy health burdens of VVF.

Notably, the lack of priority given to girls’ education has larger ramifications in the short, medium and long term for the quality of life that many women can live in Nigeria, not least because this can cause them to fall into a lifetime of intergenerational poverty. As noted in a
report published by British Council Nigeria, *Gender in Nigeria Report 2012*, “educated women are more likely to use health services and to have fewer and better-nourished children, and their children are more likely to survive. Girls who are educated will also contribute to future economic growth” (British Council Nigeria 2012: v). Yet, even though women have gradually made some progress in the education sector, much still needs to be done. The low educational levels attained by women continue to hamper their participation in the labour market, where they are disproportionately employed in low wage jobs. More so, in places where they are employed, “they are still rarely employed in jobs with power, authority and status or traditionally male blue-collar occupations” (NBS 2011: 5). Hence, Ekpe et al. (2014) argue that to ensure that women are not disproportionately employed in low wage jobs, it is important for the Nigerian state to encourage women’s access to education and skills acquisition in order to increase their participation in managerial positions.

While women continue to face very tough choices in the employment, health, and education sectors, the exclusion of women from decision-making processes in governance is also visible at all levels in Nigeria, including at the local community level where most women experience the burden of unequal gender relations and multidimensional poverty. To put the exclusion of women from decision-making institutions, processes, and mechanisms into perspective, out of a total number of 469 national legislators in the National Assembly, Nigeria’s national legislature, which comprises 360 House of Representatives members and 109 Senators, only 35 and 30 legislators were women in 2007 and 2011 respectively (NBS 2011: 5). The low representation of women in elected institutions like the National Assembly is replicated across other branches of government at all levels (Udegbe 2004; Akanji 2009). But despite the fact that different governments in Nigeria continue to acknowledge the gender disparities, women still
remain underrepresented in Nigerian politics. As Sanda (2011) explains, the lack of action or efforts to address the glaring differences in gender representation shows the unwillingness of the Nigerian state to intervene in addressing such differences. For Sanda (2011: 121), although the Nigerian constitution guaranties that all Nigerian citizens, regardless of their gender, should have access to equal opportunities and rights, “the poor and majority of women can hardly realize those rights without the state or societal intervention.” For instance, the financial barriers and cost of participating in politics is too high for many poor women to afford, and without adequate financial guarantees or support, such barriers will continue to pose a great challenge for women to participate in politics and governance.

In addition, Akanji (2009: 111) argues that by virtue of Nigeria being a signatory to several gender-related international treaties and instruments, the country needs “to protect women’s rights, including the right to adequate representation in government.” At the same time, when opportunities to participate in politics arise, only elite women, especially those connected to powerful male politicians, are more likely to be granted access to participate. For instance, during the military era, the initiatives and activities of the wives of male political office holders who head governments at different levels are seen as the means through which women can be a part of governance in Nigeria, even though some of these initiatives are not known to the law and often operated at the discretion of the heads of state and their wives (Akanji 2009). Indeed, since the 1980s, particularly under the military regime of General Babangida, the “first ladies,” that is, the wives of the heads of state under the military regimes, have initiated pet programmes or projects aimed at engaging women in politics, governance and development at the national and local levels. One of the most notable programmes that sought to mobilize women at the grassroots into national development is the Better Life for Rural Women Programme (BLP).
With the objective of providing social and economic assistance to women in rural areas across Nigeria, the BLP was launched in 1987 by Mrs. Maryam Babangida, the wife of the former head of state, General Ibrahim Babangida. The BLP provided small financial loans and skills acquisition training for women in the rural areas, and the programme is sometimes credited for mobilizing rural “women in large numbers, making them aware of their numbers and the powers, therein” (Sanda 2011: 121).

However, without adequately providing the avenues for rural women to exercise greater authority and powers in the determination of the programme’s priorities, the BLP was implemented through top-down structures. More so, with regard to accountability, some scholars have argued that because the BLP was implemented under a military regime, accountability to the people about the programme was largely missing (Akanji 2009; Balogun 2009). In other words, because the BLP was mainly an initiative of the wife of the head of state at that time, funds allocated for the programme were mostly provided through discretionary allocation and not part of the national budget, which made it difficult to keep track of how the allocated resources were utilized or to gauge the impact of the programme on economic growth and the welfare of the people (Balogun 2009: 129). Tellingly, the return of democracy in 1999 has not put an end to the first ladies’ pet projects syndrome, and the problems associated with the lack of transparency and accountability in social programmes at the local levels have equally continued under the various civilian administrations.

Yet, while the programmes of the first ladies continue to be geared towards poor women, such programmes often times end once the tenure of the first ladies’ spouses are terminated at the end of their spouses’ tenure, except for some that are institutionalized through registered NGOs or foundations (Sanda 2011). The lack of institutionalization of many of the programmes
initiated by the first ladies means that many projects are abandoned once their husbands leave political offices or the programmes become inactive due to lack of financial and political support (Akanji 2009). But beyond the programmes of the first ladies, programmes initiated by different governments for the poor also suffer similar problems of lack of accountability, transparency, institutionalization, and the exclusion of key stakeholders. Indeed, as mentioned earlier, a criticism of NAPEP’s programmes is the lack of inclusion of major stakeholders in the activities of the agency. With respect to rural women in particular, even when such programmes are designed to target women beneficiaries, the women are not involved in making decisions about important aspects of the programmes like what kinds of assistance they require.

Although there continues to be demands for a greater inclusion of women in decision making processes, such calls have not yielded much positive results. This is partly because of the reluctance of men to the inclusion of women in governance. According to Udegbe (2004), a high level of unfavourable views about women in position of power still exists amongst rural and urban educated and non-educated males in Nigeria, and such views are higher amongst rural men. Udegbe’s (2004) argument is based on findings from a study on sexism amongst undergraduate and postgraduate university students, workers, and rural dwellers in selected rural and urban areas in some Nigerian cities. But the reluctance of men generally, and rural men in particular, to include women in decision making processes should be placed in the broader context of the prevailing patriarchal systems in Nigeria that fosters gender inequality and norms that prevent women from participating in governance (Durojaiye 2013; Makama 2013; Para-Mallam 2010; Staveren and Odebode 2007). In Makama’s (2013: 116) words, although women constitute more than half of the population of Nigeria, and contribute to the social and economic development of the country more than men, “their participation in formal and informal structures
and spheres, where decisions regarding the use of societal resources generated by both men and women are made, remains insufficient. The Nigerian society has been patriarchal in nature which is a major feature of a traditional society.” As Makama (2013: 116) further explains,

The patriarchal society sets the parameters for women’s structurally unequal position in families and markets by condoning gender-differential terms in inheritance rights and legal adulthood, by tacitly condoning domestic and sexual violence and sanctioning differential wages for equal comparable work. Tradition or culture and religion have dictated men and women relationship for centuries and entrenched male domination into the structure of social organization and institution at all levels of leadership. Patriarchy justifies the marginalization of women in education, economy, labour market, politics, business, family, domestic matters, and inheritance.

Makama’s (2013) characterization of patriarchy aptly captures how patriarchal structures the exclusion of women from governance and other sectors of life in Nigeria. This exclusion extends from the discriminatory practices that undermine women’s participation in education, business, and labour markets, to certain practices in inheritance that often times dispossess women of their hard-earned properties when their husband die. The latter practices include preventing widows from inheriting productive assets like land and other landed properties, which in some cases were acquired solely by the women or in partnership with their late husbands, but which get taken away from the women when their husbands die. In some cases, such inheritance practices also prevent daughters from inheriting the productive assets from their late fathers under the guise of cultural and religious practices (Durojaiye 2013). Although there have been efforts to challenge such practices, the plural legal system in Nigeria that combines the customary, the Sharia, and the common law systems in different parts of the country, often make it difficult to challenge the discriminatory inheritance practices. It should be noted that denying women access to important productive assets based on cultural and religious practices that dispossess women and girls of all their actual and potential inheritance, sources of income, and access to education and good
health, contribute to the multidimensional poverty that women experience in Nigeria. This dispossession leads to further social and economic vulnerability, risks and poverty for women.

Nonetheless, even though the Nigerian state has so far failed to promote gender equality and women’s empowerment in ways that can effectively promote the inclusion of women in governance, recent developments in the areas of social protection governance suggests an opening for women to participate in social protection programmes as both beneficiaries and leaders. To this end, this dissertation’s examination of how communities and citizens participate in the governance of social protection programmes in Nigeria, allows for understanding the participation of women in COPE, including the role that women played as leaders. Essentially, while it would take a lot of effort to transcend systemic patriarchal orders that keep women impoverished and excluded from governance in Nigeria, understanding how women engaged with COPE provides an opportunity to examine the way women’s participation was viewed by different actors and stakeholders in COPE. As Nigeria’s pioneer CCT programme, COPE was designed for members of vulnerable groups like female headed households, VVF victims, the elderly, and those living with HIV/AIDS. However, aside from targeting women as beneficiaries, the hybrid community-based targeting mechanism adopted for the implementation of COPE also allows women leaders to participate in the governance of the programme. As the discussions in the analytical chapters will show, the active participation and positive contributions of women in the governance of COPE were well recognized and acknowledged by beneficiaries and state officials who participated in the programme.

3.7. Summary of Review

As an elusive concept, debates about “governance” continue in the theory and practice of international development. But its distinctive feature as a concept that goes beyond government
opens up a myriad of possibilities for understanding the interactions between state and non-state actors and institutions. Moreover, even as the participation of state and non-state actors is now considered to be the essence of governance for some scholars, it is now widely recognized that several challenges remain in achieving positive outcomes through participatory mechanisms. But while various conceptual and theoretical approaches have emerged within the general discourse on participatory governance mechanisms in international development, this chapter shows how transparency and accountability feature as central elements. Notably, however, even though governance can be conceptualized as good governance, good enough governance, better governance or enhanced governance, how to ensure the effective participation of non-state actors in the exercise of authority over public affairs remains debatable.

Nevertheless, within the African context, the idea that Africa’s developmental challenges are intrinsically linked to “bad governance” continues to grow, and ensuring that more transparent and accountable governance mechanisms prevail on the continent still remains a major area of scholarly inquiry. Specifically, as the scholarly debates on the role of patrimonialism and neopatrimonialism in politics, development and governance illustrates above, significant gaps exist in the literature on the appropriate means to improve governance on the continent. In addition, debates over how to effectively bring the people at the community level, not least the marginalized poor rural women, into governing institutions to exercise authority over issues that directly affect them highlights another important debate in the literature.

What this chapter has attempted to do is to show these debates and gaps in the scholarly literature on governance and development, and as the discussion in this chapter illustrates, much remains to be contributed to the discourse on governance. Yet, as the identified debates and gaps in the literature suggest, the imperative of analyzing various governance mechanisms, especially
as they relate to how community participation improves or impedes transparency and accountability, cannot be overemphasized, especially in countries like Nigeria with significant governance challenges. As such, while building on the discussions in the previous chapters, this chapter has tried to situate the scholarly debates on community participation within the larger context of existing debates in the literature. As the search for more transparent and accountable mechanisms that allow non-state actors to effectively exercise authority over public affairs continues, understanding existing mechanisms and analyzing their relevance and contributions to emerging governance frameworks is essential. Thus, the content of this chapter provides important background understanding and discussions for the rest of this dissertation. To highlight the important linkages between governance and social protection in developing countries, the next chapter reviews some of the debates in the social protection literature.
Chapter Four
A Literature Review on Social Protection

4.0. Chapter Overview
As social protection programmes continue to proliferate in developing countries, scholarly debates on the theoretical and practical aspects of social protection as a paradigm in international development have also become more evident. In order to identify some of current gaps in the literature, this chapter reviews some of the current debates in the social protection literature. The review focuses in particular on debates with significant implications for the governance of social protection programmes in developing countries, and helps to situate the current study in the context of other studies on the governance of social protection through CBTMs. The review includes the debate between proponents and critics of the risks based and rights-based approaches to social protection, and the debate over the use of “targeting” methods and CBTMs in social protection. Specifically, the review examines these debates to showcase how discussions on the use of CBT mechanisms in social protection reflect current gaps in the academic literature. To contextual these gaps, the review also includes a brief discussion of CCTs as major social protection programmes in developing countries that originated in Latin America, but which are now implemented in African countries, where they are mainly implemented through CBTMs.

In all, the review illustrates the divergent discourses and disagreements amongst development scholars and practitioners on how to ensure that benefits of social protection programmes in developing countries reach those that are the most in need of assistance. To this end, understanding how to ensure transparency and accountability in participatory mechanisms such as CBTMs is crucial. The chapter proceeds as follows. First, it provides a review of the dominant approaches to social protection and the major debates surrounding these approaches.
Here, the review focuses in particular on the debate between proponents and opponents of the social risk management (SRM) approach and the rights-based approaches to social protection. Second, the review examines the debate surrounding the practice of “targeting” in social protection. Here, the review presents the main arguments and counterarguments for targeting, highlights the various kinds of targeting methods, and notes the differences between community-based targeting (CBT) methods and other targeting methods. Third, the review elaborates on the unique role CBTs also play as both a method and mechanism for the governance of social protection programmes. The review then examines how debates on CBT mechanisms cut across discussions on participatory governance and community participation, while highlighting some of the arguments for and against CBT mechanisms in developing countries. Fourth, a brief review of CCTs is provided to highlight how they have become major social protection programmes around the world, and how African countries are using CBT mechanisms to implement them. The section also notes some important discussions around women’s participation in CCTs in Latin America and the implication of such participation for understanding the participation of women in African CCTs. The chapter ends with a summary of the main points covered.

4.1. Approaches to Social Protection

Recall that three conceptual approaches to social protection were identified in chapter two. These are the risks management approach, the rights-based approach, and the pro-poor economic growth approach (Brunori and O’Reilly 2010). Although a fourth “needs-based” approach can be added to these three approaches (Munro 2008), the two dominant approaches that have so far influenced the discourse and practice of social protection within the literature on social protection are the risks management and rights-based approaches. Both the pro-poor economic
growth and needs-based approaches often constitute subsets of these two dominant approaches. However, while the various approaches to social protection are not mutually exclusive, arguments for and against the risks-based and rights-based approaches to social protection have defined how the power of ideas play out in the theory and practice of social protection in many developing countries today. Hence, as reviewed below, the major points of agreements and disagreements between scholars reveal gaps in the literature, not least in light of what many scholars and practitioners consider to be the underlying ideological justifications of the two approaches. Thus, a review of these two dominant approaches to social protection in developing countries is provided below.

4.1.1. Risks-Based Approaches to Social Protection

As noted in chapter two, human beings often experience a myriad of social and economic risks during the course of a lifetime. These may range from risks associated with poor early childhood development to lack of social security in old age. Although peoples’ experiences vary, coping with social risks can be challenging for those experiencing multidimensional poverty and vulnerabilities in developing countries, where social protection systems are not as developed in comparison to those of developed countries.\(^{14}\) To this end, many developing countries have made efforts to model their social protection systems around what is now known as the “social risks management” (SRM) approach. Notably, the SRM was mainly developed as a “new conceptual framework for social protection” by the staff of the World Bank’s Social Protection Unit under the leadership of Robert Holzman and Steen Jorgensen (Holzman and Jorgensen 2001). The framework was subsequently adopted as the “Social Protection Sector Strategy” of the World Bank.

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\(^{14}\)Generally, in many developing countries, risks-based approaches to poverty reduction often involve addressing risks and vulnerabilities through, for instance, asset management (Carter and Barrett 2007; Moser 2006), livelihood diversification (Scoones 2009; de Sherbinin et al. 2008; Bebbington 1999), and human security frameworks to problems such as climate change (Heltberg et al. 2009; Khagram et al. 2003).
Bank (2001). According to the World Bank (2001), the turn of the new century and the imperative of providing social protection to many poor people in developing countries necessitate creating holistic social protection systems.

For Holzman and Jorgensen (2001: 531), considering that poor and vulnerable people are more risk averse and tend to be “unable or unwilling to engage in higher risks/return activities,” the SRM provides greater access to risks management for the poor. Hence, the SRM is formulated to address the problem of information asymmetry that exists between poor people’s knowledge on the sources and challenges of risks on one hand, and the instruments needed to overcome these risks on the other. The two main objectives of the SRM are to (i) “assist individuals, households, and communities better manage risk” and (ii) “to provide support to the chronically poor” (Holzman and Jorgensen 2001: 536). As Holzman and Jorgensen (200) argue, these objectives can be achieved through the SRM’s three main risk management strategies, which operate at different levels of formality (the informal, the markets and the government/public). These are the prevention, the mitigation and the coping strategies. Depending on the nature of the risk involved and availability of necessary instruments, different actors (individuals, households, communities, NGOs, national and subnational governments and international organizations) are able to operate the main risk management strategies (Holzman and Jorgensen 2001).

As Holzman and Jorgensen (2001: 541-542) further explain, preventive strategies operate “to reduce the probability of a down-side risk,” and they are supposed to be introduced before risks occur. They maintain that risks prevention instruments should include sound macroeconomic policies and policies for improving and effectively managing health, education and environmental systems. Mitigation strategies are needed to decrease the negative impacts of
down-side risks when they occur, and similar to the preventive strategies, they should ideally be introduced before the risks occur. These, according to Holzman and Jorgensen (2001), can be achieved through various forms such as portfolio diversification, informal and formal insurance mechanisms or hedging. Portfolio diversification involves taking measures that include spreading assets beyond one portfolio, for instance, having more avenues for income beyond a single source by investing in a combination of physical, human, financial and social capital assets. Formal and informal insurance measures can also be used in ensuring that risks are pooled within formal and informal arrangements. These include using market mechanisms and the family. The former may involve paying a premium for formal insurance benefits, and the latter can entail engaging in family and community activities that insure against adverse risks. Hedging is a mitigation strategy that allows for other individuals, families or groups to assume some risk and may occur through marriage or some labour contracts for household members within communities, for example. Finally, the coping strategies are needed to relieve or ameliorate the impact of a particular risk after it occurs, and these may include drawing upon savings, migration or borrowing (Holzman and Jorgensen 2001: 541-542).

Nevertheless, while various strategies and instruments can be used in managing risks through the SRM approach, market-based instruments are the preferred first set of instruments for addressing risks and vulnerabilities. Other public instruments involving the state should be used when market instruments are either unavailable or unable to address the challenges posed by such risks and vulnerabilities (Holzman and Jorgensen 2001). In sum, the SRM approach assumes that a combination of these strategies and instruments will help to improve the outcome of social protection programmes in developing countries. Following its adoption by the World Bank, the SRM approach to social protection in developing countries has been considerably
influential, and has become widespread. But criticisms of risks-based approaches such as the SRM approach abound, not least due to what many critics consider to be their origin in classical and neoliberal economics, and the focus on absolute poverty without due consideration of poverty as a multidimensional phenomenon (Munro 2008). Critics of risks-based approaches often argue that their formulation, especially the strategies, actors and levels of formality, are detached from actual reality, and therefore, cannot address the risks that they seek to address using the simple neoliberal economic lens (Munro 2008). For instance, given that risks-based approaches tend to define poverty based on income, they are unable to address other structural problems such as lack of access to education, health, and protection from unlawful and harmful cultural practices that prevent poor people, especially poor women and girls, from overcoming their poverty. At the same time, considering that “the very poor and/or chronically poor may suffer from several overlapping and mutually reinforcing market failures that prevent them from using the market to manage risk”, ensuring adequate social protection for such people is very important (Munro 2008: 30), which in many cases require the involvement of the state.

Specifically, Adesina (2011) argues that even though the SRM is arguably the most dominant approach to social protection in the post-structural adjustment era, it can be interpreted mainly as an attempt to perpetuate a neoliberal ideological approach to social protection in many developing countries. Adesina (2011) maintains that the SRM mainly reflects the World Bank’s “old safety net” approach by promoting residual safety nets through market instruments. As he puts it, the “SRM remains locked within the neoliberal market transaction logic and allocation of “bad risk” to the public” (Adesina 2011: 457). In other words, for Adesina (2011: 457), “while the SRM is often presented as a departure from the earlier restrictive focus on safety nets...for managing ‘bad risks’...the underlying logic remains the same.” For him, this means that the
residual role allocated to the state and the primacy of market-based instruments within the SRM only reinforces the World Bank’s approach to limited social provisioning in many developing countries. For instance, the focus on the vulnerable poor within the SRM partly explains the preference for limited targeting and the use of market-based instruments such as cash transfers for addressing poverty. Adesina (2011: 459) further explains that within the context of the neoliberal economic order in the post-structural adjustment era, the SRM’s rehashing of the old safety net approach “reflects the ideational crisis at the heart of the dominant international multilateral, bilateral or “development community” in the wake of the seeming hegemonic power of neo-liberal orthodoxy, and how to respond to the crisis it created.” Put together, without separating the social from the larger economic aspects of development plans and programmes, Adesina argues that the SRM’s emphasis on market mechanisms for addressing vulnerabilities and risks of chronically poor individuals and households, simply “makes the ‘social’ almost invariably function as the flip-side of the ‘economic’ in the broader neo-liberal discourse” (Adesina 2011: 459).

Devereux and Sabates-Wheeler (2004: 6) also criticize the SRM on three major grounds: (i) for being narrow in its conceptualization of vulnerability, (ii) for overlooking the plight of the chronically poor, and (iii) for focusing on market-based strategies and allocation of residual roles to governments. First, in Devereux and Sabates-Wheeler’s (2004) view, the SRM conceptualizes vulnerability as a characteristic attributable to a person or group without making distinctions. For example, Devereux and Sabates-Wheeler (2004: 6) note that within the SRM “people living with disabilities can be characterized as more or less vulnerable as people without disabilities in any given context.” Explaining this further, they maintain that this “type of analysis tends to classify vulnerability according to a range of risks or shocks that affect one or more of a variety of
livelihood assets,” and which necessitate certain types of policy instruments for the poor such as setting up orphanages for orphans or disability aids for farmers with disabilities and so on (Devereux and Sabates-Wheeler 2004: 6). Devereux and Sabates-Wheeler further maintain that the SRM’s focus on economic risks, and its effects on income and assets do not really capture the effects of social risks that exacerbate poverty and vulnerability. This reality they observe is evident in the treatment of social inclusion, social cohesion and social stability as “positive externalities of well-designed SRM interventions” (Devereux and Sabates-Wheeler 2004: 6). The emphasis here is that the SRM simply focuses on vulnerability to economic risks that are caused by the lack of adequate income while largely neglecting social risks.

Second, Devereux and Sabates-Wheeler (2004: 7-8) note that the SRM overlooks the distinction between various degrees of poverty that people live in. By this, it ignores the inability of different individuals and households to address their own poverty due to the depth of such poverty and challenges of getting out of it. In other words, for them, the SRM strategies fail to recognize and effectively address the poverty of those who have been permanently unable to recover from a major shock or asset loss. Hence, without considering the inability of certain groups of chronically poor people to access market driven solutions, the SRM conflates the treatment of social risks as “structural” and “contingent” in a way that undermines its effectiveness.¹⁵ Within the realm of overlooking the conditions of the chronic poor, vis-à-vis the inability of many poor people to move out of permanent poverty aftershocks, Devereux and Sabates-Wheeler (2004: 7) note that the SRM “remains rooted in a safety-nets agenda” as it only

¹⁵According to Devereux and Sabates-Wheeler (2004), social risks that are “structural” in nature refer to systemic discriminations and marginalization within social settings, while “contingent” social risks are economic and environmental in nature.
“proposes to put instruments in place to catch and protect people when they face short-run shocks and livelihood risks.”

Lastly, by focusing more on market-based instruments such as private credits and insurance schemes as risks management instruments, Devereux and Sabates-Wheeler argue that the SRM misrepresents the realities in many developing countries where these are not developed (Devereux and Sabates-Wheeler 2004: 8). For them, the large proportion of people working in the informal sector as well as the “high levels of self-employment, of unstable and irregular wage employment, and widespread underemployment (rather than unemployment)” limits the scope of social protection through these instruments. These and other factors necessitate a larger role for governments, yet the SRM only provides limited space for government involvement (Devereux and Sabates-Wheeler 2004: 8). The government is only supposed to “compensate” for the failures of market instruments and not act proactively in preventing poverty or providing social protection for the poor. For these three reasons, and having criticized the World Bank’s SRM, Devereux and Sabates-Wheeler maintain a more “transformative” approach to social protection is needed to address the challenges faced by poor people in developing countries. Hence, Devereux and Sabates-Wheeler (2004) developed and proposed a “transformative social protection” framework.

Transformative social protection refers to the imperative of having policies that address the power imbalances amongst the societies, especially the power imbalances that create, sustain and encourage vulnerabilities (Devereux and Sabates-Wheeler 2004: 9). The transformative aspects of social protection can be achieved by encouraging the application of “transformative measures” to address concerns such as social equity and exclusion. These may include measures involving support for workers’ collective action and the rights of minorities in ways that ensure
“chronically poor,” “economically vulnerable,” and “socially marginalized” people are looked after by the state (Devereux and Sabates-Wheeler 2004: 10). Although the transformative social protection approach is sometimes considered a step away from the SRM, Adesina (2011: 458) argues that like the SRM, Devereux and Sabates-Wheeler’s transformative social protection framework suffers a major drawback; that is, “the excessive focus on “the socially vulnerable,” and a refusal to engage the neoliberal economic framework as vulnerability-inducing.” Likewise, Aoo et al. (2007) criticize the framework for not clearly articulating whose transformative really counts in practice, the individual’s or the Community’s, and also for being too ambitious without specifying which state and non-state institutions, donors, communities, or governments, are responsible for initiating and sustaining the necessary transformation in the short, medium and long terms. To this end, some other scholars argue that the transformation that can lead to freedom and empowerment for the poor can only be found in rights-based approaches as discussed below.

4.1.2. Rights-Based Approaches to Social protection

Recognizing citizens as right holders and states as duty bearers are central elements of right-based approaches to social protection (Brunori and O’Reilly 2010; Piron 2004). Hence, from the perspective of a rights-based approach, social protection is considered “a right and entitlement, and not just a matter of charity” (Piron 2004: 3). But while a “right-not-charity” consideration is the main feature of rights-based approaches to social protection (Standing 2014), the “development of social rights such as equality, inclusion and non-discrimination” influences the contributions to, and arguments for, rights-based approaches (Brunori and O’Reilly 2010: 3). Essentially, although perspectives on rights-based approaches to social protection are dominated by legal/institutional and social contract perspectives, these perspectives tend to advance the
course of designing and implementing social protection programmes and policies on the basis of social and economic rights (Hickey 2011; van Ginneken 2011).

From a legal/institutional perspective, proponents of rights-based approaches to social protection draw on a number of international agreements, declarations and various national, regional and organizational human rights regimes (Luna Pla 2014; Seymour 2014; Piron 2004). These include but are not limited to the United Nations’ Universal Declaration of Human Rights of 1948, International Labour Organization’s Social Security Minimum Standards of 1952, and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) of 1966 (Midgley 2013). Notably, within the broader context of development, these international covenants and agreements also continue to inspire calls for rights-based approaches to development in the global south (Munro 2008; De Kadt 1980). More so, arguments within the realms of the basic needs approach to development during the 1970s and 1980s were mostly influenced by reference to the imperative of meeting the basic needs of people from a human rights perspective (Stewart 1989; Streeten 1980). But in recent years, and with special reference to social protection, organizations like the ILO and other UN agencies have extended the application of rights-based approaches specifically to social protection.

