Optimal Treatment Allocation Under Single-Payer Health Care With Pricing Competition
In this thesis we use dynamic programming and game theory background to build an optimal allocation model for a known treatment among population groups, given a single-payer health care provider. We model and analyze whether or not the presence of competition may help reduce the cost of vaccines and increase coverage to include more age groups under the same budgetary restrictions. We then show that there are best coverages to be achieved under various budget distributions of two distinct types: one from single-payer to population groups of distinct age, and another from single-payer to producers of treatment. Lastly, we incorporate and discuss a "copay" option for treatment payment such that consumers may be asked to pay up to 10% of the cost of the treatment directly to producers, showing potential increase to the available number of doses to be distributed at the expense of decreased consumer demand as a result of a copayment request.