Originary passivity: selfhood and alterity in Ricoeur and Levinas

dc.contributor.advisorMitscherling, J.
dc.contributor.authorDahl, Darren E.
dc.date.accessioned2020-08-24T15:53:56Z
dc.date.available2020-08-24T15:53:56Z
dc.date.copyright2001
dc.degree.departmentDepartment of Philosophyen_US
dc.degree.grantorUniversity of Guelphen_US
dc.degree.nameMaster of Artsen_US
dc.description.abstractIn his book 'Oneself as Another' Paul Ricoeur articulates his philosophy of selfhood. Essential to his proposal is his claim that alterity is constitutive of selfhood as such. Through an examination of the tenth and final study of 'Oneself as Another' I will analyse Ricoeur's philosophy of selfhood and determine whether or not he achieves this intention. By exploring his account of the temporality of the self and its fundamental capacity for action I conclude that alterity, and its phenomenological correlate which is passivity, is not constitutive of selfhood. The thesis then examines the philosophy of Emmanuel Levinas. I conclude that his philosophy of alterity accomplishes that which Ricoeur cannot.en_US
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/10214/20529
dc.language.isoen
dc.publisherUniversity of Guelphen_US
dc.rights.licenseAll items in the Atrium are protected by copyright with all rights reserved unless otherwise indicated.
dc.subjectPaul Ricoeuren_US
dc.subjectselfhooden_US
dc.subjectalterityen_US
dc.subjectEmmanuel Levinasen_US
dc.titleOriginary passivity: selfhood and alterity in Ricoeur and Levinasen_US
dc.typeThesisen_US

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