As explained by the UN Special Rapporteur on Human rights and Extreme Poverty, Magdelena Sepulveda, “When designing, implementing monitoring and evaluating social protection programmes States must ensure compliance of general human rights principles such as (a) equality and non-discrimination; (b) participation, and (c) transparency and access to information and (d) accountability” (Sepulveda 2011: 2). According to Sepulveda (2011), equality and non-discrimination refer to the duty of states to ensure that citizens are protected against risks and vulnerabilities, and that attention is paid to providing access to social protection
instruments for the most disadvantaged groups in society. The principle of equality and non-discrimination also involves ensuring that the design and implementation of social protection programmes are gender-sensitive and respect people’s cultural values. On the principle of participation, Sepulveda (2011) maintains that states must ensure citizens effectively participate in the design and implementation of social protection programmes using rights-based approaches that go beyond reference to issues of ownership and sustainability. On the principles of transparency and accountability, states must ensure access to information and provide complaint mechanisms and remedies for ensuring people have access to their entitlements.

Furthermore, following its designation as the UN lead agency charged with developing a UN-wide perspective on social protection, the ILO developed what is now referred to as the Social Protection Floor (SPF) initiative as a way of fostering the achievement of minimum social security standards in its member states (Boychuk 2014). According to the ILO, the SPF “may be seen in the broad perspective of a drive to realise key human rights, reflecting principles of social justice and providing an institutional framework for embedding fair development” (ILO 2011: 33). During its General Conference in Geneva in June 2012, the ILO adopted a “Recommendation concerning the National Floors of Social Protection” (Recommendation 202) mandating member states to progressively provide minimum guarantees of social protection for all citizens in need at the national level. Recommendation 202 specifically requires that member states work towards providing basic income security for children, the aged, unemployed, the disable, the sick and women in need of assistance. However, Recommendation 202 allows states to determine their minimum standard at the national level and how they intend to achieve these standards based on their own capabilities (Deacon 2014).
From a social contract perspective, arguments in support of rights-based approaches to social protection mainly entail the pursuit of social justice and promotion of social citizenship (Chopra 2011; Devereux et al. 2011; Hickey 2011, 2009, 2008; Devereux and Sabates-Wheeler 2004). As Hickey (2011) argues, from a social contract perspective, a rights-based approach to social protection involves moving towards more guaranteed rights to social protection, that is, away from the residual safety nets approach typified by social risks management and minimalist market-based instruments for addressing vulnerabilities and risks. This, he argues, should be part of the social contract between states and their citizens to reflect social citizenship and justice. In other words, the social contract perspective seeks to move away from the logic of the free market as espoused by neoliberal ideologues to more contractual perspectives that support social protection as social rights. Citing the examples of some developed countries, Hickey (2011: 430) notes that “the most significant advances in social protection occurred from 1870 onwards in countries such as Germany, Australia, New Zealand and Britain, reaching a high point in the welfare states of postwar Europe, thus placing the social rights of citizenship at the heart of the social contract.”

Furthermore, social contract and social justice arguments that form part of rights-based arguments recognize the importance of state obligations towards their citizens, especially the most vulnerable in need of help like women. As such, social protection is considered a “tool for justice” (Economic and Social commission for Western Asia - ESCWA 2015). According to ESCWA (2015: 3),

Social protection and social justice share a common denominator: rights….Social protection is an indispensable ingredient of the social contract in which State parties are legally bound to respect, protect and fulfill their obligations by ensuring the provision of basic subsistence, essential primary health care, basic shelter or housing and basic education. State parties also have the specific
obligation to protect vulnerable groups and to use available resources to realize the right to social protection of all members of society.

Although rights-based approaches to social protection are increasingly gaining ground, some critics and observers maintain that they still face a number of challenges with respect to their operationalization and implementation. For instance, despite acknowledging the contributions of rights-based approaches to social protection in recent years, Ulriksen and Plagerson (2014) maintain that the distinction between states as duty bearers and citizens as right holders are quite simplistic and fail to recognize the role that citizens also play as duty bearers in many developing countries. In their opinion, even though the poor require social protection, they are not unproductive agents within states who are without the ability to perform certain functions (Ulriksen and Plagerson 2014: 756). Ulriksen and Plagerson (2014) argue that poor citizens are productive agents who are law abiding and contribute to fostering harmonious relationships in their communities. Hence, framing states as sole duty bearers does not recognize the immense duties that poor citizens also perform in the everyday governance of society. In other words, rights-based approaches often fail to recognize rights and duties as “generalised exchanges” between citizens and states in a way that advances solidarity between all citizens, both rich and poor, and the state (Ulriksen and Plagerson 2014: 759).

Similarly, while the ILO and other UN agencies are quite active in advancing the course of rights-based approaches to social protection, scholars like Mestrum (2014) and Lamarche (2014) argue that recent developments such as the adoption of Recommendation 202 have only highlighted some of the contradictions within the rights-based approaches. As Mestrum (2014) observes, although Recommendation 202 allows states to determine what the “minimum standard” of social security should be for them at the national level, the lack of clarity on what an acceptable minimum should be for comparative purposes makes it difficult to pin down, and to
situate the calls for minimum standards. More so, even though both the ICESCR and Recommendation 202 may broadly be interpreted to achieve the minimum standards, challenges in their implementation arise with respect to what the required standard for living a “life in dignity” should be, particularly in the case of the ICESCR. From a women’s rights perspective, Lamarche (2014) argues that despite its contributions to the rights-based approach to social protection, Recommendation 202 fails to clearly and distinctively articulate a clear definition of women’s rights besides adding them up with those of other vulnerable groups. For this reason, Lamarche (2014) maintains that the Recommendation does not fully acknowledge the burden that the global economy places on women as caregivers, and mainly reinforces the position of the poor as managers of risks within poor households.

When combined, to some extent, criticisms of rights-based approaches echo Amartya Sen’s views that “despite the tremendous appeal of the idea of human rights, it is also seen by many as being intellectually frail – lacking in foundation and perhaps in coherence and cogency” (Sen 2005: 151). Nevertheless, rights-based approaches continue to provide useful insights and foundations for social protection programmes through the legal/institutional and social contract perspectives. Indeed, the growing application of rights-based approaches to social protection, not least as part of arguments in support of universal as opposed to limited targeting of social protection for all, confirms this point. But the limited targeting versus universal coverage debate goes beyond risks and rights-based discourses. The debate on the use of targeting methods and mechanisms such as means-testing and community-based targeting method in the

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16While advocates of risks-based approaches tend to support limited coverage for those considered to be in desperate and absolute need of assistance, the discrimination that such limited access provide is considered a violation of social rights by proponents of rights-based approaches. At the same time, the growing numbers of social protection programmes that combine elements of risks and rights-based approaches illustrate the non-exclusive nature of both risk and rights-based approaches to social protection (Piron 2004).
selection of beneficiaries is one of the major debates in the social protection literature. Considering its relevance to this dissertation, this debate warrants a brief review of the major issues surrounding community-based targeting mechanisms in particular.

### 4.2. Targeting in Social Protection

In a broad sense, “targeting” refers to aiming at an object. However, in social protection parlance specifically, and poverty reduction/eradication generally, targeting refers mainly to the act of choosing beneficiaries of social or poverty reduction programmes who are considered to be the most in need of assistance as opposed to providing coverage for everyone. Yet, given the multidimensional nature of poverty in many countries, and claims of inadequate resources to provide coverage for everyone in need of assistance, how to effectively target the poor can be quite difficult and contentious. Moreover, the turn towards neoliberal economic policies, and the mantra of reducing social spending by governments in many developing countries in the past three decades, has encouraged the move away from universal social provisioning towards limited coverage and targeting for the poor (Mkandawire 2005).

Since the 1980s, as governments and donors seek to maximise the use of available resources to reduce poverty, the use of different targeting methods to select a few beneficiaries for social programmes has become quite common. As Coady et al. (2004) explain, targeting can be beneficial in seeking to achieve a maximum reduction in poverty, and to increase access to social welfare using limited available resources. More so, it is argued that targeting can also help to address the opportunity cost involved in the “trade-off between the number of beneficiaries covered by the intervention and the level of transfers” offered to those chosen (Coady et al. 2004). Sen (1995: 11) notes that the arguments in support of targeting often revolve around the need to maintain “cost effectiveness,” and the main theoretical argument in favour of targeting
purports that the “more accurate a subsidy in fact is in reaching the poor, the less the wastage, and the less it costs to achieve the desired objective.” But Sen (1995) maintains a major drawback of programmes that use “targeting” as a method of selection for beneficiaries is that they often frame poor people as “patients” and not “agents.” He argues that this framing often undermines the effectiveness of the programmes and the targeting methods used to select beneficiaries.

Yet, targeting is now a major part of social protection provisioning across the developing world. The most commonly used targeting methods are (i) individual/household assessment, (ii) categorical targeting, and (iii) self-targeting (Coady et al. 2004). Individual/household targeting can be done using means-testing, proxy-means testing, and community-based targeting. Means-testing occurs when a trained official assesses an individual’s or household’s eligibility for a programme based on their income or assets after collecting such information from the individual or household (Coady et al. 2004). Proxy means testing involves assessing individuals or households assets or incomes against a baseline or threshold following observations of specific characteristics. Community-based targeting involves the use of recognizable authorities or community group members to select beneficiaries of social protection programmes. The second major targeting method, categorical targeting, can be done through two major approaches; geographic and/or demographic targeting. In the former, the location where beneficiaries reside is used to determine their eligibility, and in the latter, belonging to a demographic group based on age, gender, marital or health status is used to determine eligibility. The final major targeting method is self-targeting, whereby individuals self-identify by enlisting in a programme designed to attract more poor than non-poor people (Coady et al. 2004).
Although all the aforementioned targeting methods can be used interchangeably or in combination with one another, community-based targeting is arguably the only one that doubles as both a method for selecting beneficiaries, and also as a mechanism for governing social protection programmes. As explained in chapter two, Conning and Kevane (2002) define community-based targeting mechanisms as situations where community members are contracted by the state to perform functions such as selecting beneficiaries, and monitoring and evaluating the programmes. In contrast to simply being a method, in which case community-based targeting simply refers to selecting beneficiaries based on established eligibility criteria as Coady et al. (2004) define it above, community-based targeting mechanism involves community agents in the implementation of programmes beyond the selection process. Hence, when used as a mechanism, a CBT mechanism entails governing programmes through community participation, with agents such as community members, CSOs and/or NGOs working together with state actors and institutions in the implementation of social protection programmes. But to achieve transparency and accountability, it is argued that CBTMs should have participatory mechanisms that are designed based on hybrid systems, which allow both state and non-state actors and institutions to provide checks and balances (Yusuf 2010; Conning and Kevane 2002).

Essentially, the main theoretical arguments in support of CBT mechanisms revolve around the use of community members’ local knowledge of poverty to identify eligible beneficiaries within the community. In other words, proponents of CBTMs argue that community members possess the required knowledge and understanding about those that require urgent social assistance amongst them, and that community members have more accurate and up to date information on individuals and households in need. Moreover, CBTMs are considered to be very relevant in places where other targeting methods will be administratively costly, and
where the availability of registers containing vital information on poor citizens is either inaccurate or non-existent. Put differently, it is argued that given the problem of inadequate information that state officials may confront in their bid to use means-testing or proxy-means testing methods, programmes can be implemented at lower costs when CBTMs are used (Garcia and Moore 2012; Conning and Kevane 2002; Sen 1995).

Furthermore, on transparency and accountability, Yusuf (2010: 31) explains that, “Transparency in targeted programs is primarily required at three steps: (i) while apprising communities of the program and benefits; (ii) when ensuring that those in charge of selection understand the identification criteria; and (iii) during disbursement of benefits.” Hence, proponents of CBTMs maintain that the involvement of community agents will not only ensure transparency, but also help to reduce corruption, fraud, and errors. It is crucial to emphasize the importance of reducing corruption, errors and fraud in social protection programmes because these sometimes pose serious problems to the achievement of programme objectives (van Stolk and Tesluic 2010). While fraud involves beneficiaries or individuals intentionally providing false information to officials in order to be selected, corruption in social protection mainly involves officials and agents manipulating the procedures for private gain (van Stolk and Tesluic 2010: 3). Errors involve both those of inclusion and exclusion. In the case of the former, ineligible beneficiaries are unintentional included, and those who are eligible are unintentionally excluded in the latter. Consequently, it is argued that since community members and agents are responsible for taking actions and decisions relating to different aspects of social protection programmes, the level of transparency will be improved. At the same time, proponents maintain that because of the supposedly high levels of trust, albeit social capital, that exists within communities, various members and agents are answerable and accountable to one another.
The debates about how CBTMs improve or impede transparency and accountability remain in the literature, not least given the inconclusive evidence, and sometimes mixed results, from studies on the use of CBTMs as participatory governance mechanisms. In light of the various social, political, economic and administrative factors that can influence the outcome of CBTMs, some critics argue that CBTM, like other community participation mechanisms, are not able to effectively prevent corruption and other vices owing to amongst other things, the power imbalance between the poor and rich, and women and men in many communities in developing countries. For instance, Platteau and Abraham (2002: 104) argue that, “in the presence of endogenous community imperfections,” that is, imperfections that arise from unequal access to power and resources in many communities, the tendency for local elites to capture and appropriate resources to themselves makes it difficult for the poor to get what they truly deserve without any strings attached. In other words, the possibility of patron-clientelism taking further roots is a likely outcome of this process. For Wood (2003), the power imbalance between local elites, especially those who operate like patrons and the poor who are their clients, can be likened to what obtains in “Faustian bargain” scenarios in many communities in developing countries.

In addition, as government officials and donors seek to cut administrative costs without providing commensurate rewards for community members for their participation, CBT mechanisms have also been criticized for what some consider the burdens they bring to communities (Himmelstine 2012). This, some maintain, can encourage corruption as agents simply return to extort gains from beneficiaries after they are selected. More so, the time used by agents in performing duties can sometimes be a burden on the communities themselves, especially if those agents are either individually or collectively involved in the daily governance of the community outside the context of being “volunteers” for the implementation of social
programmes. However, while noting some limitations in the use of CBTMs, some studies of CBTMs have found evidence in support of their ability to improve transparency and accountability. For instance, in a control experimental study of community-based targeting preferences in social cash transfers in some selected rural communities in Zambia, Schuring (2014) found that while individuals tend to select beneficiaries based on the stated eligibility criteria, some individuals acted selfishly when they were left to select beneficiaries on their own. But Schuring (2014) argues that the selection processes mostly led to progressive outcomes in transparency and accountability amongst community members. For Schuring this finding raises questions about whether or not the capture of benefits by elites that critics often cite as argument against CBTMs should be considered accurate. The need for greater access to information and trust are nevertheless noted as important for improving transparency and accountability.

Similarly, in a social mapping study of the distribution of agricultural input in Malawi, Chinsinga (2005) found that despite modifying the eligibility criteria based on local perceptions of poverty rather than the criteria provided by state officials, and with the exception of some misallocation and reported fraudulent activities, the community members were quite transparent in the allocation of the inputs. Thus, Chinsinga (2005) argues that the use of CBTMs in selecting beneficiaries allowed some community leaders to decide who should benefit from the distribution, while also aiming at the most optimal outcome for everyone in need. For Chinsinga (2005), local perceptions of poverty should be incorporated into the eligibility criteria in order to improve the level of understanding between state and non-state officials and to achieve more strategic outcomes in the distribution of inputs to the poor. Handa et al. (2012) reached similar conclusions in their study of CBTMs and social cash transfers in Kenya, Malawi and Mozambique, where decisions on eligibility criteria were set by central and local officials.
without adequate consideration for local perceptions of poverty. The imperative of having better flow of information between state and non-state actors is also highlighted by Gilligan et al.’s (2005) assessment of the effectiveness of CBTMs in selecting beneficiaries of emergency food aid in Bangladesh, Ethiopia, and Malawi. As Gilligan et al. (2005) observe, although a better flow of information between officials and community members has the potential of improving the level of consistency and effectiveness in the selection of beneficiaries, in the three countries studied, it was noticeable that a high percentage of households did not clearly understand the criteria for allocating the food aid.

Nevertheless, although the studies by Schuring (2005), Chinsinga (2005), and Gilligan et al. (2005) show that there is a need for better understanding of eligibility criteria to ensure that programme benefits are not diverted or erroneous distributed, these studies did not adequately address the question of how information can be made available to all community members in understandable and accessible formats. Moreover, given the potential of having leakages and errors within CBTMs, there is a need to have clearly outlined eligibility criteria for transparency and accountability. Indeed, using a randomized control trial to determine the effectiveness of CBTMs and census based methods in targeting vulnerable children for a cash transfer programme in Zimbabwe, Robertson et al. (2014) found that neither the involvement of communities nor the use of the census was helpful in selecting a large proportion of vulnerable children. This is partly due to exclusion errors and the improper training and lack of clarity on the eligible criteria that community members were given by the officials. But like in many studies, community members expressed satisfaction with the selection process because of the participatory nature of the exercise (Robertson et al. 2014).
As such, even though Robertson et al. (2014: 335) note that it is important to involve community members “in targeting cash transfer programs in order to capitalize on existing local resources, enhance ownership of the program, improve transparency and perceptions of fairness, and reduce potential for jealousy and conflict,” they conclude that much work still needs to be done to improve the capacity of community members to effectively participate in the selection of beneficiaries in social protection programmes. Likewise, in a randomized evaluation comparing community based targeting, proxy-means test, and a combination of the two methods for selecting beneficiaries of cash transfers in Indonesia, Walsh (2013: 1) notes that “Community-based methods of selecting who qualifies for a cash transfer program were less accurate than means test overall, but they greatly improved local satisfaction and better matched the poor’s own concept of poverty.” Walsh (2013) also noted that elites did not capture the program benefits within the communities.

However, in a study that use a Principal Component Analysis (PCA) to ascertain the relative wealth levels of households based on their assets and housing construction variables, Steinhardt and Peter (2010) examined community involvement in the selection of beneficiaries for the waiver card scheme in Afghanistan and found that despite some progressive outcomes, which demonstrate that community based approaches can work in fragile contexts, significant leakages were recorded alongside high levels of under-coverage. This was because the community leaders and hospital staff who were responsible for selecting the eligible households were not transparent in targeting the eligible beneficiaries, and this was detrimental to the interest of the eligible poor. Consequently, 42 percent of beneficiaries were chosen from the wealthiest three quintiles and only 19 percent were chosen from the poorest quintile (Steinhardt and Peter 2010).
Notably, in their action research on user fee exemptions for the poor in health centres in rural communities in Burkina Faso, Ridde et al. (2010a, 2010b) found that even though the coverage level was low amongst eligible beneficiaries because of inadequate funds, there were fewer inclusion errors in the selection done by village community members. This was mainly because the lists of eligible beneficiaries produced by village committees set up for the study showed that the villagers were able to accurately identify the poorest amongst them. More so, despite their subjection to further vetting and validation by management committees at district health centres, those that were eventually selected were found to be the poorest within the villages (Ridde et al. 2010a). In addition, and from a gender perspective, given an important requirement in the design of the CBTMs for the implementation of the user fee exemption programme in Burkina Faso was the inclusion of women in the selection process, Ridde et al. (2010b) note that the inclusion of women in the village selection committees helped to ensure that there was an equitable representation of women amongst the selected beneficiaries as well. This finding supports the arguments of proponents who maintain that the inclusion of women in participatory mechanisms such as CBTMs can sometimes produce equitable outcomes for women in poor communities, not least because women tend to be amongst the most vulnerable and poor. Yet, how to better protect the interests of women and the poor in social protection programmes remain debatable, even though it is sometimes argued that the use of grievance mechanisms, and the presence of non-state actors such as CSOs and NGOs, can be helpful. This is because the marginalization of women and the poor can occur, even in places where the establishment of CBTMs requires that women should be equitably represented in decision-making bodies.
For instance, as Young and Maxwell (2013) found in their study of the World Food Programme’s (WFP) food aid distribution through CBTMs like the Food Relief Committees (FRCs) for Internally Displaced Peoples’ (IDP) camps in Darfur, Sudan, gender equity was not achieved, even though the guidelines for setting up the FRCs required that women should be involved in the FRCs. Although Young and Maxwell (2013) maintain that the exclusion of women may be due to the low literacy levels of women in Darfur, they note that most of the beneficiaries of the food aid were also women, a fact that makes it more imperative to include them in the FRCs. Young and Maxwell (2013) observed that the CBTM framework which the FRCs were a part of had a weak grievance or complaint mechanism through which beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries could make their complaint (Young and Maxwell 2013: 570). However, as Young and Maxwell (2013) explain, the grievance mechanisms were not well developed. In their words,

There were no well-developed complaints mechanisms linked to the FRC in Darfur. Undoubtedly there is an issue with having a complaints mechanism that is organized by the same body that is responsible for distribution. Beneficiaries did not always have a means of verifying their ration entitlement in a particular distribution. They had no way of knowing if reduced rations were because the FRC had received less from the cooperating partner or because of the diversion of the food. People often claimed not to be aware of their entitlement. Without a means of knowing or verifying, there is little point in complaining (Young and Maxwell 2013: 571).

Consequently, the absence of a strong grievance mechanism created an avenue for local leaders who are not part of the FRC to fill the vacuum of addressing complaints from beneficiaries, and issues that are not resolved are then referred to the local NGO representative of the WFP (Young and Maxwell 2013). Indeed, on the importance of grievance mechanisms in social protection programmes, Barca (2013: 1) argues that,
A grievance mechanism [GM] is a system that allows citizens to provide feedback to implementers of a given service and allows implementers to respond. There are several important benefits to setting up strong GMs for social protection programmes, such as: increasing overall programme accountability and citizens’ trust and involvement; continuously solving operational issues (complementary to monitoring and evaluation) and reducing cost of addressing them; holding implementing authorities accountable at all levels of implementation to curb corruption; and standardizing programme implementation and performance.

Depending on the local context, design, and objectives of social protection programmes, grievance mechanisms can be established through the use of complaint boxes, social workers, call centres, and mobile units, amongst others (Barca 2013). However, for grievance mechanisms to work, some proponents of participatory mechanisms argue that access to information is necessary to facilitate the actions of citizens as well as the response by the state (Joshi 2014; Jayal 2008). For Joshi (2014), consideration for specific macro and micro contextual factors such as the political and economic environments as well as the nature of the interaction between the state and citizens, both historically and in the present times, should be taken into consideration in the design and implementation of participatory mechanisms. Joshi (2014: 31) argues that such mechanisms should be established to ensure that “causal chains” that allow citizens to demand state action based on the available information should be established in order to promote transparency and accountability between states and citizens. In other words, there should be a causal relationship between information, citizen action, and state response. Demands for access to information can be facilitated through instruments like the various Freedom of Information Acts that some developing countries have enacted in recent years (Joshi 2014; Jayal 2008). But whether such access to information and the causal chains that may emerge can improve transparency and accountability remains debatable in light of the different factors and actors that can influence the outcomes of participatory mechanisms at the local level.
Furthermore, although the presence of CSOs and NGOs can sometimes help to protect the interest of the poor, their presence is not a guarantee that corruption, errors and fraud may not occur in social protection programmes. For instance, in a study of the mandatory social audits in India’s Mahatma Gandhi National Rural Employment Guarantee Act (MGNREGA), Vij (2011) notes that while the social audits produced mixed results across India, the participation of CSOs and NGOs in some states improved the outcomes of the social audits in places where the CSOs and NGOs were active. Social audits refer to processes that allow community members and other non-state actors like NGOs and CSOs to participate in the monitoring and evaluation of projects from time to time, while also holding programme officials accountable for their actions or inactions. In the case of the MGNREGA, for the social audits to take place, programme officials and village heads are expected to organize special meetings every six months with village assemblies, workers, villagers, and government officials. Some states also engage CSOs and NGOs in their social audits. Thus, the social audits function as an avenue for workers and the public to monitor and hold the government officials and agencies responsible for the programme accountable for their actions. Although Vij (2011) notes that the social audits allowed for public participation and created awareness for many people about the programme, the social audits suffered severe setbacks in places where the exercise was hijacked by local officials and village leaders.

In addition, Vij (2011) maintains that despite having a large representation of women and the poor as workers, the voices and opinions of these groups of vulnerable and often poor women

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17The MGNREGA is an employment guarantee scheme that provides a hundred days of guaranteed employment every year to adult members of poor communities and rural areas in India if they volunteer to work on any identified projects in their area. While the government provides the funds, the implementation of projects is monitored and evaluated by different committees at the central, state and village levels. But in order to facilitate public participation, and promote transparency and accountability in the implementation process, a mandatory social audit exercise is included in the design of the programme (Vij 2011).
and workers remained marginalized in the social audits. As Vij (2011) argues, even though the social audits represent a step in the right direction in ensuring accountability and transparency, a major weakness in the social audits is that some of the officials and village heads exercised considerable powers in deciding the outcomes of the social audits, especially in states where CSOs and NGOs are either not active or completely absent. In particular, Vij (2011) notes that in Uttar Pradesh, the problem of elite capture by officials and local heads was common and made it possible for the elites to easily control the flow of information on the programme to the workers. But in Andra Pradesh and parts of Rajasthan where CSOs and NGOs were active, the social audits were more successful, and the poor and vulnerable were able to hold officials and local heads accountable, while also helping the poor to claim their entitlements (Vij 2011). Thus, Vij (2011) concludes that social audits can be strengthened if CSOs and government bureaucracies can work together for the course of social justice, transparency and accountability.

Nonetheless, what Vij’s (2011) study highlights is the need to not only have social accountability mechanisms such as social audits, but also to ensure that participatory mechanisms involve non-state actors such as CSOs and NGOs. While social audits and the involvement of CSOs and NGOs may or may not improve accountability and transparency, it is important that the marginalized have access to grievance mechanisms, which they can use to hold state officials and other non-state officials accountable. As Jayal (2008: 106) recognizes, the demands of accountability requires that other stakeholders such as civil society should also be held accountable for their actions. According to Jayal (2008: 106), “Despite the self-righteousness in the watchdog role that it has assumed in holding the state to account, how accountable is civil society itself? If NGOs do their funder’s bidding, and their accountability is to the funding agencies alone, can they really be described as ‘civil society’?” Hence, to help
different actors and institutions hold each other accountable for their actions and inactions, there is a need for strong systems of accountability in the design of CBTMs. But such systems of accountability depend on the contexts in which CBTMs operate. In this vein, proponents of CBTMs have highlighted the need to consider the specific social, political, and economic context in which community participation takes place by focusing on the nature of interactions between different actors and institutions (Young and Maxwell 2013; Maxwell et al. 2011; Marchione 2005). Yet, within the emerging literature on CBTMs as governance mechanisms, numerous gaps exist in studies that focus on these interactions, albeit with specific reference to how CBTMs impede or improve accountability in the implementation of social protection programmes.

Consequently, while some of the studies above have examined various aspects of CBTMs in the implementation of social protection programmes, many of the studies only focused on specific aspects such as the use of CBT methods, the role of local elites, and the imperative of having mechanisms to ensure accountability and transparency. But as the debates rage over the benefits and costs of using CBTMs, CBTMs continue to be deployed in various social protection programmes like fee waivers for public service, food subsidies, and cash transfers amongst others. However, the evidence base remains inconclusive with regard to how CBTMs mechanisms improve or impede the governance of social protection programmes in developing countries. Tellingly, while studies of CBTMs have focused on different social protection programmes in different countries, their use in the implementation of conditional cash transfers in Africa, where they are increasing becoming popular, has remained understudied. As such, this dissertation not only attempts to fill some of the knowledge gaps in the use of the CBTMs in social protection, but also focuses on CCTs as popular social protection programmes across the
globe. To this end, the following section examines social protection in Africa, and provides a brief overview of how CCTs have proliferated on the continent using CBTM. The section helps to contextualize this study’s focus on the Nigerian experience with CBTMs and CCTs.

