Monism disguised: scientific pluralism in Philip Kitcher's Modest Realism

dc.contributor.advisorFreedman, K.
dc.contributor.authorHarron, Nathan A. of Philosophyen_US of Guelphen_US of Artsen_US
dc.description.abstractThis thesis is an investigation of Philip Kitcher's Modest Realism, as it is presented in his book 'Science, Truth, and Democracy' (2001). His position argues that the aims of science are determined by socially and historically based contextual factors. Kitcher denies that such factors also influence the content of scientific knowledge, which I argue are similarly vulnerable. To defend my position I refer to the multiplicity of judgments that are required by the general structure of the scientific method. I avoid constructivism and maintain realism, however, through the adoption of scientific pluralism. This claim is defended using the case of gene-centrism. I further argue that although Kitcher purports to abandon scientific monism and adopt a form of pluralism, when compared to strong versions of pluralism, such as that presented by Helen Longino, Kitcher is revealed to be a monist in disguise.en_US
dc.publisherUniversity of Guelphen_US
dc.rights.licenseAll items in the Atrium are protected by copyright with all rights reserved unless otherwise indicated.
dc.subjectPhilip Kitcheren_US
dc.subjectModest Realismen_US
dc.subjectscientific knowledgeen_US
dc.subjectscientific methoden_US
dc.subjectscientific pluralismen_US
dc.subjectscientific monismen_US
dc.titleMonism disguised: scientific pluralism in Philip Kitcher's Modest Realismen_US


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