Relational Agreements & Rented Farmland: Implications for Agricultural Contracting and Land Stewardship

dc.contributor.advisorNuno-Ledesma, Jose
dc.contributor.advisorDeaton, Brady
dc.contributor.authorGabrel, Gabriela of Food, Agricultural and Resource Economicsen_US of Guelphen of Scienceen_US, Agriculture and Resource Economicsen_US
dc.description.abstractWith a significant portion of farmland in the rental market, it is important to understand what type of impacts landowners and tenants have on the declining farmland soils. We know landlord-tenant relationships are structured through simple, legally enforceable contracts and self-enforcing handshake deals. However, previous literature has either not distinguished the contract structure or has applied the textbook assumption of full contract enforceability. With these assumptions in place, the tenant is not offered an incentive for unverifiable actions, such as displays of land stewardship. This thesis compares different contract structures using agency theory to present the influence on the tenant’s choice in effort in farming practices and land stewardship behaviour. This shows literature has been misguided and consequently has modeled the landlord-tenant relationship inaccurately. This thesis concludes with a recommendation for researchers to leverage relational contract theory in future research on the topic of farmland relationships.en_US
dc.publisherUniversity of Guelphen
dc.rights.licenseAll items in the Atrium are protected by copyright with all rights reserved unless otherwise indicated.
dc.subjectRelational Contractsen_US
dc.subjectlandlord-tenant relationshipsen_US
dc.subjectrented farmlanden_US
dc.titleRelational Agreements & Rented Farmland: Implications for Agricultural Contracting and Land Stewardshipen_US


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