4.3. Social Protection in Africa

Despite recording increased economic growth rates in the past decade and a half, many African countries remain trapped in the vicious cycle of poverty. This has produced calls for the introduction of new, and the expansion of old, social protection programmes to ameliorate the conditions of the poor on the continent. The different efforts to create new, and expand old, social protection programmes across the continent have led to the proliferation of various social protection programmes on the continent (Handa 2011; Ellis et al. 2009). Hence, as a result, two models of social protection currently predominant across the sub-Saharan African (SSA) region in particular. The first model is mainly “age-based” programmes that are more visible across the middle-income countries in Southern Africa, while the other model, known as the “poverty based” model, is prevalent in other parts of Eastern, Central, and Western Africa (Nino-Zarazua et al. 2012).

The age-based model of social protection programmes mainly includes child benefits and social pensions for the elderly, and these tend to last longer. This is unlike the short-term poverty-based programmes common in Western, Eastern, and Central Africa that tend to be shorter in duration and more limited in their coverage. They include short-term cash transfers or public works intended to mitigate the effects of poverty in poor households on vulnerable groups such as women, children and unemployed youths. The age-based programmes in Southern Africa

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18These calls include, but are not limited to, the Ouagadougou Declaration and Plan of Action (2004), the Livingstone and Yaounde Calls for Action (2006), the African Union Social Policy Framework for Africa (2008) and the Social Ministers' Khartoum Declaration on Social Policy Action Towards Social Inclusion (2010) (Devereux and Getu 2013).
are designed to address vulnerabilities on a long-term basis for children and the elderly in countries such Namibia, Botswana, and South Africa, where universal coverage also exists (Leisering 2009; Nino-Zarazua et al. 2012). Moreover, beyond what obtained during apartheid when only the white minority had access to social protection programmes like pensions, social protection has been extended to many blacks in the case of South Africa since the end of apartheid (Devereux 2011).

Notably, Nino-Zarazua et al. (2012) observe that the influence of donors is very visible across the African continent’s social protection landscape, and that the social protection programmes are mostly donor driven and technically focused in many sub-Saharan African countries. Along this line, Chitonge (2012: 332) observes that “In many SSA countries, social protection policy has mainly been pushed on the agenda by the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) through the Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSPs) and the Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility (PRGF) respectively, which require the participating states to incorporate social protection in PRSPs and PRG.” Essentially, without adequate local involvement to ensure continuity of the programmes the concern over the dominance of Africa’s social protection landscape by donors relates to issues and concerns over financial sustainability and ownership of the programmes at the national and local levels. With respect to ownership, the technocratic and apolitical approaches of some of the donors threaten the ability of state and non-state actors and institutions to incorporate the programmes into their national policies in ways that prioritize their needs. Even as moving beyond the technocratic focus of most programmes is challenging, the technocratic focus often neglects the imperative of “getting the politics right” (Nino-Zarazua et al. 2012). Other authors have equally drawn attention to the absence of political
engagements in social protection within the sub-Saharan African context (Devereux and White 2011; Hickey and Bracking 2005).

As for financial sustainability, considering that these programmes are often tied to the ebbs and flows of foreign aid, concerns about how to fund the social protection programmes that are initiated using foreign aid remain in many countries. More so, the residual focus of limited targeting of beneficiaries is considered detrimental to the overall development and poverty reduction efforts of many African countries (Adesina 2011). This has further created debates about which of the two models of social protection should be pursued by African countries (Adesina 2011; Mkandawire 2005), and whether or not African countries have both the administrative and financial capacity to effectively implement social protection programmes like cash transfers (Pellerano and Barca 2014; Hodges et al. 2013; Holmes et al. 2012a, 2012b). At the same time, given the influence of the World Bank in many African countries, the debate over how the SRM overpowers other alternative approaches in influencing the design and implementation of social programmes has also raised concerns over issues of ownership. Tellingly, the influence of donors in Africa’s social protection landscape is reflected in the adoption, design and implementation of CCTs in many African countries during the past decade. This arguably represents one of the most vivid examples of how the World Bank in particular influences social protection on the African continent through its SRM approach as highlighted in the next section.

While the evidence base in support of the positive contributions of social protection programmes to poverty reduction in Africa remain inconclusive, some scholars maintain that the presence of social protection in countries like South Africa has certainly prevented the poverty situation in that country from being worse than it currently is (Woolard et al. 2011). Likewise, within African countries in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region, where the event now known popularly as the “Arab Spring” has forced various governments to institute different social protection programmes for the poor, Karshenas et al. (2014) observe that greater attention is now being paid to social protection issues. In fact, as Karshenas et al. (2014: 726) note, the popular socio-economic and political grievances in the MENA region seems to be driving a shift from hitherto authoritarian corporatist social welfare regimes to more democratic and developmental ones as the example of Tunisia illustrates.
4.4. Conditional Cash Transfer Programmes: Between Latin America and Africa

In general, amongst different social protection programmes across the world, the global diffusion of Conditional Cash Transfers (CCT) modeled after Brazil’s *Bolsa Familia* and Mexico’s *Oportunidades* programmes stand out. This is due mainly to the presence of CCTs in many developing countries following their proliferation across the globe within the past two decades. Spurred mainly by the involvement of the international development agencies like the World Bank, CCTs have increased from a single national programme in Mexico in 1997 to more than 100 programmes across the world. Owing to the widely acclaimed successes of CCTs in Mexico and Brazil, many scholars, observers, policy makers, governments, donors (private and public), nongovernmental and intergovernmental organizations in the international development community now advocate for the adoption of CCT programmes in other developing countries. In the words of Nancy Birdsall, founding President of the Centre for Global Development, CCTs “are as close as you can come to a magic bullet in development. They [a]re creating an incentive for families to invest in their own children's futures. Every decade or so, we see something that can really make a difference, and this is one of those things.”20

CCTs are social protection programmes that are often used as instruments to “transfer cash, generally to poor households, on the conditions that those households make prespecified investments in the human capital of their children” (Fiszbien and Schady 2009: 1). In other words, CCTs can be used to “pay recipients in exchange for an action that brings private behaviour closer to the social optimum” (de Janvry and Sadoulet 2004: 75). Hence, as programmes targeted at poor individuals, households and communities, CCTs function as social assistance instruments designed to achieve short-term poverty reduction and long-term human capital development (Kakwani et al. 2006; Chapman 2006).

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The arguments in support of CCTs relate to the increased school enrolments and improved access to health services and nutrition that they can enhance for members of poor households and communities.\textsuperscript{21} In most CCTs, conditions require that the participating or benefiting households should send, and ensure that, their children attain at least 80 to 85 percent school attendance rates during the academic year. In addition, beneficiary households are sometimes expected to receive necessary immunisation against diseases and/or receive nutrition supplements in some cases. The duration of participation and the possibility of benefiting from other social programmes occasionally exist within CCTs in some countries, but this is largely influenced by several factors like the availability of funds and the specific objectives of individual CCT programmes. The influence of international development agencies also matters in determining how CCTs are initiated, designed and implemented. Although there are lots of variations across countries and regions of the world, CCTs are often designed with the objectives of reducing vulnerabilities and breaking the cycle of intergenerational transmission of poverty in poor households and communities through human capital development.

To be sure, the World Bank has embraced CCTs as major instruments for managing social risks associated with human capital development. Hence, as part of the social protection strategies, the World Bank’s PRSPs in many countries now contain CCTs, which are based on the SRM approach. While some advocates of rights-based approaches to social protection argue that the use of “conditionalities” in CCTs is antithetical to the idea of social protection as social

\textsuperscript{21}Some scholars maintain that CCTs only “work” well with respect to improving enrolments in schools, and that the actual effects on learning are not as positive as some evaluations suggest (Lomelí 2009, 2008). Indeed, the inequalities that exist in access to public services between the rich and the poor have raised questions on the actual impact of CCTs in addressing the unequal access to quality services. To be sure, concerns over the supply side issues with respect to the quality of schools and health centres that are available to the poor means that in order for CCTs to achieve their objectives of human capital development and poverty reduction in poor households, improving the quality of educational and health services for the poor must be a top priority (Rawlings 2005). More so, in combination with the above, the debates on conditional versus unconditional cash transfers, as well as the arguments relating to targeting versus universal coverage remains unresolved (Barrientos 2007).
and economic rights (Standing 2014; Freeland 2007), some others maintain that conditionalities in CCTs can be helpful, so long as countries move towards the progressive realization of universal rights, and also provide access without excluding anyone in need (Orton 2014; Sepulveda 2011). To this end, ensuring that the principles of participation, transparency and accountability in their implementation is considered crucial to assessing how CCTs contribute to promoting a life in dignity for the poor and vulnerable (Sepulveda 2009).

Nonetheless, despite having similarities with the Latin American CCTs, CCTs vary in a number of ways across countries and continents. For instance, CCTs in African countries are usually shorter in the duration of time that households can benefit from the programmes. In other words, Latin American CCTs tend to last longer and have more sustainable designs than those found in many African countries, where many of the programmes only last for less than three years (Garcia and Moore 2012). Furthermore, it is equally important to note that unlike in many Latin American countries where CCTs arose out of “redistributive compromises” amongst ideological groups on the left-right spectrum (Teichman 2008), many CCTs in Africa were introduced at the behest of the World Bank. Essentially, starting from the late 1990s, the various Debt Relief/Cancellation Initiatives of the World Bank require that African countries should justify what they would do with the savings from the debt relief or cancellations that they get from international financial institutions and other lending bodies like the Paris and London Clubs. Thus, in countries where the World Bank has considerable influence in providing guidance and development finance, especially within the context of the debt relief initiatives, it is not uncommon to find that CCTs prescribed by the World Bank are some of the possible programmes for poverty reduction. To this end, many African countries such as Burkina Faso, Eritrea, Kenya, Ghana, Nigeria, Senegal, Malawi, and Tanzania have implemented or are
currently implementing CCTs with the support of the World Bank (Garcia and Moore 2012; Fiszbien and Schady 2009).  

In addition, while African CCTs tend to use CBTMs, Latin American CCTs mostly utilize means/proxy-means tested targeting methods and bureaucratic top-down governance mechanisms with limited involvement of community representatives in the implementation of the programmes. This is because Latin American CCTs are implemented by line ministries such as the Social Development Ministry (Sedesol) in Mexico and Ministry of Social Development (MDS) in Brazil (Sugiyama 2011; Britto 2008). Indeed, although some CCTs in LA provide some form of oversight for non-state actors such as civil society and the church, the programmes are mostly designed to eliminate any intermediaries such as local groups at the community level. This is done in order to prevent the programmes from being captured by local interests groups or individuals (Sanchez-Ancochea and Mattei 2011; Hevia 2008). Hence, central government ministries are in charge of selecting beneficiaries based on means or proxy means targeting methods. For instance, the selection of beneficiaries is done by government officials in both Mexico and Brazil from central registers containing the list of those considered poor. In the case of Mexico, the list of selected beneficiaries is subsequently presented to the community to inform those selected or excluded, and also to verify the names of those selected. Thus, neither the local municipalities nor communities have a final say in who gets selected in Mexico. But in Brazil, although the central officials decide who gets selected into the programme, municipalities are given the opportunity to submit and add the names of potential beneficiaries to the central register before the central ministry chooses those who will benefit (Fried 2012).

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22 However, other donors like UNICEF, UK DFID, HelpAge International and Save the Children also have different CCTs targeting various groups of vulnerable populations on the African continent.
Some critics of centralized CCTs like those of Mexico and Brazil argue that the limited or almost complete elimination of community participation in LA is a major weakness in the design of CCTs in the region. For instance, in reference to Mexico’s Oportunidades, Roberts (2012: 1) argues that the “lack of opportunities for beneficiaries to contact officials and negotiate with them is a clear Oportunidades shortcoming.” Although Mexico’s Oportunidades CCT programme is “essentially a top-down program that is planned and executed by central government,” the central implementing ministry has toll-free telephone lines, mailing and e-mail address for beneficiaries to express their views and lay their complaints about the programme (McGuire 2010: 80). Yet, based on the exclusion of the poor from participatory processes in Latin American CCTs, Hevia (2010: 1) concludes that, “…for the positive effects of CCTs to reach the poorest population in Latin American countries, there is a need to strengthen and promote channels for civic involvement and social accountability, wherein the poor are no longer considered part of the problem but rather become engaged actors who are part of the solution.” While Hevia (2008) notes that social accountability boards comprising CSOs and state officials were set up in Brazil to provide oversight over the programme, the poor have been unable to effectively participate because of the lack of local leaders and groups that are capable of engaging the other state and non-state actors to promote their interests and concerns. But some critics also argue that the problems associated with the lack of participation of the poor in the implementation of CCTs in LA is connected to the weak and equally low participation of civil society groups in providing oversight over the programmes.

Indeed, the weak participation of CSOs in Latin American programmes has been highlighted by Teichman (2008) who maintains that the deliberate exclusion of CSOs/NGOs in Chile’s Solidario CCT, and their weak participation in Mexico’s Oportunidades, has been a
drawback of these programmes. In the case of Chile, Teichman (2008) argues that despite efforts by NGOs and CSOs to engage in the implementation process on behalf of the poor, they were not invited to participate, monitor or evaluate the programme. But in addition to their exclusion, Teichman (2008) explains that the concerns raised by CSOs and NGOs about issues such as the potential social divides that the programme would create in the communities, the exclusion of some people, the fact that the programme is not based on rights, and the absence of any means or opportunities for beneficiaries to participate in the process, were dismissed by the government. Such concerns have equally been expressed in Mexico, where Teichman argues that there has been a resistance to the participation of CSOs, even though the exclusion has not been to the degree experienced in Chile. But in contrast to the Chilean and Mexican experiences with regard to the participation of CSOs, Alcazar (2010) observed that the involvement of CSOs in Peru’s Juntos CCT programme is a positive example because of their active participation alongside other non-state actors like the Church and the workers associations that provide oversight over the programme. As Alcazar (2010) explains, even though the Juntos programme continues to be challenged by problems ranging from lack of grievance mechanisms and significant design and management problems, the creation of oversight bodies like the Executive Council and the Transparency and Surveillance Council comprising state and non-state actors have helped in promoting transparency, especially at the national level.

Yet, in addition to criticisms of the weak involvement or otherwise of CSOs, and the exclusion of the poor in general, the gender implications of CCTS within the Latin American region, especially the exclusion of women from decision-making processes is a major concern for critics. With special reference to the gender implications of CCTs, some scholars have drawn attention to the need to examine how the implementation of CCTs create additional burdens for
women as (i) the principal recipient of transfers on behalf of their children, and (ii) the involvement of some women beneficiaries as representatives for sanctioning the behavior of other beneficiaries (Herzog 2011; Molyneux 2007; Luccisano 2006; Bordi 2002). On the first issue, a criticism against Latin American CCTs is the burden that many women beneficiaries bear as principal recipients of transfers who also have to ensure the fulfillment of the requirements for the programme. As Soares and Silva (2010) explain,

Most conditional cash transfers (CCT) programmes in Latin America select a woman as the primary recipient of the transfer. In most cases she is the mother of children in the household or the woman responsible for those children. The rationale behind this is that money spent on women tends to be concentrated more on goods and services that are more likely to have a positive effect on the children’s well-being.

Consequently, because the women often have to go around schools to obtain evidence that their children have attended schools, they have to spend several hours in community service and filling forms to demonstrate compliance with the conditions of the programmes. Some scholars maintain that these challenges place enormous responsibilities on women who have to bear the additional burden of fulfilling administrative responsibilities in order to remain in the programme (Molyneux 2007; Luccisano 2006, 2004). Thus, the critics argue that the responsibilities associated with fulfilling the conditions attached to CCTs reinforce the traditional role of women as caregivers. Indeed, as Luccisano (2006: 75) notes about Mexico’s Oportunidades CCT programme, “Participating as co-responsible actors in the actualization of the objectives of the program has brought additional work and responsibilities to women’s activities as mothers.” In fact, Molyneux (2007: 72) notes that the “Receipt of the transfers in effect reinforces traditional roles and responsibilities, so that women are empowered only within these structures which are ones through which disempowering gender asymmetries are reproduced.”
On the second issue, following criticisms of the large gaps in communication between centralized ministries and beneficiaries when CCTs were launched, some CCTs like Oportunidades currently allow beneficiaries to elect some women within the communities who are also beneficiaries to serve as intermediaries between state officials and the beneficiaries. Alongside a municipal officer responsible for CCTs in each municipality, the elected women known as promotoras or vocales are primarily responsible for disseminating information about the programme and also monitoring compliance with the conditions amongst beneficiaries (Hevia 2008). But as Luccisano (2004: 44) explains, “The role of the community promoter was to ensure that program beneficiaries made the sanctioned choices.” Consequently, critics maintain that although the community promoters are required to monitor the activities of other beneficiaries, they have become part of an administrative system that is used to govern women in practice. As such, the promoters have assumed new responsibilities of organizing women to take part in community activities such as cleaning schools, neighbourhoods, and medical centres, even though such requirements are not part of the programme (Agudo Sanchiz 2012; Hevia 2008; Luccisano 2004), and they are still without much decision-making powers to hold state officials accountable. Moreover, for critics, the fact that the role of the women promoters now includes organizing other women for community participation and development is connected to the subservient position that the women have further assumed as other local actors such as local doctors, teachers, nurses, amongst others, interpret the rules of the programme beyond what is required. As Agudo Sanchiz (2012: 1) puts it, the women promoters or vocales, like the “doctors, nurses, teachers, and other service providers, illustrate the new and changing knowledge and authority that both shape and are shaped by development interventions based on the principle of co-responsibility.”
Quite importantly, the incorporation of women in Latin American CCTs raises questions about how women should be involved in CCT programmes, especially in relation to taking up decision-making responsibilities that can lead to their empowerment for the interest of themselves and their fellow women. To be sure, advocates of “gender-sensitive” approaches to social protection maintain that women should also be seen as leaders and not simply as clients or beneficiaries in social protection programmes, and that the involvement of women should not lead to further marginalization and problems for women in the process of working towards empowering themselves and others (Holmes and Jones 2013; Asaki and Hayes 2011; Kabeer 2008). They argue that as an often marginalized group, the participation of women as leaders in social protection programmes can help to address their social exclusion from programmes that are intended to benefit women. Thus, in addressing concerns over “social exclusion,” that is, the “inadequate participation of individuals in key aspects of society” (Babajanian and Hagen-Zanker 2012: 2), it is imperative to recognize the positive roles that women can play in society, and the need for them to be included in decision-making processes. Nonetheless, it is equally important to recognize that within social protection programmes, the debate over how much empowerment women’s participation can provide still remains a source of controversy (Antonopoulos 2013; Molyneux 2007). Yet, given the need to ensure equity and equality in social protection programmes, as well as promote transparency in social protection programmes, it is necessary to allow women to be well represented in the decision-making aspect of social protection programmes. Consequently, it is important to note that the incorporation of women into CCTs has to be scrutinized to ascertain whether it places women in more subservient positions that can lead to them being further marginalized.
Hence, based on the manner in which the women promoters in Latin American CCTs are expected to perform the responsibilities of monitoring how beneficiaries fulfill the conditions of the programmes, critics maintain that the incorporation of women as leaders in Latin American places them in more subservient positions in relation to other state and non-state officials (Hevia 2008; Luccisano 2006, 2004). This has important lessons for understanding women’s participation in the implementation of CCTs. But while the experience of women in Latin American CCTs can provide important lessons for examining how women are incorporated in CCTs in other regions like Africa, it also raises questions about the kinds of additional burden that CCTs can place on women as caregivers. To be sure, although women tend to be the main recipients of CCT stipends in Africa (Garcia and Moore 2012), how well and how much burden African women have to bear as recipients of stipends, remains highly understudied. In addition, given the use of CBTMs, which sometimes allow women to participate as leaders as well, the extent to which women leaders are able to exert authority and demand accountability from other state and non-state actors are also highly understudied. Understanding how CCTs can benefit or hinder women’s empowerment in the African context thus requires additional studies to contribute to knowledge in this area. Although this dissertation does not specifically focus on these issues, it offers some important contributions on the subject matter, especially in relation to evidence about the participation of women as members of the community committees in charge of governing COPE.

Nonetheless, what the above criticisms of the Latin American programmes illustrate in general is that while CCTs in the Latin American region continue to be seen as useful interventions in education and health (Adato and Hoddinott 2010), significant problems still exist in how the programmes are governed. But more important is the imperative of creating more
transparent and accountable participatory mechanisms for governing CCTs. Indeed, as Bassett and Blanco (2011: 1) rightly observe, “Strong control and accountability mechanisms at all stages of CCT program implementation are critical to minimize and manage risks, and to ensure effective program implementation and sustainability.” Likewise, noting the susceptibility of CCTs to corruption, Alcazar (2010: 1) maintains that while politicians can use the opportunity for their own purposes, CCTs can easily be captured by local state officials when the eligibility criteria are not known or clear enough, and beneficiaries can also falsify their information in order to receive benefits. Hence, Alcazar (2010) argues that CCTs should not only be designed with clear and consistent eligibility criteria, but also with effective complaint mechanisms alongside opportunities for CSOs to participate and provide surveillance. Combined, some of these considerations have led to the creation of CBTMs as participatory governance mechanisms in managing social protection programmes like CCTs in African countries. However, how CBTMs contribute to the governance, not least transparency and accountability in the implementation of CCTs, remains highly understudied in the literature. Thus, this dissertation’s focus on the use of CBTMs in the governance of CCTs in the Nigerian context where community agents are responsible for governing the implementation of COPE alongside other state and non-state actors.

4.5. Summary of Review

As this chapter’s review of major issues in the social protection literature demonstrates, how to ensure that the poor receive the necessary benefits at the right time remains a puzzle in the academic literature. This remains the case, even as social protection programmes designed to assist poor individuals, households and communities continue to proliferate in developing countries. Moreover, while current debates in the literature on which approach, or combination
of approaches, is more appropriate for delivering social protection in many developing countries remain, the dominance of the SRM approach has so far gained influence in many countries. The rise of programmes that utilize targeting methods and mechanisms has brought to the fore the vexatious issue of targeting of social protection programmes to the neediest beneficiaries versus providing universal coverage for all in need. As the chapter notes, although the debate persists on which level of coverage contributes the most to poverty reduction and development, the limited financial resources in many developing countries has been advanced as justification for the use of targeting in social protection. But this debate is made particularly acute by the fact that in communities where most or all individuals or households can be categorised as poor according to the eligibility criteria, successfully selecting the beneficiaries requires transparent and accountable processes, which have so far proven to be quite challenging to achieve in many countries.

While the arguments in support of CBTMs have risen in view of the need to ensure that community agents such as local leaders and CSOs/NGOs are involved in the selection of beneficiaries, and monitoring and evaluation of social protection programmes, critics argue CBTMs may foster the capture of benefits from social protection programmes to the detriment of those in need. But some advocates of CBTMs maintain the involvement of such community agents can lead to improvements in transparency and accountability, even as some critics maintain it creates opportunities for rent-seeking and other forms of corruption, fraud, and errors of inclusion and exclusion. To contextualize these debates, and to show how well they help promote transparency and accountability, the chapter reviewed studies that have examined the use of CBTMs in social protection programmes. But as the review demonstrate, without analysing the interactions between various state and non-state actors and institutions, many of
such studies have mainly focused on the involvement of community members in the selection of beneficiaries. Although some studies also focused on different aspects of CBTM, and how the involvement of different state and non-state actors do or do not contribute to improving accountability and transparency, the evidence to support or refute the claims of the positive contributions or otherwise of CBTM to the governance of social protection programmes remain inconclusive. Thus, additional studies are necessary for understanding how CBTM operate, especially in the African context where they are now common for implementing programmes such as CCTs, which have spread from Latin America to the rest of the world within the past two decades.

Yet, the review also illustrates how the implementation of CCTs in Latin America through centralized bureaucratic mechanisms aimed at avoiding the participation of communities is fraught with several challenges that warrant the involvement of community agents for the purpose of improving transparency and accountability. Indeed, while Latin American CCTs continue to be cited as examples of how to use cash transfers for human capital development and poverty reduction in poor households, some critics have drawn attention to some governance failures. In particular, the non-participatory nature of Latin American CCTs have proceeded on the basis of excluding non-state actors such as the community members, beneficiaries, and civil society. At the same time, critics note that CCTs place additional burden on women as beneficiaries, given that as the primary recipients of stipends on behalf of their children, women in Latin American CCTs have the responsibility of fulfilling the conditions of the programme, which adds to, and reinforces, their already heavy responsibilities as caregivers in households. Moreover, the incorporation of some women as leaders into CCT programmes in Latin America is seen as inadequate, given that it does not really empower them to demand accountability from
other stakeholders, especially from state officials. These criticisms have important ramifications for studies of CCTs in other regions like sub-Saharan Africa where women are also involved in CCTs as leaders and beneficiaries.

In closing, what the current chapter highlights are some of the debates and gaps in the theory and practice of social protection as a paradigm in international development. Linking its contents to the previous chapters, the current chapter shows some of the gaps in the social protection literature, and highlights how they reflect the growing debates and controversies over the governance of social protection programmes in developing countries. As the subsequent chapters of this dissertation will make clear, the findings in this study contribute to filling some of the gaps in the literature on how CBTMs impede or improve transparency and accountability. But first, the next chapter outlines the research design and methodology applied in this dissertation. This is followed by two analytical chapters that discuss the findings of the study, and a concluding chapter that links the various aspects of the dissertation.
Chapter Five
Research Design and Methodology

5.0. Chapter Overview
This chapter builds on the discussions in the previous chapters. It discusses the research design and methodology of this dissertation. Specifically, the chapter outlines how this study examined the implementation of COPE through the CBTM. As discussed below, the research design and methodology adopted in this dissertation allows for rigorous engagement with the subject matter of the dissertation. Theoretically, based on the need to understand how collective action is exercised by state and non-state actors, it is crucial to collect and analyze data on the multisubjective perspectives and narratives of various actors about how they exercise authority in public affairs. In tandem with the conceptual and analytical framework of this dissertation, investigating the interplay of processes, mechanisms and institutions for the purpose of transparency and accountability requires a research design and methodological approaches that contribute to gaining useful insights into the subject matter of the dissertation: the governance of social protection through CBTMs in developing countries.

From the previous two chapters that reviewed the literature on governance and social protection, the identified debates and gaps show that in order to understand the current state of governance in Africa, it is necessary to examine the context in which governance operates on the continent. The arguments on the role of patrimonialism and neopatrimonialism are particularly poignant in this context. Likewise, the proliferation of social protection on the continent has also evolved alongside different normative approaches which underpin the social protection programmes that are currently implemented in many countries. In the case of conditional cash transfers, despite their increasing popularity across the globe, including in African countries, the importance of gaining useful insights into their increasing adoption under neoliberal influence
requires engaging with various stakeholders from the local to the international levels. More so, in light of the implementation of CCTs through CBTMs, it is imperative to examine the interplay of the implementation strategy and CCTs as social protection programmes designed to contribute to human capital development in poor households and communities through appropriate research design and methodological approaches.

To this end, this dissertation uses an in-depth case study research design and mixed methodology to examine the Nigerian experience with the CBTM in its implementation of the COPE CCT programme in Oyo state, south-west Nigeria. The chapter proceeds as follows. It begins with a discussion of the research design of this study. This is followed by explanations of the methodological approach adopted for the research. The methodological section also provides details on the techniques used in collecting data for the study as well as details of how the data was analyzed. It should be noted that while this study uses a mixed methodological approach, it is mainly a qualitative study; the quantitative data and analysis are simply used to provide univariate descriptive statistics of key relevant variables to this study. The chapter ends with a discussion of the limitations of the study, and the challenges experienced during the course of conducting the field research for this study.

5.1. Research Design
This dissertation is designed as an in-depth single-country case study of Nigeria. It examines Nigeria’s application of the CBTM in the implementation of the COPE Conditional Cash Transfer (CCT) Programme in the country since 2007. While the merits of single country case studies are numerous (Mahoney 2007; George and Bennett 2005), they are particularly relevant to understanding social phenomena when “specifically chosen for the merit in contributing to larger sets of questions in the field” (Landman 2008: 87). Considering the increasing use of
CBTMs in many developing countries, especially on the African continent (Garcia and Moore, 2012), the choice of Nigeria for this study on governance and social protection is contingent on the understanding that its experience is relevant to other developing countries using similar CBTMs. Along this line, the Nigerian experience provides relevant insights into how CBTMs operate in practice, and enables a more contextualized analysis of participatory governance mechanisms involving state and non-state actors. As Africa’s most populous country and largest economy, Nigeria’s multicultural, socioeconomic, political and ethnoreligious composition allows for understanding the dynamics of governance and social protection in a complex sociocultural and political setting. For instance, given the prevalence of corruption and negative neopatrimonialism in Nigeria, corrupt elites at all levels tend to capture programmes for their personal benefits, and the problem of neopatrimonialism in Nigeria continues to hinder the development of the country. Hence, Daloz (2005) regards Nigeria as a place where trusting your patron is more important than trusting any government institution, and as Daloz (2005: 155-156) notes, due to Nigeria’s “exceptional size, its unstable history and its extreme levels of corruption, Nigeria is a very remarkable case for those interested in socio-political relations south of the Sahara.”

The choice of Nigeria is also informed by the fact that it uses a CBTM modeled on the hybrid framework, which allows for understanding how the CBTM impedes or improves transparency and accountability in an African context. However, in order to provide a nuanced and in-depth understanding of the case of Nigeria, this study closely examines the implementation of COPE in three communities in Oyo State, Nigeria. Oyo state is one of the 12 out of 36 states in Nigeria that was selected to participate in the first phase of COPE after the programme was launched in 2007. According to NAPEP (2007a), Oyo state was selected based
on the low Human Capacity Development Index (HCDI) in the state. The “HCDI is constructed largely from indicators using girl child school enrolment ratio and adult literacy in English and measures the potential capacity for contribution to economic development in a country, state or community” (NAPEP 2007a: 3). Located in southwestern Nigeria, Oyo state is one of the six states in Nigeria’s southwest geopolitical zone. A map showing the location of Oyo state is attached as Appendix I at the end of this dissertation.

As mentioned in chapter two, Nigerian states are grouped into six geopolitical zones for administrative purposes. The zones are the southwest, south-south, southeast, northwest, northeast and north-central geopolitical zones, and two states were selected from each zone to participate in the first phase of COPE. But the choice of Oyo state for this study relates to the fact that unlike some other states selected to participate in the programme, Oyo state has avoided problems associated with disruptive violence and kidnappings that affected the implementation of the programme in some states.\(^\text{23}\) Hence, Oyo state was able to implement the first phase of COPE between 2008 and 2009 without interruptions. The peaceful climate that exists in the state also enabled this study to be conducted without any interruptions. Oyo state has thirty-three local government areas out of which ten were selected to participate in the COPE programme. Five communities were further selected from each of the ten participating local governments to make a total of fifty communities in the state. A quota of ten households per community formed the maximum possible numbers of households selected in each community for the programme.

As part of COPE’s design and implementation strategy, states are allowed to select participating local governments based on criteria determined in conjunction with NAPEP officials. Within each state, NAPEP recommends that community agents such as the local \(^\text{23}\)The Boko Haram insurgency in northern Nigeria has affected the implementation of social programmes such as COPE in many northern states and ransom induced kidnappings affected are common in some southern states.
community/village head, the leading pastor or imam, a school head and a community development committee representative or leader, should form a Community Social Assistance Committee (CSAC) for implementing the programme (NAPEP 2007a). In Oyo state, the operational guidelines and templates used by NAPEP officials and Oyo state government staff obtained during fieldwork shows that the CSACs were composed of (i) a Village Head that serves as the chairperson of the CSAC, (ii) a Church Leader/Chief Imam, (iii) a Headmaster/Headmistress, (iv) a Community Representative, (v) a Community Women’s leader and (vi) a Community Health Assistant, all serving as members. The CSAC members are responsible for selecting beneficiaries and ensuring the successful implementation of the programme at the community level, with technical assistance provided by NAPEP officials. The collaboration between the CSAC members and government officials constitute the CBTM in the Nigerian context, or more specifically for the implementation of COPE.

The three communities that participated in this study were purposefully selected based on their participation in the first phase of the programme, and the fact that they are all located in the same local government. The rationale for having all the communities in one local government stems from both logistical and pragmatic considerations. Logistically, accessing communities willing to participate in the study was initially challenging due to their rural locations, and given the nature of the implementation of COPE, ensuring at least three communities were chosen for the study was a pragmatic consideration in order to increase the number of cases within the study and identifying the officials.\textsuperscript{24} The latter consideration allowed for overcoming the challenge of identifying NAPEP and government officials who participated in COPE’s implementation. While tracing the current locations of the officials was initially difficult because most of them

\textsuperscript{24}Although it might have been helpful to select non-participating communities as control groups, it would have been difficult to obtained the relevant information about how the CBTMs functioned, since COPE was not implemented in all communities.
had been posted out of the agency to other government ministries, departments and agencies as part of routine bureaucratic practices after their participation in the programme, some of the officials were successfully identified, and they agreed to participate in the study.

During the implementation of COPE, NAPEP officials from the federal government worked directly with staff from both the Oyo state and participating local governments. But each participating local government had the same NAPEP, state and local government staff working with all the five communities selected in each local government. Consequently, after identifying the three communities in the local government chosen for this study, it was necessary to ensure that a mix of officials from different agencies, ministries and departments across the different levels of government were included in the study, and this was done. In addition, the study included the representative of the NGO and CSOs that were contracted to serve as intermediaries for the programme in the local government where the three communities are located. Although tracing the location of these representatives was also challenging, their identification and inclusion allowed for all key participants and stakeholders in the governance of COPE to provide their input.

Due to ethical considerations, and in line with the ethics approval granted by the University of Guelph Ethics Board for the fieldwork component of this study, the identities of participants, and the exact names and locations of the local government and communities in Oyo state, will remain anonymous in this dissertation. This is primarily to protect the identities of participants, the local government, and the communities involved. Hence reference to the specific local government chosen for this study will remain generic and anonymous. The three communities selected will also remain anonymous and will respectively be referred to as Community A (CA), Community B (CB) and Community C (CC) in this dissertation. But to
contextualize the discussion and analysis, it is important to note that the three communities are socio-economically poor with respect to the low HCDI of the communities, which informed the selection of the communities by the NAPEP, state and local government. In other words, the communities have low scores on girls’ education, and based on a key targeting criterion which seeks to identify poor female headed households as beneficiaries of COPE, the communities have a high number of female headed households with children of school age. In addition, given their location and the lack of social amenities like good access roads, schools, and health facilities, the communities are located in areas that are considered rural and regarded as villages/rural communities by members of the community as well as state officials.

Nonetheless, certain distinctive features are visible between the communities, and to further describe the community settings, these features are summarized here. Community A (CA) is a relatively small community, and is the smallest of the three communities studied. It does not possess basic social amenities like pipe borne water or electricity, and the only source of water is an open well donated to the community by a non-governmental organization. But the community’s well has ceased to function for some years owing to a fault in the hand-operated well pump, which the community has been unable to fix due to lack of funds. Consequently, using ropes and buckets, the members of CA draw water directly from the well. The houses in the community are entirely made of mud-houses, and they lack any modern sanitary facilities like toilets or bathrooms. The overgrown bushes nearby functions as a place for people to openly defecate, and their improvised bathroom is made of thatched grasses and rotten corrugated roofing sheets. Community B (CB) is also a relatively poor community. However, unlike CA that has houses made entirely of mud, some of the houses in CB are made of bricks and others of mud. But it also does not have pipe borne water, and its sanitary systems are mainly manually
dug open latrines available in parts of individual household dwellings. Amongst the three communities, CB is bigger than CA but smaller than CC in size and population, making it a mid-sized community in comparison to the other two. CC is the largest of the three communities, and like CB has houses made of bricks and mud, even though it also relies on open latrines and wells. It is also a more densely populated community. Notably, all the communities are low income communities.

5.2. Methodology

This study utilizes a mixed-method approach that combines elements of both qualitative and quantitative data collection techniques and analysis.\(^{25}\) It should be emphasized that although the use of mixed methods in the individual disciplines within the social sciences and humanities has gained attention in recent times,\(^{26}\) their application in interdisciplinary research, not least in relation to the field of international development studies, is on the rise.\(^{27}\) According to Moran-Ellis et al. (2006: 46), a mixed-method approach can be defined as the “use of two or more methods that draw on different meta-theoretical assumptions (i.e. that are cross-paradigmatic).” Studies using mixed-methods approaches can include “‘standard’ positivistic quantitative and interpretive-qualitative components, or a mix of different qualitative data (positivistic, interpretive, phenomenological, visual)” (Moran-Ellis 2006: 46). For Leech and Onwuegbuzie (2009: 267), mixed-methods generally represent “research that involves collecting, analyzing and interpreting quantitative and qualitative data in a single study or a series of studies that investigate the same underlying phenomenon.”


\(^{26}\)See Levitt et al. (2011), Bryman (2010), Polit and Beck (2010), and Mahoney and Goerzt (2006).

Leech and Onwuegbuzie (2009: 267-268) note that “Once a study combines quantitative and qualitative techniques to any degree, the study no longer can be viewed as utilizing a monomethod design,” but instead can be classified as being either partially or fully mixed. Based on the “time orientation,” that is, whether the methods are applied concurrently or sequentially, and based on “emphasis of approaches,” whether both techniques are ascribed equal status or one is dominant than the other, mixed methods can yield a variety of designs (Leech and Onwuegbuzie 2009: 267-268). This dissertation is based on a partially mixed method design that sequentially applies both qualitative and quantitative techniques with a dominant status given to the former. In other words, while the study contains some quantitative descriptive data and analysis, the qualitative data and analysis are the dominant approaches as explained below. As applied in this study, it allows for in-depth analysis of the phenomena of governance of social protection programmes in developing countries and recognizes the interdisciplinary character of the study with respect to its application to the disciplines of political science and international development studies.

5.2.1. Data Collection

During six months of fieldwork in Nigeria between May and October 2013, qualitative and quantitative data for this study was collected. The main qualitative technique used to collect the data for this studied was semi-structured interviews. This was supplemented by data from qualitative archival research of relevant documents and a quantitative household survey conducted in the three communities that participated in the study. In all, to collect data on the subjective understanding of various actors, 78 semi-structured interviews with open-ended questions were conducted with a wide range of actors in Lagos, Oyo and Abuja (Nigeria’s federal capital territory). These mainly include the following officials of NAPEP and other
relevant federal government agencies involved in the implementation of COPE; members of the CSACs, beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries of COPE in the three communities; representatives of major international organizations active in the areas of governance and social protection in Nigeria; academics; representatives of non-governmental organizations; and journalists working on issues of social development in Nigeria.

Interview participants were selected using mainly purposeful and snowball sampling, and depending on participant’s language of preference, the interviews were held in either English or Yoruba language. The interviews were either audiotaped and/or extensive notes were taken. Most of the interviews lasted between forty minutes to one hour. The interview questions were designed to obtain the relevant data used to answer the research question for this study, and the semi-structured interview format used aided the collection of relevant information for this purpose. The interview questions used for this study are attached as Appendix II at the end of this dissertation. Data collection was also done through archival research. During visits to government establishments, offices of non-governmental and international organizations, and some research centres, both published and unpublished records of relevant documents on COPE were obtained at different periods of the fieldwork.

Although some of the documents obtained were available to the public, some documents were obtained strictly on a confidential basis. Hence, in keeping with ethical obligations of this study, where appropriate, such confidential restrictions are strictly adhered to, and reference to these documents is generic. Combined, all the documents obtained as part of the archival research provide useful documented data for understanding the context in which governance and social protection occur in Nigeria. In relation to COPE, gaining access to some of the documents produced by local and international governmental and non-governmental organizations,
ministries, departments and agencies allowed for a more nuanced understanding of different perspectives of governance and social protection in the Nigerian context.

To triangulate data collection, data was also collected through the household surveys administered in the three communities. The household survey formed the third technique for data collection and allowed additional information to be collected on a number of relevant questions. Based on responses to structured questions with options for open-ended follow-up questions, the household survey questionnaires were designed to gather information on the level of access to social protection programmes within communities, and data on relevant demographic and socioeconomic characteristics of community members were obtained. To administer the surveys, three trained bilingual research assistants were employed, and face-to-face survey interviews were conducted with randomly selected household heads in the communities. The main advantage of face-to-face interviews as Bernard (2013: 219) notes is that “they can be used with people who could not otherwise provide information – respondents who are illiterate or non-literate, blind, bedridden, or very old.” This applies in the context of the three communities in this study. This was also helpful given that internet based or self-administered surveys could not be used because most of the community members surveyed had low literacy levels and had to be interviewed directly to obtain the necessary data. In all, 97 randomly selected household heads were surveyed. These comprise 19 household heads in CA, 33 in CB, and 45 in CC. The number of households surveyed in each community reflects the size of each community in comparison to the others as explained above. A sample of the questionnaire that was administered in the three communities is attached as Appendix III at the end of this dissertation.

In addition to the three data collection techniques discussed above, data was also collected through personal communications with experienced individuals on relevant subjects
related to this study.\textsuperscript{28} Also, as an invited participant observer at a focus group discussion (FGD) on social protection organized for staff of selected Ministries, Department and Agencies (MDAs) in Oyo State by some representatives of local and international governmental and non-governmental agencies, some notes were taken on relevant themes. During the meeting, information on on-going social protection programmes in Oyo state, and the knowledge of state staff on what constitutes these programmes and who they target were obtained. From both historical and contemporary perspectives, the invaluable insights on topics of relevance obtained through the personal communications and FGD further enriched the data collected for this study.

\textbf{5.2.2. Data Analysis}

Epistemologically, this dissertation follows an interpretive tradition that “aims at understanding subjective knowledge” (Della Porta and Keating 2009: 23). Consequently, given the primacy of the qualitative methodological approach in this dissertation, interpretive thematic analysis was used to analyze the data collected from the field. Thematic analysis or interpretive thematic analysis is a “method for identifying, analyzing and reporting patterns (themes) within data” (Braun and Clarke 2006: 79). It is a useful analytical approach that allows researchers to engage in careful readings and interpretations of their data as they seek to answer their research questions (Liampittong 2013; Green et al. 2007; Maxwell 2005; Ryan and Bernard 2003). Using the analytical framework outlined in chapter two, transparency and accountability were analyzed as main themes. This was done in order to ascertain the various multisubjective perspectives and understanding of state and non-state actors directly or indirectly connected to the implementation of the COPE programme. The analysis involved interpretation of responses to interview

\textsuperscript{28}Specifically, personal communications with experienced serving and retired public servants and politicians in Oyo State, including a leading politician and former Commissioner on the State Executive Council (Cabinet), was helpful in understanding the political and administrative climate in which social protection occurs in the state.
questions such as what form(s) did the selection processes take and do you think this was transparent and fair? Do you think all participants displayed accountability in the programme’s implementation? Did members of the CSAC facilitate accountability of the programme at the local level in its implementation?

To aid the analysis, the semi-structured interviews were transcribed and thematically organized into a Microsoft excel document. The transcribed data formed a critical aspect for identifying the patterns, and analyzing the perspectives of various participants in the study. In order to ascertain how the relevant themes are presented in published and unpublished documents, the analysis also entailed organizing data from documents obtained through the archival research. The data obtained from documents like the operational guidelines for staff involved in COPE, and the publications of different local and international governmental and non-governmental organizations on social protection and governance in Nigeria were examined to gain additional understanding of relevant themes. Likewise, notes taken during the FGD and data collected through personal communications were analyzed to establish how participants understand the themes of the study in the Oyo state/Nigerian politico-administrative context.

The quantitative data obtained through the household survey questionnaires were coded and analyzed with the use of the Statistical Package for the Social Sciences (SPSS) programme. But consistent with the interpretive “aim to understand” social phenomena in a specific context, analysis of the quantitative data in this study was aimed at deriving descriptive statistics through univariate analysis. As Babbie (2014) explains, univariate analysis “involves describing a case in terms of a single variable – specifically, the distribution of attributes that compose it.” In the words of Singleton and Straits (1999: 466), “the goal of univariate analysis is to get a clear picture of the data by examining one variable at a time, which occurs as part of the data cleaning
process, as a prelude to more complex analysis, or a part of a basic descriptive study.” The quantitative analysis of specific relevant variables in this study was done to understand the demographic and socioeconomic characteristics of households in the three communities. In addition, considering COPE focuses on the vulnerable and poor, the quantitative data was also useful in ascertaining the level of access to social programmes within the communities. Responses from structured questions were coded according to the appropriate relevant variables of interests and frequency distributions were generated through SPSS.

5.3. Limitations of Study

Notwithstanding the advantages of the case study research design and mixed methods approach applied in this study, six limitations should be borne in mind. First, although a case study allows for an in-depth understanding of how social protection is governed by community-based targeting mechanisms, the discussion and analysis of the findings of the study are contingent on the Nigerian experience. Hence, unlike what obtains in large-scale multi-country studies, the findings from this study may not be generalizable without necessary qualifications on the limits of such generalizations, notwithstanding their relevance elsewhere. Second, as mentioned above, within the Nigerian context itself, a number of logistical challenges had to be overcome to ensure that the study was conducted in a systematic fashion. These include the initial challenge of identifying communities willing to take part in the study and the fact that most of the government officials involved in COPE had relocated or had been posted out of Oyo state when the study was conducted. As a government agency set up in 2001 by the Federal Government of Nigeria to coordinate poverty alleviation programmes in the country, NAPEP relies on staff seconded to it from other federal government MDAs. Hence, upon completion of phase one of the COPE programme, many officials either returned to their home MDAs or were posted out to other
MDAs. This made identifying officials who participated in the programme difficult. But this limitation was overcome after some of the officials who participated in the implementation of the programme, and who were willing to participate in this study, were identified and subsequently interviewed to understand their roles in the implementation of the programme in the communities that participated in this study.

Third, from a methodological standpoint, while this study involved interviews and responses from a diverse array of actors, the time lapse between the conduct of this study in 2013 and the end of the first phase of the COPE programme in 2009 meant a more complete, albeit more comprehensive, coverage of the various actors was not possible. For instance, despite the fact that some members of the communities, including CSAC members, beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries of COPE, participated in this study, some others had either relocated from the community or were reported as having died after the programme ended. These made it impossible to include them in the study. In addition, the time lapse also meant a more direct observation of the process of selecting participants for the programme, which could have enabled an on-the-spot assessment, rather than memory recall, of the various roles played by both state and non-state actors during the process, could not be done. This limitation nonetheless is mitigated by the fact that the multisubjective perspectives of various actors who participated in the programme were captured during the semi-structured interviews, and the responses collected through the household surveys and archival research allowed for a triangulation of some of the responses obtained.

Fourth, with respect to the quantitative analysis conducted, although the results from the surveys contribute to the overall presentation of this dissertation, it should be noted that the sample size of the study was small, and broad generalizations cannot be made from the results.
Without knowledge of the actual numbers of people residing within the community, and in the absence of comparable official population data, it is difficult to draw conclusions from the results. To be sure, to aid comparison of specific household surveys such as the one for this study, it is a common practice in studies using household surveys to have samples of respondents selected from larger population censuses or surveys that were conducted in prior surveys and/or studies (see for instance, Lehna et al. 2015; Herrera et al. 2005). However, notwithstanding the lack of relevant and comparable surveys or censuses for the communities, the fact that the numbers of household heads surveyed in each community were more than the quota of selected households that participated in the COPE programme, allows for certain claims to be made.

Fifth, as a researcher studying a topic on social protection in poor communities, I was regularly perceived as a government official with some level of influence over potential policies and programmes that the communities would benefit from. At the same time, among some government officials, I was perceived as a privileged researcher from a western university with some potential ability to reach influential policy makers in and out of government at the local and international levels. As such, understanding my positionality in various contexts, and ensuring that participants in the study understood my primary interest as an academic researcher, was necessary to overcome this limitation. Moreover, being a Nigerian citizen with ethnocultural roots from southwestern Nigeria, maintaining a professional and ethical approach and interaction with my participants was respectfully done in line with the cultural mores and milieus prevalent in the communities. Although I was still perceived as belonging to a more privileged educated class of citizens, and while it is still possible that respondents provided answers based on their interpretation of my privileged position as an educated young male-researcher based in a western university, I was able to relate to the people in ways that respected
their socioeconomic background, and was able to earn their trust with respect to their participation in this research study.

Sixth, even though this study includes relevant references and analysis of the role that gender relations play in social protection programmes, the dissertation is not about a critical gender analysis of COPE, nor is it specifically about how COPE financially or socially empowers women to overcome the numerous structural barriers that they experience in Nigeria. At its core, the study is about understanding how CBTMs improve or impede transparency and accountability in the governance of social protection programmes in developing countries. Although the study of CBTMs used in COPE invariably involves the study of important stakeholders like the CSAC members, which include women leaders, the study mostly focuses on the role of community members in the implementation of social protection programmes. Given the fact that poor female-headed households were the main target beneficiaries of COPE, and based on the fact that women leaders were also included as part of the composition of the CSACs, the references to gender and women in this study allows for situating the study within the larger context of the roles that women play in social protection generally. Therefore, even though the study was not designed as an in-depth gender analysis to understand the dynamics of gender relations in the implementation of social protection in Nigeria, and can only make limited claims in relation to gender dynamics in social protection, the analysis and findings nevertheless provide insightful details about the role of women in the governance of COPE specifically.

Put together, despite the limitations of this study, the findings, discussion and analysis in the next chapters provide relevant contributions to the literature on the governance of social protection programmes in developing countries. Thus, the use of a single-country case study research design and mixed-methodological approach in the study is quite beneficial. Moreover,
given that the study was conducted within an interpretive epistemological tradition that emphasises the importance of understanding the multisubjective perspectives of various actors, the study’s design and methodological approach facilitated the achievement of the overall objective of the study. These also allowed the study’s question to be answered in a nuanced and comprehensible way. The next two chapters present and discuss the data and findings from this study, and the main argument of this dissertation is presented. These are followed by a final concluding chapter.
Chapter Six
Transparency in COPE

6.0. Chapter Overview
This chapter presents and analyses data on transparency as an element of governance in the implementation of the COPE CCT programme in Nigeria. It focuses on how the implementation of the programme through the hybrid CBTM improved or impeded transparency by answering the sub-question; what are the factors that improved or impeded transparency in the implementation of the COPE CCT programme through the CBTM in Oyo state, south-west, Nigeria? To identify and ascertain which factors impeded or improved transparency in the implementation of COPE through the hybrid CBTM design, this chapter specifically analyses the interaction between the CSAC members as community agents and state officials. The analyses take into consideration the definition of transparency in this study as meaning “decisions taken and their enforcement are done in a manner that follows rules and regulations,” and that “information is freely available and directly accessible to those who will be affected by such decisions and their enforcement” in understandable forms and through relevant and appropriate media (Chakrabarty and Bhattacharya 2008: 8). To this end, and in line with the analytical framework adopted for this study, the analysis focuses on (i) the decision-making processes for selecting eligible households and (ii) the availability of, and access to, relevant information about COPE between relevant state and non-state actors and institutions.

As discussed in the following pages and paragraphs, based on the data collected and analyzed for this dissertation, the findings of this study reveal the following with regard to transparency in COPE. The study found that community participation through the hybrid CBTM improved transparency in decision-making because of the (i) novelty/newness of the hybrid CBTM which allowed initial selection of beneficiaries by an array of community agents working
through the CSACs, and (ii) the openness of the final selection of beneficiaries in places of communal significance. While the former enabled community members to select those considered as the most in need of assistance within their communities, it also prevented potential elite capture of the programme’s benefits, and helped to tap into the social capital of community agents such as women leaders in the communities. The latter, on the other hand, helped to improve the legitimacy of the programme’s selection process within the communities. Nonetheless, the study also found that transparency was impeded in COPE by the unidirectional manner in which information was available to community members. This specifically relates to the fact that state officials were the only sources from whom the community members received and verified information about COPE, and information was only available through verbal/oral communication, which impeded access to information in alternative understandable forms.

The chapter proceeds as follows. A brief overview of COPE’s design and implementation strategy follows this chapter overview. The brief overview discusses the expected processes involved in engaging community members and selecting beneficiaries for COPE according to the programme document and operational guidelines. This is subsequently followed by a presentation and analysis of data on how the processes operated in practice. The analysis draws mainly on the multisubjective perspectives, narratives, and experiences of various state and non-state actors, including but not limited to the relevant government officials at all levels of government, community agents, beneficiaries, and non-beneficiaries alike. However, where and when appropriate, information from other sources such as the results of the analysis of the household surveys, archival work and other supplementary sources mentioned in the previous chapter are included to support the data presentation and analysis in this chapter. These include
relevant data about the gender and age distribution of COPE beneficiaries. The chapter ends with a summary of the main issues discussed in the chapter.

6.1. Transparency in COPE: Design and Implementation Strategy

According to the design and implementation strategy of COPE and the operational guidelines for the programme’s implementation (NAPEP 2007a, 2008), COPE is to be implemented with the support of state and non-state institutions and actors at different levels. To this end, NAPEP created various committees in the states, local governments, and communities to implement the programme. At the state level, a State Social Assistance Committee (SSAC) was established, comprising of the NAPEP state coordinator, a representative of the state government appointed by the elected state governor, and other key officials of relevant MDAs as members. The main responsibilities of the SSAC was to select the local governments that would benefit from COPE in each state, coordinate the implementation of the programme, and assist in mobilizing the necessary resources to support the implementation at the state level. The committee was also expected to coordinate the implementation of the programme in each state. At the local government level, a Local Government Assessment Committee (LGAC) was set up to select communities that would benefit in each local government. The LGAC had NAPEP field officers in the local governments as members and was chaired by the elected or appointed local government chairperson.29 Other members of the LGAC include the elected or appointed departmental heads of the education and health units in each local government and a recognized religious leader in the local government.

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29Within Nigeria’s federal system, local governments are governed by elected chairpersons and councilors. Each local government is headed by an elected chairperson every three years, and the elections are conducted by state governments. In cases where elections have not been held, the elected state government is permitted to appoint an interim head for every local government until elections are held.
With technical support from NAPEP, the LGACs were mainly responsible for selecting the communities that would benefit from COPE, and were also required to provide the necessary logistical and supervisory support to the NAPEP and other officials that are responsible for the implementation of COPE in the communities.\textsuperscript{30} In each of the selected communities, a Community Social Assistance Committee (CSACs) was established. As mentioned in the previous chapters, the members of the CSACs in Oyo state included a community head who chairs the committee, the village’s religious leader, the women’s leader, the school head, the community health assistant, and the community development representative. State actors were mostly officials of NAPEP and the local government officials from the communities chosen to benefit from COPE in the state. According to NAPEP (2007a: 8), “Strong community involvement and ownership, particularly in the selection process” is required for sustainability and ownership of COPE at the community level. As such, a main responsibility of the CSACs was to select beneficiaries in partnership with NAPEP and other government officials from the state and local governments. To do this, beneficiaries are to be selected on the basis of their initial identification and shortlisting by members of the CSACs who are expected to list households that are considered to be the most in need of assistance before presenting the list to the community assembly in an open gathering for validation. This should be followed by a screening exercise involving interviews with short-listed beneficiaries by NAPEP and local government officials who ascertain if the households meet the eligibility criteria before a final selection is made.

The final decision on the selection of beneficiaries is taken by NAPEP officials based on the outlined eligibility criteria, especially in relation to whether the selected households have at least a child of school age and are headed by a female, an elderly, a disabled, a victim of VVF or

\textsuperscript{30}Such logistical support includes providing transportation, accommodation, and other necessary support.
person living with HIV/AIDS. While COPE targets households that are headed by members of the different categories, there is a preference for female headed households, and the household head may or may not belong to a combination of the categories. But to ensure transparency in the exercise, the operational guidelines for the implementation of COPE also requires that the NGO contracted by NAPEP to oversee the payments of the cash transfers should also verify the list of selected beneficiaries. As stated in the operational guidelines, the NGO should be “included in the selection process to validate the list of selected households done by the CSACs in addition to their duty as a disbursement outfit in order to ensure that the selection process is done with all transparency and devoid of political or religious undertone but purely by strict adherence to the guidelines in the project implementation manual” (NAPEP 2008:3). The following section presents data on how the processes worked in practice.

6.2. COPE in Practice: Data Presentation on Transparency

A central aspect of transparency is involving people in the decision-making process, especially on issues that directly affect them. For COPE, this meant engaging communities through CSACs to facilitate the selection of beneficiaries and the dissemination of relevant information about the programme to all the community members. Hence, before the programme could commence, it was important to educate and sensitise the different state and non-state actors, including NAPEP officials, about the programme, its objectives, and the implementation strategy. To achieve these, NAPEP organized ad-hoc training and workshops for its officials who are responsible for implementing COPE across the country. A few officials were also sponsored to Brazil for

31 A NAPEP official interviewed mentioned the programme was considered primarily as targeting women headed households (Interview with NAPEP official, Oyo state, 29-7-2013.)

32 Interviews with NAPEP officials in Oyo state and Abuja.
training on CCTs. The knowledge gained during the ad-hoc training and workshops formed the basis of the officials’ understanding of COPE, and based on their training, the officials subsequently informed the state and local government officials and community members on what the programme was about and how it was to be implemented. A number of local, state and NAPEP officials visited the selected communities to inform the people about the programme and its objectives. This was done to facilitate confidence building with community members in general, and the CSAC members were expected to help facilitate the process. According to a NAPEP official that participated in the implementation of COPE in CA, CB, and CC,

Initially, we met with the committee leaders in those villages within the local government and we discussed with them the visions and objectives of the programme, what we intend to do and what we intend to achieve at the end of the day. Before that, we constituted the community committees [CSACs] that would work with us for the success of the programme. We selected the local heads of the communities, women leaders, faith-based organizations, youths and local government primary school headmistress or headmaster as a member of the committee. There is another member which is the community health assistant because the theory behind it is that we want them to be involved in the programme and at the same time to be sure that all our participants are attending their health centre regularly and that the children will take their immunization and likewise the school children should be able to go to school because we want to be sure of the school attendance for the children of the beneficiaries.

In addition to constituting and informing members of the CSACs on their responsibilities, the officials that participated in COPE mentioned at various times during interviews that the national office of NAPEP also organized visits to the communities to educate community members about the objectives of the programme. These were done mainly through public awareness campaigns in the communities to draw the attention of community members to the

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33 Interview with NAPEP official, Abuja, 29-7-2013.
34 In order to gain access to the communities, the involvement of officials from the local governments where the communities are located was particularly necessary given they are the closest level of government to the people.
35 Interviews with NAPEP officials, Oyo state.
36 Interview with NAPEP official, Oyo state, 24-5-2013.
impending implementation of the programme in their communities. A NAPEP official also mentioned that some CSAC members were invited to the state government’s secretariat to further inform them about the programme before it commenced.37 A local government official who participated in the implementation explained how the CSAC members were expected to assist in sensitising and informing the community members about the programme as follows,

The role of this community head that we refer to as chairman is that any time we are in the community he would help us talk to his people about the benefits of the programme because he is the one leading the people. When the Christian leader gets to the church, he would brief them about the programme and the Imam would do the same thing when he gets to the Mosque. The function of the school head is that since you have these children in school, he or she would be able to monitor them, those that are truants among them, are they in school regularly? It is the duty of the school head to help us to know that. Also, we have the CDA [Community Development Association] member. The function of the CDA member is to talk to the people as well. There is one meeting we used to have at the local government called the CDC meeting, the community development council meeting and they have one CDA as their representative, so when this CDA gets to their community development meeting, since the person is a member of the community, they would be able to talk to the people about the programme, that it is about this or about that. So when we officers get to their communities they won’t embarrass us since their CDC has informed them about the programme. Likewise, the health assistant works with the community and can as well assist us in giving them the necessary information and the women leader as well. We also have a community women leader as a member of the committee. In the women forum, she can as well talk to the women about the programme and related developments. That is why we have these people as the committee members.38

Within the communities, the majority (70.4 percent) of the household heads surveyed confirmed they were aware of COPE when it was introduced to their communities. Table 1 below shows the distribution of responses to the question on awareness of COPE in the survey and Table 2 shows the age distribution of respondents.

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37Interview with NAPEP official, Oyo state, 27-5-2013.
38Interview with local government official, Oyo state, 28-5-2013.
### Table 1: Awareness of COPE

<table>
<thead>
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<th>Percent</th>
<th>Valid Percent</th>
<th>Cumulative Percent</th>
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<tr>
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<td>28</td>
<td>28.6</td>
<td>28.9</td>
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<tr>
<td>Total</td>
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</table>

<table>
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<th>Missing System</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>total</td>
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<td>1.0</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

| Total          | 98        | 100.0   |

### Table 2: Age Distribution of Household Heads

<table>
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<th>Valid</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Percent</th>
<th>Valid Percent</th>
<th>Cumulative Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
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<td>47</td>
<td>48.0</td>
<td>50.5</td>
<td>50.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>50 above</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>46.9</td>
<td>49.5</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>93</td>
<td>94.9</td>
<td></td>
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</table>

<table>
<thead>
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<th>Missing System</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
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<td>4</td>
<td>4.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>total</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5.1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| Total          | 98        | 100.0   |

Concerning the selection of beneficiaries and the role of the CSACs, one NAPEP official explained that,

> Our responsibility is to select the participants for the programme to make sure that we pick the right people for the programme because the programme is about taking care of people that are in need in a particular community. So we based our selection on rural areas of the state and we were able to identify five villages within the local government from different wards.\(^{39}\)

Considering that the design of the selection process required members of the CSACs to decide who gets selected within the community, officials had to rely on the knowledge of the CSAC members in selecting beneficiaries that are deemed to be the most in need of urgent assistance. The eligibility criteria were explained to the CSAC members to guide them in selecting beneficiaries.

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\(^{39}\)Interview with NAPEP official, 24-5-2013.
households that meet these criteria. Based on the information received from officials, CSAC members met and compiled the lists of eligible members of the communities. In the three communities in this study, the CSAC members interviewed confirmed meeting to make decisions on those in their communities that were selected to benefit from the programme. For instance, in CA, the religious leader in the community mentioned that he worked with other members of the community to select the people who were presented to officials during the final selection process. In his words,

The selection of beneficiaries for the programme in our community was done in the village square over there. We were asked to come up with the names of the people we think should be selected for the programme and after deliberating on those we think need help, especially those we believe cannot take care of themselves and their families, we selected some of the widows in the community. Some of these people I must tell you would have been dead by now if we didn’t select them for the programme back then because they are very sick and couldn’t take care of themselves and all these little children you see around. But after we selected them and presented them to the officials at the village square, their participation in the programme helped them overcome some of the difficulties they were experiencing back then.\textsuperscript{40}

Likewise, the women’s leader in CA mentioned how she participated in deciding the widows who in her opinion were in desperate need of assistance when COPE was introduced to the community. As she explained,

Even though I am a widow and I initially thought I would be selected for the programme since it was for women without any assistance, I eventually realized after the officials explained it to me that the programme was more for those who cannot really work and make enough money to take care of themselves and their families. And because I have a daughter that is above school age and I am also not as old as some of the women in the community, I could not benefit. But I worked with the officials and other members of the community to select the women that benefited from the programme.\textsuperscript{41}

Similarly, in CB, the local chief expressed his satisfaction with the overall selection process, which he described as a unique experience for him and members of the community in assisting

\textsuperscript{40}Interview with religious leader in CA, 22-10-2013.
\textsuperscript{41}Interview with women leader in CA, 5-6-2013.
their poor members. For him, when he first heard of COPE from the officials who informed him that his community had been selected for the programme, he mobilized various leaders to disseminate the information to all members of the community. He further remarked that he met with other CSAC members to decide which people should benefit from the programme before the final selection that openly took place in his compound. According to him,

This COPE programme was a very good one that allowed members of our community to receive assistance from the government in order to send their children to school. I ensured that everyone was informed about the exercise and asked that they all gather in my compound on the day of the actual selection when the officials were present. The list of the people that myself and the other committee members had put together was then presented to the officials who called out the names of people on the list before asking them questions about their situation. After that, those selected were informed about what they needed to do to be able to receive the money for the one year that the programme lasted.42

The women’s leader in CB also recalled that the selection of the beneficiaries was done in the compound of the local chief where everyone in the community gathered for the selection process. For her, “the [COPE] programme allowed many women in the community to get some support from the government like never before. The fact that we were also involved in the selection of the participants gave us the opportunity to also be involved in helping our members who needed support.”43 She further explained that the list of beneficiaries was compiled by members of the CSAC in CB before it was presented to the officials.44

In CC, the selection of beneficiaries was also done by the CSAC members prior to the general meeting of all members of the community for the final selection that took place at the community hall. The women’s leader who served as a member of the CSAC in CC explained that,

42 Interview with the local chief in CB, 7-6-2013.
43 Interview with women leader in CB, 8-8-2013.
44 Ibid.
In our community, we have a lot of women who we support through our local community associations and market groups, but there are others we are unable to help because of little money in our community. When the programme came to our community, we selected those that had little children in schools so that they too can have a chance to feed themselves with the money they get from the programme. I was the one who represented women on the committee and since the programme was for women I made sure that we selected people that needed it.\(^{45}\)

The school head who served as a member of the CSAC in CC also expressed satisfaction on the overall programme, because in her opinion, those who got selected for the programme were the deserving ones. In her words,

I was a member of the committee that selected the beneficiaries. Other members of the committee included the women leader, the local chief that died not long after the programme started, the local Imam and some other people. We were asked by the NAPEP and government officials to nominate those who we feel should be a part of the programme and after we did that, we informed members of the community to gather at the community hall where the final selection was made. Although there were many people there that day, the officials only selected those they considered were actually in need. Some people who had come with their best dresses thinking they would impress others only showed that they were better off than the rest. But at the end of the day, the women we selected were mainly widows with little children of school ages.\(^{46}\)

Beyond what the CSAC members and officials thought of their experiences, some of the beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries interviewed in the communities also confirmed they were present during the final selection processes. In CA, a beneficiary explained she was selected to participate in the programme because she was a widow responsible for taking care of three of her grandchildren who attend the nearby school.\(^{47}\) According to her, she was informed by the women’s leader that there would be a selection of members of the community for a programme that allows them to keep their children in school. She further explained that “the process of selection was done openly in the village square and my name was read out with other members

\(^{45}\)Interview with women leader in CC, 15-5-2013.
\(^{46}\)Interview with the school head in CC, 15-5-2013.
\(^{47}\)Interview with a beneficiary in CA, 21-6-2013.
of the community after which the government officials asked me some questions and I answered them before they later told me that I was selected for the programme.”48 Another beneficiary in CA expressed her gratitude to have been selected for the programme. Being a widow as well, she narrated how difficult life had been since she lost her husband, and she had to fend for the entire household alone.49 She maintained that she earnestly looked forward to the day that the selection took place at the village square where the beneficiaries were chosen. In her words, “I used to sell vegetables to feed the family but that has not been very helpful in helping me take care of everyone in my home. But the money I used to get from the programme monthly helped me to buy little items that we use in the house and also make sure the children have pencils and exercise books.”50

In addition, a young male non-beneficiary who was present during the selection exercise in CA noted that the programme helped women in the community. In his words, “the government programme that you are talking about was a good one for many of our mothers in the community and even though we wish there is a programme for young people, at least our women were supported.”51 In CB, beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries also confirmed that the selection was held openly at the compound of the local chief with officials present and community members in attendance. One beneficiary explained that the selection was done based on those considered to be in need of assistance at that time and those whose children were of school age. According to her,

If you saw me at that time, you probably would think I am a living dead because of the way I looked. I was really skinny as a result of the problems I was experiencing. My husband had left me with four children to take care of and it was difficult to keep up with the responsibilities. Even though the responsibilities

48Ibid.
49Interview with a beneficiary in CA, 21-6-2013.
50Ibid.
51Interview with a non-beneficiary in CA, 23-5-2013.
still continue to grow today, I am better off today because I was selected to benefit from the programme. 52

She added that on the day of the selection, she attended the gathering at the local chief’s compound and other members of the community were in attendance before the selection was openly conducted. According to another beneficiary in CB,

I benefited from the programme and wish that it continued so that others who were not selected on that day could benefit as well. It was a good programme that brought all of us in the community together. The officials who came here explained that the programme is for women and as one of the women that took part in the programme I was able to send my kids to school and take them for immunisation at the clinic whenever we were asked to come for immunisation. 53

An elderly man who did not benefit from the programme, but who was also in attendance during the selection at the local chief’s compound, mentioned that the exercise was conducted openly with many people in attendance. 54 But like the youth member in CA, he also expressed his view on the relevance of the programme in helping women, and adds that he hopes men will also get their turn. For him, “we were glad that such a programme came to our community and we benefited from it in a way that makes us grateful to the government. It would nevertheless be helpful if men were also considered in future programmes.” 55 He continued by explaining that “I was there when the selection was done at the [local chief’s] compound. We were all summoned to gather on a specific day and people attended with the hopes of being selected. But since the programme was mainly for women, those selected were women.” 56

For beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries of the programme in CC, their experiences with the selection of beneficiaries were similar to those in CA and CB. Having gathered at the

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52 Interview with a beneficiary in CB, 7-8-2013.
53 Interview with a beneficiary in CB, 7-6-2013.
54 Interview with a beneficiary in CB, 7-6-2013.
55 Ibid.
56 Ibid.
community hall where the selection took place, one of the beneficiaries narrated how she was chosen to be part of the beneficiaries. In her words,

I am a widow and my husband passed away some years ago. I have a senior wife who I must commend for displaying a lot of understanding and support when our household was being considered as one of the beneficiaries. Since we belong to the same household and could not both be selected we decided that one of my children who was grown up enough to be trained for the trade acquisition part of the programme would be put forward for that purpose while my senior wife would receive the monthly payment in order to assist her to take care of some of the grandchildren under her care. For this reason, I am grateful to her and also the officials for selecting me to be a part of the programme. 57

Another beneficiary in CC mentioned that she got to know about COPE from the women’s leader in her community who informed her prior to the actual selection day. According to her, “a lot of people came to the gathering at the community hall, but only a few women were selected from the crowd. Those of us selected were then told additional details of what we would be doing to get the money.”58 One of the non-beneficiaries in CC confirmed that “the crowd was many that day and some who were not selected expressed frustration because they expected to be part of the programme. It would have been good if many people were selected to benefit.”59

Notably, although CSAC members and government officials are mainly responsible for selecting beneficiaries, the NGOs that are contracted by NAPEP to pay beneficiaries are also expected to verify the list of those selected for transparency purposes. While two NGOs are selected by NAPEP in each state as paymasters to manage disbursement for COPE beneficiaries, each NGO was responsible for certain numbers of local governments. An official of the NGO contracted by NAPEP to disburse payments to beneficiaries in the local government where CA, CB, and CC are located, explained that the selected beneficiaries in the

57 Interview with a beneficiary in CC, 16-6-2013.
58 Interview with a beneficiary in CC, 16-6-2013.
59 Interview with a non-beneficiary in CC, 16-6-2013.
communities were mostly women with children of school ages. With regard to transparency in the payment of the monthly stipends to selected beneficiaries, the NGO official explained that payments were made at the end of each month at the local government secretariat or community halls, where participants are asked to gather every month. According to the official,

The beneficiaries have to converge either in their local government secretariat or the town hall. They collect and sign. For those who are unable to come, if we see a note by the doctor or that person, signed or thumb printed and we are satisfied with that we pay. But if we are not satisfied we put the money at the secretariat until the next month.

During various interviews with community members, beneficiaries confirmed that they received the payments from the NGO every month. But they also mentioned that the CSAC members often served as intermediaries in communicating with officials about when payments would be made and also helped to mobilize the community members to the venue of the payments. Although the NGO official noted that the implementation of COPE in the local governments in which the NGO was responsible for disbursing the payments and observing the selection of beneficiaries was generally satisfactory, the official also mentioned that future implementation of COPE should allow for the greater involvement of NGOs in the selection of beneficiaries. This, the NGO official explained would assist in further educating beneficiaries on the programme’s objectives. Based on the NGO official’s observation, some of the beneficiaries did not really understand the programme’s objectives. In the NGO official’s words, “the people don’t really understand the programme that was my observation. They didn’t really understand the

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60 Interview with NGO official, Oyo state, 29-5-2013.
61 Ibid.
62 Interview with NGO official, Oyo state, 29-5-2013.
programme. In light of the above, and based on analysis of data collected for this study, the following section provides an analysis of transparency in the governance of COPE.

6.3. Transparency in COPE: An Analysis

To analyze transparency in COPE in line with the focal areas mentioned at the beginning of this chapter, this section is subdivided into two parts, which allows for an interpretive analyses of how the hybrid CBTM impeded or improved transparency in COPE through: (i) the decision-making process for selecting eligible households; and (ii) the availability of, and access to, relevant information.

6.3.1. Decision-Making in the Selection of Eligible Households

In general, many of the people interviewed expressed satisfaction with the openness of the procedures adopted in the implementation of COPE, and from the result of the household survey presented in Table 1 above, it is clear that the communities received information and were aware of the programme. In other words, it was not shrouded in secrecy and known to just a few persons only. Although some community members noted that they were not residing in the communities when the programme was implemented, and did not participate nor benefit from the programme, they confirmed learning about the programme from other community members following the sensitization campaigns by NAPEP officials. The opinion on the hybrid CBTM that was used in the implementation of COPE was also positive in the three communities.

Specifically, considering that the involvement of the CSACs in the implementation of COPE was a first time experience for many people in the communities, many of the people interviewed described it as a departure from previous practices. Notably, the use of the CSACs in the implementation of COPE in Nigeria was described as a novel initiative that was

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6Ibid.
appropriate for the programme. Unlike in the past when social programmes are implemented solely by state officials with occasional engagement with some community members, the novelty of the hybrid CBTM, which mandates different community agents to be part of the implementation of COPE, allowed for greater transparency in the programme’s implementation. It was also the first time a CCT programme was implemented, and the inclusive selection process created an avenue for the people to engage with it. According to one NAPEP official,

We don’t use committees before. This was the first time we used committees. The programmes we normally implement differ and the approaches differ. The committee approach we adopted for this [COPE] was suitable for it. Because of the nature of the people we were trying to touch, it was a novel idea to use committees. Even to the people themselves it was a novel idea.\textsuperscript{64}

Quite instructively, the novelty of the hybrid CBTM opened up the decision-making space for community members to participate in the implementation of COPE. This is significant for at least two main reasons discussed as follows. One, the novelty of the CBTM in Nigeria created an avenue to overcome the vagaries of actual and potential patronage links that often dominated the selection of beneficiaries of previous social programmes, especially when the communities or intended beneficiaries are excluded as discussed in chapter three. As succinctly explained by a local government official during an interview,

In the past, if there is a programme of this nature, we go through the politicians. They are the ones who would bring the beneficiaries. The duty of our own community development officer is just to distribute those materials, for instance, if we have grinding machines. But the difference between this one [COPE] and some of the previous local government programmes is that the beneficiaries in this one are from nowhere. But in the case of the local government programmes, the beneficiaries are majorly politicians. We just have to collect their list and do our distribution as far as the local government staff is concerned. But beneficiaries of this one are neutral people that benefited from the programme because we went to their communities. It was not a politically oriented programme. But if we want to distribute any items related to any poverty

\textsuperscript{64}Interview with NAPEP official, Oyo state, 27-5-2013.
alleviation programme, we have to go through the politicians to give us the list of those they want us to distribute the materials to.\textsuperscript{65}

While the above comments illustrate how the inclusion of community agents helped to open up and improve decision-making in a hitherto patronage-dominated system, where local elites are often expected to capture public social programmes for private gains, the use of CSACs helped to open up the decision-making space in a way that improved transparency in the implementation of COPE. Notably, since the advent of structural adjustment programmes and the turn to limited state provisioning of social programmes since the 1980s, the plight of the poor, especially poor rural women in Nigeria, has been particularly dire, as local politicians capture the limited social safety nets programmes meant for the poor. The fact that local politicians and elites of various kinds capture programme benefits has been worsened by the willing or unwilling connivance of state officials responsible for ensuring the implementation of social programmes in Nigeria.\textsuperscript{66} Thus, the contribution of the CBTM in opening decision-making spaces in COPE is noteworthy because it helped to prevent the capture of the benefits in COPE, and allowed such benefits to reach the poor people.

Consequently, the fact that the CBTM used in the three communities allowed both the community agents and state officials to exercise authority in determining who benefits from the programme was remarkable. More so, opening the decision-making process for community agents to participate through the CSACs fulfills a key element of participatory governance in general and transparency, in particular, that is, “participation” itself. The importance of this is

\textsuperscript{65}Interview with local government official, 28-5-2013.
\textsuperscript{66}Considering corruption has spread throughout the public service in Nigeria, many state officials simply align with the politicians as a survival strategy. Even when some of them do not agree with the theft of public funds and the appropriation of programmes meant for the poor, the threat of losing their jobs if they do not cooperate sometimes forces civil servants to keep quiet and support the corruption. Corruption is nonetheless rampant in the public service as well and public servants are known to regularly demand bribes before rendering services to members of the public.
noted in the comment of the local government official above, which shows how local
government officials and politicians hitherto capture(d) social programmes for the benefits of
their cronies, affiliates, and clients. Although it is possible that various social and development
programmes in Nigeria continue to be captured at the local level by some local elites, from the
analysis of the data collected for this study, the evidence suggests that when decision-making
processes are opened to community members, it is possible that elite capture of programmes can
be prevented.

Indeed, while some scholars are skeptical about the potential of CBTMs to prevent elites
from capturing programmes like COPE in African countries, where it is often assumed that the
negative effects of patron-client regimes prevent social programmes from reaching the poor, the
participation of communities in the decision-making processes of COPE indicate that it is
possible to prevent elite capture. The local elites that served as community agents in the three
communities that were studied in this research generally displayed a sense of commitment and
altruism in ensuring that the poor received the support required, and that the programme was not
captured for private gains. This is not unconnected to the fact that the hybrid CBTM did not only
help to open hitherto closed-off decision-making spaces, but it also helped to tap into the social
capital of the community leaders. Based on the analysis of the opinion of the community
members interviewed, the social capital of the identified community agents who served as
community leaders helped to improve the legitimacy and transparency of the decision-making
processes of the programme. The community members interviewed expressed their satisfaction
with the inclusion of their representatives in the decision-making processes.

Put together, while the dangers of having the negative outcomes of patron-clientelism
such as the elite capture of programmes could have characterized the implementation of COPE
in the three communities, the social capital that community leaders possessed and deployed in
their engagement with the CBTM produced positive outcomes for the poor. Moreover, the fact
that the programme was not negatively politicized to the detriment of community members,
whose exclusion would have negated the idea of the programme’s design, created the avenue to
tap into the social capital in the communities. This produced better outcomes than previous
practices where local patrons and politicians select cronies and clients as beneficiaries. As such,
by providing avenues for communities to participate in the determination of who gets selected,
the high level of social exclusion that sometimes defines social protection programmes in
Nigeria was avoided. But it is necessary to specifically note the significant role played by
women as leaders in the decision-making process of COPE. This is crucial in light of the
criticisms often levied against women’s participation in social protection programmes such as
CCTs.

The participation of women in social protection programmes generally, and in CCTs
particularly, is often analyzed from the perspective of their participation as beneficiaries. But
the CBTM allowed women to also participate as leaders, even though many of the households
that were selected were headed by women, especially widows. Yet, it is possible that the
criticism of CCTs as reinforcing traditional roles of women as discussed in chapter 4 still holds
in Nigeria as well. But the participation of women in COPE as leaders in decision-making
recognized and reinforced their role as leaders and not simply as beneficiaries. Moreover, while
the inclusion of women in the CSACs may be seen as a way for the state to engage women
leaders for the purposes of carrying the burden of implementing a social programme on behalf
of the state, the role played by the women leaders in COPE within the three communities
reinforced their ability to contribute to decision-making in areas hitherto controlled by men. All
the three women leaders interviewed for this study spoke confidently about their contributions to ensuring that the programme was beneficial to women in their communities. This is particularly important given the fact that most women in Nigeria, especially those in rural areas, face tremendous barriers when seeking to participate in governance, as explained in chapter three.

At the same time, with respect to ensuring that the beneficiaries were carried along in the implementation of the programme, the support provided by the women leaders in the communities also helped to reduce the potential burdens and anxieties that beneficiaries could experience in their participation in the programme, especially with respect to fulfilling the conditions attached to the programme. Indeed, in relation to promoting transparency in the programme, the inclusion of women in the implementation of the COPE programme allowed for other women beneficiaries to feel a sense of belonging. In addition, and quite significant, is the fact that the involvement of the women leaders within their communities was well recognized and appreciated, not only by women beneficiaries, but also by other community members and the officials of the programme. As such, the participation of the women leaders in COPE contributed to providing some transparency in the programme with regard to the selection of women beneficiaries within the communities. The knowledge of the women leaders about the situation of their fellow women within the communities was helpful in identifying the women that were the most in need of urgent assistance.

Nonetheless, the analysis of the role of women in COPE should not be read as a blank endorsement of COPE’s contribution to women empowerment, but rather a significant indicator that the inclusion of women can facilitate transparency. But women in Nigeria, like many other parts of the world, remain marginalized in many aspects of life, and overcoming the challenges
of everyday living still remains a challenge for them. Moreover, as shown in Table 3 below, despite the fact that the gender distribution of women and men in the three communities of this study indicates that a majority of the households are headed by women, the women still live under male dominated patriarchal systems. Yet, while not overcoming all their challenges, the inclusion of women as members of the CSACs illustrates a gender-sensitive approach to the composition of the committees, which allowed the women leaders to participate in decision-making in relation to COPE.\footnote{But beyond the participation of the women leaders, other community agents also helped to ensure that decision-making process for the selection of beneficiaries was transparent based on the input and knowledge of community agents.}

\begin{table}[h]
\centering
\begin{tabular}{|c|c|c|c|c|}
\hline
          & Frequency & Percent & Valid Percent & Cumulative Percent \\
\hline
Valid     & 17        & 17.3    & 17.5          & 17.5          \\
female    & 80        & 81.6    & 82.5          & 100.0         \\
Total     & 97        & 99.0    & 100.0         &               \\
Missing   & 1         & 1.0     &               &               \\
System    &           &         &               &               \\
Total     & 98        & 100.0   &               &               \\
\hline
\end{tabular}
\caption{Gender Distribution of Surveyed Community Members}
\end{table}

Furthermore, the second factor that helped to improve transparency in COPE is the open approach that was adopted during the final selection of beneficiaries. As one NAPEP official explained,

The selections were in the village squares. Because what we did was when we gathered them together we made sure that the committees that we set up in the communities were part of the selection. We have key indices and questions that we ask them before they can qualify for the programme, so it was an open thing not that we kept them in a secret place and we just put down names or make up names. We picked our beneficiaries openly and it was an open selection.\footnote{Interview with a NAPEP official, 24-5-2013.}

The open selection of beneficiaries increased the level of confidence that the community members had in the programme. Given the communitarian nature of the communities, being
able to gather and witness the final selection of the beneficiaries was helpful in creating a feeling of unity for the community members present. The selection of beneficiaries was done in spaces of communal significance such as the village squares or community hall, where everyone could openly observe the final selection of the beneficiaries. Based on interactions with community members, their presence during the selection exercise made it easier for those present to confirm whether undeserving members had been selected for the programme by the CSAC members and the officials. In all the three communities, various persons interviewed recalled how satisfied they were with the selection processes in their communities because it produced persons they deemed deserving of the selection.

It is necessary to add that even non-beneficiaries such as the youth leader in CA, and the elderly man in CB mentioned above, expressed satisfaction that the women selected received support from the programme. Likewise, in CC where many more people could not be enlisted in the programme because of the large size of the community in comparison to the two others, there was a general acceptance that those in most need were chosen. The acknowledgement of the deservingness of community members that were selected amongst non-beneficiaries is important, given the need to ensure that non-beneficiaries recognize the reasons they were not selected. Along this line, the CBTM used in COPE relied on the local knowledge of multidimensional poverty by a diversity of community agents, including the women leaders that were engaged as members of the CSACs, and this contributed to improving transparency in the implementation of the programme.

Despite the contributions of the CBTM to opening up the decision-making space for community members to participate in the programme, the next section analyses how the unidirectional flow of information about COPE, from officials to the members of the
communities, partly impeded the overall availability of, and access to, information on the programme. The implications and dangers posed by the unidirectional flow of information are analyzed in view of some of the critical concerns about governing social protection programmes through CBTMs in the absence of adequate information on the programmes. As it would be made clear, the lack of access to adequate information about COPE eroded some of the benefits that the CBTM could bring to the implementation of COPE in Nigeria. As such, to strengthen the CBTM, it is imperative to provide access to information in more understandable and accessible forms.

6.3.2. Availability of, and Access to, Information in COPE

As discussed above, COPE’s use of the hybrid CBTM formed a critical strategy for the implementation of the programme, and considering that the CBTM helped to open up decision-making spaces for community members to participate, a significant improvement in transparency was achieved. However, while the newness of the CBTM and the open selection of beneficiaries played significant roles in improving transparency in decision-making in COPE, the manner in which information was available and accessible to community members impeded transparency in the programme. Specifically, this relates to the availability of, and access to information for community members on one hand, and how much they understood the programme beyond what the officials verbally explained to them on the other hand.

For the purpose of improving transparency, the importance of having adequate access to relevant and accurate information in social protection programmes cannot be overemphasized. To strengthen transparency, it is necessary that information on every aspect of a social protection programme should be readily available and accessible. From the interviews and interactions with the people in the communities, it was clear that the information they received
was solely from the officials, and whatever information the officials disseminated was considered accurate by members of the CSACs and community members. Without having any other source of information on the programme, asking relevant questions that could have helped to clarify any concerns was not readily possible. For instance, for the community members that were not selected, the officials were the only ones to speak to, and although community members were encouraged to privately approach officials if they had any concerns, there were no other alternate sources of information nor any grievance mechanisms in place to address any issues relating to the programme.

The lack of information in alternate formats posed a high risk to the implementation of COPE in the Nigerian context, where corruption in social programmes is a major concern. The fact that community members relied on the verbal explanations of officials without having alternative sources to confirm or reconfirm the information received from the officials impeded transparency in COPE. For instance, the lack of adequate understanding about COPE that the NGO representative cited above mentioned is related to the fact that while the community members were informed about the programme generally, some did not adequately understand specific details concerning the programme such as the long-term objectives of the programme with regard to human capital development. Moreover, although COPE had a preference for selecting female-headed households with at least a child of basic school age, households are eligible to enlist up to four or more children, and are eligible to receive 1500 Nigerian naira (N) per child up to a maximum amount of N5000 for four or more children per household. Yet, during the initial stages of the programme, a NAPEP official mentioned that there was a lack of clarity amongst the community members about the minimum and maximum numbers of

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69 Interview with NGO official, Oyo state, 29-5-2013.
children allowed per households.\textsuperscript{70} Hence, despite having more than one eligible child, some households ended up enlisting a child of basic school age because they understood the limit allowed to be one child per household.\textsuperscript{71} Yet, by the time some of the beneficiaries who had more children of school ages realized and reported it to the NAPEP officials, the list of beneficiaries had been submitted to the NAPEP secretariat for processing, and the households were advised to wait for the subsequent phases of the programme before they could enlist the other children.\textsuperscript{72} The lack of clarity could have been overcome if the information on COPE was available and accessible to the community members in printed manuals in the local Yoruba language, which most of the local people are able to read and understand.

In addition, with respect to the selection of beneficiaries from special groups such as persons living with HIV/AIDS (PLWHA), victims of VVF, or the disabled, much information is not available on how many persons benefited or what was done to ensure that members of these special groups received special treatment to encourage their participation. Although the number of VVF victims and disabled persons that benefited from COPE, if any, in Oyo state is unknown, only one PLWHA headed household was chosen. When asked about the possible reason for only one household belonging to the PLWHA group out of 500 households, a NAPEP official explained that this may be because community members did not self-identify as PLWHA due to the fear of being stigmatized within their communities.\textsuperscript{73} Nonetheless, while it is impossible to ascertain whether other households in the PLWHA group benefited from the programme, but chose not to identify as PLWHA for possible fear of stigmatization, it was

\textsuperscript{70} Interview with a NAPEP official, 24-5-2013.
\textsuperscript{71} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{72} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{73} Interview with a NAPEP official, 24-5-2013. While this reason is a very real possibility in the Nigerian context, where PLWHA are often subject to discrimination and stigmatization, it is unclear whether adequate emphasis was on the eligibility of PLWHA, and if sufficient measures were taken to encourage such persons to self-identify anonymously for the COPE programme
confirmed that most of the households that benefited from COPE fit into the target group of female-headed households. Many of these households are headed by widows and/or elderly persons responsible for taking care of their children and grandchildren.

Tellingly, within the three communities in this study, COPE was largely interpreted as a poverty eradication programme for women with little children of school ages, and the beneficiaries were mostly elderly widows. The fact that the number of eligible households was limited to a quota of 10 per community also suggests that community members and officials might have simply decided that the elderly widows are the most vulnerable amongst the women in the community, and therefore, they narrowed their selection to elderly widows with little children. Yet, while the programme allows for children of basic school age, which in Nigeria refers to children from primary one to junior secondary/high school, based on the information received within the communities, and the interpretation of the programme being for women with little children, most of the beneficiaries mostly enlisted children in the primary or elementary school category. This lack of clarity may partly explain the initial confusion about the number of eligible children per household as noted above because it is possible that some households with older school age children in the junior secondary/high school category only submitted names of the younger children in elementary or primary schools.

Furthermore, it should be mentioned that the level of information and the understanding of COPE by officials was mainly based on the ad-hoc training and information contained in the operational guidelines for implementing the programme, which the officials were given, but which the community members did not have access to. Yet, as mentioned earlier, with the exception of a few NAPEP officials who were sponsored by the World Bank to Brazil to learn about CCTs, many of the field officers that directly participated in the programme did not know
about CCTs before it was introduced into Nigeria, and they had no inclination about where the programmes originated from. But the only source of information for the communities was the officials who they were in direct contact with in their communities. The NAPEP officials that worked with the communities confirmed during interviews that their knowledge of COPE is mostly based on a few days ad-hoc training, and that they were responsible for disseminating information about the programme to other state and non-state officials, including the community members and beneficiaries.

Even though NAPEP organized public sensitization campaigns to disseminate information within the communities, the campaigns could also have been supplemented by detailed explanations of what the programme was about through local media such as radio stations and local newspapers. Much publicity was not given to the programme via the mass media to educate and inform people about it. For instance, announcements on local radio stations could have helped to publicize the programme, considering people in the rural areas still have access to transistor radios. Several local programmes are held in the Yoruba language in south-western region of Nigeria, and members of the communities tend to listen to the news on their local radio stations. But the implementation of COPE did not utilise any of the local mass media to inform the people. Indeed, the newspaper journalists interviewed for this study confirmed that the programme was neither advertised in the newspapers as well. As persons with experience covering local news on social development, the journalists expressed disappointment over the low publicity given to COPE. One of the journalists interviewed

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74 Only some officials at the national office in Abuja mentioned knowing about the Brazilian programme. Officials at the state and local government levels did not mention the linkages between COPE and external CCTs. This may not be unconnected to the fact that some of the officials deployed to NAPEP were from other ministries, departments, and agencies, and were deployed for the sole purpose of assisting in the implementation of COPE. The state and local government officials who relied on NAPEP field officials also did not know about CCTs before.

75 Interviews with journalists in Oyo state.
mentioned the need to ensure that programmes like COPE are adequately publicized so that journalists can also become involved in helping to monitor their implementation. The journalist maintained that based on his experience covering local news in Oyo state, when programmes are not adequately publicized, politicians and local elites can easily capture the benefits.  

In addition, during separate interviews with some civil society activists who are involved in social rights advocacy and campaigns for better transparency in Nigeria, the lack of adequate publicity of programmes such as COPE was noted as a problem that impedes the ability of CSOs to engage the government in more effective ways on behalf of the poor. As one activist involved in monitoring transparency in public affairs in Nigeria mentioned, for programmes like COPE to be transparent, there is the need to involve independent civil society groups that have the tools to support communities in the implementation of programmes. Here, reference was made to the fact that if the programme had been well publicized and participating communities had been clearly identified and possibly included in an accessible database, some activists may have gotten involved in assisting the communities to get the necessary information about the programme, even if community members may be unable to access it themselves.  

Furthermore, as one social rights activist who specialises in working with marginalized communities across Nigeria mentioned, getting governments at all levels to be transparent in their dealings with marginalized rural communities is still a great challenge in Nigeria. The activist mentioned that ensuring that the government provides basic amenities to marginalized and rural communities is also a great challenge in Nigeria, and that when cases are filed in

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76 Interview with journalist, Oyo state, 9-9-2013.
77 Interview with activist, Lagos, 13-6-2013
78 Ibid.
79 Interview with social rights activist, Lagos, 24-7-2013
courts against the respective governments at different levels for failing to provide social services to those in need, it takes quite a long time before cases are heard and adjudicated, not least because of the delays in court processes. More so, given the paucity of data on social programmes, their location, and beneficiaries, the extent to which activists can access relevant information on behalf of the marginalized communities was mentioned as another great problem. In the words of the activist, “when we do not have information on the programmes that the governments are initiating, it is very difficult for us to put pressure on them.”

To be sure, in some countries like India, the use of the 2005 Right to Information Act has become one of the ways that activists have become engaged in demanding information about social programmes from the government (Jayal 2008). Although Nigeria currently has a Freedom of Information Act (FOI Act 2011) through which members of the public can request information on government activities, getting information from the relevant government MDAs remains a major challenge in the country. Thus, according to another activist, while some progress has been made in seeking information and getting a response from the government on some issues, the process is quite slow and frustrating. Yet, if programmes like COPE are to become more transparent, it would be imperative to ensure that the programme is well documented, and that such documentation is made available to members of the public in accessible and understandable forms.

More importantly, as noted in the literature reviews in chapters three and four of this dissertation, the main concern in the governance of social protection programmes in developing countries is how to ensure that the benefits of social protection programmes get to the right

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80Ibid.
81Ibid.
82Ibid.
83Interview with activist, 25-6-2013.
beneficiaries at the right time. Within this context, preventing the incidences of corruption, fraud and error in programmes are considered a paramount aspect in the design and implementation of social protection programmes. Recall, as explained in earlier chapters, corruption in social protection programmes occurs when officials manipulate programme requirements for private gains, fraud occurs when citizens intentionally provide false information in order to be eligible for programme benefits, and errors of inclusion and exclusion occur when ineligible citizens are unintentionally included and eligible citizens are excluded (van Stolk and Tesluic 2010). Here, the unidirectional flow of information in COPE posed dangers to COPE’s implementation because of the potential for errors, fraud, and corruption to easily occur.

Consequently, the problems that could arise from the unidirectional flow of information on a programme like COPE can produce unintended negative effects on the programme’s implementation. Avoiding corruption, fraud, and errors in social protection programmes is fundamental to ensuring that the poor receive the benefits they need. More so, in communities where many of the people are poor, the social division that can occur in communities if corruption, errors and fraud are not adequately prevented or properly addressed can lead to conflict and disharmony. As Ellis (2012: 202) rightly observes,

Notwithstanding the efforts made by agencies delivering targeted social transfers to explain transparently why certain individuals or families are deemed eligible to receive transfers while others are not, and despite involving communities in beneficiary selection, a sense of puzzlement and unfairness about the selection process can nevertheless persist in communities long after targeting decisions have been made.

Ellis’s (2012) observation is a peculiar problem in social protection programmes that utilise targeting, especially when the coverage level is limited to certain numbers of people and not
universal to the population. This raises the stake for ensuring that targeting is properly and transparently done. In the case of COPE, this takes on added significance given the lack of access to social programmes generally in the communities. For instance, when asked if the community members or any of their household members have benefitted from any government social protection programme in the past ten years, a majority of the household heads surveyed in the three communities answered “no” as shown in Table 4 below.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Percent</th>
<th>Valid Percent</th>
<th>Cumulative Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Valid</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>24.5</td>
<td>24.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>no</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>74.5</td>
<td>75.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td></td>
<td>97</td>
<td>99.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Missing</td>
<td>System</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td></td>
<td>98</td>
<td>100.0</td>
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</table>

Put together, it is important to close this section with a reflection on the implication of the unidirectional flow of information for transparency and participatory governance. Considering that the distinctive feature of governance is the exercise of authority by both state and non-state actors, the importance of having access to vital information is important. To achieve greater transparency, access to information is vital to enhancing the ability of non-state actors such as community members to effectively engage with the participatory mechanism that the CBTM presents. Without having alternate access to information, COPE relied mostly on officials to ensure transparency in sharing relevant information. While the evidence provided above indicates that the officials did provide some information to communities for the programme’s implementation, having only a single source of information affected the overall access to and
availability of information about the programme. But if and when officials decide to collude or distort the kind of information they wish to share with the communities, the programme can easily be captured by officials, either working together or in collusion with local elites. This can further lead to the marginalization of the poor whom the programme was designed to assist.

Nonetheless, what the findings of this study show with regard to transparency in COPE is that even in the Nigerian context where programmes can easily be captured by local elites, the possibility still exists for positive outcomes for the poor to get the benefits they deserve. Moreover, the CBTM allowed women to participate in COPE as leaders and not simply as beneficiaries, a significant departure from previous programmes where women were mostly excluded from participation in decision-making processes. While building on these significant improvements in the Nigerian context will help to facilitate greater transparency in the implementation of future social protection programmes through CBTMs, addressing the drawbacks will strengthen the overall governance of social protection in the country.

6.4. Summary of Chapter

This chapter was mainly about the presentation and analysis of data on transparency as an element of governance in the implementation of COPE as a social protection programme in Nigeria. Based on this dissertation’s focus on the governance of social protection programmes in developing countries through CBTMs that allow community agents to participate in the implementation of social protection programmes, the chapter examined how the design and implementation of Nigeria’s COPE CCT programmes functioned in practice. But in line with the analytical framework used in this study, the chapter focused on how the participation of community agents, working through the CSACs set-up to implement COPE at the community level in partnership with state officials, worked to improve or impede transparency in the
implementation of the programme. The analysis focused on the decision-making processes, and the availability of and access to necessary information in the implementation of the programme.

The chapter focused on answering one of the two sub-questions of this dissertation, that is, *what are the factors that improved or impeded transparency in the implementation of the COPE CCT programme through the CBTM in Oyo state, south-west, Nigeria?* As discussed in this chapter, the CBTM used in COPE helped to improve transparency in decision-making during the implementation of the programme. A number of factors were identified as having contributed to this in the Nigerian context. These include the newness of the programme’s implementation strategy, which helped to open up the decision-making space for non-state actors such as CSAC members, and the openness of the selection process that allowed community members to witness the final selection of beneficiaries in places of communal significance. The local knowledge and social capital of a diverse array of local community agents also helped to dampen the influence of any particular set of state and non-state actors. In addition, the presence and inclusion of women as leaders in the implementation of COPE was also noted to have significantly aided transparency in the decision-making process. Considering that women in rural areas of Nigeria are often excluded from decision-making processes, not least in social programmes that are designed to benefit women, the contribution of women is quite important in this regard.

With regards to the availability of and access to information, the unidirectional flow of information from officials to the community members was a major factor that impeded the achievement of greater levels of transparency in the implementation of the COPE programme. Because of a lack of alternate sources of information, the unidirectional flow of information impeded the level of transparency in the programme. This meant that only the state officials
were the people that could provide answers to any questions or concerns about the programme. Moreover, there were no grievance mechanisms in place. At the same time, the unidirectional flow of information also meant that the information was not available through other forms and media beyond the verbal communications provided by officials. Combined, the lack of alternate sources of information beyond the officials and the absence of information in understandable media and forms such as the mass media or printed information manuals in local languages prevented the achievement of greater levels of transparency within COPE’s CBTM.

Connecting the findings of this study to the analytical framework of this dissertation, it is important to note that the inclusion of a broad diversity of local community agents through the CSACs, which functioned as semi-formal community committees, as well as the application of categorical targeting, contributed to improving transparency in COPE. But while the use of categorical targeting to select households in need allowed for community agents to select those considered the most in need within the communities, the use of quotas, especially in communities where many members meet the eligibility criteria is not ideal. The social exclusion and divisiveness that can arise can create disharmony in communities. Hence, while targeting remains a central aspect of social protection programmes in developing countries, rather than providing limited coverage for communities in need of assistance, ensuring universal coverage of those in need should always be paramount where and when possible. The next chapter builds on the discussion in this chapter and examines how the CBTM impeded or improved accountability in the implementation of COPE as a social protection programme in Nigeria.
Chapter Seven  
Accountability in COPE

7.0. Chapter Overview
This chapter builds on the discussion and analysis in the previous chapter. It focuses on accountability as an element of governance in the implementation of COPE. Specifically, based on the checks and balances put in place to improve accountability in the implementation of COPE, the chapter examines how various actors and institutions were answerable to one another. The chapter answers the second sub-question of this dissertation, that is, *how was accountability improved or impeded through the CBTM in the implementation of Nigeria’s COPE CCT programme in Oyo state?* Recall, as used in this dissertation, accountability refers to “the power of one actor to make demands upon another to provide information about, or justification for, his/her actions; and the compulsion of the actor subject to those demands to respond” (Brinkerhoff 2006: 268-272). This means that for accountability to hold, both state and non-state actors and institutions should be answerable to one another and uphold the necessary sanctions as applicable. Thus, the analysis of accountability in this chapter focuses on how COPE’s CBTM impeded or improved the checks and balances for ensuring actors and institutions were answerable to one another.

From the discussion in this chapter, it would be shown that the checks and balances in COPE were weak, and did not improve answerability between and amongst various state and non-state actors and institutions to one another during the implementation of the programme. Rather, the weak operation of the checks and balances impeded accountability in the implementation of the programme. As discussed in the following pages, the poor administrative and technical capacity of state actors and institutions, particularly within NAPEP and OSSAP-MDGs, impeded accountability in COPE as checks and balances amongst the various state and
non-state actors were ineffective. The absence of any grievance mechanisms for community members to hold state and non-state actors and institutions accountability for their actions also impeded the overall accountability in COPE. Notably, the poor capacity problem was compounded by the hasty nature in which COPE was introduced into Nigeria. Also, the failure of the CSO contracted by OSSAP-MDGs as an external actor to perform its function of meeting with community members created a major drawback in accountability amongst state and non-state actors. The chapter proceeds as follows.

First, an overview of the checks and balances structures set up by the OSSAP-MDGs and NAPEP to ensure actors and institutions are answerable to one another for the successful implementation of COPE is summarized. To ensure accountability in COPE, the checks and balances structures of the hybrid CBTM were designed as part of the monitoring and evaluation of the programme’s implementation from the national to the sub-national levels. This was done in view of the decentralized nature of the Nigerian federation. A presentation and analysis of data relating to how the checks and balances operated in practice subsequently follows the discussion. The analyses provide insights into how state and non-state actors fulfilled their accountability responsibilities, and the section is further sub-divided into two sub-sections. The first sub-section analyses the roles of state actors and institutions in ensuring answerability or otherwise, and the second sub-section analyses the roles of non-state actors and institutions. The chapter ends with a summary of the main issues discussed in the chapter.

7.1. Accountability in COPE: The Checks and Balances Structures

To ensure actors and institutions are answerable to one another in the implementation of COPE, the accountability structure of the programme was two-fold. One was embedded within the structure of the MDGs monitoring and evaluation strategy, which the OSSAP-MDGs was
responsible for, and the other was based on NAPEP’s own accountability structure. Notably, although NAPEP was given the responsibility to implement COPE in Nigeria, the OSSAP-MDGs was responsible for overseeing NAPEP’s implementation of COPE. This was done in order to achieve accountability in the implementation of all MDGs related projects, which COPE was linked to. To this end, the OSSAP-MDGs has an in-house MDGs monitoring and evaluation unit that oversees all its projects. But the OSSAP-MDGs monitoring and evaluation unit operates a decentralized accountability structure that involves a central monitoring and evaluation unit based at the OSSAP-MDGs headquarters in Abuja, the Nigerian capital, and 36 state monitoring and evaluation units, which are spread across the Nigerian federation.  

However, to ensure checks and balances, external non-state actors working as CSOs and technical consultants are engaged to verify OSSAP-MDGs projects or programmes, and are also required to interact with citizens in the local governments and communities where the projects or programmes are located. The technical consultants are locally recruited within Nigeria to verify every project in each local government, and are required to visit the local government secretariats to verify the status of projects that are approved for each local government. But the verification is mainly to collect quantitative information on the status of each project, and to ascertain whether or not the projects are ongoing or completed. The CSOs, on the other hand, are required to visit every community where projects are located and conduct qualitative interviews and focus group discussions with community members on their assessment of projects in the communities. This was supposed to be a more interactive approach where reports of any discrepancy in projects or programmes are identified or discussed with independent organizations, who report back to the OSSAP-MDGs at the state and national levels. This is

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84 Interview with OSSAP-MDGs official, Abuja, Nigeria, 25-06-2013.
85 Interview with technical consultant, Oyo state, 04-06-2013.
expected to improve accountability through effective monitoring and evaluation by external actors from civil society.\textsuperscript{86} Essentially, all MDG related projects and programmes, whether relating to the construction of schools, health centres, boreholes, markets, distribution of household materials or cash transfers like COPE, are subject to external monitoring and evaluation for accountability purposes. The technical consultants and CSOs are required to write and submit reports to the OSSAP-MDGs for consideration and appropriate actions, including the application of sanctions where and when necessary. Specifically, with reference to ensuring accountability in COPE, while the CSO is responsible for conducting interviews and focus group discussions with community members, the technical consultants are responsible for verifying that the programme took place in communities through confirmation of records available at the local government secretariat. Meeting with the CSAC members was also to be done during meetings with the communities. But in addition to the responsibilities of the technical consultants and the CSO, NAPEP is also responsible for reporting to the OSSAP-MDGs on the implementation of COPE, not least on how the funds allocated for the programme are expended.

On its part, and as the main implementing institution of COPE, NAPEP also has its own structure for ensuring accountability in COPE. According to NAPEP (2007a:11), while COPE is to be monitored and evaluated in partnership with the OSSAP-MDGs, NAPEP also “employs various tools, including that of participatory monitoring and evaluation to monitor the access, utilisation and satisfaction of services to participating households.” As mentioned in the previous chapter, NAPEP established committees at the state, local government, and community levels to implement the programme. In particular, at the community level where programmes are implemented, the CSACs were responsible for ensuring the effective implementation of the

programme through constant monitoring and evaluation. To this end, the CSAC and community members are expected to report any observations or reservations to the NAPEP officials who in turn report to the state and national offices of NAPEP, the LGACs, and SSACs. The contracted NGO was equally required to send a monthly report on the disbursement of funds to NAPEP as well. Consequently, when combined, the accountability structure for COPE involves various actors and institutions from the federal to the local government and community levels. The various actors and institutions are expected to provide checks and balances in ways that promote accountability for the overall success of the programme. These were put in place to ensure that all state and non-state actors and institutions involved in the programme are answerable to one another. The next section presents data on how the checks and balances worked in the implementation of COPE.

7.2. COPE in Practice: Data Presentation on Accountability

To begin with, as the main institution responsible for the implementation of COPE in Oyo state, the effectiveness of NAPEP’s checks and balance structure was necessary for ensuring accountability. Some of the NAPEP officials interviewed explained that the accountability structure of the OSSAP-MDGs required that they work with their own national office, which reports to the OSSAP-MDGs on its activities. For instance, one of the NAPEP officers in charge of the COPE funds that the NGO responsible for payment subsequently disburses to COPE beneficiaries explained that,

The funds for COPE beneficiaries come from the national office of NAPEP after the OSSAP-MDGs releases the money to them. What we do here is to fill out the necessary forms and apply for the monthly allocation that is used to pay beneficiaries. But since we are not directly involved in paying beneficiaries, we ensure that the NGO that is in-charge gets the money that is used to pay the beneficiaries monthly. The NGO is however expected to provide a monthly report
on how much was paid to beneficiaries each month. We then compile the report and send it back to our national office which reports back to the OSSAP-MDGs.\textsuperscript{87}

As confirmed by the NGO official responsible for payment, the accountability structure for ensuring NGOs are answerable to NAPEP was strictly adhered to, and a monthly report was submitted to NAPEP. The NGO official also added that to ensure accountability, the national office of NAPEP invited the NGO to Abuja for an assessment of the process of COPE’s implementation in Oyo state.

Furthermore, on how NAPEP ensures it effectively monitors and evaluates the implementation of COPE in communities, a NAPEP official explained that they occasionally paid visits to communities to speak with beneficiaries and CSAC members during the course of the programme’s implementation. The NAPEP official also added that the logistical challenges of getting to the remote locations of the communities and because of a lack of adequate financial resources, the frequency of such visits was low.\textsuperscript{88} The official expressed great disappointment and frustration over the fact that NAPEP did not provide enough resources to its officials to facilitate the effective monitoring and evaluation of the programme. This, according to the official, occasionally forced the field officers to utilise their own meager resources and salaries to visit the communities. Although the official mentioned that the local government chairperson, who was the head of the LGAC at the local government at the time of COPE’s implementation, sometimes supported both the NAPEP and local government officials with some funds to visit the communities, the funds were largely insufficient.\textsuperscript{89}

One of the local government officials responsible for COPE’s implementation also confirmed the low frequency of visits to the communities due to the lack of funds. This the

\textsuperscript{87}Interview with NAPEP official, Oyo state, 27-5-2013.
\textsuperscript{88}Interview with NAPEP official, Oyo state, 24-5-2013.
\textsuperscript{89}Ibid.
official noted hampered the monitoring and evaluation of the programme by local government staff as well.\textsuperscript{90} But the official also mentioned that despite its decentralized implementation model requiring sub-national state and local government involvement and support, COPE was still perceived as an initiative of the federal government.\textsuperscript{91} Thus, it was expected that much of the resources to support the implementation of the programme should be provided and supported through necessary transfers from the federal government. Hence, the limited resources available to the local government, and the inadequate funding for the monitoring and evaluation by the state and federal government, hampered the ability of the officials at the local level to effectively monitor and evaluate COPE. The inability of NAPEP and local government officials to regularly visit the communities meant that community members relied more on CSAC members for support during the programme’s implementation. But the low frequency of their visits also meant that regular contact and feedback from the CSACs members to the officials and vice versa was limited.

Within the communities, the lack of adequate resources, especially for community agents such as the school heads who are charged with the responsibility of monitoring and reporting school attendance of the children, equally affected the effective monitoring and evaluate of the programme.\textsuperscript{92} For instance, in CC, the school head noted that “I worked very hard to ensure that the programme succeeded by monitoring the children in my school but it was stressful and I was not rewarded for it. It would have been good to get some extra support for my efforts.”\textsuperscript{93} But according to some of the CSAC members, they considered their responsibility as a service to

\textsuperscript{90}\href{https://example.com/90}{Interview with local government official, Oyo state, 28-5-2013.}
\textsuperscript{91}\href{https://example.com/91}{Ibid.}
\textsuperscript{92}\textsuperscript{While no provisions were made for CSAC members to be paid for their services during the programme, the lack of any compensation dampened the moral of some CSAC members, and this was mentioned by both state officials and CSAC members themselves as a drawback, given the enormous time and efforts put into the implementation of the programme.}
\textsuperscript{93}\textsuperscript{Interview with school head in CC, 15-5-2013.}
their communities. For instance, according to the religious leader in CA, the close-knit nature of the community made keeping in touch with the beneficiaries an almost daily experience.\textsuperscript{94} For him, the wellbeing of the community members was a communal responsibility, considering that the community was selected to participate in COPE, it was important to monitor how children attended school and received immunisation.\textsuperscript{95}

The local chief in CB expressed a similar opinion, and explained that it was part of his responsibility to ensure people in his community are cared for, as well as making sure that the COPE beneficiaries fulfilled the conditions of the programme by sending their children to school and taking part in routine immunisation against diseases.\textsuperscript{96} The women leaders interviewed also considered their responsibility as a service to the communities, especially as a support to their fellow women who were beneficiaries of COPE. For instance, the women leader in CA explained that,

Looking at the women who benefited from the programme in my community, I know they appreciate my work because they often come to me to express their gratitude for assisting them with issues relating to the COPE programme. Each time the payment was scheduled I was always making sure that as many people were able to be there. The secretariat is not too close to our community so we have to plan on how to take public transport to get there.\textsuperscript{97}

The women leader in CB expressed the opinion that given her role as an active member of the community development association before COPE was implemented in her community, she was familiar with the needs of the women. As she explained,

As you can see around here, there are many women in need of assistance, even the widows that didn’t benefit the last time still come to me to ask when the next programme will commence and I tell them I don’t know but when it comes I shall inform them. During the programme, I was the one who normally call the officials to ask which date the payment will be and when our people should gather for their

\textsuperscript{94}Interview with religious leader in CA, 22-10-2013.
\textsuperscript{95}Ibid.
\textsuperscript{96}Interview with local chief in CB, 8-8-2013.
\textsuperscript{97}Interview with women leader in CA, 5-6-2013.
money. I sometimes organize for transportation depending on my availability. I also ask the women to make themselves available and not go anywhere else because some of them may decide to go to the farm or the market on the payment day and miss payment.98

The women’s leader in CC expressed similar sentiments with regard to helping her fellow women.99 Notably, as noted in the previous chapter, the inclusion of women as CSAC members, and the role they played in ensuring accountability was also widely acknowledged by both state officials and community members as the women leaders were often credited for being more responsive in answering questions on the programme. In this regard, and as a confirmation of the active roles played by the women in helping beneficiaries to answer some of their questions, a local government official mentioned that the women members of the CSACs were more active than the men in monitoring the programme.100 According to the official, “while some of the men were helpful, the women were more supportive and this may be because the beneficiaries were mostly women.”101

A NAPEP official also explained that despite the fact that there was no remuneration given to committee members, the women displayed more support for the programme. The official mentioned that some of the CSAC members in the communities became less enthusiastic about COPE because of the lack of compensation for their work during the implementation of the programme. In the official’s words,

Some of the CSAC members asked if they would also receive something for their work but we explained this was for their people so they should understand that helping their people was like helping them too. It seems the females amongst them really understood that the right people to get the payment were the

98 Interview with women leader in CB, 8-8-2013
99 Interview with women leader in CC, 15-5-2013.
100 Interview with local government official, Oyo state, 28-5-2013.
101 Ibid.
beneficiaries and not the committee members. They really assisted us throughout the programme.\textsuperscript{102}

According to a beneficiary in CA, “the [women’s leader] did a lot for us during the period that the programme was on. She was always making sure that we were informed about the programme. When we need to get paid sometimes, she would inform us ahead of time about how we will all move to the secretariat for our money.”\textsuperscript{103} Another beneficiary in CB expressed a similar view about the role that the women’s leader in CB played in answering some of the questions regarding when payment would be made. As she puts it, “she [women’s leader] helps us keep in touch with the government officials to know when our payment will be done and once we know the payment date, we plan ahead of time to go as a group to the venue of the payment. She was really like a mother to many of us and we appreciate her effort.”\textsuperscript{104} The women’s leader in CC was also described as having played a significant role as a member of the CSAC. As one beneficiary in CC explained, “it was the women’s leader that helped to coordinate how we get to the place of payment. She was also helpful in asking the officials any questions we had.”\textsuperscript{105}

Nonetheless, on their part, many beneficiaries mentioned they also ensured that the children attended school regularly and were immunised as scheduled. Even though some mentioned there were days the children could not attend school due to illness, they made sure this was reported to the school head and the children returned to school immediately they felt better. The beneficiaries also noted how the CSAC members regularly asked about the wellbeing of their children and informed them of impending immunisation of children either at the nearby hospitals or during visits of health workers to the community.

\textsuperscript{102} Interview with NAPEP official, Oyo state, 27-5-2013.
\textsuperscript{103} Interview with beneficiary in CA, 30-7-2013.
\textsuperscript{104} Interview with beneficiary in CB, 18-6-2013.
\textsuperscript{105} Interview with beneficiary in CC, 19-6-2013.
Beyond NAPEP’s role in providing checks and balances during the implementation of COPE in Oyo state, OSSAP-MDGs employed technical consultants and CSOs to fulfil the functions of independent external auditors. The oversight functions were designed to enhance answerability of actors and institutions at various levels. The reason for contracting a technical consultant to verify projects was explained by an OSSAP-MDGs official as follows,

The process of monitoring is done by the MDG state monitoring and evaluation implementation unit but the total evaluation of the impact is done by a consultant, an independent body to ensure accountability in the implementation of projects. The MDG monitoring unit is responsible for monitoring the state by state implementation of projects. But since we also want to know if actually the programmes are working and because we don’t want to send in someone from the national office or the state office that is doing the payment or selection to do the evaluation, the OSSAP-MDG work with some consultants in all their programmes.106

In an interview with the technical consultant contracted to verify the projects approved for the local government where CA, CB, and CC are located,

What we did was to collect information from officials of NAPEP and try as much as possible to trace what they claim to have done in all the communities. All the conditions they set we found out that they actually fulfilled those conditions. We also found out that most of the NAPEP officers put in those areas went into the communities….The job was divided into two between the consultant and civil society organization. The CSO was supposed to do focus group discussions, it was supposed to do interviews, and it was supposed to administer questionnaires. But the questionnaires that we [Consultants] administered were to get quantitative, not qualitative data.107

The technical consultant further explained that the focus of his own work was to verify whether COPE actually took place in the communities by cross checking with the local government authorities to see if the names of the people and the places chosen for the programme were consistent with the list received from the NAPEP office. These, he mentioned, were verified to be true, but he added that the CSO contracted to do the focus group discussion did not fulfil its

106 Interview with OSSAP-MDGs official, Abuja, 24-06-2013.
107 Interview with technical consultant, Oyo state, 04-06-2013.
part of the contract, and instead came to him for reports of the programme, which he declined to share with the CSO. According to the technical consultant, the CSO was inefficient in the discharge of its duties. As he explained it,

We were supposed to write a joint report but one thing I discovered was that they didn’t do the job. They just collected the money and they didn’t do the job. Unfortunately, the instructions to go and monitor and evaluate NAPEP projects came at a later stage so we had already divided our programme because they were wasting time and we cannot actually wait for them as consultants….The two organizations were supposed to complement each other so what we found quantitatively was supposed to be complemented by qualitative data. So what they ought to do was to get qualitative data from the members of the community, the local chiefs, and some of the beneficiaries. But in our case, we only observe and monitor what the NAPEP officials did. I can tell you NAPEP did their own part of the job.\(^{108}\)

Based on interactions and interviews with members of the community as at the time the field work of this study was conducted, the community members made no mention of knowing, meeting or having met with anyone or CSO to discuss their views on the programme during or after the programme ended. Furthermore, while narrating his experience working as a technical consultant for the OSSAP-MDGs, the consultant explained that the monitoring and evaluation systems put in place by the OSSAP-MDGs were faulty. According to him, the selection of some CSOs and technical consultants was not properly done in ways that ensured the organizations selected were properly verified to ascertain if they could properly do the job they are assigned. He also mentioned that the OSSAP-MDGs failed to act upon reports of discrepancies in project implementation when reported. For instance, the consultant cited some cases where certain turn-key projects such as boreholes were found to be missing after they had been reported as completed by the project contractors, but no action was taken on the report.\(^{109}\) Instead, the consultant added that he was subsequently dropped in the next round of

\(^{108}\)Ibid.

\(^{109}\)In confidence, the consultant showed this author a copy of the report and the discrepancies in the project executed.
recruitments for OSSAP-MDGs technical consultants. The next section provides analysis of the data for this dissertation as it relates to how the checks and balances operated in the implementation of COPE.

7.3. Accountability in COPE: An Analysis

The analysis of accountability in this section focuses on how COPE’s hybrid CBTM impeded or improved the checks and balances structures for ensuring actors and institutions were answerable to one another. To facilitate the analysis, the section is subdivided into two. The first subsection provides analysis in relation to answerability amongst state actors and institutions, especially the roles of OSSAP-MDGs and NAPEP. The second subsection provides analysis on the roles of non-state actors and institutions like the CSACs, the technical consultant, and the CSO. Based on the analysis provided, the chapter argues that despite efforts by some state and non-state actors and institutions in fulfilling their responsibilities, the weak administrative and technical capacity of the relevant state institutions, the absence of a grievance mechanism, and the lack of a mandatory public meeting for communities to assess the programme, impeded accountability. Therefore, the checks and balances structures failed to effectively improve answerability amongst different actors and institutions. It is argued that to ensure answerability and improve accountability in COPE through the CBTM, it is imperative to mandate state and non-state actors and institutions to be answerable to one another. This can be achieved through the provision of grievance mechanisms and regular mandatory meetings with community members by different external state and non-state actors and institutions.

7.3.1. Checks and Balances amongst State Actors and Institutions

As noted above, accountability in COPE was woven into the monitoring and evaluation mechanisms of the programme, and it was to be ensured through the various internal and external
processes of the OSSAP-MDGs and NAPEP. In addition, community agents and members were also required to participate in the programme’s monitoring and evaluation. But many of the various actors, either working individually or within the relevant implementing agencies, did not adequately abide by the processes set-up to provide robust checks and balances that can facilitate answerability. One major factor that impeded answerability through the checks and balances in COPE amongst state actors and institutions is the weak administrative and technical capacity of the relevant institutions, particularly OSSAP-MDGs and NAPEP, to effectively monitor and evaluate the programme. This weakness partly stems from the weak organizational structures of both institutions, and the fact that without the necessary structures needed to effectively implement the programme, COPE was hurriedly put together under the prodding of donors. The following paragraphs elaborate on these.

To begin with, without a strong organizational structure, the OSSAP-MDGs was created in 2005 after Nigeria secured a debt relief from the World Bank. But it did not only lack the organizational structure, it also lacked the adequate human resources to effectively engage the various MDAs in a decentralized three-tiered federal system in Nigeria. Even though it was able to pool a handful of officials from within the presidency and the federal civil service, working with hundreds of state and local government MDAs across the federation remains a challenge. Moreover, considering its lack of adequate human resources, the OSSAP-MDGs was limited in its ability to deploy adequate and capable staff to many states and local government areas. Although it set-up an internal monitoring and evaluation team at the centre as well as state monitoring and evaluation units in various states, these were largely understaffed.\(^{110}\) In particular, the state monitoring and evaluation teams were made up of staff who could not

\(^{110}\) Interview with OSSAP-MDGs official, Abuja, 24-06-2013.
effectively engage the numerous MDAs in states and local government areas where projects were sited. But this also affected the OSSAP-MDGs’ capacity to engage other non-state actors such as civil society organizations, technical consultants, and citizens that it relied on for ensuring accountability.

Yet, to ensure accountability through checks and balances, the internal monitoring and evaluation structure of the OSSAP-MDGs was supposed to be complemented by the external monitoring and evaluation that consultants, CSOs, and citizens were expected to provide. But providing adequate oversight over the activities of those contracted to facilitate accountability was problematic due to the OSSAP-MDGs’ weak organizational structure and inadequate human resources. As the technical consultant contracted by the OSSAP-MDGs to verify some infrastructure projects already approved and paid for by the OSSAP-MDGs mentioned above, when reports showing discrepancies are submitted, actions are often not taken nor sanctions applied as necessary. Although the OSSAP-MDGs recognizes that some project contractors are only in business to defraud the government, and notes that it blacklists the project contractors that are found to have engaged in fraud, it acknowledges its limited abilities in ensuring sufficient monitoring of its projects and programmes (OSSAP-MDGs 2015).

Furthermore, specifically in relation to COPE, OSSAP-MDGs was unable to provide adequate oversight in monitoring the CSOs contracted to engage with the communities. As mentioned in the previous section, the CSO contracted to conduct interviews and focus group discussions in the three communities involved in this study did not do so. This prevented the communities from having an input in the accountability process set-up by OSSAP-MDGs because the beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries did not get a chance to evaluate COPE’s implementation in their communities. During interviews with community members, it was
obvious that they were unaware of the fact that a CSO was required to visit their communities to interact with them about their experiences with COPE. When asked if anyone or organization had visited their community to get their feedback or follow-up on their participation in COPE, members of the three communities confirmed that no organization or individual had visited their communities, and that the only officials they have interacted with are those from NAPEP, the state, and the local government. While this confirms the inadequate access to information on COPE itself as mentioned in the previous chapter, it shows that the checks and balances put in place by OSSAP-MDGs failed to incorporate the perspectives of the community members.

On its part, having been given the responsibility to implement COPE by the OSSAP-MDGs, ensuring checks and balances required more human resources for NAPEP as well. But it was also understaffed. More so, its top-down structure for coordinating other poverty alleviation programmes was incompatible with COPE’s implementation strategy, and additional resources were needed to improve implementation. The CBTM used in COPE required community participation in the implementation of COPE, and its newness required that additional human and material resources should be provided. As noted in the previous chapter, the CBTM used in COPE was a new approach and all the NAPEP officials interviewed for this study confirmed that they had no prior experience implementing programmes through the hybrid CBTM, and were unfamiliar with CCTs as well. Hence, although NAPEP set-up SSACs, LGACs and CSACs at the state, local government and community levels, respectively, to assist with the responsibilities of coordinating and fostering accountability in COPE, the SSACs, LGACs, and CSACs did not possess the necessary resources to ensure the effective monitoring and evaluation needed to improve answerability amongst the various state and non-state actors and institutions. In the case of the SSAC, a NAPEP official mentioned that it only met a few times, and once the benefiting
local governments were selected, the SSAC did not engage with the supervision of the programme’s implementation.\textsuperscript{111} While the SSAC was supposed to coordinate, monitor and evaluate the programme across the state, it was also responsible for mobilizing resources at the state level, and ensuring accountability amongst the officials and institutions involved in COPE. But the lack of adequate human and material resources restricted the performance of the responsibilities assigned to the committee. To fulfil its responsibilities, it required support from the Oyo state government. Yet, due to lack of funds as at the time COPE was launched in the state, the state government itself was unable to provide the counterpart funding required for increasing the number of people who should benefit from the programme or even to adequately support the implementation of the programme generally.\textsuperscript{112}

To be sure, when COPE was launched in 2007, the federal government required that each state should provide counterpart funding for the implementation of COPE in their state and ensure that more people benefit from the programme in each state. But the Oyo state government was unable to provide its own counterpart funds.\textsuperscript{113} The federal government nonetheless allowed the implementation of the programme in states that did not provide funds, given the importance of addressing the low human capital development levels in the 12 states that were chosen from the six geopolitical zones for the first phase of COPE.\textsuperscript{114} But the lack of counterpart funds affected the overall implementation of the programme, and further limited the number of people that could have benefited from COPE. The logistical support that the local and state governments provided was limited. The lack of resources at the state level, coupled with the same at the local level, affected the role of NAPEP in ensuring adequate checks and balances through the effective

\textsuperscript{111}Interview with NAPEP official, Oyo state, 24-5-2013.
\textsuperscript{112}Interview with Oyo state government official, 15-8-2013.
\textsuperscript{113}Interview with NAPEP official, Oyo state, 24-5-2013.
\textsuperscript{114}Ibid.
monitoring and evaluation of COPE. This also meant relying on NAPEP field officers and local government officials as the main contacts with the communities. Yet, the lack of adequate resources hampered the ability of NAPEP field officers and local government officials to effectively monitor and evaluate the programme. As mentioned by different officials, the remote locations of the communities meant that visits were occasional, and that the poor financial resources provided by NAPEP and the local government was highly insufficient, forcing them to sometimes use their own resources without any reimbursement. Thus, by relying on field officials without providing the necessary logistical support for them to gather information from the communities, the inadequate resources hampered the ability of field officials to visit and engage with community members on a regular basis. Although this can be partly attributed to the lack of resources, it also shows that the checks and balances system put in place suffered severe limitations.

Consequently, the ineffective system of checks and balances provided by NAPEP created a situation whereby community members relied on the information provided by CSAC members who relayed any enquiries from community members to the officials whenever the officials visited.\textsuperscript{115} When combined, it is clear that the checks and balances structures put in place by NAPEP and OSSAP-MDGs were ineffective in promoting answerability in COPE as a cardinal feature of accountability. Nonetheless, it is important to place the weak capacity of these institutions in the larger context of the poor capacity of the Nigerian state itself. Considering that state capacity to effectively implement government programmes and policies is “a distinct component of any definition of national development” (Pritchett et al. 2013: 1), the failures of the state institutions responsible for COPE indicate a systemic problem with the implementation

\textsuperscript{115}Although most of the people interviewed did not express concerns about having issues they would have preferred asking officials directly, the absence of alternate sources of information would have improved accountability in the implementation of the programme.
of programmes in Nigeria. As discussed in chapter three, following years of neoliberal economic reforms that weakened the ability of public institutions and the bureaucracy to function effectively, the federal government of Nigeria often establishes institutions like NAPEP and OSSAP-MDGs whenever it seeks to implement poverty alleviation programmes. But since the officials of these institutions are drawn primarily from the already weakened public service, the institutions tend to lack the administrative and technical capacities. In addition, their mandates are sometimes unclear and overlap with existing institutions. For instance, as one academic expert mentioned during an interview, the problems experienced with NAPEP’s role in COPE’s implementation is not unconnected with the fact that NAPEP was created to mainly “coordinate” and not “implement” poverty alleviation programmes.\textsuperscript{116} For him, that NAPEP was given the responsibility to implement COPE meant creating new structures that it never had before as an institution mandated to coordinate and not necessary implement poverty alleviation programmes.\textsuperscript{117}

Moreover, aside from the fact that these newly created institutions often lack the necessary organizational foundations, they also have to contend with weaker capacities at lower levels of government. Unsurprisingly, according to a report published by the OSSAP-MDGs in 2010, coordinating MDG projects in Nigeria is challenging because of the weak capacities at the lower tiers of government. According to the OSSAP-MDGs, weak capacity of government MDAs at the sub-national levels where projects are implemented is a major problem in the implementation of projects and programmes (OSSAP-MDGs 2010: 22). Likewise, while painting a mixed picture of Nigeria’s overall performance on the MDGs, another report published by the OSSAP-MDGs in 2015 maintains that the poor intergovernmental coordination amongst the

\textsuperscript{116}Interview with academic expert on social protection in Nigeria, Oyo state, 11-6-2013.

\textsuperscript{117}Ibid.
various tiers of government affected the implementation of MDG programmes and projects (OSSAP-MDGs 2015: xxiv). Given the problem of poor capacity at the lower tiers of government, and the challenge of coordinating intergovernmental relations in Nigeria, OSSAP-MDGs’ weak decentralized organizational structure compounded its monitoring and evaluation capacity.

Nonetheless, the neoliberal origins of COPE as a social protection programme that is based on a social risk management framework, and the impromptu manner in which the programme was introduced, also placed additional pressures on the capacities of both NAPEP and OSSAP-MDGs to effectively operate the checks and balances structures that could have fostered answerability. In the words of an international organization official,

COPE came as a result of an attempt by the government to implement a social protection initiative. It is a form of a CCT. When the whole discussion about social protection began those past years and the government team with the prompting of the World Bank and the rest of them wanted to demonstrate one of the key interventions within social protection, the one that quickly came to mind and with chances of demonstrating what could be done was the COPE CCT.\textsuperscript{118}

The official further explained that,

The major emphasis at the beginning was how do we protect poor households from falling into intergenerational poverty? That is, to protect families from falling further into poverty by focusing on investment and improving human capital. The appropriate mechanism then was a CCT. But a CCT requires strong building blocks and structures. The first problem with COPE was that the systems were not put in place. Two, it was then overloaded. It was turned into a poverty reduction mechanism rather than a social protection mechanism. Because they quickly added a third condition to it which is skills building and then added other institutions that needed to provide training and other guidelines that households need to follow. But there was no way of monitoring all of these or supervising all of these. So it became an overloaded programme right from day one that was not also on a solid foundation so it did not really achieve much, so that’s why as at today nobody is seriously talking about COPE.

\textsuperscript{118} Interview with official of international organization in Nigeria, Oyo state, 2-7-2013.
The importance of the quote above should be noted in relation to the influence of the World Bank in the adoption of social protection programmes in Africa. As mentioned in chapter four, the landscape of social protection in Africa is dominated by donors, and in countries where the World Bank is influential, it requires countries to incorporate social protection programmes such as CCTs into their Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSP), which are prepared in consultation with the staff of the IMF and the World Bank (Chitonge 2012; Craig and Porter 2003). According to the IMF (2005), Nigeria’s PRSP, which is also known as the National Economic Empowerment and Development (NEEDS), was prepared by officials of the Nigerian government in consultation with staff of the IMF, the World Bank, and some other stakeholders. Like other PRSPs on the African continent, NEEDS mainly represents a neoliberal approach to development and poverty reduction. More so, given that the World Bank requires countries to incorporate social protection as part of their PRSPs, such social protection programmes tend to reflect the World Bank’s neoliberal SRM approach that privileges market mechanisms over the state’s involvement in social provisioning. It should also be added that Nigeria’s adoption of NEEDS as a PRSP in 2004 was also a demonstration of its willingness to deepen neoliberal reforms as it sought debt relief from the World Bank and other creditors. Thus, its subsequent adoption of COPE was to further demonstrate its readiness to invest any of the money that was saved from servicing its debt into poverty reduction programmes for the poor.

In furtherance of this, and despite the lack of adequate structures to support the implementation of COPE across the federation, the COPE was also “overloaded” with a skills acquisition programme. The implication of such an overload for the capacities of the relevant state institutions cannot be overemphasized in the Nigerian context, where state institutions are
weak at all levels. Although NAPEP has the main responsibility of implementing COPE in partnership with the OSSAP-MDGs, it was expected to also liaise with other state institutions like the Small and Medium Enterprises Development Agency of Nigeria (SMEDAN) and the National Directorate of Employment (NDE) to provide skills acquisition training to household members that are nominated by the household heads for training. Thus, aside from paying households a Basic Income Guarantee (BIG) of maximum five thousand Nigerian Naira (N5000) every month, selected households also receive a total of N84000 at the end of the programme. The latter is to enable them to start a business or trade at the end of their one year participation in the programme, and this one-time grant of N84000 is known as the Poverty Reduction Accelerator Investment (PRAI). As stated in the NAPEP (2007a) programme document,

> The PRAI is a guaranteed investment grant to the head of the household toward the end of the programme to start a business of his/her own or invest in a profitable business venture that will yield sufficient income to sustain the household after the completion of 12 months of receiving the Basic Income Guarantee (BIG). The PRAI represents a compulsory saving component of the COPE programme.

According to some NAPEP officials, the skills acquisition aspect was designed to help households acquire skills to generate incomes or start a trade after they exit the programme. This is the “exit” or “graduation” strategy in social protection parlance.119 But the poor coordination between NAPEP and the institutions responsible for providing training affected the provision of such training to beneficiaries. The beneficiaries interviewed explained that for those who claim they were previously skilled in certain trades or businesses, they did not receive any formal

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119 As social protection programmes continue to proliferate in many countries, scholars and policymakers are increasingly becoming interested in how people “graduate” out of poverty. This has heralded questions about how beneficiaries of social protection programmes can exit the programmes. In the case of COPE, the PRAI was considered a means of graduating beneficiaries from the programme and helping them continue in supporting their families after their participation in the programme.
training, but instead were given equipment and/or money to engage in a chosen business or trade. Consequently, the NAPEP officials simply asked what kinds of equipment would be needed for each beneficiary to commence the trade or business of their choice at the end of the programme. Some of the equipment purchased by NAPEP on behalf of beneficiaries included mostly power (electricity) generating sets, sewing machines, hairdressing and grinding machines.\textsuperscript{120} But the equipment purchased for beneficiaries who indicated interest in starting a business or trade did not exceed the amount allocated for the PRAI. Yet, some of the beneficiaries claimed that the equipment they would have preferred to buy was not purchased for them, owing to the high costs of the equipment. In the words of one beneficiary who stated she was a tailor/seamstress by profession, “the equipment I really required for my work is not the one I got. The ones I got cannot do the job as I would have liked it and I couldn’t buy the main one I wanted for lack of enough money so I haven’t been able to do a lot since they bought the other ones for me.”\textsuperscript{121}

Some other beneficiaries stated that the equipment purchased for them to engage in their chosen trade or vocation no longer function, and they are left with no other options but to look for other sources of employment. Others, especially women who did not have any household members to present for the training were given the PRAI money to engage in the buying and selling of goods and commodities.\textsuperscript{122} Given that the skills acquisition or trade aspects of COPE was a cardinal design in the programme to support families after they exit the programme, adequate monitoring and evaluation of this aspect could have been done more effectively to ensure that officials were duly answerable to the beneficiaries. After the programme ended, no follow-up strategy was put in place to monitor the progress of the beneficiaries. Although some

\textsuperscript{120}Documents containing details of the equipment purchased for the beneficiaries were shown to the author during a visit to NAPEP office in Oyo state.
\textsuperscript{121}Interview with beneficiary in CB, 22-8-2013.
\textsuperscript{122}Interview with NAPEP official, 24-5-2013.
officials identified this as a major lacuna that should have been addressed in the programme’s design, nothing was done to support beneficiaries after they exited from the programme. Yet, without the necessary support after the programme ended, the beneficiaries were expected to fulfill the function of taking care of their households.

In addition to the weak capacity of OSSAP-MDGs and NAPEP in ensuring that the checks and balances structures operated properly, the poor state capacity of the Nigerian state itself also affected the identification of erring or hard working officials. As a crucial element of governance, the capacity of a state to effectively sanction or reward diligent officials is important (Diamond 2004). But the failure of state actors and institutions to effectively oversee the implementation of COPE not only affected the application of sanctions, but also the reward of hardworking officials in COPE. More so, how the activities of both OSSAP-MDGs and NAPEP as institutions of government were to be effectively reviewed were unclear in relation to COPE. While the OSSAP-MDGs and NAPEP had sanctions in place for other non-state actors, what the actual sanctions were for them were unclear. Compounding the problem created by unclear sanctions for officials at the federal level is the fact that COPE was designed to be implemented within a decentralized governance framework which involves officials from the state and local government areas as well. However, officials of the state and local governments are not employees of the federal government, but rather employees of the state and local governments who are subject to different civil service disciplinary processes. It should nonetheless be noted that within the Nigerian federation, the centralization of governmental power and authority at the federal level further weakens the capacity of MDAs at the lower tiers of government. Aside from being poorly staffed and lacking the necessary financial resources to monitor the activities of their officials, the availability and application of sanctions at the state and local government
levels were equally unclear. As the discussion in the next subsection will show, the poor state capacity at all levels negatively affected the checks and balances available for non-state actors and institutions as well.

7.3.2. Checks and Balances amongst Non-State Actors and Institutions

Beyond the weak operation of the checks and balances experienced by state actors and institutions in COPE, the weak state capacity of the Nigerian state also affected the operation of the checks and balances amongst non-state actors and institutions. Considering that the CBTM adopted for COPE was designed to enhance decentralized governance for state and non-state actors and institutions, the weak capacity of the state to operate effective checks and balances undermined overall accountability amongst non-state actors and institutions. Recall, aside from the involvement of state actors and institutions, it is recommended that to be effective, CBTMs should involve community agents such as CSAC members and other NGOs and CSOs for accountability purposes. It is argued that the “best” CBTMs should be designed in a way that ensures local agents are kept “accountable through external auditing and evaluation, and institutions such as mandatory public meetings, and competition amongst groups for contracts and elected office” (Conning and Kevane 2002: 388). For COPE, although the NGO and CSO were contracted as external auditors to ensure accountability, the fact that the external auditors were only answerable to the state actors and institutions that contracted them affected accountability to the people. More so, the poor capacity of the state actors and institutions affected their ability to ensure that the CSO employed by OSSAP-MDGs to serve as an intermediary between the state and the communities performed its assigned duties.

While it was confirmed that the NGO performed its responsibilities, the CSO failed to perform its functions. Although it is often acknowledged that civil society organizations are also
vulnerable to corruption, the failure to effectively monitor the activities of CSOs in COPE and ensure the application of sanctions to erring organizations affected the accountability in the programme. But while the failure of the CSO employed by OSSAP-MDGs may be taken as additional evidence that CSOs can also fail in promoting accountability in the public interest, it further raises the question of how genuine participation by non-state institutions such as CSOs can be achieved within neoliberalism inspired programmes like COPE. What is more, although the reason that the CSO contracted by OSSAP-MDGs to engage with communities failed to fulfil its function is not entirely clear, the inability of the state to properly ensure checks and balances further places the people at a disadvantage, vis-à-vis other actors and institutions. Yet, given that mandatory public meetings are important for ensuring accountability in CBTMs, the failure of the CSO to conduct interviews and FGDs in the communities created a huge gap in achieving accountability.

Furthermore, the absence of grievance mechanisms for community members to express their views on the programme worsened accountability to the people. Although it may be argued that the interviews and FGDs that the CSO was contracted to conduct constitutes an attempt by OSSAP-MDGs to provide an avenue for the communities to assess the programme and express any grievances, the extent to which such interviews and FGDs can be representative of a grievance mechanism is debatable. Tellingly, the absence of any grievance mechanisms for citizens to alternatively hold state and non-state actors and institutions accountable was a major omission in the implementation of COPE. For instance, when beneficiaries are deemed to have failed in fulfilling the conditions of the programme, NAPEP delists their names and stops payment as a form of sanction against the household.\textsuperscript{123} But without any grievance mechanism or appeal process, sanctioned beneficiaries lose their benefits, and are no longer able to participate

\textsuperscript{123} Interview with NAPEP official, Oyo state, 27-5-2013.
in the programme. The absence of such grievance mechanisms or appeal processes is further indication of how beneficiaries were accountable to officials and not vice versa. Recall that one of the main arguments in support of hybrid CBTMs is the accountability they can bring to social programmes, a grievance mechanism would have helped to fill the gap created by the failures of other state and non-state actors such as the CSO to engage with communities.

On their part, although community members, including the CSAC members, made efforts to provide answers and support to one another during the implementation of COPE, the lack of answerability by other state and non-state actors to the community members placed them at the receiving end of the spectrum. In other words, while the community members were answerable to other state and non-state actors, the other actors and institutions were not answerable to the community. But regardless of the efforts of the community members to support one another, the poor operation of the checks and balances and the absence of any grievance mechanism to hold other state and non-state actors and institutions accountable weakened accountability to the community members. It might have been useful for OSSAP-MDGs and/or NAPEP to provide at least a medium such as a mailing address that beneficiaries can send their complaints to if they had any, or provide any other alternate means for the people to communicate with the state and non-state actors more effectively and directly. But given OSSAP-MDGs’ organizational drawbacks as well as NAPEP’s poor capacity to ensure effective monitoring and evaluation besides relying on the contact of its officials with CSACs and community members, no grievance mechanisms were provided.

7.4. Summary of Chapter and Findings

This chapter focused on answering the second sub-question of this dissertation, that is, how was accountability improved or impeded through the CBTM in the implementation of Nigeria’s
COPE CCT programme in Oyo state? It mainly examined the checks and balances structures put in place to ensure accountability amongst the different state and non-state actors and institutions in the implementation of the programme. As discussed in this chapter, the checks and balances structures put in place by OSSAP-MDGs and NAPEP to ensure accountability in the implementation of the programme were found to be generally weak, and this impeded answerability amongst various state and non-state actors and institutions. In addition, the imbalance in the answerability of one actor to the other placed community members at the bottom and affected the interaction between state and non-state actors and institutions in COPE.\textsuperscript{124} The lack of administrative and technical capacity on the part of state actors and institutions was found to have significantly weakened the system of accountability in COPE. At the same time, the neoliberal origins of COPE, and its introduction soon after Nigeria gained a debt relief from the World Bank in 2005, created a situation whereby the programme’s structures were hurriedly put together without due consideration for the capacity of state institutions and actors to effectively perform the tasks assigned to them.

It is equally instructive to add that in a country like Nigeria where some maintain a “culture of transparency and accountability” is absent, the lack of attention to creating effective governance structures before embarking on the implementation of COPE affected the accountability that the CBTM could have provided.\textsuperscript{125} The failure of the CSO that was contracted by OSSAP-MDGs to meet with community members to perform its functions was worsened by the inability of OSSAP-MDGs and NAPEP to ensure that the community members had access to any grievance mechanisms, which they could use to express their views

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\textsuperscript{124}More so, given the weak capacity of state institutions, ensuring sanctions are in place to address any deviation from expected duties on the part of state and non-state actors and institutions was difficult.

\textsuperscript{125}In an interview with a staff of a donor agency in Lagos, the staff argued that the work of the agency is focused mainly on governance because they believe Nigeria needs to fix its lack of a culture of transparency and accountability before development can take place in the country.
\end{flushright}
on the programme. The inadequate human and material resources from various levels of government also limited how much engagement the different committees set-up by NAPEP to assist in the coordination of COPE could have with the communities. Despite the efforts of NAPEP and local government officials to regularly visit communities to engage with the people, the lack of resources reduced the frequency of their visits. The informal accountability provided by members of the CSACs, especially the women helped to mitigate some of the problems associated with the weak accountability in COPE.

Consequently, based on the discussion in this chapter, the findings of this study can be summarized as follows. First, the checks and balances put in place by both NAPEP and OSSAP-MDGs in the implementation of COPE were weak in practice, and this impeded accountability in the programme. The weak operation of the checks and balances contributed to the failures experienced in ensuring that various state and non-state actors were answerable to one another. More so, the lack of clarity on the availability and application of sanctions against state and non-state actors was an impediment to accountability. Second, the fact that COPE was implemented within a neoliberal SRM framework without the necessary supporting structures compounded the weak state capacity problem. Third, the absence of any grievance mechanism for beneficiaries to express their views and seek redress as appropriate impeded accountability.

Put together, in relation to the analytical framework of this study, while the CBTM allows for mechanisms that could have been used to foster accountability, its weak operation in practice impeded accountability in COPE. With specific reference to the responsibilities of community agents such as the CSAC members in the three communities, although some members were answerable to both community members and officials, the overall weakness of the accountability structure affected their ability to engage effectively with the programme. In
particular, the inability of community members to ensure other actors and institutions were answerable to them impeded the accountability that the CBTM was supposed to bring about, provided the checks and balances structures put in place by OSSAP-MDGs had functioned effectively. Moreover, despite the fact that some of the CSAC members interpreted their accountability responsibilities as part of their service to the communities, the failure to hold other actors and institutions accountable was detrimental to the overall levels of accountability that the community members deserve. The next chapter concludes this dissertation with a discussion of the implications of the findings of this study for the governance of social protection programmes in developing countries through CBTMs.
Chapter Eight
Conclusion
As programmes designed to help poor individuals, households and communities overcome poverty, vulnerabilities and risks, social protection programmes have become important tools for assisting many poor people in developing countries in the past three decades. Owing to the failures of many state bureaucracies to effectively ensure transparency and accountability in the delivery of social protection programmes to the poor, questions and debates about how to govern social protection programmes are being raised in many developing countries. These questions and debates have become more salient in light of the limited resources available for social protection in many developing countries, which necessitates the selection of the poor based on targeting methods and mechanisms. While such calls continue to be made, proponents and critics of community-based targeting mechanisms (CBTMs) have argued for and against the use of CBTMs as a means of overcoming some of the concerns about transparency and accountability in the governance of social protection programmes in developing countries.

While some critics of CBTMs argue that the use of CBTMs as governance mechanisms for the implementation of social protection programmes lead to the capture and diversion of benefits meant for the poor by state and non-state actors, proponents maintain that CBTMs, especially those that are designed as hybrid models or systems that include both state and non-state actors and institutions, will produce positive outcomes for the poor. Hence, although critics believe that CBTMs are beset with problems such as patron-clientelism, capture of programme benefits by local elites as well as different forms of corruption, fraud and errors, proponents argue that the use of hybrid CBTMs will not only allow benefits to reach the poor, but also improve accountability and transparency in the governance of social protection programmes. For the proponents, CBTMs that involve local community agents and state officials in hybrid
systems or models represent the “best” arrangements for overcoming some of the dangers that often plague community participation in the governance of social protection programmes. Nonetheless, despite the arguments put forward by proponents and critics of hybrid CBTMs, empirical evidence is sparse and inconclusive in the literature about how CBTMs impede or improve transparency and accountability in the governance of social protection programmes (Young and Maxwell 2013; Maxwell et al. 2010; Gilligan et al. 2005; Chisinga 2005; Marchione 2005). Moreover, despite their popularity and presence as social protection programmes in many developing countries as well as the use of CBTMs to implement them, especially in African countries, studies of how CBTMs are used to implement Conditional Cash Transfers are few in the academic literature.

To this end, and in contributing towards filling some of the gaps in the extant literature on the governance of social protection programmes in developing countries through hybrid CBTMs, this dissertation was a case study of the hybrid CBTM used in the implementation of Nigeria’s “In Care of the People” CCT programme in three communities in Oyo State, southwestern, Nigeria. The COPE CCT programme was launched in 2007 by the Federal Government of Nigeria as part of MDGs related pro-poor programmes, which the country agreed to implement following the debt relief it received from the World Bank and other creditors in 2005. While the National Poverty Eradication Programme (NAPEP) was the major state institution responsible for the implementation of COPE in Nigeria, it was mandated to work with the Office of the Senior Special Assistant to the President on the MDGs (OSSAP-MDGs) in the implementation of COPE. The OSSAP-MDGs provides and supervises the utilization of the funds for COPE. But unlike other social protection and poverty eradication programmes that are
implemented through top-down bureaucratic mechanisms, NAPEP adopted the use of CBTMs to implement COPE.

Nigeria’s COPE CCT contains the recommended features of a hybrid CBTM. These features include the use of quotas and categorical targeting for selecting beneficiaries, the creation of village/community councils comprising community agents, and the involvement of state/government officials, which ensures a hybrid of state and non-state actors. Specifically, in the case of COPE, the selection of beneficiaries was limited to a maximum of ten households per community; the programme targeted beneficiaries that belong to demographic categories such as households headed by females, the elderly, people with disabilities, persons living with HIV/AIDS, and victims of VVF; and it established community social assistance committees (CSACs) comprising community agents like the local community heads, women representatives, religious leaders, school heads, and health workers. In addition, COPE also involved NGOs and CSOs who worked as external auditors alongside the state and non-state actors and institutions in the implementation of the programme (NAPEP 2007a). As such, in theory, COPE’s implementation strategy qualifies as a hybrid CBTM that is designed to improve transparency and accountability.

Using a mixed-methodology approach that combined qualitative and quantitative data and interpretive thematic analysis, the main aim of the study was to examine how hybrid CBTMs improve or impede transparency and accountability in the governance of social protection programmes in developing countries. The study was conducted with the objectives to understand and ascertain the factors that impeded or improved transparency and accountability in the implementation of COPE. Participatory governance theory was used as a theoretical framework to guide the study, and the analytical framework applied examined how transparency and
accountability were impeded or improved in the implementation of the COPE CCT programme. For transparency, the analysis focused on how the interactions of various state and non-state actors and institutions improved or impeded the decision-making processes for choosing eligible households, and the availability of, and access to, information about the programme by all state and non-state actors and institutions. The analysis of accountability focused on how the various checks and balances put in place to ensure that the various actors and institutions were answerable to one another operated in practice.

Overall, as discussed in this dissertation, the use of the hybrid CBTM in Nigeria reveals some important findings in relation to transparency and accountability in the governance of social protection in developing countries. On transparency, the study found that the CBTM used in the governance of the COPE programme in Nigeria helped to improve transparency through a more inclusive selection process that involved community agents such as the village head, religious and women leaders. The knowledge and understanding of the community leaders assisted in the selection of the beneficiaries of the programme. In addition, the fact that the selection of beneficiaries was also conducted in open deliberative spaces like village squares or community halls within the three communities that participated in this study helped to improve transparency in the implementation of the programme. However, the study also found that the unidirectional flow of information about the programme from the government officials to the community members impeded the overall transparency of the programme. This was because the lack of alternative sources of information for community members limited their ability to fully understand the different aspects of the programme. The community members only obtained information on the programme from the officials, and did not have access to information through
other understandable forms like printed information manuals in local languages and the mass media such as local radio stations and/or newspapers.

Flowing partly from the factors that impeded transparency, accountability in COPE was weak. The checks and balances structures that were put in place to ensure answerability between and amongst various state and non-state actors and institutions were ineffective in ensuring that the different stakeholders were accountable to one another for their actions and inactions. While the community members were answerable to state actors and institutions, the checks and balances structures did not ensure that state and other non-state actors and institutions were answerable to the communities. In addition, accountability was impeded in COPE because of the absence of any grievance mechanisms that the community members could utilise to express their views on the programme and demand answers from the state. But the poor accountability recorded in COPE relates to the overall weak administrative and technical capacity of the state institutions charged with the responsible to effectively monitor and evaluate the programme. Specifically, as the main agency responsible for COPE’s implementation, NAPEP’s inability to effectively coordinate the implementation, monitoring and evaluation of COPE with other state institutions, especially the OSSAP-MDGs, negatively affected accountability in the programme’s implementation. On its part, however, the OSSAP-MDGs failed to conduct effective supervision of the CSO it contracted to serve as an external audit for the programme.

The CSO was responsible for conducting external audit on COPE by meeting with the community members and collecting information on the views of the programme. But during the course of conducting the fieldwork for this dissertation, it was discovered that the CSO did not perform its duties, and that the community members were not informed about the external audit component of the programme by either NAPEP or the OSSAP-MDGs. Consequently, the failure
of the CSO to perform its duties and the failure of OSSAP-MDGs to ensure accountability through external audit due to its weak internal accountability mechanisms, further eroded accountability within COPE, especially for the community members. Hence, the weak capacity of state actors and institutions affected the overall levels of transparency and accountability that could have been achieved in the governance of the programme, notwithstanding the positive outcomes mentioned above. But the weak capacity of state actors and institutions is traceable to the poor foundation upon which COPE was founded and the hasty manner in which the programme was implemented. Notably, as a social protection programme with the objectives of reducing vulnerability amongst the core poor and breaking the intergenerational transmission of poverty in poor households, COPE required a lot of human and material resources and strong administrative and technical capacities from different state institutions. Yet, even though these were largely missing in NAPEP and OSSAP-MDGs, the programme was hastily implemented.

Beyond the specific findings on transparency and accountability, the study also found that the CBTM used in COPE contributed to the governance of the programme by preventing potential elite capture. This is quite significant in the Nigerian context, where the actual and potential capture of programme benefits by elites often constitute major impediments to reaching the poor. The prevention of elite capture of benefits in the three communities in this study is mainly attributable to the fact that the CBTM helped to open up decision-making spaces for community members and other local agents to directly participate in the programme. It should be noted that one of the main arguments of the critics of community participation in the implementation of social protection programmes is that such participation only empowers local elites and promotes patron-client relationships in countries like Nigeria, where patrimonialism and neopatrimonialism are considered to be pervasive. Yet, the novelty of the CBTM, and the
deliberative spaces it opened for the participation of various community agents, prevented potential capture of the programme. But it is also possible that patronage was avoided because local elites and politicians considered the benefits of the programme to be quite low and/or that the low coverage levels of the programme did not provide sufficient incentives for local elites to capture the benefits and expand their patron-client networks. However, it is not uncommon for corrupt state official, local politicians and elites to collude and divert the benefits of social programmes in Nigeria, regardless of the small sizes or coverage of the benefits. As such, it is noteworthy that the use of the CBTMs in the case of COPE functioned in a way that not only prevented local elites and politicians from hijacking the benefits, but it also allowed those who truly deserve the benefits to receive them.

In addition, the study also found that the CBTM provided the opportunity for women to participate as leaders in the implementation of the COPE programme, and the participation of women contributed to some of the positive outcomes recorded in the programme’s implementation. Notably, unlike what obtains in most social protection programmes in Nigeria and elsewhere, where women only participate as beneficiaries, the CBTM allowed women to participate in COPE as leaders as well. In particular, this is a departure from previous practices in Nigeria where most women, especially those in the rural areas, are often excluded from decision-making processes and institutions. The participation of women as leaders in COPE was, therefore, an improvement from previous practices, and the positive outcomes recorded as a result of women’s participation as leaders illustrates the need to ensure that women are treated as

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126 For instance, an Oyo state government official in charge of some community development projects across the state narrated his experience with some local politicians. While trying to convince the politicians to allow some non-partisan communities to get certain projects such as the refurbishment of schools and healthcare centres, some politicians stated that only communities where their supporters reside should get the projects and not others. The official added that although he sometimes manages to convince the politicians to see reasons for those in need to get the benefits, he maintained that some politicians prefer the projects are not implemented at all in any area, rather than the projects being placed in areas deemed to be against the politicians’ interest or in places where the politicians are unable to claim ownership of the projects (Interview with Oyo state government official, 10-9-2013).
equal partners in the implementation of social protection programmes in developing countries like Nigeria. Indeed, by building on the pre-existing informal accountability structures in the communities, the three women leaders that served as members of the CSACs, that is, the village committees set up as part of the CBTMs for COPE, were able to ensure and promote the interest of the beneficiaries who were mostly women in the three communities. In this vein, although many women in Nigeria still remain excluded from governance processes, and while it would require more interventions for women to overcome the structural and multidimensional poverty that they experience in Nigeria as explained in chapter three of this dissertation, the inclusion of women as leaders in COPE ensured that women were allowed into formerly closed-off decision-making spaces that were hitherto controlled and dominated by men.

Putting the findings of this study together, this dissertation argued that while the hybrid CBTM contributed to some positive outcomes in the governance of COPE in Oyo state, southwestern Nigeria, the level of transparency could have been improved if information was available and accessible to the community members in understandable and accessible forms such as information manuals printed in local languages or the mass media. It also argued that accountability was largely impeded in the implementation of the programme as a result of the weak capacity of state institutions like NAPEP and OSSAP-MDGs. The weak capacity of these institutions affected the poor operation of the checks and balances structures put in place by the two institutions. Consequently, with special reference to the Nigerian context, the dissertation maintains that improving the capacity of state institutions to implement social protection programmes in partnership with non-state actors and institutions will be essential to promoting transparency and accountability. In this regard, enhancing the capacity of NAPEP as the main poverty eradication agency charged with the implementation of COPE is crucial. Indeed, as
discussed in this dissertation, the problems associated with NAPEP range from poor coordination and lack of skilled personnel to weak monitoring and evaluation of programmes. Although these problems surfaced in the case of COPE, the inability of NAPEP to effectively disseminate information in understandable and accessible formats as well as effectively monitor and evaluate the programme was a major drawback to transparency and accountability.

In addition, the poor accountability of other state and non-state actors to community members was worsened by the absence of any grievance mechanisms. Hence, moving forward, while it will be imperative to build the capacity of state institutions like NAPEP, providing avenues for more citizen engagement will be important for community members to hold state actors and institutions accountable. This can be achieved by learning from the experience of other countries or regions. For instance, and as noted in chapter four, the provision of grievance mechanisms and help lines for beneficiaries to contact state officials through dedicated phone lines or mail boxes has helped to improve some of the initial problems associated with accountability in Mexico’s Oportunidades CCT programme (McQuire 2010). Likewise, the involvement of truly tested and trusted NGOs and CSOs in India’s MGNREGA has been helpful in protecting the rights of the poor (Vij 2011). Thus, to strengthen accountability and transparency in programmes like COPE in Nigeria, there should be effective grievance mechanisms for community members to engage with state actors and institutions, and collaboration between the communities and progressive CSOs and NGOs should be encouraged. These will likely lead to more effective and inclusive governance frameworks that can facilitate accountability and transparency for the benefit of the poor, while also empowering the communities, and the poor amongst them, to demand their entitlements.
Tellingly, given that the Nigerian government has recently commenced an expansion of CCT programmes across the country with the aim of reaching at least one million households in the next few years, it is imperative to ensure that greater levels of transparency and accountability are achieved in the implementation of the programme. This is particularly important because of the fact that some corrupt state and non-state officials and local politicians and elites may want to take advantage of the current weaknesses in transparency and accountability to divert and hijack the benefits from reaching the poor. For this reason and more, it is important that the interest of the poor is protected by ensuring the people are better informed and equipped to demand their entitlements through legal and institutional mechanisms. To this end, and in light of the findings of the study, the dissertation makes the following recommendations.

1. That all the details associated with social protection programmes like COPE should be made available and accessible to community members in understandable and accessible forms such as the mass media and informational manuals printed in local languages.

2. That there should be grievance mechanisms for all beneficiaries and community members as a way of strengthening accountability and transparency in the implementation of social protection programmes such as CCTs.

3. That the capacity of state institutions like NAPEP should be strengthened in order for them to be effectively engaged in monitoring and evaluating programmes in partnership with other state and non-state actors.

4. That there must be adequate provisions and support for women to participate as leaders in the governance of social protection programmes, especially when such
programmes are designed and implemented for women as the main beneficiaries as well.

At this point, it should be stated that this dissertation has been a modest effort to contribute to the literature on social protection in developing countries, albeit with a more specific focus on how CCTs as social protection programmes are governed through hybrid CBTMs in Nigeria. Therefore, it is important to concisely summarize the answers to the main research question of this study in relation to how CBTMs improve or impede transparency and accountability in the governance of social protection programmes in developing countries. Combining the findings and analyses contained in this dissertation on the implementation of Nigeria’s COPE CCT programme through a hybrid CBTM, transparency was improved in COPE due to (i) the newness of the hybrid system that opened up decision-making for community agents to participate, and (ii) the fact that the final selection was done by community agents and officials in public spaces. The latter contributed to the legitimacy of the process and provided an opportunity for community members to verify the selection process of the beneficiaries. The CBTM also helped to open up hitherto closed-off decision making spaces to the participation of women as leaders and not simply as beneficiaries in COPE. However, considering there were no alternative sources of information beyond state officials, transparency was impeded in COPE’s hybrid system.

With respect to accountability, despite the existence of the checks and balances structures within COPE’s hybrid CBTM, accountability was impeded mainly because of the weak administrative and technical capacity of state institutions. This affected the operation of the accountability structures in improving how state and non-state actors were answerable to one another. While the hybrid system made provisions for external auditors as NGOs and CSOs, these were only answerable to the state actors and institutions and not to the communities.
Hence, the checks and balances within the hybrid system placed the community members at a
disadvantage. The absence of any grievance mechanisms, which community members can use to
seek redress or communicate with the state officials and institutions further weakened
accountability in COPE. At the same time, the weak capacity of state actors and institutions
affected their ability to compel the CSO charged with the responsible of providing external audit
to perform its functions.

Finally, although this current study as focused on the governance of social protection
programmes that utilize the hybrid CBTM in developing countries, it is suggested that future
studies examine other areas such as the impact of social protection programmes like CCTs on the
reduction of poverty, vulnerabilities, and risks in poor households in Nigeria and other African
countries. It would also be relevant to examine how gender dynamics are altered or remain
unchanged by the involvement of women in governance structures like CBTMs within
patriarchal systems such as those prevalent in many rural areas of Africa. These, and many other
relevant areas of study remain to be explored, and studies that investigate some of the suggested
areas for future studies will enormously contribute to the budding literature on social protection
in Africa.
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APPENDIX I: MAP OF NIGERIA SHOWING THE LOCATION OF OYO STATE

Source: http://www.nigeriamasterweb.com/Etc8/MapNigShowingOyoState.jpg
APPENDIX II: INTERVIEW QUESTIONS

1. Are you aware of the “In Care of the People” (COPE) Conditional Cash Transfer Programme in Ibadan South Local Government, Oyo state? If so, how did you become aware of the programme?

2. Did you participate in the programme, and if so, in what capacity?

3. What form(s) did the selection processes take and do you think this was transparent and fair?

4. How would you describe the programme implementation generally? Was the programme very inclusive of all stakeholders?

5. Who were the main organizers and participants of the programme in your opinion?

6. How would you explain the roles of the social assistance committees set up to monitor the implementation of the programme?

7. Do you think the SACs were very helpful during the programme implementation process? Was the process of implementing the programmes open enough in your opinion to all participants?

8. Do you think all participants displayed accountability in the programme’s implementation?

9. Did members of the CSAC facilitate accountability of the programme at the local level in its implementation?

10. Would you say it was a good practice to decentralize the programme’s implementation? Did the programme provide empowerment at the local level?

11. Would you describe the programme as a success?

12. In what ways do you think the programme can be improved in future? Do you have any other information you would like to add?
SURVEY OBJECTIVE: This survey is been carried out in order to ascertain the level of access to social programmes in selected communities in Oyo State, Nigeria. The answers obtained to the questions below will provide insights on accessibility of citizens to social programmes within the communities. Your cooperation will be highly appreciated.

Date of survey:

Questionnaire entry number:

Local Govt. Area Code:

Community Code:

House number Code:

Respondent(s) data

Age:

Gender:

Marital Status:

Occupation:

Family size:

Estimated Family Income:

Questions

1a. Do you reside in this community?

☐ Yes ☐ No

1b. If yes, how long have you lived here? ..........................................................................

2a. Do you have any child or children attending a public primary or secondary school within the community?

☐ Yes ☐ No
2b. If yes, is the child sponsored by you? .................................................................

3a. Is there a local healthcare centre within the community?

☐ Yes  ☐ No

3b. If yes, do you visit it when you need medical care?

☐ Yes  ☐ No

3c. If you visit it, do you pay yourself or it is free? ........................................................

4a. Have you or any of your household member benefited from any government social protection programme in the past ten years, e.g. employment programme?

☐ Yes  ☐ No

4b. If yes, could you please mention the name(s) of the programme(s)?

........................................................................................................................................

5a. Have you or any of your household member(s) benefited from a government education related social programme in the past ten years?

5b. If yes, please state the name(s) of the programme(s)................................................................

6a. Are you aware of the “In Care of the People” Conditional Cash Transfer programme?

☐ Yes  ☐ No

6b. If yes, did you or any of your household member participate in the programme?

☐ Yes  ☐ No

7a. Are there health and educational needs within the community?

☐ Yes  ☐ No

7b. If yes, please list them.................................................................................................